

# Analysis of the great Hanshin earthquake lifeline information and the role of broadcasting

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# ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT HANSHIN EARTHQUAKE: LIFELINE INFORMATION AND THE ROLE OF BROADCASTING



HŌSŌ-BUNKA FOUNDATION

## SYMPOSIUM REPORT

# Analysis of the Great Hanshin Earthquake: Lifeline Information and the Role of Broadcasting

Report of a Symposium sponsored by  
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## Foreword

The earthquake that hit the densely-populated international port city of Kobe and adjacent areas in the Hanshin (Osaka- Kobe) region in the early morning of January 17, 1995, generated the most calamitous disaster since the 1923 earthquake in the Tokyo region that cost 140,000 lives. More than 6,000 people died, mostly trapped in collapsed houses and buildings. 37,000 were injured. Some 200,000 houses and apartment buildings were ravaged by the quake and the subsequent fires, and 310,000 citizens had to evacuate from their homes to emergency shelters.

The striking characteristic of this earthquake, with a magnitude of 7.2, was that communications from the most severely-affected areas were totally cut off as it struck the most densely-populated areas of both modern office and shopping districts and old wooden house neighborhoods in central Kobe, cutting power and telephone lines, breaking water pipes, blocking roads, and destroying elevated highways and bridges.

People outside the affected areas learned the severity of the tremor from pictures of local NHK-TV station's office at the moment of the quake. The footage was recorded by a newly-developed video recorder. The video vividly showed a reporter being thrown out of bed as furniture shook and objects were hurled to the floor over the period of 20 seconds.

However, as Kobe's city, regional and central communications links were left in confusion, the central government authorities in Tokyo could not assess the extent of the disaster for several hours, and failed to respond immediately and effectively.

The communications breakdowns also left the media very much in the dark as to the gravity of the situation until almost two hours after the first tremor when their helicopters flying over the shattered areas started to shoot live coverage of demolished elevated expressways, derailed and wrecked trains, ravaged stations, fractured office buildings as well as collapsed wooden houses in flames.

The media then responded by trying to establish effective working links with local government authorities, relief agencies and those in charge of lifelines - water, power, gas, telephone and railways, and started to distribute information about affected areas, news on casualties, damage and destruction, as well as information useful for post-disaster relief efforts, including information for victims as to what to do and where to go for emergency shelters, food supplies, etc.

The Hoso-Bunka (Broadcast Culture) Foundation (HBF), recognizing the vital importance of communications for disaster mitigation and relief, sponsored a symposium "ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT HANSHIN EARTHQUAKE - LIFELINE INFORMATION AND THE ROLE OF BROADCASTING" in Osaka on July 18th, six months after the quake.

Representatives of lifeline companies and broadcasting stations in the Osaka-Kobe region participated in the one-day symposium and examined how they, also crippled by the earthquake, performed throughout the disaster and discussed how best to tackle future disasters through cooperative ventures among them. This booklet is a summary of the symposium.

The United Nations designated the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), and held the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in Yoko-

hama last year. The Conference, attended by some 5,000 participants and delegations from 148 countries, focussed on the vital role of communications in all phases of disaster mitigation.

Besides the Yokohama UN meeting, many other conferences and forums on disaster communications have been held on the initiative of various international organizations, including the International Institute of Communications (IIC).

In the wake of the Hanshin Earthquake, the IIC decided to address the subject again at this year's conference in Osaka. The Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) is also taking up the subject at its General Assembly in Tehran this October. The HBF will report the result of the symposium, by distributing copies of this booklet to the participants of these meetings.

We hope that the experiences and reflections of the lifeline executives and the broadcast editors reproduced in this booklet will be of help to those concerned in future emergency planning, particularly in relation to the critical role of the mass media in providing public information services to affected communities, and the necessity of lifeline and disaster mitigation organizations to keep effective working relationships with the media.

Lastly, I would like to add that our Foundation will continue to take up this urgent and crucial issue of "Disaster Relief and the Media" as one of our major programs.

Yasushi Takenaka  
General Managing Director  
Hoso-Bunka Foundation

## INTRODUCTION

Before dawn on January 17, 1995, at 5 : 46 a.m. exactly, a powerful earthquake with magnitude of 7.2 struck the international port city of Kobe and nearby cities and towns in the Kansai region. The Kansai region (Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto) is one of the three main economic and industrial centers of Japan, the others being the Keihin (Tokyo-Yokohama) and the Chukyo (Nagoya) regions. The industrial output of the Kansai region in 1993 accounted for 12 % of total national output.

Factories of such world-famous companies as Matsushita, Hitachi and Mitsubishi (electronics), Kirin and Asahi (breweries), Kawasaki and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (shipbuilding), Matsuda (automobile) and Kobe Steel, are located in Kobe and adjacent areas. The Kobe port, with 35 container berths, was managing about 30 percent of all the container cargo handled in the country.

On that day before dawn, this industrial city of 1.5 million people was shaken violently, as the focus of the quake was located only 20 kilometers below the sea level, off the northern tip of Awajishima Island. The island lies southwest of Kobe just across the narrow Akashi strait. The violent tremor was believed to have been caused by an active fault running beneath the Awajishima and Kobe metropolitan areas.

More than 6,000 people died and 37,000 were injured. As many as 193,000 houses and apartment buildings were destroyed by the quake and 7,500 more, mostly collapsed old wooden houses, burned by the subsequent fires. More than 310,000 people, one-fifth of the whole population, had to evacuate to emergency shelters.

### “VERTICAL-TYPE” EARTHQUAKE

The distinctive features of the Hanshin Earthquake, which registered 7, the maximum on the Japanese quake intensity scale, show it to have been a so-called “vertical-type earthquake,” hitting almost directly under the modern industrial city. Communications from the most severely-affected areas were totally cut off minutes after the quake.

Another feature was the lack of preparation on the part of city officials and citizens for the quake. Most believed that Kobe would not be struck by a severe earthquake as it had not experienced a serious quake for several decades.

It was the repeated broadcast of a video clip showing a local TV station's office during the terrifying twenty seconds that conveyed the severity of the jolt to viewers nation wide. The scene was recorded and replayed by newly-developed technology called a “skip-back recorder.” The video vividly reproduced how a reporter was thrown out of bed by violent vertical tremor and how objects on desks and shelves were hurled to the floor. The picture was transmitted by satellite overseas and broadcast on TV networks throughout the world.

The elevated tracks of Japan Railway's famous “Shinkansen” bullet train, as well as local and private railway lines, collapsed in many places. All trains in the Kansai region stopped soon after the quake.

The only fortunate thing was that the earthquake occurred before dawn, when “Shinkansen” bullet trains and commuter trains of JR and private lines were not yet running. A spokesman of Hankyu, a private railway, said : “If the quake occurred two hours later, we would have had 135 trains running with 110,000 passengers on board. I shudder to think what would have happened then.”

Foreign correspondents reported that the Kobe earthquake had jolted the self-confidence of Japan. Some even commented that “pictures showing the collapsed sections of the elevated expressway and the damaged bullet train system gave the lie to the authoritative assertions that even severe earthquakes could be withstood by Japan’s superior engineering skills.”

## LIFELINES SEVERELY AFFECTED

The damage to water, gas and power supply facilities, as well as to telephone lines and railways were extensive. In the first session of the HBF symposium “Analysis of the Great Kansai Earth quake : Lifeline Information and the Role of Broadcasting,” representatives of lifeline companies reported as follows :

**WATER :** The water supply to the whole city area affecting 650,000 households, was cut. Purification plants and pumping facilities were damaged and 4,000-kilometer-long underground main water pipes and branch pipes to homes were broken at 80,000 points.

**POWER :** As many as 2.6 million households in the Kobe, Osaka and Awajishima island areas had power cuts just after the earthquake as 10 out of 21 thermal power stations, 50 transformer stations (out of 860) and more than 11,000 electric line poles were damaged. But within a few hours of emergency restoration work, the number of affected households was reduced to about one million.

**GAS :** The gas supply to 860,000 households in the Kobe-Osaka region was suspended as mid and low-pressure gas pipes to consumers were damaged in hundreds of places along the 5,000 kilometer underground pipelines.

**HANKYU RAILWAYS :** At the time of the quake, 35 trains carrying about 3,000 passengers, were running. Three trains were derailed, injuring 21 passengers and crew. Dozens of places along the Osaka-Kobe line were badly damaged, including two station buildings which were destroyed. A policeman died after being trapped in a collapsed building. Four other people were injured.

Hankyu Railways is one of the two big private railways badly affected by the quake. The other is Hanshin Railways. Besides Japan Railways’ Bullet, trunk and local lines, there are other private railway lines, Kintetsu, Keihan and Nankai, in the region with central terminals in Osaka. In the Kobe area, sandwiched between the Rokko mountains and the Inland Sea, there are several local private railways including a subway and elevated express railway. They were all badly affected.

**NTT (Telephone Company) :** 285,000 telephone lines out of a total subscription of 1,440,000 lines (about 20%), were affected because of power failure at telephone exchanges. Some 193,000 lines were cut by damage to subscribers’ houses.

## HOW RADIO AND TV REACTED

In the second session, media representatives reported how they performed right after the earthquake. Taking into account their particular characteristics, local radio and TV stations covering only Kobe and its vicinities, concentrated on conveying mostly post-disaster relief information to affected citizens, such as evacuation instructions and where to get emergency relief supplies.

Regional TV and radio stations, covering the wider areas of the Kansai (Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto and their vicinities) region and also serving as network stations feeding post-quake news to affiliates in Tokyo for distribution throughout the country, tried to gather and transmit information about affected areas, while also trying to communicate to the affected population information and news about rescue and relief activities.

The nation-wide public service network, NHK, tried to make effective use of its multi-media services. The non-commercial network used its terrestrial General TV channel, BS Satellite Channel One and AM radio mostly for dissemination of news and information about the disaster ; loss of life, damage to property and livelihoods, while mobilizing its terrestrial Educational TV channel for 14 days to respond to millions of welfare inquiries from outside the disaster area. It also tried to provide information for anxious families concerned about loved ones believed to be in the disaster areas.

While serving as NHK's originating base for the national TV and radio services, NHK's Osaka station expanded its regional slots to provide victims in its service area with news and information about post-disaster rescue and relief efforts.

## ROUTINE CONTACTS RECOMMENDED

In the panel discussion after the two sessions, participants examined the role of the media, the need to establish and strengthen working relationships between the media and lifeline organizations, and also explored the more effective use of advanced communications technologies and skills to inform the public, save lives, and diminish the impact of disasters.

Lifeline executives expressed their readiness to act in concert with the media to make themselves a reliable source of usable information for journalists. They also expressed the need for regular, routine interaction with journalists, before a disaster strikes, to lay the groundwork for effective working relations in the aftermath of a disaster.

During the discussion, there was a suggestion that an emergency press center should be set up, for the convenience of the media, lifeline industries and relief agencies, to provide the media with in-coming information about the disaster aftermath and to answer their inquiries more efficiently and effectively, at any time. There was also a suggestion that a data base center like the One-Stop Center in the United States should be set up so that the media can obtain basic information from the center. Several representatives from both utilities companies and the media responded favorably to these suggestions.

Shinichi Shimizu, Editor



## THE FIRST SESSION :

### HOW LIFELINE COMPANIES TRIED TO COMMUNICATE TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE MEDIA



## IF THE QUAKE HAPPENED TWO HOURS LATER

By Mr. Kazuhiro Matsui, Chief Advisor  
Public Relations Office  
Hankyu Corporation (Hankyu Railways), Osaka

Hankyu Railways is one of the three major commuting railway lines between Osaka (population 2,570,000) and Kobe (population 1,500,000) in the great metropolitan Hanshin (Osaka-Kobe) region (population over 10,000,000) of commerce and industry. The other railways are Hanshin Railways and a regional line of JR, formerly Japan National Railways.

On normal weekdays at around 8 a.m., the busiest time of the day, Hankyu Railways has 135 commuter trains running concurrently, carrying about 110,000 passengers. As luck would have it, the Hanshin Earthquake happened more than two hours before the peak rush hour. At 5 : 46 a.m. on Tuesday, January 17, 35 Hankyu trains were in operation, carrying about 3,000 passengers. Three trains were derailed, injuring 21 persons.

The buildings of two major stations in downtown Kobe collapsed, killing one person and injuring four others. At scores of points on the Hankyu Kobe line, elevated bridges and banks were destroyed, or the railway tracks were blocked by collapsed highways and fallen bridges of JR's "Shinkansen" super-express line. About 300 employees or 20 percent of the total, suffered in the disaster.

It required 146 days, or 260,000 man-days, to make the Kobe line operational again. Restoration costs were estimated ¥55 billion.

### How We Worked with the Press

Railway companies in the Hanshin region have established working relationships with the press through two press clubs : one, a group of city news reporters who cover accidents or train delays, and another, a group of economic and financial news reporters covering industrial management issues in the Kansai region.

The staff members of Hankyu Corporation's Public Relations Office have daily contacts with these reporters, and these working relationships were very helpful after the earthquake to effectively distribute Hankyu railways' post-disaster traffic information to the public.

On the day of the quake, we issued 16 press releases, the first at 6.40 a.m. Throughout the following several days, we distributed similar written reports on various developments, at intervals of one or two hours. We also held a regular daily press conference about restoration work at 5 p.m. at the press club. We continued to hold this daily press conference for two months.

Besides the press releases and press conferences, the Public Relations Office received many inquiries from radio and TV program producing teams daily. About 2,000 inquiries and interviews were handled during the five months following the earthquake.

For our own convenience and that of the media, lifeline industries and relief agencies, I think we should have set up an emergency press center to provide the media with in-coming information about the disaster aftermath and to answer their inquiries more efficiently and effectively, at any time.

Through the experiences of the emergency management during the post-Kobe-earthquake months, we, public relations team, learned the following points :

- 1) Providing precise information only on what was happening was not enough. We, the members of the Public Relations Office, were required to have a comprehensive knowledge of the railway and its operating system, to give reliable and comprehensible information to the media by putting complicated technical terms into easy daily language and explaining them explicitly. It was particularly important this time, since many of the reporters and producers covering post-quake news had poor knowledge of railways ;
- 2) Arrangements for around-the-clock contact with reporters were effective for coping with an emergency ;
- 3) As much background and related information as possible should be given to the media to help them make accurate and effective reports.

My conclusion was that what was needed for our public relations staff to effectively deal with an emergency, is not a well-prepared emergency management manual but their daily preparedness for such a situation, their physical strength, their information gathering ability within the company, and their business knowledge. And, last but not the least, their positive attitude toward the media and efforts to maintain good working relationships with the media as a way of disseminating information to the public.

## PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES IN THE WAKE OF THE HANSHIN EARTHQUAKE

By Mr. Tetsu Shimizu, Manager, Media Relations  
Public Relations Department  
The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc., Osaka

On the day of the earthquake only two regular staff members out of five at our Kobe Branch office's Public Relations Section could reach the office by 9 o'clock in the morning. The three others were affected by the disaster. Our head office in Osaka immediately set up a Post-Disaster Relief and Restoration Headquarters.

Fortunately, most staff members of our Osaka headquarters' Public Relations Office were not commuting from the quake-affected Kobe area, and they were able to get to the office, once their commuting trains resumed operations a few minutes after the tremor.

Ten thermal power stations out of 21 and 50 transformer substations out of 861 as well as many aerial and underground transmission and distribution lines were damaged. More than 11,000 poles were also damaged. About 2,600,000 homes were out of power.

We sent three staff members from the Osaka Headquarters to the Kobe Branch's public relations office on the first day and two members henceforth every day for 10 days to coordinate our PR activities between the two offices until a provisional power supply was restored in the affected areas. We used the sea route from Osaka to Kobe because the roads were cut off.

We issued press releases two to four times a day for 12 days to the media in Osaka and Kobe, informing them of the areas where electricity had been restored. To meet the expectations of the affected population for early restoration of the power supply, we made great efforts to inform them of the expected date of power restoration in specified areas, although we sometimes failed to fulfill their expectations due to unexpected developments.

Our President also held press conferences on our restoration activities, while staff members took part in radio programs 34 times and TV programs 32 times during the two weeks following the quake. In these programs we not only provided the public with information about our power restoration efforts, but also gave them advice about the safe handling of electricity lines and home electric appliances to prevent shocks, short circuits or fire threatening accidents.

In addition to our public relations efforts involving the media, we also used spot commercial messages on radio and television, using ten local and regional stations. We also placed advertisements in five major regional newspapers and one local paper, as well as distributing handbills advising the public on the locations of our temporary service stations established in place of the demolished ones.

The information supply by the media was not necessarily satisfactory in terms of the duration of broadcasts or the space that newspapers allocated to news concerning electricity supplies.

In some cases, the broadcast reports were short on detailed information, and sometimes viewers or listeners were misinformed or got the wrong impression about electricity restoration in their areas.

Looking back at our performance during the first few days of the crisis, we think we should have first provided accurate overall information about the situation to the administrative authorities and the media. We should also have prepared illustrations and video clips to educate the public about disaster preparedness, for use on television. We should have worked more closely with the media to establish effective working relationships in an emergency.

## COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE WATER SUPPLY WAGON SERVICE AND CITIZENS – THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM WE FACED

By Mr. Koji Nagase, Manager, General Affairs Division  
Kobe Municipal Water Works Bureau  
Kobe City Administration

I would have been killed by the earthquake if it had happened several hours later, because my office building was completely destroyed by the tremor. One of our branch offices also collapsed. We set up a prefabricated house as our emergency head quarters, but soon we had to move again, when a landslide warning was issued. Twenty percent of our 200-member working staff were affected by the disaster, losing their homes. Under these unlucky circumstances, we had to start the restoration work of the city water supply.

Soon after the quake, the water supply to the whole city area was cut, affecting 650,000 houses and buildings. Reservoirs, purification plants, pumping facilities and distributing reservoirs were damaged. 4,000 kilometers of underground trunk water pipes and branch pipes to homes, were damaged at 80,000 points.

Water supply wagons were sent to 170 primary and middle schools, which were being used as emergency shelters. But the shuttle of wagons was hampered by blocked roads and heavy traffic and often failed to meet the expectations of the citizens waiting in line.

Information about the water supply was disseminated via Kobe City's Earthquake Relief Headquarters. We, at the Water Supply Bureau had difficulty giving information to citizens about our emergency water supply schedules, because of poor communications links with water supply wagons, struggling to reach the emergency shelters through congested roads.

The repair work was very difficult and temporary restoration took at least ten weeks. Water was leaking in many places. It was very difficult to find these leakages because of low water pressure and destroyed or blocked roads, etc. The repair work on emergency water supplies and facility restoration required 73,000 man-days.

## TELEPHONE, KEY COMMUNICATION TOOL, DIDN'T WORK WELL BUT, PORTABLE SATELLITE STATIONS WERE EFFECTIVE

By Mr. Takeshi Ikemoto, Manager  
Public Information Office  
Kansai Regional Headquarters  
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corporation

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) has improved the earthquake-resistance of its telephone service system throughout the country, since 1968. That was the year that a great earthquake hit the northern Pacific off the Tokachi area of Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido. The quake totally disrupted communications between Japan's main island of Honshu and Hokkaido, for three days.

The Hanshin Earthquake, however, was much more powerful than we initially thought, and brought about extensive damage to NTT's telephone network. Automatic switchboards, operation buildings and towers for radio communications had been designed to cope with an earthquake of intensity scale 6. But, the generators for emergency power supplies for switchboards were toppled and the cooling system pipes of automatic power generators were broken by the quake.

The suspension of switchboard operation and the damage to 163,000 circuits of underground cables, left 285,000 subscribers in Kobe without telephone connections. There were about 1,440,000 subscribers in the Kobe area. In addition, active subscribers' circuits soon became overcrowded, as calls from outside poured in at a rate of more than 50 times the average daily number on the first day of the disaster. Thanks to appeals to the public on radio and television, to refrain from calling the Kobe area, calls were reduced to 20 times the normal level on the following day.

Inquiries about the damage and restoration work from the media, continued around the clock from soon after the quake. NTT issued eleven press releases in the first two days, 20 up until the end of January, and seven in February. The public relations service to the media was solely handled by the Public Information Office of NTT's Kansai Regional Office in Osaka, including a number of staff members. Contacts with the media, including radio and TV interviews, totaled 600 in one month alone.

To back up the damaged telephone circuits soon after the earth quake, NTT mobilized six truck-mounted satellite transmission switchboards with 132 circuits each and 11 portable satellite uplink stations to the affected areas of Kobe. We also set up more than 2,800 free emergency telephone and facsimile sets at some 840 locations, mostly emergency shelters but some public places like the City Hall entrance hall. The satellite stations provided links not only with domestic telephone systems but also with overseas telephone and computer systems, making it possible for people to use the INTERNET.

NTT initiated several special services in its disaster mitigation and relief activities to serve its customers. We set up a "free message service" number to receive messages, free of charge, from people throughout the country, who wished to convey their sympathies to relatives and friends in the affected areas. Received messages were written and faxed to emergency shelters

where these people were living. We also set up a data base of the names of the deceased, published by the National Police Agency so that people could confirm the names of the dead using the free dial services.

We published a special telephone book listing the telephone numbers of offices in charge of utility information, essential to daily life. An additional edition, listing offices in charge of information on utility restoration activities, was also published.

NTT also set up an emergency television conference system linking the Disaster Response Headquarters of the Hyogo Prefectural Government and its six branch offices in the affected areas.

On the following day of the Osaka Symposium, NTT announced its 10-year plan with a budget of ¥75 billion to further improve its anti-disaster communications system. One of the proposed measures, is development of new systems to ease over-burdened lines, including a voice-mail service enabling people outside the disaster-affected areas to pick up recorded voice messages from the people affected. Another proposal is more extensive use of satellites by developing more efficient portable earth stations.

## WE PROVIDED EDUCATION VIDEO CLIPS TO TV STATIONS ABOUT DISASTER PREPAREDNESS TO PREVENT GAS LEAKS AT HOME

By Mr. Koji Nishimura, Manager  
Corporate Communications Department  
Osaka Gas Company, Ltd.

Osaka Gas Company supplies gas to the Osaka-Kobe region. Information about the suspension of gas supplies and the restoration activities of damaged facilities was provided to the media by its emergency response public relations offices set up in Osaka and Kobe.

Within 20 minutes of the earthquake, a number of staff members of the Public Relations Office of the company's Osaka head office arrived at the office in accordance with the company's emergency manual. They immediately started replying to inquiries about damage to our gas service facilities from broadcasting stations. They, rather than the print media, were the first to contact us. No high-pressure trunk gas pipes were damaged, but many mid-and- low-pressure branch gas pipes to customers were damaged. The gas supply to 860,000 homes in Kobe and Osaka areas was cut.

We requested radio and television stations to first broadcast a recorded warning to the public about preventing gas leaks and asked them to telecast a safety video clip on this subject. As a way of educating the public about disaster preparedness, we had distributed the recorded tapes and video clips to all radio and television stations in Osaka and Kobe in advance. The tapes and video clips are designed to teach people to operate the safety device to cut gas at the mains, before leaving home, in an evacuation. Just in case they might not be able to find the tape or video clip, we gave them additional copies.

We asked those TV and radio stations which carry our commercials to suspend our normal commercial messages, and use the CM time to run the tape or video clips to warn the public about the danger of gas leaks and tell them how to use the home device to stop gas. We also issued, at intervals, press releases about the damage to our facilities and the situation of gas supply suspension in the affected areas. We also produced videos about our repair activities and used them at press conferences to explain how our restoration work was progressing. We also distributed the videos to the media for their reference.

We responded to inquiries and interviews from radio and TV reporters and program producers 530 times, and from newspapers 670 times during the three month period from January 17th through April 15th. More than 100 press releases were issued on post- disaster restoration work during the same period.

We did our best to establish good working relations with the media and we were accountable to the public through the media. But our problem in the future is how we can provide exact information to individual households about when they will have gas, water or power. Our consumers' immediate needs are paramount.

THE SECOND SESSION :

HOW THE MEDIA PLAYED ITS ROLE IN EMERGENCY



## WHAT SHOULD WE REPORT HOW?

By Mr. Hiroyuki Kabasawa, Chief Manager  
MBS News Center  
Mainichi Broadcasting System, Inc., Osaka

MBS is a regional station covering the Kansai region of Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto and vicinities with AM radio and terrestrial TV services. It is also an affiliate of the TBS-JNN network, one of five national networks of commercial broadcasters in Japan.

In the initial aftermath of the Hanshin Earthquake, the information our company collected was very fragmentary because of the degree and extent of the damage, and because the communication network was disrupted in so many places. Only after our helicopter flew over the devastated areas after dawn, did we all learn the enormity of the situation. We immediately decided that we had to report the situation to all of our viewers, using a network formed with other commercial TV and radio stations in Japan.

At the same time, we needed to supply information to the affected areas as well. In this connection, we ourselves were victims of the quake, just as much as doctors, nurses, policemen and local government employees, who shared with us the duty to help ordinary citizens. The houses of twenty MBS employees were either destroyed or partially damaged. Nine employees suffered injuries.

An MBS cameraman rushed to the Kobe bureau after digging his father out from under their collapsed house. A desk man carried his injured father to a hospital on his way to the bureau. We felt that journalists, office workers and government employees belonged to the same "victim" group and shared the same destiny.

Our feeling was that welfare and livelihood information must have priority over discussions about the responsibility of central and local governments or the cause of the damage to elevated highways.

Initially, we broadcast reports on the damage because fire and police stations could be reached by phone. Then, evacuation warnings started coming in because of gas leakages, the possible collapse of buildings and the danger of landslides. The following day, our emphasis shifted to livelihood information. We were not sure who was watching, but we kept broadcasting.

Needless to say, we gathered information on the supply of electricity, gas and water as well as on the communication networks. We broadcast when and where water would be distributed, which bath houses were open, where kidney dialysis treatment could be received, which gas stations were open, and even how lost bank cards could be reissued.

We mobilized 10 fly-away satellite up-link mobile stations to report on the affected areas.

Our special program on the Hanshin Earthquake continued for two days. Even after we resumed commercials, however, we continued to broadcast livelihood information in our

regular news programs. For example, we reported which bath houses would open at what time. Such reports gave viewers a vivid image of the affected areas.

And in place of the special program, we continued to broadcast daily, a two-hour local program on the quake. Initially, it was broadcast in and around the Hanshin area alone. However, other affiliate members of the network began to request the program, and soon ten broadcasters in Tokyo and other areas were taking the program. What we thought would be a local program became a program of national interest.

Looking back on the initial stages of the earthquake coverage, we feel we could have done more for elderly and physically handicapped people.

For example, when we aired a scene of a burning house, our subtitle was not specific about its location. Since this could cause anxiety to people in the area, we began to give the exact addresses of such scenes.

When an evacuation warning was issued due to the leakage of gas, it was not enough to show the name of the area concerned. We prepared a map showing the area and the place where the evacuees should go, connecting the two locations with an arrow.

Three days after the quake, an MBS engineer proposed that with the co-operation of electronic appliance manufactures, MBS install teletext monitors for those with hearing difficulties. MBS successfully installed such monitors at 30 refugee centers. For about a month, MBS broadcast teletext information, in this way.

Kobe, hardest hit by the quake, is an international city, home to many nationalities. MBS Radio had been broadcasting since last year a weekly foreign-language program every Saturday evening. Two days after the quake, MBS Radio invited Chinese, Korean, British and other students to one of its studios and broadcast messages from their consulates, welfare inquiries, and livelihood information in their own languages for seven hours.

On TV as well, MBS aired a fax message from the Thai consulate, welfare inquiries and other information in Korean, Persian, English and other languages. But we could have done much better.

We also gave access to air time to heads of local autonomous bodies, executives of electric, gas and other companies so that they could speak to people in the affected areas directly.

Questions remain. Was it right for MBS to have shelved the question of whether or not central and local government should be held responsible for certain matters. There is also criticism that TV gave too much prominence to the most devastated areas and showed the damage repeatedly. Some people also say reporters swarmed some refugee centers where it was easy to gather information. We must learn from our failures.

## FOR WHOM DO WE WORK?

Mr. Hiroto Morioka, Manager, News Division  
Yomiuri Telecasting Corporation (YTV), Osaka

YTV is also a Kansai regional TV station, an affiliate of the NTV-NNN network. It has one TV channel but no radio service.

One of the questions we faced in covering the Hanshin Earthquake was whether we should remain reporters only, or whether we should also be rescuers.

Immediately after the quake, one of our Kobe-based cameraman rushed to our Kobe bureau. He found an undamaged camera and dug out a battery from under the rubble and immediately began shooting damaged sites, even as after-shocks continued, dodging falling pieces of glass and sometimes stumbling over cracks in the roads. Before long, a woman asked him to help dig her father out of the rubble. He put his camera aside to join the rescue operation together with a reporter who had joined him by then. They rescued four people.

A female announcer left her crumbling apartment-block, and while joining in a rescue operation for three people, she tried to contact her headquarters, using a borrowed portable telephone. She later joined up with a reporter and cameraman, but when she interviewed an elderly woman with a blood-stained bandaged head, she broke down and cried. The interview was broadcast, and drew a number of favorable responses.

Much hostility was directed at journalists. An elderly woman shouted at a cameraman --- "Stop taking pictures. Dig for those buried alive!" All the cameraman could say was "I'm so sorry, ma'am! Running the camera is what I must do now. I'm sorry." While saying so, the cameraman was crying. In every case, there was much more than pictures and sounds could convey.

I recall the proposition put forward by French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre "What can literature do for starving children?" I also remember much-criticized Pulitzer Prize-winning photographer Kevin Carter who took a picture of a falcon about to attack a dying girl in Sudan. He later committed suicide.

Reporting can not save people on the spot. Reports must be broadcast to viewers, who may be prompted to take action. Therefore, there is not much that reporters can do in the face of dying people. All we can say at the moment, is that broadcasting does have effects, if indirect.

Another question we faced in our coverage of the earthquake was to whom we should broadcast. The contents of our reports would differ, depending on who our target audience would be. For quake survivors, information on the whereabouts of family members and friends as well as livelihood information would be of immediate importance. For others, news about the disaster itself would be of more interest. Since Yomiuri TV has only one TV channel and no radio waves, we felt ambivalent toward our role.

At the initial stage, neither the police nor local autonomous bodies could supply us with adequate information about the earthquake damage. Our reporters and cameramen tried to determine the extent of the damage. There was little livelihood information available which we could broadcast.

Of course, whenever information came in about highways, railroads, electricity, gas and water as well as the telephone network, we broadcast immediately, together with calls for donations. Evacuation warnings and information about possible after-shocks were aired instantaneously. For two days after the quake, Yomiuri TV was the only member of our network that skipped all advertisements.

For a week after the quake, we broadcast a daily program on the earthquake, but we were not sure how well accepted our program was. My feeling is that when it comes to detailed welfare and livelihood information, such as which hospitals are open, radio and television cannot beat newspapers. And it had to be left to quake survivors themselves to personally distribute even more detailed information, like which shops were open. We feel that we just kept broadcasting without due consideration of the special characteristics of different media.

If the role of a TV station includes that of rescuer as well as reporter, we should have distributed battery-run portable TV sets to all the evacuation centers.

In this connection, what Nippon-Hoso, an AM radio station in Tokyo, has been doing is admirable. They have established a network of information suppliers, including night guards of buildings, to gather necessary information in case the police and other authorities fail to meet their requirements. And they distributed more than 1,400 radio sets.

One question which Yomiuri TV has yet to consider, is the limitations of having only one TV channel.

## IS IT POSSIBLE FOR BROADCASTERS TO PRODUCE A COORDINATED TIMETABLE?

Mr. Akihiko Nagasawa, General Manager  
News Center  
Asahi Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Osaka

ABC, one of four Kansai regional broadcasting companies, is an affiliate of the ANN network led by TV-Asahi in Tokyo. ABC operates both radio and television services.

Asahi Hosho, or ABC, has one TV channel and one radio service, but we must ask ourselves why newspapers seem to have been preferred by quake survivors.

Of course, both newspapers and TV were criticized. There were complaints that the voices of those buried alive could not be heard because of the helicopter noise. Others claimed that helicopters fanned and intensified the flames. Still others said that OB (outside broadcast) vans and other autos of the media sometimes blocked ambulances and other emergency cars. We also mobilized a number of fly-away mobile satellite up-link stations. We need to address these criticisms in the future.

Be that as it may, I think newspaper reporters and photographers could be more sensitive than their TV counterparts, who had to film at various places and then rush back to their studios on motorcycles to report in live programs. While newspaper people had more time before sending in their reports by the deadline, TV crews had to keep moving. Every minute was their deadline. Quake survivors must have felt that TV people were pressing and even pestering them.

Another important point is that TV viewers who enjoy watching programs can all of a sudden themselves become the focus of attention. The same thing could be said of newspapers, but TV has much more impact on the masses than newspapers. I think that quake survivors feel more antagonism toward the TV medium. The roles of newspaper and TV are different, and we need to win the understanding of our viewers everywhere. For example, in reporting on burning buildings, TV had much more impact than newspapers.

Shortly after the quake, a plan emerged among commercial broadcasters to divide the affected region into sections and to allot each section to each broadcaster for coverage. However, since all thought they should cover Sannomiya - Kobe's leading shopping center - hardest hit by the quake, the plan did not materialize. And there was the danger of incorrect information being circulated, should one section be left to one broadcaster alone. In the end, most broadcasters showed similar pictures at the same time.

Therefore, we'd like to propose that all broadcasters use a common channel or channels, and that they take turns in broadcasting according to a coordinated program timetable. What should be aired could be discussed by executive editors from all broadcaster organizations. This way, we would be able to avoid inaccurate information, and also avoid airing similar programs simultaneously.

## WHAT SHOULD WE REPORT?

By Mr. Jiro Shimomuro, Manager, News Bureau  
Kansai Telecasting Corporation, Osaka

Kansai Telecasting Corporation, is a regional TV station covering the Kansai region, belonging to the Fuji TV FNS Network. It has one TV channel but no radio service.

My memory is almost blank about what our station did on the day of the Hanshin Earthquake. All I remember is we broadcast one report after another about the disaster. Only on the following day was I able to organize myself.

For sometime after the quake, the extent of the damage, including the loss of life, was not clear. In order to avert anxiety among quake survivors, Kansai Telecasting took care not to report the disaster in a sensational manner. We have an 'earthquake hand book' which provides instructions regarding the coverage and broadcasting of earthquake damage.

Soon, fax messages arrived from those affected, saying that they had no rescuers or relief people in their neighborhoods. Obviously, covering the refugee centers alone was not enough. We had difficulty determining which areas had suffered what sort of damage. Requirements for information differed, depending on the sort of damage each area had suffered.

Kansai Telecasting has only one TV channel, covering six prefectures including the Hanshin area, but we belong to one of the national networks of commercial broadcasters. Initially, we were obliged to use the slots for advertisements for supplying vital information to those affected. We found ourselves in a dilemma between local requirements and those of the other members of our network. At the forthcoming meeting of the network, we plan to propose a fixed program slot for local information.

A questionnaire survey we recently conducted, shows that Kansai Telecasting should have broadcast more welfare and livelihood information for those affected.

In March, there was a major poison gas terrorist attack on Tokyo subway lines, and this incident quickly overshadowed the aftermath of the Great Hanshin Earthquake. But our station is continuing to broadcast a 30-minute weekly local program for the quake sufferers, out of the conviction that we should not let them feel abandoned. Even though the ratings are not high, we intend to continue this program.

## WHAT A QUAKE-HIT LOCAL RADIO STATION COULD DO

By Mr. Hiroyuki Saegusa, Deputy Manager  
Programming Division, Radio Kansai, (AM-K), Kobe

Radio Kansai, popularly known as AM Kobe, is a local AM radio station in Kobe. It does not belong to any national network of broadcasters.

The Radio Kansai building, located in Kobe, was almost completely destroyed by the quake, but we managed to continue broadcasting, using our own power generator and a studio which could have been destroyed at any time by after-shocks. Indeed, the threat was such that I lived in an OB (outside broadcast) van for more than two months.

Initially, we aired recorded messages such as 'Please stay calm.' or 'Turn off the gas.' Then, we asked ourselves what a local radio station could do. We do not belong to any national network of broadcasters. We decided that supplying vital rescue and relief information to those affected, was the best we could do.

One of our reporters wrote stories by the light of flames. For three days, we reported the extent of the damage and broadcast welfare and relief information. We even reported the registration numbers of vehicles crushed by a highway which collapsed.

Local autonomous bodies were in confusion: They themselves were victims of the quake. However, preventing secondary disasters, rescuing those buried alive, and providing make-shift mortuaries, were all urgent tasks. Supplying drinking water was also a problem.

Since the telephone network was disrupted at a number of points, there were long lines of people in front of public telephones. Seven of our receive-only telephones were still working. Rescue requests and welfare inquiries poured in. All the staff-members available as well as executives, answered the phone calls for broadcast. This was the kind of information that would not normally go on the air. Our female announcers, who usually introduce popular music to young listeners in excited voices, spoke in very different tones.

Since the electricity supply to the hardest hit areas was cut, portable radios and car radios were the only means of receiving information. A communications network developed between our station and our listeners. Our service was truly one of the life-lines. Several days later, our life-line network expanded further to include such livelihood information as where meals would be handed out or which bath-houses were open. The requirements of the quake survivors determined the contents of our broadcast. The voices of our announcers were the only reassurance to many of those affected.

Kobe and other cities in the Hanshin area were often said to be the best places to live, but they are now ruined. The satellite communications network for disaster prevention, introduced by Hyogo Prefecture, did not function because of electricity failure. Traditional radio worked most effectively.

## WHAT DID WE REPORT?

By Mr. Hidekazu Miyata, News Reporter  
Sun Television Co., Ltd, Kobe

Sun Television Co. is an independent local television station based in Kobe. It has one channel.

Sun TV is the only local TV station in Hyogo Prefecture, and to be honest, we were taken by surprise. We had never imagined that there would be such a devastating quake in our own prefecture. Almost all of our staff-members were affected.

Our station is located on Port Island, which is a man-made island, Kobe's new landmark. Since the ground became liquefied, I had to abandon my car and walk over the bridge to reach our TV station. The facilities were damaged, but still they were good enough to transmit signals.

Staff members, who managed to get to the station, took turns in reporting the disastrous scenes they saw on their way. Even engineers joined. Initially, only ten staff members were available. The telephone lines were disrupted, and we had difficulty in getting information about the damage.

Staff members worried about drinking water and food of their own families. They also worried about the welfare of their relatives and friends. We quickly decided that the information our own staff members desired was the kind of information that we must provide to our viewers.

We could have done much better, had the Kobe Newspaper, our affiliate, had not suffered so much from the earthquake. Their office building was collapsed. For six days, we dropped all commercials and continued to report the extent of the quake damage.

There was a suggestion that we should broadcast welfare and relief information. But other stations were already doing this and we did not want to depend on announcements by the local authorities. We could have done better in supplying livelihood information. We never thought that it would take so long for water supply to be resumed.

In sum, I think we could broadcast what we should say since our company is the only independent local TV station in the Kobe area and we ourselves were quake survivors.

## ROLE OF LOCAL FM RADIO IMPORTANT

By Mr. Satoru Fukuoka, General Manager, Programming  
Department, Hyogo FM Broadcasting, Ltd. (Kiss FMKobe),  
Kobe

Hyogo FM Broadcasting, headquartered in Kobe, is a local FM radio station popularly known as 'Kiss FM Kobe'. It has no affiliation with other broadcasters.

When the Hanshin Earthquake happened, Hyogo FM was broadcasting a recorded program. The program was interrupted for more than 30 seconds, but the power generator was not damaged and started working again. We were to start a live music program from 7 am, but the DJ did not show up. Therefore, one of the program directors went on air to report the earthquake announcement by the Meteorological Agency.

Soon the president arrived, and he and several staff-members held an emergency meeting to discuss how a recently-opened local radio station in Kobe should respond. Hyogo FM broadcasts mostly music programs and has no news teams. We do not belong to any network of broadcasters. The president decided that the best thing our company could do in the situation would be to use information from other organizations. He also decided that since there were both Japanese- and English-speaking DJs, our company should air quake-related information in both Japanese and English. Immediately, the president went to NHK's Kobe station for permission to use NHK news. In this way we secured several news sources.

TV sets and fax machines were still working thanks to our own power generator. Using TV reports and faxes from newspaper companies as sources, staff-members wrote stories in both Japanese and English, and DJs read them. For the first few days, our station concentrated on supplying information vital to the survival of our listeners in Kobe and neighboring cities such as which hospitals were open or where drinking water and food were available. As regards welfare inquiries, we gave the telephone numbers of those broadcasters and newspapers which were handling such inquiries.

Foreign residents in Kobe volunteered to work with our foreign DJs, and they started a 'hot line' for foreign residents in Kobe and neighboring cities. We received such inquiries as 'What is the best way to escape to Tokyo?' Our service soon expanded to include Spanish, French, Chinese, Korean and Philippine languages. Native speakers proved very efficient.

Looking back on what we did, we feel that the role of a small local FM radio station can be very important. With the cooperation of other organizations, we were able to supply vital information to quake survivors. In preparation for possible future disasters, we plan to strengthen our relationships with those organizations.

## WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD WE PROVIDE AS NATION'S SOLE PUBLIC BROADCASTER?

By Mr. Nobuo Tsuchiya, Executive Reporter  
News Reporting Center, NHK Osaka Station,  
Osaka

Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), or NHK, is Japan's sole public broadcaster with both nation-wide TV and radio networks. Operating with fees collected from TV viewers, NHK has two terrestrial TV channels - General and Educational -, two DBS satellite channels, two AM and one FM radio services. It also has an overseas short-wave radio service, Radio Japan, and international satellite television services to North America, Europe and Asia.

NHK made use of its national TV and radio networks to report the earthquake to all of Japan, as well as to supply necessary information to those affected. We mainly used one of the two terrestrial TV channels, one of the two DBS channels, and one of the three radio waves to broadcast news of the disaster and livelihood information, while dedicating one other TV channel and one radio wave to welfare information.

When the earthquake hit, what we call a "skip-back recorder" at NHK's Kobe station, was triggered and shot pictures of the news room from ten seconds before the quake, showing how the earth quake threw the newsroom into chaos. The picture was distributed to broadcasters all over the world. Our helicopter also shot pictures of the main elevated highway lying on its side. The earthquake was an unprecedented disaster.

With the railways, highways and telephone lines disrupted, the Kobe area was isolated. Therefore, immediately after the quake, we broadcast information about traffic conditions as well as other life-line information. We faced difficulty gathering information about the extent of the damage in the Kobe area. However, as NHK crews entered the affected areas, we received more and more information about the disaster and the real requirements of local residents. There was a gradual shift in the kind of livelihood information needed. For example, we could easily imagine that hospitals were in trouble. However, not until sometime later did we realize that those patients receiving artificial dialysis treatment needed water and electricity on a regular basis.

Since local governments had suffered damage and could not function as had been expected, NHK as the nation's public broadcaster, had to broadcast all sorts of information --- about evacuation centers, water supply, hospitals, gas stations, bath-houses, banks and even about where the remains of victims were being held. NHK also put emphasis on welfare inquiries. We received more than 54-thousand such inquiries and broadcast them. Since the telephone network was disrupted at a number of points, we had to take on this job, as well.

Six months after the quake, we are now asking ourselves how quickly we can send crews into the center of a disaster area when railways and highways break down. Immediately after the earthquake, information came in only from the surrounding areas. With easier access to the heart of the disaster area, we could have supplied more prompt information to those affected.

PANEL DISCUSSION :

CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MEDIA  
AND LIFELINE INDUSTRIES ARE ESSENTIAL



## “CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND LIFELINE INDUSTRIES ARE ESSENTIAL”

### PANEL DISCUSSION :

In addition to the representatives of lifeline industries and the media, the Panel Discussion session was joined by Professor Yasumasa Yamamoto, Ph. D. and Ms. Mikiko Koizumi, editor of a monthly town magazine “The Kobecco” (Kobeites). Mr. Koichi Yoshii, special assistant to the Managing Director of the Asahi Shimbun (The Asahi Newspaper), Osaka, moderated the session.

At the beginning of the session, Professor Yamamoto of Komazawa University, Tokyo, summed up the presentations by the representatives of lifeline industries, and radio and television companies in the preceding sessions.

### LIFELINE INFORMATION URGENTLY REQUIRED

He then suggested that the media and lifeline industries consider the following points :

- A) What kind of information is urgently required, that lifeline industries can offer, immediately after the disaster?

The affected population usually want to know the following information :

- (1) Information on the possibility of subsequent hazards, such as aftershocks in the case of a major earthquake.
- (2) Lifeline information.
- (3) Information concerning the cause of the hazard, such as the epicenter, intensity and magnitude of an earthquake.
- (4) Information concerning the safety and welfare of family members, relatives, or friends.
- (5) Information on casualties and damage.

In the case of the Hanshin Earthquake, the media mainly concentrated on reporting item (5) : information on casualties and damage.

What kind of lifeline information do the affected people need most? It is the kind directly related to their daily life such as that listed below :

- (1) Information which helps to ease the strain of the victims, such as news about safe places to evacuate to or the names of hospitals with vacant beds.
- (2) Information on alternative ways to survive on a day-to-day basis such as available transportation or where to get water and food supplies.
- (3) Next to the above information, people need to know when water and electricity will be restored and when the phones will be in operation again.

For the media to fill the role of supplying information of this nature effectively, they should establish good working relationships with lifeline industries, disaster mitigation and relief organizations and local government authorities. But the information the media can get from those organizations will always be deficient because they are busy with post-disaster relief efforts. The media must collect as much information as possible from various sources, and assess and collate it before broadcasting or printing.

## TO WHOM SHOULD THE INFORMATION BE DIRECTED?

B) For who's sake and to whom should the information be directed?

The media should regard themselves as organizations responsible for contributing to disaster prevention and preparedness. The role of the media should not be limited to reporting the aftermath of a disaster. They should also try to educate the public about disaster preparedness and play an important role in post-disaster relief efforts. Local broadcasters in non-affected regions and areas should try to educate the public about disaster preparedness by reporting about the experiences of people in the affected areas.

What kind of information should the media provide for people in the affected areas?

- (1) Information and instructions on what people should and should not do, including updates on emergency shelters.
- (2) Information concerning the safety and welfare of family members, relatives, or friends.
- (3) Information which helps relieve the strain of victims, such news about emergency shelters and water and food supply sources.
- (4) They should also deal with direct inquiries from listeners and viewers in the affected areas, playing the role of disaster mitigation organizations.

In the case of the Kobe earthquake, radio and television stations responded to a large number of telephone inquiries about information on relief activities. People count on broadcasting stations to give them useful information as soon as possible.

It is important to recognize the unique characteristics of the different media (print vs. broadcast, radio vs. television, local service vs. national network, etc.) and to take into account their particular potential and needs. The broadcast media should take into consideration the following points :

- (1) Use each channel or medium effectively for different purposes, if a station has more than two TV channels or both radio and television or/and teletext services.
- (2) Divide broadcasting time slots and use the same slots daily for the same purpose, for example, welfare information for people in the affected areas from nine o'clock at night every day.
- (3) Specify the roles of a Tokyo network station, and regional and local stations in the affected region, when forming a net work.
- (4) Take into account of the distinct character of radio and TV.

## ADVANTAGES OF TRANSITORY INFORMATION

C) Be aware of the advantages of transitory information as well as its limits.

In the wake of the Hanshin Earthquake, there were critical comments on transient information and on the reports broadcast by radio and television. But we should recognize the advantages of both the broadcast and print media and make effective use of them, taking into account differences and distinct characteristics of these media, and also the needs of the public. When reporting the Kobe earthquake, TV stations frequently used captions to supplement audio and video information and meet the needs of the affected people, including those with hearing difficulties, in particular.

## NEWS COVERAGE AT THE DISASTER SCENES

After Professor Yamamoto's speech the participants discussed various problems of news coverage at the disaster scenes. Local broadcasting stations in Kobe faced immense difficulties covering the disaster, because they themselves were so badly affected. Their station buildings and broadcasting facilities were damaged and many of their staff members were affected. Most of them were unable to come to the office or take part in news coverage activities, immediately after the earthquake. Many of them had to walk for several hours to get to the office, as all means of transportation were cut and many roads were blocked by damaged buildings.

There was a proposal during the session for forming a "unified" or "pool" channel among TV stations, in the case of major disasters, to provide the affected areas with emergency news and information, such as evacuation instructions or news on rescue and relief activities. The proposal was supported by a couple of speakers as it is worth studying by broadcasting stations in a multi-channel environment like Kobe, where there are at least eight terrestrial and two DBS TV channels and seven radio services including two FM stations.

Participants also agreed that the media should study the feasibility of motivating listeners and viewers to inform them in an emergency and let the media know what is happening or what has happened around them. The initiative by the media will certainly facilitate public awareness about disaster preparedness and response.

Mr. Kazuhiro Matsui of Hankyu Railways suggested again that for the convenience of the media, lifeline industries and relief agencies, an emergency press center should be set up to provide the media with in-coming information about the disaster aftermath and to answer their inquiries more efficiently and effectively, at any time. A number of participants, both from utilities industries and the media, responded favorably to this suggestion.

In this connection, Professor Yamamoto said that the media themselves should make their own emergency response planning, such as devising a specific format of data collecting and classifying, etc., in order to meet the needs of the public effectively. He said that setting-up an information center like the One-Stop Center in the United States, is an idea. The media can obtain from the center, basic information about specific lifeline companies and emergency authorities for inclusion in their information broadcast to the public. It is also recommended that the media and such data-base agencies should establish an on-line network, to exchange and share information instantly.

Mr. Koichi Yoshii, the moderator, concluded the session, saying that regular, routine interaction with public relations officials of lifeline industries as well as with disaster response municipal officials, is highly recommended to the media for effective working relationships in the aftermath of a disaster. He also commented that the suggestion for setting up an emergency press center is worth studying by the media, lifeline industries and relief agencies.

## APPENDIX : SYMPOSIUM PARTICIPANTS

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Sun Television Co., Ltd.  
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## HOSO-BUNKA FOUNDATION

The Hoso-Bunka (Broadcast Culture) Foundation (HBF), an independent, non-profit organization, was established in 1974 to assist in the cultural and technological development and progress of radio, television and new telecommunication media.

The Foundation aims to provide financial assistance to research, projects and events considered useful in promoting the social and cultural aspects of broadcasting and the advancement of new technologies. HBF assistance is provided in two forms, one through direct grants to researchers or project organizers (regular assistance grants) and the other through commissioning HBF-initiated studies or projects to specific researchers or organizers (special assistance projects).

After celebrating its 20th anniversary in 1994, the Foundation has started a variety of new programs under the general theme "Greater Human Fulfillment Towards the 21st Century," with the idea that the coming century should be an era focused on human potential rather than on scientific endeavor. The symposium about the Hanshin Earthquake is one of them.

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