

# Trends in public service television programming in South Korea 1990 - 1995

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## Trends in Public Service Television Programming in South Korea 1990 - 1995

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### 1. Introduction

#### 1) A Brief History of Korean Broadcasting

Radio broadcasting in Korea started fairly early in 1927, but like most other social institutions that had undergone vicissitudes of the tumultuous modern Korean history, public broadcasting had changed its face many times over the decades. From the beginning of radio broadcasting up until 1945, when the 36-year-long Japanese occupation ended, radio broadcasting had served mainly as an instrument of colonial rule. Three years after the liberation of the country in 1945, the newly independent Korean government nationalized radio broadcasting and made its operation as part of government service. This radio network formed the basis of the current public broadcaster, Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the Cold War that followed made broadcasting an indispensable tool for an ideological warfare throughout the 50's. The obsession for national security and the authoritarian style of governance, and the three decades of military rule dashed whatever hopes left for Korean broadcasting to evolve along the line of public service model developed in Western Europe.

After the military seized power in 1961, it had ruled the country for almost three decades. The military oligarchy needed a means of mass persuasion both to justify its illegitimate act and to mobilize people for a newly set goal of industrialization. They quickly grasped that broadcasting would make an effective instrument to accomplish it. Therefore, the military was eager to start television broadcasting (1961) and rather permissive in introducing commercial broadcasting into the country. It had a mighty political apparatus to surveillance the dissidence and broadcasting advertising was expected to promote an industrial economy. Thus ushered in a golden age of commercial broadcasting in the 60's and 70's. People, who badly needed a source of cheap entertainment after long hours of work, found spicy entertainment programs churned out by commercial broadcasters far more appealing and attractive than those bland programs aired by the public broadcaster. Public broadcasting has been since perceived by average Koreans as a government mouthpiece with no journalistic integrity and producer of programs of limited range. This failure of the public broadcaster to win the popular affection and support is perhaps a most tragic element in the history of the Korean broadcasting. Further, KBS was made a public corporation in 1973. Although made a public corporation, KBS could not transform itself into a self-governing institution. The change was only in form than in substance and as such there had been practical difference neither in the mode of its operation nor in esprit de corps. For the following two decades, it had been forced to serve the interests of changing powerholders rather than of the public. The ideas of public service broadcasting as trustee of public interest was still alien and, moreover, an anathema up until the late 80's.

The two-decade-long prosperity of commercial broadcasting abruptly ended when the



new military regime again took power in 1979 right after the assassination of President Park. Hard pressed to justify its illicit takeover of power, as part of bold 'reform' measures, Chun regime coercively merged two major commercial stations into KBS and made KBS take over a controlling stocks of a third commercial networks (MBC). Thus once-booming privately run broadcasters suddenly disappeared altogether. The pretext given by the junta was that Korean society needed to sweep away the abuses accumulated by commercial broadcasting in the preceding decades and the best way to do it was to make broadcasting solely a public enterprise. But the real motive behind such an unprecedented move was to control broadcasting more easily. In fact, interference with and manipulation of broadcasting reached its peak under the Chun government.

Momentum for change came in 1987 when the massive civil resistance to the authoritarian rule ended the repressive Chun government and ushered in society-wide democratization movement. As in industrial sector, the labor union formed within broadcast organizations suddenly emerged as a potent internal watchdog of their own organizations. Citizen movement groups and media scholars exhorted KBS to live up to its mandate and expectation. Because of such external and internal pressure, KBS became more attentive than before to public criticism and wary of the quality of its programming such as fairness in news and . For instance, in 1993, then newly appointed president of KBS, to publicize his new management policy, came up with a slogan, which proclaimed 1993 as 'the Year One for Public Broadcasting.' It was an indirect admittance of its lapse in the past and determination to stay in the right course. As self-salvaging efforts made since the late 80's, ratings and public perception have been vastly improved. In recent years, the ratings of news programs frequently beat those of commercial stations, which was unimaginable in the previous decades.

Under the prevailing democratic milieu, direct and overt attempt to politically manipulate KBS seems to have disappeared. Nevertheless, it is not free from subtle forms of influence from the power center. Such room for interference is in part maintained by the lingering authoritarian and undemocratic legal arrangements regulating public broadcasting. In this sense, the extent to which the public broadcaster serves the public interest will constitute a touchstone for a viability of democracy in the nation as a whole.

## 2) Structure of Public Broadcasting

Korean Broadcasting System is the principle public broadcaster in Korea. It operates two terrestrial television networks, two AM and two FM radio networks. KBS also broadcast shortwave radio programs in foreign languages for overseas audience. The KBS networks are run highly centrally and the regional stations are not independent affiliates but regional branches. As such, KBS is an entity more like ZDF than ARD in Germany. During the 80's, KBS retained an educational channel but separated it out to the Ministry of Education. In the course of policy debates in recent years, some have proposed that the education channel (EBS) be returned to KBS but the majority opinion wants it turned into a separate public corporation. In an effort to keep abreast with the fast-changing broadcasting environment, the government revealed last July a comprehensive broadcasting policy for the next five years. According to the plan, experimental direct satellite broadcasting is to start in 1996 and KBS is assigned two satellite channels for that purpose.

For the last several years, KBS channel 1 put emphasis on news and public affairs programs, whereas KBS-2 airs more light and 'home entertainment' programs. Such an double-edged programming policy was an attempt to respond to the rapidly multiplying commercial



television channels while preserving its core public service programming. However, as the later such a programming strategy risks losing its programming mandate and jeopardize its long-term future as public broadcaster. The programming in other television channels will be analyzed in depth in the next section.

KBS is financed both by viewership fee (40%) and advertising (60%) revenue. Mixed financing is a historical byproduct of the early years in television broadcasting. When the newly instituted military hastily opened television broadcasting in 1961, without adequate resources to finance the undertaking it resorted to advertising without assessing carefully the implications of such method of financing.

However, the potential adverse effect of advertising on public service programming has been partially checked by the intervening role played by the Broadcasting Advertising Corporation. The public corporation is a sort of a super ad agency intervening between advertising agencies and broadcasters. It collects a fee from advertising cost and give it to the Public Interest Fund after deducting its own operating expenses. The Fund finances scores of public organizations engaged in broadcasting as well as the press and cultural activities. Yet amidst deregulation and an world trade regime, its monopoly position is threatened.

### 3) Regulatory Framework Governing Public Service Broadcasting

Three organizations oversee public broadcasting: Ministry of Public Information, Broadcasting Commission, and the Board of Directors within each broadcast corporation (KBS and MBC). Since 1980 Broadcasting Commission regulates both public and commercial terrestrial broadcasters. The Broadcasting Commission, recommends to the President the board members of KBS as well as part of member of the public foundation that is the largest shareholder of the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation(MBC). However the president of KBS is in reality selected by the President, the legal provision is perfunctory. Hence, the main function of the Broadcast Commission is screening of contents of broadcast programs and settling of audience's complaints registered against broadcasters. Therefore, Broadcasting Commission lack a policy-making authority which is essential to function as an independent protector of public interests. This does not mean that Broadcast Commission does not perform any significant job. Its monitors broadcast programs very thoroughly and exercises its authority to sanction producers and other involved in a given program. The Commission conducts also research and hold hearings and seminars, which help sensitize the various issues in broadcasting to the general public.

Academics and citizen activist groups have long stressed the need to strengthen the Commission with policy-making power, but the government is reluctant to delegate the power. The government recently revealed its intention to merge the Broadcast Commission with the separate commission that regulates cable television.

The Ministry of Public Information makes policy relating to broadcasting. It revealed last summer a five-year comprehensive plan for broadcast, cable and satellite broadcasting. Core items in the plan will be debated in the National Assembly this fall, the result of which will end up in a new broadcasting law. Yet as broadcasting and telecommunication converges on, the Ministry is more and more engaged in a bureaucratic tussle over its jurisdiction. One of the hot issues debated is over how to distribute twelve direct satellite channels.

The Board of Directors in the KBS also performs a watchdog role but lacking practical power to select the chief executive for itself, its role is more often than not advisory than supervisory.

## II. Comparisons of Broadcast Programming 1990-1995

### 1) Comparisons of Program Categories Across Channels during 1990-1995

#### a) All Hours

During 1990-1995, KBS-1 devoted far more time (average 35.4%) to news and current affairs program than to fiction and entertainment programs (9.2% and 8.2% respectively). Further, the programming pattern has remained fairly stable over the five year period.

Yet, the programming of its sister channel (KBS-2) ran a different course. While having spent the least time on news and current affairs (average 8.2%), it devoted the largest amount of airtime on fiction (27.4%) and entertainment among the four channels compared. In 1990-91, a year before the introduction of commercial channel(SBS), KBS-2 allocated 47% of broadcast time on fiction and entertainment. And for the ensuing three years, the percentage had remained greater (48%, 57%, 50%) than that of the 1990-91 level, finally diminishing to the base level during 1994-1995. Also, it is worth noting that five-year averages for fiction (27.4%) and entertainment (22.4%) programs are greater than those of commercial channels, MBC and SBS.

Together, then, Table 1 demonstrates that the programming pattern in KBS-2 has been more akin to those of commercial channels than to its sister channel (KBS-1). The pattern appears to result in part from a self-proclaimed double-edged programming strategy KBS has taken in recent years in order to stem the tide of increased competition.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the proportion of information program in KBS-1 during 1990-91 was similar to that of ARD. However, the level of fiction and entertainment programming in KBS-1 was lower than those of ARD and BBC-1. Nevertheless one should readily admit that this kind of comparison should be made after a more rigorous data analysis.

- Table 1 about here -

#### b) Prime Time Programming

When total hours were considered (Table 1), fiction and entertainment programs in all four channels has not exceeded on average fifty percents. Yet, when just prime time hours (7-10:30 pm) were considered, percentages rapidly rose to over 65%. In the case of entertainment-oriented KBS-2, it had reached an average of 80%, topping all other channels. During the fiercely competitive '92-93 seasons, it even zoomed up to 94 %. Although, on average, even KBS-1 has televised fiction and entertainment programs more often during prime time than for total hours (20.8% vs 9.2%, 13.4% vs 8.2%), it aired information programs (44.2%) more than fiction and entertainment programs (34.2%).

- Table 2 about here -

### 2) Contents of Drama

Analysis of program categories reveals only the quantitative aspect of programming. From the fact that broadcasters tend to schedule heavily fiction and entertainment programs in the prime time, one might be tempted to conclude that those programs must be filled with



sensational materials such as sex and violence. But it is an empirical question to be demonstrated. Further, only when one could demonstrate that inter-channel competition lead to increased sensationalism in public service programming, one could then claim that the growing competition among television channels have had adverse effects on public service programming.

Yet, this would require a time-consuming examination of the relevant programs over an extended period of time. This is an arduous task that takes an systematic content analysis. Hence, this paper will present some figures that indirectly captures a qualitative dimension of programming: the results of disciplinary actions against programs taken by an independent program screening body, the Korean Broadcasting Commission. The KBC, regulating authorities of terrestrial broadcasters, monitors and reviews all broadcast programs either before or after broadcast. Dramas and other entertainment programs are screened after they are transmitted.

While other program genres could be targets of sensationalism, it is usually drama and serials wherein depiction of sex and violence are rampant. For instance, in Korea, domestically produced daily and serial dramas are most popular television genre among the audience and these programs are heavily scheduled during the prime time. Nonetheless, because of its popularity and high exposure rate, television dramas are most frequently targeted for public outcry, followed by comedy, variety and talk shows. Interestingly, foreign serials and films are less popular now and thus usually scheduled off the prime time hours, opposite of which was true in the early years of television broadcasting when the level of domestic production was low.<sup>1)</sup>

Table 3 shows the number of disciplinary measures the Broadcasting Commission had taken against 106 television dramas in the last five years. The KBC has three level of punitive measures against the programs that violate its review standards, caution: warning and legal sanctions ranging from apology to the audience to suspension of producer for a maximum of one year.<sup>2)</sup> Of 106 sanctions, twenty seven (18%) were related to advertising codes such as indirect advertising. The remaining cases were all related to sex and violence in one way or other. Therefore, Table 3 indicates that in terms of frequency of review code violation, KBS-2 was more similar to commercial broadcasters than to its sister channel, KBS-1. This pattern echoes that found earlier in the scheduling practice. One should also note that the new commercial channel launched in late 1991 (SBS) was disciplined most often than other existing channels, thereby justifying public concerns raised at the time of its opening.

- Table 3 about here -

### 3) Scheduling Diversity

One of the ways to measure the quality of programming is what J. Blumler called scheduling diversity. He defined scheduling diversity as a) how program categories are distributed in a particular channel across different times of the day, b) the range of choice provided across channels at given times of the day.<sup>3)</sup> While the first dimension of the concept is important in itself, in the context of fast multiplying channels, one should look more closely into the second aspect of diversity in that growing inter-channel competition, contrary to popular conception, may not lead to more audience's choice. If, as the preceding tables demonstrated, multiplication of channels indeed tends to induce homogenization of programming rather than its diversity and such tendency is found to be more commonplace, then reduction of scheduling diversity should be a legitimate subject for public concern.



One common scheduling practice plaguing the Korean television has been what is often called as 'blunting', which "attempts to hold or draw the target audience of the competitor's programs by offering a program of similar or greater appeal to that same target audience."<sup>4</sup> As S. Head suggested, when a certain program commands a high rating, an opposing station can succeed more often by blunting the competition with a similar program genre than by counterprogramming with a contrasting program types.<sup>5</sup> Such a strategy is obviously dictated by the managerial imperative for rating and profit maximization. Therefore to measure the extent to which programming hours are blunted across channels would be a way to assess the impact of increasing channel rivalry on the public service broadcasting, which has other goals to achieve than to win a rating war.

The degree of blunting (henceforth, duplication rate) may be measured in many ways. One way is to calculate the percentage of duplicated hours across channels to the total number of broadcast hours of the channels compared. Similarly, duplication rate can be also calculated within each program type. Within-genre duplication rate may be calculated in the same way as that for total hours: sum of duplicated hours divided by the total number of broadcast hours of a particular genre compared. Comparison of duplication rates across program types would identify which program types are frequently used for blunting among programmers. Table 4 show changes of blunting rate between paired channels during prime time before and after a commercial channel (SBS) was introduced.<sup>6</sup>

One can see that whereas programming duplication rates across KBS-1/KBS-2, KBS-1/MBC seldom changed after the introduction of a commercial channel, the rate for KBS-2 and MBC pair increased by 7%. And duplicated programming was most frequent in drama (66%), variety show (32%), and comedy (37%) categories, which confirms again the heavy scheduling of these programs during the prime time. And after the introduction of the fourth channel, duplication rate across KBS-2 and upstart SBS was twice that for KBS-1/SBS pair, confirming the diverging programming policy of public service KBS. The programming duplication between KBS-2 and SBS occurred most frequently in talk shows (30%) and quiz/game shows (26%). The duplication between two commercially-oriented channels, MBC and SBS, in the same genre was very high, but was topped by imported serials (44%). Meanwhile, an exceptionally high rate of duplication in the news programs of KBS-1 and MBC may have to do with a longtime rivalry between the two channels at 9 o'clock for main evening news.

Convergence among KBS-2, MBC, and SBS on entertainment programs during prime time can be more clearly seen in Table 5 which shows programming duplication rates for threesome groups. As expected, the overall duplication rate during prime time was the highest among the KBS2-MBC-SBS triad (7%). And such duplication level was largely due to entertainment programs such as movies(23%), quiz/game shows(22%), and dramas (12%). It is noteworthy that for any triad, all of the duplication rates surfaced were found in entertainment genres, except for documentary/current affairs. Such finding corroborates the assertion that entertainment programs are favorite genres for blunting among schedulers.

The convergence trend toward entertainment programming has shown no sign of change. For the 1994 fall/winter season, duplication rate between KBS-2 and SBS during primetime hours was the highest (42%), followed by that between KBS-2 and MBC (32%). Again, dramas and comedy were the most frequent sources for duplicated programming.



#### 4) Violence Index

For the last three years, researchers at the Korean Broadcasting Commission have developed composite indices that can measure the amount of violence and sex in television programs.<sup>7)</sup> Table 6 shows Gerbner violence index mean scores for drama, cartoon, and movie categories combined across four channels for a sampled week in February 1995. It is only natural that violence index that included verbal violence is higher than those that considered only physical violence. And as expected, SBS and KBS-2 have higher scores than the other two channels. When only non-verbal violence was examined, SBS topped the other channels. It is surprising that normally less sensational KBS-1 exhibited somewhat high violence scores, but it appears to be influenced by a few violent programs on the mean scores.

- Table 6 about here -

Finally, an international study conducted by AMIC in 1988 offered a rare opportunity to compare individual Asian country's violence index with one another. Unfortunately, South Korea was not included in the study, so that exact comparison may not be warranted. Nonetheless, with such caveat in mind, one may compare the most closely matched figures computed by KBC in early 1995 with the AMIC's early study. According to Table 7, the Korean index is the second highest among nine countries compared. Yet the rank of S. Korea may have been lower than this if the study had been conducted in the same year as the AMIC study, for there is evidence that the studies done in Korea in the early 1990's showed much lower violence scores then. For instance, a study conducted in 1990 reported violence index of drama as 64.2, but in a 1993 KBC study, the figure jumped to 123.6.<sup>8)</sup> An average score calculated for drama, cartoon, and movie categories combined in this study was 213, which is still lower than that in 1995. Such evidence suggests that violence index in Korea might have increased substantially in recent years. One wonders if the same trend may have prevailed in other Asian countries during the interval.

(Discussion part to be completed)

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## ENDNOTES

- 1 A strong exception to this generalization is a popular serial imported from Taiwan, Pochungchon.
2. Broadcasting Act, Article 21.
3. J. Blumler, "In pursuit of programme range and quality," *Studies of Broadcasting*, 1991, Tokyo: NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, p. 198.
4. J. Tiedge and K. Ksobiech, "Counterprogramming primetime network television," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, Winter 1987, p. 43.
5. Ibid.
6. J. Ahn, "Analysis of duplicate television scheduling after the onset of public/commercial dual broadcasting system," *Broadcasting Research*, Winter, 1992.
7. While the basic formulation of their index relied on the works of George Gerbner and his colleagues, the KBC violence index was different from the Gerbner index in several ways. For instance, whereas Gerbner considers the entire programs (dramas, serials) broadcast during the period under analysis as unit of analysis and each individual showings as unit of observation, KBC researchers use each episode of program as unit of analysis and a specific sequence of meaningful shots within each episode as unit of observation.<sup>1)</sup> Thus while the Gerbner index can be compared across periods, channels, time slots, and days, it cannot be calculated for a specific program. The reason KBC developed such an index was that it needed to identify any specific program episode that scores high in the violence index, so that it could discipline the producers of those programs. The KBC index also considers not only frequency of violence, but also duration of violence as well as verbal form of violence. The latter two elements are absent in the Gerbner's violence index.<sup>2)</sup> In addition, KBC has also developed an index that measure sexual contents in programs, both verbal and physical.
8. Y.H. Kim, "An assessment method of broadcasting culture and cultural index study," *Broadcasting Research* (Korean Broadcasting Commission), Winter 1994, pp. 60-61.



Table 1 . Percentages of Program Categories Aired by 4 Television Channels during 1990-1995 (Total Hours)

		'90- 91	'91- 92	'92- 93	'93- 94	'94- 95	Average
KBS 1	Information	38	39	34	32	35	35.4
	Fiction	10	8	9	8	11	9.2
	Entertainment	9	10	8	7	7	8.2
KBS 2	Information	11	12	5	6	7	8.2
	Fiction	30	27	30	27	23	27.4
	Entertainment	17	21	27	23	24	22.4
MBC	Information	28	34	25	23	25	27.0
	Fiction	21	21	21	20	21	20.8
	Entertainment	24	19	21	18	19	20.2
SBS	Information	-	20	12	13	12	14.3
	Fiction	-	20	20	25	29	23.5
	Entertainment	-	23	21	19	20	20.8
(ARD)	Info	39					
	Fic.	12					
	Ent.	18					
(BBC-1)	Info.	27					
	Fic.	21					
	Ent.	21					

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Information progrmes = news and current affairs

Fiction = drama, movies

Entertainment = variety show, quiz, game, talk show

Figures for ARD, BBC-1, cited from *Els De Bens et.al.(1992)*, are based on programming as of Jan. 1991.

Table 2 . Percentages of Program Categories Aired by 4 Television Channels during 1990-1995 (Prime Time Hours)

		'90- 91	'91- 92	'92- 93	'93- 94	'94- 95	P-Time Avg.	Total hrs. Avg.
KBS 1	Information	47	49	41	42	42	44.2	35.4
	Fiction	22	20	20	18	24	20.8	9.2
	Entertainment	13	17	16	8	13	13.4	8.2
KBS 2	Information	15	11	7	10	12	11.0	8.2
	Fiction	41	45	55	47	41	45.8	27.4
	Entertainment	34	37	39	32	31	34.6	22.4
MBC	Information	28	29	26	27	24	26.8	27.0
	Fiction	39	40	35	34	28	35.2	20.8
	Entertainment	28	26	33	25	34	29.2	20.2
SBS	Information	-	30	22	25	24	25.3	14.3
	Fiction	-	34	38	38	51	40.3	23.5
	Entertainment	-	24	34	27	23	27.0	20.8



Table 3. Number of Disciplinary Actions Against Top TV Dramas taken by Korean Broadcasting Commission, 1990-1995

	1990			1991			1992			1993			1994					
	KBS-1	KBS-2	MBC	KBS-1	KBS-2	MBC	KBS-1	KBS-2	MBC	SBS	KBS-1	KBS-2	MBC	SBS	KBS-1	KBS-2	MBC	SBS
Legal- sanctions	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
warnings	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	7	2	4	0	4	4	1
cautions	2	8	9	2	6	8	2	6	8	16	0	3	4	5	0	1	2	3
	2	9	10	2	6	9	3	7	9	21	0	10	6	10	0	5	6	6

Source: Korean Broadcasting Commission

Table 4. Percentages of Programming Duplicacy between Paired Channels during Prime Time Before and After Introduction of a Commercial TV Station (SBS)

	K1 - K2		K1-MBC		K2-MBC		K1-SBS	K2-SBS	MBC-SBS
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	After	After	After
News	2	-	87	75	2	-	4	10	-
Documentary/									
Current Affairs	-	-	-	5	3	-	5	-	-
Drama	10	19	31	30	53	66	21	20	27
Imported Serials	12	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	44
Talk Shows	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	36
Quiz/Game	17	7	13	18	45	20	11	26	31
Variety Show	7	-	6	9	24	32	-	10	23
Comedy	-	-	-	-	20	37	-	5	2
Total Cross-Channel Dupl. Rate	5	6	30	30	26	33	7	13	16

Total Cross-Channel Duplicacy Rate =  $\frac{\text{Sum of Duplicate Hours}}{\text{Sum of Total Airtime of Two Channels}} \times 100$

Duplicacy Rate within Program Type =  $\frac{\text{Sum of Duplicate Hours within a given Program Type}}{\text{Sum of Total Hours of a given Program Type in Two Channels}} \times 100$

Source: J. Alm (1992)



Table 5. Percentages of Programming Duplicacy between Three-Channel Groups during Prime Time After Introduction of a Commercial TV Station (SBS)

	K-1 K-2 SBS	K-1 MBC SBS	K-2 MBC SBS
News	-	-	-
Docum./Cu.Aff.	-	2	-
Movies	-	-	23
Drama	4	10	12
Quiz/Game	9	11	22
Variety Show	-	-	9
Total Cross- Channel Dupl. Rate	2	3	7

Source: J. Ahn (1992)

Table 6. Mean Gerbner Index Scores for Drama, Cartoon, Movie  
Categories Combined Across 4 Channels for One Week in February 1995

	Verbal Violence Included	Verbal Violence Excluded
KBS-1	242	196
KBS-2	257	220
MEC	203	181
SBS	250	213

Source: KBC Report for Broadcasting Culture Index (1995)

Table 3. Gerbner Violence Index for 9 Asian Countries


Bangladesh	43.5	
Malaysia	78.7	
India	137.2	
Indonesia	137.8	
Japan	139.7	
Thailand	176.5	
Pakistan	197.2	
Philippines	259.8	
S. Korea	248.1	<div> <div></div> <div>187.3 (drama)</div> <div>244.9 (movies)</div> <div>312.1 (cartoons)</div> </div>

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All scores except for S.Korea are quoted from a study conducted by AMIC in 1988.<sup>10)</sup> The programs selected for computation of index were social dramas, action adventures, cartoons, comedies. S.Korean figure is based on a KBC analysis done in 1995.



## The Structure of Korean Electronic Media



Notes: \* Privately owned but broadcast no commercials.  
KBC and KCCC will be merged in 1977.