Islamism, and the ideological questioning of the pancasila

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ISLAMISM, AND THE IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONING OF THE *PANCASILA*

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SUMMARY

This study investigates the existential threat that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and their organisations pose to the *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). The three case studies chosen for analysis of their origin and development, ideology and strategy are *Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah* (JI), *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) and *Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT).

After determining the existential threat, the study then proceeds to understand the post-Suharto government's weak response to them. What could be the reasons for the state's indecisiveness to securitise them? Why is it difficult for the state to convince the Indonesian population in general, and more specifically, religious leaders in Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as well as public intellectuals that these Islamists are an existential threat to the unitary *Pancasila* state?

This study argues that the absence of a consensus between the securitisers and the relevant audience, the Indonesian population, on the existential threat posed by them is the reason for the post-Suharto Indonesian state finding it difficult to securitise them.

To obtain first-hand information, I conducted interviews, talked, and discussed with people from among the securitisers and relevant audience. By employing qualitative analysis of the primary and related documents, this study evaluates the intentions and capabilities of the chosen case studies. After that, an assessment was also made on the post-Suharto government's securitisation of them.

This study concludes that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists are an existential threat to the NKRI. To securitise them the government must secure the mandate of the general Indonesian public by allocating more resources to convince them and develop a consensus on the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. Since Indonesia is becoming a stronger “negara hukum” (a state that implements its government based on the rule of law) because of the establishment of democracy, the government must find the right balance of actions to act against the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. A preventive law like the Internal Security Act of Singapore or the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) which Malaysia is currently implementing might not be the solution in the short term. Implementation of such measures would only be possible if the government is successful in convincing the general Indonesian population as the relevant audience of the existential threat. In this regard, the politically aware public and the leadership of the largest Muslim organisations (NU and Muhammadiyah) must agree that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and their organisations are indeed an existential threat. They must allow the government to formulate and implement policies necessary to contain the threat.

CHAPTER ONE

ESTABLISHING THE THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PLATFORM FOR THIS STUDY

“Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the “security” label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force) and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept”– Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century” *International Affairs*, 67.3 (1991), pp. 432-433.

In securitisation theory, security is a “speech act” in the sense that expressing “security” leads to something being done. By saying that the existence of a particular referent object is threatened, a securitising actor obtains a right to implement extraordinary measures so that the survival of the referent object is safeguarded. Consequently, the issue is transferred from the domain of normal politics to the realm of emergency politics, so that it can be dealt with promptly and extracted from the usual democratic rules and regulations of policy-making.¹ In Indonesia, the security agencies have been effective in tackling terrorist attacks.² However, Hasan felt that the government

¹ Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 54-57.

² Indonesia’s intervention efforts to counter-terrorism activity are more effective when compared to the efforts undertaken in the Philippines and Thailand. See, Lorraine Mazerolle, Gary LaFree, and Gentry White, “Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, The Philippines and Thailand,” The Australian Research Council (ARC) Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), (<http://www.ceps.edu.au/research/extending-frontiers-research-program/effectiveness-of-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-indonesia--the-philippines-and-thailand>, Apr. 2012), accessed on 19 Apr. 2012.

has not managed to address the quest for the establishment of an Islamic state.³ One of the challenges to Indonesia's security, therefore, is in determining what constitutes the threat posed by Islamists to Indonesia's national security.

Here, the state's, army's and political elites' framing rejection of the *Pancasila* as Indonesia's national ideology by Islamists could weaken the *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) would not go uncontested. It has to be proven that these Islamists with their existing capabilities have the immediate potential to manifest into an existential threat. Securitising them by designating them as an existential threat only because of their belief that *Pancasila* is incompatible with Islam is not easy because Islam is not a trivial matter in the lives of Indonesians.

Since the pre-independence period, Islam has been a motivating factor and has played a major role in the struggle to gain independence from the Dutch colonial power.⁴ Subsequently, in determining what constituted an ideal Indonesian state, the question of whether the state should be "Islamic" or "nationalist" in character was fiercely debated. Attempts were made to reconcile the two demands. However, this did not yield a lasting solution which meant that Islamists continue to raise the same issue periodically.⁵ Even the formulation of the Jakarta Charter as a concession failed to satisfy the contending parties. From then on, the clause in the Jakarta Charter which states

³ Noorhaidi Hasan. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Yogyakarta, (08 July 2014).

⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality," *World Policy Journal* 21, No. 3 (2004): 2.

⁵ Moch Nur Ichwan, "The Seven-Word Controversy," *IIAS Newsletter* (March 2003).

“Ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya” (The belief in God, with the obligation to implement the Islamic *Sharia* for its adherents) highlighted the position of Muslim activists in Indonesia. This clause continues to be the central issue in the ensuing debates on the ideology of the state in Indonesia.⁶

While the clause elevated the position of Islam, it did not make the *Sharia* law the highest body of law governing Indonesia constitutionally. The fact that Indonesia’s population was and is predominantly Muslim makes it difficult to confine Islam to the private domain. The assertion that Islam should concern itself with religious rituals and not transgress the perimeters set by the *Pancasila* state that treats all religions⁷ as equal seems to contradict Islamists’ notion of Islam as a religion that addresses all aspects of human life. Islam, they argue, should not be confined to such a narrow interpretation. As such, the struggle for the establishment of an “Islamic state” in Indonesia is an attempt to push for a conscious implementation of the socio-political tenets of Islam in the life of the nation.

From a security point of view, the push to establish an Islamic state by Islamists threatens the *Pancasila* as the state ideology because *Pancasila* represents a vision of a pluralist state. As a pluralist state, the state treats all

⁶ For a detailed discussion, see Saifuddin Anshari, “The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman’s Agreement between the Islamic and Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia” (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1976); Faisal Ismail, “Islam, Politics and Ideology in Indonesia: A Study of the Process of Muslim Acceptance of the Pancasila” (Ph.D diss., McGill University, 1995); and B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).

⁷ According to Law No. 1/PNPS/1965, there are six religions adhered to in Indonesia, namely, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. However, beliefs and practices of other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism and Taoism are not prohibited in Indonesia. For a more detailed discussion, see Nicola Colbran, “Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia,” *International Journal of Human Rights* 14, No. 5 (2010): 681.

religions the same.⁸ The *Pancasila* also serves to ensure that the unitary Indonesian state remains intact with all its religious and cultural diversities. This situation, however, is difficult to be achieved if Indonesia is to become an Islamic state where Islam and Muslims occupy dominant positions in the constitution. Given the contradictory nature of the Islamic state and the *Pancasila* state, how will the state react to attempts by Islamists to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state? Does this explain why the Indonesian state vacillates in its consideration that the Islamists' quest for an Islamic state is an existential threat?

1.1. The Research Problem: Securitisation in Indonesia

While the Islamic state that Islamists pursue seems to put Islamism at the centre of attention, it is important to note that Islamism, as a political ideology, can “range from the mild and almost academic, or the acceptably programmatic, to the extremist and terrorist.”⁹ A distinction, therefore, has to be made about whether the aspirations to create an Islamic state and the secondary call to restore the Jakarta Charter by Islamists, are sufficient evidence to accuse them of being anti-*Pancasila* and an existential threat. In the past, Darul Islam (DI) led by Kartosoewirjo made attempts to make the *Sharia* the basis of the Indonesian state through armed struggle. The DI rebellion is an important chapter in Indonesia's history but should not be the sole basis to judge Islamists because DI was a physical security threat to the state for having carried out an armed insurrection. Islamists in Indonesia are different. They are not monolithic, and to paint them with a broad brush of rebellion against the

⁸ Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 1995), 14-20.

⁹ Meghnad Desai, *Rethinking Islamism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 23.

state, would only complicate securitisation in Indonesia. Despite their inability to carry out armed rebellion, their incessant questioning of the *Pancasila* and *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) could delegitimise core institutions and break the national consensus.

Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism

For this reason, there is a need to clarify some terms used in this study. Firstly, this study makes a distinction between Islam and Islamism. This study defines Islam based on Prophet Muhammad's definition of Islam as:

“You witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah. You establish the *Ṣalāt* (prayer), give the *Zakāt* (charity), fast during the month of *Ramadan*, and perform the *Hajj* to the House (pilgrimage to the House of God in Mecca) if you can travel there”.¹⁰

From the same *Ḥadith*,¹¹ a Muslim is one who concerns himself with *Imān*, *Islām*, and *Iḥsān*,¹² which the Prophet Muhammad referred to as “*dīnakum*,” meaning, “your religion” in the *Ḥadith*. Islamism, this study argues, is different from Islam. Islamism is the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life. Islamism, based on this understanding, manifests itself through groups, movements, and parties that sought the formal

¹⁰ For explanation of the ḥadith, see Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, *Jāmi‘ al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam (The Compendium of Knowledge and Wisdom)* (Al-Qāhirah (Cairo): Dār al-Ḥadith, 1994), 33-57.

¹¹ Ḥadith refers to narrative or report of the deeds and sayings of Prophet Muhammad. For a detailed explanation, see, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, Second Revised ed. (Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Ilmiah Publishers, 1999), 44-85.

¹² The word “*Imān*” originally means conviction of the heart to the tenets of Islamic faith comprising the belief in Allah, His angels, His inspired Books, His messengers, the Last day, and in destiny, both good and evil. While the word “*Islām*” signifies submission by carrying out the five pillars of Islam mentioned earlier. “*Iḥsān*” is to worship Allah as if you see Him, and if you see Him not, He nevertheless sees you. See, Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Religion of Islam: A Comprehensive Discussion of the Sources, Principles and Practices of Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Perkim), 119-133; and Nuh Ha Mim Keller, *Al-Maqasid: Nawawi's Manual of Islam* (USA: Amana Publications, 2002), 170-171.

application of Islamic law in politics and society. As such, the essence of its ideology and existence is the implementation of *Sharia* and Islamisation of the state. However, the manifestations of Islamism vary. They are not always violent but are at times, mild and accommodative.

In Indonesia, some Islamists participated in democratic elections and formed political parties. The parties are *Partai Amanah Nasional* (PAN, National Mandate Party), *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB, Crescent Star Party), *Partai Keadilan* (PK, Justice Party re-established as *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Justice Prosperity Party)) and *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, Unity Development Party).¹³ Some others, however, refused to join these parties and remained non-integrative, preferring instead, other means, to further their political agenda.¹⁴ Thus, an Islamist is a Muslim, who, in addition to observing *Imān*, *Islām*, and *Ihsān*, subscribes to an ideology which is political; he aims to win power over the people so that he could implement Islam in its widest sense, and not confined to rituals.

Understanding the History of Pancasila

Secondly, the *Pancasila* which Sukarno proposed, as the basis of the Indonesian state consists of five principles: (1) Indonesian nationalism; (2) Internationalism; 3) Consultation or democracy; (4) Social welfare; and (5) Belief in God. The *Panitia Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan*

¹³ See the list of political parties which participated in the General Election 2009 at Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Electoral Commission), “Partai-Partai (Political Parties)” (http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5967&Itemid=83, 2008), accessed on 20 Mar. 2012.

¹⁴ See Greg Fealy’s “Foreword” in Bernhard Plattdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), xi; Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), xi; Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” *Middle East Policy* 9, No. 2 (2002): 61; and Ayoob, “Political Islam,” 2.

(PPUUPK, Investigating Committee for the Efforts for the Preparation of Independence) debated it intensely. As a result, a political concession in the form of the *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter) of June 22, 1945, was reached. The *Piagam Jakarta* differs from the *Pancasila* in the sense that the first *sila* of the belief in God included the phrase referred to as the “seven words,” “*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya*” (with the obligation to implement the Islamic *Sharia* for its adherents). The fear that some non-Muslim areas in Indonesia objected to the seven words and other pro-Islam articles caused the first *sila* to be amended. In the final modified version, the first *sila* became “*Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*” (Belief in the one supreme God).¹⁵

Pancasila, as the Indonesian state ideology, is highly valued because it is an integral part of the accepted conception of Indonesia as a unitary state. A case in point was the sole preoccupation with the *Pancasila* as the state ideology during the Suharto’s era in the *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* courses (P4, Upgrading Course on the Directives for the Realisation and Implementation of *Pancasila*). Civil servants below the rank of a cabinet minister were required to attend the two-week upgrading courses based on a 1978 decision of the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR, People’s Consultative Assembly).¹⁶

In Indonesia’s case, the *Pancasila* state is the referent object of security. As such, its survival needs to be safeguarded and protected. Any attempt to alter or reconfigure the *Pancasila* state to something contrary to its present form is an attempt which will threaten the referent object. The threat arising from

¹⁵ Saifuddin, *The Jakarta Charter of June 1945*, 39-62.

¹⁶ See, Michael Morfit, “The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government,” *Asian Survey* 21, No. 8 (Aug., 1981), 838-840.

such an effort was made explicit by the leadership of *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (ABRI, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)¹⁷ during Suharto's time.¹⁸ Reiterating the same message, General Try Sutrisno viewed that commitment to the *Pancasila* was not only crucial but is also, the defining character of the existence of Indonesia as a nation. He said:

“Without commitment to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, we will lose the meaning of our existence as a nation with unique Indonesian characteristics.”¹⁹

In addition to that, till today *Pancasila* is accepted as a positive political tradition for Indonesia. The acceptance was re-emphasised by the present and past political leadership during an event to commemorate the *Pancasila* Day (the anniversary of Sukarno's first articulation of the *Pancasila* on 1 June 1945, in a speech delivered by Sukarno to the preparatory committee for Indonesia's independence) on 1 June 2011. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, former President B.J. Habibie, former President Megawati Soekarnoputri, Vice President Hamzah Haz and former Vice President Jusuf Kalla were among those who attended the anniversary. The President and ex-presidents also delivered speeches that defined *Pancasila* as the foundation of the Indonesian state.²⁰

Ideological Questioning of the Pancasila

Thirdly, throughout Indonesian history, the ideological questioning of the *Pancasila* is shown in the Islamists' aspirations to create an Islamic state or call to restore the *Piagam Jakarta*. Both demands, however, were not representative of the desire of the whole Muslim population of Indonesia. Nevertheless, they

¹⁷ ABRI was renamed and became known as the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI) after 1999.

¹⁸ Ramage, 131.

¹⁹ “Gen Try Urges Renewal of Pledge to Pancasila,” *The Straits Times* (28 June 1992).

²⁰ See, Panca Hari Prabowo, “Pancasila dan Tradisi Politik yang Positif,” *Antara* (08 June 2011).

indicate there are Islamists in the population who want Islam to shape politics in Indonesia.²¹ This study classifies Islamists into two categories: integrative and non-integrative.²² The first category challenges the *Pancasila* but does so within the legal perimeters set by the state. They participate in the general election or accept it as a constitutionally accepted instrument for political change. The second category, the non-integrative Islamists, which this study refers to, challenges the state's ideology and rejects participation in the general election. They dismiss the *Pancasila* and hold the view that the *Pancasila* is incompatible with Islam, and is, therefore, un-Islamic.

As these non-integrative Islamists exhibit pro-jihad²³ tendencies and consider *Pancasila* as a threat to the Islamic way of life, their non-integrative and pro-jihad characteristics raise questions of existential threat to the referent object, which is the *Pancasila* state. Their struggle which is unrelated to the reinstatement of the *Piagam Jakarta* or reinterpretation of the *Pancasila* further heightened the concern. The heightened concern is because they want to replace the *Pancasila* with Islam.²⁴ The desire to replace the *Pancasila* also raises an important question on the way they intend to achieve this objective. Will they be non-violent like the *Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia* (HTI, Indonesian

²¹ Munir Mulkhan. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Yogyakarta, (14 May 2014).

²² Bahtiar Effendy uses "non-integrative" differently to refer to partisan politics approach associated with political forces in the past such as *Masyumi*, *Parmusi*, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* and *Perti*. See, Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 124-134.

²³ Pro-Jihad is used throughout this study to mean support for the expending of ability and power in fighting in the path of God. See, Muhammad Hamidullah, *The Muslim Conduct of State* (Lahore, Pakistan: SH. Muhammad Ashraf, 1987), 191.

²⁴ See, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, "Strategi Perjuangan Majelis Mujahidin" (<http://majelismujahidin.com/about/strategi-perjuangan-majelis-mujahidin/>, 2012), 17 May 2012; and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, "Profil JAT" (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/jamaah/110/profil-jat/>, 2009), 17 May 2012. Also, see Linggar Rama Dian Putra, "'Meng-Indonesia' Tanpa Pancasila, Mungkinkah? ('Indonesianize' Without Pancasila, Is It Possible?)" in *Kongres Pancasila III* (Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya 31 Mei - 01 June, 2011).

Party of Islamic Liberation)²⁵ or violent like *Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah* (JI, Islamic Group) or inclined to violence like JI's transformations such as the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI, Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and the *Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT)?

The Existential Threat from Non-Integrative and Pro-Jihad Islamists

Fourthly, when these non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists organised themselves as movements, groups or even organisations in pursuit of their political agenda, they could be designated as an existential threat to Indonesia by the state's leadership, and become a security issue. The existential threat arises from their rejection of the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. Additionally, they believe that something must be done to change the status quo of Indonesia as a *Pancasila* state.²⁶ By refusing to participate in the democratic election to change the status quo, the avenues for them to make changes are limited. In such a situation, the possibility of them clandestinely operating cannot be ruled out.²⁷ General (Retired) A.M. Hendropriyono who was the former Chief of *Badan Intelijen Negara* (BIN, State Intelligence Agency) pointed out that the way these non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists go about translating their ideology into actions also raises concerns about the degree of existential threat they could pose to the Indonesian state. Much pressure is

²⁵ In his discussion on the Indonesian government's response to HTI, Ken Ward questions, "Why has all this secretiveness and non-conformity not prompted frequent public warnings from political leaders or security authorities about the need for vigilance towards HTI?" See, Ken Ward, "Non-violent Extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63, No. 2 (2009): 152.

²⁶ The study discusses this in more detail in Chapter Three which is on "Existential Threat: Defined and Assessed."

²⁷ Justin V. Hastings, *No Man's Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*, Cornell Paperbacks (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2010), 7-9.

therefore placed on the state to decide whether they are indeed an existential threat, and if so, how best to contain the threat.²⁸

The Tablighi Jama'at in Indonesia in this regard is different. Although the movement is characterised by their fundamentalist-literalist approach to Islamic practices, they have always remained passive, non-violent and non-sectarian. Their rejection of democracy, party politics and elections is not motivated by a refusal to accept the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. It is because of their view that political activities are worldly affairs that cause distractions from the path of spiritual revival and the improvement of the Muslim soul and character. Having existed for almost a century and now the world biggest Islamic missionary movement, they have consistently rejected and condemned all acts of violence and terrorism. On the one hand, the movement could be considered as non-integrationist, anti-state and anti-government, but it is by no means Islamist. While the movement's support for the *Pancasila* state is unclear, it has not sought to destabilise the state, let alone, overthrow the state.²⁹

As such, the study finds it important to find out whether the state designates the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists as posing an existential threat to the unitary *Pancasila* state. The existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists makes "Islamism, and the Ideological Questioning of the *Pancasila*" an important study as it has policy implications on Indonesia's security. The security of Indonesia, as one of the founding

²⁸ A.M. Hendropriyono. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Jakarta, (27 Apr. 2017).

²⁹ For a more detailed discussion on this, see Farish A. Noor, *Islam on the Move: The Tablighi Jama'at in Southeast Asia* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2012).

members of ASEAN, will undoubtedly affect the region.³⁰ Furthermore, in the era of globalisation, Islamists can easily network with similar-minded groups and movements in other countries in the region and beyond. Neutralising domestically the security threat is not only crucial, but could make a considerable difference between containing the threat nationally, and allowing it to become transnational.³¹

The JI's episode in the region is a testament to this situation. The threat posed by JI demonstrates that there is too much at stake if Indonesia allows the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists to weaken and divide the country. Furthermore, if a multicultural and multi-religious Indonesia is allowed to be pulled apart by xenophobic Islamists,³² Indonesia could become a potential security threat to its neighbours. While this study focuses on Indonesia's security, its significance, nonetheless, extends beyond Indonesia, to include the security of the region as well.³³

1.2. The Puzzle: Securitisation of Non-Integrative and Pro-Jihad Islamists

The central aim of this study is to investigate the weak response of the Indonesian state to the existential threat posed by non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists after Suharto's fall. What could be the reasons for the state's

³⁰ David Wright-Neville, "Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants and Terrorists in Southeast Asia," *The Pacific Review* 17, No. 1 (2004): 28; and Zakir Hussain, "JI Offshoot JAT May Be Latest Regional Threat" *The Straits Times* (Feb. 25, 2012).

³¹ For example on this, see "Perjalanan ke Afghanistan" (Journey to Afghanistan) and "Perjalanan ke Mindanao" (Journey to Mindanao) in Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI (Unravelling Jamaah Islamiyah: Admission of Ex-JI Member)* (Jakarta: Penerbit Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), 19-69 and 139-167.

³² Imam Samudera argues that attacking civilians from among the colonial race is a fair and just act. See Imam Samudera, *Aku Melawan Teroris (I Fought the Terrorist)* (Solo: Jazera, 2004), 109-115.

³³ The importance of Indonesia's security to the region is highlighted in Paul Dibb, "Indonesia: The Key to South-East Asia's Security," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 77, No. 4 (2001): 829-842.

indecisiveness to securitise them? Why is it difficult for the state to convince its relevant audience among its population that these Islamists are a threat to the referent object, the *Pancasila* state? With these questions in mind, this study will examine why the post-Suharto Indonesian state has not securitised the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists when there is evidence to show that they are threatening to undermine the unitary and pluralistic Indonesian state.³⁴

This situation was different during Suharto's New Order. Then, Defence Minister, General Benny Moerdani, vowed to "crush any attempts to replace the Pancasila state ideology with religious or ethnic ideologies."³⁵ Lieutenant General Harsudiyono Hartas has also warned against the re-emergence of a threat to the *Pancasila* and national unity from the "extreme right," which Ramage points out, was an official term for "Islamic fundamentalism."³⁶ In other words, there was a clear and decisive process by which something, in this case, the Islamists, gets designated as a security issue. The Suharto's government executed measures to contain the threat and in some cases, to eliminate it.³⁷

Despite the fact that political threats are more ambiguous and difficult to identify as compared to military threats; the *Pancasila* state during Suharto's era was decisive in designating something as a threat. Any ideology that could weaken the state as a political entity was considered a political threat and

³⁴ While the threat from the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists could be identified with the threat posed by "Radical Group Movements" mentioned in the *Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia*, "Defending the Country Entering the 21st Century," (2003), 28-29. There seems to be some reluctance to mention the threat more specifically other than describing the threat as "Some of the radical groups existing today are reincarnation of groups which in the past felt left out."

³⁵ "Moerdani Vows to Crush Attempts to Replace Pancasila," *Jakarta Post* (11 Sep. 1991).

³⁶ Ramage, 130.

³⁷ For details, see Donald Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 2; and John T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 50-66.

treated in the same way as a military threat. For this reason, both General Edy Sudrajat and Lieutenant General Harsudiyono Hartas identified proponents of liberal democracy and human rights as threats to the *Pancasila* and national unity.³⁸ While many may disagree with the decision and consider it extreme, it proves that securitisation of the Islamists during the Suharto era was relatively easy. In this regard, the arrest of Islamic activists by local military officers before the *Tanjung Priok* killings on 12 September 1984 could serve as another proof to strengthen this argument. The authorities arrested the activists after they discovered that activists of a mosque had been inviting Islamic preachers who were very critical of government policies.³⁹ In the incident, securitisation led to the mass protest. When the Suharto regime acted against the protesters violently, the action left behind much resentment of the regime and of its security agencies, which the post-Suharto government must take into consideration whenever it decides to securitise the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. It makes securitisation far more challenging.⁴⁰

Clarifying the Major Issues

Here, the study's use of the term "securitised" is consistent with the framework employed by the Copenhagen School, which regards security as a politically and socially constructed concept. Thus, political concerns arising from the political change that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists want to bring about in Indonesia became a security matter and are perceived as a threat

³⁸ Ramage, 84-85.

³⁹ See the re-investigation of the *Tanjung Priok* killings in Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Politics of Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 37, No. 1 (2007): 77.

⁴⁰ Prof. Martin Van Bruinessen (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Visiting Senior Fellow), discussion with Mahfuh Halimi, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. (17 Feb. 2017).

when the concept of securitisation is applied.⁴¹ To securitise them means to present them as an existential threat. Due to the special nature of the existential threat coming from the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, the invocation of security allows Indonesia to resort to extraordinary measures, whenever necessary, to handle the threat. It not only legitimises the use of force when necessary, but, it also permits the state to mobilise, or take special powers, to handle the existential threat. This handling of the existential threat in such a manner is only possible when a state representative's utterance of "security" successfully constructs a shared understanding of a threat with the relevant audience among its population.

The existential threat referred to earlier is to the referent object of security, in this case, the *Pancasila* state. It is not a physical threat unlike the threat posed by an army of a hostile country at the border of another state. Instead, it is something the political leadership designates as a threat. In the Indonesian case, the Indonesian Defence Minister Abdul Djalil described such threat with these words:

"Several times Indonesia has been attacked by an act of terrorism which causes a loss of life. Therefore it's an emergency. That's why I am brave to say this nation actually needs an Internal Security Act which provides authority to the security apparatus to take preventative measures before terrorist attacks take place."⁴²

In the context of this study, a systematic approach to unravel the ideology of the *Pancasila* state by non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists; through a deliberate attempt to mobilise the masses to reject the state ideology using religious rhetoric, could qualify as an existential threat. The argument supporting this claim is that the unravelling of the *Pancasila* as the foundation

⁴¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), 23-26.

⁴² As quoted in Matthew Moore, "Human Rights the Next Casualty," *The Age* (16 Aug. 2003).

of the unitary Indonesian state could lead to its Balkanization. The aftermath would be the emergence of smaller states which are often hostile and uncooperative with each other, and would ultimately affect stability and security of the region.

The non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists' ideological assault, in this sense, could be interpreted as a refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the *Pancasila* state. It raises the question of the lawfulness of the governing authority by arguing based on a political interpretation of Islam which Indonesians consider as not mainstream.⁴³ Also, their determination to change the political system⁴⁴ and replace it with one which favours their political interpretation could jeopardise the survival of the *Pancasila* state, making it a security issue.

The non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists' conviction about the implementation of legalistic and formalistic Islam generates a security concern because of *Pancasila*. As the ideological basis of the Indonesian state, *Pancasila* treats all religions as equal. Since the *Pancasila* carves a place for all faiths, and not for Islam alone, any attempt to change this status quo will, of course, alter or even strain the harmonious relationships of the various religions, cultures, and ethnicities in Indonesia. In this regard, the state cannot ignore the ramifications of such political idealism and activism of these Islamists. The state cannot treat them as inconsequential to national unity, and by extension, Indonesia's security because Indonesia's survival demands that the state remains pluralistic.

⁴³ *Nadhatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, two biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia accept the *Pancasila* state. For details, see Ismail, 311-314.

⁴⁴ The way they are going to achieve this will be much clearer when this study examines in detail their strategies.

Despite this situation, the violation of national security is a subjective issue. It is dependent on the perception of Indonesia's decision-makers. Indonesia's security concerns also reflect the anxieties of the Indonesian elites where, the anarchic character of the international environment, and the need to make Indonesia secure, are essential factors. Equally important is the domestic environment where its interaction with international environments could affect the legitimacy and survival of the incumbent regime.

Identifying Key Determinants of the Puzzle

This study will go on to analyse the key determinants that affect two key variables in the research, namely, the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, and their securitisation by the political leadership of Indonesia.

i. Constructing the Existential Threat

In assessing the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, this study identified three factors for analysis: their origin and development, ideology and strategy. These will be used to establish their intention and capability. Understanding the root of the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists will provide answers to questions of whether they are locally inspired or influenced by developments in the Muslim world. The understanding would help determine the nature of the threat, and allow this study to evaluate the security implications at the national, regional as well as international level.

In JI's case, its root goes back to the *Darul Islam* (DI) movement in the early years of the Republic of Indonesia. It was a movement that went against Sukarno's vision of a *Pancasila* state for Indonesia. Some of its members took part in the Afghan-Soviet War and have undergone training in the military camps run by the *Mujahidin* faction led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf is a proponent of strict Wahhabi Islam who was financed by Saudi Arabia. The faction's logistics operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan were run by Osama bin Laden, among others.⁴⁵ JI then connected with Al-Qaeda and was involved in several bombings or plans to bomb several targets in the region. The episode demonstrates how a locally inspired group through association with other groups was transformed from being a security threat in one country, into a security threat to the region and beyond.

The ideology is a comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas with which non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists look at the world through a socio-political lens, primarily based on Islam. It explains the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists' thinking about the present situation. It also indicates the direction these Islamists are heading and what they need to do to remain faithful to their ideology. The ideology forms their worldview, and provides them with a basis for distinguishing "truth" from "falsehood."

In this sense, it is a foundation with which they frame their arguments and weigh other people's arguments. The ideology also strengthens the justifications of their actions. When challenged by outsiders, these Islamists mount their defence according to the ideology. The existential threat of the ideology will be apparent when one compares it with the state ideology of

⁴⁵ International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," *ICG Asia Report No. 63* (26 Aug. 2003).

Pancasila. The comparison helps determine the degree of incompatibility between the two, and at the same time, assists in constructing the degree of existential threat arising from such ideology.⁴⁶

By looking at their strategy in pursuit of their political agenda, it is possible to analyse the existential threat. The reason, the strategy ensures their survivability by preparing them to deal with every possible situation in their struggle. It increases the effectiveness of their attempt to reach their goals. For JI, the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah* (PUPJI, The General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah)⁴⁷ does this by offering JI's members with two broad guidelines. The sections in the PUPJI under the headings "*Al-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien*" (The Progressive Methodology in Establishing the Religion) and "*Al-Manhaj Al-Amaliy Li Iqomatid Dien*" (The General Operational Guide in Establishing the Religion) explain these guidelines.⁴⁸

By examining the origin and development, ideology, and strategy of the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, this study will establish two things: their intentions and capabilities. These, in turn, will be used to determine the existential threat to the referent object.

⁴⁶ See discussion on *Hizbut Tahrir* Indonesia's (HTI) ideology in Ward, "Non-violent Extremists?" See also, Majelis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah (The Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah), "Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah (General Guide Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah's Struggle)," (n.d.).

⁴⁷ The author analysed the original transcript of the PUPJI which is written in both Indonesian and Arabic. The copy used is from the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) Database, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. For another analysis of the PUPJI, see Elena Pavlova, "From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 9 (2007).

⁴⁸ For HTI, see Ward, 155-157. See also, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "A System for Caderisation of Mujahidin in Creating and Islamic Society", address delivered at the first Indonesian Congress of Mujahidin, in *Indonesian Congress of Mujahidin* (Yogyakarta, Indonesia 5 - 7 August, 2000 (Translated by Tim Behrend).

ii. Reaching a Consensus on the Existential Threat

In 1998, when Indonesians overthrew a dictator who had ruled for 32 years, the nation's status changed to become the world's third-largest democracy. Responsibility for the country's antiterrorism effort was transferred from the military to the police by the Indonesian parliament in an attempt to reform the military. The military had been instrumental in helping Suharto stay in power for many years. The newly elected democratic leaders decided to prosecute the terrorists publicly through the regular court system and refused the use of internal security act or other draconian laws that could incarcerate terrorists much faster. Even the increasingly vocal Islamic political movements were dealt with patiently. The authorities treated suspected terrorists "as good men gone astray." Similarly, in police custody, they were "treated with kid gloves in order to get information on the terror network."⁴⁹

In Indonesia, it is hard to assume that security interests of the state, regime, and nation, are an integrated whole, especially in a democracy where political parties are free to pursue their political agendas. An existential threat to the state or nation could also be a threat to the ruling regime. Even when the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists are perceived as directed against the state, it does not seem to generate enough momentum among the Indonesian political leaders to warrant them to be securitised. One possible reason is that traditionally, the security of the Indonesian state is about defending it from external threats and preserving its independence in political, economic and military terms. As non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists are non-state actors, there are obvious difficulties in

⁴⁹ Sidney Jones. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Singapore, (17 July 2014).

comprehending the nature of the threat they pose. In fact, this is the same problem that terrorism posed for security studies. Attempting to argue that the threat from these Islamists could shatter a political system committed to *Pancasila* does not provide additional leverage to securitise them. It is because opposition to the *Pancasila* had in the past, been used by those in power in the regime to serve its narrow security interests.⁵⁰

Many factors could account for the lack of decisiveness in securitising non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. Four are visible after Suharto's fall. The first factor consists of changes in political leadership which occurred in rapid successions after Suharto's fall. The changes created uncertainties for the future of the newly democratising Indonesian state. Under such situation, the priority, therefore, was to ensure the return of political and economic stability. The eagerness to reform the political system unleashed the political forces that the New Order had suppressed or controlled. The new political environment, in the name of democracy, ironically enabled non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists to launch the 'jihad project' to establish an Islamic state, which undermines the country's pluralist political institutions. Initially, the return of Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and JI members who were Afghan War veterans with an established link to Al-Qaeda did not raise a security concern. On the contrary, the new political landscape in Indonesia saw high risks and few advantages in moving against them without proper evidence. Furthermore, since 1998, governing coalitions have found it necessary to include some Muslim parties in their ranks. As such, ignoring the provocations from Islamist

⁵⁰ Leonard C Sebastian, *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force* (Singapore: ISEAS Publication, 2006), 55-58. See also, Marcus Mietzner, "Politics of Engagement: The Indonesian Armed Forces, Islamic Extremism, and the 'War on Terror'," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9, No. 1 (2002): 78-79.

groups not only ensures greater coalition stability but also promises brighter future electoral prospects.⁵¹

The second factor is the role of *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI, Indonesian National Armed Forces) as the guardian and protector of the *Pancasila* state. After the New Order had fallen, it came under scrutiny. Its expanded role in the doctrine of *Dwifungsi* (dual function), where the Armed Forces became both a “military force” and a “social-political force,” were severely questioned.⁵² Largely, this not only watered down the existential threat that the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists posed but also, impaired the state’s ability to securitise them. The Armed Forces, being the only entity in the past, which had fought “rebellion under the banner of Islam,”⁵³ has been asked to “return to the barracks” and are now more concerned with the external threat to the state. There is also a concern about an increasing Islamist influence in TNI which could have facilitated the decision.

The third factor is the fact that the majority of Islamists in Indonesia are non-violent. The perception numbed the threat posed by the violent ones. It gives rise to positive feelings that, whatever these Islamists do; they are not going to succeed in implementing their agenda, as the majority of Indonesian Muslims are moderates.⁵⁴ It is alarming that the government failed to recognise that only a few people are needed to cause major disruption to the peace and security as demonstrated by the Bali bombings.

⁵¹ Ward, 153.

⁵² Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, “Defending the Country Entering the 21st Century,” 9-14. See also, Terence Lee, “The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia,” *Asian Survey* 40, No. 4 (2000): 692.

⁵³ See C. Van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

⁵⁴ Andrée Feillard and Rémy Madinier, *The End of Innocence?: Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism* trans. Wong Wee (Singapore: NUS Press in association with IRASEC, 2010., 2011), 221-222.

The fourth factor is the American-inspired idea of a Global War on Terror (GWOT) as a response to the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre's twin towers in New York. GWOT led to heightened anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. It left a deep feeling of disappointment, resentment and anger felt by Muslims over United States' extreme reactions.⁵⁵ For the Indonesian government not to aggravate the situation further, the easiest way is for the government not to support the GWOT openly. A view that asserts that the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists pose an existential threat is congruous with GWOT, and hence, should be pursued cautiously.

These four factors, in turn, make it difficult for the state political leadership as the securitising actor, to designate non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists as a threat. Even if they claim that there is an existential threat from the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists to the referent object, the *Pancasila* state, this claim must be accepted by the relevant audience among the population to have an effect. It also calls into question of whether in the absence of a consensus; securitisation can be morally right or justifiable.

1.3. The Working Hypothesis: A Consensus on Securitisation

This study argues that the factor that led to the post-Suharto Indonesian state's decision against securitising the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists was the absence of a consensus on the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. As pointed out earlier, the underlying principle of securitisation theory is that security is a speech act. Securitisation occurs when the securitising actor elevates an issue from the sphere of ordinary

⁵⁵ Sikawarsini Djelantik, "Terrorism in Indonesia: The Emergence of West Javanese Terrorists," *East-West Center Working Papers* No. 22 (2006): 10-11.

politics governed by democratic rules and decision-making procedures to the domain of high politics shaped by urgency, priority and a matter of life and death. When a state representative as the securitising actor utters “security,” and the relevant audience among the population accepts this, it allows a particular issue to be moved into a specific area because it poses a threat to the existence of a specific referent object. The threat to the survival of the referent object justifies the securitising actor to claim a special right to use whatever means necessary to block the threat.⁵⁶ Even if it means adopting extraordinary measures to ensure the survival of the referent object.⁵⁷

In theory, for the speech act to occur, the Indonesian political leadership must issue a statement that designates the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists as an existential threat to the referent object, the *Pancasila* state. The statement warns the Indonesian general public about the threat, and they must agree with the political leadership on the need to do something. If the general public as the relevant audience disagrees with Indonesian political leadership on the threat, the intended effects will not materialise, and so, no securitisation will take place.

While the Strategic Studies literature has not sufficiently addressed these issues, national security, as Kobi Michael suggests, is the explicit domain of the political leadership.⁵⁸ Following this understanding, the responsibility for defining an existential threat and their appropriate responses lies with the political leadership. However, due to the four factors, which the study has identified earlier, the political leadership in Indonesia find it challenging to

⁵⁶ Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 54-55.

⁵⁷ Rita Taureck, “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies,” *Journal of International Relations & Development* 9, No. 1 (2006).

⁵⁸ Kobi Michael, “Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, No. 5 (2009): 691.

achieve a consensus among them. This difficulty leads to the question of whether the *Pancasila* state is the referent object of security that is being threatened, and that which these political actors have identified and intended to safeguard. Conversely, are there different reasons for treating it as the referent object? Here, as Rita Floyd cogently points out, the key to uncovering sincerity is to examine the rhetoric of the speech act and whether the following security practices match it. The inexplicable discrepancy between words and deeds of the political leadership may suggest insincerity, while conformity between the two indicates sincerity.⁵⁹

Finally, two issues raise a concern here. First, in principle, securitisation could become a powerful tool for the ruling regime to silence political opponents if they can securitise anything. Second, if the relevant audience accepts securitisation among the population, the government's use of extraordinary means cannot be questioned. Under such circumstances, the usual checks and balances do not apply, and the government will not be required to account for its actions to protect the referent object.

1.4. Theoretical Framework of this Study

There are two reasons for adopting the concept of securitisation proposed by the Copenhagen School. First, in the post-Cold War era, the idea of security has become much more multifaceted and complex. Therefore, security needs a broader framework that incorporates earlier disregarded concepts to be a part of the security problem. The idea of securitisation formulated by Ole Wæver was the securitisation of an issue when it gets constructed into a threat. This

⁵⁹ Rita Floyd, "Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards A Just Securitization Theory," *Security Dialogue* 42, No. 4-5 (2011): 429.

definition is particularly relevant to this study. According to Wæver, “something is a security problem when the elites declared it to be so,” and something becomes securitised when it is declared a security problem. The concept of securitisation provides this study, which seeks to examine and analyse securitisation in Indonesia with the necessary theoretical backdrop.

Second, the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitisation is a more comprehensive theory that rests on the speech act, the securitising actor and audience. These three aspects of the securitisation theory provide this study with a basis to gauge a consensus on securitisation of non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists in Indonesia. The securitising agent’s decision to securitise or not to securitise them is a political choice, which this study utilises by securitisation theory. This study understands Wæver’s concern that:

“As a security/securitisation analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try and assist in shaping the continent [Europe] in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence — even if this occasionally means invoking/ producing ‘structures’ or even using the dubious instrument of securitization.”⁶⁰

Nevertheless, this study adopts the securitisation theory as an analytical theory and not a normative theory. In this regard, this study will not try to address the question of using securitisation theory in the normative analysis, which Rita Floyd discusses in detail in “Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards A Just Securitization Theory.”

Concept of Security

There is a substantial body of concepts about security which the Copenhagen School developed. The School has been instrumental in

⁶⁰ O. Wæver, “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post Sovereign Security Orders,” in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 285.

broadening the concept of security by including new referent objects of security other than the state. However, this study finds the School's analytical framework of defining security by analysing the question of how and when a specific matter becomes securitised, to be crucial. According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, security is about the survival of the designated referent object when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to the referent object.⁶¹ It involves classification of, and consensus about, certain phenomena, persons or entities as existential threats, that require emergency measures.

An issue is no longer a subject of standard political procedures once it has been securitised. The securitisation of the said issue that is posing an existential threat allows the government the use of extraordinary actions. As it is a matter of utmost urgency, constituencies accept the use of counter-threat measures that fall outside the boundaries of normal politics. The book, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* cogently articulates the idea. It defines security as issues that are “staged as existential threats to referent objects by a securitising actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind.”⁶²

The speech act designates a certain issue as an existential threat to security. It is what securitising actors use to articulate a problem in security terms and persuade a relevant audience among the population of its immediate danger. Wæver regards security as a speech act where “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act... By uttering “security,” a state representative moves a particular

⁶¹ Lipschutz, 21.

⁶² Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 5.

development into a given area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”⁶³

The securitiser constructs a threat into a security issue and for this to occur; there is no need for any material and existential basis. Nevertheless, Buzan et al. make it clear that:

“We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measures has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity. If no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of a securitizing move, not of an object being securitized.”⁶⁴

Application of the Concept to this Study

From the discussions above, the concept of securitisation proposed by the Copenhagen School offers the following understanding:

- i. The government and political elites in Indonesia acting as securitising actors can securitise non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists as posing an existential threat to the survival of the referent object, the *Pancasila* state.
- ii. The securitisation can be effected by articulating what constitutes a speech act. However, securitisation occurs when securitising agents succeed in convincing the relevant audience, in this case, the general Indonesian population, that the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists are indeed an existential threat. The acceptance of the relevant audience, therefore, is crucial in the securitisation process. The governments of post-

⁶³ Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 55.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 25.

Suharto Indonesia needs to consider the opinions of the general Indonesian population seriously.

- iii. The consensus on the existential threat that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists pose is between the securitising actors and the relevant audience. With the consensus, the securitising actors proceed to formulate and implement policies to counter the threat. After the securitising actors achieved a consensus with the relevant audience on the existential threat, the imposition of extraordinary measures to contain the threat will not be an issue.
- iv. In the absence of a consensus, securitisation is ineffective because the general Indonesian population refused to accept the government's designation of the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists as an existential threat. Any attempt to formulate and implement policies to counter the existential threat from non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists will remain futile. The concurrence of the relevant audience, which is the Indonesian general public, is an essential consideration for the newly-democratised Indonesia if it wants to shed the images of past abuses by the Suharto regime.⁶⁵

In summary, the concept of securitisation proposed by the Copenhagen School provides this study with the foundational understanding of several terms such as the “speech act,” “securitising actor,” “relevant audience” and “consensus.” These terms allow this study to conduct a systematic inquiry,

⁶⁵ Sulistiyanto, 73-94.

examination, and analysis of the research topic; in particular when arguing that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists pose an existential threat to the *Pancasila* state as the referent object. By using the existential threat to the referent object as a starting point, this study advances the inquiry further by testing whether a consensus exists between the “securitising actor” and the “relevant audience.” Here, this study analyses the “speech act” and traces its acceptance by the “relevant audience,” and uncovers whether or not it leads to formulation and implementation of policies to counter the threat.

1.5. Research Methodology

For an in-depth analysis of the existential threat that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamist pose to the *Pancasila* state’s ideology, and the manner in which the state reacts to this perception, this study adopts a qualitative research approach. This study has chosen JI, MMI, and JAT as case studies to represent the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. Their origin and development, ideology and strategies will be examined to assess the seriousness of the threat they pose to the *Pancasila* state.

During fieldwork, interviews and discussions were carried out with the securitisers and relevant audience. Apart from that documentary research was a second major source of information which includes examining publications by both the Islamists and the state. Although this research relies primarily on qualitative methods, triangulation⁶⁶ is employed to strengthen the case of the empirical data. Secondary source materials such as books, book chapters, monographs and articles from journals, newspapers, and magazines were used

⁶⁶ Todd D. Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24, No. 4 (Dec. 1979): 602-611.

to validate the claims and arguments presented in the primary materials. Throughout the research, materials written in three languages, namely Bahasa Indonesia, English, and Arabic, were examined extensively.

This study was conducted in two phases. The first phase focuses on assessing the existential threat by examining JI's, MMI's, and JAT's origin and development, ideology, and strategy. The findings established two things, namely, their intentions and capabilities that were then used to analyse the extent they seek to undermine the *Pancasila* state. The result of the analysis provided the basis to demonstrate the existential threat they posed to the referent object. For this purpose, this study examined and analysed speeches and lectures of the leaders and founders of the three groups; magazines and documents that they published; their websites and, what their supporters and sympathisers said about them. These were then compared to scholarly research and security agencies' statements about them to represent views from both sides.

The second phase of the analysis examined securitisation in Indonesia; in particular, responses to the existential threat posed by JI, MMI, and JAT to the referent object. For the second phase, this study focused and analysed speech acts by securitising actors and their acceptance by the relevant audience. Also, this study is interested in establishing whether a consensus exists, and if so, whether it leads to formulation and implementation of policies to counter the threat. Sources for the second phase include speeches of political leaders such as Indonesia's present and past presidents, interviews with security chiefs, and official representatives of the state.

To further illuminate the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, this study examined speeches made by the three groups' founding fathers and ideologues before Suharto's retirement in May 1998, where relevant. It also included analysis of documents that could shed more light on groups such as JI, which is much older than MMI and JAT. As for the absence of consensus among Indonesian elites to securitise them, this study examined the issue within an eighteen-year period, starting from 1998 to 2016. The period is when liberal democracy replaced authoritarianism in Indonesia and accorded greater rights to freedom of speech and voting. As such, the chosen time frame, this study argues, provides greater room for Islamists to articulate their disagreement with the *Pancasila* state. The condition is in sharp contrast to the Suharto era where no such opportunity abounded. So, the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists continued refusal to embrace the mainstream and pursuing their political agenda away from the constitutionally accepted platforms after the Suharto era, establish the need to investigate further the underlying reason(s) for their convictions.

1.6 Structure of this Research

This study consists of three parts. The first part comprises of three chapters where Chapter 1 establishes the theoretical and methodological platform for the succeeding chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review and critique of existing approaches to security and Islamism. Chapter 3 sets up the perimeters for defining and assessing the existential threat to the *Pancasila* state. The second part of this study consists of three chapters and examines the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. The

origin and development, ideology, and strategies for the three chosen case studies (JI, MMI, and JAT) were examined, and their intentions and capabilities assessed to ascertain the existential threat they pose to the *Pancasila* state. Then, assessments were also made on the government's responses to the threat. The third part consists of Chapter 7, which presents conclusions drawn from the preceding discussions.

CHAPTER TWO

A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF SECURITY AND ISLAMISM

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides a literature review of Security and Islamism that is pertinent to understanding the concepts and key theoretical assumptions that inform the securitisation of non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists in Indonesia. The chapter is divided into six sections. Part I offers an overview of the developments that have taken place within security studies. Part II examines in detail the literature on the various approaches to security. Part III reviews existing literature on the Copenhagen School of security. Part IV reviews the application of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory to the Indonesian case. Part V evaluates the literature on Muslim political activism in Indonesia. Part VI concludes the chapter.

2.2. Developments within Security Studies

An analysis of the literature on security raises two inevitable questions that need answering. The first reflects upon the difficulty of drawing a clear and distinct line for studying Security. The second determines what should be included or excluded from Security Studies.⁶⁷ There are at least two approaches, which are discernible from the literature. One approach is to adopt a broad and inclusive understanding of Security as the starting point. The approach allows almost every human value and interest to be a potential

⁶⁷ Edward A. Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.

security issue, depending on how the affected party perceives it, whether it is a threat or not. Such an approach, however, risks including in the definition of security much more than necessary, and this may hinder a more focused study of security. Another approach is to opt for a narrower conception of security, which involves states and armies. While this approach permits security studies to be more focused, it runs into the danger of excluding actors and factors, which affect security considerably. The existential threat that the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists in Indonesia posed to the unitary *Pancasila* state will not be a security issue if security concentrates only on force and coercive threats from other states and armies. The threat from such Islamists would only be of security concern when it involves violence or threat to use violence.

In this light, both Ullman's⁶⁸ and Mathews'⁶⁹ contributions to a redefinition of security are significant as they tried to move away from emphasising military threats to the state. Ullman opined that "defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality."⁷⁰ Mathews in her observation of the global developments suggested the "broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues."⁷¹ They are not the only two scholars who challenge the traditional understanding of security which identifies security with external threats and challenges to the state. In fact, like them, other scholars argue for the concept of security to be expanded and include

⁶⁸ Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, No. 1 (1983): 129-153.

⁶⁹ Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, No. 2 (1989): 162-177.

⁷⁰ Ullman, 129.

⁷¹ Mathews, 162.

some new definitions and aspects.⁷² These new definitions and aspects of security present the ‘new thinking’ about security. The new thinking also highlights the inadequacy of the traditional thinking of security where state security from the external threat posed by another state usually receives more attention. States now will have to look at security from a non-traditional perspective, which introduces threats stemming from within the states and non-state actors.

Such a view became more pronounced with the end of the Cold War. There are now two broad categories of literature on the thinking about security, namely, traditional and non-traditional security.⁷³ The categorisation presents two complementary ways of looking at security. Both are needed to provide a better understanding of present-day threats to security and the issue of security itself. Both views are important because a traditional view of security suggests that key disputes lie between states, and therefore, focuses on military dimensions of their interactions. While states may accord greater priority to this, a non-traditional view of security complements the traditional view in its recognition of the role of actors other than the state and views security as involving issues other than the military dimension. However, one significant difference between the two views lies in the designation of the referent point for security. The traditional view sees the state as an entity that has to be secured and defines security in military terms. The non-traditional view represented by

⁷² Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework*, 71-93; and Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

⁷³ Lorraine Elliot, “Regional Environmental Security: Pursuing A Non-Traditional Approach,” in Andrew T. H. Tan and J. D. Kenneth Boutin, eds., *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Select Publishing for Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), 438-467; and Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “War and Other Insecurities in East Asia: What the Security Studies Field Does and Does Not Tell Us,” *Pacific Review* 22, No. 1 (2009): 60-62.

the newer works on security focuses on a different referent object, usually the individual, and has a much broader view of security, which usually focuses on economic and environmental dimensions of security.⁷⁴

Another group of scholars on security also wrote extensively post-September 11. The literature they published identified terrorism as the number one threat not only to the United States but also many other states, including those in South-east Asia.⁷⁵ Scholars who argue that terrorism is a new threat, also view traditional security measures are inadequate to deal with it. A strategy based on Clausewitzian strategic thought cannot address the threat of terrorism effectively. In this regard, the challenges from non-state actors such as terrorist organisations, as well as ideology such as the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate, require yet another shift in thinking about security.⁷⁶

Therefore, arguments prevalent in the security literature which calls for security to be widened and for the inclusion of aspects of international life other than military security are indicators of the many contemporary security concerns.⁷⁷ This realisation and the fact that the security landscape is fast changing, support a broader and deeper concept of security. Security can no

⁷⁴ "Inaugural Meeting of the Consortium of Non-traditional Security Studies in Asia: Report of the Inaugural Meeting, 8-9 January 2007, Singapore / organized by the NTS-Asia Secretariat, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Nanyang Technological University with the support of the Ford Foundation," (Singapore: S. Rajaratnum School of International Studies, 2007).

⁷⁵ Carl Ungerer, "Australia's Policy Responses to Terrorism in Southeast Asia," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 18, No. 3 (2006): 193-199; Amitav Acharya and Arabinda Acharya, "The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the 'War on Terror' in Southeast Asia," *Washington Quarterly* 30, No. 4 (2007): 75-90; and Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists* (Westport Praeger, 2007).

⁷⁶ Kumar Ramakrishna, "Countering the New Terrorism of Al Qaeda Without Generating Civilizational Conflict: The Need for an Indirect Strategy," in Andrew T. H. Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, eds., *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-Strategies*, (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), 207-232; and M. R. Habberfeld and Agostino Hassell, eds., *A New Understanding of Terrorism: Case Studies, Trajectories and Lessons Learned* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2009).

⁷⁷ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, No. 2 (1996): 233-235.

longer be based on a particular view of the world or focused on “American national security rather than on international security or security *per se*.”⁷⁸ Issues previously thought of in non-security terms have been included in the concept of securitisation and have entered the debate on security.⁷⁹

2.3. Approaches to Security

There are many approaches to security, but the debates have always concentrated on three aspects: actors, structures, and processes. Reflecting upon the debates concerning the nature of security, Smith⁸⁰ considers the non-traditional literature in security studies as the ‘new thinking,’ which he points out, is distinct from the dominant realist paradigm prevalent in mainstream debates on security. While many still study the military aspects of security, new dimensions and aspects of security are beginning to shape the discussions on security. Nevertheless, the military concerns remain central position in the discussions about security, with increasing number of other aspects of human activity being discussed as security issues.

From a Realist Perspective

Realists assume states as the main actors in an anarchic international system, where power is central to political life. There are, however, disagreements among realists regarding some essential ideas. Hans

⁷⁸ Edward A. Kolodziej, “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!,” *International Studies Quarterly* 36, No. 4 (1992): 423; and Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, No. 2 (1991).

⁷⁹ Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 2-20.

⁸⁰ Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 20, No. 3 (1999): 72-101.

Morgenthau⁸¹, for example, sees competition between states as arising from the human lust for power. Kenneth Waltz⁸², on the other hand, disregards human nature and assumes that states merely aim to survive. For “offensive” realists, such as Mearsheimer,⁸³ great powers seek to maximise security by maximising their relative power, while “defensive” realists, such as Jack Snyder,⁸⁴ argue that great powers attempt to defend the status quo. Realism is, therefore, not a narrow intellectual monolith, but made up of proponents who share a few important ideas but disagree about many others.⁸⁵

Realists separate inter-state relations from domestic politics but do not deny that domestic politics influence foreign policy. However, they contend that “in self-help systems, the pressure of competition weighs more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures.”⁸⁶ So, the threat from the military power of an adversary is viewed as something that can threaten the very existence of a state, whereas other forms of power cannot. There is a serious concern here; thinking about national security as military threats arising from beyond the borders of one’s country draws attention away from the non-military threats. Precisely for this reason, the realist security paradigm is less suitable for this study as it would be difficult to project the existential threat that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists posed, because Islamists are non-state actors, and the threat they pose is domestic in nature. The state, however, is still

⁸¹ Robert Kaufman, “Morgenthau's Unrealistic Realism,” *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 1, No. 2 (Spring 2006): 25.

⁸² Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

⁸³ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, No. 3 (1994): 11-12.

⁸⁴ Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and international Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

⁸⁵ Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” *American Political Science Review* 91, No. 4 (1997): 932-933.

⁸⁶ Keohane, Robert O., ed., *Neorealism and its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 329.

crucial as the main provider of security to its citizens in line with Hobbes' Leviathan where the modern state has "the monopoly of legitimate violence over a defined territory and is capable of imposing order on an otherwise contentious population inhabiting that space."⁸⁷

From a Constructivist Perspective

Unlike realists, constructivists view that the facts of international politics as not reflecting an objective or material reality, but an intersubjective or social reality.⁸⁸ So, what actors in international relations do, the interests they hold, and the structures within which they operate are determined by social norms and ideas. These are based not on objective or material conditions. Similarly, constructivist security studies proceed from the premise that the structures of international politics are more social than strictly material. Security, therefore, is made and re-made by human intersubjective understandings and can be constructed. Constructivists reject the neo-realist assumption that the state of anarchy is a structural condition inherent in the system of states. Instead, Alexander Wendt views "anarchy is what states make of it."⁸⁹ Anarchy is the result of a process that constructs the rules or norms that govern the interaction of states. As such, a change in the anarchic nature of the system of states is, therefore, possible.⁹⁰

Despite the differences between realist and constructivist perspectives, security studies based on constructivism are sometimes accused of being a mere

⁸⁷ Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations*, 56.

⁸⁸ Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rules in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

⁸⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, No. 2 (1992): 395.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 420-421.

supplement to realist and neo-realist security theory. There are several reasons for this. For the first reason, social constructivists agree with realists that states are the main actors in world politics. Second, they do not dispute that the international system is anarchic. Third, they do not refute realists' definition of security in primarily military terms. Like realists, they too assert that states cannot know the intentions of other states. However, constructivists look at the meanings that actors give to these important features in international politics and posit that changing these realities require changing the way we think about international politics.

Comparing realism and constructivism, Peou concludes that both realism and constructivism are established as key intellectual competitors in South-east Asian security studies.⁹¹ In his review of the major works of two political scientists; Michael Leifer⁹² and Amitav Acharya,⁹³ Peou argues that constructivism is more insightful than balance-of-power realism. In Peou's review, it is more likely to conform to a sophisticated balance-of-threat theory, which he describes as a form of 'minimalist' or 'soft' realism and can provide an explanation for the daunting task of security-community building. Mearsheimer, using realism, has a different opinion. According to him, "every state would like to be the most formidable military power in the system because this is the best way to guarantee survival in a world that can be very

⁹¹ Sorpong Peou, "Realism and Constructivism in Southeast Asian Security Studies Today: A Review Essay," *The Pacific Review* 15, No. 1 (2002): 120.

⁹² Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989); —, "Indochina and ASEAN: Seeking a New Balance," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 15, No. 3 (1993); and —, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability* (London: Routledge, 2000).

⁹³ Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence Community?," *Pacific Affairs* 64, No. 2 (1991); —, *The Quest for Identity : International Relations of Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000); and —, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia : ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (Milton Park: Routledge, 2009).

dangerous... Survival would then be almost guaranteed. All states are influenced by this logic, which means not only that they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, but also that they work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. States are, in other words, both offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented.”⁹⁴ While acknowledging the progress constructivists have made in South-east Asian security studies, Peou did not discount the fact that realism is still important. Peou merely suggests that constructivism provides a better answer.

From Critical Security Studies Perspective

Another approach to security, which is substantially different from both realism and constructivism, comes from the Critical Security Studies (CSS) School. As CSS owes its development to the Marxist tradition of Critical Theory, it either problem-solves within the existing framework of society or focuses on human emancipation. One major difference it has from the first two approaches is its focus on the individual as the referent object of security instead of the state. In fact, for Booth⁹⁵, states can often be the most significant threat to the security of their populations. Emancipation, Booth argues, should be given priority in our thinking about security and not power. Booth defines emancipation as freeing people (as individuals and groups) from the human constraints, which prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. These constraints are war, the threat of war, poverty, poor

⁹⁴ Mearsheimer, 12.

⁹⁵ Ken Booth, “Emancipation and Security,” *Review of International Studies*, 17, No. 4 (1991): 323. Also,———, ed. *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

education and political oppression. Thus, CSS regard emancipation as producer of true security and not power or order.

There are two main criticisms of CSS. Many traditional security specialists find its focus on emancipation inappropriate because it confuses analysis with morality. It resulted in objective analysis of events being replaced by CSS's normative commitment to human emancipation. As there are many different forms of emancipation, debates on human rights cannot conclusively determine the set of human rights that all societies of the world abide by and would accept. Another criticism is directed at CSS's focus on the emancipation of individuals, which is understood as, and many have also argued, that the notion is a western-developed view of security. The criticism stemmed from many scholars who perceive strengthening the state or the ethnic group as more important than Western concepts of individual rights.

From Human Security Perspective

The fourth approach to security also represents a significant account of security as it links the individual with the broader economic, environmental and social conditions of humanity. The concept of human security emerged out of the 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP).⁹⁶ An examination of the literature on human security demonstrates that the language of human security is about "the re-centring of the subject of security away from the state."⁹⁷ In its broadest sense, Newman⁹⁸ understood human security as an

⁹⁶ United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 1994," (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Chapter 2.

⁹⁷ Ryerson Christie, "Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, To Engage or To Critique?," *Security Dialogue* 41, No. 2 (2010): 169.

⁹⁸ Edward Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism," *International Studies Perspectives* 2, No. 2 (2001): 239.

attempt to place the individual or people collectively as the referent of security. It is not necessarily in opposition to institutions such as territory and state sovereignty. Thus, human security does not mean a complete break with the state. In fact, most of the current work argues that the state remains the most effective guarantor of human security.⁹⁹

Considerable writing on human security is based on liberalism, where security comes to be equated with the pursuit of peace and development for individuals. Duffield¹⁰⁰ pointing this out explains that ‘the idea of liberal peace, for example, combines and conflates “liberal” (as in contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with “peace” (the present policy preference towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction).’ Human security according to the advocates of this formation is both a significant break from the previous state-centric security calculation and an eye-opener which allows pressing security issues of peoples in the South to be better understood. The primary motivation pushing scholars of human security is their concern for peoples in the developing world. The literature also highlights that the state as the traditional referent object of security can be a source of primary threat to peoples’ lives.

Many arguments have been made to push for human security because of its capacity to include a range of issues in debates about security.¹⁰¹ Human security narratives provide greater space for a broader range of issues to be

⁹⁹ Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First,” *Global Governance* 7, No. 1 (2001): 19-23; and George Maclean, “Instituting and Projecting Human Security: A Canadian Perspective,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 54, No. 3 (2000): 269-276.

¹⁰⁰ Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed, 2001), 11.

¹⁰¹ Annick Wibben, “Human Security: Toward an Opening,” *Security Dialogue* 39, No. 4 (2008): 455-462; and Sandra Maclean, “Microbes, Mad Cows and Militaries: Exploring the Links Between Health and Security,” *Security Dialogue* 39, No. 5 (2008): 475-494.

included, as well as moving the referent object of security away from the state to individuals. Matters that were once ignored by state-centric security practices are now given their proper attention. In this respect, Annick Wibben ¹⁰² has been most coherent in advancing this. Wibben argues that human security frameworks are consistent with the broadening and deepening of security discourse.

From another aspect, human security also provides useful insights into making sense of the motivation behind the attacks on 9/11. The hijackers' and their direct sponsors' justification of their antagonism against the US and its role in the Middle East can be attributed to problems that a human security perspective highlights. In other words, analysing September 11 using the human security approach is more comprehensive as it offers more than the traditional viewpoint. The human security approach brings our attention to the reasons why numerous individuals outside the developed world can support the attacks on the bastion of global capitalism. It alerts us to one of the possible causes of terrorism and asserts that the debates over how to respond to such attacks must consider more comprehensive definitions of security other than those already in the mainstream. In the final analysis, human security also set us thinking whether military security can be accomplished without economic security.

Some scholars cautioned against the uncritical extension of the concept of security to the individual. Khong for instance, viewed making a security issue out of every threat to the well-being of every individual in every state, and trying to resolve these human security predicaments by diverting resources from other non-security areas, can lead to “(total) paralysis of our ability to

¹⁰² Wibben, 458.

prioritize.”¹⁰³ Instead, Khong urged human security proponents to build the capability and preparedness to prioritise the numerous human security dilemmas so that the essential human, economic, and military resources can be allocated more efficiently.

2.4. The Copenhagen School of Security

The name ‘Copenhagen School’ refers to a small group of scholars formerly based at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen, Denmark. Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan are the School’s most prominent members. The two scholars have developed three conceptual tools of analysis which further develop the study of security. These three concepts are sectors of security, regional security complex theory, and securitisation theory. Buzan developed the first two while Wæver developed the latter.

There are three steps for securitisation to be successful. The first is the identification of existential threats. The second is the emergency action taken in response to the threat. The third is the effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules.¹⁰⁴ An issue is presented as an existential threat when a securitising actor utters that: “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way).”¹⁰⁵ This first step towards successful securitisation is called a securitising move. In Securitisation Theory, the securitising move requires a securitising actor to convince an audience of an existential threat and the need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations to deal with it

¹⁰³ Yuen Foong Khong, “Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?,” *Global Governance* 7, No. 3 (2001): 233.

¹⁰⁴ Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 6; and Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization”.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 24.

(extraordinary measures). It is dependent on the securitising actor having the power and capability to socially and politically construct a threat. In this way, while the study of security remains wide, there are restrictions about ‘who’ can securitise.

Wæver is exceptionally critical of framing issues regarding security. For Wæver: “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics.”¹⁰⁶ For this reason, Wæver encourages a strategy of desecuritisation, whereby securitisation is reversed, and issues are moved out of ‘the threat – defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ so that they can be dealt with by the rules of the (democratic) political system.¹⁰⁷ Despite this statement of preference by Wæver et al., desecuritisation is still largely under-theorised and open to interpretation. Despite this, Wæver views desecuritisation as a positive concept – one which policymakers should strive towards, and one a wider ‘securitisation studies’ should embrace.¹⁰⁸

2.5. Application of the Securitisation Theory to the Threat of Terrorism in Indonesia

Several attempts have been made to apply the Copenhagen’s Securitisation Theory to the threat of terrorism in Indonesia. Damme¹⁰⁹, for example, offers a modified securitisation framework by looking at both the decision to securitise and subsequent policy action, which in his view can better

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 29.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ O. Wæver, “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post Sovereign Security Orders,” in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 253.

¹⁰⁹ Ashley Van Damme, “The Securitization of Terrorism in Indonesia: 2001-2006” (M.A. Thesis, The University of British Columbia, 2008).

accommodate the complexities of addressing terrorism in Indonesia. The framework emphasises the importance of political and institutional motivations behind not only the speech act but also the related non-discursive action. The study demonstrates that a government's decision to pursue a strategy of securitisation, criminalisation or a combination of both is dependent on political context, and in doing so reinforces the importance of understanding the motives behind both the decision to securitise and the following policy action.

Choiruzzad¹¹⁰, on the other hand, borrows from the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory to explore how the global war on terror discourse was used as the basis for securitisation by state apparatuses in Indonesia and its impacts to human (in)security. In his analysis of extraordinary measures allowed by the securitisation theory, he notes that there is a possibility that instead of achieving security, securitisation can lead to human insecurity. In Indonesia's case, he argues that the vast extension of power or "state of exception," accorded by securitisation has the potential to transform democracies into totalitarian states.

While both studies used securitisation theory as a basis to advance their arguments, no attempt was made to systematically address the fundamental issue of existential threat to the referent object (the Indonesian state). As the two studies focused on terrorism in Indonesia and chose JI in Indonesia as a case study, the studies ignore the fact that there are other groups in Indonesia,

¹¹⁰ Shofwan Al-Banna Choiruzzad, "Global War on Terror, Securitization and Human Security: Indonesia's Case," http://ritsume.academia.edu/ShofwanAlBannaChoiruzzad/Papers/434199/Global_War_on_Terror_Securitization_and_Human_In_Security_Indonesias_Case), accessed on 10 June 2012.

which are ideologically similar to JI. The Indonesian government, therefore, should also be wary of these groups. While these groups are not known to engage in terrorism or violence, leaving them out may be misleading.

2.6. Islamism, Fundamentalism, Radicalism, and Extremism in Indonesia

Terms such as Islamism, fundamentalism, radicalism, and extremism are often used to explain terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and its franchises. Other than the difficulty in arriving at a universally accepted definition for Islamism, the attempt also suffers from differences arising from contending perspectives of looking at these terms.¹¹¹ For this reason, the oft-quoted phrase, “one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter” best represent this conundrum. In Indonesia, Islamism is a multifaceted phenomenon with multiple dimensions and various implications. In its modern-day manifestations, similar to other political doctrines, Islamism, Mozaffari observes, manifests itself as an “ideology,” a “movement-organisation” and a “form of government.”¹¹² However, Islamist’s objective of re-establishing a

¹¹¹ Martin Kramer, “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?,” *Middle East Quarterly* 10, No. 2 (2003): 65-77; William E. Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology,” *International Journal of Middle East* 19, No. 3 (1987): 307-335; Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002); Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); and ———, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

¹¹² Mehdi Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, No. 1 (2007): 17-33; Bassam Tibi, “Islamism and Democracy: On the Compatibility of Institutional Islamism and the Political Culture of Democracy,” *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 10, No. 2 (2009): 136-137; and Desai, *Rethinking Islamism*, 88-131.

system of government based on Islam's glorious past continues to be a source of security concern for some scholars.¹¹³

Definition and Meaning

Mozaffari, in his analysis of Islamism as a totalitarian ideology, notes some different meanings associated with the term Islamism. Voltaire, the Enlightenment philosopher, wrote, "this religion is called *islamisme*"¹¹⁴ instead of Islam. However, "Islam" and "Islamic" were the most commonly used term by Western Islamologists, orientalist and political scientists before the Islamic revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollah Khomeini took place. After the revolution, other terms such as "Islamic fundamentalism," "radical Islam," "Islamic revival," and "political Islam" were used to capture political activism based on a commitment to the religion of Islam.¹¹⁵ It is only after the tragic events of 9/11; "Islamism" became more frequently used, to denote, among other things, "a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means."¹¹⁶ Islamist therefore, is an individual who believes that Islam "has something to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion."¹¹⁷

Islamism understood as such, does not accept the separation of religion and state. In fact, *Deen* (religion), *Dunya* (life in this world) and *Dawla* (state)

¹¹³ Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press: 1998), 138-178. Angel Rabasa, "Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists," *Adelphi Paper* 358, London: *International Institute for Strategic Studies* (2003), 27-28 & 61-63; and Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 201-203 .

¹¹⁴ Cited in Kramer, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?," 66.

¹¹⁵ Mozaffari, 17-18.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 21.

¹¹⁷ Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, xi.

are integrated and indivisible. The ideal reference points for the implementation of Islam according to Islamists are the “Medina model” and the classical era of the “Rightly-guided Caliphs.” Therefore, when Islamists seek to implement these models to replace existing political system, political violence becomes a major concern. In the context of Southeast Asia and more specifically, in Indonesia, Sidel and Liow¹¹⁸ for instance, noted the increasingly dominant approach of the “religious violence industry” in the literature after the U.S.-led War on Terrorism. The approach has gained currency in the mainstream media over the past decade, since the fall of Suharto and more significantly, after the Bali bombings. In this regard, Sidel highlights an important point that violence in Indonesia cannot be adequately explained just by focusing on “one riot here, one bombing there.”¹¹⁹ In Desker’s view, taking the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the war in Afghanistan and the existence of Al-Qaeda networks in Southeast Asia as validation of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” thesis is flawed. It could, in the end, “fosters hostility towards the United States and the West by Muslims around the globe.”¹²⁰

Those who opposed the earlier approach felt that a better approach would be one, which is rooted, in a political, institutional, and intellectual tradition. Ramakrishna’s attempt to uncover the geopolitical, cultural, political, historical, psychological factors that allow individuals to engage in the mass murder of innocent people is another important contribution along this line.¹²¹ According to Means, the political developments in Afghanistan from 1978 to 2001

¹¹⁸ See, Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad*, ix-xvii; and Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Fluid Terrain of Islamism in Southeast Asia,” *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Aug. 2008): 23-32.

¹¹⁹ Sidel, 6.

¹²⁰ Barry Desker, “Islam and Society in South-East Asia after 11 September,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 56, No. 3 (2002): 383-394.

¹²¹ See, Kumar Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2009), 5.

changed “the homegrown characteristics of radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia.”¹²² However, Means could be misinterpreted as following the path taken by the religious violence industry for his preoccupation with Saudi funding, the Afghan jihad, and Al-Qaeda/JI nexus. A further reading of his discussion on transnational Islamic influences under the title “Southeast Asia and the Global Jihad”¹²³ helps confirm this view.

Relations between Islam and the State in Indonesia

Despite the problematic relationship Islamism has with states in Southeast Asia such as Thailand and the Philippines, Islam remained an integral part of Indonesia’s political history. One cannot understand Indonesia without understanding Islam in Indonesia. It is necessary to develop a foundational understanding of why Islamists want Islam to play a significant role in determining the future of Indonesia. Also significant is Sukarno’s and Suharto’s attempt to curb political parties based on Islam because they perceived them as potential power contenders capable of undermining the nationalist basis of the state.¹²⁴ The Islamic political resurgence some have argued was due to Suharto’s “efforts to de-politicise Indonesia,” which drove “many to look to Islam as an alternative political arena.”¹²⁵ There is evidence presented in the literature to support the claim that Suharto’s programme of campus “normalisation” aimed at depoliticising campus life through restrictions on student organisations had the reverse effect. Students instead, became more

¹²² Gordon P. Means, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 161.

¹²³ Ibid, 151-187.

¹²⁴ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam in Contemporary Indonesian Politics* (Jakarta: Ushul Press, 2006), 39. See also, —, *Islam and the State in Indonesia*, 13-52.

¹²⁵ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting : Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 174.

inclined to join an increasing number of unmediated Islamic organisational cells and study groups. Mosques, both on and off campus, became a new focus of religious-political activities and discussion groups that helped fuel an Islamic awakening.¹²⁶ Unlike some scholars, Hefner presents substantial evidence to support his view that modernist Indonesian Muslim organisations and leaders have worked to establish democratic social institutions by power sharing with other religious and social groups. Hefner however, is less optimistic about Indonesian Islamists who are committed to more exclusivist ideals. In his analysis, they have been less willing to work with non-Muslims and moderate Muslims to establish a civil society in Indonesia.¹²⁷

Manifestations of Islamism

Looking at Islamism in Indonesia, many scholars agreed that it is not monolithic. However, Islamists could be broadly categorised into two categories: integrative and non-integrative. There is numerous literature on integrative Islamist party/movements such as the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, Unity Development Party), *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB, Crescent Star Party), and *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Justice and Prosperity Party). One such study is by Bernhard Platzdasch who provides details and analysis of the parties, leaders, and ideologies of political organisations of the post-Suharto era.¹²⁸ The PKS deserves special mention here, because of its “organic roots go(ing) back to the campus-based student activist networks that played a visible role in the toppling of Suharto and the

¹²⁶ Porter, 2 and 57-58.

¹²⁷ Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12-14 & 218-221.

¹²⁸ Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia*.

opening up of Indonesia's new-found democratic space.”¹²⁹ Although PKS is a registered political party, its Islamist label continues to be a cause for suspicion in the media as well as with secular-liberal NGOs that are apprehensive about attempts to undermine the unitary *Pancasila* state. On the other hand, the non-integrative Islamists have criticised the PKS and others like it, for choosing the course of constitutional democratic politics and being committed to participation in the democratic arena. These non-integrative Islamists reject the view that democracy is compatible with Islam. They assert, “any Islamist party that seeks to contest in a democratic sphere has sold out its principles, and is in league with the forces of secular liberalism and democracy.”¹³⁰

There is also another group of literature on Islamism, which discusses non-integrative Islamist movements/groups such as the *Darul Islam* (DI) rebellion.¹³¹ The extent of DI influence on Muslim militancy and armed struggle against the state is well-documented both in the past and more recently, in JI's spate of bombings.¹³² Over the last five decades, DI has produced splinters and offshoots that range from violent to non-violent religious groups. DI's history and Kartosuwirjo's quest for an Islamic state often inspired young militants.¹³³ While *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Defenders of Islam Front) and *Laskar Jihad* (LJ, Jihad Paramilitary Force) could be categorised as non-

¹²⁹ Farish A. Noor, “The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the Landscape of Indonesian Islamist Politics: Cadre-Training As Mode of Preventive Radicalisation?” *RSIS Working Paper No. 231*, (2011): 5.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 4.

¹³¹ Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellions: A Study of Indonesian Political Behaviour* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1980) and David J. Kilcullen, “Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1949-99” (Ph.D. diss., University College, University of New South Wales, 2000).

¹³² Abdul Syukur, *Gerakan Usroh Di Indonesia Peristiwa Lampung 1989* (Jogjakarta: Penerbit Ombak: 2003) and As'ad Said Ali, *Al-Qaeda: Tinjauan Sosial-Politik, Ideologi Dan Sepak Terjangnya* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2014).

¹³³ International Crisis Group, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,” *Asia Report* 92 (Feb. 2005).

integrative, and there is no doubt that both groups have been involved in violence, the literature on them has not demonstrated convincingly their ability to undermine the *Pancasila* state of Indonesia. FPI, for example, holds the view that the existing system of government is illegitimate, but the group is best remembered for its raids on cafés, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other so-called dens of iniquity.¹³⁴ Contrary to the image FPI projected, the group leaders have maintained contact with Indonesia's political elite through the Habib community which is based at the Islamic Centre in Kwitang, Jakarta.¹³⁵ From the beginning, FPI has been closely associated with individual police and military officers,¹³⁶ thus raising serious doubt on their ability to pose a security threat. LJ, on the other hand, was notorious for dispatching fighters to fight in the armed conflict between Muslims and Christians on the Island of Ambon.¹³⁷ The group was disbanded in October 2002¹³⁸, and there is no indication of any attempt to resuscitate the group.

The literature suggests that in Indonesia, Islamists come in many shades and colours but have two distinct features. One group is made up of Islamists who are not antagonistic to the *Pancasila* state and are willing to work within the legal perimeters provided by the Indonesian constitution. Another group consists of Islamists who reject the unitary *Pancasila* state and could be violent or non-violent. In other words, the recent development following the fall of

¹³⁴ Known as *razia maksiat* (raids on vice), see Noorhaidi Hasan, "Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *RSIS Working Paper No. 143* (2007): 3.

¹³⁵ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims," *Indonesia Briefing*, Jakarta/Brussels (10 October 2001): 12-13.

¹³⁶ Sidney Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam Since 1998," *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, eds. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred C. Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 111-112.

¹³⁷ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 2006), 186; and ———, "Reformasi, Religious Diversity," 39.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 211.

Suharto confirmed the fact that a broad and general understanding of Islamism and Islamist should not be adopted for this study. The existential threat that Islamists in Indonesia pose, which this study intends to demonstrate, requires making a distinction between the integrative and non-integrative Islamists. The literature review also establishes the need to inquire more in-depth into how non-integrative Islamists champion the Islamic cause and agenda. For this reason, this study proposes “non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamist” as two definitive constituents that will allow this study to conduct the research in a more focussed manner. It also moves the research away from linking Islamism with Al-Qaeda/JI ideology, and Islamists groups with the broader terrorist network, which are common in the literature on extremism, radicalism, and terrorism.¹³⁹

2.7. Conclusion

The many different theories or approaches to security can be classified in two ways. Some are more or less add-ons to realism while others are responses to realism. Constructivism, for example, argues that the structure of the international system not necessarily lead to competition, but could be altered to make cooperation more forthcoming. Some theories such as CSS argue that it is not the state that should be the focus of security discussion, but instead individuals. Finally, the human security literature powerfully argues that there cannot be security internationally without economic, gender, ethnic and social security within nations. While these approaches are useful in understanding the threats states face, they are too general to explain more specific and non-

¹³⁹ Wright-Neville, “Dangerous Dynamics”.

traditional threat posed by non-state actors such as the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists.

The Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory in this respect offers a much more comprehensive framework that could be applied to understand the non-traditional threat posed by non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists in Indonesia. The theory provides this study with a viable and systematic analysis of how the Indonesian state securitises and allows assessment of the success of such strategies to be made. Successful securitisation, in this case, depends on the relevant audience acceptance of the securitising agent's speech act. The framework, however, falls short of discussing how consensus among securitising actors could be achieved. It did not provide ways to measure success or failure of a securitising move. It did not look further into various possible outcomes after securitisation has been successful. In particular, whether the security speech act that was accepted by the relevant audience has been successfully transformed into policy and implemented.

In light of the shortcomings of existing studies and critical unanswered questions on the securitisation theory, this study sees a need for further inquiry into the processes of successful securitisation as well as what goes on after securitisation is successful. Building upon existing studies, this study will investigate further on the issue of consensus at three different phases of the securitisation process. The first step is examining consensus among the securitising agents. The second phase is between the securitising agents and the relevant audience. The third phase is whether successful securitisation is followed by formulation and implementation of policy. Moving beyond

securitisation theory by looking at consensus, this study contributes to knowledge.

As for the existential threat from Islamists, it remains contentious because the term “Islamist” has been used to capture a broad spectrum of Muslim political activism founded on Islamic principles. This study specifies the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists as the focus of study. It allows this study to conduct an inquiry on two issues to determine the existential threat. The first involves analysing the origin and development, ideology, and strategy of the three chosen case studies (JI, MMI, and JAT). The second includes assessing the intention and capabilities of these groups to determine how they relate to the threat to the referent object, the unitary *Pancasila* state.

The study, by looking at these movements through the lens of an existential threat will be able to determine whether they represent a significant matter of concern for security. However, many Indonesians both in and outside the government, looking at the movements’ existing capabilities cannot agree that they could pose an existential threat to the NKRI. While their immediate potential to manifest as an existential threat is debatable, there is no denying that given the right circumstances, they could manifest as an existential threat in the future. This is especially so when populist political movements incorporate extremist views and canvass extremist support to gain additional political mileage.

With the application of the securitisation theory based on the above premises to the Indonesian case, this study offers a more systematic approach of looking at non-traditional threats from Islamists even if they are not violent or do not engage in acts of terror. The analyses and findings from this research

will not only build upon existing knowledge on security but will also contribute to terrorism studies.

The research also addressed some of the “methodological and analytical weaknesses, including among others: a reliance on poor research methods and procedures, an over-reliance on secondary information and a significant failure to undertake primary research” which critics have highlighted.¹⁴⁰ The subsequent chapters will elaborate on this and provide substantiations for the arguments put forward in the previous chapters.

¹⁴⁰ Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass, *Terror and Taboo: the Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 1996), 149-150; Andrew Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, No. 4 (2001): 1 – 14; and ———, “An Introduction to Terrorism Research,” in *Research into Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, ed. Andrew Silke (London Routledge, 2004), 1-29.

CHAPTER THREE

EXISTENTIAL THREAT: DEFINED AND ASSESSED

“Indonesian history since independence to this day – shows that ideological issues emerge from time to time. When Indonesia declared its independence, Pancasila was declared as the state ideology. However, there have always been groups who tried to change Pancasila with other ideology. Different efforts were made by these groups, through political methods or through armed struggle. These groups’ efforts still continue to the present day, and will likely continue in the future”- Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, “Defending the Country Entering the 21st Century,” (2003), 29.

Not all security threats are existential threats. Precisely for this reason, determining what is or is not an existential threat is a contentious issue. The controversial nature could be effectively demonstrated by looking at security threats posed by terrorism to the United States and Israel.

In a unipolar world where the United States is the only superpower, the implementation of its foreign policies no doubt has affected many countries in the world. Pankhurst who is a member of *Hizbut-Tahrir*¹⁴¹ views the tragic attacks on the United States on September 11 is a result of U.S. policies in the Muslim world.¹⁴² Ironically, President Bush in a press conference with Tony Blair seems to concur with Pankhurst on this. Bush in response to a question said: “For a while, American foreign policy was just, let's hope everything is

¹⁴¹ Owen Bowcott, “LSE Tutor Says He Is Victim of McCarthyite Witch-Hunt Over Hizb ut-Tahrir Membership,” *The Guardian* (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/17/reza-pankhurst-mccarthyite-witchhunt>, 17 Jan. 2010), accessed on 06 June 2013.

¹⁴² Reza Pankhurst, “The Legacy of 9/11: A Decade of Denial and Destruction,” *Political Theology* 12, No. 5 (2011).

calm, kind of managed calm. However, beneath the surface brewed a lot of resentment and anger that was manifested in its -- on September the 11th.”¹⁴³

For Israel, the way it is managing and handling the Palestine issue since Israel was formally recognised as an independent state in 1948 has been far from favourable to its interests.¹⁴⁴ The threat of the liquidation of the state of Israel is something that Israeli political leaders take seriously, and therefore, the harsh measures that were taken to ensure the survival of the state of Israel were sometimes inevitable. Leibowitz, who was one of the most outspoken and controversial twentieth-century Jewish thinkers and Israeli public intellectuals, observed Israel’s ability to retain its “rule over the rebellious people” was solely, “by actions regarded the world-over as criminal.”¹⁴⁵ Even today, resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict is still a work in progress. Israel’s military superiority over Palestine reduces but does not diminish, Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt in their analysis, consider the attacks to be “largely a response to Israel’s prolonged campaign to colonise the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”¹⁴⁶

Although the cause of the terrorist attacks on both states is a subject of debate, the question of whether terrorism is an existential threat to them has also been widely debated. Designating an issue as an existential threat depends on which perspective one is looking from. Nevertheless, the debates have

¹⁴³ For the transcript of the press conference, see: CQ Transcripts Wire, “President Bush, Tony Blair Hold a Joint News Conference” *Washington Post Politics* (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/28/AR2006072800939.html>, 28 July 2006), accessed on 06 June 2013.

¹⁴⁴ Arie Aron, “Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967-2007,” *Middle East Journal* 61, No. 4 (2007).

¹⁴⁵ Yeshayahu Leibowitz, *Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State* (United States of America: Harvard University Press, 1992), 244.

¹⁴⁶ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 64.

provided this study with a useful preliminary understanding of what an existential threat is or is not.

On the question of whether terrorism is an existential threat to the United States, many politicians, leaders, opinion-makers, scholars, bureaucrats, and ordinary people believe that terrorism is indeed an existential threat to the United States.¹⁴⁷ Mueller and Stewart however, challenge this view. In their comparison of the risk to human life terrorism and other hazards present, they concluded that the threat of terrorism is “hardly existential.”¹⁴⁸ The risks from terrorism, particularly from Al-Qaeda, they argue, are low enough and therefore, “acceptable.”¹⁴⁹ Al-Qaeda, as the transnational terrorist adversary of the United States “is a fringe group of a fringe group.”¹⁵⁰ The global consensus, cooperation, and operations to counter Al-Qaeda,¹⁵¹ have

¹⁴⁷ See edited excerpts of Michael Chertoff’s interview with *National Journal* in Shane Harris and Stuart Taylor Jr., “Homeland Security Chief Looks Back, and Forward,” *Government Executive* (<http://www.govexec.com/defense/2008/03/homeland-security-chief-looks-back-and-forward/26507/>, 07 Mar. 2008), accessed on 14 June 2013.

¹⁴⁸ John E. Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Terrorism as a Hazard to Human Life” (paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 2010). The same conclusion could also be found in Scott Shane, “Radical Muslim Americans Pose Little Threat, Study Says” *The New York Times*, (<http://mobile.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/us/radical-muslim-americans-pose-little-threat-study-says.xml>, 08 Feb. 2012), accessed on 26 Dec. 2012. See also, Stephen M. Walt, “Sullivan, the NSA, and the Terrorism Threat” *Foreign Policy* (http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/06/sullivan_the_nsa_and_the_terrorism_threat, 06 June 2013), accessed on 07 June 2013.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 96.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 2.

¹⁵¹ This was before US engagement in torture and other abuses associated with secret detention and extraordinary rendition came to light. The reports diminished US moral standing and eroded support for its counterterrorism efforts worldwide. See Al-Jazeera, “CIA Renditions ‘Aided by 54 Countries’,” (<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/02/201325233853220240.html>, 06 Feb. 2013), accessed on 06 Feb 2013. For more details, see, Amrit Singh, “Globalizing Torture CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition,” ed. David Berry (New York: Open Society Foundations, 2013).

significantly reduced its capability to mount future attacks on United States' soil.¹⁵²

A quantitative assessment of fifty cases of supposed "Islamic terrorist plots" against the United States also supports this finding. The evaluation reveals that Al-Qaeda is not an existential threat to the United States. The same study also describes the perpetrators as "incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganised, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish."¹⁵³

It is also the view shared by internationally renowned security technologist and author, Bruce Schneier, who considers the publicised terrorist plots as "a study in alarmism and incompetence: on the part of the terrorists, our government and the press."¹⁵⁴

Even though the same data was analysed, there is no consensus on whether terrorism is or is not an existential threat to the United States. As perceptions and interpretations of the data differed, the assessments differed as well. It is just not possible to reach a consensus on whether or not terrorism is an existential threat to the United States. Both views have their fair share of proponents.

¹⁵² Scott Stewart, "Why Al Qaeda is Unlikely to Execute another 9/11," *Stratfor Global Intelligence* (<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110831-why-al-qaeda-unlikely-execute-another-911>, 01 Sep. 2011), accessed on 27 Dec. 2012. Also, CBS This Morning, "John Miller: Al Qaeda's Intent High, Capability Low," *CBS News* (http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505266_162-57422810/john-miller-al-qaedas-intent-high-capability-low/, 27 Apr. 2012), accessed on 27 Dec. 2012.

¹⁵³ John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, "The Terrorism Delusion: America's Overwrought Response to September 11," *International Security* 37, No. 1 (2012): 88.

¹⁵⁴ See Bruce Schneier, "Portrait of the Modern Terrorist as an Idiot," *Schneier on Security Blog*, (http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/06/portrait_of_the_1.html, 14 June, 2007), accessed on 19 Dec. 2012. See also, Daniel Byman and Christine Fair, "The Case for Calling Them Nitwits," *The Atlantic*, (<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-case-for-calling-them-nitwits/308130/>, July/Aug. 2010), accessed on 19 Dec. 2012.

Similarly, for Israel, the opinions on existential threat to the state vary. Nevertheless, the definition of existential threat to the state of Israel remained consistent. In Israel's case, an existential threat is a threat that could eliminate not only the state but also its people. Here, Michael succinctly defined it as "a trend, process or development that substantially endangers the existence of the state of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people."¹⁵⁵

Oren's discussion on the existential threat to Israel is exceptional. Oren identified not one, but seven existential threats which according to him, the State of Israel has to handle every single day.¹⁵⁶ Terrorism is just one of them. Other than military threats to the national existence of the modern state of Israel, the state also faces existential threats of a political and cultural nature. The immediate threats, however, are from nuclear-armed Iran¹⁵⁷ and terrorism.

Still, terrorism before the fall of 2000 was only viewed as a nuisance by the Israeli security establishment, and therefore, not a threat to the state's survival. In other words, terrorism was not an existential threat to Israel.¹⁵⁸ However, things changed when the drive-by shootings and suicide bombings carried out by the Palestinians threatened the survival of the State of Israel. The effect: "Tourists and foreign capital fled the country as a result, and Israelis were literally locked inside their homes. The state was dying."¹⁵⁹

The two cases confirmed that for a securitiser to convince the relevant audience on the designation of an existential threat, and achieve a consensus on

¹⁵⁵ Kobi Michael, "Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, No. 5 (2009): 689.

¹⁵⁶ Michael B. Oren, "Seven Existential Threats," *Commentary* 127, No. 5 (2009).

¹⁵⁷ For arguments against this assessment, see Haggai Ram, "To Banish the 'Levantine Dunghill' from within: Toward a Cultural Understanding of Israeli Anti-Iran Phobias," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 2 (2008). See also, Barak Ravid, "Mossad Chief: Nuclear Iran Not Necessarily Existential Threat to Israel" *Haaretz* (21 Dec. 2011).

¹⁵⁸ Oren, "Seven Existential Threats."

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

it is not an easy task. Very often, opinions are divided. As for this study, without a clear understanding of the difference between security threat and existential threat, adopting the Copenhagen School Securitisation Theory and applying it to Indonesia may prove difficult. As such, clarifying the definition and meaning of existential threat becomes crucial. More specifically, there is an urgent need to address the existential threat to the unitary *Pancasila* State of Indonesia. In light of this urgency, this chapter lays the foundation for the subsequent chapters by taking a closer examination of what is meant by an existential threat. Subsequent chapters will then analyse the origin and development, ideology, and strategy of the chosen case studies. It will serve as a platform for assessing the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists' intention and capability to undermine the unitary *Pancasila* state. As a logical sequence to that, the inquiry will proceed further to establish the existential threat they pose to the state.

3.1. Lifting the Veil on Existential Threats

The issue of existential threats has to be examined in relation to security. Here, security is about the survival of the designated referent object which is traditionally understood to mean the state, incorporating government, territory, and society from an existential threat. Therefore, an existential threat politically defined, is, “anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority.”¹⁶⁰ An existential threat to the state or the nation is, therefore, related to national security. It is a threat not only to “the safety of citizens of the state,

¹⁶⁰ Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 22.

its entirety, and sovereignty,” but also “its national identity and the legitimacy of its existence as a national entity.”¹⁶¹

No political leadership in a state can ignore the fact that their purpose and foremost responsibility is to ensure national security, which is, the “defense of the nation’s existence and its vital interests.”¹⁶² Accordingly, an existential threat to a state is a threat that could probably bring about the destruction of the state or could compromise the essence of the state by rendering its sovereignty meaningless or untenable.¹⁶³ It is a threat where there is a looming danger to the physical, cultural, or social health of the community. Securitisation of an issue having such potential reflects the state’s attempt through its political actors or authority to keep the threat in check. However, for a political actor to securitise an issue by framing it as a threat depends on the relevant audience concurring that the said issue is an existential threat. Only then, the use of extraordinary procedures to contain the threat becomes acceptable, and securitisation is considered successful.¹⁶⁴

Balzacq’s proposal of a new definition for securitisation in this regard is certainly illuminating. He defines securitisation as:

“an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent object with such an aura of unprecedented threatening

¹⁶¹ Michael, 688.

¹⁶² Israel Tal, *National Security – The Few Against The Many* (Tel-Aviv: Dvir 1996)(Hebrew). Cited in Michael, “Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience,” 687.

¹⁶³ Olaf Corry, “Securitization and ‘Riskization’: Two Grammars of Security,” in *7th Pan-European International Conference, Stockholm, 9th-11th September, 2010* (Standing Group on International Relations), 11.

¹⁶⁴ Fred Vultee, “Securitization As A Theory of Media Effects: The Contest Over Framing of Political Violence” (University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007), 2.

complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development.”¹⁶⁵

The new definition has not articulated beyond the shadow of a doubt that securitisation indeed refers to a real existential threat and not merely a perceived threat. Floyd offers two ways out of this conundrum. First, by working out the actual intention of the aggressor in wanting the referent object destroyed. Second, by scrutinising whether or not the aggressor has the capability to do so.¹⁶⁶ Here, Buzan et al. raise several important points relating to the existential threat, which forms an essential basis for forging a consensus on the matter. An existential threat is one, which threatens the “essential quality of existence” of a referent object. Thus addressing the threat becomes a priority, which supersedes “the normal political logic of weighing issues against one another.” Buzan et al. see an existential threat as something that needs to be addressed urgently. It is evident in the statement: “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here, or will not be free to deal with it in our own way).”¹⁶⁷

3.2. The Illusive Consensus of the Relevant Audience

The relevant audience is the other half of the equation to achieve successful securitisation. It is not enough for the securitisers to frame an issue as an existential threat, but it has to be accepted by the relevant audience. Only then, it is possible to move the issue from the realm of normal politics to

¹⁶⁵ Thierry Balzacq, ed. *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 3.

¹⁶⁶ Rita Floyd, “Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards A Just Securitization Theory,” *Security Dialogue* 42, No. 4-5 (2011): 430.

¹⁶⁷ Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 21 & 24.

extraordinary politics.¹⁶⁸ The relevant audience's acceptance would make it possible for the state to take emergency action to deal with the existential threat even if it involves employing measures which are inconsistent with democratic practices.

The problem, however, is in convincing the relevant audience that such actions are crucial for the survival of the referent object. To assume that the relevant audience would automatically agree with the securitisers' assessment of the existential threat is a gross under-estimation of the independent nature of the relevant audience. This linear thinking has resulted in the securitisers paying lesser attention to achieve the concurrence of the general public who is the relevant audience. Instead, governments spent more time and resources on the actions to take after making a security move but little time and resources on convincing the relevant audience. As a result, successful securitisation fails because there is no consensus between the securitisers and the relevant audience. The subsequent actions that are taken to contain the existential threat also become questionable.

Summing up the discussion and putting it in the Indonesian context, an existential threat to Indonesia is a trend, process or development that substantially endangers the existence of the unitary state of Indonesia based on the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. The Preamble of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states that Indonesia's national interest is to "safeguard and protect the sovereignty of the state, the territorial integrity of the Republic

¹⁶⁸ Paul Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision To Invade Iraq," *Security Dialogue* 39, No. 6 (2008): 618-622.

of Indonesia, the nation's safety and pride, and to actively involve in efforts to create world peace.”¹⁶⁹

However, to assume that the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists in Indonesia pose an existential threat to “the state's sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as the nation's safety and pride,” would be considered by some, as an exaggeration of the threat posed by such groups. Even in instances of their most violent campaigns, they do not consider such groups as posing an existential threat to the NKRI and the hegemonic hold of the state's Pancasila ideology. While such groups and movements then, do not yet constitute an existential threat, they do possess the potential to develop into one. Given the right circumstances such as the incorporation of extremist views and canvass of extremist support by populist political movements to achieve political mileage, the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists could manifest into an existential threat.

As a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia may not be the only state whose security is threatened if it does not act to counter the potential existential threat. Eventually, countries in the region and beyond will face the same threat. Once the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, which harbour the intention and build capabilities to undermine the unitary *Pancasila* state, are successful, they will turn their attention

¹⁶⁹ Defending the Country Entering the 21st Century, *The White Paper of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, 31 Mar. 2003), VII.

elsewhere.¹⁷⁰ Equally important, is to establish a consensus between the securitisers and the relevant audience so that any actions that are taken to contain the existential threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists would not be the subject of unending debates. It is in this light that this study examines three factors: origin and development; ideology and strategy of the three case studies to assess the existential threat objectively. After that, a section on the interpretation of the existential threat and another section on the securitisation of non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists threat will follow.

¹⁷⁰ Reza Pankhurst, "The Caliphate, and the Changing Strategy of the Public Statement of Al-Qaeda's Leaders," *Political Theology* 11, No. 4 (2010). See JI's vision of *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara* linking Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Southern Thailand and the Southern Philippines in Barry Desker, "Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretation," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16, No. 3 (2003): 421. Also, International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," *Asia Report N°43* (Dec. 2002).

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY 1

VIOLENT ISLAMISTS – AL-JAMA‘AH AL-ISLAMIYYAH (JI)

The three chosen case studies correspond to the three categories of non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, namely, violent, support violent and non-violent. Just by looking at the violent attacks that *Al-Jama‘ah Al-Islamiyyah* (JI) has perpetrated to date, there is no doubt that JI surpasses other groups in the violent Islamist category. However, unravelling the existential threat, JI poses to the unitary *Pancasila* state of Indonesia is different. It requires more than just looking at the physical violence and destruction such as the two Bali bombings, which JI had committed. In so doing, this study proceeds to trace the JI’s origins and development, highlighting that its goal of replacing the *Pancasila* state with a different conception based primarily on Islam and the Sharia law constitutes an existential threat to the existing unitary *Pancasila* state of Indonesia.

4.1. Origin and Development

Darul Islam

Since October 2002, the U.S. Department of State has designated JI as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).¹⁷¹ JI, dubbed as the Al-Qaeda-linked Southeast Asian terrorist network, was involved in the Bali bombings in October 2002. In August 2003, it carried out the car bombing of the JW

¹⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>, 28 Sep. 2012), accessed on 27 May 2013.

Marriott hotel in Jakarta. On 9 September 2004, the bomb explosion near the Australian embassy in central Jakarta was also the work of JI. On 2 October 2005, JI perpetrated the second Bali bombings and on 17 July 2009, succeeded in bombing the JW Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta's business district.¹⁷² The group's notoriety continues even until today.

Historically speaking, the *Darul Islam* (DI) movement was instrumental in the birth of JI. Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, DI's founder, led a rebellion in West Java against the newly formed Indonesian republic. The Islamic Army of Indonesia (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*, TII) under Kartosuwirjo's command was established in 1948 and began fighting the Republic, a year after Kartosuwirjo objected to *Masyumi's* pre-independence political strategy.

As the leading Modernist Islam Party at that time, *Masyumi* was hostile to not only the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) but also, President Sukarno. The hostility stemmed from Sukarno's rejection of *Sharia* law to be included in Indonesia's Constitution. *Masyumi* as a staunch supporter of *Sharia* could not accept Sukarno's refusal to implement it but remained cooperative towards Sukarno's government for pragmatic reasons. In contrast, Kartosuwirjo was disappointed with *Masyumi*. To register his deep dissatisfaction for the failure to implement *Sharia* law forcefully, he founded DI. Later, Kartosuwirjo transformed DI into a platform to challenge Sukarno's government.

Kartosuwirjo's proclamation of his own Indonesian Islamic State (NII, *Negara Islam Indonesia*) in August 1949 further escalated the conflict. With the proclamation and the outbreak of armed violence, the newly formed Indonesian

¹⁷² Ali, *Al-Qaeda*, 241-295.

Republic headed by Sukarno was in danger of disintegration. The very existence of the unitary state of Indonesia was under threat. From the state's perspective, DI as an armed movement had to be dealt with accordingly. The decision to combat DI militarily was necessary and resulted in a long war of attrition. DI was not alone; together with regional revolts in Aceh¹⁷³ and South Sulawesi,¹⁷⁴ which identified with DI, they fought the republic. The threat the Indonesian army had to overcome therefore was not only from DI but also other rebellious groups which had come under the banner of DI. Although the rebellion was finally crushed in 1962 with the capture and execution of Kartosuwirjo, DI's ideology remained intact in the minds of the surviving DI members.¹⁷⁵

The remnants of DI went underground and continued to maintain their informal networks secretly in the hope of pursuing the vision which Kartosuwirjo had for Indonesia. Nevertheless, the reality on the ground was not in their favour. DI after the defeat was severely weakened militarily after having lost not only their supreme commander, Kartosuwirjo but also, most of their high command. Worse still, some of those who survived accepted a government amnesty. The movement was no longer what it used to be. Conboy is right in his assessment that "the movement, for all intents and purposes, appeared to be dead."¹⁷⁶

The one thing in common which DI had with the Army that had defeated them was their abhorrence of the PKI. It probably gave DI a new lease of life. For the Army,

¹⁷³ Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, *The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehese Rebellion* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000).

¹⁷⁴ Barbasa Harvey Silars, "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1974).

¹⁷⁵ Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion*, 1-23

¹⁷⁶ Kenneth J. Conboy, *Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces* (Jakarta: Equinox Pub., 2004), 139.

the PKI was a dangerous political opponent. For the DI, the communists' embrace of Marxism's atheistic precepts could never be reconciled with Islam.¹⁷⁷ Although both the Army and the DI would make strange bedfellows, the communist threat called for a marriage of convenience between the two. The remaining DI rebels were co-opted by President Suharto's chief political strategist; Gen. Ali Moertopo,¹⁷⁸ the same way he had co-opted the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*, PRRI) rebels to fight the communists.¹⁷⁹ The threat from the communists was not only bigger, more dangerous, but also, immediate. The threat became pronounced when PKI senior cadres together with disaffected military officers attempted to seize control of the state by targeting several key generals to weaken the army. It is important to note that factionalism was common in the ABRI. Those who supported the PKI 'coup' were not just a small group of disappointed officers who have made it possible for the conspirators to execute half a dozen important officers. General Suharto, however, was not on the target list and was successful in executing the counter-strike. The episode allowed Suharto to seize power from Sukarno and officially became president in 1968.¹⁸⁰

DI's recovery started in early 1965. The Special Operations (*Operasi Khusus*, Opsus) which Moertopo also headed during the critical years of the New Order government had an officer by the name of Sugiyanto who had established ties with Danu Mohammad Hasan. Hasan was a top DI commander from West Java. The ties allowed Moertopo to maintain and preserve a group of

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ For Moertopo's roles in preserving the regime's security, see, Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order*, 3rd ed.(London: Routledge, 1998), 15, 30 and 127-128.

¹⁷⁹ Conboy, *The Second Front*, 13-15.

¹⁸⁰ Vanessa Hearman, "Review: Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup D'etat in Indonesia by John Roosa," *Indonesia*, No. 85 (2008): 165-69. For a witness' account of the whole process of political confrontations between the Army and PKI from 30 September to 1 October 1965, see: Jusuf Wanandi, *Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965-1998* (Jakarta: Equinox Pub., 2012), 48-52.

DI veterans through a network of contacts to be part of his arsenal in the fight against communism initially, and later other enemies of the state.¹⁸¹ In a secret meeting in 1968, which was presided by Kartosuwirjo's son, Dodo Mohammad Darda and attended by many of Kartosuwirjo's former Sundanese lieutenants, the intention to resurrect the DI's vision of an Indonesian state governed by Islamic Law was declared.¹⁸²

Suharto who had replaced the left-leaning Sukarno as the President of Indonesia was initially welcomed by the more traditional Islamic groups because Sukarno had banned *Masyumi* in 1960. For *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), its youth wing, *Ansar*, had worked together with the army in eliminating their common enemy, the PKI. With the alliance that they had forged with the new government, both groups had expected Suharto to be supportive of their Islamic agenda. They were wrong. Suharto and his fellow officers who had fought Muslim insurgents in West Java, Sumatera and Sulawesi still harboured a deep suspicion of political Islam on account of having spent much of their careers fighting the insurgents.¹⁸³

During the PRRI/Permesta revolts in 1957/58, most *Santri* officers¹⁸⁴ had supported, and some led the rebel groups.¹⁸⁵ When the military took over power under Suharto, it had a mostly *Abangan* Muslim¹⁸⁶ and Christian leadership.

¹⁸¹ Andrée Feillard, *Islam et armée dans l'Indonésie contemporaine* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), 119 cited in Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (1 July 2002): 7.

¹⁸² Conboy, *Kopassus*, 140 and *The Second Front*, 15.

¹⁸³ David Bouchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, eds., *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2003), 82.

¹⁸⁴ The *santri* officers are Muslims whose Islamic practices are much closer to the official doctrinal teachings of Islam. See, Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 317-318.

¹⁸⁵ R. E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 66.

¹⁸⁶ *Abangan* Muslim practices Javanese Islam where Hindu-Buddhistic beliefs and concepts are blended together with Islam. See, Koentjaraningrat, *Javanese Culture*, 316-317.

Suharto's New Order regime which came to power in the 1960s not only refused but also ensured that leaders of *Masyumi* and Muhammadiyah were removed from the political arena. As a result of the removal, their political aspirations were inhibited, and that led to some of their members and sympathisers joining DI/TII to realise the ideals of establishing an Islamic state.¹⁸⁷

Feeling betrayed they directed their wrath at the Suharto's government. To them, Suharto was no better than Sukarno since both declined to establish the Islamic rule in Indonesia. DI's increasing animosity towards Suharto's government culminated in DI elements that were committed to the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia going deeper underground. Kartosuwirjo's proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia in 1949 was used to legitimise the rebellion, and the struggle became that of re-establishing the Islamic State.

The idea about Islam that is *syumul* (comprehensive) and *kaffah* (complete) that brought Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir together in 1968-69, also viewed *Pancasila* as something that went against the tenets of Islam. Traders of the Klewer Market attended religious classes that Sungkar and Ba'asyir conducted after the midday prayer at Masjid Agung in Solo. The duo became well-known as preachers who were critical of the state and supported their views with religious arguments. As they became closer to one another, a new *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) known as Al Mukmin was established

¹⁸⁷ Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI: Salafi Jihadisme Indonesia* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011), 4. For the English translation of the book, see: Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*, translated by Dave McRae (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013). The book is considered by Greg Fealy as "the first work to provide a comprehensive account of *Jihadism* from the early years of the Draul Islam rebellion till the Jema'ah Islamiyah terrorist bombings in the early 2000s."

in 1972 in the village of Ngruki, Solo.¹⁸⁸ Sungkar and Ba'asyir used the *pesantren* to propagate fundamentalist religious views. The book entitled *Tarbiyah Islamiyah* which Ba'asyir wrote became compulsory reading for the *pesantren*. The book teaches implementation of the Islamic *Sharia* in life is an obligation, which could only be carried out with power. Therefore, power must be seized. The book serves as a preface to Ba'asyir's more complete doctrine found in another book he wrote with the title, *Pedoman Mengamalkan Islam Menurut Al-Quran dan As-Sunnah*. The former Deputy Chief of BIN, Ali did not doubt that both Sungkar and Ba'asyir wholeheartedly embraced the idea of an Islamic state in Indonesia and admired Kartosuwirjo's DI rebellion.¹⁸⁹

Sungkar and Ba'asyir continued preaching not only through the *pesantren* but also, through their religious lectures, which the *Radio Dakwah Islamiah* (Radis, Radio for the Islamic Call) in Solo aired. The radio allowed Sungkar's and Ba'asyir's uncompromising stance towards the New Order to be heard more widely such as their antagonism to respecting Indonesia's "*bendera Merah Putih*" (the red and white flag) which they considered as against Islam.¹⁹⁰

The state reacted to counter the destabilising effect generated by Sungkar and Ba'asyir's preaching by shutting down the radio station in 1975. However, it did not dissuade Sungkar. Sungkar continued his preaching and urged people not to vote in national elections. For that, he was detained for six weeks in 1977. By then, DI members whom the government could not win over to their side were already being pursued by Suharto's security apparatus. So, while opposing the state ideology of *Pancasila*, Sungkar and Ba'asyir were very

¹⁸⁸ Ali, *Al-Qaeda*, 139-140.

¹⁸⁹ As'ad Said Ali. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Jakarta, (27 Apr. 2017).

¹⁹⁰ Ali, *Al-Qaeda*, 141.

cautious not to disclose their connections to DI openly. Their status as DI members became a well-guarded secret as they continued preaching against the *Pancasila* state.¹⁹¹

Two decades later, in 1997, in an interview with the Australian-based Islamic student magazine *Nida'ul Islam*, Sungkar praised Kartosuwirjo and admitted that JI originated from DI and declared jihad. In the interview, he mentioned *Quwwatul Musallaha* (military strength) as being central to his organisation's struggle against the Suharto regime.¹⁹² The admission left little doubt that they were DI members or at the very least, maintained close contact with DI. Sungkar made the revelations at a time when he had already formed JI and had under his command, militarily trained members who had participated in the Afghan-Soviet War.

There is another significant development in JI's history which occurred in November 1978. Sungkar and Bashir were both arrested and charged over their connections to Haji Ismail Pranoto,¹⁹³ a senior DI commander in West Java and part of an armed group known as *Komando Jihad*. Gen. Ali Moertopo was the man responsible for conceiving the elaborate sting operation. He had cleverly used his contacts with the DI movement to actively encourage the formation of an armed militia, *Komando Jihad*. His reason for it rested on the claim that it was necessary to combat the dangers of a communist revival following the US defeat in Vietnam in 1975. The real purpose behind it was to identify and trap

¹⁹¹ As'ad Said Ali. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Jakarta, (28 Apr. 2017).

¹⁹² Abdullah Sungkar, "Suharto's "Detect, Defect and Destroy" Policy Towards the Islamic Movement." *Nida'ul Islam* (<http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/31890/20031025-0000/www.islam.org.au/articles/17/indonesia.htm>, Issue 17, Feb-March 1997), accessed on 27 Aug. 2013.

¹⁹³ The West Java DI group that he led was one of the last groups to surrender to the authority in 1967. See Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 75.

Islamic militants as well as to politically discredit Islamic political parties and organisations that had become a threat to Suharto's regime.¹⁹⁴

The operation in mid-1979 by the security apparatus netted some 185 people, together with the alleged *Komando Jihad* leaders: Pranoto and Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan. The covert operation was revealed in court when Hasan admitted that the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara*, BAKIN) had recruited him. Following the instructions, which Hasan received from BAKIN, the DI members were mobilised by him to counter the communist threat. In the investigations, Sungkar and Ba'asyir were implicated. Both were detained the following year. In court, Sungkar admitted to meeting Pranoto but denied being a member of DI. Pranoto who was pivotal to the case was never brought before the court to testify. It seemed at that time, Sungkar and Ba'asyir's conviction rested almost entirely on public anti-government statements that they had made.¹⁹⁵

Meanwhile, in retaliation for the arrests, a Garuda Airlines plane was hijacked in 1981 and *Borobodur*, the famous Buddhist monument in central Java was bombed in 1985.¹⁹⁶ Both Sungkar and Ba'asyir were found guilty by the court and were sentenced to nine years in jail. In 1982, less than three years after the sentence was passed, they were released after the term was reduced on appeal. When Indonesia's Supreme Court overturned the Appeal Court's decision and sought to reimpose the original sentence in 1985, the two fled into

¹⁹⁴ Ken Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network* (Jakarta: Equinox Pub., 2006), 12-23.

¹⁹⁵ Sungkar's denial of being a DI member was questionable because the Ex-Chief of Staff for War of Aceh Merdeka, Fauzi Hasbi was told by Hispran that both Sungkar and Ba'asyir had taken the pledge to be DI members. See "Wawancara Fauzi Hasbi: "Saya Dijebak ICG"" *Tempo.Co Politik* (<http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2003/01/01/05582/Wawancara-Fauzi-Hasbi-Saya-Dijebak-ICG>, 01 Jan. 2003), accessed on 05 June 2013.

¹⁹⁶ Damien Kingsbury, "Australia's Renewal of Training Links With Kopassus: A Critique," *Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 387* (2004): 7.

exile in Malaysia.¹⁹⁷ The unintended consequence of the episode was the export of radicals and radicalism to neighbouring Malaysia.

Darul Hijrah

Both Sungkar and Ba'asyir considered Malaysia as *Darul Hijrah*. Following the example of Prophet Muhammad's immigration to Medina, and with the help of Muhammad Natsir (Pak Natsir), the leader of *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, Sungkar and Ba'asyir left for Malaysia.¹⁹⁸ In Malaysia, they were protected by the local authorities. The Malaysian government's refusal to extradite Sungkar and Ba'asyir even after the Indonesian government made repeated requests strengthened the assertion.¹⁹⁹ Both Sungkar and Ba'asyir were allowed to live normally in Malaysia without harassment. It was possible because of Pak Natsir's²⁰⁰ assistance through his contacts in Malaysia.²⁰¹

Ustaz Hashim Abdul Ghani, the head of Maahad Ittiba As-Sunnah in Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan, accepted Sungkar and Ba'asyir who entered Malaysia illegally. The act of helping Sungkar and Ba'asyir was in the spirit of helping Muslim brothers who were under pursuit by the government of the said country.²⁰² The *Maahad* ²⁰³ at the time was a mosque that also functioned as a centre for learning how to translate the Quran into the Malay language, which

¹⁹⁷ Quinton Temby, "Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah," *Indonesia* 89 (Apr. 2010), 31.

¹⁹⁸ Solahudin, *NII Sampai Ji*, 192.

¹⁹⁹ Hastings, *No Man's Land*, 54.

²⁰⁰ Mohammad Natsir was one of the big names among Indonesia's nationalist and revolutionary political leaders who shaped the path of Islamic thought and politics in post-war Indonesia. See, George McTurnan Kahin, "In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir (1907-1993)," *Indonesia*, No. 56, (Oct. 1993), 158-165.

²⁰¹ Sunarto alias Adung and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir revealed this in their interview, see, Solahudin, *NII Sampai Ji*, 199-204.

²⁰² Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 29.

²⁰³ Public institute or institution in Arabic.

was incorporated into a course known as “*Kursus Menterjemah Al-Furqan*” (Al-Furqan Translation Course). The centre was well-known for its speedy Al-Quran Translation course. Sungkar and Ba’asyir being Islamic preachers themselves faced no problem in adjusting to their new surroundings.

In early 1985, about fifty Indonesians came to the *school*. Abas described them as friendly and very knowledgeable about Islam. Having established the necessary rapport, they told Ghani of their plight as DI members who were on the run and wanted by the Indonesian authorities.²⁰⁴ While there, they neither caused trouble nor had any problem with their host. They used every opportunity to exchange religious knowledge with their host while showing proper decorum during the discussions. Even after their religious preaching began to be accepted, they did not attempt to set up a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) or a mosque but continued being active in forming religious discussion groups and attending such groups when invited.²⁰⁵ Hazman Hashim, the secretary for the *Maahad*, clarified that “not long after that the *Maahad* severed their ties with them after being asked to give the *Bai’ah* and to agree to support Abu Bakar’s struggle.” He made the statement to deny a report by *Utusan Malaysia* that linked the *Maahad* with the recruitment of youth based on the JI’s militant ideology.²⁰⁶

In Malaysia, some sympathetic Malaysian businessmen helped Sungkar in his effort to establish an Islamic state. Through their businesses, they employed Indonesian workers.²⁰⁷ These were not ordinary Indonesians looking for employment abroad, but Muslim activists who were part of the DI network. The

²⁰⁴ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 20-34.

²⁰⁵ “Abu Bakar Bashir: The Malaysian Connection,” *Tempo*, 9 Nov. 2002.

²⁰⁶ “Abu Bakar” *Utusan Online*, 21 June 2011.

²⁰⁷ ICG, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, Indonesia Briefing*, 12.

support from Malaysians such as Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana came only after being exposed systematically to various Islamic themes like Islam, Jihad and the history of *Darul Islam*. Bafana made the revelation before Ba'asyir's trial in 2003 while under detention in Singapore.²⁰⁸

Ever since Sungkar and Ba'asyir successfully sent the first batch of volunteers to Afghanistan in 1985, they were seen as preachers who practised what they preached. All of those who went to Afghanistan were trained at the military camps run by the *Mujahideen* faction led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf,²⁰⁹ a proponent of strict Wahhabi Islam, and had extremely close links to Saudi Arabia. The faction's logistics operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan were run by Osama bin Laden, among others. As Sungkar's influence grew especially among those Afghan-trained members under his command, the DI leader in Indonesia, Anjengan Masduki, a *Sufi* by orientation sent word for the Afghan-trained members under Sungkar to be brought under his command. Masduki's decision was based on a *wangsit* (divine inspiration) that he had received from God. Sungkar well known for his *Salafi* ways became disenchanted with the reason given and strongly opposed Masduki's un-*Salafi* ways.²¹⁰ In the heat of the argument over the legality of using divine inspiration as a basis for decision making which Sungkar insisted on being a fundamental issue in Islamic theology, he decided to break away from DI. It marked the

²⁰⁸ Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, "Witness Interrogation Report" (International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) Database, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 22 Oct. 2002), accessed on 27 Nov. 2013.

²⁰⁹ Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia* (Singapore: Ridge Books, 2005), 55.

²¹⁰ Personal Conversation in mid-1990s with JI leaders among them was Abdullah Sungkar.

watershed incident that led to the formation of *Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah* (JI) in 1993.²¹¹

Birth of JI

Although JI is a more tightly structured organisation than DI, initially, it still preached the setting up of an Islamic state in Indonesia, which is to be achieved through armed struggle. The armed struggle is referred to as jihad, but there were no details on it. Even after becoming a different entity, JI still looked up to Kartosuwirjo's struggle and his ways as a point of reference. The "*pagar betis*" (human fence) that led to the capture of Kartosuwirjo was one of the important incidents that were told and retold to the JI members to remind them the great length that the other, in this case, the Indonesian army would go to defeat them.²¹² The "*pagar betis*" was a strategy that involved using civilians to surround the mountain where DI detachments were holed up, and subsequently marching the civilians up to the mountain. The civilians were used as bait to draw the DI armed rebels into firing the approaching civilians which resulted in giving their position away. The Indonesian army then closed in upon the DI rebels. The DI commanders who were there later expressed the awkward position they were in, having to shoot at "non-combatants in cold blood if they were 'good Muslims.'"²¹³

Other than DI, what Sungkar and Ba'asyir had experienced in Indonesia and later Malaysia, contributed to the knowledge base of DI faction which Sungkar led before it became JI. Sungkar's success in sending some of those under his command to Afghanistan expanded that knowledge base further. The

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellions*, 18.

DI faction that was based in Malaysia was converted from being Indonesia/Indonesian centric into a more regional group.²¹⁴ JI that was formed from the DI faction is a dynamic organisation which is not only complex but also, extremely nimble as well as having the ability to recruit from and adapts to the other countries in which it operates.²¹⁵

As proof, some of the members who had received military training and participated in the Afghan-Soviet War were instrumental in transforming JI into a more militarised outfit. These so-called Afghan veterans would later fill important leadership positions in the JI. They became the “next generation of leaders, ideologues, and commanders of JI.”²¹⁶ While it is true that JI had its root in DI, the many developments that the DI faction under Sungkar went through indeed shaped JI’s ideology, organisational structure, and strategy.

When JI was founded in January 1993, the organisation was very much *Salafi* in its religious orientation and was active beyond the Indonesian borders. Through its international networking, JI managed to solicit funds from the Middle East especially Saudi Arabia. Some of the JI’s members were also trained militarily and had experienced fighting in actual battles during the Afghan-Soviet War. Therefore, the decision to leave DI did not hurt the new organisation. Sungkar, under the name of Abdul Halim, and Ba’asyir, under the name of Abdus Somad,²¹⁷ had little difficulty in convincing those under them that the decision to leave the DI was not only right but also legitimate. Sungkar and Baasyir’s “*Hijrah*” to Malaysia says it all. In a relatively short time, they

²¹⁴ The “logic of adaptation” compelled JI to transform its original Indonesia-centric focus into a “larger, more dangerous organization because it was not focused on governing specific pieces of territory”, see, Hastings, *No Man's Land*, (2010), 177.

²¹⁵ Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 59, No. 2 (2005): 169-78.

²¹⁶ Solahudin. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Jakarta, (24 Sep 2014).

²¹⁷ These were the names Sungkar and Ba’asyir used while in exile in Malaysia.

have achieved what others could not achieve in Indonesia. The movement had Malaysians and Singaporeans as its members. Even the pressure and threat they faced from the Suharto government were considerably muted. Sungkar and Baasyir were not only effective NII representatives for foreign affairs before forming the JI, but also, managed to build the NII strength abroad. In Malaysia and Singapore they built networks through *Da'wah*, and in Afghanistan collaborated with an international Islamic network.²¹⁸

Afghanistan not only provided the JI members with military training and experience but also, became a melting pot where ideas and experiences were shared. The sharing precipitated a strengthened spirit of Islamic brotherhood and heightened awareness of the perceived enemy. Individuals such as Abdullah Azzam who conducted regular classes after the Maghrib prayer (prayer just after sunset) in Camp Saddah ²¹⁹ and Osama bin Laden also left a deep impression on the minds of the JI Afghan veterans.

Also, various Islamic groups from all over the world that came in defence of Afghanistan provided JI with valuable lessons and best practices to steer JI's future course. The realisation concretised JI's ideology, increased the motivation of its members, and made its strategies more focused. The lethal skill of waging and fighting a war that JI had acquired elevated its status from being an organisation peddling the theory of jihad to that of the practitioner of jihad. Without the slightest doubt, the Mujahidin's victory in Afghanistan over the Russians provided the JI with confidence and vision or dreams of similar victories in the future. In summary, the Afghanistan sojourn transformed the JI

²¹⁸ Ken Conboy, *The Second Front*, 43-51.

²¹⁹ Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 30.

into a group strongly influenced by Egyptian Islamist radicalism, in particular, *Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya*, and a strong Saudi Arabia *Salafi* orientation.

Military Training Camps

The fighting and training in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1995 which the JI senior leadership was involved in while under the umbrella of DI until 1993, provided two additional capabilities. Other than being trained militarily, they also had the experience of running and managing military training facilities. It was in part due to the Afghan Mujahiddin commander, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's idea in 1986 of establishing training camps within the Camp Saddah complex according to different *Qabail* or tribes. Southeast Asians formed one tribe (the majority were Indonesians from DI), the Arabs (those from Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) formed another tribe while those from Algeria and Tunisia formed the Maghrib tribe. Sayyaf, a "strict neo-Wahhabi with close ties to Osama bin Laden" was supported financially by Saudi Arabia, and played a major role in providing the land, food, and firearms for the training camps.²²⁰

In 1992, the mujahidin established a coalition government before Abdullah Sungkar's DI faction formed JI. A new DI training camp outside Torkham replacing the earlier one in Camp Saddah was established. Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi²²¹ was a crucial figure in that camp, and it was there that his friendship with the leaders of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front blossomed.

²²⁰ Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 54-56.

²²¹ Al-Ghozi was JI's explosives expert who received military training at an Al-Qaeda camp on the Afghan-Pakistani border. He was involved in conducting surveillance and procuring explosives for the Hambali-approved JI plan to attack U.S. and other Western interests in Singapore. See, Homeland Security, "Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/fathur_rahman_al-ghozi.htm, n.d.), accessed on 22 July 2013.

The camp was later taken over by JI²²² after Sungkar severed ties in 1993 with Anjengan Masduki, the DI leader with whom Sungkar had irreconcilable theological differences. By September or October 1994, JI's expertise of running and managing military training camps was put to use in Mindanao, Southern Philippines, to train the Bangsamoro fighters militarily. Later in December 1994, Camp Hudaybiyah was opened within the larger Abu Bakar Camp Complex. Nasir Abas a JI member and an Afghan veteran served as the head as well as the military instructor there. The camp continued to operate until the end of 1996.²²³

Running and managing military camps is taken seriously by JI. It is discernible from the actions, which Ustaz Zulkarnaen²²⁴ took after his visit to the military camp in Southern Philippines in mid-1995. Zulkarnaen visited the camp to see for himself the development of the training of the Bangsamoro fighters which had taken place. After hearing about the shortage of teaching staff from Nasir Abas, Zulkarnaen after his return to Indonesia dispatched additional instructors to assist in training the Bangsamoro fighters at Camp Hudaybiyah. It marked yet another significant milestone for JI. Not only a military training camp was successfully set up but also, more military-trained JI members began to be actively involved with the Bangsamoro struggle. The capability that JI had acquired was used to build the military capability of the Bangsamoro. What JI members had learned and experienced during the

²²² Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 87.

²²³ Ibid, 148-167.

²²⁴ Zulkarnaen replaced Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin also known as Hambali, as operations chief for JI after Hambali was arrested in Thailand in August 2003. As military commander, Zulkarnaen has been responsible for intelligence operations and military training, and authorized to launch terrorist attacks. See, "Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1889 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities," (<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI18705E.shtml>, 16 May 2005), accessed on 22 July 2013.

Afghan-Soviet War continued to be enhanced and upgraded. Most noteworthy was the involvement of Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi, Mukhlas and Mustapha as JI's military commanders and Afghan veterans who served as instructors at the camp.²²⁵

Between the end of 1996 and 1997, the JI members from Mantiqi I (Regional Group I)²²⁶ were also sent to train in Camp Hudaybiyah (see Figure 4.1 for illustration of JI's organisational structure with specific reference to the organisation in Singapore). While there, they were involved in the Bangsamoro's fight against the Philippine government. Every batch, three to six people were sent to attend a very short training session lasting about two weeks to a month. Among the attendees who later became actively involved in the JI's bombing operations were Imam Samudra, Noordin M. Top, and Azahari Hussain.²²⁷

²²⁵ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 153.

²²⁶ Mantiqi I comprised of Singapore, Malaysia and Southern Thailand. For a detail explanation on JI's four *mantiqis*, see, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, *White Paper* (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 07 Jan. 2003), 10, and *ICG Asia Report N°63* (26 Aug. 2003): 11-13.

²²⁷ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 154.

FIGURE 4.1

Organisational Structure of JI (with specific reference to Singapore)

SOURCE: Government of Singapore White Paper © 2003; ICG Asia Report No. 63, 26 August 2003

In 1997, Mustapha²²⁸ another Afghan veteran and instructor who headed the Mantiqi III²²⁹ stopped the training of the Bangsamoro fighters. In its place, a newly scheduled programme from the JI Markaziyah (Headquarters) was introduced in 1998. The JI's Military Academy Education and Training Programme (*Diklat Akademi Militer*) planned various Basic Military Courses, which included short military training programmes and lasted from two weeks to six months. With the increase in military training, more barracks and other infrastructures were constructed. JI continued to channel funds for the running

²²⁸ Also known as Abu Tholut who is an Afghan veteran and former JI area commander. See, Peter Alford, "Terror Suspect Abu Tholut Caught in Java" *The Australian* (<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/terror-suspect-abu-tholut-caught-in-java/story-e6frg6so-1225969172329>, 11 Dec. 2010), accessed on 18 Oct. 2013.

²²⁹ Mantiqi III comprised of Sabah, Sulawesi and Mindanao.

of the training camp in Mindanao.²³⁰ The learning-teaching facilities were also upgraded and the landscape beautified, giving a military academy like environment. The words, “Military Academy of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah” adorned the main entrance to Camp Hudaybiyah. Its equivalent in Arabic, “*Kuliah Harbiyah Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah*” was written below it, evoking the nostalgia of the Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy in Camp Sadda.²³¹

In early 2001 JI faced one major setback. The JI training camp in Mindanao, Southern Philippines had to be relocated because it was no longer conducive to conduct training activities in Camp Hudaybiyah. The relocation was a result of the large-scale offensive operation, ‘All-Out War’ carried out by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from July 2000 to the end of the year on all territories under the control of the Bangsamoro fighters, especially in the Maguindanao and Lanao del Norte province. The military operation, ‘All-Out War’ was ordered by the Philippines President Joseph Estrada which forced the Bangsamoro fighters to move back their defence position to an area close to Camp Hudaybiyah.

The initial setback proved to be a blessing in disguise as JI members were able to use their military skills in the clashes with the Philippine army. The new battlefield revitalised their fighting spirit²³² and opened a new chapter in JI’s so-called jihad. Southern Philippines as a military base for JI is not only nearer to Indonesia, but also has similar geographical terrain. It is also cheaper to conduct military training for JI members there, and the porous borders facilitate clandestine travels to and from Southern Philippines. More importantly, JI was

²³⁰ Interrogation depositions of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, 13 Dec. 2002, and 19 Feb. 2003 cited in *ICG Asia Report N°80*, 15.

²³¹ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 156.

²³² *Ibid*, 165-167.

there as a major actor and not a mere participant in the scheme of things. The International Crisis Group also noted that JI not only trained in MILF-controlled camps but this same JI element in Mindanao “planned many of the major terrorist acts in the Philippines between 2000 and 2003.”²³³

***Rabitatul Mujahidin* (Mujahidin Coalition/League)**

In crafting a playmaker’s role for itself in the region, the JI regional leadership established the *Rabitatul Mujahidin* (Mujahidin Coalition/League) in 1999.²³⁴ True to its name, the *Rabitatul Mujahidin* was a bold attempt by JI to consolidate, coordinate and direct the various militant groups involved in their jihad under one umbrella. The *Rabitatul Mujahidin* marked the first time a platform that tightly mirrored Al-Qaeda was created in Southeast Asia. To be more specific, it was almost an exact carbon copy of the *Maktab al-Khadamat* (The Service Bureau)²³⁵ except for one crucial distinguishing feature. As a platform, the *Rabitatul Mujahidin* tried to unite various disparate militant groups, each with their separate domestic agendas into a coalition with one common denominator – the struggle for implementing Islamic law across the Malay Muslim lands of Southeast Asia (Nusantara).

The summit that was held at the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 invited Mujahidin leaders from all over Southeast Asia to attend. According to Bafana, the JI treasurer for Mantiqi I who attended that meeting, the initial meeting was “to promote co-operation between Islamic

²³³ JI played a major role in the Davao International Airport and Sasa wharf bombings where 38 people were killed. See, *ICG Asia Report N°80*, 1-2 & 23.

²³⁴ This happened after Sungkar’s death.

²³⁵ One of *Maktab al-Khadamat*’s activities was to support the jihad in Afghanistan while the *Rabitatul Mujahidin* was intended to support jihad activities in the region. For explanation on *Maktab al-Khadamat*, see, Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milleli, eds., *Al Qaeda in Its Own Words* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 93-95.

organisations from Indonesia, Aceh, South Sulawesi, Singapore, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines.”²³⁶

Other than the JI leaders such as Ba’asyir, Hambali, Mukhlas and Abu Fatih (the JI leaders of Mantiqi 2), a small contingent from DI was also present. In total, about two dozen men were in attendance. They included representatives from the MILF in the Philippines, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Nik Adli, son of the leader of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), Agus Dwikarna, the head of the militia group *Laskar Jundullah*, two representatives from the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) as well as representatives from two Islamist groups in Burma.²³⁷

In the second meeting of the *Rabitatul Mujahidin*, which was held in mid-2000 in Kuala Lumpur, fifteen delegates from the JI’s affiliate groups attended. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir presided over the meeting and Hambali was appointed secretary-general. The meeting passed a resolution “to attack Philippines interests.”²³⁸ In August 2000, the bombing of the Philippine ambassador’s residence in Jakarta took place, which Bafana claimed was based on the earlier resolution.²³⁹

The third and final meeting took place in November 2000 at a resort in the Malaysian state of Perak.²⁴⁰ Although not many details of what went on during the meeting were revealed in the literature and reports, which this study consulted, JI’s bombing activities showed an upward trend from December

²³⁶ Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, Witness Interrogation Report.

²³⁷ Ali, *Al-Qaeda*, 178.

²³⁸ Bafana, Witness Interrogation Report.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

2000 to August 2003.²⁴¹ The attendance of the representatives from the various militant Islamist groups in the three *Rabitatul Mujahidin*'s meetings, however, did not yield the desired outcome for JI. At most, it was an explorative attempt to unite these militant groups but was not a clear indication that these groups unanimously agreed to the JI's ideology and objectives.²⁴² The *Rabitatul Mujahidin* never conducted any co-ordinated attacks, and as an alliance, if it could be considered as such, was inactive.

Return to Indonesia

President Suharto's resignation on 21 May 1998 changed the political landscape in Indonesia considerably. For the two exiled JI leaders; Sungkar and Ba'asyir, the door for them to return to Indonesia was now opened. Capitalising on the political development in Indonesia after Suharto's resignation, Ba'asyir and Sungkar published what Neighbour described as a "major political manifesto"²⁴³ while Sungkar and Ba'asyir referred to it as a *Tadhkirah* (reminder).²⁴⁴ In it, they underscored the need for Indonesian Muslims to aggressively pursue the implementation of the Islamic law based on the Quran and the Sunnah. Several historical events from the colonial days to the Old

²⁴¹ "Jemaah Islamiyah," *Timetoast* (<http://www.timetoast.com/timelines/jemaah-islamiyah>, n.d.), accessed on 29 July 2013.

²⁴² Kumar Ramakrishna highlights that "not all of these groups share JI's global jihad agenda". See, Kumar Ramakrishna, "Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: The Need to Confront the Functional and Ideological "Enabling Environment"," in Paul J. Smith, ed., *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 145.

²⁴³ Sally Neighbour, *In the Shadow of Swords*, 153.

²⁴⁴ Sungkar, Abdullah and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "The Latest Indonesian Crisis: Causes & Solutions," *Nida'ul Islam*, Issue 24, Volume V, Rabi Awwal & Rabi Akher 1419, July & August 1998. The English translation is available at <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/31890/20031025-0000/www.islam.org.au/articles/24/index.htm>, accessed on 14 Aug. 2013.

Order's NASAKOM²⁴⁵ as well as the New Order's P4,²⁴⁶ and eventually, the bloody events of Tanjung Priok and Lampung were mentioned to strengthen the arguments that the failure to implement Islamic law in Indonesia had resulted in the past crises. The way forward according to them was to pave the way for Islamic law to shape the future of the nation.²⁴⁷

In contrast to Sungkar's and Ba'asyir's *Tadhkirah*, the movement that was responsible for bringing Suharto down was set on democratising Indonesia. The movement was not interested in replacing the *Pancasila* with Islam. So, after returning to Indonesia, Ba'asyir and Sungkar had to stay clear of efforts to democratise Indonesia. Sungkar in his lectures made it explicit that implementing the *Sharia* is "*harga mati*" (fixed price), and so, opposed the pursuit of democracy in Indonesia. Sungkar was against the idea of democratising Indonesia, and thus, made it clear his unwillingness to compromise on the issue. He rejected democracy the same way he had rejected *Pancasila* as the state ideology before.²⁴⁸

In fact, Sungkar was eager to start armed jihad after Suharto's fall. The eagerness was reflected in Sungkar's question to Achmad Roihan, a Mantiqi II leader, seeking from him an answer for delaying jihad in Indonesia. In a separate meeting called by Zulkarnaen in Solo in 1999, Abu Fatih, the head of

²⁴⁵ Nasakom symbolizes the unity among the principal partisan political groups in the country, reflecting nasionalisme (nationalism), agama (religion), and komunisme (communism) which Sukarno stressed since October 1960. Justus M. van der Kroef, "An Indonesian Ideological Lexicon," *Asian Survey*, No. 5 (1962): 26.

²⁴⁶ P4 refers to Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila or Upgrading Course on the Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila. Michael Morfit, "The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," *Asian Survey* 21, No. 8 (1981): 838-851.

²⁴⁷ Sungkar and Ba'asyir, *The Latest Indonesian Crisis: Causes & Solutions*.

²⁴⁸ This is evident from the lectures Sungkar delivered after returning to Indonesia. The audio lectures are from the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Studies' database: (\\idsswktr064\The Ideological Support Database Project\Audio & Video\Lectures by Abdullah Sungkar), accessed on 31 July 2013.

Mantiqi II, was criticised for the slow pace at which Mantiqi II was moving. The two incidents serve as clear indicators that the hard-core militants among the Afghan veterans, and Sungkar as the emir of the JI, would not settle for anything less than armed jihad to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state.

The eagerness to start armed jihad was unmistakable as could be seen in the case of Ambon. The bloody civil war between Muslims and Christians that Ambon was already embroiled in at that time. It provided the hardcore like Zulkarnaen with just the right opportunity to wage armed jihad. A team under Zulkarnaen's command was dispatched to Ambon with the blessing of Sungkar.²⁴⁹

Sungkar did not live long enough to realise his vision for JI which he co-founded with Ba'asyir. Sungkar died in November 1999, shortly after his return to Indonesia. Ba'asyir who was then the obvious choice to succeed Sungkar drew criticism from some of JI younger members. To Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali; Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra; and Ali Gufron alias Mukhlas, Ba'asyir was not decisive enough and could be easily persuaded to compromise with others when making important decisions. Co-founding the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) with Irfan Awwas Suryahardi in August 2000 was an excellent example of what they meant. It became a significant drawback to Ba'asyir leadership. The move was seen to be in direct contradiction to the late Sungkar's political analysis that JI should persist as a secret organisation in its struggle to set up an Islamic state.

JI developments after Sungkar's death suggested that the group was in danger of becoming fragmented. Ba'asyir who succeeded Sungkar as the new

²⁴⁹ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi" *ICG Asia Report N°74*, Jakarta/Brussels (03 Feb. 2004), 2-4.

emir was unable to unite the different factions within JI. The radicals among them continued to despise accommodating to a non-Islamic political system which in their view, not only could contaminate the faithful but was also forbidden. Ba'asyir, on the other hand, preferred to ride the wave of democratisation that had swept Indonesia since Suharto's fall. Ba'asyir's enthusiasm, however, was met with scepticism. Seen from this light, *Rabitatul Mujahidin* was an attempt by Ba'asyir to appease the radicals and erase any doubts they might have about JI under his leadership being less committed to pursuing the jihad agenda. In contrast, the founding of MMI was targeted at a different segment of the JI members, those who felt the time is still not ripe for armed jihad in Indonesia. Nevertheless, adopting the word "mujahidin" for the new organisation indicates a future intention which for now, has to be kept in view.

The subsequent bombings that took place and plans to bomb various targets confirmed that some JI members refused to be restrained further from "Jihad operations". After September 11, they chose to align themselves closer to the Al-Qaeda's agenda. Dr Azhari Husin, the JI's top bomb-maker who was killed in November 2005 and Noordin M. Top who according to documents seized by the Indonesian authorities became the leader of *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad* (Organisation for the Base of Jihad), and was killed on 16 September 2009, represent this faction.

As more JI members were killed or captured the group is no longer intact. The discovery in late February 2010 of a jihad training camp in Aceh

proves this point where the idea of *Lintas Tandhim*²⁵⁰ (across organisations) makes its debut. The term makes the distinction between who is a JI member and who is not, more difficult. The *Markaziyah* that was once instrumental in putting together the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah* (PUPJI) no longer exist. Referring to JI as though it is an organisation that is still intact can be misleading as JI ceased to function as such. While these latest developments are heartening to note, there are still individuals who share and believe in the JI's ideology. The physical threat may have been considerably reduced for now, but the ideological threat nevertheless remains.

4.2. Ideology

DI in this regard offers many lessons for us to understand JI's ideology. When Kartosuwirjo was defeated and later sentenced to death by firing squad on 5 September 1962, the DI/NII/TII was thought to have crumbled. When all the TII detachments involved in the armed struggle against the Republic of Indonesia were given amnesty, thirty-two leading DI/NII/TII figures were made to pledge loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia collectively. A statement that DI had deviated from Islam was issued on 1 August 1962.²⁵¹ With that, it was almost inevitable that DI/NII/TII had been consigned to history. Furthermore, some of the ex-DI/NII/TII senior commanders were employed and given venture capital by the government,²⁵² and that seemed to confirm that DI/NII/TII engagement in armed jihad was all over.

²⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh" *ICG Asia Report N°189*, Jakarta/Brussels (20 Apr. 2010).

²⁵¹ Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 76 & 82.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 83.

These words: “*Tah ieu Hudaibiyah jang urang mah*” (This is our *Hudaibiyah*)²⁵³ which Kartosuwirjo whispered three times during his capture; however, became the ideological motivation for some DI leaders to resume the fight when the time is right. The first time, he uttered it while looking at his aide Aceng Kurnia,²⁵⁴ the second time while looking at his son Dodo Mohammad Darda and the third time was to emphasise its importance.²⁵⁵ These were not ordinary words as they extended the DI ideological life by sparking serious discussion on the status of jihad during the *Hudaibiyah* phase between two senior DI leaders; Aceng Kurnia and Djaja Sudjadi²⁵⁶. Both were known to be DI/TII ideologues. Kurnia and Sudjadi understood the last message of Kartosuwirjo that DI political defeat in 1962 was a transition period before achieving victory. The understanding motivated them to start afresh programmes that were aimed at reconsolidation of ex-DI/TII members in West Java. The reconsolidation process began by reconnecting with ex-DI/TII members and socialisation of the concept of *Hudaibiyah* and *Jihad Fillah* (non-violent spiritual jihad) where all forms of evils²⁵⁷ were repelled internally with the heart. The phase was temporary and would gradually move to the next phase, the *Qital Fisabilillah* (armed struggle) phase, after successfully developing the necessary capability of ex-DI/TII members to wage armed jihad to establish the Islamic state.

²⁵³ *Hudaibiyah* refers to the peace treaty between Prophet Muhammad and the Meccan pagan leaders from the tribe of Quraysh. The treaty allowed the Prophet to preach Islam freely and was considered a transitional phase leading to the fall of Mecca.

²⁵⁴ He was Kartosuwirjo's former aide.

²⁵⁵ Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 74.

²⁵⁶ He was DI's Minister for Finance.

²⁵⁷ According to DI as well as JI one major evil is the acceptance of Indonesia as a *Pancasila* state and not an Islamic state where Allah's laws are held supreme.

Configuring the mind for action

From the previous discussion, it becomes clear that ideology is vital for DI as it is for JI. Ideology configures the mind by providing it with *ideas*, *beliefs*, and *opinions*. Verschueren however, notes that there is no clear-cut relationship between ideology on the one hand and ideas, beliefs, and opinions, on the other hand. Ideas, beliefs, and opinions he argues do not make ideology as they are what he views as just ‘contents of thinking.’ Nevertheless, ideology is linked to “*underlying patterns of meaning, frames of interpretation, world views, or forms of everyday thinking and explanation.*” As such, the various discursive uses of beliefs, ideas, or opinions in the forms of expression and for rhetorical purposes are equally important in analysing ideology as they reflect what goes on in the mind.²⁵⁸

For this study, ideology creates intention by providing meaning and also legitimisation for actions in pursuit of a particular goal. As the underlying current, it has been the precursor to many terrorist attacks not only in Indonesia but also elsewhere in the world. Even when no terrorist attacks were carried out, ideology can still be a potent motivator for the pursuit of political change. Ideology drives non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists who are imbued with it to act or be mentally prepared for action to reconfigure, in this study, the unitary *Pancasila* state of Indonesia to be in line with the group’s ideology.

More specifically, ideology relates to values that are shared among individuals within the group. It manifests in the form of collective beliefs, which discourage forming personal opinions and limit the ability to develop independent thinking among group members. The group identity sets the

²⁵⁸ Jef Verschueren, *Ideology in Language Use: Pragmatic Guidelines for Empirical Research* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7.

perimeter for defining the acceptable behaviours among them. Additionally, ideology deals with important social and political issues, which are core justifications for the existence of non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamist groups. To JI and the like, their struggle is therefore not about trivial everyday things, but principles that could not be compromised at any rate. Van Dijk states succinctly that “... an ideology in a sense is a form of self- (and Other) representation, and summaries the collective beliefs and hence the criteria for identification for group members. That is, ideology is one of the basic forms of social cognition that at the same time define the identity of a group and hence the subjective feelings of social identity (belonging) of its members.”²⁵⁹

While manifested “violence is a means, not a goal in itself” according to Tibi,²⁶⁰ this study argues that ideology plays a central role not only in motivating action but also, in setting the group’s goal as well as building the infrastructure to reach that goal. With this in view, the subsequent discussion on JI’s ideology is the second of the three premises that will be used to assess JI’s intention and capability after discussing earlier, JI’s origin and development. From the study of JI’s ideology, the existential threat JI poses to the *Pancasila* state of Indonesia will become more apparent.

Inheriting Tauhid Rububiyah, Uluhiyah and Mulkiyah²⁶¹ from DI

The concept of *Tauhid* (the oneness of Allah) is essential for all Muslims. For JI, there is a history attached to it. It goes back to when Aceng Kurnia spent

²⁵⁹ Teun A. van Dijk, *Ideology and Discourse: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (English version of an internet course for the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), July 2002), 18.

²⁶⁰ Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2012), 156.

²⁶¹ Salafi divides *Tauhid* into three: *Tauhid al-Rububiyah*, *al-Uluhiyah* and *al-Asma’ wa al-Sifat*.

the time to compile DI's version of the *Tauhid* known as *Tauhid RMU* (*Rububiyah, Mulkiyah and Uluhiyah*) which later became materials for recruitment and development of new DI members after the defeat in 1962.²⁶² As a movement that had rebelled against the state, and believed in the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) that Kartosuwirjo declared, religion and politics do not have a well-defined boundary. In formulating the *Tauhid RMU*, Kurnia was very much influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi.²⁶³ Qutb wrote something similar when explaining “*La ilaha illallah manhaj hayah*” (There is no god but Allah as the way of life) in *Ma‘ālim fi al-Ṭoriq* (Milestones).²⁶⁴ Abul Ala Maududi also discussed the same thing in *Al-Muṣṭalahāt Al-Arba‘ah fi al-Qurān* (The Four Terminologies in the Qur’an).²⁶⁵ The two books were among the books that were translated into Bahasa Indonesia and published by Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia in the early 1970s.²⁶⁶

Tauhid Rububiyah is understood as admission and belief that Allah is the one and only creator, organiser and lawmaker. In Allah’s hand, lies the absolute authority to legislate laws.²⁶⁷ By implication, whosoever legislate laws other than what Allah had revealed is considered a competitor to Allah and is a *Musyrik* (one who ascribes divinity to other than Allah). For *Tauhid Rububiyah* to be realised, Allah’s laws must be implemented in the life of the individual, family, community, nation and state. It is something that could only be

²⁶² Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 115 and 119.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *Ma‘ālim fi al- Ṭarīq*, 51-59, downloaded from <http://www.twhed.com> on 06 Nov. 2013.

²⁶⁵ Syed Abu Al-‘Ala Al-Maududi, *Al-Muṣṭalahāt Al-Arba‘ah fi Al-Qurān* (Damascus: Maktabah Dār Al-Fath, 1941), 13-94.

²⁶⁶ Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 125-126.

²⁶⁷ The explanation is given by Solahudin based on his interview with an anonymous ex-member of *Jama‘ah Pemuda Mujahidin* (The Mujahidin Youth Group), Bandung, (Oct. 2007), and his interview with an anonymous ex-DI member, Bekasi, (Nov. 2006).

implemented nationally if state leaders adopt Islam as the constitution for the state. Within this framework, the state leaders' refusal to implement the laws of Allah is equivalent to ascribing divinity to other than Allah which nullifies the belief in Allah.

Likewise, *Tauhid Mulkiyah* as admission and belief that Allah is the one and the only sovereign that man must obey offers the same conclusion that no other sovereign must be accorded the same level of obedience as Allah. As a direct consequence of the understanding of *Tauhid Mulkiyah*, the establishment of Allah's Kingdom on Earth is obligatory. It requires a government that implements Allah's laws to run the affairs of the state. Any government that does not apply Allah's laws or the laws of the Qur'an is a *Thoghut*²⁶⁸ government, and a conscious effort to change the government and the system must be made.

Next, *Tauhid Uluhiyah* is dedicating all forms of worship solely to Allah. It is because Allah is man's only sustainer, creator, and sovereign. It also means only Allah has the right to legislate laws for all his creations. So, the manifestation of *Tauhid Uluhiyah* is in man's willingness and contentment to obey Allah's laws. Any form of opposition to Allah's laws makes one a *Musyrik Uluhiyah* (one who ascribes divinity to other than Allah by worshipping others).

In sum, these three aspects of *Tauhid* render politics as a fundamental issue and an integral part of the religion for DI and JI. Anyone rejecting politics which incorporate the three aspects of *Tauhid* is considered a *Kafir* (infidel). The practice of *Takfir* (the practice of one Muslim declaring another Muslim an

²⁶⁸ The term denotes, primarily, anything that is worshipped instead of Allah, and, thus, all that may turn man away from Allah and lead him to evil.

unbeliever) in DI was more pronounced than in JI. To some degree, this was motivated by DI's war with the Republic of Indonesia. The DI then had to be sure who among the population was with them and who was against them. Although JI originated from DI, *Takfir* as a consequence of the understanding of *Tauhid* that was taught to JI members was less noticeable. JI members were less assertive probably because *Takfir Mu'ayyan*²⁶⁹ or the act of declaring a specific individual as *Kafir* (infidel) requires conforming to stringent requirements. With the absence of a war against the state, *Takfir* for JI is more of a theoretical exercise than a practical requirement.

In JI, the understanding of *Tauhid* has one significant difference. While retaining *Tauhid Rububiyah* and *Tauhid Uluhiyah*, JI left out *Tauhid Mulkiyah*.²⁷⁰ Like other *salafis*,²⁷¹ JI includes *Tauhid Asma' wa Sifat* (Oneness of Allah's Names and Attributes) as one of the three aspects of which *Tauhid* is understood. While this may be the case, the change nevertheless, did not alter the understanding of *Tauhid* substantially.

In the discussion on *Tauhid*, the issue of *al-Hakimiyah* which falls under *al-Rububiyah* remain central. Abu Rushdan identified the concept, "*al-Hakimiyah*" as the "*semangat yang sama*" (the same spirit) that could be found in the writings of Syed Qutb and thoughts of Abdullah Azzam.²⁷² *Al-Hakimiyah* is the understanding that divine sovereignty belongs only to Allah, and this is the thread that binds JI and DI together even if the terms they used differ. The

²⁶⁹ There is an attempt in Indonesia to build a consensus among Muslim activists on applying the "*takfir mu'ayyan*" on members of TNI and POLRI. See, Al Ustadz Saiful Anam bin Saifuddin, "Hukum Anshar Ath Thawaghit (TNI/POLRI)" *Jihad News* (<http://jihad-news.com/2013/11/ebook-hukum-anshar-ath-thawaghit-tnipolri/>, 03 Nov. 2013), accessed on 15 Nov. 2013.

²⁷⁰ Personal Conversation in mid-1990s with JI members.

²⁷¹ Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab, *Kitab At-Tauhid* (n.p: Dar-us-Salam Publications, n.d)

²⁷² See Abu Rushdan, "Bedah Buku Strategi Dua Lengan (Materi Ust Abu Rusdan) Part 1 & 2," Online video, YouTube, (web: rizal resi, 24 Sep. 2013), accessed on 06 Nov. 2013.

implication arising from this understanding is that the acceptance of *Pancasila* as the state ideology will always be a contradiction and a direct violation of *Tauhid*. From JI's *Tauhidic* paradigm, *Pancasila* as the state ideology must be rejected and opposed. Likewise, democracy is seen as a form of *Syirk* because power in such a political system lies in the hand of the people when it should only be in the hand of Allah.²⁷³

Expanding the Ideological Content

The concept of *Al-Walā'* (allegiance) and *Al-Barā'* (enmity) is another significant development in JI's understanding of *Tauhid*.²⁷⁴ The two most important references for JI in explaining the two concepts were taken from Shaykh Muhammad Saeed Al-Qahtani's "*Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā' fi Al-Islām*"²⁷⁵ and Saeed Hawwa's "*Jundullah Thaqaḥfah wa Akhlāqan*."²⁷⁶ For JI, a correct understanding of these concepts is not only crucial but also, enables Muslims to determine who their friends and their enemies are.

In the explanation of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*, internalisation of the declaration of faith: "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah" which is the essence of belief in Allah, is determined solely by one's *Al-Walā'* and *Al-Barā'*. *Al-Walā'* (allegiance) is the standard for determining whether a Muslim belongs to the "*Hizbullah*" (partisan of Allah) or the "*Hizbussyaithan*" (partisans of Satan). This distinction could not be

²⁷³ This is the main theme of Sungkar's sixteen lectures which the author had analysed. See also, Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 234.

²⁷⁴ Like many Arabic words, *Al-Walā'* can also mean friendship, amity, devotion and loyalty whereas *Al-Barā'* can also mean free, exempt and disavowal.

²⁷⁵ The book was originally a Master's thesis submitted to the Department of Aqeedah, Umm al-Qurra University in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

²⁷⁶ Especially the part on "*Tahrīr Al-Walā': Lillāh wa Al-Rasūl wa Al-Mukminūn*" (Freeing the *Al-Walā'*: For Allah, the Messenger and the Believers).

achieved by merely looking at a Muslim for his performance of the five daily prayers, paying the *Zakat*, going on the *Hajj* pilgrimage, fasting during the month of *Ramadhan* or doing any Islamic deeds.²⁷⁷

Consequently, a true believer can be distinguished from a false believer by his/her *Al-Walā'* and *Al-Barā'*. Based on the concept, Sungkar made it explicit that it is "*Haram*" (unlawful) to give *Al-Walā'* to Suharto because according to Sungkar, Suharto is not only ignorant of the Qur'an and *Sunnah* but also rejected them.²⁷⁸

As for Islam, JI views it not just a religion, but a way of life or in Arabic, "*Al-Dīn*." Referring to Islam as *Al- Dīn* means Islam cannot be confined to ritual practices but covers every aspect of life. The comprehensiveness of Islam is known as "*Islam Kaffah*" by JI, and becoming a Muslim requires embracing Islam in its totality. In seeking the correct understand of Islam as "*Al-Dīn*," JI argues that the usage of the word "*Al- Dīn*" in the Quran refers to at least three things: judgment, law, and worship. In essence, Islam as "*Al-Din*"²⁷⁹ requires the implementation of *Sharia* laws to govern every aspect of life. It is mandatory and not negotiable. For JI, it is the correct understanding of what it means to submit to Allah truly and to worship him wholeheartedly. Every Muslim will be asked to account for it on the Day of Judgment.

Like all Muslims, JI also insists that the Prophet Muhammad is the best human interpreter on how Islam should be understood and practised. However, when the *Seerah* of the Prophet (life of Prophet Muhammad) is studied, it is

²⁷⁷ These were made clear during personal conversation with JI members in mid-1990s.

²⁷⁸ Abdullah Sungkar, "Serial Ustad Abdullah Sungkar (Al Wala' wal Baro' 1)," Online video, *YouTube* (Web: candra bayu, 17 Sep. 2013), accessed on 06 Nov. 2013. Sungkar gave a series of four discontinuous lectures lasting more than seven hours in total on the topic.

²⁷⁹ For a more comprehensive discussion of the word, see Al-Maududi, *Al-Mustalahāt Al-Arba'ah*, 116-130.

conveniently categorised into four stages: *Iman* (faith), *Hijrah* (migration), *I'dad* (military training and preparations) and *Jihad* (armed struggle).²⁸⁰ These four are the milestones for JI to establish the Islamic state. JI claims that the milestones conform to the content of the following verse of the Quran:

“Behold, as for those who have attained to faith (*iman*), and who have forsaken the domain of evil (*Hijrah*) and are striving hard (*Jihad*), with their possessions and their lives, in Allah's cause, as well as those who shelter and succour [them] - these are [truly] the friends and protectors of one another. But as for those who have come to believe without having migrated [to your country] - you are in no wise responsible for their protection until such a time as they migrate [to you]. Yet, if they ask you for succour against religious persecution, it is your duty to give [them] this succour-except against a people between whom and yourselves there is a covenant: for God sees all that you do.”²⁸¹

Although the above verse did not mention the *I'dad* (military training and preparations) stage, it was added based on the argument “*mā lā yatimmu al-wājibu illā bihi fa huwa wājib*” (when an obligation cannot be fulfilled without a means, then the means become obligatory).²⁸² So, applying the maxim, the *I'dad* stage becomes compulsory because, without it, the *Jihad* stage cannot be reached or becomes untenable. JI deliberately over-emphasised the last stage; *Jihad*, in the study of the *Seerah* (biography of the Prophet Muhammad) by persistently highlighting that Prophet Muhammad participated in battles throughout his life, and therefore, should be emulated.

In an attempt to build the legitimacy of the group, JI argues that implementing Islam as *Al-Dīn* is something that cannot be undertaken by an individual alone.²⁸³ It requires a platform known as *Al-Jama'ah* with a clear *Al-Walā'* (allegiance) given to Allah, the Prophet, and the believers. The *Al-Jama'ah* must also show *Al-Barā'* (enmity) to all things that can lead a Muslim

²⁸⁰ These will be dealt in more details in the discussion on JI's strategy.

²⁸¹ Quran, surah *Al-Anfal* verse 72. *Iman*, *Hijrah* and *Jihad* are also mentioned in surah *Al-Anfal* verses 74 and 75 as well as surah *Al-Taubah*, verse 20.

²⁸² The maxim is discussed more generally in Muhammad Abu Zahrah, *Usūl Al-Fiqh* (Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr Al-'Arabi, 1997), 160.

²⁸³ Personal conversations with JI members in mid-1990s.

astray from the straight path. In arguing the case for adopting the *Al-Jama'ah* as a vehicle for the establishment of an Islamic state, the words of the second Caliph Umar bin al-Khattab were often quoted. Umar was reported saying “*lā Islāma illā bi al-jamā‘ah, wa lā jamā‘ata illā bi imārah wa lā imārata illā bi al-ṭā‘ah*”²⁸⁴ (there is no Islam without the *Jama'ah* (group), and there is no group without leadership, and there is no leadership without obedience). It disqualifies the existing political and mass organisations from being included in the understanding of *Al-Jama'ah*. For JI, these organisations do not fulfil the criteria of *Al-Jama'ah* because their leadership and membership are not by the requirements of *Imamah* (political leadership) in Islam, and no *Bai'ah* (pledge of allegiance) was given to the leader of the organisation. JI only considers *Al-Jama'ah* like itself to be a legitimate vehicle for the struggle of Islam.

Revising Some of the Earlier Understanding

The revision came about as a result of the internationalisation of the Afghan-Soviet War through news, publications such as the translation of Abdullah Azzam's books and videos on the war that were circulating within the Indonesian Muslim community.²⁸⁵ Ever since the first batch of volunteers were sent to Afghanistan in 1985, Sungkar, Ba'asyir and those who later occupied JI leadership were gradually exposed to other militant Islamists in Afghanistan. The interactions succeeded in changing and complementing the religious thoughts of JI.

On *Tauhid Al-Hakimiyah* where the establishment of the *Sharia* law is deemed as mandatory, those who reject the *Sharia* law are infidels. Since the

²⁸⁴ Abdullah Bin Abd Al-Rahman Al-Darimi, *Sunan Al-Darimi* (Karachi: Qadimi Kutub Khanah, n.d.) Vol. 1, 79.

²⁸⁵ Ali, *Al-Qaeda*, 150.

right to legislate laws is the prerogative of Allah alone, anyone who legislates laws other than what has been revealed by Allah is considered to have subverted the right of Allah. In so doing, they have committed *Shirk* (polytheism or idolatry) and infidelity. Similarly, adopting laws other than what Allah has revealed in running the state is a major *Shirk*, and waging war against those who are guilty of it is obligatory.

In this case, an attempt must be made to change the political system of Indonesia to an Islamic system. Although this does not alter JI's earlier objective of establishing an Islamic state which it inherited from DI, nevertheless, the view that *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, the Islamic State of Indonesia) still exist as maintained by DI, was reviewed and corrected. JI now argues that after DI's defeat in 1962, NII no longer exists. What is left is not a state because DI no longer controls any territories in Indonesia. The revision considers DI and JI as just "*jama'atun minal Muslimin*" (groups made up of Muslims).

Concerning jihad, Kartosuwirjo accepted that jihad does not always mean *Qital* (waging war/armed struggle). To him, war or armed struggle is *Jihad Asghor* (lesser *Jihad*), and jihad against oneself is *Jihad Akbar* (Greater *Jihad*).²⁸⁶ The revision made to this view restricts the meaning of jihad as an '*ibadah* (the act of worship) to waging war/armed struggle to make Allah's word supreme. It is the legal meaning of the word jihad, and that jihad against oneself is only the literal meaning. The verses of the Quran that were revealed during the Meccan period where *Jihad* is mentioned not as waging war/armed struggle had been abrogated by the verses of the sword in Surah *Al-Taubah*.

²⁸⁶ S.M. Kartosoewirjo, *Sikap Hijrah PSII 2*, 418. See also, Chiara Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012), 63

These verses were revealed later during the Medinan period and therefore provide the finalised meaning of *Jihad*.²⁸⁷ However, this view which JI holds has been contested and has remained controversial among scholars both old and new.²⁸⁸ The abrogation by the verses of the sword is, therefore, inconclusive, and to present it as though the view is definitive is inappropriate.

One significant development from the discussion on jihad is the view that refusal of the Indonesian government to rule based on the *Sharia* law renders the government an apostate government. Waging war against an apostate government is considered as defensive jihad and is *Fardhu 'Ain* (an individual duty). However, *I'dad* (military training and preparations) must be undertaken first before waging war against such government.

Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah (PUPJI, The General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah)

After the separation from DI, JI was a *Salafi* group. It is evident from the events that led to that separation. Sungkar as the leader of JI had criticised Anjengan Masduki for his religious practices and beliefs which Sungkar considered as deviations from Islam. Masduki was an ardent follower of *Thariqat* (a term used for a school or order of Sufism) which *Salafism* regards as heretical. Furthermore, Masduki claimed to be in possession of “*ilmu laduni*” (direct knowledge from Allah) and had received *Wangsit* (divine inspiration) from Allah.²⁸⁹ These, from the *Salafi* theological point of view, go

²⁸⁷ Personal conversations with JI members in mid-1990s.

²⁸⁸ Al-Qaradawi, “*Āyat al-saif mukhtalaf ‘alaihā wa al-ba‘d yaqūlu bi naskhihā*” (The verses of the sword are disputed and some says they are abrogated) (<http://www.qaradawi.net/2010-02-23-09-38-15/7/4764-2009-12-14-12-31-15.html>, 10 Sep. 2009), accessed on 30 Dec. 2013.

²⁸⁹ Reasons given by JI leadership for the separation which was mentioned during personal conversations with JI members in mid-1990s.

against the fundamentals of Islam and cannot be tolerated. The chapter demonstrates how Sungkar rejected syncretism or local influence in the thinking and practice of leaders like Masduki, preferring instead, the global approach of *Salafi* theologians.

Looking at JI's ideological development, JI is, in fact, a *Salafi- Jihadi* group with the objective of *Iqomatid Dien* (establishing an Islamic state and after that an Islamic caliphate) by using the power of *Da 'wah (Indzar)* to issue a warning and *Jihad Musallah* (armed jihad).²⁹⁰

The PUPJI is a document that was approved by JI central leadership. The police recovered it in late November 2002 during the raid on the house of one of JI's leaders; Saad, an alias for Achmad Roihan.²⁹¹ The conceiver of the PUPJI was Abu Rushdan whom Sungkar accorded the trust to formulate the ideological concept and strategy of JI's struggle. The draft was then discussed over several meetings attended by Sungkar, Ba'asyir, Mukhlas, Abu Fatih, Adung and others.²⁹²

Many books were used as references for the PUPJI. Three, however, became the main references: "*Al-Ṭarīq ilā Jamā'ah al-Muslimīn*" (The Road to Muslim Groups), "*Al-Manhaj Al-Ḥaraki li Al-Sīrah Al-Nabawiyyah*" (The Political Methodology for the Life History of the Prophet) and "*Mīthāq Al-'Amal Al-Islāmiyy*" (The Charter for Islamic Action).²⁹³ A deeper analysis of the PUPJI indicates that the section on "USHULUL MANHAJ AL-HARAQIY LI IQOMATID DIEN"²⁹⁴ was taken from *Mīthāq Al-'Amal Al-Islāmiyy* which

²⁹⁰ PUPJI, 5 and 7.

²⁹¹ Tim Penanggulangan Terorisme, *Percakapan dengan Sidney Jones Dan Nasir Abbas: Seputar Jamaah Islamiyah* (Jakarta: Tim Penanggulangan Terorisme, 2007), 87.

²⁹² Ali, *Al-Qaeda*, 173

²⁹³ Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 233.

²⁹⁴ PUPJI, 5-6

was written by the founding members of the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG). The other two books complement it. The influence of EIG in JI's thinking is not surprising because DI Afghanistan alumni, who later became JI members, were trained at the EIG military training camp which was located in Khowst Province. The shift from *Salafism* to *Salafi-Jihadism* is a natural progression given JI's obsession with armed jihad and how this understanding of jihad is later put into action as the means to establish an Islamic state.²⁹⁵

The PUPJI as JI's official document provides the general direction for JI to follow. As an independent identity from DI, it provides the blueprint for JI to carry out its struggle for an Islamic state which is systematically organised under four main headings as follows:

1. *Ushulul-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid-Dien* (The principles for the methodology to establish the religion).
2. *Al-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien* (The methodology to establish the religion).
3. *Al-Manhaj Al-Amaliy* (The operational methodology).
4. *Nidhom Asasiy* (The Constitution).

Four principles in the PUPJI capture JI's world-view. The first, the sole reason for the creation of man is to worship Allah alone. As such, man's worldly possessions, time, energy and thoughts must be expended for this purpose.

The second, as Allah's vicegerent on earth, man shoulders the responsibility of ensuring that life on earth is in accordance to what Allah has prescribed. For this to happen, all acts of corruption on earth arising from a way of life that does not observe Allah's law must be stopped.

²⁹⁵ For working definitions of *Salafism* and *Salafi-jihadism*, see: Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstrorp, "Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Salafist Jihadism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30 (2007): 826-827.

The third, life on this earth serves as a test to filter and sieve members of the human race to determine who has performed the best deed. In this case, two criteria must be met. The deeds must be performed solely for the sake of Allah and emulating the Prophet in all of one's life endeavours.

The fourth, Prophets were sent by Allah to establish the *Al-Dīn*. Here, establishing *Al-Dīn* or '*Iqomatid Dien*' is understood as instituting a way of life that is based on *Tauhid*, and it requires Islam to be implemented in all aspects of life.

To others these may seem too theoretical and idealistic, but not to JI. JI argues that the integration of life on earth with full submission to Allah has been practised since the time of Prophet Muhammad, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the Companions and the generations that came after them. It is only after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 that the practice came to an abrupt end. As a response to it, many movements emerged wanting to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate. JI identifies itself with the many Islamic revival groups/movements which continue to seek the same objective.²⁹⁶ Like the many groups/movements before it, JI also insists that *Al-Ḥall huwa al-Islām* (Islam is the solution). In the Indonesian context, the interpretation of Islam as the solution asserts the need for remaking and reconfiguring the state of Indonesia by doing away with the un-Islamic *Pancasila*.

The *Ushulul Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien* (The principles for the methodology to establish the religion) is the ideological foundation of JI based on ten principles. The ten principles were adopted by JI from the EIG,²⁹⁷ after

²⁹⁶ See the section on "MUQADDIMAH" (Introduction) in the *PUPJI*. 3-4.

²⁹⁷ See, Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmiyyah, *Mithāq Al-'Amal Al-Islāmiyy* (n.p.: Minbar Al-Tawhīd wa Al-Jihād, n.d.). Before the completion of the *PUPJI* in 1996, the ten principles were taught to JI members and were then known as the "*Fikrah Asasiyah*" (Foundational Thoughts).

making the necessary changes to suit II's context, and renaming it as the *Ushulul-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid-Dien*. These are II's ideological foundations for establishing the Islamic state before the Islamic Caliphate can be re-established. The ten principles are:

First Principle: Our aim is only to seek Allah's pleasure through the means that have been determined by Allah and His Prophet.

Second Principle: Our faith is based on the faith of Sunnis according to the way of the *Salaf*.

Third Principle: Our understanding about Islam is comprehensive that follows the understanding of the *Salaf*.

Fourth Principle: Our aim in the struggle is to guide mankind to submission to Allah only by the restoration the caliphate on earth.

Fifth Principle: Our way is *Iman* (faith), *Hijrah* (emigration) and *Jihad* in the way of Allah.²⁹⁸

Sixth Principle: Our provisions are:

1. Knowledge and *Taqwa* (God consciousness)
2. *Yaqin* (Certainty) and *Tawakkal* (total reliance on Allah)
3. *Syukur* (Gratefulness) and patience
4. *Zuhud* (Abstinence from the life of this world in preference for the Hereafter)
5. Love for *Jihad* in the path of Allah and martyrdom

Seventh Principle: Our loyalty is to Allah, the Prophet and the believers

Eighth Principle: Our animosity is directed towards the unseen Satan and human Satan

Ninth Principle: Our *Jama'ah* ties are based on the shared aims, beliefs and understanding of the religion.

Tenth Principle: Our Islamic practices are pure and comprehensive with the *Jama'ah* system, followed by the state and then, the caliphate.²⁹⁹

These principles were established by II to form the basis not only for understanding *Al-Dīn* but also, for establishing *Al-Dīn* in the form of an Islamic state and subsequently the Islamic caliphate. The process starts from moulding

²⁹⁸ In the EIG's *Mithāq Al-'Amal Al-Islāmiyy*, the fifth principle states: "Our path: *Da'wah*, *Hisbah* (enjoining good and forbidding evil), waging jihad in the way of Allah, working within the framework of a *Jama'ah*, regulated by the *Shari'ah*, and a *Jama'ah* which draws lessons from the past."

²⁹⁹ There are only nine principles in the "*Mitsaq Al-'Amal Al-Islamiyy*".

the individual before moving on to the family and the *Jama'ah* (group) with the Islamic mould.

From the analysis of the ideological content of JI's ten principles, implementation of pure and comprehensive Islam is to be achieved by assuming political power and establishing the Islamic state. JI argues that the Prophet did this using armed struggle which JI understood as the only accepted technical meaning of jihad according to the *Sharia*.³⁰⁰

Accepting jihad as armed struggle implies that there is a need for violent actions that could result in the loss of lives. The sixth principle which states one of JI's provisions is "Love for jihad in the path of Allah and martyrdom" in this respect, implicitly, is a call to be operationally ready to perform jihad. It is the same message that Ba'asyir conveyed to other prisoners at the Batu Nusakembangan Prison before he was transferred to Pasir Putih Prison, that the *Ummah* (Islamic community) is obligated to carry out jihad to establish the *Sharia* and not to accept or defer to the *Pancasila*.³⁰¹

In this regard, JI's virulent ideology is promoting the urgency to establish an Islamic political order in Indonesia by bringing down existing regimes through armed jihad. The ideology portrays an Indonesia that is united by the national ideology of *Pancasila* as unacceptable, and it is a religious duty to replace it with a divinely mandated *Sharia*.

³⁰⁰ Abu Tholut Al Jawiy quoting Dr Abdullah Azzam on the meaning of jihad as "perang dengan senjata" (war with arms). See, M. Fachry, "Email Tadzkirah (Nasehat) Abu Tholut Tentang Fa'i Di Indonesia" *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arammah.com/read/2010/11/22/9982-email-tadzkiroh-nasehat-abu-tholut-tentang-fai-di-indonesia.html>, 22 Nov. 2010), accessed on 18 Nov. 2013. Also, Candra Bayu "Meluruskan Makna Jihad Yang Di Simpangkan BNPT" *YouTube* (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rhu-zVnl28I>, 01 July 2013), accessed on 18 Nov. 2013.

³⁰¹ Bilal, "Kronologis Pemindahan Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir ke Penjara Super Maximum Security," *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://arammah.com/read/2013/01/20/26237-kronologis-pemindahan-ustadz-abu-bakar-baasyir-ke-penjara-super-maximum-security.html>, 20 Jan. 2013), accessed on 18 Nov. 2013.

Simply put, an Islamic political system must be established to substitute the *Pancasila*. The ideology puts it plainly that there is no middle ground between Islam and *Pancasila*. JI's worldview which is couched in religious tone and language did not hide JI's real intention of wanting the unitary *Pancasila* state of Indonesia replaced.

While the ideology may or may not manifest in physical violence and physical threat, one thing that is clear is JI's rejection of democratic means to make legitimate political changes in Indonesia. JI's refusal of legitimate channels to make political changes raises many questions on the way JI intends to pursue its political agenda of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. Equally important, is the question of whether these changes will be constitutional or unconstitutional? Will these changes also respect the democratic system that had replaced Suharto's authoritarian New Order or will these changes disregard the reformation that has set in motion democratisation in Indonesia? This study turns next to JI's strategy to put its vision of "*Iqomatid Dien*" (establishing the religion) into action to find the answers to these and other related questions.³⁰²

4.3. Strategy

The strategy is the third premise that this study uses to assess JI's intentions and capabilities to determine the existential threat JI posed to the *Pancasila* state of Indonesia. In the PUPJI, JI's stated strategy involves gathering, cultivating and directing all resources to achieve the common long-term objectives of establishing an Islamic state of Indonesia. Police Inspector

³⁰² PUPJI, 7.

General (Police Retired) Drs Ansyaad Mbai as the Head of National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) also noted that to some extent, similar motivation also drove other Indonesian radical groups.³⁰³

The PUPJI also makes provision for smaller scale strategies which the PUPJI refers to as tactics. These encompass understanding how resources could be mobilised to achieve specific short-term objectives in a particular field. They involve carrying out military operations, which include all endeavours, activities, and actions that could utilise elements of power according to a plan or plans that are determined by interactions between space and time.³⁰⁴

The section on *Al-Manhaj Al-'Amaliy Li Iqomatid Dien* (The Operational Methodology for Establishing the Religion) is where the strategy, tactics, and operations are discussed in the PUPJI.³⁰⁵ The section is intended to provide general guidelines (*Pedoman Umum*) and is not meant to be restrictive. The considerable room is given to tactical and operational commanders to exercise their discretions, but these commanders are also required to carry out something like a “SWOT” (short for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis.

From the analysis, positive and negative elements that may affect the proposed actions are identified. The analysis serves as a basis with which the commanders try to ascertain whether the proposed military operations that they are planning to undertake are not only possible, but the group must also have the capability to carry out the operations, and that the operations are preferable or beneficial.

³⁰³ Ansyaad Mbai. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Jakarta, (23 Sep. 2014).

³⁰⁴ PUPJI, 8.

³⁰⁵ Ibid, 8-12.

From the section on ideology, it becomes clear that JI understanding of Islam as *Din-wa-dawla* where the religion of Islam is united with state order is an overwhelmingly dominant feature of JI's ideology and to manifest it is JI long-term objective. *Al-Hall al-Islāmi* or the Islamic solution JI unwaveringly aspires to implement in the form of an Islamic *Sharia* state of Indonesia as the replacement for the *Pancasila* state is imperative in the *Din-wa-dawla* framework. In fact, the ideology goes further to insist on the unity of religion and state becoming a yardstick for determining how genuinely Islamic one is. With such an ideology, it is a fallacy to believe that JI's vision of an Indonesia state where *Sharia replaces Pancasila as the philosophical basis of the state* will embrace pluralism. With the bedrock of JI ideology clear, this study will next examine JI's strategy closely.

There are three essential points to note at this juncture. First, JI was no longer a monolithic organisation after Sungkar's death in 1998.³⁰⁶ Second, with the overwhelming influence of Al-Qaeda after September 11, terrorist attacks in Indonesia which had been attributed to JI, were mostly reactive and motivated by revenge. They were more tactical or operational than strategic. In other words, they have little or no relation whatsoever with the ideology of *Tauhid Al-Hakimiyah* that insists on the divine sovereignty of Allah being the sole basis for governing Indonesia. Nevertheless, they are essential in resuscitating "jihad" and preserving it in the minds of Indonesian Muslims in general, and more specifically, JI members. Third, JI's vision of an Islamic state in Indonesia is to be achieved by armed jihad, and this requires building JI's capacity to achieve the stated goal.

³⁰⁶ Ali, Personal Interview (27 Apr. 2017).

With JI fragmented, it is hard to determine which of its many splinter groups speak or act for JI. According to Abu Rushdan, there are three views within JI on how *Al-Jihad fi sabilillah* (jihad in the path of Allah) as an obligation based on the *Sharia* which is either *Fardhu Kifayah* (collective duty) or *Fardhu 'Ain* (an individual duty) should be carried out.³⁰⁷ The views to a large extent dictate the strategy that will be used to conduct jihad.

The first group favours carrying out “jihad operations” by using *Al-Jama'ah* as the platform. They are the traditional JI which follows the PUPJI and represent the JI core group.

The second group views jihad as *Fardhu 'Ain* for those with capabilities and opportunities to carry out “jihad operations” independently from the *Al-Jama'ah*. It is the group that has been responsible for the many bombings in Indonesia.

The third group considers “*Daf' al-ṣā'il*”³⁰⁸ as necessary to defend Muslim brethren from the persecutions of *Thagut* government or attacks by non-Muslims. So, military actions to help other Muslims in difficulties in places like Ambon, Poso or elsewhere which falls under this category are obligatory. Depending on the severity of the situation, and the location of the conflict, considerable overlaps occurred among members of the three groups within JI. The differences were not on fundamentals but more tactical.

³⁰⁷ Abu Rushdan, “Fiqh Jihad” (Audio, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), The Ideological Support Database Project, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 03 Sep. 2006), accessed on 27 Nov. 2013.

³⁰⁸ The term denotes an act of defending oneself against an aggressor.

Unity in Diversity

While the manner of performing *Al-Jihad fi sabilillah* (jihad in the path of Allah) differed, there still exists a wide bandwidth for cooperation within the fragmented JI fraternity as well as with other similar minded individuals or organisations. Carrying out joint endeavours where they support each other to achieve the same purpose was common.

Ali explained that this was true in 1998 when the concept of fighting the Americans first surfaced because of the World Islamic Front³⁰⁹ issuing a statement urging jihad against the Jews and Crusaders. Osama bin Laden was a prominent figure in the Front. Sungkar had already sent Hambali as JI's envoy to Osama bin Laden in 1997, and contact between Osama and JI was also made through Osama's envoy who came to Kuala Lumpur. Also, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was assigned by Osama to build contact with JI. In that declaration, the United States was accused of occupying the "Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its neighbours, and turning its bases in the Peninsula with which to fight neighbouring Muslim peoples."³¹⁰ For all these so-called crimes, Bin Laden considered the killing of Americans wherever they might be, as the top priority which comes next after the belief in Allah.

The call received mixed reactions from JI members. The issue of targeting the far or the near enemy was debated among JI senior military members. Hambali and Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas favoured attacking Americans. Thoriqudin alias Abu Rushdan and Achmad Roihan were against it, and insisted that JI top priority is waging jihad against the near enemy; the Indonesian apostate government, and not the far enemy; the Americans.

³⁰⁹ Ali, Personal Interview, Jakarta (27 Apr. 2017).

³¹⁰ Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milleli, eds., *Al Qaeda in Its Own Words* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 53-56

However, the communal conflict in Maluku and Poso³¹¹ between Muslims and Christians in 1999/2000 altered all that. The issue of the near or far enemy became irrelevant because the “Christian fanatics” whom they claimed had attacked Muslims in Maluku and Poso stood as their immediate enemies.³¹² In retrospect, these differences occurred at the tactical and operational levels. Nonetheless, at the strategic level, they remained united. Mbai observed that their collective strategic goal is to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state, and this is where the existential threat is.³¹³

While JI did not start the communal conflict, the conflict provided new hope for JI by paving the way for the opening of a new “jihad front” and inflaming the passion for jihad. It also provided JI with the opportunity for military training and to be directly involved in armed conflicts. Also, the conflict served as a platform to educate the Indonesian Muslim community on *Jihad fi sabilillah* (jihad in the path of Allah) and as a means to rekindle the spirit of jihad among them.³¹⁴

Internally, the conflict united the two factions and resolved the issue of the near and far enemy for the time being. Zulkarnaen, JI military chief who was responsible for the jihad project in Ambon conducted a meeting in Solo in June 1999. For the project, he had under his command members of the *Laskar Khos* and a few other JI members. The project could not take off because of the lack of funds. Soliciting funds from the public without a credible and trusted

³¹¹ Geert Arend van Klinken, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 73-106; *ICG Asia Report N°74* and International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku” *ICG Asia Report No 31*, Jakarta/Brussels (8 Feb. 2002).

³¹² Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 227-228.

³¹³ Personal Interview, (23 Sep. 2014).

³¹⁴ Ali Imron, *Ali Imron Sang Pengebom* (Ali Imron the Bomber) (Jakarta Selatan: Republika, 2004), 56. JI’s involvement in the Syrian civil war also serves this purpose. See, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict,” *IPAC Report No.6* (30 Jan. 2014): 11.

organisation as the front organisation was a significant problem they needed to overcome. As a way out, Abdullah Anshori alias Abu Fatih, Head of Mantiqi II, decided to cooperate with *Komite Penanggulangan Krisis* (Kompak, The Crisis Management/Prevention Committee), a social organisation under *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII, The Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council). DDII was contacted, and a request was made for DDII to form branches in various cities in Indonesia with the objective of collecting funds that would be allocated for the jihad activities. DDII agreed so long the cooperation was mutually beneficial.³¹⁵

The communal conflict subsided in mid-2001. A few months after that on 9 September 2001, the attacks on the World Trade Centre took place. The attacks reignited the desire of Hambali's group to fight the enemies of Islam with particular reference made to Americans and its allies in Southeast Asia. The group was encouraged by the attack on the United States which they thought was carried out with relative ease, considering that the United States is the only superpower left after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Based on the group's calculation it was the most opportune time to wage jihad against America. The group was convinced that America after the attack on the World Trade Centre was at its weakest, and attacking the enemy at the time of weakness was the best strategy.³¹⁶ To implement the attack they collaborated with Al-Qaeda. It is a strategy in the PUPJI parlance known as "*Tansiq bainal jama'ah*" (collaborations with other groups) which specifies

³¹⁵ Based on unpublished personal notes of an anonymous JI member in Solo on the jihad project in Ambon, see, Solahudin, *NII Sampai JI*, 271.

³¹⁶ Ibid, 262.

mutual help and support through the nurturing of relationships with other *jama'ah* (group) to achieve an objective.³¹⁷

During the preparatory stage, Mansour Jabarah, an Al-Qaeda operative came to Malaysia and discussed with Hambali the attack plan. Jabarah also surveyed several targets in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Later, both Jabarah and Hambali agreed to attack Singapore.³¹⁸ The plan was to use truck bombs to attack the US and Israeli Embassies, the Australian and British High Commissions and commercial buildings housing US firms. For the attacks that were supposed to be launched in December 2001/January 2002 or April/May 2002, Singapore JI members had made plans to obtain 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate.³¹⁹ Faturrahman Al Khozi, JI's bomb expert who at that time resided in Mindanao, was given the task of constructing the truck bomb.

The plan fell apart when in 2001 the Singapore authorities discovered the plot and swiftly arrested JI members in Singapore including Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana who was the treasurer for Mantiqi I and Hambali's trusted man. The Malaysian authorities also arrested JI members in Malaysia. Among those who escaped the arrest and who was later involved in several bombings in Indonesia were Hambali, Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, Dr Azahari Husein and Noordin M. Top. In early 2002 they met in Thailand. In the meeting, Hambali apparently ordered attacks on soft targets like nightclubs and bars in Indonesia instead of foreign embassies.³²⁰ What followed next were a series of bombings in Indonesia spearheaded by JI leaders. The most brutal was the Bali bombings of

³¹⁷ PUPJI, 36.

³¹⁸ United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, *Canadian Al Qaeda Member Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Kill Americans by Bombing U.S. Embassies in Singapore and the Philippines* (U.S.: Department of Justice, 2008), 2.

³¹⁹ The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrest and the Threat of Terrorism, *White Paper*, 13.

³²⁰ Ali, Personal Interview (28 Apr. 2017).

Sari Club and Paddy's Café on 12 October 2002³²¹ which Imam Samudera regarded as revenge for America's attack on Afghanistan towards the end of 2001 that killed 200, 000 innocent men, women and children.³²²

Tyranny of the Tactical

The Bali bombings on hindsight were a complete disaster for JI. Not only were the perpetrators caught, but also other JI leaders and ordinary members were targeted. Even those who were against the Bali bombings such as Achmad Roihan alias Saad, Thoriqudin alias Abu Rushdan/Hamzah, Mustopha alias Abu Tholut and Nasir Abas alias Sulaiman were among the JI Mantiqi I and II leaders who were arrested. From the arrests, the police succeeded in unravelling JI's organisation and disrupting its operations. Consequently, JI's programmes that were supposed to build personnel and territory were affected and became haphazard.

Many JI members considered acts of bombings like the Bali bombings as a contravention of the *Sharia*. The bombings were not at all beneficial. On the contrary, they brought more losses for JI. Ali Imron who was involved in the Bali bombings and later repeatedly expressed remorse for his actions wrote:

“Jihad in the path of Allah is supposed to be the protector of Islam and the Muslims, but instead, became the reason for Muslims feeling disturbed. Jihad in the path of Allah is supposed to promise triumph, but instead, became the cause for perpetrators of the bombing, and those involved in helping the perpetrators of the bombing, feeling humiliated because they were hunted, pursued and imprisoned. Moreover, jihad in the path of Allah which is supposed to be a means to eradicate discord, in fact, causes the onset of discord. All these were the result of mistakes that were made in executing and implementing the obligation of jihad in the path of Allah.”³²³

³²¹ Ali Imron, *Ali Imron Sang Pengebom*, 75-108.

³²² Imam Samudera, *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I Fought the Terrorist) (Solo: Jazera, 2004), 135-145.

³²³ Ali Imron, *Ali Imron Sang Pengebom*, 221.

The bombings were utterly detached from JI's strategic objective of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. The violent actions received the most attention from Indonesia's security agencies such as *Detasemen Khusus 88*³²⁴ (Densus 88, Special Detachment 88). Densus 88 is not alone in this; the media, researchers and security analysts too, tend to put them in the spotlight because of the bombings. While every effort must be made to eliminate or reduce their capability to mount attacks, success in this area does not register a significant reduction of the existential threat that JI posed to Indonesia in wanting to reconfigure NKRI based on the *Pancasila*. The reason: the bombings were a tit-for-tat tactic that failed to deliver JI's strategic/ideological objective of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.³²⁵

While the JI attacks, in the short term, became a significant security threat, the attacks did not pose a significant existential threat to the unitary *Pancasila* state. The more obvious outcome of the indiscriminate violence which JI had employed was the group's alienation from Indonesia's mainstream Muslim organisations such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah*. Further evidence of that could also be seen in a recent survey where about 81% of the Indonesian population rejected any justification for suicide bombings or other acts of violence where civilians are targeted.³²⁶ The majority of Indonesians deplored the attacks and was not captivated by the religious arguments to legitimise them.

Until the attacks, Indonesia's mainstream Muslim organisations, as well as the general public, did not see a risk that more extreme Muslim groups in

³²⁴ Densus 88 was established after the Bali bombing, with Australian support.

³²⁵ Ali Imron, *Ali Imron Sang Pengebom*, 218.

³²⁶ Pew Research Global Attitudes, "Muslim Publics Share Concerns about Extremist Groups" *Survey Report* (<http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-share-concerns-about-extremist-groups/>, 10 Sep. 2013), accessed on 20 Dec. 2013.

Indonesia could engage in bombings and other acts of terrorism. The shift in public opinion is in stark contrast to the earlier widely held views which denied the presence of a transnational terrorist network in Indonesia despite reliable information provided by regional governments and the United States. The Bali bomb attack of 12 October 2002 was pivotal in changing Indonesia's stand in the war against terror, affecting the attitudes of both the government and Muslims.³²⁷

The Real Threat

The more strategic minded within JI are those working within the framework of the *Al-Jama'ah*. They reflect the ideological nature of the group and are not swayed from its objective of establishing an Islamic state by seeking to exact revenge on their perceived enemies. Instead, the group continues to float the JI ideology around, and seek tirelessly to build its capability. Due to its clandestine nature, it was difficult to pinpoint the exact members of the group. In a nutshell, this is the group that may not be visible by their actions at the moment, but a definite looming threat.

Working under the umbrella of the *Al-Jama'ah*, their jihad is against the apostate Indonesian government for upholding the *Pancasila* as the philosophical basis of the state. Fighting the local infidel/apostate government according to them is the priority as compared to fighting the foreign infidels who occupy Islamic countries such as Palestine, Mindanao, Kashmir, and others. Accordingly, the near enemy to them is considered more dangerous than the far enemy.

³²⁷ Leonard C. Sebastian, "Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali Bombings and the War in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16, No. 3 (2003): 435.

In preparation for jihad, they have adopted an organisation which mirrors the military. The adoption is evident from the JI organisational structure which Nasir Abas described.³²⁸ The *Wakalah* is intended to function as a brigade in the contemporary military setting. The *Sariyah* which comes under it is the equivalent of a battalion whereas the *Katibah* mirrors the company. Under the *Katibah*, comes the *Kirdas* or platoon with three *Fiah* or groups under it. There is also the *Thoifah* which is the smallest unit that could be formed when necessary. (See Figure 4.2)

FIGURE 4.2
Military Organizational Structure of JI (according to Nasir Abas & PUPJI)

SOURCE: Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI* (Unravelling Jamaah Islamiyah: Admission of Ex-JI Member), (Jakarta: Penerbit Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), 121-122; Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyyah (*PUPJI*, (General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah), (1996), 41.

The military-like organisational structure reinforces the well-established fact that JI's intention of establishing an Islamic state will be pursued by the armed struggle which they termed as "jihad." To get the necessary people to implement the project, JI treats the Muslim and non-Muslim Indonesian masses

³²⁸ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 121-122.

as having the potential to assist JI to achieve the stated objective. JI will take into consideration the functional role they could play in JI's overall mission. It is not necessary to convince all Indonesian Muslims to be JI members. Depending on their closeness to JI's members they could still function as JI's supporters or sympathisers. Mobilising these supporters and sympathisers from among Indonesians who are not JI members, but support JI's mission is a part of the JI plan.

The categorisations are represented by the concentric circles (See Figure 4.3) where the outermost ring is made up of the so-called neutrals. They are the majority. As the name suggests, JI considers them to be non-hostile to its mission; not an obstacle in its path; and also, do not support those who are anti-*Sharia*. The second ring is made up of the so-called sympathisers. They are those who agree with JI's strategic goal of implementing the *Sharia*, and on occasion, provide JI with funds and manpower. The third ring is made up of the so-called supporters. These are non-JI members, but agree with JI strategic goal of implementing the *Sharia*, and are ready to provide JI with the necessary funds and manpower. Finally, the innermost ring is occupied by the JI members. As members, they would undergo training and development programme with the objective of turning them into JI's backbone for spreading and implementing the message of Islam, which more specifically means, the implementation of the *Sharia*, which is to be achieved by the establishment of an Islamic state.³²⁹

³²⁹ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 96-97.

FIGURE 4.3
The Indonesian Masses

SOURCE: Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI* (Unravelling Jamaah Islamiyah: Admission of Ex-JI Member), (Jakarta: Penerbit Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), 97.

4.4. Interpreting the Existential Threat

It is evident from the discussion above that JI with its goal of replacing the *Pancasila* state with a wholly different conception based predominantly on Islam, and the *Sharia* law constitutes an existential threat to the existing unitary *Pancasila* state of Indonesia. Due to the effectiveness of counter-terrorist operations carried out by Densus 88, JI's operational capabilities have been severely crippled. While this may be the case, by adopting the strategy of *Tansiq baynal jama'ah* or cooperation with similar-minded groups, JI could still proceed to pursue its strategic goal regardless of its limited capabilities. On that account, in evaluating the existential threat that JI posed, JI's ability to make up for its lack of capabilities through coalitions or joint ventures with other groups should always be factored in.

Another equally important consideration is the fact that JI's preachers continue to propagate the ideology. In doing so, the Indonesian masses are still susceptible to be primed as neutrals, sympathisers or supporters of JI's struggle

even if they are not members. In addition to that, there are many splinter groups with a similar ideology which are operating clandestinely as *Tandhim sirri* (secret organisation). These groups may be different tactically or operationally from the known JI, but strategically and ideologically, these splinter groups remained unanimous on the issue of establishing an Islamic state to replace the *Pancasila* state of Indonesia. Carrying out jihad to achieve this long-term objective is still the preferred means. The potential for them to destabilise the Indonesian state and generate domestic disorder cannot be discounted.

Also, JI may be based in Indonesia but shares the same ideology of establishing the Islamic state with groups in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The ideological linkages had in the past provided JI with funds, training camps and mutual support which succeeded in transforming the Indonesia-centric JI into a lethal transnational terrorist organisation. It is not difficult to imagine JI using these linkages in the future to maximise its potential as it did in the past.

4.5. Securitisation of JI

While Indonesia supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism in the months immediately following the 9-11 attacks, Hendrpriyono recounted that it was not possible to securitise JI. Due to the democratisation process and the politicians demanding that the government do things by the book, the Indonesian security forces could not act proactively. Without definite proof of Ba'asyir's involvement in the 2000 Christmas and 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian authorities could not detain him. Doing so would be illegitimate.

Much to the dismay of the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore and the Philippines governments, Jakarta could not act on JI based on the intelligence provided by its allies. Likewise, Indonesian citizens could not be arrested or detained on suspicion of being a terrorist. There is no preventive law such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) in Indonesia. The implementation of a law which allows detention without trial could lead to unwanted demonstrations by the masses because there was fear of unwarranted detentions that cast doubts on the future of Indonesia's democracy. The immediate concern after Suharto's fall was to stabilise the government and ensure that the democratisation process was not short lived. Therefore, it would be unlikely that the Indonesian authorities could convince the Indonesian public that extraordinary measures were needed against the shadowy JI.³³⁰

The uncertain political condition at that time allowed Ba'asyir as the ideological force behind JI and the many JI Afghan veterans that were trained in military tradecraft to remain free. On 7 August 2000, another new platform headed by Ba'asyir was created, which came to be known as *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI – the Indonesian Mujahidin Council). The non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists took advantage of the situation and were moving fast. The Indonesian authorities, on the other hand, appeared as though they were hesitant, reluctant to acknowledge the threat and was not up to speed.

It was only after the 2002 Bali attacks that the Indonesian authorities took concrete actions. The security forces swiftly moved to identify, apprehend and try JI members who were responsible for the Bali bombings. The Indonesian government also issued two anti-terrorism regulations after the 12 October 2002

³³⁰ Hendropriyono, Personal Interview, (27 Apr. 2017).

Bali bombings. They were the *Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (Perpu*, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) No. 1/2002 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and No. 2/2002 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Relation to the Bomb Explosion Incident in Bali. The two *Perpu* were later approved by the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR*, The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia) in April 2003 and were given the status of law (Law No 15 and 16 of 2003).³³¹ Even though Indonesians rallied behind their government's initiative they still expressed concern that the regulations could be abused by the government, in the same manner, the Suharto regime used the subversion and state emergency laws that were eventually scrapped in 1998.³³² In mid-2003, Ba'asyir was arrested and sentenced to four years imprisonment for involvement in a JI plot to overthrow Megawati's government, but there was no proof that Ba'asyir led the JI network.³³³

The police and intelligence services too began cooperating with their regional counterparts. Earlier, while JI operated as a networked organisation across Southeast Asia, police and intelligence agencies in the region only acted within their territory and were jealous of their sovereignty, not sharing intelligence with their counterparts.³³⁴ The exchange of tactical information and participation in joint operations succeeded in crumbling JI as well as the Al-Qaeda linked cells existing across Southeast Asia. Still, no attempt was made by the Indonesian government to securitise JI decisively and secure the

³³¹ Tim Lindsey, ed., *Indonesia Law and Society*, 2nd ed. (Australia: Federation Press, 2008), 445.

³³² Leonard C. Sebastian, "Indonesia's new anti-terrorism regulations," *RSIS COMMENTARIES* No. 25 (2002).

³³³ Ali, Personal Interview, (28 Apr. 2017).

³³⁴ Hendropriyono, Personal Interview, (27 Apr. 2017).

consensus of the relevant audience to allow the government to act even if no terrorist acts or violence were committed. As a result, JI continued to enjoy a considerable degree of operational space as well as being able to carry out recruitment and indoctrination efforts.

Although the responses by the Indonesian government were commendable, the focus was more on the “ticking time bomb” scenario. It was where most of the resources were allocated. JI was not designated as an existential threat. Important Muslim leaders such as Vice President Hamzah Haz, Din Syamsuddin the vice chairman of the Muhammadiyah, and Hidayat Nur Wahid, the head of the Prosperous Justice Party not only visited Ba’asyir in prison but also disputed Ba’asyir’s re-arrest on 30 April 2004.³³⁵

What the government had done could aptly be described by the phrase “tyranny of the tactical” where the focus on preventing another bomb from exploding diverted attention away from the existential threat that JI posed. Since the Indonesian government considered an existential threat originating from an anti-*Pancasila* ideology as not an immediate threat, but a threat at some unspecified future, the tendency to neglect it remained high. Ironically, not treating the existential threat emanating from JI anti-*Pancasila* ideology as an imminent threat tended to elevate the threat. The danger of doing too little too late is not something that should be taken lightly.

³³⁵ Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

CASE STUDY 2

MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA (MMI)

Unlike JI, MMI is not listed as a terrorist group. Although some of its members in the past were jailed for their involvement with DI, the group remains above board. MMI operates and preaches openly. It is also officially registered as a mass organisation under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and subsequently under the Ministry of Justice and Human Right.³³⁶ Still, there are concerns about MMI being a front organisation for JI. The fact that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was instrumental in its founding and had assumed the position of Amir was at the core of this concern even though Awwas could have been the person orchestrating the moves.³³⁷ These two reasons suggest that the underlying reason for establishing MMI was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia through unconstitutional means with one significant change – using an organisation with a softer image than JI. In addition to that, MMI is extremely vocal in calling for the enforcement of *Sharia* in Indonesia. Although it does not hide this, being an anti-*Pancasila* and anti-democracy group which is non-integrative and has a high inclination towards jihad, are without the slightest doubt, an existential threat to the NKRI. While all this may be the case, MMI projects the image of “what you see is what you get.” It is an organisation

³³⁶ Irfan S. Awwas as the MMI Head of Executive Council reported to the Mujahidin Congress in 2013 that MMI is a legal organisation. See Desastian, “Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Bukan Organisasi Ilegal dan Tanpa Bentuk” *Voice of Al Islam* (<http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2013/08/26/26472/majelis-mujahidin-indonesia-bukan-organisasi-ilegal-dan-tanpa-bentuk/#sthash.PKSrLduv.dpuf>, 26 Aug. 2013), accessed on 30 Oct. 2014.

³³⁷ Van Bruinessen, Personal Discussion.

which shares many similarities with other Islamic organisations or movements whether in Indonesia or elsewhere in the world, championing the Islamic cause where the ideology of *Din wa Dawla* (unity of religion and the state) remained dominant. It harbours no pretension about denying that it wants to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and implement the *Sharia*.³³⁸ Nevertheless, it chooses the means carefully to achieve that objective. One thing is clear, though, MMI avoids imitating or competing with JI's acts of terrorism. It may be sympathetic to many issues engulfing the *Ummah* (the body of Muslims as one distinct Community) but remains focused on Indonesia.³³⁹ Even the arguments that MMI puts forward as justifications for its struggle are carefully structured to conform to national discourses on Indonesia as a Muslim majority nation. Masdar Hilmy in the concluding chapter of his book also points out:

“As far as MMI is concerned, the failure to incorporate Islam into the Constitution through the Jakarta Charter by the old generation of Islamists provided invaluable lessons for the Islamists in their present-day activism. Moreover, the bitter journey of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir under the New Order regime has inspired the Islamists to be socio-politically and intellectually literate.”³⁴⁰

Linking JI and MMI together, it is also possible that establishing MMI was done deliberately. While JI engages in terrorist acts, MMI seeks to sensitise Indonesian opinion and to present public arguments for an Islamic state in Indonesia. The analysis seems logical, but in the absence of clear evidence even prominent analysts such as Solahudin; Co-Director of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) and a researcher at the Centre for Terrorism and

³³⁸ Lajnah Tanfidziyah Majelis Mujahidin, “Keputusan Mudzakah Nasional Majelis Mujahidin “Era Baru Perjuangan Penegakan Syariat Islam di Lembaga Negara,” *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/2015/12/keputusan-mudzakah-nasional-majelis-mujahidin-era-baru-perjuangan-penegakan-syariat-islam-di-lembaga-negara/>), 26 Dec. 2015), accessed on 15 Nov. 2016.

³³⁹ Martin van Bruinessen, “Ghazwul Fikri or Arabisation? Indonesian Muslim Responses to Globalisation”, in Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (eds), *Dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims in the Era of Globalization* (Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI), 2013), 47-70.

³⁴⁰ Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 256-257.

Social Conflict Studies, Faculty of Psychology, University of Indonesia, refuse to commit to such a conclusion.³⁴¹

While this may be the case, the influence of DI and JI cannot be denied. In fact, the experiences these two groups went through serve as MMI's "rite of passage" before becoming a separate entity. The reasons for believing this to be so will be elaborated in the subsequent sections where MMI's ideology and strategy are discussed. At this juncture, suffice to say that MMI has not abandoned the Islamic state agenda, implementation of the *Sharia*, *Da'wah*,³⁴² and *Jihad* which have been the hallmarks of its predecessors: DI and JI.

MMI as a learning organisation draws from the lessons learned from the many challenges which DI and JI went through. When MMI adopts an approach to pursue its agenda by avoiding a physical confrontation with the authorities, it does so fully cognizant of what DI and JI had experienced when they chose to confront the state through armed struggle in pursuing their political agenda. Being Indonesia-friendly, therefore, is how MMI chooses to move forward. MMI wants to avoid being seen as a security threat or being labelled as a terrorist organisation. Thus, it is difficult to describe MMI with a black or white picture. Instead, MMI could be considered as militant and radical because of its particular faith and tenets. MMI is not a terrorist organisation like JI because it has not carried out any terrorist attacks.³⁴³

In this regard, A. Maftuh Abegebriel is more straightforward in his analysis of JI and MMI. Abegebriel concludes that there is a strong correlation

³⁴¹ Solahudin, Personal Interview.

³⁴² In general, *dakwah* is used to refer to "inviting or calling people to worship Allah by following the Messenger of Allah". See, Aisha Bewley, *Glossary of Islamic Terms* (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1998), 6.

³⁴³ Mbai, Personal Interview, (23 Sep. 2014).

between them.³⁴⁴ Abergebriel argues that JI and MMI are “*Mukhtalifah al-Asma’ wa al-lughāt Muttahidah al-Ashkāl wa al-Aghrāḍ*” which means although they use different names and expressions to describe themselves, nevertheless, they are similar in essence and goals.³⁴⁵ He reaches this conclusion after carefully comparing JI’s document, *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah* (PUPJI) with MMI’s document, *Mengenal Majelis Mujahidin Untuk Penegakan Syari’ah Islam*. Abergebriel even insists that MMI plays around with words, and uses MMI’s vision of implementing *Sharia* to prove his point. The vision, in his view, is an example of “*‘Iṭlāq al-‘Ām wa irādat al-Khāṣ*.”³⁴⁶ What it means is that MMI promotes enforcing the *Sharia*, and this is what it tells people its vision is, but what it intends to do is to establish an Islamic state.

Like many Islamist groups, MMI was born out of a political context which the study will turn to next.

5.1. Origin and Development

After the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998, Ba’asyir and Sungkar returned to Java. Unlike Sungkar who died soon after returning from exile, Ba’asyir successfully re-established himself in *Pondok Ngruki*. From there he initiated the drive to bring together all groups which are interested in implementing the *Sharia* in Indonesia. It was at the time of the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, the Indonesian Muslim religious and political leader who served as the President of Indonesia from 1999 to 2001. In August 2000, Gus

³⁴⁴ A. Maftuh Abegebriel, “Ada Apa Dengan Dokumen JI? Sebuah Penghampiran Hermenetik”, in A. Maftuh Abegebriel, A. Yani Abeveiro and SR-Ins Team, *Negara Tuhan - The Thematic Encyclopaedia* (Yogyakarta: SR-Ins Publishing, 2004), 895.

³⁴⁵ Ibid, 899.

³⁴⁶ Ibid, 898.

Dur was facing open challenges from radical Islamist groups, which took advantage of the more democratic political landscape after Suharto's resignation. For example, *Laskar Jihad*, a militia group which was established earlier in the same year, and was publicly known to have sent thousands of fighters to Maluku ignored Gus Dur's orders prohibiting them from getting involved in the conflict.³⁴⁷

Under such trying moments for Indonesia, Ba'asyir took the opportunity to organise a three-day Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta. The gathering was attended by delegates from across the archipelago belonging to practically every Islamist groups in the country. The gathering gave birth to MMI³⁴⁸ which is devoted to paving the way for the formation of a new caliphate. Even *Hizbut Tahrir*, a group that has been calling for the reestablishment of the caliphate sent some observers to the congress in Yogyakarta.

Inspiration for the Establishment of MMI³⁴⁹

MMI was declared on 7 August 2000.³⁵⁰ The declaration was made in a gathering known as the Mujahidin Congress to implement the *Sharia*. It was inspired by the belief held by some groups calling themselves *Mujahidin* that

³⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia's Maluku Crisis: The Issues," *Indonesia Briefing Paper*, (Jakarta/Brussels, 19 July 2000), 3.

³⁴⁸ In many official documents, *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* refers to itself only as *Majelis Mujahidin*. However, for the purpose of this study, MMI; the acronym for *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* will be used.

³⁴⁹ Sobarin Syakur, General Secretary Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Abdul Aziz, interviewer. Yogyakarta, (08 Mar. 2005) cited in Abdul Aziz, "Islam Politik dan Strategi Gerakan Penegakan Syari'at Islam (Studi Kasus Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia)" (Skripsi S2, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 2005), 89.

³⁵⁰ Martin Van Bruinessen gave 08 August 2000 as MMI's date of establishment which according to him coincided with the date Kartosuwirjo declared the Islamic State of Indonesia. See, Martin van Bruinessen, "Overview of Muslim Organizations, Associations and Movements in Indonesia," in *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn"*, ed. Martin van Bruinessen (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), 37. The Islamic State of Indonesia was proclaimed on 07 August 1949 according to Cees van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam*, 1; and S. Soebardi, "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia" *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 14, No. 1 (1983): 121.

there is an outstanding issue that is inherent in the history of Indonesian Muslims since the pre-independence days – the implementation of the *Sharia*. The issue continues to resonate among Indonesians even during the post-independence days, the *Orla* (*Orde Lama* or Old Order)³⁵¹ and *Orba* (*Orde Baru* or New Order).³⁵²

During the *Orla*, Sukarno's political orientation which was initially accommodative towards political Islam shifted towards the communist bloc (PKI). The shift was made more evident when Sukarno initiated the slogan NASAKOM³⁵³ and continuously reiterated "Communist-phobia" to reduce the opposition to the PKI.³⁵⁴ It made the Islamic mass organisations more suspicious of Sukarno's behaviour and actions as he became increasingly influenced by PKI.

Under the *Orba*, political Islam did not fare better. Having contributed to the fall of the *Orla*, these elements of political Islam felt that they deserved to be partners in the political power distribution.³⁵⁵ Unfortunately, that did not happen. Instead, they were marginalised and left on the fringes of the political

³⁵¹ *Orla* refers to the socio-political order during the Sukarno era

³⁵² *Orba* refers to the socio-political order in Indonesia since 1965 until Suharto's resignation in 1998.

³⁵³ NASAKOM means the cooperation of nationalist, religious and Communist forces. The idea was originally explored by President Sukarno as early as 1926 in an article entitled, "Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme" which was published in *Suluh Indonesia Muda*. The same article was then republished in 1963. See, Ir. Soekarno, *Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme* (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1963). The same article was then republished in microform which was made available for my research by ISEAS library. See, Soekarno, *Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme*, microform (Zug, Switzerland: Inter Documentation Co., 1974). A translation of the same article is also available at the ISEAS library, see, Soekarno, *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*, translated by Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon, with an introduction by Ruth T. McVey (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1970).

³⁵⁴ Ewa T. Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?," *Asian Survey*, 4, No. 9, (1964): 1062. See also, Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, 3rd ed. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005), 52.

³⁵⁵ See, Abdul Aziz Thaba, *Islam dan Negara Dalam Politik Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), 25, and Andre Feillard & Rmy Madinier, *The End of Innocence?: Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism*, translated by Wong Wee (Singapore: NUS Press in association with IRASEC, 2010), 24-25.

arena which the *Orba regime* had created. Suharto as the most important political actor at that time realised the ideological threat posed by these Islamic political activists.³⁵⁶ To keep them at bay, he reduced the number of political parties to three: *Golongan Karyawan* (Golkar, the Group of Functionaries), *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, Unity for Development Party) and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party). It was a political strategy which Suharto adopted to depoliticise the population by limiting their political expressions and activities. Suharto, whose orientation was towards economic development per se considered oppositional politics as a serious hindrance to the development and consolidation of his power.³⁵⁷

The introduction of the “floating-mass” (*Massa mengambang*) concept in the early *Orba* period had this purpose in mind where the mass of the people is obligated to express their political preferences in general elections held every five years. The concept rested on the assumption that the vast majority of Indonesia’s population was simple and susceptible to adverse effects of politicking at the village level. Political parties were therefore barred from operating in the villages, and political activity was strictly limited except for short periods close to the elections. In so doing, the masses’ daily activities could then be fully devoted to economic development. The major advocate of this theory was Moertopo.³⁵⁸

Suharto’s and TNI’s unwillingness to allow Islamic movements greater participation in the political arena, as Ramage points out, was caused by the

³⁵⁶ The political marginalisation in the past was identified as one of the reasons for the emergence of radical Islamic movements today. See, Zuly Qodir, *Syari’ah Demokratik: Pemberlakuan Syari’at Islam di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), 78-79, and Feillard, 36-37.

³⁵⁷ Anders Uhlin, *Indonesia and “Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World* (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1997), 55-57.

³⁵⁸ Vatikiotis, 94-95.

historical reality where armed rebellion was carried out by DI and its elements between 1948 to 1962. That episode in the history of Indonesia served as a reminder of the “Islamic threat” that the *Pancasila* state could face. The history of DI for Suharto the *Pancasilaist* and TNI that crushed the DI’s rebellion guided their politics, thoughts, and attitude towards political Islam. For more than three decades political Islam was not allowed to develop into a formidable political opposition.³⁵⁹

When the New Order regime fell, it brought about euphoria to Indonesians especially, the political Islam activists. The incident of 21 May 1998 opened the door for liberalisation and allowed greater political expression and freedom for every Indonesian. With that, Indonesia’s politics became free from the historical and structural shackles which had earlier inhibited and limited their participation in national politics. They began to feel some sense of control over the process of how a democratic state of Indonesia should be run.³⁶⁰

The feeling was very different from the Suharto era. Political parties began emerging in large numbers, and these included Islamic political parties. Between May to October 1998, in the midst of uncertainty as a result of the economic and political crisis where violence could be seen in many big cities in Indonesia, more than 200 political parties were formed. After verification from *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU, General Elections Commission) 48 political parties were allowed to contest in 1999 elections.³⁶¹ From the *Mujahidin*’s

³⁵⁹ Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance* (Routledge: London, 1995), 17-44.

³⁶⁰ Dr. Sidik Jatmika, Lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University, Yogyakarta. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Yogyakarta, Indonesia, (16 May 2014).

³⁶¹ Andreas Ufen, “From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *South East Asia Research*, 16, No. 1 (2008): 5.

perspective, the many Islamic-based political parties only made it harder for Muslims in Indonesia to unite and build the nation.³⁶² Some of the *Mujahidin* elites interpreted the situation as a loss and misfortune for Islam if nothing was done. They responded by forming a rank of *Mujahidin* to enforce the *Sharia* as an alternative for the Muslim *Ummah* to pursue its political struggle outside what they viewed as divisive political party system during the Reformation era. The poor support for Islamic-based political parties in the 1999 elections and MMI's decision not to pursue the implementation of *Sharia* through the parliamentary system provide the context from which MMI emerged.³⁶³

The First Mujahidin Congress in 2000

The concept of a unifying entity was embodied in MMI as an attempt to organise the mujahidin in one platform so that they could gather together, and struggle for the aspirations of the Islamic *Ummah* in Indonesia. More specifically, in enforcing the *Sharia* which they believed is the only solution to overcome the malaise faced by the nation. MMI is a small mass organisation which was formed based on the decision of the founding *Kongres Mujahidin I Indonesia untuk Penegakan Syari'at Islam* (Indonesia First Mujahidin Congress to enforce the *Sharia*) in Yogyakarta on 7 August 2000.

The congress participants came from various parts of Indonesia, and even from other countries (Singapore, Malaysia and the United States of America).³⁶⁴ The Congress has been hailed as a monumental event because it demonstrated

³⁶² Sobarin Syakur, General Secretary Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Abdul Aziz, interviewer. Yogyakarta (08 Mar. 2005), 94.

³⁶³ For an explanation of Islam's political decline in Indonesia, see, Sunny Tanuwidjaja, "Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam's Political Decline," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 32, No. 1 (2010): 29-49.

³⁶⁴ Aziz, *Islam Politik dan Strategi Gerakan Penegakan Syari'at Islam*, 96.

the possibility of enforcing the *Sharia* other than through the parliamentary system. To pursue such an agenda through the parliamentary system, MMI would have to overcome oppressively complicated and time-consuming procedures – the red tape, and contend with fighting among the different political strands within the parliamentary system.

Nevertheless, what transpired during the annual session of the MPR in August 2000 was a blessing in disguise. Political parties lodged a formal proposal; *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, United Development Party) and *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB, Crescent Star Party) to amend Article 29 of the *Undang-Undang Dasar* (UUD, The Constitution) 1945. They wanted the *Sharia* to be reinserted into the Constitution. Looking at the statements made by some factions within the MPR there was an attempt made to reinstate the phrase “*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*” (with the obligation to implement the Islamic *Sharia* for its adherents) – the seven words which were removed from the Jakarta Charter.³⁶⁵ So, the timing for the MMI Congress and the declaration that was made were, in fact, strategic because under the existing political climate sparking discussion on *Sharia* and the state was no longer restricted. Here, MMI could be understood as trying to indirectly influence the decision to enforce the *Sharia* through the constitutional procedure. The attempt fitted nicely into the new mosaic where mass demonstrations, military force, and presidential decrees to agree or reject proposals to amend the Constitution were a thing of the past.

The Congress that was held in Gedung Mandala Bhakti Wanitatama in Yogyakarta from 5 – 7 August 2000 had 1500 - 1800 participants. Some of

³⁶⁵ See, Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, *Politik Syari’at Islam Dari Indonesia Hingga Nigeria* (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), 62-63. See also, Nadirsyah Hosen, *Shari’a & Constitutional Reform in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), 201-215.

whom were Muslims from outside Indonesia. The theme: “Kongres Mujahidin I Indonesia untuk Penegakan Syariat Islam” (Indonesia Mujahidin Congress I for Enforcement of *Sharia* Law) that was chosen indicated the intention of the Congress in no uncertain terms. The fact that it was announced publicly also captured the current mood after the resignation of Suharto. Before the resignation, it was unimaginable to organise such a congress. Also visible at the venue of the congress were flags with the declaration of faith in Islam written in Arabic and flags of *Laskar Mujahidin*, *Laskar Jundullah*, and *Front Pembela Islam Surakarta*. Students from *Pondok Pesantren Ngruki, Sukoharjo, Jawa Tengah* gave a self-defence demonstration with the use of samurai sword.³⁶⁶

In fact, delegations from various regions in Indonesia such as Aceh, Poso and Maluku which were embroiled in violence were also present. A delegation from the *Pesantren* which was built by the son of the late Kartosuwirjo, the *Imam* of DI-TII from *Malabong, Tasikmalaya, Jawa Barat* was also present at the congress. Even though the *Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah* was unable to attend, the group through their leader Ayip Syaifuddin, expressed support for the Congress and its agenda.³⁶⁷

An analysis of the Congress list of attendees reveals that many prominent figures from different organisations were in attendance. Among them³⁶⁸ were:

<u>Participants</u>	<u>Organisation</u>
Prof. Dr Deliar Noor	<i>Partai Umat Islam</i> (PUI, Islamic Umat Party)
Ohan Sujana	<i>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1912</i> (PSII 1912, Indonesian Islamic Union Party 1912)

³⁶⁶ Aziz, *Islam Politik dan Strategi Gerakan Penegakan Syari'at Islam* 97.

³⁶⁷ Bersihar Lubis and Heru Prasetyo, *Majalah Gamma*, (9-15 Aug. 2000): 28-29, cited by Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin 1 dan Penegakan Syariat Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001), 287.

³⁶⁸ According to Abdul Rahman Ma'mun, *Panji Masyarakat* (9-16 Aug. 2000): 6, cited by Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin 1 dan Penegakan Syariat Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001), 693.

KH Ali Yafie	Ex-chairman, <i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Pusat</i> (MUI Pusat, Central Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars)
KH Mawardi Noor	
Dr Fuad Amsyari	<i>Universitas Airlangga</i> (Unair, Airlangga University), Surabaya
KH Alawy Muhammad	Prominent figure, <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (PPP, United Development Party)
KH Tijani Jauhari	Prominent Figure, <i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> (NU, Association of Muslim Scholars), from Madura
KH Asep Mausul Affandi	
KH Sidiq Amin	Manager/Administrator of Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association) and Pondok Pesantren (Ponpes, Islamic Boarding School) Manojaya Tasikmalaya
Prof. Ahmad Mansur Suryanegara	Lecturer at Universitas Padjadjaran (Unpad, Padjadjaran University) Bandung
KH Miftah Farid	Head of <i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> (MUI, Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars) Bandung Municipality, from West Barat
Ustad ³⁶⁹ Abdul Qadir Baraja ³⁷⁰	From Lampung
Prof. Dr Abdurrahman A. Basalamah	Lecturer at <i>Universitas Muslim Indonesia</i> (UMI, Indonesia Muslim University) Makassar, from South Sulawesi
Ir. RHA Sahirul Alim	M.Sc from Yogyakarta

All were there to support the initiative to enforce the *Sharia* in Indonesia, but it remains unclear why Ba'asyir and Awwas were chosen to hold prominent positions in the newly-formed MMI. Another well-known individual, Abdul Qadir Baraja who was the author of “Hijrah dan Jihad,” and who was arrested twice – in January 1979 and 1985, became the Head of Fatwa (religious ruling) section. A few other prominent individuals became members of the *Ahlul Halli wal Aqdi* (AHWA).³⁷¹ At the end of the Congress, the central leadership

³⁶⁹ Ustad, sometimes spelt as ustadz or ustaz is a term of address for Islamic teacher.

³⁷⁰ He was arrested in January 1979 in connection with “Terror Warman” and served three years in prison. He was arrested the second time for his link with the bombings in East Java and Borobudur in 1985.

³⁷¹ Literally, it means “those who loosen and bind”. In the Islamic parlance, it refers to elites who collectively make decisions on behalf of the entire community or organisation.

positions were still retained by Awwas, Ba'asyir and their close associates.

(See Figure 5.1 & 5.2)

FIGURE 5.1
Ahlul Halli Wal Aqdi AHWA [Legislative Council 2000-2003]

SOURCE: Pedoman Dasar Majelis Mujahidin (ICPVTR Database, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University)

FIGURE 5.2
Lajnah Tanfidziyah [Executive Council 2000-2003]

SOURCE: Pedoman Dasar Majelis Mujahidin (ICPVTR Database, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)

Ba'asyir who was accused of being the Amir of JI, a group affiliated to Al-Qaeda after its discovery post-911 was elected by the founding congress to be the first Amir. Awwas became the Head of the Executive Council and was re-elected to the same position during the second MMI Congress which was held in September 2003 in Solo. Other leadership positions were occupied by

people closely linked with the Ngruki and those who had fought in Afghanistan as well as those who had studied in Pakistan.³⁷²

Only later during the second Mujahidin Congress which was held in Solo in 2003 that the complete profile on the identity of MMI was established. In line with the softer image MMI wanted to create for itself, MMI as a mass organisation rejected all forms of terrorism. Other than terrorism by individuals and groups, MMI also opposed state terrorism. According to MMI, terrorism contradicted the *Sharia*. The profile was spelt out in the *Pedoman Umum dan Pelaksanaan Majelis Mujahidin untuk Penegakan Syariat Islam* (General Guide and Implementation for the Mujahidin Council to Establish the *Sharia* Law, PUPMMPSI).

The Second Congress in 2003

With the discovery of terrorist cells and networks in Southeast Asia after the tragic bombings of the North and South towers of the World Trade Center complex in New York City on 11 September 2001, the security landscape was fast changing. MMI was also affected when in January 2002, the Indonesian security authorities summoned Ba'asyir to question his alleged links to Islamic militant networks, *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (KMM, Malaysian Mujahidin Movement) and possibly even Al-Qaeda.³⁷³ In October the same

³⁷² International Crisis Group, "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia" *Indonesia Briefing* (Jakarta/Brussels, 8 Aug. 2002). Refer also to: International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims" *Indonesia Briefing* (Jakarta/Brussels, 10 Oct. 2001).

³⁷³ Yogita Tahil Ramani and Annastashya Emmanuelle, "Govt Acts to Cope With Terrorism" *The Jakarta Post* (23 Jan. 2002).

year, the police placed Ba'asyir under their custody after Omar al-Faruq³⁷⁴ confessed that Ba'asyir played a role in various bomb attacks, and in a plot to assassinate Megawati Soekarnoputri before she became President.³⁷⁵ Only in April 2003, prosecutors submitted the dossiers of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to the Central Jakarta District Court and charged him with treason and immigration violations.³⁷⁶

By July 2003, MMI started making preparations for their upcoming congress. Ba'asyir as the Amir was in custody of the Indonesian authorities which prompted the MMI leaders to request the Central Jakarta district court to allow Ba'asyir to attend MMI's second congress which was scheduled to be held in Surakarta, Central Java from 10 – 12 August.³⁷⁷ The request was rejected. However, Chief Judge Muhammad Saleh allowed Ba'asyir to write his speech that would be read by other people during the congress. The judge also prohibited recording of Ba'syir's speech to be played during the conference.³⁷⁸

The Congress continued without Ba'asyir's presence. The opening was held at Manahan Stadium in Solo, and the participants later assembled at the Asrama Haji Donohudan in Solo from 10 – 12 August 2003 for the rest of the Congress duration. Just three years into its existence, MMI was reported to have

³⁷⁴ Al-Faruq which is sometimes spelt as al-Farouq was considered as al-Qaeda's point man in Southeast Asia. He was detained by the Indonesian authorities on June 5, 2002, on immigration violations, and was handed over to the U.S. in September 2002, one month before the Bali blasts that killed 202 people. He escaped from a U.S. detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan, on July 11, 2005. On September 25, 2006, he was killed during a fire fight in a pre-dawn raid at his residence in Iraq. See, "Omar al-Farouq" *GlobalSecurity.org* (http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/omar_al-farouq.htm, 01 Nov. 2006), accessed on 12 Aug. 2014. See also, Ridwan Max Sijabat, "Al-Farouq's Escape 'Staged': Ex-BIN chief" *The Jakarta Post* (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/11/14/alfarouq039s-escape-039staged039-exbin-chief.html>, 04 Nov. 2005), accessed on: 12 Aug. 2014.

³⁷⁵ "Police Place Ba'asyir Under Detention" *The Jakarta Post* (21 Oct. 2002).

³⁷⁶ "Prosecutors Formally Charge Ba'asyir with Treason" *The Jakarta Post* (15 Apr. 2003).

³⁷⁷ "Indon Mujahidin Council Requests Court to Allow Ba'asyir to Attend Congress" *LBKN Antara* (24 July 2003).

³⁷⁸ "Ba'asyir Tidak Dijinkan Menghadiri Kongres Majelis Mujahidin" *ABC Radio Australia* (<http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/indonesian/2003-08-01/baasyir-tidak-dijinkan-menghadiri-kongres-majelis-mujahidin/798968>, 01 Aug. 2003), accessed on 01 July 2014.

opened thirty-eight branches in ten provinces in Indonesia. The MMI representative offices in the ten provinces in Central Java were in Yogyakarta, West Java, East Java, DKI Jakarta (*Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta* or Special Capital City District of Jakarta), South Sumatra, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Bali.³⁷⁹

To avert suspicion as a result of the heightened alert on terrorist cells and networks both in the region and beyond, MMI had to play their cards right. Choosing to be transparent was how they manoeuvred along the unpredictable security landscape. MMI openly invited intelligence personnel from the military or police to attend the Congress. KH Farid Ma'ruf, who was the chairman of the organising committee for the second Congress and one of the members of the MMI Executive Committee, justified the action by saying: "We open ourselves up widely (to many parties, especially the security apparatus) in order for them to know MMI's struggle and vision. This will allow the existing baseless suspicions to be removed."³⁸⁰

To further demonstrate its openness, MMI extended an invitation to Chief of Police (Kapolri) General Da'i Bachtiar to address the Congress. Bachtiar was asked to speak on the Armed Forces/Police (TNI/Polri) attitude towards the application of the *Sharia* about terrorism. Others who were also scheduled to speak were ZA. Maulani, KH. Alawi Muhammad, Dr Din Syamsuddin, and KH. Zainuddin MZ.³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Syaiful Amin, "Sekitar 15 Ribu Orang Akan Menghadiri Kongres Majelis Mujahidin" *TEMPO Interaktif* (<http://tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2003/07/29/brk,20030729-37,id.html>, 29 July 2003), accessed on 01 July 2014.

³⁸⁰ Anas Syahirul, "Majelis Mujahidin Tawari Intel Jadi Peserta Kongres MMI" *TEMPO.CO* (<http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2003/08/07/05810831/Majelis-Mujahidin-Tawari-Intel-Jadi-Peserta-Kongres-MMI>, 07 Aug. 2003), accessed on 01 July 2014.

³⁸¹ Syaiful Amin, "Sekitar 15 Ribu Orang Akan Menghadiri Kongres Majelis" *TEMPO.CO* (Mujahidin<http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2003/07/29/0556543/Sekitar-15-Ribu-Orang-Akan-Menghadiri-Kongres-Majelis-Mujahidin>, 29 July 2003), accessed on 12 Aug. 2014.

Despite the apparent willingness of MMI leadership to allow the organisation to be scrutinised by the public and the Indonesian security apparatus, the local police did not take any chances. Six hundred police personnel were deployed to ensure that the Congress was conducted peacefully. Policewomen were also on duty to ensure the safety of the female participants. The Administrative Section Head of Operation for the local police, AKBP³⁸² Drs Soekotjo also requested that members of the *Laskar* MMI (MMI military wing) who were on duty carry only batons.³⁸³

At the close of the congress, in the name of all participants of the second Mujahidin Congress, the following declarations³⁸⁴ were made:

1. Ustad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was confirmed as *Amirul Mujahidin* for the second term from 2003-2008. Irfan S. Awwas was also re-elected to the head of the Executive Committee for another term.
2. Urged the Government of Indonesia's Central Jakarta District Court to free *Amirul Mujahidin* Ustad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir from all indictments.
3. Demanded public prosecutor to stop its cruelty against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir by suggesting to the court his extradition to Malaysia to face trial in the United States. The Mujahidin Council demanded that the judge reject the public prosecutor's proposal.
4. Demanded that the Government of Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs (Depu) secure the release of Mujahidin Council's activists, Agus Dwikarna who was detained by the Philippine Government, and Abu Jibril who was imprisoned by the Government of Malaysia.
5. The Mujahidin Council opposed all forms of terrorism, whether carried out by individual, group, or state because it contradicted the *Sharia*.
6. Urged Human Rights International Court to summon George Bush, Tony Blair, Ariel Sharon, and John Howards to the International War Crimes Court as global terrorists.
7. Urged the MPR-RI to repeal Act No. 15 of 2003 on the Anti-terrorist legislation, because certain groups have utilised it as an instrument of power to muzzle Muslim activists.

³⁸² It is the acronym for *Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi* Police Adjunct Senior Commissioner in English.

³⁸³ Anas Syahirul, "Majelis Mujahidin Tawari Intel Jadi Peserta Kongres MMI".

³⁸⁴ Irfan S. Awwas, "Hasil Kongres Mujahidin II" (ICPVTR Database, 12 Aug. 2004), accessed on 16 Dec. 2014.

8. Urged the Government of Indonesia to define the meaning of worship which is written down in the 1945 Constitution, Article 29, Paragraph 2, in accordance with the *Sharia*.
9. Stated emphatically that Muslims who reject the application of the *Sharia* in government institutions and agree to the principle of separation of religion from the State had committed *Kufr I'tiqadi* (unbelief that puts a person beyond the pale of Islam).

The Third Congress in 2008

Even though Ba'asyir was absent during the Congress in 2003, judging from the declarations made, he still had considerable support in MMI. Apparently, the accusation against Ba'asyir of being a terrorist with linkages with JI and a series of bombings which were conducted in Indonesia did not appear to have taken a toll on his leadership. When he was finally jailed, and then released in 2006, Ba'asyir was expected to continue to lead MMI again since the worst was thought to be over.

So, when Ba'asyir decided to leave MMI on 19 July 2008, barely a month before the third MMI Congress was due to be held, many were caught by surprise. Ba'asyir explained his decision for leaving by expressing his disappointment with MMI for not following the examples of the Prophet Muhammad. According to Ba'asyir, MMI had adopted an organisational system which in his view was based on the Jewish traditions. The election of the Amir which was done periodically was akin to the democratic system and was unknown in Islam. Ba'asyir was also not in favour of the Amir playing the role of a coordinator instead of becoming the only leader whose decision should be listened to and obeyed. In Islam, Ba'asyir argued, an elected leader could only be removed if he violates the *Sharia*, dies, resigns, or suffers from a permanent illness that prevents him from carrying out his duties as a leader. The

leader, Ba'asyir added, should not be made accountable to the Mujahidin Congress for his leadership as was the case with MMI, but only to Allah.

Nonetheless, Ba'asyir concurred with MMI on employing *Da'wah* and *Jihad* as means of advancing the Islamic cause but remained critical of the organisational system which MMI has adopted. As the appointed leader of the AHWA, Ba'asyir noted that there was confusion in the manner MMI understood this. Although he was reluctant to accept the appointment of Amir of MMI, he relented when they kept on insisting. Furthermore, he had hoped that by being the Amir he could rectify the shortcoming.

Initially, Ba'asyir was determined to help MMI change for the better. After his release from prison in 2006, Ba'asyir invited MMI administrators to return to a system of leadership which he believed to be in accordance with the teachings of Islam, a system known as *Al-Jama'ah wal Imamah* (the group and the imamate). He went about doing it through consultations and discussions. The response was not forthcoming at all, and since Ba'asyir had done his level best, he felt he was no longer accountable to Allah for MMI's actions.³⁸⁵

While Ba'asyir's position in MMI in 2003 seemed secure, it was not so when the third congress was held from 9 – 10 August 2008 in Gedung Mandala Bakti Wanitatama, Yogyakarta. In fact, cracks in the leadership of MMI began appearing. Muhammad Thalib who was Deputy Amir replaced Ba'asyir as the Amir whereas Awwas retained his position as Chairman of the Executive

³⁸⁵ Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "Pernyataan Pengunduran Diri Amirul Mujahidin Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," *Letter to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (Kompleks, Pon. Pes. Al Mukmin, Ngruki, Cemani, Grogol, Sukoharjo, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia, 17 July 2008).

Committee. Nevertheless, all was not lost. Awwas' brother, Abu Jibril³⁸⁶ who was deported from Malaysia in May 2004 and served a five and a half-month sentence in Indonesia for immigration offences and forgery was elected as the first Deputy Amir.³⁸⁷

Eight years after working for the enforcement of the *Sharia* under the leadership of Ba'asyir, MMI was finally ready to be led by a new charismatic figure that was not in any way associated with JI. Many parties have anticipated the rise of Thalib at the helm of MMI leadership. He was Deputy Amir when Ba'asyir was the Amir. When Ba'asyir resigned a few weeks before the third congress was held, Thalib came forward to stabilise the organisation. So, nobody among the leadership doubted his loyalty. As a capable and effective leader, Thalib had ensured MMI continued to grow when Ba'asyir was put behind bars. Likewise, his command of the religious texts made him a source of reference for the fatwas that were being issued. Many were hopeful that with the new Amir, MMI with a new spirit would emerge.³⁸⁸

Thalib showed his true mettle when he traded barbs with Ba'asyir on the issue of MMI's organisational system which Ba'asyir was critical of. Without mincing his words, Thalib accused Ba'asyir of being influenced by Shia, *Ahmadiyya*, and Communism. He strongly objected to the three points which Ba'asyir raised. The first is the doctrine that the imam is appointed for life, and cannot be replaced as long as he is willing to lead the *Ummah*. The second is

³⁸⁶ See, the list established and maintained by the United Nations Security Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida at <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08603E.shtml>, accessed on 13 Aug. 2014.

³⁸⁷ Sholahuddin Al-Ahmed, "Mohammad Thalib Gantikan Ba'asyir" *Suara Merdeka* (<http://m.suaramerdeka.com/index.php/read/news/2008/08/11/11468>, 11 Aug. 2008), accessed on 19 June 2014.

³⁸⁸ Prince of Jihad, "Majelis Mujahidin: Amir Baru, Semangat Baru" *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arammah.com/read/2008/08/11/2075-majelis-mujahidin-amir-baru-semangat-baru.html>, 11 Aug. 2008), accessed on 20 June 2014.

the view that the *Imam* is not accountable to the people. According to Thalib, this is the doctrine of the *Ahmadiyya*. The third which concerns consultation (*Musyawarah*) as non-binding on the *Imam* which Thalib charged as the Shia's understanding on the imamate.³⁸⁹

In his response to Thalib's allegations of him being an *Ahmadi* and Shiite, Ba'asyir interpreted the accusations as character assassination. The system of collective leadership which MMI had adopted, Ba'asyir insisted, was not from Islam. Instead, it is a secular system that was derived from the Jewish traditions. Ba'asyir acknowledged that Thalib is an intelligent person, but expressed his disappointment with Thalib's view on the issue at hand which to Ba'asyir was below par. Ba'asyir also made it clear that on the subject of the imamate, Shia differs from the Sunni. Shia accords infallibility to the *Imam* while Sunni believes as human, the *Imam* is fallible. In trying to close the chapter between them amicably, Ba'asyir gave his assurance that whatever had transpired between them would not jeopardise the cooperation and relationship that had been established.³⁹⁰

Almost four years after Ba'asyir left MMI, the leadership split was far from over. Thalib was next to go. Two trigger points led Thalib to submit his resignation to the AHWA on 12 June 2012. Thalib was uncomfortable working with MMI's central executive committee and was unhappy with MMI's failure in the formation of its cadre.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ Aliano, "Tanya: Mengapa Ust Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Mendirikan Jamaah Baru? Ada Apa Antara MMI dan JAT?" *Bulletin* (<http://forum.annah.com/forum/admin-forum-viewed-by-admins-only/ruang-admin/1520-tanya-mengapa-ust-abu-bakar-ba'asyir-mendirikan-jamaah-baru-ada-apa-antara-mmi-dan-jat>, 29 Jan. 2010), accessed on 19 June 2014.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Solahudin, Personal Interview.

The Fourth Congress in 2013

During the fourth Congress, about a year after his resignation, Thalib was again elected as the Amir of MMI.³⁹² The fourth MMI Congress with the theme, “A century of struggle for implementation of *Sharia* in Indonesia” was held over three days from July 23 – 25 August 2013 at the Az-Zikra Mosque, Sentul, West Java.

The tone of the Congress was different. It could be discerned from the chairman of the organising committee; Arfan M. Alwy’s opening speech. He said: “All Muslims who have associated themselves with various groups, mass organisations or other communities, which aspire to uphold Allah’s law in the institutions of this country, in reality, are also the Mujahidin.”³⁹³ The agenda for the Congress other than being a platform for “National Meet for Love *Sharia* in Indonesia” also included “National Inter-faith Dialogue, Inter-Mass Organization, and Inter-Political Party.”³⁹⁴

In its fourth congress, MMI not only invited Muslims to love the *Sharia* but extended the invitation to all components of the Indonesian society. Indonesians from different religions, ideology, political parties and ethnic groups were welcomed to attend the “National Dialogue.” The shift was prompted by “the hostility shown by non-Muslims, secularists, liberals and nationalists towards the Islamic solution proposed by the Muslim community to

³⁹² Ukasyah, “Ustadz Muhammad Thalib kembali memimpin sebagai amir Majelis Mujahidin” *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/news/2013/08/26/ustadz-muhammad-thalib-memimpin-amir-majelis-mujahidin.html>, 26 Aug. 2013), accessed on 14 Aug. 2014.

³⁹³ Desastian, “Kongres Mujahidin IV di Sentul: Seabad Perjuangan Indonesia Bersyariah” *Voice of Al Islam* (<http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2013/08/26/26470/kongres-mujahidin-iv-di-sentul-seabad-perjuangan-indonesia-bersyariah/#sthash.InA4KmpC.dpbs>, 26 Aug. 2013), accessed on 14 Aug. 2014.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

solve the problem of this nation. It is also because of the suspicion concerning Islam as anti-minority, radical and intolerant.”³⁹⁵

The recognition by MMI that those outside MMI are also crucial in determining the success of its struggle to enforce the *Sharia* could indeed be viewed as a step closer to moderation and welcomed as the correct direction to take towards the mainstream. Robi Sugara, a Security Analyst from Barometer Institute, attributes the significant shift taken by MMI to two factors – Ba’asyir leaving MMI and Talib as the new Amir who is more intellectual.³⁹⁶ Nonetheless, MMI remains a work in progress, and it is still too early to tell whether the shift is tactical or ideological. On that account, the subsequent sections on MMI’s ideology and strategy which the study will turn to next will be a good measure of the existential threat MMI poses to the NKRI.

5.2. Ideology

While MMI may not be inherently violent physically, its idea of wanting to change or confront the status quo which it regards as not only unsuitable with Islam but also un-Islamic is indeed a threat to Indonesia. From a political perspective, MMI’s intention to change the *Pancasila* state with one that implements the *Sharia* and its preaching of ideas about an Islamic state is a threat to the existence of the *Pancasila* state. It might not be new to Indonesia, but questioning the legal status of the elected government because it does not implement the *Sharia* when Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world is not to be taken lightly.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Robi Sugara. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, (08 June 2014).

As an organisation that believes religion and the state cannot be separated but is an integrated whole, this very notion calls into question MMI's plan for Indonesia. MMI's desire to see Indonesia governed and administered by *Al-Hakimiyah* (divine sovereignty) means an Islamic state of Indonesia must be in existence. The present *Pancasila* state must then be replaced with an Islamic state to make this a reality. No matter how careful MMI chooses to express itself, achieving the implementation of the *Sharia* in Indonesia would mean the end of the *Pancasila* state.

Islamic State, Islam, and Democracy

Awwas explained MMI's view of an Islamic state when Khamami Zada interviewed him. According to Awwas, it is a state where the *Sharia* is implemented. A state that does not implement the *Sharia* cannot be called an Islamic state, even though its institutions bear the word Islam. However, Awwas was quick to point out that the Islamic state during Prophet Muhammad's time was a state made up of different communities. There were Jews, Christians, and Pagans who lived side by side with Muslims. So, Awwas believes that there is no issue with regards to non-Muslims living in an Islamic State.³⁹⁷

Awwas' statement was far from re-assuring when he considered democracy an infidel system, and the worst system among the worst. Awwas argued that in such a system, the religion of Islam which is the religion of the majority of Indonesia's population is practised at the individual level and limited to ritual practices. It is a bad system which the Dutch had bequeathed to

³⁹⁷ Irfan S. Awwas. Khamami Zada, interviewer. Indonesia, (28 Oct. 2001) cited in Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia* (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), 112-113.

Indonesia. Awwas claimed that the democratic figures who started the republic and spread the concept of democratic government were in reality, cadres whom the Dutch built or at the very least, they were influenced by several democratic ideas that were circulating within the European societies. The ideas were either Capitalist (Liberal Democracy) or Socialist (Social Democracy). For these reasons, Awwas felt that Indonesian society, the majority of whom are Muslims must change the bad democratic system to an Islamic system. For the past fifty years, Indonesia was under a secular system starting from the *Orla* till the Reformation era which is why Awwas insisted on the Muslim community forming a team of formulators for Islamic government who are ready to change the un-Islamic government.”³⁹⁸

There are three differences between Islam and democracy as envisioned by MMI according to Awwas. Firstly, in Islam, sovereignty belongs to Allah. It is in contrast to a democratic system where sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. Secondly, the truth comes from Allah, whereas in democracy, the truth is based on the voice of the majority. Thirdly, in a democracy, Awwas said: “semua orang itu sama, baik pelacur atau ulama” (everyone is the same, regardless whether the individual is a prostitute or ulama). In Islam, Awwas maintains that everybody’s position is not the same.³⁹⁹

Rejecting Pancasila as the Foundation of the Indonesian State

MMI’s Amir for the period 2013 – 2018, Al-Ustadz Drs Muhammad Thalib had in 1960, sharply criticised the *Pancasila*. In the article which Thalib wrote, he disputed *Pancasila* as the foundation of the Indonesian state.

³⁹⁸ “Untuk Kejayaan Islam: Gus Dur Mundur Demokrasi Digusur” *Laporan Buletin Risalah Mujahidin*, Edisi 16 (Dzulqa’dah 1412H/10 Februari 2001), hlm 1-12.

³⁹⁹ Zada, *Islam Radikal*, 132-133.

According to him, there was no legal basis for *Pancasila* to be made the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia. In response to the article, President Suharto⁴⁰⁰ sent his messenger to Thalib, offering him the position of assistant to the President or in other words, a minister post. Thalib declined the offer.⁴⁰¹

On 14 March 2013, Thalib repeated what he said in 1960 – “*Di dalam Undang-Undang Dasar negara kita, tidak ada yang menyatakan Pancasila secara eksplisit adalah dasar negara Indonesia*” (In the Constitution of our country, nothing about the *Pancasila* as the constitution of the Indonesian state is stated explicitly).⁴⁰²

MMI’s refutation of the *Pancasila* as the constitution of the state rested on the interpretation of Article 29 of “The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia” which states:

- (1) The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God.
- (2) The State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief.

Based on the Article, MMI is adamant that they have every right to demand that the state enforces the *Sharia* for Muslims. According to them, therefore, laws must be enacted to ensure that this is carried out. They question

⁴⁰⁰ Although the incident was said to have taken place in 1960, the report clearly mentioned Suharto, and therefore, most probably, occurred in the late 60’s because Suharto officially became the President of Indonesia in 1968. Even then, it is difficult to accept the fact that Suharto offered a minister post to Thalib who was twenty years old at that time, considering he was born in 1948.

⁴⁰¹ A.Z. Muttaqin, “MMI Silaturrahim ke MIUMI, Kesesatan Syiah Salah Satu Bahasannya,” *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/news/2013/06/11/mmi-silaturrahim-ke-miumi-kesesatan-syiah-salah-satu-bahasannya.html>, 11 June 2013), accessed on 19 June 2014.

⁴⁰² Bilal, “Ustadz Drs. Muhammad Tholib: Pancasila Tidak Memiliki Dasar Hukum Sebagai Dasar Negara,” *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/news/2013/03/14/ustadz-drs-muhammad-tholib-pancasila-tidak-memiliki-dasar-hukum-sebagai-dasar-negara.html#sthash.jJRI3v5j.dpuf>, 15 Mar. 2013), accessed on 19 Nov. 2014.

the reason for the *Sharia* not being put into practice, and why MMI is being accused of being terrorists for fighting for this right.⁴⁰³

Implementing the Sharia

No matter how MMI approaches the issue of implementing the *Sharia*, at the most fundamental level, their conviction is based on the belief that the Quran commands them to obey Allah, the Prophet and the leaders among Muslims.⁴⁰⁴ There is no difference between MMI and other Muslims as far as these are concerned. Despite this, the Quranic phrase, “*An aqimuddien*” which is found in Surah Al-Syura, verse 13 gives rise to a term which is commonly referred to by JI and MMI as “*Iqomatid Dien*” (establishing the religion) and has only one benchmark – implementation of the *Sharia*. As this is a dominant theme in MMI’s struggle, the following verses of the Quran for example:

“And that there might grow out of you a community [of people] who invite unto all that is good, and enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong: and it is they, they who shall attain to a happy state!”⁴⁰⁵

“You are indeed the best community that has ever been brought forth for [the good of] mankind: you enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong, and you believe in God. Now if the followers of earlier revelation had attained to [this kind of] faith, it would have been for their own good; [but only a few] among them are believers, while most of them are iniquitous”.⁴⁰⁶

“Now whenever God and His Apostle have decided a matter, it is not for a believing man or a believing woman to claim freedom of choice insofar as they themselves are concerned: for he who [thus] rebels against God and His Apostle has already, most obviously, gone astray.”⁴⁰⁷

“The only response of believers, whenever they are summoned unto God and His Apostle in order that [the divine writ] might judge between them, can be no other than, “We have heard, and we pay heed!” - and it is they, they who shall attain to a happy state.”⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Al-Qurān Al-Nisā’ 4: 59.

⁴⁰⁵ Al-Qurān, Ali ‘Imrān 3:104.

⁴⁰⁶ Al-Qurān, Ali ‘Imrān 3:110.

⁴⁰⁷ Al-Qurān, Al-Aḥzāb 33:36.

⁴⁰⁸ Al-Qurān, Al-Nūr 24:51.

“God has promised those of you who have attained to faith and do righteous deeds that, of a certainty, He will cause them to accede to power on earth, even as He caused [some of] those who lived before them to accede to it; and that, of a certainty, He will firmly establish for' them the religion which He has been pleased to bestow on them; and that, of a certainty, He will cause their erstwhile state of fear to be replaced by a sense of security - [seeing that] they worship Me (alone), not ascribing divine powers to aught beside Me. But all who, after [having understood] this, choose to deny the truth - it is they, they who are truly iniquitous!”⁴⁰⁹

“O you who have attained to faith! Pay heed unto God, and pay heed unto the Apostle and unto those from among you who have been entrusted with authority; and if you are at variance over any matter, refer it unto God and the Apostle, if you [truly] believe in God and the Last Day. This is the best [for you], and best in the end.”⁴¹⁰

are read and understood within this framework.

MMI as an organisation or *Tandhim* provides the platform for alliances (*Tansiq*) to be made among mujahidin. The mujahidin in MMI's parlance are Muslims who execute and spread the teachings of Islam with full vigour at the level of the individual, family, society, and nations. These are carried out by them, both individually and collectively. Instead of making those who subscribe to MMI's vision of implementing the *Sharia* in Indonesia pledge their allegiance (*Bai'ah*) to MMI's leadership, they are bound together based on the Islamic creed (*Aqidah* Islam), brotherhood, and the methodology of the Prophet's struggle. MMI only serves as a platform for the *Ummah* to strive for the implementation of *Sharia* in its totality or *Kaffah*. It cannot be implemented to the fullest without having a state.

Contextualising Salafism

In principle, MMI's ideology is based on the Qu'ran and the Prophetic Traditions as understood by the Companions of the Prophet who are widely accepted as *Ulama Salafush-shalih*. In essence, MMI is a *Salafi* organisation

⁴⁰⁹ Al-Qurān, Al-Nūr 24:55.

⁴¹⁰ Al-Qurān, Al-Nisā' 4:59.

which embraces “a form of Islam practised by the Prophet Muhammad and the two generations after him, and rejects any deviation from the faith after this.”⁴¹¹ Initially, *Salafism* was apolitical,⁴¹² but MMI is deeply involved and interested in Indonesian politics. It suggests that MMI has appropriated *Salafism* to suit Indonesia’s context and MMI’s *Salafist* ideology now transcends beyond the theological border. As a result, the organisation has incorporated the following aims and objectives:

1. To realise the *Sharia* law in all aspects of life, both in private life, family, community, nation, and state.
2. To apply *Sharia* law in the management of government/state.

In working towards achieving the above aims and objectives, MMI encourages movements for the establishment of *Sharia* law. For this reason, MMI allows itself to become a platform where the Islamic *Ummah*’s potential for *Da‘wah*, enjoining good and forbidding evil as well as jihad in the path of Allah could be effectively carried out. Avoiding violence, MMI continuously strives to prepare and establish management concept for its vision of the Government which is in accordance with *Sharia* law in all areas of life where all work and effort must comply with *Sharia* law. MMI also recognises the need to establish relationship and cooperation with fellow Muslims wherever they may be to realise Islam as *Rahmatan lil ' Alamin* (mercy to the worlds).⁴¹³

⁴¹¹ Mark Coultan, “Puritanical Form of Islam Puts Brakes on Terrorism,” *The Sydney Morning Herald* [Sydney, Australia] (14 Sep. 2004): 10. See also: International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix,” *ICG Asia Report No. 83* (13 Sep. 2004), 32.

⁴¹² As a comparison, Egypt under the Mubarak regime allowed the “Salafi Da‘wa” (*Al-Da‘wa Al-Salafiyya*) to carry out its activities as an informal religious organization because it is against violence and did not engage in formal politics. See, Stéphane Lacroix, “Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism” *Policy Briefing*, Brookings Doha Center (June 2012).

⁴¹³ Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, *Pedoman Umum & Pelaksanaan Majelis Mujahidin untuk Penegakan Syariat Islam*, Seri Publikasi (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2003), 33-36.

About the phrase, “Islam as *Rahmatan lil ‘Alamin*,” there exists a different connotation in MMI’s conceptual framework.⁴¹⁴ MMI challenges the many meanings given to the phrase which MMI considers as not from Islam. It is anti-jihad and sacrificing the interests of the Muslim majority for the sake of protecting non-Muslim minorities. It tolerates digression of Islamic teachings in the name of democracy and being soft towards vices and sins in the interests of upholding human rights. More specifically, MMI does not believe that Allah’s mercy could be acquired through the practice of democracy, whether it is *Pancasila* democracy or liberal democracy. Instead, the mercy of Allah could only be attained by putting the teachings of the Quran into practice. It is when Allah's *Sharia* is obeyed in all human affairs as stated in the verse of the Quran: “*And this, too, is a divine writ which We have bestowed from on high, a blessed one: follow it, then, and be conscious of God, so that you might be graced with His mercy.*”⁴¹⁵

Uniting the Diverse Communities of Indonesia Under the Sharia

In MMI’s world view, it is possible for Indonesia’s diverse communities to be bound together by accepting the aspiration of the majority of the population. This line of argument by MMI could be inferred from MMI’s reference to the beliefs of the majority of the population becoming the identity of the state. MMI argues that in Russia, China and Nicaragua when the majority of the population there embraces Communism, a Communist State is established. The same logic also applies to America, the United Kingdom,

⁴¹⁴ Irfan S Awwas, “Islam Rahmatan lil Alamin Dalam Bingkai Kebhinekaan” *SITUS RESMI MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://majelismujahidin.com/2010/12/islam-rahmatan-lil-alamin-dalam-bingkai-kebhinekaan/>, 13 Dec. 2010), accessed on 28 Nov. 2014.

⁴¹⁵ See MMI’s Indonesian translation of Surah Al-An’ām 6:155 by Muhammad Thalib, *Al-Qur'an Tarjamah Tafsiriyah* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ma'had Nabawy, 2012), 174.

Australia, France, and others. When the majority of the population in these countries believes in democracy, a democratic state is established. Using the same analogy, MMI questions why this is not the case in Indonesia. The majority of the population in Indonesia are Muslims, and implementing the Islamic *Sharia* in all aspects of life has become the aspiration of the majority.⁴¹⁶ Still, an Islamic state in Indonesia could not be established.

Arguing the case further, MMI accused the Indonesian state of having acted repressively against the aspiration and belief of the Muslim majority. Muslims who are demanding for the establishment of an Islamic State or the implementation of the Islamic *Sharia* in state institutions are marginalised and treated as perpetrators of subversive acts, anti-government, and enemies of the State. Despite making these accusations, MMI admitted Muslims are also to blame for the unfortunate turn of events because of their ambivalence towards the demands for the formalisation of the Islamic *Sharia* in state institutions. Particularly, leaders of Islamic mass organisations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah are equally to blame for accepting the principle of *Pancasila* democracy as final, and their satisfaction with Indonesia being “Negara ‘bukan-bukan’” – a state that is neither secular nor religious that the former President Suharto said Indonesia was. In the final analysis, MMI accuses the members of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches of Government for being uninterested in managing the country by the Islamic *Sharia*.⁴¹⁷

MMI believes that the long march for the struggle to enforce the Islamic *Sharia* in Indonesia had been carried out long before the independence and also after the independence. Making the same demand today would be met with

⁴¹⁶ MMI does not provide any evidence for this.

⁴¹⁷ Irfan S. Awwas, “Islam Rahmatan lil Alamin dalam Bingkai Kebhinekaan”.

attacks and threats from various directions. The Muslims who are vested with authority and power in Indonesia by being in the legislative, executive and judicial branch of the government are unlikely to use their positions to enforce the Islamic *Sharia*. As a result, Indonesians, in general, are not only fearful of terrorist threats but are also terrified of Islam which has been stigmatised as a religion that has spawned the jihad ideology and is synonymous with being the source of radicalism.

Although MMI faces an uphill battle in its struggle to enforce the *Sharia* in Indonesia, MMI insists that the formalisation of the Islamic *Sharia* in state institutions is the juridical constitutional right of Muslims in Indonesia. MMI continues to preach that the UUD 45 article 29, paragraph 1 and 2 as well as the Presidential Decree of 5 December 1959 guarantee this right, and it remained valid to this very day.⁴¹⁸ Ironically, MMI's formalisation of the Islamic *Sharia*, if allowed to materialise, could also pose an existential threat to the Indonesian state identity in how it undermines the rights of non-Muslims and Muslims who prefer a non-*Sharia* Indonesia.

Calling for Muslim Solidarity⁴¹⁹

MMI understands that enforcing the *Sharia* is not something that could be achieved overnight. Neither could this be accomplished by force nor by MMI alone. Insisting on fighting the battle of enforcing the *Sharia* alone by leaving out potential partners will not bear fruit. Nonetheless, working with different partners has its problem that MMI needs to address. Here, Abu Jibril raised two

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Abu Muhammad Jibriel Abdurrahman, "Merajut Ukhuwah Islamiyah Dalam Penegakan Syari'ah" *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://majelismujahidin.com/2013/06/merajut-ukhuwah-islamiyah-dalam-penegakan-syariah/>, 11 June 2013), accessed on 23 June 2014.

issues that MMI should be concerned. The first issue is about working together with Muslims who are “ahli-ahli bid‘ah” (innovators in religion) and deviationists. The second issue is adopting a tolerant attitude towards those who not only differ from MMI but whose practices are not in accordance with the sacred texts of the Qur’an and As-Sunnah. As a way out, Abu Jibril borrowed heavily from Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi’s view⁴²⁰ who quoted the maxim that Sayyid Muhammad Rasyid Ridha⁴²¹ had conceived, and popularly known as “*Qā’idah al-Manār al-Dhahabiyyah*.”⁴²²

The maxim, “*Nata’awanu fi mā ittafaqnā ‘alayh wa yu’azziru ba’dhunā ba’dhan fi mā ikhtalafnā fih*” (We help one another on issues that we agreed upon, and we excuse one another in matters which we disagreed)” calls “ahli kiblat” (those who faces the direction of Mecca in their prayers i.e. Muslims) to help one another against the enemies of Islam. Outlining the mechanism for working together, Abu Jibril gave his interpretation of the situation in Indonesia where the maxim is to be applied. The innovators and deviationists according to him are not monolithic. Innovations in religion are of various types and levels. Some are less serious than others. Given that, the innovators, depending on the seriousness of their innovations could be classified as sinners or in more extreme cases, as infidels. As a basis for consideration, Abu Jibril proposed looking at the issue from the perspective of “the lesser of the two evils.” The perspective allows MMI members to be more flexible in achieving their shared

⁴²⁰ For Al-Qaradhawi’s explanation of the maxim in Arabic, see, Fatwa wa Ahkam, “*Nata’awanu fi mattafaqna ‘alayh, wa yu’azziru ba’dhuna ba’dhan fi makhtalafna fih*,” (<http://www.qaradawi.net/new/all-fatawa/6281-2012-12-17-08-16-42>, 29 Oct. 2014), accessed on 26 Nov. 2014.

⁴²¹ He is sometimes referred to as just Rashid Rida; “one of the leading Islamic revivalists, a scholar of high reputation, and revolutionary thinkers of the twentieth century.” See, “Rashid Rida” (<http://islamicencyclopedia.org/public/index/topicDetail/id/829>, 26 Nov. 2014), accessed on 26 Nov. 2014.

⁴²² Literally, it means “Al-Manar golden maxim”. See, *Majallah Al-Manar*, Vol. 35, Section 6 (Rejab 1358 AH/August 1938): 480.

goals such as the implementation of the *Sharia*. It seems that MMI is trying very hard not to pose an existential threat to the Indonesian state when realising this objective.

In support of this argument, Abu Jibril quoted the following Qur'anic verses:

“Alif. Lam. Mim. Defeated have been the Byzantines in the lands close-by; yet it is they who, notwithstanding this, their defeat, shall be victorious within a few years: [for with God rests all power of decision, first and last. And on that day will the believers [too, have cause to] rejoice in God's succour: [for] He gives succour to whomever He wills since He alone is almighty, a dispenser of grace.”⁴²³

to drive home the point, based on the context in which the above verses were revealed that the Qur'an considers the Christians — even though they are non-Muslims, closer to Muslims than the “Majusi” fire worshippers. Therefore, weighing in on the situation in Indonesia, Abu Jibril felt there is nothing wrong working with other Muslims. In fact, there is no other way for MMI to improve Islam's standing in Indonesia except to call for Muslim solidarity in confronting the enemies of Islam.

Another proof which Abu Jibril offered to convince MMI to be more inclusive of others outside MMI for the sake of Islam is the fact that Prophet Muhammad himself had asked assistance from polytheists from the tribe of *Quraysh* after the conquest of Mecca when facing a threat from another polytheistic tribe, the *Hawazin*. According to Abu Jibril, Prophet Muhammad had familial ties with the polytheists from the tribe of *Quraysh*. Furthermore, the *Quraysh* tribe occupied a prominent place among the Arabs of that time. In short, these are the lessons learned from Prophet Muhammad's life history which MMI should keep in mind when interacting with the different Muslim dynamics in Indonesia.

⁴²³ Al-Qurān, Al-Rūm 30:1-5.

Summing up his arguments while quoting extensively from Al-Qaradhawi, Abu Jibril issued certain caveats. Those who oppose MMI on issues where there is definitive evidence (*Qaṭ'iy Thubūt*) with clear injunctions or explicit textual rulings (*Qaṭ'iy Dalālah*) for the issues should not be tolerated at all. *Ijtihad*⁴²⁴ (personal reasoning) does not apply to issues where the textual evidence and implications are definitive. Opening the doors of *Ijtihad* on issues which are definitive means opening “pintu kejahatan dan fitnah” (the door of evil and temptation) for the *Ummah*.

5.3. Strategy

From the ideological perspective, there is no doubt that MMI is deeply committed to enforcing the *Sharia* in Indonesia. MMI also does not have any false hope of achieving this feat alone. As such, MMI openly declares its willingness to form alliances with any Muslims, individually or collectively as a group or movement sharing this objective. It has not been easy for MMI. While MMI and its allies share a common ideological denominator of enforcing the *Sharia* in Indonesia, the strategy to achieve this requires MMI to remain flexible and tolerant. Otherwise, it would undo the alliances that have been built. Already treading on thin ice, MMI will have to take into account the current situation in Indonesia where the Indonesian population has outrightly rejected the use of force or threat of force.⁴²⁵ Instead, a more open and transparent approach would be more welcomed. MMI is, therefore, right in its choice of a softer image, but the same image could also be understood by the

⁴²⁴ Literally, it means “exertion”, but in Islamic Jurisprudence, the term refers to “the effort a jurist makes in order to deduce the law, which is not self-evident, from its sources”. For a detailed explanation, see, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, 2nd Revised ed. (Malaysia: Ilmiah Publishers Sdn. Bhd., 1999), 366-394.

⁴²⁵ Hilman Latief. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview, Yogyakarta (14 May 2014).

more uncompromising others among Islamists that MMI has sold its soul to the devil.

Tansiq or Alliance

In JI, the strategy of *Tansiq* is carried out with other like-minded groups by collaborating with them so that mutual help and support could be ensured to achieve an objective.⁴²⁶ However, MMI has a more elaborated conceptual understanding of the strategy. *Tansiq* is a strategy adopted by MMI in the form of alliances with individuals or groups on the basis of the Islamic brotherhood (*Ukhuwah Islamiyyah*). It is a result of sharing the same Islamic creed (*Aqidah Islamiyyah*), and the commitment to struggle for Islam through *Da'wah* (missionary endeavour) and *Jihad fi sabilillah* (struggle in the path of Allah).⁴²⁷

The strategy of *Tansiq* is formulated into three types of alliances, namely *Tansiqul Fardi* (allying with individuals for Islamic law enforcement), *Tansiqul 'Amali* (allying on the basis of deeds for Islamic law enforcement), and *Tansiqul Nidhomi* (allying with organisations for Islamic law enforcement). In operationalising the *Tansiq*, MMI adopts a very inclusive membership scheme. The scheme allows every Muslim male and female to be a member of MMI even if he/she is already a member of other Islamic, mass or political organisations. To qualify for membership they only have to satisfy two requirements. One, they agree with MMI's vision of implementing the Islamic

⁴²⁶ PUPJI, 36.

⁴²⁷ Although MMI understands *Jihad* as expending in all earnest one's effort and ability to achieve a noble objective in the path of Allah, *Jihad* can be conducted in many ways. Other than by striving hard against carnality which destroys and plunges man into destruction, *Jihad* could also be in the form of fighting for the sake of Allah to preserve the honour and dignity of human beings and Muslims. See, "Jihad dalam Islam" MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN (http://majelismujahidinmuslim.blogspot.sg/2013/04/jihad-dalam-islam_17.html, 17 Apr. 2013), accessed on 01 Dec. 2014.

Sharia in its totality (*Kaffah*) at the private, familial, societal and state level.

Two, they have a common understanding of MMI's mission.

As a matter of formality, they must accept and be determined to put into practice the pledge below:

In the name of Allah Most Gracious Most Merciful

Indeed we, members of the Majelis Mujahidin, sincerely pledge that with the help of Allah, we are ready to:

1. Fight for the enforcement of Islamic *Sharia* in private, family, community, the nation and the State life.
2. Implement the fight to enforce the Islamic *Sharia* based on the Al Quran and the authentic traditions of the Prophet.
3. Prioritise the fight to enforce the Islamic *Sharia* over personal, family, community, nation and other interests.
4. Fight for the enforcement of the Islamic *Sharia* wherever we will be with our wealth and lives so long as we live.
5. Help every fight for the enforcement of the Islamic *Sharia* by Muslims in other parts of the world with all the capabilities that we have.

Thus we say this pledge, hoping for Allah's pleasure and blessings. May Allah grant them.⁴²⁸

Tathbiqus Syari'ah (Enforcement of Islamic Law)

As a matter of strategy, MMI never states the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia as its vision. Instead, it uses the term "*Tathbiqus Syari'ah*" (Islamic law enforcement). The term may be less intense as compared to establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, but *Tathbiqus Syari'ah* also carries the same connotation. It is precisely spelt out in MMI's only mission that of striving to implement the Islamic *Sharia* in its entirety (*Kaffah*). The implementation of the Islamic *Sharia* in MMI's scheme of things would ensure

⁴²⁸ Azmuttaqin, "LPD Majelis Mujahidin Cibubur Bogor Jabodetabek di deklarasikan di masjid Muhammad Ramadhan, Bekasi" *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/2013/06/lpd-majelis-mujahidin-cibubur-bogor-jabodetabek-di-deklarasikan-di-masjid-muhammad-ramadhan-bekasi/>, 11 June 2013), accessed on 30 Dec. 2014.

justice and prosperity for all citizens because Islam is characterised as *Rahmatan lil ' Alamin* (mercy to the worlds).

MMI explains its mission of implementing the Islamic *Sharia* in its entirety (*Kaffah*) in two ways. Firstly, MMI intends to implement the Islamic *Sharia* unadulterated, and for this reason, secular democracy should be rejected. In MMI's view, such a system denies the law of Allah as the only source for all laws and deprives it of its rightful position in the constitution of the state. Secondly, the comprehensive implementation of the *Sharia* should take place at three levels: the individual, family, and state.

Two social approaches namely, the structural approach and cultural approach will be taken to ensure that the mission is accomplished. The structural approach is used to consolidate political power in the hands of Muslims who are committed to enforcing the *Sharia*. It would see to it that state policies that are issued to manage life in Indonesia are in accordance with Allah's law. As for the cultural approach, MMI perpetuates human civilisation that is founded on a culture which is suitable with the Islamic morals.⁴²⁹

At the operational level, the structural approach would encompass two main activities. The first activity involves building and consolidating existing socio-political strength of MMI which will pave the way for the establishment of the Islamic *Sharia*. About this, MMI takes every opportunity to prepare and strengthen the organisational concept of the government so that it supports the application of the Islamic *Sharia* in all aspects of life. For this purpose, MMI proactively invites all social and political powers towards understanding the essence of various multi-dimensional crises which the country is facing; and

⁴²⁹ "Strategi Perjuangan Majelis Mujahidin" *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/about/strategi-perjuangan-majelis-mujahidin/>, 30 Dec. 2014), accessed on 30 Dec. 2014.

convincing them that the fundamental solution cannot, but must be with the enforcement and implementation of Islamic *Sharia* at the social and state level. To effectively play such a role, MMI must first and foremost be accepted as a facilitator by all social and political powers that share MMI's mission in implementing the basic strategy for the enforcement of Islamic *Sharia*.⁴³⁰

The second activity includes expanding MMI's ability to form alliances to position itself in a manner that would allow MMI to give social direction to the ruling regime that is in line with the Islamic *Sharia*. In connection to this, MMI consolidates its organisational structure so that from the central level to the local representatives, all the MMI's organs live to carry out its mission of implementing the *Sharia*. MMI continues to conduct intensive programmes to increase the number of existing cadres to fill any vacuum in the MMI's leadership. At the same time, it also engages the mass media so that the media could contribute positively towards the socialisation effort carried out by MMI to enforce the Islamic *Sharia*.

MMI Congress and Leadership

In an attempt to allow more influential people taking responsibility for the enforcement of the Islamic *Sharia* in Indonesia, MMI uses the Mujahidin Congress as a platform to continue pushing this agenda and keeping it alive in the minds of Indonesians. The Mujahidin Congress as MMI's highest body undertakes higher decision making and is convened once every five years. The congress will bring together all members of MMI who have officially registered

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

at the Majelis Mujahidin Centre. For MMI affiliate members, they will be represented by the daily management of the affiliated groups in the Congress.

The Mujahidin Congress appoints the *Ahlul Halli Wal Aqdi* (AHWA, Legislative Council) which comprises of Islamic figures. Based on the Congress' decision, the AHWA determines policies and decides on matters of strategic interest. The collective leadership of the AHWA is under a leader known as the *Amirul Mujahidin* (Commander of the Mujahidin). The MMI's daily tasks which are based on the decision of its Legislative Council, the AHWA, are executed by the *Lajnah Tanfidziyah* (Executive Committee) at the headquarter (central) level, and *Majelis Mujahidin* Representative Committees at the provinces, districts, municipalities, and in necessary areas.⁴³¹

Da'wah and Jihad

The strategy involves preaching peacefully (*Da'wah*) the idea of enforcing the *Sharia* in Indonesia, but at the same time building the capacity to wage armed jihad if necessary. In line with the current political landscape in Indonesia, MMI when carrying out this strategy observes the prescribed boundaries and makes it a point to justify its actions. A typical example is the formation of the *Laskar Mujahidin* (Armed wing of MMI).

The underlying reason for the creation of the *Laskar Mujahidin* rests upon the understanding of *I'dad* (literally, it means preparation) in the form of military-style training.⁴³² To allay the fear that Indonesians might have on MMI

⁴³¹ "Strategi Perjuangan Majelis Mujahidin" *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://majelismujahidin.com/about/strategi-perjuangan-majelis-mujahidin/>, 30 May 2014), accessed on 30 May 2014.

⁴³² Both JI and MMI see *I'dad* as a necessary stage before *Jihad*.

being a violent organisation, MMI presents *I'dad* as an act of worship which is supported by the following Quranic verse:

*"Hence, make ready against them whatever force and war mounts you are able to muster, so that you might deter thereby the enemies of God, who are your enemies as well, and others besides them of whom you may be unaware, [but] of whom God is aware; and whatever you may expend in God's cause shall be repaid to you in full, and you shall not be wronged."*⁴³³

MMI is acutely aware of the two growing general perceptions of *I'dad* involving military-style training. Some Islamic movements associate the military training which MMI conducts openly as a form of radicalisation. The Government and secular groups, on the other hand, consider military training that is carried out secretly as a gateway to acts of terrorism or treason and treat it with utmost suspicion. While disagreeing with these perceptions, Awwas reaffirmed MMI's stand on the matter.

I'dad is meant to build the strength of Islam in the midst of the *Ummah*'s break-up. Muslims according to Awwas, are traumatised by the global stigma caused by the charge of terrorism and radicalism directed at them. Reacting to these accusations, some Muslims in an attempt to free themselves from the shackles of the stigma began interpreting Islam partially. The partial interpretation of Islam has given rise to new themes such as "Islam moderat, Islam warna-warni, ataupun Islam KTP" (moderate Islam, colourful Islam, or Islam by Identity Card).⁴³⁴ As a result, the practice of comprehensive Islam which includes *I'dad* and *Jihad* is understood as sectarian.

Here, MMI resuscitates the idea of *I'dad* and *Jihad* by presenting it as part of a comprehensive understanding of the Islamic teachings, and should not

⁴³³ Al-Qurān, Al-Anfāl 8:60.

⁴³⁴ Bilal, "Diklat Laskar Majelis Mujahidin Membangun Kekuatan Islam" *ARRAHMAH.COM* (2012www.arahmah.com/read/2012/06/21/21105-diklat-laskar-majelis-mujahidin-membangun-kekuatan-islam.html#sthash.2i9KkRpi.dpuf, 21 June 2012), accessed on 11 Dec. 2014.

be viewed as confrontational. To prove this point, training for *Laskar Mujahidin* includes materials on *Da'wah*, communication, and diplomacy, in addition to building their physical endurance. MMI reassures the Indonesian masses that enforcing the *sharia* could be achieved without controversy through diplomacy. For this reason, MMI employs *Da'wah* and *Jihad* as a strategy where *Da'wah* is equated with diplomacy, and *jihad* as the courage to defend Islam with one's life, wealth, power, and intellectual capability if necessary.

MMI argues that a fair assessment of the *I'dad* that it conducted should be made by looking at the substance of the *I'dad* activities, and not whether it is conducted openly or secretly. MMI's *I'dad* which is carried out openly, and allowed by the government does not mean MMI is collaborating with the Government. It is also not true that *I'dad* which is conducted in secrecy is necessarily hostile to the government. It seems that the *jihad* component of the strategy of *Da'wah* and *Jihad* when implemented by MMI, continues to raise doubts on MMI's stand vis-à-vis the use of violence and terrorism to enforce the *Sharia*. Furthermore, the catchphrase, "*Isy kariman aw mut syahidan*" (live nobly or die as a martyr) which MMI promotes, only succeeds in further elevating the suspicion.⁴³⁵

As a general rule in implementing the strategy, Awwas as the Head of MMI Executive Committee offers looking at the conduct of *I'dad* from the "*maslahat mudharat*" (benefit or harm) perspective.⁴³⁶ So, if the benefit of doing *I'dad* openly outweighs the advantage of doing it secretly, and after factoring in the harm arising from conducting it secretly, then there should not be a problem in undertaking *I'dad* openly. Reflecting on past experiences of the

⁴³⁵ Azmuttaqin, "LPD Majelis Mujahidin Cibubur Bogor Jabodetabek".

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

Islamic movements in Indonesia, Awwas concluded that secret activities have more weaknesses because the activities are often used as an excuse and evidence to crush the movements.⁴³⁷

5.4. Interpreting the Existential Threat

There are at least three reasons for treating MMI as an existential threat to the NKRI. Firstly, looking at MMI's origin, there is no doubt it inherited from DI and JI some of the traits that could be used as evidence to designate these two organisations as existential threats. MMI continues to struggle for the formalisation of the *Sharia* in Indonesia but falls short of calling for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Nevertheless, MMI's rejection of democracy and *Pancasila* as the basis of NKRI implicitly reaffirms MMI's conviction to establish an Islamic state. Pushing this argument further by asking the question what is MMI's vision of NKRI without democracy and *Pancasila* as its basis, the more probable answer would be either an Islamic state or a state which implements the *Sharia* in its totality. Both would spell the demise of the *Pancasila* state and therefore threaten its existence.

Secondly, there are still people of influence in MMI with past links with DI, JI, Ngruki and the Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy. These are individuals who chose to stay with MMI after Ba'asyir left, and formed JAT. They might be less radical than those who left MMI with Ba'asyir, but they are still a security concern. In addition to that, the strategy of *Tansiq* which MMI adopts could also bring in more of such people. These are people who have not accepted the Pancasila state wholeheartedly and will continue to try and change

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

the status quo of the *Pancasila* state. While presently MMI may not be physically violent there is little guarantee that it will not be in the future. Even without the violence, the intention to reconfigure the *Pancasila* state in itself is an existential threat.

Thirdly, since its declaration on 7 August 2000, MMI has grown considerably. MMI has successfully worked within the existing democratic environment to continually draw Indonesian Muslims' attention to think and muse on issues such as Islam *Kaffah* (comprehensive Islam), *Tathbiqus Syari'ah* (enforcement of Islamic law), *I'dad* and *Jihad*. These are issues when pushed together with the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter could undermine the basis of Indonesia as a *Pancasila* state. Although MMI is not engaged in violence in the political or physical sense, it is an existential threat because it undermines the basis of the modern Indonesian state.

However, MMI has been mostly successful in presenting a softer image of itself. These have served as mitigating factors which prevent a consensus within Indonesia on designating MMI as an existential threat. So far, MMI has not been involved in any terrorism-related cases even though the organisation continues to push aggressively for the formalisation of sharia in Indonesia. There are also many influential public figures and intellectuals in MMI who have no known record of involvement in violence or links to it such as Cornell University trained historian Deliar Noer whom Hefner considers as "a conservative figure but not a violent extremist" and a member of the board of

advisors of MMI.⁴³⁸ Ustadz Muhammad Thalib who is MMI's *Amir* for the period 2013 – 2018 is also a respected religious scholar.⁴³⁹

MMI also speaks out against the caliphate declared by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS),⁴⁴⁰ helped to enhance its softer image. Ustadz Muhammad Thalib, the *Amir* of MMI, gave two reasons for standing firm on the ISIS issue. Firstly, Thalib accused ISIS of lying in the name of the caliphate, and its declaration would only trigger conflict or a civil war between two groups of Muslims: those who agree and those who reject the caliphate. Secondly, ISIS excommunicates Muslims who refused to recognise the caliphate which it declared unilaterally. Thalib argued that the act of self-appointing oneself as a caliph without prior consultation (*Musyawarah*) with the rest of the Muslims, “*maka orang itu telah sesat*” (then that person has deviated).⁴⁴¹

Finally, Ba'asyir leaving MMI together with his followers to establish JAT in 2008 purged MMI of the hardliners and extremists. Those who chose to remain with MMI are Islamists who have accepted MMI's softer image, and this is in no small degree an indication of a tacit approval of MMI's non-confrontational strategy.

⁴³⁸ W. Robert Hefner, *Islam in Indonesia's Political Future* (Center for Naval Analysis: Alexandria, Virginia, Sep. 2002), 24.

⁴³⁹ “Allahuakbar, Ustadz Muhammad Thalib Kembali Terpilih Menjadi Amir Majelis Mujahidin Periode 2013-2018” *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://majelismujahidin.com/2013/08/allahuakbar-ustadz-muhammad-thalib-kembali-terpilih-menjadi-amir-majelis-mujahidin-periode-2013-2018/> 26 Aug. 2013), accessed on 17 Dec. 2014.

⁴⁴⁰ The UN designated terrorist group has rebranded itself several times but prefers to be known as the Islamic State (IS). To them the name suggests recognition of the caliphate that they have declared unilaterally on 29 June 2014. See: Philip Ross, “ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Daesh: What's the Difference?” *International Business Times* (<http://www.ibtimes.com/isil-isis-islamic-state-daesh-whats-difference-1693495>, 09 June 2015), accessed on 31 Oct. 2016.

⁴⁴¹ Rendra Saputra, “Dua Unsur Sesat ISIS Menurut Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia” *VIVA.co.id* (<http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/529558-dua-unsur-sesat-isis-menurut-majelis-mujahidin-indonesia>, 16 Aug. 2014), accessed on 17 Dec. 2014.

5.5. Securitisation of MMI

Although the government is aware of Ba'asyir's involvement with JI and AQ which are transnational terrorist organisations, without the necessary proof not much could be done to charge Ba'asyir and MMI; the new organisation that Ba'asyir established and declared. The Indonesian National Police Chief, General M. Tito Karnavian noted that under the present climate of democratisation after Suharto's fall in May 1998, Indonesians want the government to act according to the rule of law.⁴⁴² It is, therefore, understandable why the Indonesian government insisted on trying terrorism cases in the open court. There is no doubt that the government apparently wants to make a clean break from Suharto's *Orba*. Much to the consternation of countries that are affected by transnational terrorism, Indonesia insists on making the distinction between the individual and the organisation; and to act according to the rule of law as well as not succumbing to external pressures.

For this reason, the government went after the individuals that were involved in terrorist acts unless there is indisputable evidence that the organisation is behind the acts of terror like in the JI case. For MMI, the existential threat it poses to the *Pancasila* state of Indonesia is in the realm of ideas, and it is not perceived as a physical threat. Furthermore, MMI continues to oppose IS and asserts that Al-Baghdadi's self-declared caliphate is not only deviant but also, misleading.⁴⁴³ MMI's public declarations against IS

⁴⁴² Police Inspector General M. Tito Karnavian, PhD was the Assistant to the Chief for Planning and Budgeting. He was previously the Chief of Police for Papua and the Head of Densus 88. He was promoted to Police-General and has been the National Police Chief of Indonesia since 13 July 2016. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview. Jakarta, (21 Sep. 2014).

⁴⁴³ A. Z. Muttaqin, "Majelis Mujahidin tegaskan Daulah Khilafah Al Baghdadi sesat dan menyesatkan" *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<https://www.arahmah.com/news/2014/08/09/majelis-mujahidin-tegaskan-daulah-khilafah-al-baghdadi-sesat-dan-menyebabkan.html>, 09 Aug. 2014), accessed on 15 Nov. 2016.

indirectly serve as a counterweight to IS as the number one terror threat to the region and beyond. What makes it even more difficult for the Indonesian government to build a consensus that the MMI is an existential threat to the NKRI, is the openness with which this non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamist organisation declares that it will pursue the implementation of the *Sharia* through constitutional channels.⁴⁴⁴ MMI is also willing to debate the issue of MMI threatening the NKRI. In connection to this, MMI challenged Prof. Dr KH. Said Aqil Siroj (Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama) to a debate, after the latter urged Polri to dissolve MMI. It was reported on Friday, 02 September 2016 edition of the *Duta Masyarakat* daily with the heading: “PBNU: Semua Teroris di RI Wahabi” (PBNU (Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama): All terrorists in RI are Wahhabists).⁴⁴⁵

There is, therefore, a very remote chance that the relevant audience would agree with the government’s securitisation of MMI by declaring it as an existential threat to the NKRI, which needs to be neutralised. The current law enforcement initiatives that are put in place are more punitive and at the very best, serve to disrupt groups that are known to be violent. Convincing the relevant audience that MMI is an existential threat because of MMI’s ideology which is similar to DI and JI without the necessary evidence of acts of violence will not be easily achievable.

⁴⁴⁴ Lajnah Tanfidziah Majelis Mujahidin, “Keputusan Mudzakarrah Nasional Majelis Mujahidin “Era Baru Perjuangan Penegakan Syariat Islam di Lembaga Negara”” *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/2015/12/keputusan-mudzakarrah-nasional-majelis-mujahidin-era-baru-perjuangan-penegakan-syariat-islam-di-lembaga-negara/>, 26 Dec. 2015), accessed on 15 Nov. 2016.

⁴⁴⁵ Lajnah Tanfidziah Majelis Mujahidin, “Tantangan Debat Publik Ilmiah Kepada Said Aqil Siroj tentang Majelis Mujahidin Membahayakan NKRI” *MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN* (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/2016/09/tantangan-debat-publik-ilmiah-kepada-said-aqil-siroj-tentang-majelis-mujahidin-membahayakan-nkri/>, 25 Sep. 2016), accessed on 15 Nov. 2016.

CHAPTER SIX

CASE STUDY 3

JAMA'AH ANSHARUT TAUHID (JAT)

When Ba'asyir left MMI in 2008, the disagreement on the issue of leadership was the main issue that was cited as the reason that led to Ba'ayir leaving MMI, and subsequently, founding JAT. There were, however, two other contributing factors that could have caused Ba'asyir to officially sever his relations with MMI. Ba'asyir's family, especially his son, Abdul Rohim alleged that MMI had made use of his father's popularity for MMI's benefit. To them, Ba'asyir belongs to the Ummah and therefore, should be allowed to conduct *Da'wah* (religious outreach) activities freely even if the activities were not done under MMI's banner.⁴⁴⁶

The differences in opinions began when Ba'asyir was released in June 2006 after receiving remissions for both his prison sentences. Ba'asyir was arrested for immigration violations in 2002, tried and convicted by the court. He was then released in 2004 before being re-arrested for conspiracy in the 2002 Bali bombings. The court found Ba'asyir guilty and sentenced him to 30 months imprisonment in March 2005. When Ba'asyir's was about to be released in 2006, many people including those in MMI saw his release as a big event. As the *Amir* of MMI, many MMI leaders wanted to organise activities which coincided with Ba'asyir's release from prison. According to MMI's

⁴⁴⁶ Solahudin, Personal Interview.

proposed plan, on the day of Ba'asyir's release, he would be flown to Solo from Jakarta and then escorted to Ngruki by MMI.⁴⁴⁷

However, Ba'asyir sons, Abdul Rohim and Rasyid Ridho disagreed. Ba'asyir was instead driven by car from Jakarta to Ngruki. Along the way, they stopped in cities like Cirebon where Ba'asyir followers were allowed to greet him. The change in the plan made MMI unhappy. To add insult to injury, Ba'asyir supported his family on the matter.⁴⁴⁸ The incident would have been forgotten, and the relations among them would have improved if not for another incident – the establishment of the Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Center (ABB Center).

The centre was established in early 2008 by Ba'asyir's family as a separate entity from MMI. The underlying reason for its establishment was the belief that Ba'asyir belonged to the *Ummah*. With the establishment of the centre, MMI no longer managed Ba'asyir's *Da'wah* (religious outreach) activities. While the idea to create the centre could have come from Ba'asyir's family, there were MMI leaders such as Haris Amir Falah in Jakarta and Muhammad Achwan in East Java who supported the ABB Centre. Some of the other MMI leaders felt enraged by this development and saw it as an attempt by Ba'asyir's family to undermine MMI. The centre, to them, was akin to creating a “cult of personality around Ba'asyir.”⁴⁴⁹

When Ba'asyir chose to resign from MMI and established JAT on 27 July 2008, it was not unexpected. Ba'asyir had before that, been involved in DI, JI, and MMI. JAT was the latest organisation where Ba'asyir continues to play a major role until today. However, when JAT was declared, to those who had been with Ba'asyir since JI's establishment, JAT was a new platform which

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁹ “Ustad Berpisah Jamaah Terbelah”, *Gatra*, 13 August 2008.

promised a new beginning for their struggle. However, the facts about JAT reveal that JAT was an aspiration which was more conceptual, but nothing significantly new. The phrase, “recycling militants”⁴⁵⁰ and ideas would be more appropriate to describe JAT.

Among the reasons for describing JAT as such were the many individuals in JAT who were in one way or another connected with JI. In fact, when Ba’asyir left MMI, those who followed him to form JAT were the hardliners in MMI. It is true that JAT was a new organisation, but splits in existing organisations and formation of new groupings has become a recurrent theme in the organisations which Ba’asyir led. For JAT, its history, ideology, and strategy bore many resemblances with JI and MMI. As such, the most prominent challenge for JAT then was to carve a new image for itself which was different from the violent JI and the pliant MMI. That image was something not readily achievable as the following sections will demonstrate.

6.1. Origin and Development

Ba’asyir established the new organisation of *Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT) on 27 July 2008 in Solo, just ten days after his resignation as the *Amir* of MMI.⁴⁵¹ Officially, JAT was declared on Wednesday, the 17th of September 2008. The date might not be significant according to the Western calendar, but according to the Islamic *Hijriah* calendar, JAT’s declaration coincided with 17 *Ramadhan* 1429 *Hijriah*. The 17th of *Ramadhan* is remembered by Muslims all over the world for two significant events in Islamic history. It was the date of

⁴⁵⁰ The phrase was used in the title of the report by the International Crisis Group. See, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing.” *Asia Report* 92 (February 2005).

⁴⁵¹ “Ba’asyir Tepis Jadi Donatur Aksi Terorisme” *Info Jihad Internasional* (<http://forum-jihad.blogspot.com/2010/05/baasyir-tepis-jadi-donatur-aksi.html>, 14 May 2010), accessed on 19 Dec. 2014.

*Nuzul al-Quran*⁴⁵² where on this date, forty-one years after the birth of Prophet Muhammad, the Quran was revealed. For JAT, the more significant event in Islamic history which took place on this date was the Battle of *Badr*.⁴⁵³ Ba'asyir made the point to single out this event during the declaration when he said: *“Umat Islam menang dalam perang Badar karena Nashrullah, meskipun pasukan dan persenjataan umat Islam sangat lemah, sedangkan pasukan dan persenjataan musuh sangat kuat.”* (The Muslim community won in the Battle of *Badr* because of Allah's help, even though the Muslim community's troop and weapons were very weak, while the enemy's troop and weapons were very strong.)⁴⁵⁴

The context in which JAT emerged played an important role in shaping this new organisation. Ba'asyir went head-to-head with MMI's senior leadership and left MMI. Ba'asyir put JAT in the same predicament as JI when Sungkar decided to leave DI after irreconcilable differences with Anjengan Masduki. JAT had to demonstrate that it was dissimilar to MMI, the same way JI had to prove that it was different from DI. If not, JAT's very existence became questionable, and the split from MMI would severely dent its future image. The fact that Ba'asyir as the *Amir* of JAT and the “elder statesman of Indonesia's radical movement” was known to his critics for his “lack of strategic sense and poor management skills” also opened JAT to relentless

⁴⁵² Muhammad Khadziq Alami, “Mengapa di Indonesia Nuzulul Qur'an Diperingati 17 Ramadhan?” *NU Online* (<http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,2-id,46215-lang,id-t,Mengapa+di+Indonesia+Nuzulul+Qur'an+Diperingati+17+Ramadhan+-.phpx>, 30 July 2013), accessed on 15 Jan. 2015

⁴⁵³ In the Quran, Surah Al-‘Imrān 3:123, there is a reference made to the Battle of Badr which occurred in the second year of Prophet Muhammad's migration to Medina: “for, indeed, God did succour you at Badr, when you were utterly weak. Remain, then, conscious of God, so that you might have cause to be grateful.” The same battle is dealt with more extensively in Surah Al-Anfāl.

⁴⁵⁴ Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, “Taujih Am Amir Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid” *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/jamaah/139/taujih/#sthash.NBAqE9RX.dpbs>, 21 Sep. 2008), accessed on 15 Jan. 2015.

criticism from former associates.⁴⁵⁵ Unlike JI which was a secret organisation (*Tandhim sirri*) until its whole network was unravelled in the years after September 11, 2001, JAT was openly known as the new organisation that Ba'asyir and his supporters had established. To be referred to as a new organisation was of little consolation to JAT because JAT's primary objective of establishing the Islamic state or caliphate still overlapped with that of MMI and HTI. HTI, for instance, had its beginnings in 1982.⁴⁵⁶ So, the need to create a new organisation was questioned by Islamists such as Wildan Hasan from *Forum Kajian untuk Peradaban Dunia* (World Civilisation Research Forum) who had been following Ba'asyir's saga closely.⁴⁵⁷

Generating Interest in and Co-operation with JAT

JAT's formal declaration of its establishment was held at the Bekasi Pilgrims Hostel, in West Java which is located next to Bekasi Islamic Centre Building on 17 September 2008. The centre was frequently used to conduct the *Majelis Ilmu Arroyan*, a platform for sermons and lectures for both Ba'asyir and Abu Jibril when Ba'asyir was still in MMI. While the choice of location might not be a good start for JAT which claimed to be different from MMI, nevertheless, the decision could have been made for practical reasons. The event succeeded in attracting a large number of participants – about a

⁴⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid JAT" *ICG Asia Briefing N°107* (6 July 2010), 1 & 6.

⁴⁵⁶ Sheikh Taqi al-Din An-Nabhani established a political party with the aim of reviving the Islamic Caliphate in 1953, but the Indonesian chapter of Hizbut Tahrir began in 1982. For details, see: Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, "Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, No. 4 (2010): 601- 622.

⁴⁵⁷ The issue was raised during the scholarly discussion which was part of the programme during JAT's Declaration. See, "JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID DECLARATION" *ICPVTR Database*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

thousand.⁴⁵⁸ Two busloads of participants came from Solo with another four busloads from West Java. The other participants were from parts of East Indonesia, Banten, and Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi). There were no less than a hundred female participants, many of whom were dressed in black and wore veils. To avoid intermingling between the opposite sexes, which is considered as *Haram* (unlawful in the Islamic *Sharia*), the female participants were assigned a separate registration point and seats from the male participants.

From the participants' background, many were in one way or another associated with Ba'asyir. Other than MMI members who left MMI to follow Ba'asyir when he set up the new organisation, many had attended religious classes where Ba'asyir taught, preached and lectured. In a way, MMI's accusation that establishing the ABB Center was similar to creating a cult of personality around Ba'asyir was not totally unfounded. JAT, when it was established, fitted the description exactly. Apart from Ba'asyir's close associates, students and supporters, the declaration was also attended by invited participants who represented several Islamic organisations.

The ease with which anyone could register for the event was another important factor that could have attracted many participants. Those who were interested in attending JAT's declaration did not have to pay any fees. In comparison, participants to MMI IV Congress in 2013 had to pay 100,000 rupiahs for the cost of the Congress and an unspecified amount of *Infraq* or

⁴⁵⁸ Kompas gave an attendance figure estimated in the hundreds. See, "Ba'asyir Dirikan Ormas Baru" *KOMPAS.COM* (<http://sains.kompas.com/read/2008/09/17/13241387/baasyir.dirikan.ormas.baru>, 17 Sep. 2008), accessed on 11 Feb. 2015.

“spending in Allah’s way” as much as they could afford.⁴⁵⁹ Journalists covering JAT’s declaration only had to show their journalist identification cards while the rest of the participants, their KTP (Resident’s Identity Cards) were enough to secure entrance to the event. Compared to MMI, JAT appeared to be more open, but as a group ingrained in *Da’wah* (religious outreach) and *Jihad* being open or secretive was a matter of expediency.⁴⁶⁰ As such, the same JAT could be very open where *Da’wah* is concerned, but extremely secretive when conducting jihad.

Several well-known Muslim activists attended JAT’s declaration. They were Muhammad Alkhattat (Secretary General of Islamic Ummah Forum); Ahmad Mihdan (Muslim Lawyers Team) and Ahmad Basri Laili (Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Sharia in Indonesia – KPPSI). There are others such as Chep Hermawan (Islamic Reformist Movement – Garis); Abdurahman Padre (Jamaah Anshorullah); Fauzan Anshari, and some activists from the Islamic Youth Movement – GPI). While their attendance could not be directly interpreted as a formal support for JAT, at the very least, future co-operation could be established based on that initial contact.

Even when Ba’asyir left MMI, he made it clear that the differences he had with MMI’s senior leadership would not render their cooperation in continuing the struggle to uphold the Islamic *Sharia* impossible. There would always be an area where co-operation is possible, and this was spelt out by Ba’asyir in the

⁴⁵⁹ “PERSYARATAN & FORMULIR PENDATARAN PESERTA KONGRES MUJAHIDIN IV” *Majelis Mujahidin* (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/formulir-km4/>, 11 Feb. 2015), accessed on 11 Feb., 2015.

⁴⁶⁰ “Dakwah Dan Jihad Jalan Perjuangan Thaifah Manshurah” *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/156/dakwah-dan-jihad-jalan-perjuangan-thaifah-manshurah/#sthash.U6M4v1VH.dpbs>, 20 Jan. 2014), accessed on 12 Feb. 2015.

speech he gave during JAT's declaration.⁴⁶¹ Ba'asyir called Muslims whose organisations conformed to the "*Jama'ah wal Imamah*" system to work towards being united under one command. If that was not possible, then the minimum that they should strive for is to "*Ta'awun 'alal birri wat taqwa*"⁴⁶² (help one another in furthering virtue and God-consciousness). In other words, so long as their objective remains the same, differences in their choices of a platform to reach the objective become a secondary issue, and should not hinder co-operation among the various groups.

Branding the New Organisation

After its declaration, JAT continued to pursue the so-called moral high ground by claiming to be closer to the Prophetic Tradition in its leadership structure. JAT's claim of adopting the "*Jama'ah wal Imamah*" system was possibly an attempt to legitimise its establishment as a new platform for the Islamic struggle. The system was, according to JAT, the appropriate form of leadership in the Islamic *Sharia* in the absence of the *Khilafah Ar Rosyidah* (Rightly Guided Caliphate). It was a system where the *Amir* of JAT and its members would be given the duty and authority along the lines of the Islamic *Sharia*, but according to their capabilities.⁴⁶³ At the same time, the JAT's leadership system was also to delineate the difference between JAT and MMI because at the core of the split from MMI was the issue of an accepted leadership structure based on the Islamic *Sharia*.

⁴⁶¹ Ba'asyir, "Taujih Am," 2015.

⁴⁶² The phrase is taken from the Al-Qurān, Al-Ma'idah 5: 2.

⁴⁶³ Tim MuslimDaily, "Gegap Gempita Jelang Deklarasi Jama'ah Anshorut Tauhid" *MuslimDaily.Net* (<http://www.muslimdaily.net/berita/nasional/gegap-gempita-jelang-deklarasi-jamaah-anshorut-tauhid.html>, 10 Sep. 2008), accessed on 05 Feb. 2015.

Next, was to build JAT into a “*Jama‘ah yang berprestasi*” (accomplished group) whose leadership mechanism conforms to Islam. To abide by the perimeters it has set, JAT portrayed itself as a *Jama‘ah* or group that is led by an *Amir* and argued that being affiliated with a group with such characteristics is an Islamic obligation. Being led by an *Amir* as the head of the group also served as a means to habituate members to the actual Islamic leadership in the form of an Islamic State or Caliphate. In this regard, being in a *Jama‘ah* which is led by an *Amir* should not be viewed as just another routine with which an individual Muslim is differentiated from other Muslims in general who are not affiliated to any *Jama‘ah*. Affiliation to a *Jama‘ah* should not be done by merely imitating others who are affiliated to a *Jama‘ah*. Instead, affiliation should be to a *Jama‘ah* with a clear vision and mission. It is not enough for a *Jama‘ah* to have a functioning management. The *Jama‘ah* should also have a clear concept of the struggle as well as the necessary programmes without which it would be impossible to be a “*Jama‘ah yang berprestasi*” (accomplished group).⁴⁶⁴

To achieve the status of “*Jama‘ah yang berprestasi*” (accomplished group), JAT came out with three benchmarks. The first was to make itself known to the general Muslim community by introducing to them JAT’s “*Aqeedah*” (beliefs) and “*Manhaj*” (methodology of its struggle); the concept of its struggle and defence of the people as well as the ideas and the notions that JAT believes in. These would ensure that the general Muslim community understood the foundations of JAT’s struggle. In so doing, JAT was trying to avoid ending up as an unknown *Jama‘ah* that found it difficult to garner real

⁴⁶⁴ Ust. Abu Hadid, “MEMBANGUN JAMAAH YANG BERPRESTASI” *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/130/membangun-jamaah-yang-berprestasi/#sthash.b9cnzm8n.dpbs>, 23 July 2009), accessed on 03 Feb. 2015.

support from the people for its struggle, even after having engaged the masses actively for decades.

The second benchmark was to have an assessment made on JAT's achievements. The assessments in JAT's view were vital because they served as a gauge to establish JAT's accomplishments in concrete terms, and preventing JAT from being lulled into believing that it had achieved something. The most prominent challenge to implementing this was determining who is qualified to make the assessment. JAT proposed that the evaluation should be based on the measures that Allah and the Muslim community had set.

JAT's tasks and programmes should accordingly be carried out in conformity with the conditions that Allah and His Messenger had specified without exception. For JAT, it meant conforming to these conditions with sincerity and ensuring that fulfilling these conditions were done in accordance with the *Sunnah* (normative practice or an established course of conduct) of the Prophet Muhammad. JAT also took the view that the Muslim community should strictly be the one assessing JAT by the seriousness, hard work and sacrifices that JAT's members had made. The assessment should not be carried out by JAT or the ruling authorities.

The third benchmark was to have clear indicators for assessing whether JAT qualified as "*Jama'ah yang berprestasi*" (an accomplished group). JAT chose four indicators⁴⁶⁵:

1. The principles that JAT has developed must be in sync with "*Al-Haq*" (the Truth).
2. JAT members or the Muslims in general, when asked about the principles of JAT's struggle, should be able to identify themselves with these principles, and accept them on the basis of knowledge.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

3. JAT is managed well at all levels, and should not be overly concerned with having a management which in reality, existed only in name. On the contrary, there should be standards for measuring the manner in which the management keeps the *Jama'ah* in check and under control.

4. JAT should undoubtedly be on the side of the *Ummah*, and the *Ummah* should be able to feel that JAT is on their side be it socially, morally, legally, and so on. Indeed, it should be based on the measures which Allah has set, and not taking their side blindly.

These indicators in JAT's view should not be tied to the number of assets or members that JAT has, but instead they should be tied to JAT's ability to motivate the *Ummah* to make a return to Islam in its totality, by putting the Islamic *Sharia* above everything else.

JAT in its subsequent developments after its declaration in 2008 wanted others also to know that it was serious about transforming itself into an accomplished group. JAT believed that only by doing so, being in a *Jama'ah* would be meaningful. Accomplishing this would spur JAT's rank and file to work harder as a *Jama'ah*, and prevent "*Jama'ah yang berprestasi*" (an accomplished group) from becoming a meaningless slogan without any ability to shape JAT.

To enforce discipline among JAT's members, the *Peraturan Jama'ah* (Regulation for the Group) specifically addressed the issue of termination of membership. The document was produced by JAT's *Imaroh Markaziyah* (Central Leadership) and approved by JAT's *Amir Biniyabah* (Acting Amir), Muhammad Achwan on 27 November 2010. Section 3 of the regulation is on "*Maksud Peraturan*" (Purpose of the Regulation)⁴⁶⁶ which states:

1. To prevent and shut the emergence or possibility of an act of indiscipline which is excessive and in contradiction to the general wisdom/policy of the *Jama'ah* among some members.

⁴⁶⁶ Imaroh Markaziyah, "PERATURAN JAMA'AH NO. CO1 THN. 1431 TENTANG PEMBERHENTIAN KEANGGOTAAN" *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (Sukoharjo, 2010). A copy of it was obtained by the author during his field trip to Yogyakarta, Indonesia, from 7-11 July 2014.

2. To meet the need for the *Jama'ah* to be firm in keeping to the official guideline of the *Jama'ah*'s struggle when implementing its strategies as an institution that subscribes to the *Jahriyatud Da'wah wa Jahriyatut Tandhim* (public religious outreach and organisation).

In May 2011, further efforts to streamline JAT were made. JAT's *Majelis Syuro* (Consultative Council) produced "*Khiththoh JAT*" which contains JAT's conceptual framework for planning JAT's activities to achieve its objectives.⁴⁶⁷ The *Khiththoh* was written in the midst of what JAT analysed to be "*tribulasi lokal maupun internasional yang sedang kita alami sekarang dan munculnya pelbagai permasalahan internal*" (local as well as international tribulations that we are facing now, and the emergence of various internal problems). The *Khiththoh* was to serve as a master plan for JAT's existence as a manifestation of its belief that "*Diinul Islam*" (the Islamic way of life) teaches how the Muslim community could attain Allah's love. This could be achieved by performing sincere deeds that are well organised and firm until power could be established. Using the *Khiththoh* as a unifying knot, JAT hopes to tie all its activities together, and thereby, removing the weak condition caused by "*Ananiyah*" (selfishness) and "*Ashobiyah*" (pre-Islamic social solidarity).⁴⁶⁸

Organising the Jama'ah (group)

In organising the *Jama'ah*, JAT resembled JI more than MMI. Although an Amir led each of the three groups, the designation of *Amir* in JAT is a permanent appointment, thus making JAT *Amir*'s term of office closer to JI and

⁴⁶⁷ Majelis Syuro JAT, "*Khiththoh JAT*" (Jawa Tengah: Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, 2011), 6. The copy was made available to the author by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR). For an online copy of it, see, "*Khiththoh JAT*" *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/jamaah/180/khiththoh-jat/#sthash.osYyynOk.dpbs>, 31 June 2011), accessed on 17 Feb. 2015.

⁴⁶⁸ "*Khiththoh JAT*", 6.

further away from MMI. Although the *Amir* in JAT is said to be elected by the *Ulama* (Islamic religious scholars), Islamic intellectuals and public figures, these groups of people, however, do not represent the entire Indonesian Muslim population. Most probably, they were confined to those who attended JAT's official declaration. In JAT, removal of the *Amir* from his position is only possible if the *Amir* violated the Islamic *Sharia*. JAT also considered periodic election of the *Amir* through organisational congresses as practised by many mass organisations as "*Sunnah Yahudi*" (the practice of the Jews).⁴⁶⁹

In fulfilling the mandate given to him by the *Jama'ah* (group), the *Amir* consults the *Majelis Syura* (Consultative Council). The *Syura* is made up of members who are referred to as "*Dzu 'Ilmin*" (those endowed with knowledge), "*Dzu Malin*" (those endowed with wealth) and "*Dzu Syaukatin*" (those endowed with power).⁴⁷⁰ The council serves as a platform for the *Amir* to solicit inputs from them and deliberates issues that are important to JAT. It is a practice which could be traced back to two verses of the Quran:

"...And take counsel with them in all matters of public concern; then, when thou hast decided upon a course of action, place thy trust in God: for, verily, God loves those who place their trust in Him."⁴⁷¹

"And who respond to [the call of] their Sustainer and are constant in prayer; and whose rule [in all matters of common concern] is consultation among themselves; and who spend on others out of what We provide for them as sustenance."⁴⁷²

However, after consultation with the Council, the *Amir* is not required to accept the decision of the council. Instead, he is free to choose and decide what he believed to be the correct decision. As long as the decision he made is not in direct contradiction to any definitive sacred texts of the Quran and the *Hadith*,

⁴⁶⁹ Ba'asyir, "Taujih Am". Ba'asyir delivered the speech during JAT's inauguration in Bekasi on 17 September 2008.

⁴⁷⁰ "JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID DECLARATION" *ICPVTR Database* (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2008), 9.

⁴⁷¹ Al-Qurān, Ali-'Imrān 3:159.

⁴⁷² Al-Qurān, Al-Shūrā 42:38.

that decision has to be accepted and obeyed. For JAT, this is based on the interpretation of the following Quranic verse:

“O you who have attained to faith! Pay heed unto God, and pay heed unto the Apostle and unto those from among you who have been entrusted with authority; and if you are at variance over any matter, refer it unto God and the Apostle, if you [truly] believe in God and the Last Day. This is the best [for you], and best in the end.”⁴⁷³

In this regard, JAT as an organisation places a huge trust on the *Amir* but with minimal checks and balances. Even though in their daily interactions, the *Amir* and members of JAT are expected to remind and advise each other constantly. Still, the *Amir* enjoys exclusive powers.⁴⁷⁴ In order not to be seen as making a cult out of the *Amir*, the issue of showing respect to the *Amir* was discussed in the first edition of *Majalah Ansharut Tauhid* (Ansharut Tauhid Magazine).⁴⁷⁵

In the article, showing respect to the *Amir* is an attitude that should lie in the middle, between belittling him and over-respecting him. However, the article cautioned against taking lightly the obligation of obeying the *Amir* as that implied lowering the position of the *Amir*, an attitude that the *Sunnah* of the Prophet prohibits and chastises. Over-respecting the *Amir* by keeping silence on his evildoings is also forbidden in Islam according to the article. What is even worse than that is to justify his evildoings and recasting them in a good light. Similarly, the act of over-praising him and ascribing him with attributes which he is not worthy of is also forbidden because respecting the *Amir* is not the aim, but maintaining the unity of the *Jama'ah* (group) is.

⁴⁷³ Al-Qurān, Al-Nisā' 4:59.

⁴⁷⁴ Ba'asyir, “Taujih Am”.

⁴⁷⁵ See, “Menghormati Amir, Sebuah Perintah Syariat” *Majalah Ansharut Tauhid* (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/514/menghormati-amir-perintah-syariat/#sthash.nlyqz2b7.dpbs>, 16 Oct. 2014), accessed on 05 Feb. 2015.

The apex of the JAT Organisational Structure consisted of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as Amir, Muhammad Achwan as Acting Amir and the Majelis Syuro (Consultative Council). The following chart illustrates the JAT Organisational Structure. (See Fig. 6.1)

FIGURE 6.1
JAT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

SOURCE: "JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID DECLARATION"
ICPVTR Database, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
& International Crisis Group, "The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)"
ICG Asia Briefing N°107 (6 July 2010), 5.

Other than the *Majelis Syura* (Consultative Council) which comprises Ba'asyir's close advisers, and loyalists, there are two offices known as the *Tanfidziyah* (Executive Office) and the *Tafwidhiyah* (Empowerment Office). Under the *Tanfidziyah*, there are six departments. The departments are *Baitul Mal* (Finance); *Hisbah* (Morality Enforcement); *Da'wah wal I'lam* (Religious Propagation/Outreach and Media/Publication) or sometimes referred to by its acronym, *Dawlam*;⁴⁷⁶ *Tarbiyah* (Education); *Katib* (Secretariat) and *Askariyah* (Military). Unlike the *Tanfidziyah*, the *Tafwidhiyah* (Empowerment Office)

⁴⁷⁶ Such as the one set up in East Java called *Forum Muballigh Anshorut Tauhid* (FORMAT).

oversees JAT's branches, each with their district *Amirs* who have been given authority by JAT's *Amir* to manage their own Provincial Leadership in the struggle for "*Tatbiqusy Sharia*" (the application of *Sharia*).

In strengthening JAT and providing the momentum for it to move forward, individuals who were known to be Ba'asyir stalwarts and supporters held key appointments after JAT was declared in 2008. For example, Muhammad Achwan who became the Acting Amir was an ex-MMI member who left MMI together with Ba'asyir to form JAT.⁴⁷⁷ In the *Majelis Syura* (Consultative Council), there were Afif Abdul Majid, Muzayyin alias Mustaqim and Abu Tholut whose association with Ba'asyir goes back a long way to their involvement in JI. Afif Abdul Majid also ran JAT's day-to-day operations whereas both Muzayyin alias Mustaqim and Abu Tholut are Afghan veterans who were put in charge of JAT's Military Department. Further analysis of JAT's appointment holders in 2008 based on their previous involvement before joining JAT, reveals that they could be broadly categorised into five: DI, JI, MMI, Afghan veterans and Pesantren Ngruki.

Expanding Membership But Not Without Risk

While JAT wanted to insist on quality and not quantity, in reality, it is hard to abide by such ideal. JAT's rapid development across Indonesia was in part due to Ba'asyir's frequent travels to carry out *Da'wah* (religious outreach)

⁴⁷⁷ Achwan was appointed as a temporary replacement for Ba'asyir to lead JAT in August 2010 when Ba'asyir was arrested by the police for involvement in planning acts of terrorism. See, "Politisi: Jelaskan Secara Gamblang Mengapa Baasyir Ditangkap" *Republika Online* (<http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/nasional/10/08/10/129175-politisi-jelaskan-secara-gamblang-mengapa-baasyir-ditangkap>, 10 Aug. 2010), accessed on 11 Feb. 2015 & Ismoko Widjaya and Eko Huda S, "Amanat Ba'asyir, 'Bomber' Borobudur Amir JAT" *viva.co.id* (<http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/171513-amanat-ba-asyir>, 17 Aug. 2010), accessed on 11 Feb. 2015.

where he gave lectures, delivered sermons and made speeches wherever and whenever he was invited. It resulted in many people joining JAT. Within two years, JAT had already established branches in five provinces, namely Banten, West Java, Central Java, Jakarta, and East Java. When the Secretary-General of JAT, Ustadz Abdurrahman was queried in August 2010 on the number of its members, he gave the figure as between 1500 – 2000 members.⁴⁷⁸ The quality of the people joining JAT, however, could not be assured because there was no rigorous selection process in place. The case was different with JI which instituted varying levels of educational programmes for potential new members which comprised of *Tabligh* (conveyance), *Taklim* (teaching), *Tamrin* (training) and *Tamhish* (testing) to ensure quality.⁴⁷⁹ In JAT, anyone who wanted to join could join, and some JAT members had expressed their concern over this development.⁴⁸⁰

While the concern seemed valid, it should be noted that JAT also succeeded in drawing people from other Islamist groups to join them. Other than MMI, there were JI members who chose to leave JI to join JAT without any hesitation when JAT was established. Another group of JI members took their time and did not want to rush things. They preferred to establish first the general sentiment towards JAT, and then decide whether or not to join JAT. The third group was those who insisted on following Sungkar to the letter in their struggle to establish Islam, and was led by Abu Rushdan and Zuhroni alias Zarkasih or “Mbah.” To them, *Bai’ah* or pledge of allegiance cannot be given

⁴⁷⁸ Nurvita Indarini, “Sekjen Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid: Kami Masih Bayi Tapi Dipukuli” *detiknews* (<http://news.detik.com/read/2010/09/22/111033/1445470/158/sekjen-jamaah-ansharut-tauhid-kami-masih-bayi-tapi-dipukuli>, 22 Aug. 2010), accessed on 12 Feb. 2015.

⁴⁷⁹ Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah*, 99.

⁴⁸⁰ ICG, *The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, 5.

to two leaders or two organisations. Furthermore, they viewed JAT as an open mass organisation whereas JI operated as *Tanzim Sirri* (secret or clandestine organisation). As JAT continued to grow, JI leadership made it official that JI members wanting to join JAT must leave JI. There were no exceptions. The decision, however, did not deter JI members who were ex-prisoners from joining JAT. After their release from prison, they were often suspected of being police informants for having testified in court (which was regarded as revealing JI's secrets). Furthermore, they were informed by the authorities that they would continue to be monitored after their release. In JI's view, they were tainted and should be isolated.⁴⁸¹ JAT, on the other hand, kept an open door policy and did not discriminate against them. Joining JAT helped them clear their tainted commitment to jihad, but their memberships posed a high risk for JAT.

JAT open door policy was also to blame for the problems it developed with DI. One noteworthy incident was JAT's bad relationship with DI *Komandemen Wilayah 9* (Territorial Command 9, KW9) which covers the Jakarta and Banten areas. These areas were under the control of Mahfud Siddiq who is a protégé of Kartosoewirjo's son, Tahmid Rahmat Basuki. To help pay for Tahmid's medical treatment, Mahfud had instructed DI members to raise fund through *Infaq* ("spending in Allah's way") sometime between 2008 and 2009. Thousands of DI members successfully collected a sum of more than 1 billion Indonesian rupiahs. However, the money was not given to Tahmid, and this was confirmed by Tahmid when he was asked by some DI leaders who became suspicious of the sudden changes for the better in Mahfud's and his

⁴⁸¹ Ismail, Noor Huda and Ungerer, Carl, "Jemaah Islamiyah: A Renewed Struggle?," *ASPI*, 16 July 2009, 2.

family lifestyles. To get to the bottom of Mahfud's mismanagement of the fund, these DI leaders confronted Mahfud only to realise that they have been removed from their official positions in DI. JAT knew what had transpired between them but went ahead and recruited these disgruntled DI leaders to raise funds for JAT. As a result, by 2009, half of KW9's leaders officially became JAT members. The incident left Mahfud with a deep resentment toward JAT for acting without conscience by exploiting DI's vulnerabilities.⁴⁸²

Another incident concerned two prominent individuals, Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman⁴⁸³ and Halawi Makmun⁴⁸⁴ from the pure *Salafis* camp who decided to join JAT. The pure *Salafis* camp was known to be ardent critics of groups such as JI, MMI, and JAT. They disagreed with these groups and considered oath-taking by these groups as *Bid'ah*, a term often used by the pure *Salafis* to refer to unwarranted religious innovations. Even jihad activities which became the defining feature of JI, MMI and JAT were treated as too political and a departure from a pure *Salafi* perspective of Islam. So, Aman and Halawi becoming JAT members was an extraordinary accomplishment for JAT.

Aman Abdurrahman through his association with *Jama'ah Tauhid Wal Jihad* (The Monotheist and *Jihad* Group) brought many new members into JAT. Aman's *Pesantren* in Depok, near Jakarta as well as his supporters in East

⁴⁸² ICG, 'The Dark Side of JAT', 8.

⁴⁸³ He was born in Cimalaka, Sumedang on 5 January 1972, and graduated from the Sharia Faculty of *Lembaga Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (LIPIA, Institute of Islamic and Arab Studies), Jakarta which is a branch of the Al-Imam Muhammad Ibnu Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He is a prolific writer and has translated many Arabic books into Bahasa Indonesia. The translations have been disseminated in many online *Jihad* forums and uploaded to the Millah Ibrahim website. Aman has been imprisoned since 2010 for his involvement in armed military training in Aceh. For more details, see, Abu Qutaibah, "Biografi Ust. Abu Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman –fakkallahu asrah–" *Millah Ibrahim* (<https://millahibrahim.wordpress.com/biografi-ust-abu-sulaiman-aman-abdurrahman-fakkallahu-asrah/>, Jan. 2013), accessed on 25 Feb. 2015.

⁴⁸⁴ Halawi was the head of MMI's Islamic law (*Sharia*) department and director of a small *salafi pesantren* in Cilengi, Bogor. He graduated with a Masters' degree in Sharia and Dakwah from Al-Imam Muhammad Ibnu Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Halawi passed away on 20 November 2014 in Cilengi, Bogor.

Kalimantan and Nusa Tenggara Barat (Eastern Lombok and Western Sumbawa), became JAT's fertile recruiting ground. Aman as a well-known translator of *Salafi-Jihadi* literature from Arabic to Bahasa Indonesia was a household name among Indonesian radicals, and that to some extent helped raise JAT's profile.

Similarly, Halawi's membership with JAT provided JAT with another potential recruiting ground. Other than being a close friend of Aman, Halawi became inclined towards the *Takfiri* approach due to Aman's influence since his MMI days.⁴⁸⁵ Other than that, Halawi was a well-known preacher of *Tauhid* and implementation of *Sharia* in Indonesia with his followers. These two aspects of Halawi's preaching no doubt fitted well with JAT's objectives.

However, Aman and Halawi have a very low tolerance for things they perceived as going against the *Salafi* interpretation of Islam. Aman was considered by JAT to be "too *Takfiri*",⁴⁸⁶ and Aman himself found JAT's way of doing things wanting, so he decided to leave just a few months after joining JAT. Halawi too was uncompromising on the issue of *Tauhid* (oneness of God). In fact, the issue drove a wedge between Halawi and JAT when Halawi was reported to have been disappointed with JAT's and Ba'asyir's inconsistency in upholding the standard of *Tauhid*. Halawi perceived the demonstration by JAT on 10 June 2010 calling for the dissolution of Detachment 88 and the restoration of Ba'asyir's good name by the government as a breach of *Tauhid*. Halawi through a text message accused JAT and Ba'asyir of closer to becoming

⁴⁸⁵ Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, January 2009 cited in ICG, 'The Dark Side of JAT', 3.

⁴⁸⁶ Crisis Group personal communication from Solo, April 2009 cited in ICG, 'The Dark Side of JAT', 4.

Murji'ah.⁴⁸⁷ He could not reconcile between JAT as an organisation that struggled to uphold the *Tauhid* and JAT's request for a *Kafir* state to restore Ba'asyir's honour. Another strongly contested issue was JAT asking government officials whom Halawi considered as *Thaghut* to dissolve Detachment 88. The principle of *Al-Walaa' wal Baraa'* (loyalty and enmity) in these two instances, Halawi argued, was not observed. Since the very act undermined commitment to *Tauhid* and negated the belief in the oneness of God, those involved were in danger of committing apostasy.⁴⁸⁸

Halawi, however, denied committing any *Takfir Mu'ayyan* (the act of declaring a specific individual as an infidel) but insisted, "...*ana kan tidak pernah menunjuk hidung Ustadz Abu itu kafir. Tapi kan umum, ana tidak menyebut fulan-fulannya...Cuma, kita ini berbicara secara ilmiah secara syariat, kemudian orang menyimpulkan kalau begitu ia kafir, padahal tidak*" (...I never specifically accused Ustadz Abu (Ba'asyir) as an infidel. However, I said in general; I did not mention so and so...We just spoke based on knowledge, according to the *Sharia*, then people concluded if that was the case he is considered an infidel when he is not).⁴⁸⁹

Halawi left JAT after the incident but still managed to snatch away from JAT all of the JAT-Brebes which happen to be Halawi's hometown in central Java. As both Aman and Halawi were influential *Salafis*, their fallout with JAT could thwart JAT from making a further inroad into the pure *Salafi* camp. As

⁴⁸⁷ Also known as *Murjites* or *Murji'ites* in English refers to an early Islamic sect that advocated the idea of deferred judgement of peoples' belief.

⁴⁸⁸ Halawi Makmun's Student. Anonymous, interviewer. Bandung, Indonesia, (10 Jan. 2010), *ICPVTR Database*.

⁴⁸⁹ "Awat!! Provokator Catut Halawi Makmun untuk Takfirkan Ustadz Ba'asyir," *Voice of Al Islam* (<http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2012/03/26/18361/awat-provokator-catut-halawi-makmun-untuk-takfirkan-ustadz-baasyir/#sthash.ACujGCKn.dpbs>, 26 Mar. 2012), accessed on 25 Feb. 2015.

pioneers from the pure *Salafi* camp who crossed over to JAT, their departure from JAT could be perceived as JAT's incompatibility with pure *Salafi* doctrine.

Military Training in Aceh⁴⁹⁰

Almost two years after its declaration on 17 September 2008, a more significant problem emerged. The investigation into the discovery of a military training camp in Aceh in late February 2010 led to the raid on JAT's Jakarta headquarters by the Indonesian police on 6 May 2010. Subsequently, three of JAT's officials were charged with raising funds for the military training camp. Ba'asyir was also found to be involved with two men who served as instructors for the camp.⁴⁹¹ Abdul Haris alias Haris Amir Palah, JAT's Provincial Amir for Jakarta who was arrested on 13 May 2010 for his involvement in funding the training camp in Aceh, made several revelations about the camp.

Haris admitted that Ba'asyir had requested JAT's Provincial Amirs to appeal to JAT members who had additional funds to "*Berinfak Fisabilillah*" (spending in Allah's way), the term Ba'asyir used when making the request in January 2010. Haris only realised what the money was for when Ubeid⁴⁹² played a video of the training in Aceh while presenting a report to Ba'asyir at

⁴⁹⁰ See, "Ba'asyir and Aceh Camp Case Timeline," *The Jakarta Post* (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/06/17/ba'asyir-and-aceh-camp-case-timeline.html>, 17 June 2011), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015.

⁴⁹¹ ICG, 'The Dark Side of JAT', p. 1. See also the press statement by JAT in Hanin Mazaya, "Ustadz Abu Bakar: Ini Penculikan, Mereka Bukan DPO!" *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/05/08/7780-ustadz-abu-bakar-ini-penculikan-mereka-bukan-dpo.html>, 08 May 2010), accessed on 11 Mar. 2015.

⁴⁹² The alias was used by Lutfi Haedaroh who was an associate of Noordin M. Top, the mastermind of major bombings in Jakarta in 2003, 2004 and subsequently in 2009 as well as in Bali in 2005. Ba'asyir met and became close to Ubeid when both of them served time in Cipinang prison. As a young man, Ubeid looked up to Ba'asyir and accepted him as his mentor. He graduated from Ngruki Islamic boarding school in Surakarta, Central Java, and was the treasurer of JAT.

the *Pejaten* (JAT Secretariat) headquarters. As the whole thing was done in secrecy, even the donors were kept in the dark and were not aware of the training in Aceh.⁴⁹³

The police arrested Ba'asyir on 9 August 2010, but his arrest caused quite a stir among many people outside JAT. *Forum Umat Islam* (FUI, The Islamic Ummah Forum) for example, asked the national police for Ba'asyir's unconditional release immediately and denounced Ba'asyir's arrest while on a *Da'wah* safari in Bandung.⁴⁹⁴ The list of people who condemned the arrest included Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab (*Ketua Umum DPP FPI*, The Chairman of the Central Leadership Board of the Islamic Defender Front); Munarman SH (*Pimpinan Komando Laskar Umat Islam*, Leader of the Muslim Army Command) and Dr. Jose Rizal Jurnalís (*Ketua Presidium Mer-C*, Chairman of the Presidium of the Medical Emergency Rescue Committee).⁴⁹⁵

However, there was a different reaction from KH Said Aqil Siradj, *Ketua Umum Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama* (PBNU, Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama) who expressed his support for the government's effort in ensuring public order, security and peace in response to questions from reporters on Ba'asyir's arrest.⁴⁹⁶ To avoid giving rise to differing perceptions on the arrest, Said insisted that the police should carry out immediate investigations into the

⁴⁹³ For Haris' exclusive interview with *Kompas*, see: Sarie Febriane "Penangkapan Ba'asyir Berawal dari Imbauan Pengumpulan Infak" *KOMPAS.COM* (<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/08/12/09344248/Berawal.dari.Imbauan.Pengumpulan.Infak>, 12 Aug. 2010), accessed on 11 Mar. 2015.

⁴⁹⁴ Abdul Qodir, "FUI Minta Polri Bebaskan Ba'asyir Tanpa Syarat" *TRIBUNNEWS.COM* (<http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2010/08/10/fui-minta-polri-bebaskan-baasyir-tanpa-syarat>, 10 Aug. 2010), accessed on 11 Mar. 2015.

⁴⁹⁵ Tim Muslim Daily, "FPI Kecam Penangkapan Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," *Muslimdaily.Net* (<http://www.muslimdaily.net/berita/nasional/fpi-kecam-penangkapan-ustadz-abu-bakar-baasyir.html>, 09 Aug. 2010), accessed on 11 Mar. 2015.

⁴⁹⁶ "Terkait Penangkapan Ba'asyir, PBNU Dukung Pemerintah Tegakkan Keamanan," *NU Online* (<http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,1-id,24166-lang,id-c,warta-t,Terkait+Penangkapan+Ba++8217+asyir++PBNU+Dukung+Pemerintah+Tegakkan+Keamanan-phpx>, 09 Aug. 2010), accessed on 11 Mar. 2015.

case. In his statement to *Rakyat Merdeka*, one of Indonesia's national newspapers, he said: "*Kalau ada indikasi keterlibatannya dalam jaringan teroris, ungkapkan bukti-buktinya. Tapi kalau tidak ada indikasinya, ya dilepaskan dong. Makanya asas praduga tak bersalah tetap selalu dikedepankan*" (If there is any indication of his involvement in terrorist networks then state the evidence. However, if there is no indication of that then release him. Hence, the presumption of innocence must always take priority).⁴⁹⁷

As for the Indonesian police, among the reasons for arresting Ba'asyir was his role in the Aceh military camp. According to the spokesman for Mabes Polri (Central Headquarters of the Indonesian National Police); Inspector General Edward Aritonang, Ba'asyir had played a major role in terrorism activities in Aceh -- "*Dia yang menunjuk ustad Mustakim sebagai qodi'i [sic] atau pemimpin di Aceh, menunjuk Mustofa alias Abu Tholut sebagai pengelola latihan, dan menunjuk Dulmatin sebagai penanggung jawab latihan.*"⁴⁹⁸ (He is the one who had appointed ustad Mustakim as the commander or leader in Aceh, Mustofa alias Abu Tholut as the organiser of the training, and *Dulmatin* as the person responsible for the training).

Based on the testimonies of Ba'asyir's "loyal aides and followers" who testified against him in court, Ba'asyir received a 15-year sentence from the South Jakarta District Court for his part in "planning, helping and financing a terrorist training camp in the mountainous area of Jantho, Aceh" on 16 June

⁴⁹⁷ "KH Said Aqil Siradj: Saya Kira Penangkapan Baasyir Bukan Rekayasa," *RMOL.CO* (<http://www.rmol.co/read/2010/08/12/962/KH-Said-Aqil-Siradj:-Saya-Kira-Penangkapan-Baasyir-Bukan-Rekayasa->, 12 Aug. 2010), accessed on 11 Mar. 2015.

⁴⁹⁸ Eko Ari Wibowo, Cornila Desyana, Sigit Zulmunir, Ahmad Rafiq and Supto, "Ba'asyir Dituding Terlibat Terorisme di Aceh," *Koran Tempo* (Tuesday, 10 August 2010, Edition No. 3267, Year X), A2.

2011.⁴⁹⁹ Ba'asyir then appealed to the High Court and was granted a six-year reduction from the initial fifteen-year sentence. He then appealed to the Supreme Court to be acquitted of all charges, but the appeal was rejected. Also, the Supreme Court annulled the Jakarta High Court reduction in October 2011 of Ba'asyir's prison sentence to nine years and reinstated the South Jakarta District Court's original 15-year sentence.⁵⁰⁰

Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)

On 23 February 2012, JAT was officially designated by the U.S. Department of State as a terrorist organisation. The designation was prompted by the numerous attacks against civilians and Indonesian officials conducted by individuals associated with JAT. The victims included several Indonesian police officers. The U.S. Department of State also noted that JAT to “fund the purchase of assault weapons, pistols, and bomb-making materials” had resorted to bank robberies and illegal activities. On its official website, the department specifically mentioned two attacks. One, the attack on a mosque in West Java in April 2011 by a suicide bomber who died in the attack, but succeeded in injuring dozens of police officers. The other is the attack on 25 September 2011 by “a JAT suicide bomber” who “detonated explosives inside a church in Central Java, killing the bomber and wounding dozens.” In connection with the

⁴⁹⁹ Rendi A. Witular and Hasyim Widhiarto, “Aides, Protégés Help Ba'asyir's Conviction,” *The Jakarta Post* (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/06/17/aides-protégés-help-ba'asyir's-conviction.html>, 17 June 2011), accessed on 12 Mar. 2015.

⁵⁰⁰ See, “Ba'asyir Seeks Acquittal in Appeal Request,” *The Jakarta Post* (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/09/ba-asyir-seeks-acquittal-appeal-request.html>, 09 Nov. 2011), accessed on 13 Mar., 2015, and “Court Rejects Ba'asyir's Appeal,” *The Jakarta Post* (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/27/court-rejects-ba-asyir-s-appeal.html>, 27 Feb. 2012), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015.

bombing, the Indonesian police arrested other JAT members and more suicide attack plots were exposed.⁵⁰¹

JAT's spokesman, Ustadz Son Hadi responded by issuing a press release on 27 February 2012, denying all the allegations made by the U.S. Department of State. In the press release, JAT accused the department of libel because the allegations made were not based on the facts of law, and therefore, had no credibility. It was, according to JAT, a conspiracy as well as an intervention in the terrorism case against Ba'asyir. The statement was interpreted by JAT to be an attempt by the American government to stigmatise and show its hostility towards individuals and movements, struggling to implement the Islamic *Sharia* wherever they may be. It increasingly affirmed that the "War on Terrorism" was in essence, a war on Islam. Muslims should, therefore, unite to establish a new world order without U.S. hegemony by establishing the caliphate according to the Prophet's methodology.⁵⁰²

Joining ISIS and Splitting JAT

When Ahmad Fatih, the new JAT spokesman⁵⁰³ visited Ba'asyir in the Pasir Putih Penitentiary on Nusakambangan Island, Central Java, on 3 June 2014, Ba'asyir took the opportunity to clarify certain things to help overcome

⁵⁰¹ "Terrorist Designations of Jemmah [*sic*] Anshorut Tauhid," U.S. Department of State (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184509.htm>, 23 Feb. 2012), accessed on 12 Mar. 2015.

⁵⁰² The press release could not be found on JAT's official website at: <http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/#sthash.nITpDcgx.dpbs>, but was published in full in the article: Ukasyah, "Pers Release Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid Terkait Tudingan Sampah AS," *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/read/2012/02/27/18400-pers-release-jamaah-ansharut-tauhid-terkait-tudingan-sampah-as.html>, 27 Feb. 2012), accessed on 12 Mar. 2015.

⁵⁰³ He replaced Ustadz Son Hadi who passed away on 31 January 2014.

the internal discord within JAT.⁵⁰⁴ The discord in early 2014 was the result of reported splits among jihadi groups in Syria which saw the emergence of two factions within JAT. JAT leaders such as Afif Abdul Madjid and Abu Fida supported ISIS while other JAT leaders, among them Fuad al-Hazimi, and Ba'asyir's son, Abdurrahim, supported al-Nusra. The situation deteriorated further when Afif Abdul Madjid who had gone to Syria for a month, from mid-December 2013 to mid-January 2014 pledged allegiance to ISIS leader al-Baghdadi on 3 January 2014 after participating in a military training course.⁵⁰⁵

During the visit, Ba'asyir told the manager of JAT central headquarters, *Ikhwan-Ikhwan* (the brothers) in Pasir Putih and a reporter from *al mustaqbal.net* that he was carefully examining whether ISIS qualified to be called a state according to the *Sharia*. Ba'asyir, not wanting to be seen as being partisan, indicated his support for both ISIS and the Nusra Front (JN, *Jabhat al-Nusra*), and was working towards reconciling the two.⁵⁰⁶ On the issue of *Takfir*, Ba'asyir did the balancing act by saying that those who did not pledge allegiance to ISIS were not *Kafir* (infidels) as long as they still have the *Walā'* (loyalty) to ISIS and *Barā'* (enmity) towards the *Kafir* state. Ba'asyir explained that the issue of "*Kafir Mu'ayyan/Kafir Ta'yin*" (the act of declaring a specific individual as an infidel) did not arise as no names were mentioned, and the

⁵⁰⁴ "Beredar SMS Fitnah Terhadap JAT. Jubir: "Semua Berita Itu Bohong!," *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/451/beredar-sms-fitnah-terhadap-jat-jubir-semua-berita-itu-bohong/#sthash.MaDwfFuA.dpuf>, 19 May 2014), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015.

⁵⁰⁵ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "Support for "Islamic State" in Indonesian Prisons," *IPAC Report No.15* (2015): 7.

⁵⁰⁶ Ba'asir had expressed the same desire to remain neutral earlier on. For details, see: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "Seruan Ust. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Kepada Mujahidin Di Bumi Syam," *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/403/seruan-ust-abu-bakar-baasyir-kepada-mujahidin-di-bumi-syam/#sthash.iPKLSFs8.xUrGj8Od.dpuf>, 10 Mar. 2014), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015 and "Sepucuk Surat Dari Bumi Syam Untuk Ustad Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/548/sepucuk-surat-dari-bumi-syam-untuk-ustad-abu-bakar-baasyir/#sthash.dz0la0Te.dpbs>, 5 Jan. 2015), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015.

description of *Kafir* was made in general (*Kafir 'Aam*). Ba'asyir assured them that his understanding of the issue of democracy and the infidelity of *Ansharut Thaghut* (helpers of the *Thaghut*) was similar to *Majelis Syariah JAT* (JAT *Sharia* Council). Ba'asyir attributed the rumours about differences in opinion that were said to have occurred between him and JAT clerics and leadership, to the work of *Thaghut* and *Ansharut Thaghut*. The explanations given by Ba'asyir were accepted and adopted as JAT's official stand to address the problem of disunity that had swept JAT and its leadership.⁵⁰⁷

On 20 June 2014, *AL-MUSTAQBAL*⁵⁰⁸ published on its website a letter presumably written by Ba'asyir where he called upon all Muslims in Indonesia to pray sincerely for “*Daulah Islam Di Iraq Dan Syam (ISIS) agar ISIS menang di Baghdad. Allahu Akbar!*” (the victory of the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) in Baghdad. Allah is the Greatest!).⁵⁰⁹ The “letter” had led to many parties asking JAT whether Ba'asyir made those statements. JAT denied, saying that the style was not Ba'asyir's, and there was no indication that Ba'asyir knew about the letter. JAT reiterated Ba'asyir's earlier stand of remaining neutral by not favouring one group of *Mujahidin* over others. As for saying prayers for the *Mujahidin*, JAT insisted that Ba'asyir have always instructed to say prayers for

⁵⁰⁷ Ahmad Fatih, “Sikap Ustadz. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Terkait Fitnah Terhadap JAT,” *JAMAAH ANSHARIT TAUHID* (<http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/463/sikap-ustadz-abu-bakar-baasyir-terkait-fitnah-terhadap-jat/#sthash.IRmD9oye.58c0AZB7.dpbs>, 04 June 2014), accessed on 12 Mar. 2015.

⁵⁰⁸ It is a pro-ISIS website run by a small group of Indonesians who were inspired by an extremist *Jihadi* organisation in the UK, *Al-Muhajiroun* which was officially disbanded in 2004. For reports on *Al-Muhajiroun* from September 1999 – April 2015, see, “Al-Muhajiroun,” *The Guardian* (<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/al-muhajiroun>), accessed on 06 July 2015.

⁵⁰⁹ M Fachry, “Ustadz ABB: Kerahkan Senjata Do'a Agar ISIS Menang Di Baghdad,” *AL-MUSTAQBAL* (<http://al-mustaqbal.net/ustadz-abb-kerahkan-senjata-doa-agar-isis-menang-di-baghdad/>, 20 Jun. 2014), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015.

all *Mujahidin* who are fighting sincerely for the religion wherever they might be, including those in Iraq and the *Mujahidin* of ISIS.⁵¹⁰

On 29 June 2014 which coincided with the first day of the month of Ramadan, the Consultative Council of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) decided to restore the caliphate. In its declaration, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was proclaimed as the first “caliph of Islam” in this new era.⁵¹¹ As a result of the announcement of the caliphate, the Indonesian jihadi community became further divided. Deep divisions were also evidenced among convicted terrorist prisoners, and cracks were also visible in JAT as a leading jihadi organisation.⁵¹² Efforts by senior JAT leaders such as Fuad Al Hazimi and Muhammad Achwan, as well as Ba’asyir’s sons, Abdurrahim and Abdur Rasyid who visited Ba’asyir at the Pasir Putih, Nusakambangan Prison Complex failed to convince Ba’asyir to stay neutral.

The pro-ISIS convicted terrorist prisoners who had the advantage of seeing Ba’asyir every day in the Prison Complex sought to convince Ba’asyir aggressively. Even Aman Abdurrahman, the pro-ISIS group leader who is held in a different prison within the Nusakambangan Prison Complex – Ba’asyir in Pasir Putih and Aman in Kembang Kuning, continued having lengthy discussions with Ba’asyir via mobile phone on the ISIS issue. The pro-ISIS

⁵¹⁰ “Penjelasan JAT Mengenai Pemberitaan Tentang Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,” *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/470/penjelasan-jat-mengenai-pemberitaan-tentang-ust-abu-bakar-baasyir/#sthash.okwD2kPA.dpuf>, 21 June 2014), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015.

⁵¹¹ As of 29 June 2014, the caliphate is referred to as the Islamic State (IS) only by its supporters. It is also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Daesh which is the acronym for the Arabic phrase *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham*. For the audio announcement of the Caliphate by ISIS’ official spokesman, Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani in Arabic and its translation into English, see, pietervanostaeyen, “The Islamic State Restores the Caliphate,” *Video 3: This is the Promise of Allah* (<https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/06/29/the-islamic-state-restores-the-caliphate/>, 29 June 2014), accessed on 06 July 2015.

⁵¹² Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia,” *IPAC Report No.13* (24 Sept. 2014): 1-2.

group was confident that winning Ba'asyir over to their side would guarantee Ba'asyir's admirers following in his footsteps of supporting ISIS.⁵¹³ On 05 August 2014, the Jakarta Post reported that the government "earlier confirmed that 24 terrorist prisoners at Pasir Putih Penitentiary, Nusakambangan, Central Java, including firebrand Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, pledged their support to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL, on July 18, from the penitentiary's prayer room."⁵¹⁴

Although the date of Ba'asyir's pledge of allegiance to Al-Baghdadi could not be conclusively determined,⁵¹⁵ the subsequent events that unfolded were a big blow for JAT. Senior JAT leaders suspected Ba'asyir was not telling the truth when Ba'asyir told them on 10 July 2014 that he had not given the pledge of allegiance. The religious and executive councils of JAT then convened a meeting on 13 July 2014 to formally decide whether Ba'asyir as the Amir of JAT had violated Islamic law by his decision. They wanted to safeguard JAT members from what they saw as a damaging decision by Ba'asyir. Ba'asyir reacted angrily to JAT's religious and executive councils' manoeuvre. In a 17 July 2014 meeting with members of JAT's religious council, Ba'asyir admitted having pledged allegiance to Al-Baghdadi. Ba'asyir also insisted during the meeting that it was obligatory for all JAT members to obey that decision, and whoever refused to abide by his decision should leave JAT. Ba'asyir's decision to fire Muhammad Achwan as JAT operational commander (*Amir Biniyabah*) and Fuad Al Hazimi as head of the religious

⁵¹³ Ibid., 17-18.

⁵¹⁴ Yuliasri Perdani and Ina Parlina, "Govt to tighten prison security following Ba'asyir's 'baiat'," *The Jakarta Post* (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/05/govt-tighten-prison-security-following-ba-asyir-s-baiat.html>, 05 Aug. 2014), accessed on 07 July 2015.

⁵¹⁵ Email discussions the author had with two researchers and specialists on Indonesia, Vidia Arianti and Robi Sugara, "Demikian Pernyataan Ust. ABB, Semoga Mengakhiri Polemik Selama Ini," 04 Sep. 2014.

council for going against his decision on the pledge as well as appointing one of his loyalists, Afif Abdul Majid to replace them was the last straw.⁵¹⁶

Consequently, Muhammad Achwan, Fuad Al Hazimi and Ba'aysir's son Abdurrahim left JAT and formed a new organisation, *Jama'ah Ansharusy Syari'ah* (JAS) which they officially declared on 11 August 2014 in Bekasi.⁵¹⁷

The ISIS phenomenon is not confined to JAT alone. Many militant groups in Indonesia were also similarly affected. In fact, ISIS is considered by many states as a tier-one security threat, displacing Al-Qaeda which had been at the top of the terrorist threat chart for many years after September 11. Describing the ISIS threat to Indonesia, Jones in her interview with the Lowy Institute's Anthony Bubalo succinctly outlined the implications of the ISIS threat for Indonesia.⁵¹⁸

Jones noted that Indonesian militants have been travelling to Syria since late 2013 and joining a variety of different groups, and not just ISIS alone while in Syria. These militants could be categorised into three groups.

The first opposes the use of "violent jihad inside Indonesia" but has allied itself with the *Al-Qaeda* (AQ) affiliate known as the An-Nusra Front (*Jabhat al-Nusra*).⁵¹⁹ The group includes JI members which many Australians still

⁵¹⁶ IPAC interview with former member of radical discussion group, Jakarta, Aug. 2014 cited in "The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia," *IPAC Report No.13*, 18.

⁵¹⁷ Fajar Shadiq, "Iim Baasyir Turut Deklarasikan Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah," *Kiblat.net* (<http://www.kiblat.net/2014/08/11/iim-baasyir-turut-deklarasikan-jamaah-ansharusy-syariah/>, 11 Aug. 2015), accessed on 07 July 2015. JAS' website is accessible at: <http://www.ansharusyariah.com/>.

⁵¹⁸ Sidney Jones. "The ISIS Phenomenon and Its Implications for Indonesia," Interview by Anthony Bubalo. *The Interpreter* (<http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/09/24/Sidney-Jones-on-ISIS-and-Indonesia.aspx?COLLCC=3732765119&>, 24 Sep. 2014), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015.

⁵¹⁹ *Jabhat al-Nusra* announced on 28 July 2016 that it has severed all ties with its parent organization, al-Qaeda, and renamed the group as *Jabhat Fatah al-Sham* (Conquest of Syria Front). See: Mona Alami, "Jabhat al-Nusra's rebranding is more than simple name change," *ALMONITOR* (<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/jabhat-al-nusra-sever-al-qaeda-focus-local-syria.html#ixzz4TRB72wD7>, 05 Aug. 2016), accessed on 31 Oct. 2016.

consider a dominant terrorist group but had, in fact, stopped using violence in Indonesia since 2007.

The second still uses violence or is “committed to using violence inside Indonesia.” The six or seven small groups in this category which Jones assessed to be of lesser capability, have allied themselves with two big groups, namely the Mujahidin in Eastern Indonesia and the Mujahidin of Western Indonesia. The groups and some of their supporters are joining ISIS. They are also aided by a group inside Indonesia that is organising ceremonies to pledge loyalty to the new Islamic State since ISIS announced its caliphate in July 2014.

The third is a much smaller group of pure *Salafi* who are also interchangeably referred to as Wahhabi. The primary motivation for this third category of fighters is their perception that Shia leaders are killing Sunni Muslims in Syria. They are neither with the An-Nusra Front (*Jabhat al-Nusra*) nor ISIS but are linked to *Salafi* rebel groups in Syria.

According to Jones, the number of Indonesian fighters in Syria could not be conclusively verified. Nevertheless, Jones estimated the figure to be about 100 based on names of about sixty fighters which Jones had verified.⁵²⁰ Equally important about the ISIS phenomenon is the oath-taking ceremonies. In Jones’ analysis, there are two things about these ceremonies that deserve attention.

Firstly, they are making a statement that suggests that the primary loyalty of those involved is no longer to Indonesia but, to a broader Islamic entity. As such, the Indonesian government has every reason to be concerned because it seriously questions their loyalty to *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. Groups

⁵²⁰ According to The Soufan Group in its December 2015 report, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq”, the Indonesian government gave the official count of 700 Indonesian fighters in November 2015. However, analysts believe the actual figure to be no more than 500.

such as JAT pledging allegiance to ISIS are different from other radical groups giving their *Bai'ah* to *Al-Qaeda* (AQ) in the past because ISIS controls territories, has resources, and functions to some extent as a state. Looking at these facts, the potential security threat to Indonesia, therefore, could undoubtedly increase or remain significant.

Secondly, Jones put the figure of those who have attended or pledged loyalty at 2000. The given figure raises yet another security issue. Could their loyalty to ISIS be translated into an increase in violence in Indonesia? Jones, however, dismissed that possibility because no correlation exists between the swearing of allegiance and the commission of violent acts inside Indonesia. Still, the existence of ISIS, its international connections and the presence of Indonesian fighters in Syria and Iraq, in Jones' opinion, could raise the terrorism threat in Indonesia. Jones argues that the presence of a few dozens more Indonesians in Syria may not automatically and immediately transform the nature of the security threat. The security concern is when they return from Syria, provide the leadership, train and organise the presently incompetent recruits to make things happen. The threat lies in the possibility that some of the returning Indonesian foreign fighters with a strong commitment would take the enthusiastic recruits in Indonesia and turn them into a disciplined force. When that happens, greater security problems could be expected.⁵²¹ Similarly, in the past, the threat from JI was not immediately discernible when Indonesians went to Afghanistan to fight. After 911, the networks were slowly unravelled, and the influence of the returned fighters was recognised. The same could also be projected of the ISIS phenomenon.

⁵²¹ Jones, The ISIS Phenomenon, Interview.

Analysing JAT's origin and development, one cannot ignore the fact that JAT started after breaking away from MMI. After consolidating itself and remaining intact for several years, the organisation split due to differences on the issue of ISIS. Some analysts might take the split as proof that the organisation is weakened and no longer an existential threat to the Indonesian state which is based on *Pancasila* and UUD 1945. The split, however, did not in any significant way affect JAT's willingness and readiness to continue working together with others despite the apparent differences. It has been Ba'asyir's stand when he expressed willingness to cooperate with MMI after breaking away from MMI.⁵²² *Jama'ah Ansharusy Syari'ah* (JAS) also articulated the same desire to work with JAT after the split.⁵²³ The willingness to work together to achieve a common goal or against a common enemy is not unknown among them because the concept of *Lintas Tandhim*⁵²⁴ and *Tansiq*⁵²⁵ which JI, MMI and JAT subscribe to, indicate their readiness to collaborate with any organisations on matters they perceived to be of benefit to the *Ummah*.

⁵²² See, "Taujih Am".

⁵²³ This was expressed by the Amir of JAS, Ustadz Muhammad Achwan during a meeting on the formation of JAS at the Asrama Haji Bekasi, Kota Bekasi, Jawa Barat. See, "JAT Pecah soal ISIS, Mantan Anggota Bentuk Jama'ah Ansharus Syari'ah (JAS)," *Muslimedia news* (<http://www.muslimedianews.com/2014/08/jat-pecah-soal-isis-mantan-anggota.html>, 12 Aug. 2014), accessed on 07 Dec. 2015.

⁵²⁴ For this purpose the "Pengajian Ukhuwah Lintas Tandhim" (Cross-organisation Fraternity Study) was organised on 13 March 2013 at the Masjid Manarul Ilmi (Manarul Ilmi Mosque) in Semarang. See, Bilal, "Ustadz Aris Munandar: Ormas Islam harus bersinergi hadapi musuh bersama," *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/news/2013/03/18/ustadz-aris-munandar-ormas-islam-harus-bersinergi-hadapi-musuh-bersama.html>, 18 Mar. 2013), accessed on 07 Nov. 2015.

⁵²⁵ The PUPJI mentions "*Tansiq bainal jama'ah*" (Collaborations with other groups) which specifies mutual help and support through the nurturing of relationships with other *jama'ah* (group) in order to achieve an objective. See, *PUPJI*, 36 and also, refer to the MMI's strategy of "*Tansiq or Alliance*" on page 154.

6.2. Ideology

From an ideological perspective, the three – JI, MMI and JAT have at least three things in common. They are *Salafi* groups that are politically active in championing the implementation of the *Sharia* in Indonesia, have a strong inclination towards jihad and a firm rejection of democracy. Like JI and MMI, JAT too presents its ideological creed along similar lines as its two predecessors when describing and explaining about *Iman* (Belief), *Kufr* (Infidelity), Islamic and *Kafir* state as well as jihad. The reason for these similarities is the fact that Ba'asyir is still the chief ideologue in JAT and had played the same role both in JI and MMI.

The document outlines the purpose for being in the group and the basis for its action. As a defining and important document for JAT which was formulated from the Islamic teachings, such an incredibly huge task, evidently, cannot be the work of one person. Ba'asyir's ratification of the document leaves little doubt that Ba'asyir is undoubtedly a key figure in shaping JAT's views and thinking, and a study of JAT's ideology will have to consider this factor.

The Crux of JAT's Ideology

In *Aqidah dan Manhaj*,⁵²⁶ JAT expresses the essential features of its ideology concisely into the following 45 points:

1. We bear witness that there is none that deserves to be worshipped except Allah and our primary duty is to worship Allah.
2. We believe that Allah the Exalted is the Creator and Sustainer of everything. We also believe that Allah is the Almighty with the power to will anything.
3. We believe that Allah the Exalted possesses names and attributes which are exalted and perfect, and there is nothing that resembles Allah or comparable to Him.
4. We bear witness that Muhammad may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is Allah's Messenger for all His creations from among men and the invisible beings, whose commandments must be followed and obeyed by them as well as whose teachings must all be accepted wholeheartedly.

⁵²⁶ "Aqidah and Manhaj," *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/jamaah/182/aqidah-dan-manhaj/#sthash.QP1WeS1k.dpbs>, 30 June 2011), accessed on 13 Mar. 2015. The translation of the document into English is mine.

5. We believe in the existence of Allah's honourable angels who are infallible and who do not disobey Allah in whatever He has commanded them and they always do what they are ordered to do. To love the angels is a display of belief and to dislike them is a display of disbelief.
6. We believe that the Qur'an is the word of Allah the Exalted including the letters and meanings of the Qur'an. *Kalam* (speech) is one of the attributes of Allah the Exalted, and the Qur'an is not created. For these reasons, it is obligatory to hold the Qur'an in high esteem, believe in it, follow and make it the source of law.
7. We believe in all the prophets and messengers of Allah; the first was Adam and Muhammad may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was the last among them. All of them were sent to convey the message of *Tauhid* (The Oneness of Allah).
8. We are certain that Muhammad was the final and last messenger, and prophet, and that there is no other prophet and messenger after Muhammad.
9. We are pleased with all the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad and that it is obligatory to follow their examples. All the Companions are just, and we do not comment on them except favourably.
10. We believe in the Divine Decree whether good or bad happen according to what Allah has decreed, and He has predestined all.
11. We believe that punishment and blessing in the grave are true.
12. We believe in the Signs of the Day of Resurrection that is authentically narrated from the Prophet Muhammad may Allah bless him and grant him peace such as the coming of *Gog* and *Magog*, the blowing breeze which will take the life of every believer, rising of the sun from the west; and the biggest *Fitnah* (trial) since the creation of Adam until the Day of Judgment is the emergence of *Al-Masih Ad-Dajjal* ("the false Messiah whose appearance marks the imminent end of the world")⁵²⁷.
13. We believe in the Last Day and rise after death as well as all that will be unfolding according to the authentic narrations from the Prophet Muhammad may Allah bless him and grant him peace such as about the *Haudh* ("the watering-place or Basin of the Prophet in the Next World, whose drink will refresh those who have crossed the narrow bridge before entering the Garden"),⁵²⁸ *Mizan* ("the scales of the Final Reckoning"),⁵²⁹ *Shirath* ("the narrow bridge which spans the Fire and must be crossed to enter the Garden"),⁵³⁰ book of deeds and etc.
14. We believe that man will be rewarded for their deeds.
15. Believing that Allah will not forgive those who died while committing the sin of ascribing divinity to other than Allah. As for other sins, Allah will punish or forgive whoever he chooses.
16. We are certain that Allah will remove a group among those who believe in *Tauhid* (the Oneness of Allah) from Hell Fire with the intercession of those who are granted the power of intercession. The power of intercession is true and is bestowed on those whom Allah pleases.
17. We believe in the intercession of the Prophet Muhammad may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and that he will be raised to a Station of Praise on the Day of Resurrection.
18. We are certain that *Iman* (belief) is actualised through words (that which is expressed verbally or thoughts in one's mind) and deeds (arising from one's heart or limbs).
19. We do not declare anyone from among those who believe in *Tauhid* (the Oneness of Allah) or those who perform the prayers facing the direction of the *Ka'ba* in Mecca as infidels just because they commit sins such as adultery, drink intoxicants and steal, so long as they do not consider these acts as lawful.
20. Infidelity is either minor or major, and both apply to doers of acts that are associated with beliefs, expressions and deeds.

⁵²⁷ See explanation of Dajjāl in Aisha Bewley, *Glossary of Islamic Terms* (London: Taha Publishers, 1998), 6.

⁵²⁸ Ibid, 61. See explanation of Hawḍ.

⁵²⁹ Ibid, 15. See explanation of Mīzān.

⁵³⁰ Ibid, 64. See explanation of Širāt.

21. We declare those whom Allah and His Prophet consider as infidels, and all those who follow other religions are infidels whether they have heard the call of Islam or not.
22. Whoever utters the Testimony of Faith, and their practice of Islam is visible to us, we will treat him/her as Muslim while leaving whatever is hidden to Allah.
23. We are certain that a state that implements the Islamic law and whose ruler is a Muslim is an Islamic state. However, when the implemented law is not Islamic or intentionally implement the Islamic law partially, and whose ruler is an infidel or one who claims to be a Muslim (an apostate), then the state is not an Islamic state.
24. We are certain that a *Mufti* (a scholar who is qualified to give a legal opinion) who obeys the *Thagut* (one who does not implement Allah's law) rulers and issues religious decrees according to their orders which run counter to the *Sharia*, justifies their actions, and helps them in rightful or wrongful matters, scholars such as these, are *Ulama Su'* (evil scholars).
25. We are of the opinion that it is unlawful for a Muslim to live in a non-Islamic state and in the midst of people who worship something or someone other than Allah except in a state of emergency.
26. Muslims are one single *Umat* (community) and related, with Arabs having no superiority over non-Arabs except by one's *Taqwa* (consciousness of Allah which enthralls a person to be attentive to avoid any wrong action and eager for actions which please Allah), and the blood of all Muslims is equal.
27. It is unlawful to violate the blood, honour and wealth of Muslims except when the *Sharia* permits it.
28. Infidelity as a result of apostasy is more severe than infidelity by birth according to the *Ijma'* (consensus among scholars).
29. Non-Muslims are not treated in the same manner as Muslims while alive or dead, depending on the dictates of the *Sharia*.
30. We do not force non-Muslims to embrace Islam.
31. We are certain that all the teachings of Islam are absolute truth, the most modern and scientific. Its truth will endure until the end of time because Allah protects it. As for teachings that are at variance with it, they are deviant teachings.
32. We are certain that the Islamic teachings are complete, and there is not a single thing except its explanation can be found in Islam.
33. We are certain that it is obligatory to practise Islam in its totality, and that Islam cannot be practised partially.
34. We are certain that Islamic law must be made as the only basis of law, and whoever does not judge based on Islamic law is a disbeliever, wrongdoer and defiantly disobedient.
35. We reject and stay away from all *Bid'ah* (religious innovations that are introduced into Islam after the formative period) regardless whether it renders a Muslim an infidel or not.
36. We do not consider it a sin and disassociate from Muslim arising from differences in *Ijtihadi* matters (where the personal judgment on legal problems is allowed).
37. The obligation of calling people to accept Islam, promoting good and preventing evil must be carried whether individually or collectively to ensure continuity of the *Sharia*.
38. Every believer who sees any acts of evil must prevent them to the best of his ability.
39. Jihad will continue to be waged until the Day of Resurrection whether with the existence of *Imam A'dham* (the caliph or head of an Islamic state) or not. Likewise, it will continue to be waged regardless whether it is being led by a just or sinful leader.
40. Waging jihad is carried out in every way that is in accordance with the guidance of the *Sharia*.
41. It is obligatory for every Muslim to live under the leadership of a caliph who administers their entire affairs based on the *Sharia* to attain the benefit in this world and the Hereafter.
42. If three or more Muslims gather together for their affair, the *Sharia* dictates designating one of them as the leader among them.

43. Surrendering leadership to a non-Muslim is unlawful. When a Muslim leader falls into evident infidelity, his leadership becomes null and void, the obligation to obey him ceases, and it becomes obligatory for Muslims to replace him and appoint a just *Imam* (leader) in his place if they can do it.
44. We avoid division and discord, and we invite for unity in words and association under the banner of *Tauhid* (the Oneness of Allah).
45. We express loyalty to Allah, His Messenger and Muslims.

Like many Islamic religious documents, quotations from the Qur'an and the Hadith can be found abundantly throughout the document. It gives the impression that JAT is only conveying what is already in the Qur'an and Hadith. Examination of the quoted texts indicates that these are not definitive texts (*Qat'iy*) "which is clear and specific", and therefore, have a single meaning and interpretation. On the contrary, the texts are speculative (*Zanniy*) and open to interpretations.⁵³¹ In other words, they are JAT's own or chosen interpretations of the texts and cannot be taken as conclusive and representative of Islam. The one thing that is evident is that the two primary sources in Islam were quoted by JAT to presumably add legitimacy to JAT's ideological arguments against what JAT perceives to be contradictory to Islam.

By framing it as such, JAT poses an existential threat to Indonesia because the group embraces and intentionally promotes an ideology that starts a trend, process or development that substantially questions the existence of the unitary state of Indonesia that is conceptually based on the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. Owing to the fact that JAT's ideology contradicts Indonesia's national ideology of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution, embracing such an ideology has many security implications. To further assess the existential threat of JAT's ideology to the NKRI, the 45 points of the *Aqidah dan Manhaj* were carefully examined. The 45 points were read in the

⁵³¹ Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, Second Revised Edition (Malaysia, Ilmiah Publishers Sdn. Bhd, 1999), 11-12 & 21-29. See also, Mahmud Shaltut, *Al-Islām: Aqīdah wa Sharī'ah* (Al-Qāhirah: Dār Al-Syurūq, 1421H/2001), 484-486.

context of and together with relevant articles, lectures, and sermons by Ba'asyir and other JAT members, giving more significant insights into JAT's ideology. These primary documents were published on JAT's official website: <http://ansharuttauhid.com> and downloaded by the author from January 2012 to 25 August 2015 before the website became inaccessible.⁵³²

Iman (Belief) vs Kufr (Infidelity)

JAT subscribed to the concept that *Iman* (belief) in Islam is inadequate if expressed only by words to reflect the thoughts in one's mind but must be accompanied by deeds attesting to its internalisation.⁵³³

Without corroborating actions, a Muslim who believes in *Tauhid* (the oneness of Allah) is no different from a *Murjiah*⁵³⁴ who insists that Islamic belief does not require any action to validate it. The *Murjiah*'s view is rejected by JAT because it categorically disallows *Iman* (belief) to be invalidated even when there are actions that contradict a Muslim's verbal utterance of *Iman*.

Ba'asyir encapsulated *Iman* (Islamic belief) as belief in the heart that is uttered by the tongue and manifested by actions. Based on this understanding, a Muslim's belief in *Allah* can be nullified if he utters words of disbelief or performs acts of disbelief. Ba'asyir considered the *Murji'ites*' phenomena in this

⁵³² Based on personal communications with ICPVTR Indonesian Informatics Team, "Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid's Website" from 05 – 13 January 2016, the website could have become inactive between late August 2015 and September 2015. The last known date that shows JAT official website (www.ansharuttauhid.com) was still active is 25 August 2015. This is based on Ba'asyir's statement that was published on *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT)'s official website on 25 August 2015, entitled "Sebab Musibah yang Menimpa Umat Islam Khususnya di Indonesia" (Causes of Calamities Experienced by Muslims, Especially in Indonesia). Based on the record kept by the Informatics Team in the Security Informatics digest, the link for the article, <http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/603/sebab-musibah-yang-menimpa-umat-islam-khususnya-di-indonesia/#sthash.IcCqZwmL.bCG2cbqd.dpbs> was still active on 25 August 2015.

⁵³³ See point number 18.

⁵³⁴ Also referred to as *Murji'ites*, they are the opposite of the *Kharijites*. The *Murji'ites* are of the view that faith is what is important and not actions, leading them to suspend judgement on Muslims who have committed major sins.

respect to be more detrimental to the Islamic belief than the *Kharijites*. In his analysis, the view is currently being embraced by many Indonesian Muslims. As a result, “doktrin sesat murji’ah” (the *Murji’ites*’ deviant doctrine) has plunged the Muslim *Ummah* into apostasy.⁵³⁵

According to Ba’asyir, the ruling *Thagut* governments, including in Indonesia, are taking advantage of the situation by not implementing the Islamic *Sharia* in its totality. Here, he made the connection between the *Murji’ites*’ view of not nullifying a Muslim’s belief even if his or her action contradicted the belief and the widespread apostasy. States refused to implement the *Sharia* because they do not consider it as an integral part of the Islamic belief. Believing this to be a fundamental issue that cannot be allowed to pass, Ba’asyir instructed the Islamic *Ummah* to replace the *Thagut* regime with an Islamic one. The Islamic *Ummah* must have the political power to implement Islam comprehensively, and this he stressed, is the demand of *Tauhid*.⁵³⁶

At the individual level, JAT’s claim of not excommunicating an individual who believes in *Tauhid* (the Oneness of Allah) or performs prayers facing the direction of the *Ka’ba* in Mecca for committing sins such as adultery, drinking intoxicants and stealing, so long as the individual considers them to be unlawful in Islam, is inconsistent.⁵³⁷

Ba’asyir excommunicated Nasir Abbas who visited him in prison with these words, “Antum itu sudah kafir sebaiknya antum segera bertaubat, berhentilah membantu toghut dalam memerangi mujahidin. Taubat antum yang paling baik adalah pergi saja ke Afganistan atau ke Yaman sana untuk berjihad

⁵³⁵ “Ustadz (ABB) : Tanpa Negara Islam, Syariat Islam Tidak Bisa Ditegakkan,” *Kording Risalah Tauhid News*, Edisi 83 (Solo: Divisi Media Dakwah dan Informasi Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid, 16 Shafar 1433H/ 10 January 2012): 1. ABB refers to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ See point number 19.

dan jangan pulang kembali, itu yang terbaik untuk antum.” (You are already an infidel, so, it is best that you repent, stop helping the *Thaghut* fight against the *Mujahidin*. The best repentance for you is to just go to Afghanistan or Yemen for jihad and do not return, that is the best for you).⁵³⁸

Abdurrahman al ayyubi⁵³⁹ who was present rebuked Ba’asyir for the remarks by pointing out to Ba’asyir that he has no right to consider him (Abdurrahman) as an infidel. The matter is for a judge who has been appointed by the state to decide. Ba’syir agreed with Abdurrahman on this last point but qualified his charge by pointing out that helping the NKRI which is a *Kafir* state nullifies the *Iman* (belief).⁵⁴⁰

At the core of JAT’s notion of *Iman* (Islamic belief) is the belief that it is un-Islamic for a Muslim ruler not to implement the *Sharia* and accept it as the basis of legislation in governing a state.⁵⁴¹ For refusing to judge based on the *Sharia* and confining Islam to a limited scope as opposed to JAT’s belief that Islam must be implemented in its totality (*Kaffah*), the ruler and state fall into infidelity.⁵⁴² In such a condition, any Muslim supporting such a ruler and state is, in fact, supporting infidelity, according to JAT’s logic.⁵⁴³ Since the primary duty of a Muslim is to worship Allah that includes administering and governing personal and state affairs in conformity to the dictates of Islam, having other

⁵³⁸ “Nasir Abbas Mengkampanyekan Deradikalisasi Kpd Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,” *Kording Risalah Tauhid News*, Edisi 75 (Solo: Divisi Media Dakwah dan Informasi Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid, 18 Muharram 1433H/ 13 December 2011): 1.

⁵³⁹ Also known as Abdul Rahman Ayub, was a former senior member of JI cell in Australia who fought in Afghanistan and is now actively involved in Indonesia’s de-radicalisation programmes. See: Michael Bachelard, “Turning Away from Radical Doctrines,” *The Sydney Morning Herald* (<http://www.smh.com.au/world/turning-away-from-radical-doctrines-20121006-275wj.html>, 07 Oct. 2012), accessed on 18 Feb. 2016. See also: Samir Musa, “Abdurrahman Ayyub: Ansyad Mbai itu ulil amri kita!,” *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/news/2013/12/29/abdurrahman-ayyub-ansyaad-mbai-itu-ulil-amri-kita.html>, 29 Dec. 2013), accessed on 18 Feb. 2016.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ See point number 23 & 34.

⁵⁴² See point number: 32 & 33.

⁵⁴³ See point number 24.

than Islam taking its place means worshipping others instead of Allah. The whole argument rest on two arguments: acts of disbelief and apostasy.⁵⁴⁴

In the context of Indonesia, the President as the supreme ruler of the state is a Muslim who enshrines the *Pancasila* and the Constitution of 1945 in a democratic system. Except for members of groups such as JI, MMI, and JAT, the rest of the Indonesian Muslim population also accepts and supports the national ideology and political system of Indonesia. JAT rejects the existing foundations of NKRI because they contradict the concept of *Tauhid Al-Hakimiyah* where JAT understood divine sovereignty belong solely to Allah.

To JAT, accepting these foundations are acts of disbelief and apostasy that must be stopped.⁵⁴⁵ JAT's refusal to accept the present state of affairs and its commitment to change the status quo imply that JAT will attempt to reconfigure the state and the society so that Islam will be the standard denominator for both the state and society. It is a contradiction to the *Pancasila* as the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state.

Despite JAT's lack of significant military capability, when this study critically analysed JAT's ideology, JAT's intention to reconfigure the Indonesian state to be Islamic is unquestionable. It confirmed that the lack of military capability on JAT's part does not in any way impede JAT's existential threat to the Indonesian state and society. In light of this finding, the securitisation of JAT should not be measured solely by its capability but also, the ideology that instilled in JAT the will to effect the changes through jihad.

⁵⁴⁴ See point number 28 & 29.

⁵⁴⁵ See point number 37 & 38.

*Politicisation of Tauhid, Iman, and Taqwa*⁵⁴⁶

Even when JAT discussed the three terms of *Tauhid*, *Iman* and *Taqwa*, the discourse never fails to infuse in them JAT's political agenda. While the terms are often used in a Muslim's daily speech and form part of his/her religious lexicon, JAT's explanation of them is often embedded with political undertones. To be true in the practice of *Tauhid* (The Oneness of Allah) demands *Iman*. *Iman* is the belief that living by Allah laws, and not going against them will generate *Taqwa* (consciousness of Allah which will motivate a person to be mindful of the wrong action and eager for actions which please Allah).

The problem, according to JAT, is the *Thagut* leaders governing the countries invalidate the practice of *Tauhid* by rejecting Allah's law which is pure and comprehensive. By doing that, even if these leaders are Muslims who perform the prayers, JAT considers them guilty of "menjerumuskan mereka ke lembah kemusyrikan dan kemungkaran" (plunging them (Muslims) into the valley of *Syirik*⁵⁴⁷ and evil).⁵⁴⁸ In the Indonesian context, Ba'asyir argued that acts of *Syirik* include "mengganti hukum Allah dengan hukum ciptaan manusia untuk mengatur negara/kehidupan" (replacing Allah's law with manmade laws to run the state/life).

In such a situation, *Tauhid*, *Iman*, and *Taqwa* of the believers will be ruined. It is impossible for *Tauhid*, *Iman* and *Taqwa* to be nourished while

⁵⁴⁶ *Taqwa* in Arabic can be explained as a shield against wrongdoing, and often translated into English as "being conscious of Allah" or "having fear of Allah". The best explanation of *taqwa* is given by Umar, a Companion of Prophet Muhammad when he equated *taqwa* to moving cautiously on a thorny bush path so as not to tear one's cloak.

⁵⁴⁷ *Syirik* is the unforgivable sin for worshipping something or someone other than Allah or associating something or someone as a partner with Allah.

⁵⁴⁸ "Khutbah Iedul Fitri 1 Syawal 1433H Ust. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," *Kording Risalah Tauhid News*, Edisi Khusus (Solo: Divisi Media Dakwah dan Informasi Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid, 1433H/2012): 2-3.

living under a *Thaghut* or *Kafir* leadership. *Tauhid*, *Iman*, and *Taqwa* will only be safe by becoming a citizen of an Islamic state/caliphate where undivided loyalty can be given to Allah, the Prophet and the *Ulil Amri* (person in a position of authority) from among the believers.⁵⁴⁹

Such an ideology deems it necessary for Muslims to dissociate themselves unconditionally from all forms of *Kafir* states whether they are based on the notion of democracy, nationalism, socialism, capitalism, *Pancasila*, etc. It does not matter if Muslims form the majority of the population of the state. Even if there are many mosques where the *Azan* (the call for prayer) could be heard, madrasahs and Islamic institutions of higher learning are established as well as the Prophet Muhammad's birthday is celebrated, all these are inconsequential. Similarly, if the President prays, fasts, and performs other acts of worship, the state remains a *Kafir* state.⁵⁵⁰

JAT's ideology inculcates a different attitude towards the *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic state). It is obligatory for every Muslim to give his/her loyalty to the Islamic state whose positive laws are based on the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. Theoretically speaking, if the majority of the population are non-believers who are ready to commit to living under the shade of the *Daulah Islamiyah* where its *Ulil Amri* is a Muslim who obeys Allah and his Prophet, the state is, in JAT's view, Islamic.⁵⁵¹

Further analysis of the concept of *Tauhid*, *Iman*, and *Taqwa* which JAT embraced indicates irreconcilable differences when they are applied to the NKRI. The NKRI, since independence, till this very day will no doubt be categorised as a *Kafir* state. It is because the Constitution of the state is created

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid, 5.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid, 6.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid, 7.

by human reason (*Pancasila* and UUD 45), and its positive laws, *Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana* (KUHP, Criminal Law Procedure Code) are un-Islamic laws because they are based on human reason. JAT argues that accepting such laws is tantamount to casting Allah's law aside.

Consequently, JAT contends that it is unlawful for the Islamic *Ummah* to become citizens of a *Kafir* state because it violates the *Sunnah*, and it is impossible to be able to practise *Tauhid* which is free from *Syirik*. It is, therefore, obligatory to struggle to change the state into an Islamic state. If he is unable to do so, then it is mandatory for him to migrate to an Islamic state wherever that might be. If he is unable to migrate and is forced to live in a *Kafir* state then he must in his heart persistently hate and be hostile to the *Thaghut/Kafir* government for Allah's sake and always say the following prayer:

“...O our Sustainer! Lead us forth [to freedom] out of this country whose people are oppressors, and raise for us, out of Thy grace, a protector, and raise for us, out of Thy grace, one who will bring us succour!”⁵⁵²

In line with this, JAT asserts that the establishment of an Islamic state/caliphate is a primary obligation of the Islamic *Ummah*. Accordingly, this important matter should be understood and realised by the Islamic *Ummah*. When the Islamic *Ummah* disregards it, they will undoubtedly be overpowered by *Thaghut*. As a consequence, they will continue to live in a climate of humiliation, fear, disunity and weakness. Eventually, under such conditions, they will be oppressed and massacred by the infidels like the Muslims in Bosnia

⁵⁵² Al-Qurān, A-Nisā' 4:75.

and Myanmar. Without *Tauhid* and *Taqwa*, JAT firmly believes that the Islamic *Ummah* will be plunged into polytheism.⁵⁵³

As for the *Ulama* who oppose the struggle to establish the Islamic state/caliphate anywhere in the world including in Indonesia, they are the evil *Ulama*.⁵⁵⁴ JAT rejects performing the congregational prayers led by them. To JAT, their opposition to the establishment of an Islamic state/caliphate means disapproving the *Sunnah* and exhibiting loyalty to the *Kafir* state. It indicates unwillingness on their part to allow Muslims the full practice of *Tauhid*, and freedom from polytheism.⁵⁵⁵

Pluralism and Diversity

The core of NKRI which is based on *Pancasila*, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity)⁵⁵⁶ and the Constitution of 1945 is the belief in and commitment to pluralism and diversity that has been applied to the state and nation since independence. In fact, these are the pillars of strength, stability, peace and security for the unitary state. These are in direct contrast to what JAT suggests, that Indonesian citizen who is non-Muslims are to be treated differently from citizens who are Muslims.⁵⁵⁷ How could JAT not be an existential threat to the state when JAT upholds a belief that intends to unravel the foundations of the Indonesian nation?

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ ISIS refers to them as the “The Imām of Kufur” in its magazine. See, “Kill The Imām of Kufur” *Dabiq*, Issue 13, 1437 Rabi’ Al-Akhir (12 January – 9 February 2016), 6-8.

⁵⁵⁵ “Khutbah Iedul Fitri”: 9-10.

⁵⁵⁶ ““Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” and the Purpose of Indonesian Society” *Institut Leimena* (<http://www.leimena.org/en/page/v/772/bhineka-tunggal-ika-dan-tujuan-masyarakat-indonesia>, 2013), accessed on 8 Jan. 2015.

⁵⁵⁷ See point number 29.

In rejecting the equal status accorded by the Constitution of 1945 to all Indonesians, Ba'asyir claimed that Muslims' and non-Muslims' hostility, and confrontational nature towards one another or in Ba'asyir's words, "jotos-jotosan" (engage in fisticuffs) are *Sunatullah* (The Immutable Constants of Allah's System).⁵⁵⁸

Jihad

In JAT's view, for Islam to be implemented in its totality there are only two ways: through *Da'wah* (Islamic outreach) and *Jihad*. The Islamic state can never be established by democratic means. JAT conceptualised democracy as polytheism where the truth of Islam is mixed with the falsehood of democracy. So, the only viable options for the Islamic *Ummah* to establish the Islamic state where the Islamic *Sharia* could be implemented comprehensively are using *Da'wah* and *Jihad*.⁵⁵⁹

Between the two, JAT is more concerned with jihad. JAT perceived that the enemies of Islam would be making every effort to distort the meaning and obligation of Jihad so that the Islamic *Ummah* forgets the obligation. At the very least, the enemies of Islam will try to give jihad a different meaning and understanding. Jihad is portrayed by JAT as "kewajiban yang hilang"⁵⁶⁰ (the lost/neglected obligation) the same way Muhammad 'Abdus Salam Faraj

⁵⁵⁸ Ustadz Abb : "Deradikalisasi, Proyek Memerangi Tauhid" *Kording Risalah Tauhid News*, Edisi 82 (Solo: Divisi Media Dakwah dan Informasi Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid, 12 Shafar 1433H/ 06 January 2012): 1.

⁵⁵⁹ "Ustadz (ABB) : Tanpa Negara Islam, Syariat Islam Tidak Bisa Ditegakkan" *Kording Risalah Tauhid News*, Edisi 83 (Solo: Divisi Media Dakwah dan Informasi Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid, 16 Shafar 1433H/ 10 January 2012): 1.

⁵⁶⁰ Ust. Ibnul Jarrah, "Distorsi Hukum Jihad," *Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid* (<http://ansharuttauhid.com/read/publikasi/112/distorsi-hukum-jihad/#sthash.Ito3xHgJ.dpuf>, 20 Jan. 2014), accessed on 20 Jan. 2014.

described it.⁵⁶¹ To JAT, the ruling on jihad is as clear as “matahari disiang bolong” (the sun on a broad daylight). JAT argues that jihad today is *Fardhu ‘Ain* (an individual obligation), because of the condition of the *Ummah* where the enemies occupy almost all of its territories, and also “dibantai, dibunuh, dilecehkan kehormatannya” (they are being butchered, slaughtered, and their dignity insulted).⁵⁶²

JAT accepts that jihad is an individual obligation which was what Abdullah Azzam said in his book, “*Al-Difā‘ ‘an Arāḍi al-Muslimīn Ahammu Furūd al-A‘yān*” (The Defence of the Muslim Lands Is the Most Important of Individual Duties).⁵⁶³ Azzam argued that jihad become an individual duty ever since the fall of Andalusia (Muslim Spain) until today. So, JAT questions those who are hesitant about jihad being obligatory, and some others who vacillate between jihad as *Fardhu ‘Ain* (individual duty) and *Fardhu Kifayah* (collective duty). There is no doubt that JAT believes in jihad as an obligation that will continue to be in force until the world comes to an end.⁵⁶⁴

With regards to jihad, JAT’s discussions are not purely theoretical. JAT chooses jihad as a means or strategy to make the word of Allah supreme.⁵⁶⁵ In JAT’s milieu, it is established as a means to establish political power where

⁵⁶¹ Faraj was the leader of the Egyptian *Tanzim Al-Jihad* (Al-Jihad Group). He wrote a pamphlet: “Al-Jihad Al-Faridhah Al-Ghaibah” in 1981 before the assassination of Egypt’s third president, Muhammad Anwar El Sadat on 06 October 1981. For the English translation, see Muhammad ‘Abdus Salam Faraj, *Jihaad: The Absent Obligation* (England: Maktabah Al Ansaar, 2000). Both the Arabic and English translation are from the writer’s personal collection of extremist materials which he downloaded from the Internet for the purpose of his research since 2004.

⁵⁶² Jarrah, “Distorsi Hukum Jihad”.

⁵⁶³ The book by Dr. Abdullah Azzam has been translated into English by “Brothers in Ribatt”, entitled “Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman”. The copy in Arabic and its translation in English are from the author’s personal collection which he downloaded from the Internet.

⁵⁶⁴ See point number 39.

⁵⁶⁵ “Tadzkiroh Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid Bagi Rakyat dan Penguasa Indonesia” *Al Furqan* (<http://www.eramuslim.co/berita/info-umat/t-a-d-z-k-i-r-o-h-jama-ah-anshorut-tauhid-bagi-rakyat-dan-penguasa-negri-indah-yang-terus-dirundung-musibah.htm>, 03 Dec. 2010), accessed on 29 Feb. 2016.

Islam could be implemented in its totality. It is an obligation that is also directed against rulers who refuse to apply the *Sharia* in their conduct of the state.

Consequently, all Muslims bear the burden of replacing a government that refuses to implement the *Sharia* because such a government is a *Thaghut* (one who does not implement Allah's law) and *Kafir* (infidel) government. Since the present Indonesian government on its own accord will not change the manner in which state administration and affairs are executed, jihad is the only way a new government can be installed to replace the old one.

6.3. Strategy

From the discussions on the origin and development of JAT as well as its ideology, there is every indication to suggest that JAT is not a static organisation. It will continue to transform, manifest and network itself with different groups to achieve its primary objective of establishing an Islamic state so that the *Sharia* law can be implemented to the fullest, not only at the individual but also at the state level. As early as August 2008 there were already unverified accounts that an “askar sirri” (secret military wing) had been established to concentrate on the jihad agenda. The purpose of the wing could have been to ensure that *Da'wah* (religious outreach) programmes could be carried out unobstructed, but the discovery of the Aceh training camp undermined this possibility.⁵⁶⁶

This study examined closely another important document, “*Khiththoh JAT*” to understand JAT's strategy.⁵⁶⁷ The document was written on 28 May

⁵⁶⁶ See, “Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, 28 August 2008” cited in ICG, *The Dark Side of JAT*, 10.

⁵⁶⁷ The Jama'ah Anshorusy Syari'ah (JAS) which split from JAT renamed “*Khiththoh JAT*” as “*Khiththoh Jama'ah Anshorusy Syari'ah*” which the group ratified on 11 August 2014 in

2011, more than three years after JAT was established on 27 July 2008. The same document is also important to Jama'ah Anshorusy Syari'ah (JAS) which split from JAT because of differences over ISIS' self-declared caliphate.⁵⁶⁸ JAS not only adopted it but also renamed the document as “Khiththoh Jama'ah Anshorusy Syari'ah” which the group ratified on 11 August 2014 in Bekasi. The contents of the two documents are identical except for the date of ratification, and in the case of JAS, it was signed by Ustadz Muhammad Achwan who is the Amir of JAS.⁵⁶⁹

Unlike the PUPJI, the *Khiththoh* makes no distinction between strategy and smaller scale strategies which the PUPJI refers to as tactics. The document focuses on providing a conceptual framework for JAT to develop its strategy and serves as a means of building the Indonesian public's confidence in JAT so that JAT is seen in a positive light. It can be directly inferred from the document's conclusion where it states:

“Demikian Khithoh [sic] JAT ini dibuat agar menjadi dasar standarisasi internal bagi gerak kejama'ahan sekaligus sebagai penerangan publik, karena JAT berada dan berjuang secara terbuka pada ranah kemasyarakatan yang sangat heterogen dan majemuk.”

(Thus this “Khiththoh JAT” is made to be the basis for internal standardisation for the group's collective movement as well as providing information to the public because JAT exists and struggles openly at the societal level which is very heterogeneous and complex.”

JAT adopts a two-pronged strategy of *Da'wah and Jihad*. The *Khiththoh* however, emphasises more on *Da'wah* which JAT considers as “garis penyambung kepada tingkat amaliyah berikutnya” (the line connecting to the

Bekasi. The contents of the two documents are identical except for the date of ratification and in the case of JAS it was signed by Ustadz Muhammad Achwan who is the Amir of JAS.

⁵⁶⁸ A. Z. Muttaqin, “Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah menolak keabsahan Khilafah Al Baghdadi,” *ARRAHMAH.COM* (<http://www.arahmah.com/news/2014/08/12/jamaah-ansharusy-syariah-menolak-keabsahan-khilafah-al-baghdadi.html>, 12 Aug. 2016), accessed on 15 March 2016.

⁵⁶⁹ “Khiththoh” *JAMA'AH ANSHORUSY SYARI'AH* (<http://www.ansharusyariah.com/read/no/351/khiththoh/>, 15 Mar. 2016), accessed on 15 Mar. 2016.

next level of action).⁵⁷⁰ For JAT's *Da'wah* to be successful, it needs to be open and accessible to the public for JAT ideas to be disseminated efficiently.⁵⁷¹ Jihad is different. It has to be done in secrecy.

Da'wah

In *Da'wah*, JAT manifested itself as an above-ground organisation and gave more considerable attention to the media as part of its public relations effort. There were also several internet and social networking sites which JAT used to propagate its ideas. In 2009, it began publishing a monthly magazine by making use of www.muslimdaily.net, a site run by individuals close to the Ba'asyir's family. Videos produced by Muslim Daily TV were also regularly posted on the YouTube.⁵⁷²

From a closer analysis of JAT's *Da'wah* strategy, it became apparent that JAT's approach is to appeal to the Muslim masses by:

i. Bringing Everybody on the Same Page

JAT realised that it would be impossible to achieve its aim of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia or the secondary aim of seeing the *Sharia* being implemented without the support of the broader Muslim population in Indonesia. To build a consensus on the matter, JAT presents an understanding

⁵⁷⁰ Majelis Syuro JAT, "*Khiththoh JAT*", 6.

⁵⁷¹ This was done via JAT's official website. After the website became inaccessible, the outreach programmes could still be carried out through its proxies such as <http://www.muslimdaily.net/>, <https://majalahtauhid.wordpress.com/>, <http://jihaddandakwah.blogspot.sg/>, <http://anshoruttauhidwassunnahwaljihad.blogspot.sg/>, <https://www.an-najah.net/> and <http://ibnuaz-zira.blogspot.sg/2015/02/v-behaviorurldefaultvmlo.html>.

⁵⁷² ICG, "The Dark Side of JAT", 5.

of “*Diinul Islam*”⁵⁷³ which takes into consideration the present-day reality and implementation of future ideals which must be developed with a full awareness of history.⁵⁷⁴ Presenting its Islamic ideas in this way, allows JAT to have an acceptable public face which helps JAT in making inroads into the society through its religious outreach programmes.

There are specific themes that JAT uses to highlight the *Ummah*’s current state of weakness and division. JAT attributes them to “*Ananiyah*” (selfishness) and “*Ashobiyah*” (pre-Islamic social solidarity), indirectly suggesting the need to be in a *Jama’ah*. JAT reinforces the need to be in a *Jama’ah* by its selective reading of events in history which may resonate with Muslims. There were several phases that the *Ummah* went through from the time of the Mongol invasion and destruction of Baghdad. Andalusia (Muslim Spain) fell, the Ottoman Caliphate was dissolved, the State of Israel was established, and the more recent, “Penindasan Global terhadap Islam dan kaum Muslimin” (the global oppression of Islam and Muslims).⁵⁷⁵ All convey one subtle message that there are non-Islamic forces that want Islam destroyed.

In its religious outreach programmes, JAT capitalises on driving home the message that the *Ummah* must respond collectively and not individually. The solution according to JAT is to act from a common platform known as a *Jama’ah* (group) which is the very first foundation before “berjihad fi

⁵⁷³ Referring to Islam as *Al-Dīn* means Islam cannot be confined to ritual practices but covers every aspect of life.

⁵⁷⁴ Majelis Syuro JAT, “*Khiththoh JAT*” (Jawa Tengah: Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, 2011), 2. The copy is made available to the author by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR). For an online copy of it, see, “*Khiththoh JAT*” *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID* (<http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/jamaah/180/khiththoh-jat/#sthash.osYyynOk.dpbs>, 31 June 2011), accessed on 17 Feb. 2015.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 1-7.

sabilillah” (Jihad in the path of Allah) can take place.⁵⁷⁶ JAT argues that the hadith give the religious justification for it:

*“And I command you with five that Allah commanded me: Listening and obeying Jihad, Hijrah, and the Jama‘ah. For indeed whoever parts from the Jama‘ah the measure of a hand-span, then he has cast off the yoke of Islam from his neck unless he returns.”*⁵⁷⁷

In Indonesia, it is not possible for JAT to claim to be the only accepted *Jama‘ah* from the *Sharia* point of view. Therefore, JAT has to be contented with implanting the idea on the need to create *Jama‘at* (groups) and accepts the presence of other groups as long as their political objective remains similar. In this way, future cooperation in areas of converging interest becomes more probable.

ii. Laying the ground rules for forming a Jama‘ah

The existence of many groups championing Islam can also lead to infighting among Muslims in Indonesia and weaken their resolve to establish an Islamic state or implement the *Sharia*. To minimise this, JAT tries to set the standard for other groups to follow by sharing what constitutes its self-identity openly. By doing so, the many groups will recognise that they have more in common than differences.

Firstly, no matter how strongly JAT feels about itself, the group refers to itself as “*jama‘ah minal muslimin*”⁵⁷⁸ (a group made up of Muslims). The phrase communicates JAT’s intention to work with other Islamic groups in striving for the Islamic cause and avoid being exclusive. Secondly, JAT in

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid, 6.

⁵⁷⁷ See, “Chapters on Parables” *Jami‘ At-Tirmidhi*, Vol. 5, Book 42, Hadith No. 2863. The said hadith is available online at: <http://sunnah.com/urn/730960>.

⁵⁷⁸ The same way DI and JI were referred to because they are not a state and therefore, do not control any territories.

running the *Jama'ah* makes the Messenger of Allah as its point of reference. Thirdly, JAT chooses to express its objective as establishing “Tauhidullah” (the doctrine of the Divine Unity of Allah) which in essence is about implementing the *Sharia* and founding an Islamic state. Phrasing its objective in this manner could avoid unwarranted objections from others. Fourthly, JAT views itself as a group that tries its best to steadfastly hold on to the Qur'an and *Sunnah* based on the understanding of the *Salafus Sholeh* (the Righteous Predecessors) which is in line with the principles of *Sharia* and the *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah*.⁵⁷⁹

To win the support of other Muslims, JAT avoids being assertive. JAT is willing to recognise that every individual Muslim reserve the right to be associated with any Islamic group that he/she chooses. JAT's refusal to judge an individual's or the community's commitment to Islam by their membership of a particular Islamic group is noteworthy. Although it seems ironic for JAT to behave in this manner, the truth is, in the long run, working together with Muslims who have been exposed to the concept of *Jama'ah* would be easier. Afterward, building upon this understanding to include the establishment of the Islamic state and caliphate will be more feasible.

iii. Influencing Public Opinion

JAT does this by making its views on many vital issues concerning Islam, education, politics, economy, social, culture, defence and international relations

⁵⁷⁹ The term, “*Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah*” literally means “the people of the *Sunnah* and the Community: all the people who follow the *Sunnah* of the Prophet and who hold together as a community on that basis; the main body of Muslim Community.” See, Aisha Bewley, *Glossary of Islamic Terms* (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1998), 179.

available to the public through its sermons, lectures, and publications.⁵⁸⁰ It is known as *Da'wah bi al-Hāl* or preaching by example where JAT motivates others to follow its footsteps. JAT's central ideas on the various issues are also disseminated through its *Khiththoh*.⁵⁸¹

Regarding Islam, JAT wants Muslims to reject the application of manmade ideologies in their lives. JAT wants them to realise that true happiness and prosperity whether in the physical or spiritual sense, can only be achieved if the Islamic *Sharia* is implemented. JAT wants Muslims to be made entirely aware that Capitalism, Communism, Nationalism and Democracy have succeeded in doing one thing – plunging humanity into the ravine of “kebangkrutan nilai” (value bankruptcy) and “kebobrokan moral” (moral decay).⁵⁸²

JAT views the commitment to implement the *Sharia* as an attempt to make life respectable with two possible outcomes. If the attempt is successful, then all praise is due to Allah for granting JAT the victory. On the other hand, even if it is unsuccessful, Allah will still grant His reward to JAT for attempting in the first place.

JAT sees education as a means of moulding a generation that builds civilisation by drawing from the teachings of the Qur'an and the Prophetic Traditions which are in line with the understanding of the *Salafus Sholeh* (the Righteous Predecessors). JAT does not want Muslims to seek education just to be gainfully employed or to amass worldly benefits. Instead, JAT wants an

⁵⁸⁰ Ba'asyir's lectures are available for download at: <http://iwakarti.blogspot.sg/2010/04/kumpulan-ceramah-ust-abu-baasyhir.html>, <http://downloadislamgratis.blogspot.sg/2013/06/ustadz-abu-bakar-baasyir.html>, <http://al-adnani.blogspot.sg/2015/04/audio-ceramah-ust-abu-bakar-baasyir.html>.

⁵⁸¹ See, “Khiththoh JAT,” *JAMAAH ANSHARUT TAUHID*, 8 -10.

⁵⁸² Ibid, 8.

education that instils the fundamentals of *Al Walaa' wal Bara'* (allegiance and enmity) in the struggle for Islam through "*Ad Dakwah wal Jihad fi Sabilillaah*" (Islamic outreach and jihad in the path of Allah). JAT contends that education will lose its meaning and substance if it is disconnected from the reality of Islam and Muslims of today.

Where politics is concerned, JAT finds it impossible to implement "Dinul Islam" in its totality except under the shade of the Islamic caliphate. However, JAT will not form or be a part of any of the political parties which participate in democratic elections just to achieve this end. JAT insists that in politics, the end does not justify the means and therefore, rejects using political parties as a means to establish the Islamic state. In its place, JAT will engage in politics using religious outreach programmes by taking full advantage of the available opportunities while at the same time, considering its capabilities.

To JAT, the economy is another means to get closer to Allah. As such, it must be grounded on what Allah pleases. Any form of economic transactions in this respect must follow the laws that Allah has revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. JAT endorses the Islamic *Sharia* because it lays the foundations for human transactions and economic activities based on justice and without discrimination. JAT regards economic systems based on Capitalism, Liberalism, Communism and Socialism as having given rise to human civilisation which inculcates animal behaviours of promoting individualism and worshipping material wealth. The situation has become so acute that it is threatening humanity.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸³ Ibid, 9.

JAT recognises that pluralism in society is here to stay. Working around the issue of differences in beliefs and world views among members of the society, JAT raises the issue of whether absolute tolerance without restriction and towards all forms of deviancy, denials, and evils are acceptable. JAT rejects such notion because it is not only wrong but also infringes on social responsibilities. To JAT, to be socially responsible means employing legal means to correct the deviancy, denials, and evils. JAT chooses to do it through reform (*Ishlah*), guidance (*Irsyad*), education (*Tarbiyah*) and defence (*Difa'*) as well as increasing the immunity (*Mana'ah*) of the group in particular and the Muslim community in general.

Even when discussing culture, JAT actively encourages a culture that is *Sharia* compliant. Culture should not be exploited to fulfil the lust of the flesh. Likewise, it should not be an imitation of the stupidity of past ancestors. Cultural events such as art festivals featuring musical concerts, sports festivals and traditional or modern theatrical performances should not shift the society's focus from their daily sufferings. It should not be an exercise in futility which not only encroaches on the boundaries of the *Sharia* but also, succeeds in reinforcing the *Jahiliyah* culture of sexual exploitation and saturating the mind with legends and myths. All of which according to JAT is a waste of time and resources.

As a baseline for framing its views on defence and security, JAT underscores that to protect and defend oneself from attack and evil is an obligation in Islam. It is the fundamental right of each individual and the Muslim community. Even in conditions of weakness and oppression, it is unlawful for Muslims to submit and surrender. On the contrary, Muslims must

be ready to stand up and fight. Waging war, however, must be on the basis of absolute value and true law. Differences in ethnicity, group and nationality cannot serve as justifications for taking the wealth and life of others. If war is allowed to be waged for primordial reasons and claims of superiority over other groups, then humanity will be lost.

One of the significant concerns that JAT raises when discussing international relations is the failure of the United Nations to ensure world peace and prosperity. The UN has failed to treat all nations of the world equally by becoming a tool for powerful nations to maintain hegemony over weaker and poorer nations. JAT accuses the international system of having legalised and justified the Zionist and Crusader's barbarity against Muslims.

Ba'asyir's letter to the President of Myanmar, Thein Sein urging him and the people of Myanmar to stop persecuting the Rohingya Muslim community was a good case in point. The letter which was delivered to the Embassy of Myanmar in Menteng, Jakarta Pusat on 30 July 2012 was written in three languages; Bahasa Indonesia, English and Arabic; and was also made available to the public. In the letter, Ba'asyir demanded that they:

1. Hentikan kezaliman berupa pengusiran, pembantaian terhadap ummat Islam di Myanmar. (Stop the cruelty in the form of expulsion, massacres of Muslims in Myanmar)
2. Berikan mereka kebebasan untuk memeluk Islam dan menjalankan ibadahnya. (Give them the freedom to embrace Islam and perform their worship)
3. Jangan ada lagi diskriminasi terhadap ummat Islam. (No more discrimination against Muslims).⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸⁴ "Inilah Surat Ustadz Ba'asyir dengan 3 Bahasa untuk Presiden Myanmar," *Voice of Al Islam* (<http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2012/08/01/20073/inilah-surat-ustadz-baasyir-dengan-3-bahasa-untuk-presiden-myanmar/>, 01 Aug. 2012), accessed on 15 Mar. 2016.

The reply to Ba'asyir's letter from the government of Myanmar was on 08 August 2012.⁵⁸⁵ The reply indicated that the Myanmar government took Ba'asyir seriously even though he is not a government official and was in prison. The whole incident showed that JAT's strategy worked. Similarly, the call for the "sosialisasi untuk jihad ke Rohingya" (socialisation of jihad to Rohingya) by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab of FPI and reactions of other Muslim leaders after that are good examples that JAT could still punch above its weight.⁵⁸⁶

iv. Acting as a Hub Organisation

The strategy of working together to achieve the same objective is not new. It has been used in JI when it initiated meetings for *Rabitatul Mujahidin* and MMI when organising its congresses as a platform for networking. In JAT, the strategy is veiled to hide the real intention and carried out in secrecy when it involves jihad.

JAT's declaration in September 2008, for example, was an event that was attended by leaders of Islamic movements and organisations such as FPI, HTI, GPI, *Forum Umat Islam* (FUI), *Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Masjid* (FKAM), and *Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta* (FPIS).⁵⁸⁷ However, they participated in the event as a show of respect for Ba'asyir whom they consider

⁵⁸⁵ "Inilah Surat Balasan Pemerintah Myanmar untuk Ustadz Ba'asyir," *Voice of Al Islam* (<http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2012/08/28/20377/inilah-surat-balasan-pemerintah-myanmar-untuk-ustadz-baasyir/>, 28 Aug. 2012), accessed on 15 Mar. 2016,

⁵⁸⁶ "Jihad adalah Solusi!! Mujahidin Asia Siap Masuk Myanmar," *KabarNet* (<http://kabarnet.in/2013/05/09/jihad-adalah-solusi-mujahidin-asia-siap-masuk-myanmar/>, 09 May 2013), accessed on 15 Mar. 2016. See also, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, "Sikap Majelis Mujahidin Menghadapi Kejahatan Genosida Myanmar terhadap Rohingya dan Bisunya Kekuatan Barat," (<http://www.majelismujahidin.com/2015/05/sikap-majelis-mujahidin-menghadapi-kejahatan-genosida-myanmar-terhadap-rohingya-dan-bisunya-kekuatan-barat/>, 28 May 2015), accessed on 15 Mar. 2016.

⁵⁸⁷ Ali, *Al-Qaeda*, 192.

as a senior figure in *Da'wah*. None of them expressed any intention of joining JAT. They consider all Islamic movements and organisations as equals given their shared objective of implementing the *Sharia* and establishing the Islamic Caliphate *'ala minhajin nubuawah* (based on the Prophetic methodology). JAT, on the other hand, used the opportunity to gain their trust and acceptance so that JAT's future initiatives would get their support and participation.

Another more severe application of this strategy was the experiment to start a military training camp in Aceh. Nasir Abas asserted that many groups attended the training in Aceh with different interests. It was a network that consisted of NII, JI, JAT, *KOMPAK* (*Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis* or Crisis Management/Prevention Committee), FPI and the former MMI members.⁵⁸⁸

JAT's activists were involved in the Aceh-Pamulang network. It indicates that each jihad project (joint-training and carrying out operation) can be a meeting point that unites activists of the radical groups in Indonesia, ranging from the descendants of NII/DI, JI, MMI, JAT and other recruits.⁵⁸⁹

Jihad

Jihad as a strategy cannot be treated separately from JAT's outreach programmes of encouraging people to do good deeds and fight evil (*Al-Amr bi*

⁵⁸⁸ Febriyan, "Pelatihan Teroris di Aceh Ditunggangi Banyak Kepentingan," *TEMPO.CO* (<https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2010/10/28/063287914/pelatihan-teroris-di-aceh-ditunggangi-banyak-kepentingan>, 28 Oct. 2010), accessed on 30 Mar. 2016.

⁵⁸⁹ Rakhmat Damdami. "Jama'ah Anshorut Tauhid Sebagai Organisasi Hub Terorisme Berlatar Belakang Keagamaan di Indonesia" (Masters Thesis, University of Indonesia, 2011), 9.

al-Ma'rūf wa al-Nahy 'an al-Munkar).⁵⁹⁰ Always, JAT's jihad agenda will not be revealed to the public. The formation of JAT's secret military wing, for example, was not intended to carry out deadly terrorist attacks such as bombings. It was to ensure that JAT's activities could be carried out unimpeded. Nevertheless, JAT did not rule out fighting back if it was provoked. At the same time, the military wing could also act as a provider of security for JAT meetings and bodyguards for JAT leaders as needed. More generally, it is an apparatus for fighting social ills.⁵⁹¹

i. I'dad (Preparation in the Form of Military-Style Training)

Being committed to jihad, JAT must ensure that most, if not all of its members are trained militarily. While the ideology of jihad has been accepted by JAT members, carrying out jihad has its perils. Other than being equated with terrorism which Ba'asyir denied was the case,⁵⁹² JAT understood that performing jihad would be impossible without undergoing proper military training. The military training in Aceh was indeed an attempt to set *I'dad* in motion, but with its discovery by the Indonesian's security agency, JAT had to look at other alternatives.

⁵⁹⁰ See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's official speech during JAT inauguration in Bekasi on 17 September 2010. Available at <http://www.ansharuttauhid.com/jamaah/sistem-organisasi.html>, 5 Nov. 2010, accessed on 17 Feb. 2015. See also, Umi Kalsum "Ba'asyir: JAT Memang Berjihad, Bukan Teroris," *Viva News* (http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/151158-ba_asyir_jat_memang_berjihad_bukan_teroris, 15 May 2010), accessed on 30 Mar. 2016.

⁵⁹¹ ICG, 'The Dark Side of JAT', 10 and Umi Kalsum "Ba'asyir: JAT Memang Berjihad, Bukan Teroris," *Viva News*.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

ii. Hijrah (Migration)

One alternative is to send its members for military training outside Indonesia, and the best place would be in conflict zones where the Indonesian government would have difficulties intervening. The strategy had been implemented by JI in Afghanistan and the Philippines, so there was no reason for JAT not to adopt the strategy.

There is a strong possibility that Afif Abdul Madjid who ran JAT's day-to-day operations went to Syria for this reason. Afif was there for a month, from mid-December 2013 to mid-January 2014 and pledged allegiance to ISIS leader al-Baghdadi on 3 January 2014 after participating in a military training course.⁵⁹³ JAT was already involved in the activities of Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia which provided humanitarian aids to Syrians before Afif went there. In July 2013, JAT held a one-week fundraising event after Ba'asyir issued a call for Muslims to wage jihad in Syria. JAT West Nusa Tenggara collected a total of 117 million Indonesian Rupiah (US\$10,636). A documentary on Syria was also screened during the event in a shopping mall in Bima, the capital city of West Nusa Tenggara. To Ba'asyir, Syria is a "university for jihad education."⁵⁹⁴ All these support the argument that JAT has the intention of using Syria for *I'dad*.

⁵⁹³ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "Support for "Islamic State" in Indonesian Prisons," *IPAC Report No.15* (2015): 7.

⁵⁹⁴ V. Arianti, "Indonesian Jihadists and Syria: Training Ground?," *RSIS COMMENTARIES* No. 193 (2013).

iii. Qital Nikayah & Tamkin

JAT, like other non-integrative and pro-jihad groups in Indonesia, is divided over how jihad should be conducted in Indonesia.⁵⁹⁵ There are those who preferred the use of terror tactics and those who insisted that violence is acceptable only in conflict areas such as Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, or Ambon or Poso during their respective religious communal conflicts.

With Aman Abdurrahman's increasing influence on Ba'asyir, conducting *Qital Nikayah* and *Qital Tamkin* in Indonesia cannot be ruled out. Both tactics are discussed by Abu Muhammad 'Ashim Al-Maqdisiy, the most influential living Jihadi Theorist, in his tract: "*Waqafāt ma'a Thamarāt al-Jihād bayna al-Jahl fi al-Syar'i wa al-Jahl bi al-Wāqi'.*"⁵⁹⁶ The tract was translated into Bahasa Indonesia by Aman Abdurrahman as "Merenung Sejenak Atas Hasil-Hasil Jihad: Antara Kebodohan Akan Syari'at dan Kebodohan Akan Realita."⁵⁹⁷

In the tract, *Qital Nikayah* refers to repeated hits against the enemies to teach them a lesson, make them furious, cause damage, terrorise them, prevent them from harming Muslims, and release Muslims who are oppressed or imprisoned. On the other hand, the objective of *Qital Tamkin* has more to do with the removal of obstacles so that an Islamic state could be established.

Looking at Ba'asyir's and Aman's support for ISIS, the choice of tactics and targets at home would also be affected by developments in Syria. Sometimes, *Qital Nikayah* can also lead to or included in *Qital Tamkin*, and therefore there is no hard and fast rule that *Qital Nikayah* must be carried out

⁵⁹⁵ Umi Kalsum "Ba'asyir: JAT Memang Berjihad, Bukan Teroris" *Viva News*.

⁵⁹⁶ The copy that was analysed for this study was downloaded from: <http://justpaste.it/mvin> on 30 March 2016.

⁵⁹⁷ For the translation in Bahasa Indonesia on the two tactics, see: "Renungan Ke Dua Belas Antara Qital Nikayah Dengan Qital Tamkin" *Millah Ibrahim* (<https://millahibrahim.wordpress.com/2012/03/26/renungan-terhadap-hasil-hasil-jihad-bag-12/>, 26 Mar. 2012), accessed on 30 Mar. 2016.

before *Qital Tamkin*. Both are considered as good deeds and very much dependent on the situation in Indonesia.

6.4. Interpreting the Existential Threat

Several facts cannot be ignored when assessing the threat JAT poses to the existence of NKRI. JAT's ideology is fundamentally opposed to *Pancasila* as the ideological basis of the state of Indonesia. It has been explicitly expressed by JAT in its official document, "*Aqidah dan Manhaj*" (The Creed and Methodology). The irreconcilable differences also led JAT to continue propagating the implementation of the *Sharia* in Indonesia and the establishment of an Islamic state through jihad.

The existential threat that JAT poses to NKRI is, therefore, well-established and the current occupation with the ISIS's threat must not cause JAT to fall off the radar. However, time and again, the response from the Indonesian government is only focused on the physical threat and not, on the existential threat arising from JAT's ideology which opposes the very essence of the NKRI.

6.5. Securitisation of JAT

Indonesia's Anti-terrorism Law which supplements the *Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana* (KUHP, Criminal Law Procedures Code) and makes investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of terrorists easier, is still handicapped when dealing with the existential threat that JAT and other non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamist groups pose. It is particularly true when the threat is ideological and has not been transferred into the domain of action. It is,

therefore, difficult legally to designate JAT as an existential threat to the unitary *Pancasila* state. The responses thus far, have been directed against a more concrete threat like the Aceh militant training camp. In fact, Ba'asyir was convicted for funding the camp. Even Ba'asyir earlier conviction was also for his involvement in the 2002 Bali and August 2003 JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta bomb attacks.

The difficulty the government faced in implementing pro-active laws was evident. There was no consensus on “where the threat is coming from”, and a deep concern exists over negatively characterising Islam and linking it to terrorism. Many Muslim leaders at the district level perceived terrorism issue to be a scheme by the police to turn away attention from corruption scandals and served as an assurance to continue receiving counter-terrorism funds.⁵⁹⁸ There was also no consensus on the nature of the threat because many Indonesians cannot comprehend the attention given to terrorism when “less than a dozen people killed by terrorists each year for the last five years.” Many human rights advocates were concerned that freedom of expression which they work so hard to achieve would be jeopardised if the government began targeting hate speech or dictating the content of Friday khutbah (sermons). Within the Muslim community, many were worried that Islam would be negatively affected by such a move by the government.⁵⁹⁹

Also, the Indonesian Muslim community had not been adequately informed on what constitutes unacceptable speech or incitement to violence. The community became more confused when radical clerics expressed their

⁵⁹⁸ Jones, *Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam Since 1998*, 109-125.

⁵⁹⁹ Jones, Personal Interview.

views openly on the permissibility of shedding the blood of “thaghut, kafir, Ahmadiyah or others.” The confusion was further compounded by the view allowing attacks on institutions deemed to have been established to create mischief among Muslims such as “mesjid dhiror”.⁶⁰⁰

There is no denying that Detachment 88 or Densus 88 which was formed with support from Australia and the US has been effective in intelligence gathering and killing or apprehending suspected terrorists. The only regret was the Bali bombings provided the momentum for its formation. Despite that, to its credit, Densus 88 uncovered and dismantled an extremist training camp in Aceh in February 2010. Another noteworthy achievement by the government was the creation of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT, The National Agency for Combating Terrorism) in September 2010. Although the idea was conceived much earlier, it was the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings that facilitated BNPT’s formation. With its establishment, TNI became more formally involved in counter-terrorism activities. Jones, however, was not impressed by BNPT especially the prevention directorate which was led by a respected TNI officer. Since Indonesia considered terrorism as a crime that is dealt with by civilian law enforcement agencies, Jones finds TNI’s involvement contradictory. Jones is not convinced that TNI’s operational readiness would be effective in fighting a “theoretical enemy.” In the absence of expert knowledge within TNI on the workings of current extremist groups, its involvement not only yields no added value but also, “more likely to bring confusion, competition, and duplication of effort.”⁶⁰¹ Mbai only agrees with TNI’s

⁶⁰⁰ Ansyaad Mbai. Mahfuh Halimi, interviewer. Personal Interview, Jakarta (26 April 2017).

⁶⁰¹ Sidney Jones, “TNI and counter-terrorism: Not a good mix,” *Strategic Review*, January-March 2012, Vol. 2, No. 1.

involvement in counter-terrorism operations where the police do not have the necessary resources.⁶⁰²

Countering terrorism in Indonesia has made considerable progress. Nevertheless, the issue of establishing a consensus between the securitising agents and the relevant audience on the existential threat posed by non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists remains elusive. Both Hendropriyono and Mbai insisted that declaring an individual or an organisation a terrorist is only possible if either of them has been involved in terrorism cases. The government cannot securitise and declare them an existential threat without prior involvement in terrorism. It has become a dilemma that the Indonesia government is facing and to a large extent hinders achieving a consensus between the securitisers and the relevant audience. The responses thus far rely heavily on reactive law, and any attempt to introduce a law which is pro-active and preventive will be viewed with utmost suspicion and seen as a bid to return to the *Orba* era.⁶⁰³

Notwithstanding these concerns, the role of Indonesia's civil society in tackling the threats of Islamist radicalism and terrorism has been significant. Many civil society actors were involved in minimising and containing the threat of terrorism. They work to counter the strategy of the radical groups seeking to contaminate Muslims in Indonesia with violent ideologies.

In fact, NU and Muhammadiyah are already at the forefront, countering the dissemination of radical Islamist ideology and jihadi teachings through various initiatives of their own. Indonesian civil society has been involved at

⁶⁰² Personal Interview, Jakarta, 26 April 2017.

⁶⁰³ Hendropriyono, Personal Interview, (27 Apr. 2017), and Mbai, Personal Interview, (23 Sep. 2014).

the grassroots level to strengthen Indonesian Muslims' awareness of and social resilience against the threats of Islamist radicalism and terrorism. Internally, the focus of the civil society organisations is on instilling the religious understanding that is more tolerant, moderate, inclusive, and nationalist among their respective members. Externally, the focus is more on the creation of a better image of Islam, both domestically and internationally. The civil society campaigns against Islamist radicalism and terrorism have not only embraced the on-going democratic consolidation after Suharto but have also been consistent with Indonesians' aspiration for modern democracy.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰⁴ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Towards a Population-Centric Strategy: Indonesian Experience in Countering Islamist Radicalism and Terrorism," *ICCT Guest Commentary* (<https://icct.nl/publication/towards-a-population-centric-strategy-indonesian-experience-in-countering-islamist-radicalism-and-terrorism/>, 01 July 2011), accessed on 03 Oct 2017.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This study set out to explore the reasons underlying the post-Suharto Indonesian state's weak response to the existential threat posed by non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamist groups. Although there is substantial evidence to show that these Islamists are threatening to undermine the unitary and pluralistic Indonesian state, still, the government has not taken the necessary steps to reduce their influence, i.e. to securitise them. They are left to continue preaching and spreading their ideology which in essence calls for the reconfiguration of the *Pancasila* state.

This study hypothesised that the post-Suharto Indonesian state's decision against securitising the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists is the result of an absence of a consensus on the existential threat posed by these non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. It is also a result of a strong public reaction to security which had been the focus of the Suharto regime and is affecting securitisation of the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists by the securitisers. The general Indonesian public as the relevant audience is not easily convinced that such measures are indeed necessary.

Applying the securitisation theory proposed by the Copenhagen School, the study investigated the existential threat posed by JI, MMI, and JAT. Their origin and development, ideology, and strategy were systematically examined and the existential threats, they pose to the NKRI as well as the government's responses to the threat were then assessed. In doing so, this study examined

primary and related documents as well as audiovisual materials from the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research Database (ICPVTR), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This study also analysed documents and audiovisual materials from the Ideological Support Database which the writer established as the Team Leader of ICPVTR's Counter-Ideology Unit. Cross-references were also made to the ICPVTR's Research Analysts' collection of extremist materials found on the Internet while monitoring radical and extremist groups' websites since 2007. Several field trips to Yogyakarta and Jakarta were undertaken for this study.

After the documentary data had been thoroughly analysed, interviews were conducted. Those interviewed were the Indonesian government's appointed security officials, security analysts, public intellectuals, members of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as well as the public. There was evidence that Indonesians wanted stricter laws to tackle violent radical extremists but they were vague on the legal changes they wanted. There was a concern on Human Rights violations if the government was given the discretion to act without effective oversight of the process in countering violent radical extremists. Indonesians highly value the liberal democracy that is taking shape in Indonesia which was made possible by removing Suharto, and Indonesians are not willing to forgo the rule of law in a liberal democracy setting easily even in the fight against terrorism. The following sections will sum up the other findings of this study.

7.1. The *Pancasila* State as the Referent Object of Security

Except for the non-integrative and pro-jihad JI, MMI, and JAT, Indonesians accept the *Pancasila* as the national ideology of the Indonesian state. It is what binds together the diverse ethnic groups, belief systems, and cultures since Indonesia's independence till now. As the core of the *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), Indonesians believe that a call to reconfigure the ideological basis of the state by discarding the *Pancasila* will fundamentally alter the essence of the Unitary State of Indonesia. Since the *Pancasila* doctrine is at the core of the NKRI, any attempt to replace the *Pancasila* through violent or non-violent means will directly threaten the NKRI. In this regard, the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists, by their rejection of the *Pancasila* state and their constant endeavours to reconfigure the present Indonesian state to that which is Islamic, are an existential threat. The existential threat stems from the fact that it gives rise to an either-or situation where compromise, reconciliation, and middle ground are not parts of these Islamists' scheme of things.

Although a general agreement exists on safeguarding the *Pancasila* State as the referent object of security, many Indonesians contest the precise manner in which the government should act when non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists threaten the NKRI. They do not agree on giving the government the right to implement extraordinary measures to safeguard the survival of the *Pancasila* state. As a consequence, they are hesitant in legitimising the government's use of extraordinary means such as preventive detention which allows detention without trial to deal with the threat.

7.2. Existential Threat to the NKRI

In assessing the existential threat of the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamist groups such as JI, MMI, and JAT, the study found substantial evidence showing that these groups reject the NKRI which is based on *Pancasila*. They intended to make Islam the new unifying basis of the NKRI. While their initial intentions were clear, their strategy became more ambiguous after the Bali Bombings of 12 October 2002 and the subsequent success in dismantling JI infrastructures. They now articulate it differently by pursuing the implementation of the *Sharia* in Indonesia. The implementation of the *Sharia* in itself is a rejection of the NKRI and its foundations. Their ideology considers changing the very basis of the NKRI as “harga mati” (fixed price) and therefore, a necessary and unassailable condition for the implementation of the *Sharia*.

They consider the state which is established with *Pancasila* as its foundation as a grave impediment to the implementation of the *Sharia* when the majority of the populations are Muslims and Islam therefore, should be an integral part of the state’s identity. Things would have been different if the first *sila* of the belief in God had retained the phrase referred to as the “seven words” which was in the Jakarta Charter. Implementation of the *Sharia* has, therefore, become an essential part of their struggle and the underlying motivation for the establishment of their organisations. Reconfiguring the NKRI foundations was the way these Islamists chose to pave the way for a formal role for Islam within the State and the implementation of the *Sharia*.

These groups did not specifically single out employing violence as a means to achieve the goal of implementing the *Sharia*. However, their

obsession with jihad which they interpreted militarily led them to be involved in military training and conflicts in Afghanistan, Southern Philippines and Syria. The experience the Indonesian government had with JI's metamorphosis into a terrorist organisation affiliated to AQ led to the conclusion that the government must not treat an existential threat to the NKRI as inconsequential to the existence of the *Pancasila* state as the referent object of security. The fact that these non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists are ready to form alliances with like-minded groups and organisations both domestic and foreign under the notion of "*Tansiq bainal jama'ah*" (collaborations with other groups) and "*Lintas Tandhim*" (cross-organisation) to achieve their objective supports this finding further. Thus, whatever they lack regarding capabilities can be augmented by such alliances and so, amplify the existential threat.

The study, having looked at these movements through the lens of an existential threat, has found them representing a significant matter of concern but falling short, in capacity and immediate potential, of actually constituting an existential threat. The framework of securitising in response to an existential threat is helpful. However, it does not provide the answer to assessing the threat posed by these movements.

Indonesia in the post-Suharto era is more open and democratic. The post-Suharto reforms had seen the military abandoning its *dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine, which validated TNI's involvement in practical politics. TNI returned to the barracks and forfeited its seats in the House of Representatives. The reforms also brought about a new division of labour where the military focused on external defence and the police on internal security affairs. The Police were no longer under the Ministry of Defence and Security and came under the

Ministry of Home Affairs. The TNI leadership recognised civilian supremacy and guaranteed the continuation of democracy in Indonesia. Also, the process of political leadership succession from Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and since 20 October 2014, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) had become more stable. All these, profoundly, gave Indonesians the confidence that the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists would find difficulty in effecting changes to the existing political system in Indonesia.

Looking at the limited capabilities of these groups in carrying out such a grand project, the feeling of confidence is not entirely unfounded. Also, the two most prominent Islamic organisations, *NU* and *Muhammadiyah* serve as bulwarks of moderation and are standing firmly behind NKRI. However, lately, the role *NU* and *Muhammadiyah* played as civil societies defending any threat to the NKRI is being questioned.

From the detailed study of the origin and development as well as the ideology and strategy of the three case studies, there is substantial evidence that the existential threat remains significant. Given this finding, to ignore the existential threat posed by these non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists is self-defeating. It only reassures these groups and the general Indonesian public that the government does not consider them as a threat. Already, they are not known to keep idle. Even under constant surveillance, there are indications that they tried to manoeuvre and circumvent whatever measures the government put in place to curb their influence.

The potential for radical Islamism to become an increasingly substantial threat in Indonesia via the vector of populist politics cannot be taken lightly.

Allowing non-integrative and pro-Jihad Islamist movements to manoeuvre freely could, potentially, ultimately manifest as an existential threat especially if they were leveraged through populist political parties, leaders or movements.

7.3. Government Responses and the Difficulty of Reaching a Consensus on the Existential Threat

The study found that the Indonesian government's reactive responses to the terrorist threats have been effective. The government increased the state capacity to deal with terrorist threats through the establishment of governmental institutions and agencies to counter the threat. Likewise, the professionalisation of law enforcement officers was noticeable.

However, the Indonesian government was lenient in its response to the rise of non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and groups. The government allowed them to operate openly without sanction as long as they did not break any laws. The absence of pro-active and preventive laws in Indonesia further prevented the securitisers from reaching a consensus on the existential threat because there is no legal basis to help establish an agreement. Often, the existential threat is perceived as linked to defence. In Indonesia, that is the responsibility of the TNI as the guardian of the unitary *Pancasila* state of Indonesia. However, in this case, the existential threat from non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and groups is classified under the threat of terrorism which is a crime in Indonesia and therefore, the concern of the Indonesian Police, whose focus is domestic security. Any revision to the existing law on terrorism which suggests a more significant role for TNI will not be unanimously accepted or even adopted by the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR, The House

of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia) for fear of Human Rights violations in the future.

Also, if adopted by the DPR, the revisions could also lead to violations of freedom of association, opinion, and assembly. There is also concern that the revisions could be used to brand an act as subversive when discussions within the community lead to radical thinking. Some Indonesians considered radicalism harmful only when transformed into action, but radical thinking is not forbidden, especially when viewed from an academic perspective.

The different points of view within the government and of those outside the government have made it difficult to achieve successful securitisation of the threat posed by the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. There was disagreement at two different levels – among the securitisers as well as among the relevant audience. On the one hand, the securitisers from among the political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups could not come to a consensus. On the contrary, the dominant relevant audience such as members of NU and Muhammadiyah could not agree on the existential threat. Taking into consideration the opinions of other mass organisations in Indonesia, the critical political consensus that is needed to allow the use of extraordinary measures to counter the existential threat posed by non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists cannot be achieved.

As a result, the government found it difficult to proscribe non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists. Such measures are not only a politically delicate process but also, equally ambiguous because of the legal vacuum. Under such circumstances, the government cannot articulate convincing justifications for a ban, and for that reason, an adequate legal mechanism for its implementation

cannot be created. In essence, due to the lack of a clear legal framework for law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, there is uncertainty over what legal sanctions could be taken against the existential threat that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists pose.

7.4. Lessons Learned

The three case studies in this thesis have furnished strong arguments for non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists to be securitised and designated as an existential threat to the NKRI. The Indonesian government, however, could not securitise them because of three critical factors.

First, the securitisers and relevant audience agree that any actions against non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and their organisation can only be taken if they are involved in terrorism cases. As such, the government could not secure the mandate of the people to securitise non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and their organisations based solely on their radical ideology when they had not planned or carried out any terrorist attacks.

Second, the democracy that Indonesia is enjoying after Suharto's fall. It shaped Indonesia into becoming a stronger "negara hukum," a state that implements its government based on the rule of law. Allowing the government to act without effective oversight by the people and allowing the use of draconian laws is not part of the reformation that all Indonesians aspire to, after putting an end to Suharto's *Orba* (*Orde Baru* or New Order). Furthermore, securitisation and the subsequent action of moving the securitised issue from the realm of normal politics to extraordinary politics are inconsistent with reformation. The government and the people will not do anything that will

negate the sacrifice of Indonesians to reform the country into the world's largest Muslim democracy.

Third, filling the legal vacuum by introducing preventive law is considered a regression and not progression. While Indonesians agree that Indonesia must be entrenched in “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (Unity in Diversity), finding the right balance of actions against those whose ideology is opposed to it, is still a work in progress. More specifically, the non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists cannot be taken to task using a preventive law like the Internal Security Act of Singapore or its replacement in Malaysia, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) which Malaysia is currently implementing.

To eliminate the existential threat from non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and their organisations, Indonesia must make a deliberate attempt to develop a consensus between the securitisers and the relevant audience. There must be agreement among the securitising agents when securitising non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and their organisations. The government must convince the relevant audience such as the politically aware public and the leadership of the most significant Muslim organisations (*NU* and *Muhammadiyah*) that non-integrative and pro-jihad Islamists and their organisations are indeed an existential threat, and they must allow the government to formulate and implement policies necessary to contain the threat. Currently, this is an area where a consensus is lacking in Indonesia.

The Indonesian President Joko Widodo's signing of a government regulation on 10 July 2017 which amends Law No. 17/2013 on Civil Society Organisations

(CSO) to expedite the legal process of disbanding “illegal” civil society organisations is the best recent demonstration of it.

7.5. Applying the Same Model to Other Countries

Before the model in this thesis could be applied to other countries, it is crucial to first establish the referent object of security for the countries in question. Unlike Indonesia, these countries might not have a national ideology or philosophy that is the foundational block upon which the whole country rests and owes its existence. Therefore, developing a national ideology, philosophy or shared values is the first crucial step. Educating the population on the existential threat to the referent object is the next step where the different groups of securitisers and the relevant audience could be brought together to agree on the existential threats. Subsequently, the prior agreement must be established among them on the necessary actions to take to neutralise the existential threat. In line with this, the government and the people must define the degree of freedom for the government to act and the extent of the oversight needed for the government’s actions. The agreement will ensure effective countering of the existential threat without delay, and addressing the valid concerns from various parties from among the relevant audience.

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