The definition of morality : threading the needle

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The Definition of Moral Dittiness the Needle

Abstract

This essay proposes a descriptive definition of moral systems. Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules and psychological characteristics developed which performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social interaction. A method is employed by proponents of moral systems to establish a descriptive definition of morality as a way to track patterns of moral behavior. However, these methods are in nominal definition only, and moral appraisers may be ignorant about the references of the terms used in the definitions. This essay characterizes moral systems as a social construct and explains what it takes for a moral system to be defined as a moral system. It identifies evidence needed to distinguish moral systems from other kinds.

¹ Bernard Gert, *The Definition of Moral Principles* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/moral-principles/>>

² Gert, emphasis added.

³ Jonathan Haidt and Selin Kesebir, *Morality: The Science of Good and Evil*, vol. 2, ed. Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey (NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 798; *Evolution of Moral Psychology*, ed. John M. Doris and the Research Psychology Group (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 30

human nature in many ways that morality is, and why. It is so widely believed that morality has a basis in human nature that many people see no need for normative reasons as to why we act, think, or feel as we do. Of course, there is controversy about what a descriptive definition of morality would help to settle, specifying what it means to be a candidate for authoritative moral requirements. For instance: the normative ethical theory known as ethical egoism holds that we should promote our own interests. But if a definition of morality reveals that duties are the sorts of requirements that we should follow, then ethical egoism is false. In fact, many theories of duties of persons, according to the proposed definition, are false. The defining property of moral systems is that they are supposed to transcend individual interests.

In this essay, I argue that many psychologists' moral systems are in a way that is either too broad or too narrow. I will show that a descriptive definition of morality can identify some genuine moral systems and make his approach more rigorous. Jonathan Haidt and his students propose a descriptive definition of morality that is too broad. However, Haidt tends to misapply it. He misapplies that classifies some systems as moral when they ought to be considered as systems.

⁴ Gert, §1.

⁵ Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are (Not) Good* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012) 212, 258.

A typical strategy for describing the domain of morality is to divide it into moral and non-moral phenomena. The domain of morality encompasses the social and psychological phenomena that can be classified under this common classification is based on certain shared features as codes or a tendency to be shared together. Gert and Flanagan (1985) define the domain of morality as conduct of behavior that requires or forbids compliance with certain standards or rules of conduct. Practices of reward and punishment, and internalization of moral principles, and psychological states, judgments, and motivations are all part of the domain of morality. That which falls into the domain of morality is opposed to non-moral codes or conduct, or states of psychology, and modes of character development. Here we use the term "moral" to refer to the domain of morality, and "non-moral" to refer to the domain of non-morality.

⁶ Chandra Sekhar Sripada, *A Framework for the Psychology of Mind, Culture and Cognition* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 200.

moral modes of character. Few, however, may reveal that moral systems contain additional elements; the ones described here are especially revealing of morality.

Not all systems have governing psychological states, and modes of character development may differ. As we shall see, Turiel's research on the distinction between morality and social conventions has had a profound impact on people's regard for moral systems as a whole. In general, all types of moral systems are value systems. Although all moral systems are value systems, not all value systems are moral systems. The difference between moral systems and value systems is not grounded merely in intuition; ultimately, those differences are grounded in difference in causal history.

Perhaps the best approach to the study of moral development is by using a moral/conventional distinction task. This task is designed to test whether subjects distinguish between conventional and moral rules. Paradigmatic conventional rules include the rule that people should wear a seat belt, or that people should not cheat on tests. Paradigmatic moral rules include rules that forbid hitting, lying, or breaking promises. When subjects are presented with a description of a rule, they are asked to indicate whether they recognize any

⁷ Elliot Turiel, *The Development of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁸ Daniel Kelly et al., "Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction," *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 117.

differe**be** between moral and conventional transgressions. After consensus trials with subjects of various ages and backgrounds, Turiel and colleagues concluded that people distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions following⁹

(T1) moral transgressions are considered more basic than conventional transgressions

(T2) moral rules are like conventional ones in that they are independent i.e.it, would be wrong morally even if an authority told you to do it;

(T3) moral rules are regarded as universally applicable whereas conventional rules only apply at specific times and places;

(T4) moral rules are justified on the grounds of their inherent, injustice, or the violation of rights

Response to T4) This may consist in a tendency to occur together in subjects as young as 3 years old, and is not culture specific. Turiel concluded that the moral domain prescribes judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people should treat each other

⁹Ibid., 111-119.

¹⁰Ibid., 119.

¹¹Larry N. Eisenberg, *Education in the Moral Domain* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Daniel Kelly, and Stephen Stich, *The Moral Domain: A Companion to Philosophy of Psychology* (John Symons and Peter Carr-Saunders, 2009): 624

¹²Turiel, 3.

However, other studies of nonmoral/conventional or trade-off trade-off findings, a particularly notable example is given at a large socioeconomic subjects in Brazil and the United States, and to be harmless, but disrespectful, still judged to be ¹³Wrong socioeconomic groups regarded such as masturbating with a dead chicken and cleaning a toilet as more offenses. Indeed, respondents were viewed as less serious if they violated were thought to be dependent on their social status.

These and findings led Haidt to the idea that a domain of morality is not limited to concerns for justice, fairness, and rights, but also concerns advance what they would call foundational concerns, to which all other concerns constitute the domain. ¹⁴The domain of morality is foundational in the sense that respondents consistently found them being highly relevant to their moral judgment. Respondents display a tendency to agree with statements foundational concerns.

The five foundational concerns enumerated by Haidt are the

¹³Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller, and Maria G. Dias, Affect, Culture, and Dog Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(3), 613.

¹⁴Haidt, Koller, and Dias, 613; Machery and Mallon, 34.

¹⁵Haidt and Kesebir, 822; The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham, Planet of the Durkheimians, Where Community, Authority, and Sacredness and Foundation Psychological Bases of Ideology, and Systems. CusKiyca and H. Thorisdottir (New York: University Press, 2009): 371.

¹⁶Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, The Moral Mind: How Five Sets of Innate Moral Foundations and the Future Carruthers, Stephen Lawrence, & Stephen Stich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹⁷Haidt and Graham, 385.

¹⁸Haidt and Kesebir, 822; Haidt and Joseph, 382.

(H1) Harm/care concerns for the well-being of others.

(H2) Fairness/reciprocity concerns about unfair treatment and cheating
abstract notions of justice and rights.

(H3) Ingroup/loyalty concerns related to obligations to help group as
loyalty, sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal.

(H4) Authority/respect concerns related to social obligations involved in
hierarchical relationships, such as obedience, respect
based duties.

(H5) Purity/sanctity concerns about physical and spiritual contagion
virtues of chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires.

I concur with Haidt's argument that the domain of morality is not limited to concerns for harm and fairness, even if the method of classifying moral systems is too narrow. Haidt errs by classifying moral systems too narrowly. Haidt suggests that systems are not discriminately associated with loyalty, deference, purity. In sections 3 and 4, I detail what I take to be the best method for formulating a descriptive definition of morality. I employ both methods that are inadequate to this task to such a definition.

3 Searching for a Real Definition of Morality

Stephen Stich has two approaches to a descriptive definition of morality. The first is linguistic. A conceptual analysis involves trying to understand how speakers use concepts moral, immoral, right, wrong, etc. Speakers have intentions about what these terms (concepts) do and do not apply to. A definition of a concept is good and coherent to the extent it is an application.

The second approach to a descriptive definition of morality is naturalistic. It is the claim that speakers at least in terms of their terms (concepts) of a natural kind is a hypothesis whose empirical properties that display a characteristic tendency to occur. The essential properties of a natural kind are properties which explain the existence of that kind, and which natural kind members are natural kinds that have independent existences. This means a naturalistic perspective of whether or not any particular speaker believes it exists.

There is a crucial difference between conceptual analysis and naturalism. To see this, consider as an example if a unicorn is a natural kind. In the philosophy of language, a concept is a natural kind. Gremlins do not constitute a natural kind. Gremlins are a human imagination. But there is the concept of a gremlin along with the term gremlin as a term.

¹⁹Nado, Kelly, and Stich, Stephen Stich, *Realism and the Philosophy of Language* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009), 221.

²⁰David Brink, *Realism, Naturalism and the Philosophy of Language*: 115-16.

²¹Crawford L. Elder, *On the Place of Artifacts in Ontology*, *Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 115-16.

concepts initially believed to be natural kinds subsisted for a time as if that there is no such thing as a natural kind. For example, the phlogiston and caloric. Lavoisier thought that phlogiston consists of a penetrant gas. It turned out, though, that such a thing as caloric that heat is a molecular kinetic energy. Hence not a natural kind, was once believed to be. In other cases, the term leads to one natural kind, but subsequent investigation speaks of mistaken beliefs about those kinds. In Ancient Greece and China, water was thought to be of a different nature, rather than a compound of elements. The 19th century chemist John Dalton believed water to be a molecular compound of H₂O. Nevertheless, the old and standard concepts that water is a single entity, for thousands of years, human societies around the world possessed. They applied to stones that English speakers still call jade. However, it was in the 19th century when mineralogists discovered that jade refers to two really different natural kinds with different chemical compositions. Contrary to what speakers once believed, the term jade had two different meanings, not just two natural kinds.

The point, heteromorphisms and concepts are elements of linguistic activity. Natural kinds exist independently of a theory. We often intend our terms and concepts to be independent of theory, but we fail to do so, or may only be partially successful. For this reason, conceptual analysis is best based on minimal definitions. A minimal definition of a term (or concept)

discovered by investigating the conditions under which speakers use a term (or concept). On the other hand, inquiry into real definitions can furnish a definition of a term (or concept) by investigating the conditions under which that term (or concept) is used. A natural kind of definition is one form of real definition. Tracking the ways in which speakers use and apply terms is a strategy for finding real definitions, because speakers become more aware of their terms at the same time, discoveries of real definitions are more likely to have proven to be interesting and informative. It is not clear whether morality is a natural kind. According to psychologists and philosophers, the definition of morality should be a definition.

Just what sort of approach to a definition of morality is put forward by Stich suggests that Turiel's project can be interpreted as an attempt to find a definition of morality which characterizes systems as a natural kind. The kind of responses elicited by children in the task of the 'blue box' are postulated to be the essential properties of the kind. In other words, the moral is laid to be the natural kind consisting of rules that are universally applicable and justified by appeal to fairness, justice, or rights.

²²Anil Gupta, 'Definition', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/definitions/>>, §1. 1.

²³Brink, 1159.

²⁴Stich, Reply to 223, 222.

²⁵Ibid., 223.

However, I doubt that the only good definition of morality is the one that, at best, the moral/conventional task reveals. As pointed out in the previous section, the term like wrong, even if it were a consistent expression of the term, would not be wrong to instantiate as serious, authority independent, universally applicable, and just, there is still the possibility that the term is designated by the term wrong.

It is likewise true that the methods will illuminate a real definition of morality. Haidt draws findings from his experiments. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire²⁶ Like the moral/conventional task, this survey only asks what factors people find relevant in their moral judgments. But, once again, even if a handful of factors, like harm, purity, loyalty, etc., are the ones that people use to make their judgments, it follows from this that there is no any representation of moral judgments.

On the other hand, if we suppose a real definition of morality, it follows, I will argue that this definition is not a good one. The findings have been indispensable clues toward the discovery of a better system of people's intuitions about what is right or wrong. We can acquire information about the moral intuitions that is, what is that speakers refer to when they use and apply the term. The referential intentions which govern the use of the term are not the ones that

²⁶Haidt and Graham, 385.

²⁷Brink, 1172 Stich, Reply to Prinz, 222.

search for a naturalistic definition as the intended moral ideal. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire offers a rich source of data associated with the terms. Indeed, a significant finding is that in some cultures or subcultures, terms not just to rules pertaining to the prevention of harm, but also to rules about loyalty, authority, and purity/sanctity. Those terms must be accounting for the intended moral ideal. And we should expect from any adequate characterization of morality to be able to explain why people's moral judgments are sensitive to these reasons. Haidt's proposed definition of morality is plausible in explaining why so many people's moral judgments are sensitive to loyalty, authority, and purity/sanctity.

That being said, Haidt's moral foundations theory suffers from which I elucidate in sections 4. First, Haidt applies his own definition by being permissive in the way he classifies judgments as reported moral judgments. Haidt's definition of morality requires a narrower classification. Second, much of Haidt's empirical data, the data drawn from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, is inapt for his proposed definition of morality.

4 Haidt's Evolutionary Account of Morality

Haidt's moral foundations theory is a picture of morality as a Therefore, the proposed definition of morality is a function of this definition.

offers a plausible and testable explanation of how moral systems have evolved. Haidt holds that moral systems have evolved to perform the function of mutually beneficial social coordination. Accordingly, Haidt writes that humanity's moral system is a product of

ancient instincts and emotions that have been refined in more recent times with the help of cultural creations (such as law, religion, etc.) that serve the function of suppressing selfishness and increasing coordinated action.²⁸

On the basis of this functionalist account, Haidt offers the following definition of moral systems:

Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, institutions, technologies, psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate behavior that is not in the best interests of the community.²⁹

According to Haidt, a moral system is a set of values, norms, institutions, psychological states, and modes of character development that are transmitted because they perform a useful function.

²⁸Haidt and Kesebir, 2015, p. 15.

²⁹Haidt, 2013, p. 11.

functions suppress selfishness and enable beneficial social cooperation. Systems perform well if they successfully resolve the dilemmas found in H1 through H5 listed above. The code concerns basic psychological predispositions, other than the five agents to resolve recurrent adaptive problems to the longevity dilemmas and social dilemmas (Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Graham, 2004). The harm/care concern motivates individuals to meet the adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable kin. The fairness/reciprocity concern motivates individuals to acquire the benefits of cooperation, while the guarding/loyalty concern motivates individuals to acquire the benefits of cooperation, particularly in the context of intergroup competition. The authority/respect concern motivates individuals to acquire their place in the orderly social hierarchy. The purity/sanctity concern motivates individuals to avoid potential parasites.

When a social group institutes a moral system that successfully addresses these concerns, it will be more effective in engaging in collectively beneficial cooperation than social groups that lack a system. Large groups with well-functioning moral systems should be able to compete more effectively in military conflict and economic performance. These systems should be able to manage public available food sources without producing a large number of selfish individuals.

³⁰Haidt and Koller, 2001; Haidt and Koller, 2001; Haidt and Koller, 2001; Haidt and Koller, 2001.

³¹Haidt and Koller, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2001.

And, they would be able to share knowledge of strategies for catching with surrounding environments, predators, diseases, and dangerous substances.

5 What a Moral System is Not

At this stage, Haidt's classifications of what counts as a moral system are too broad and permissive. I suggest that the way he defines moral systems is inconsistent with his definition of the function of the moral system. Haidt suggests that a moral system can be interpreted as to any of the five basic moral systems. If a value system can be interpreted as such, it may have the function of a morally beneficial social cooperation. A value system that is not under Haidt's own real definition of, it should not qualify as a moral system.

Haidt suggests that a moral system is designed to address the purity/sanctity concerns. Taboos motivate people to stay away from things that are dirty or contagious. On the other hand, anthropologists have found that such functions. As a case in point, the anthropologist L.L. Langness reports that people in highland Papua New Guinea used to eat chicken feces. This was because the chickens ate the feces. This was a taboo because the chickens ate the feces. This could be a function for the avoidance of

³²Haidt and Joseph, 384.

³³Chandra Sekhar Sripada and Stephen Stich, *Evolution, Culture, and the Mind: Emotion, Evolution, and Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), n. 16.

contagion, the kabob in spite of its having heart effects, since the Bena Bena were chemically deficient

Next, considering group/loyalty foundations and discrimination as a rule or judgment, what the loyalty to one's social group is or judgment³⁵ But some demands group action be a conscious leak, not cooperation. Between 1900 and 1950 the Mereng Enga in Papua New Guinea killed each other in warfare at a rate of about 300 deaths per 1000 living people³⁶ Beginning in the late 1930s, the Australian government tried to reduce violence among the Enga. But in 1975, when Papua New Guinea gained independence from Australia, warring among the Enga resumed. Officials in the government doled out land and favors to their clansmen. This favoritism and exacted vengeance, according to anthropologist Polly Wiessner,

[w]arring engaged employed mercenaries skilled in the use of semi-automatic weapons called Rambos or hiremen, who fought largely for brotherhood and out justice where the government had failed. In the 1990s, warriors formed by Rambos that crossed boundaries, simulating some in the past. Men who had never cooperated before were bonded through confession, traditional fight magic³⁷, and victory celebration

³⁴Edgerton, 56.

³⁵Haidt and Joseph, 2008.

³⁶Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (New York: Viking, 2011), p. 53, 8.

³⁷Polly Wiessner and Tarrow, *Peace: Foreign Arms and Indigenous Institutions in Society* (2012): 1652.

Wiessner and Leach conducted extensive interviews with these F
they were asked what motivated them to practice such ramp

All of them [i.e., the Rambos] began their careers by f
with bows and arrows to avenge injustices to clan membe

Most Rambos said that they became caught up in the e
their initial year, reveling in the praise they received from
other wars, whether as mercenaries or by used most of their ea
to help clan members with school fees, hospital bills, and

The Mae Enga were driven into the infant blood shed motives
were diverse, but among those motives was revenge for a clan or
gang. Eventually, beginning in the early 2 of the 1970s, Enga i
Province often women, elders started to campaign for peace and
security. Deaths by homicide subsequently declined (2001 and
2009)³⁹

As a last case in point, consider Haidt's foundational conc

³⁸Wiessner, Polly, Youth, Elders, and the Wagwokei: A Paper for the Enga Province of
and Governance in Melanesia: Australian National University, 2010), 11.

³⁹Wiessner & Pupu, 1652.

The current triggers of the Authority/subversion my foundation that is consensual of obedience, disobedience, respect, dis or rebellion, regard to authorities perceived to be legitimate and include acts that are seen to subvert the traditions, institutions perceived provide stability

Under Haidt's moral foundations system, individuals hold many rules that impose obligations of obedience, respect, and deference to individuals or groups having legitimate authority.

However, some rules require obedience to authority contravene the foundations ascribes to moral systems. The Hindu caste system expects individuals to subordinate themselves to castes. The caste system is widely legitimate by means of upper caste members of relatively high status invoke the caste ideology superior status and hierarchy. In this way, remarkably, the caste Untouchable groups accept the caste hierarchy, particularly the station of other Untouchable groups deemed lower in the hierarchy. It is only subject to the hypothesis that Robert Deliege describes ethnically ambivalent attitudes of the Untouchable toward

⁴⁰Haidt, *The Righteous Mind* (emphasis added).

⁴¹Robert Deliege, *The Untouchables*, trans. N. A. Scott (New York: 1962), 62.

& an Untouchable will refer to caste ideology for the purpose of degradation of the castes below him, he will not explain his own status or to legitimize the⁴² position of his caste.

& Untouchables, then, do not form a homogeneous category in the caste system & their resentment is not directed against the [caste system] against their own position within it. They therefore do not join the system as to improve their⁴³ place within it.

Although the caste system is generally perceived to be legal, it is disadvantageous by its nature, and it is a source of social strife. Although the Indian constitution guarantees equality before the law, Untouchables have asserted their legal rights and provoked violence from people in high places. According to a 1999 report published by Human Rights Watch, between 1994 and 1996, at least 1,000 were registered with the police nationwide as crimes and atrocities. In the Indian state of Bihar, caste militias have been involved in bloody feuds for years. Hundreds of Untouchables have been killed in the process. In a mass⁴⁵ One high caste militia, the Ramvir Sena, more than 400 Untouchables were killed in Bihar between 1995 and 1996.

⁴²Ibid., 62.

⁴³Ibid., 63.

⁴⁴Human Rights Watch, *When People: Caste Violence Against Untouchables* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/index.htm#TopOfPage>

⁴⁵Tom O'Neill, *National Geographic* 203, photo 6 (2003).

⁴⁶Human Rights Watch, *When People*

Caste-based violence is by its nature authoritarian and despotic as Haidt describes it. A concern of the top members of the traditional social hierarchy is to allow the upper castes to monopolize land, education, power, while denying these goods to the most extreme and intolerant toward government measures to eliminate caste discrimination. The upper castes are entitled to the status of untouchables, and are willing to brutality as a means of enforcing their privilege.⁴⁷

Haidt emphasizes that moral systems function to enable socially collectively beneficial cooperation related to agriculture, trade, infrastructure development. From this perspective it becomes even harder to fathom how the Hindu caste system could qualify as a moral system. Egon Korten enumerates several inefficiencies inherent in the caste system:

The result of this immensely complicated anthropological process is that standards of the lowest caste to a level that presumably re-allocate functions on the basis of heredity, not aptitude; instill ritualistic restrictions on the market - the foreign exchange market is outside the community and reduce the chances of mutual evasion and their respective efforts to

⁴⁷Ibid., §III.

⁴⁸Haidt and Korten,

an artificial individual distance between persons suppressed
competition that in the European case, at any rate, has pro

Here we find another line which the caste system does not
consist of obligations to defend status which individuals are cooperative
functional characteristics. Although he has suggested that the caste
may have afforded some economic benefits, as a means of contract
enforcement,⁴⁹ it is extremely unlikely that these benefits would offset the many
costs outlined by the author. Facts can be enforced in societies not
stratified by heredity. Many economists have labored under conditions
under which economic relationships are not as good as in comparative historical
analysis because of national power. By Jonathan A. Robinson and
argue that wealthy countries around the world owe their success
These institutions include the which have enabled a large group the
of using the power of the state to further their interests, and which en
opportunities for people to participate in economic activity
keys to economic progress are exactly the social equality and freedom
systems. Meanwhile, Acemoglu and Robinson explain the economic st
experienced by many impoverished societies to be the result of

⁴⁹E.L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Politics in*
2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 193.

⁵⁰Kripa Freitas, *Essays on the Institutions of Caste and Dowry* (PhD diss.,
147.

⁵¹Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and*
New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), 73

political institutions these institutions should be the freedom
 choose their vocations and develop their talents. Entrepreneurs are
 from establishing new businesses, and earn their money to contribute
 into the hands of a small elite and Robinson explains it as a system
 as an extractive⁵² institution.

We have surveyed a life system of Haidt's five
 foundational moral concerns. In Haidt's view, however, there
 However, Haidt does not correctly apply his own real definition of moral
 Haidt's definition, a moral system is a system that has the function
 of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation. But a system
 loyalty and social hierarchies is not a moral system. Such value systems
 cannot be a system.

6 Interdependence and the Five Foundations

While Haidt includes too much in the definition of moral
 circumstances particular to his view that he cannot make judgments that
 can be based on the foundational concern for a universal principle, it
 requires Haidt's definition of a moral system to be applied consistently in
 moral systems. The exercise of the series is appropriate that nothing
 as an element of a moral system is a moral system. A moral system is
 concerned with moral principles, virtues and other elements of a genuine

⁵²Ibid., 11178.

system must address the foundational concerns it must address the foundational concerns among those who are more or less dependent on the foundational conditions that are common outcomes of mutually beneficial cooperation. Thus, Haidt's research defines the moral authority counted as an element of a firm's system of authority in promoting beneficial cooperation. This is also the claim for which I argue is the most present.

According to Haidt, moral judgments grounded in authority are triggered by disrespect or insubordination toward an authority perceived as legitimate. In the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, the extent to which respondents' moral judgments were based on the authority of the authority was measured by asking them if they agreed with this statement: If I were a soldier and a commanding officer's orders, I would obey and not use that authority. Haidt took an interest in moral judgments based on authority/respect. The idea seems to be that the respondent would not agree with the duty to comply with the commander's orders if the respondent regarded the commander to be illegitimate.

But Haidt introduces another set of moral judgments that are about authority/respect concerns. The judgments are the effect that a person's authority/legitimacy has on the consequences of disobedience or her position. Haidt explains that moral judgments based on the authority/respect apply to superiors whose conduct is considered to be illegitimate.

⁵³Haidt & Graham, 2006, 385

& Authority Ranking is a set of Subordinate respect and deference. Superiors must then protect them from external threats within the group. The virtues that value authority & related virtues govern the behavior of superiors (e.g., impartiality, magnanimity, subordination) (e.g., respect⁵⁴, deference)

Above all, it is that the perceived legitimacy of authorities depends on meeting specific expectations: protecting subordinates, maintaining impartiality, magnanimity, etc. Notice, however, that these conditions for perceived legitimacy should also be connected to Haidt's theory. In particular, to be perceived as legitimate, a superior must protect subordinates from harm, and to be magnanimous, moral judgments about the legitimacy of authority are foundational concerns, including harm/care concerns and reciprocity concerns. Moral judgments motivated by moral concern (e.g., authority/respect) are motivated by other foundational concerns (e.g., harm/care and

Now why would such interdependencies among concerns exist? For instance, impartiality, magnanimity, and protecting subordinates from harm are conditions for perceived legitimate authority? Haidt explicitly states

⁵⁴Haidt and Joseph, 384 (emphases added).

Human authority, then, is power backed by the threat of force. Human authorities take on responsibility for maintaining order and we can begin to understand how civilizations burst forth and covered the Earth in a few years, we will have to look closely at the role of authority in creating moral order.⁵⁵

The Authority foundation, as I describe it, is more complex because its modules must look inward toward superiors and downward toward subordinates. These modules exist to help individuals meet the adaptive challenge of forging beneficial relationships with their descendants of the individuals who were best able to rise to the protection of superiors and the allegiance of subordinates.⁵⁶

It is just to be noted that, in Haidt's view, the upward looking module of concern is dependent on other foundational preferences for care/fairness/reciprocity. The give-and-take relationship for this interdependence of hierarchical relationships between authorities and subordinates is beneficial when authority figures protect and treat subordinates fairly. Moreover, models of the heritability of ancestors who have success in creating hierarchical relationships is that process only when

⁵⁵Haidt, *The Righteous Mind* (emphasis added).

⁵⁶Ibid., 168 (emphasis added).

Haidt takes the five foundational moral modules within human moral psychology.

The interdependence between authority/respect concerns and other concerns reflect a constraint on what can be claimed and a moral Haidt's moral foundations theory. The system's moral modules, at judgment, etc., that address authority/respect concerns are a function of a hierarchical social order. But from my observations, it is clear that authority/respect concerns are not merely to support hierarchical social order. Instead, authority/respect concerns strictly represent that are, to some extent, mutually beneficial for both superior and subordinate. According to Haidt's definition of moral systems, the function of fostering mutually social cooperation in human groups is the primary function by addressing the foundation of a system because they execute this function. On the other hand, if a value system does not have the function of cooperation, then Haidt's definition cannot qualify as a moral system. Surely some value systems lack this function, for instance, they do not mutually beneficial cooperation. The Hindu caste system, for instance, exists in spite of systematically militating against this mutually beneficial cooperation. The civil and economic inefficiencies generated by the caste system. Additionally, power asymmetries can block responses to the address Haidt associates with the harm/care and justice/reciprocity concerns. The harm/care concerns enable the protection and care of kin,

that address the justice/reciprocity concerns of a deontological perspective.⁵⁷ The violence and discrimination wrought by the caste system thwarts social norms that address both the adaptive challenges.

In some constraints Haidt places on his system grounded in authority/respect conferred by Haidt's proposed definition of morality, Haidt should have been more consistent with constraints on what is a moral system grounded in foundational concerns. Haidt should have affirmed that no value system can count as a macro-level system for the five foundational concerns.

7 Moral Systems as Copied Kinds

I have criticized Haidt for interpreting his survey data in a way that is inconsistent with the real definition of moral systems. My second criticism is that Haidt's survey data does not adequately support his proposed definition. As we saw in section 6, Haidt proposes an evolutionary account of moral systems that characterizes moral systems as entities that have been and transmitted because of a tendency to produce creating a mutually beneficial social system. But in order to support this hypothesis, Haidt cannot merely rely on what factors people consider relevant to their moral judgments. Haidt must also draw on historical evidence that shows systems really have emerged as a virtue of evolutionarily beneficial traits. This challenge is provided

⁵⁷Haidt (2003, p. 12).

evidence in this regard, I expect he would agree that this section will take no time to read. Haidt has managed to offer a useful definition of morality, identify additional evidence, and explain how an examination of moral systems would define morality.

Proving a real definition of morality requires demonstrating natural kinds that moral systems are based on. Crawford Elder has argued that copied kinds are a subset of natural kinds. Copied kinds are artifacts that accidentally occur together in history. According to Elder, copied kinds include kinds of artifacts, but more besides: kinds of devices, kinds of naturally selected behaviors (e.g., mating dances), kinds of performances (e.g., dances), kinds of institutions, etc. These copied kinds are distinct from natural kinds. For example, copied kinds include artificial structures like buildings, but also include naturally occurring structures like hearts and eyes. Elder argues that copied kinds have a common pattern that is recognizable as instances of the same kind. For example, a copied kind of mating dance is recognizable as a copied kind of mating dance. Similarly, a copied kind of heart is recognizable as a copied kind of heart. Elder argues that copied kinds have a proper function. For example, the proper function of a copied kind of heart is to pump blood. Elder argues that copied kinds are subject to natural selection. For example, a copied kind of heart that is better at pumping blood will be selected for and reproduced over time. The new members of the copied kind will have the same properties as previously existing members they were copied from.

⁵⁸Elder, On the Place of Artifacts in Ontology.

⁵⁹Ibid., 35.

⁶⁰Ibid., 38.

proper function) of those properties subsequently causes the same copied kind to take some classic examples of the circulation of blood, as this is the effect of hearts which caused them to be made at the same time. The proper function is to indicate the time, since that is the proper function of watches. Watches were designed and manufactured by humans, and the members of a copied kind do not have properties that are copied or reproduced over time in conjunction with other copied kinds. Thus, the eye of a copied kind of organisms in conjunction with other copied kinds that were capable of interpreting light. Automobiles were designed and manufactured in conjunction with roads on which they could be driven.

In sum, essential properties of reciprocal kinds specific combinations of shape, proper function, and history are all defined in consistency with account morality as a combined kind of systems, have shared qualitative. They are all composed of reward and punishment, and the rules, prescriptive judgments, of character.⁶¹ Several central systems have proper function. That function has been identified by Haidt and others enabling mutually beneficial social.⁶² Cooperation moral systems have more possible mutually beneficial cooperation in the past than human such systems. Furthermore, the benefits of cooperation are also ex-

⁶¹Sripada and Stich, A Framework for the Psychology of Norms ; Machery and

⁶²Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, *The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfishness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Daniel D. O'Brien, *Moral Evolution: The Origins of Virtue from Darwinian to Neurobiological Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Peter Singer, *The Lifeboat Ethics: A Realistic Approach to Moral Problems* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Chris Morris and Brian Skyrms, *The Evolution of Virtue* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Joshua Greene, *Moral Tribes: Finding Common Ground in a Polarized World* (New York: Penguin Press, 2013).

developed innate psychological mechanisms that make it easier with moral systems. Haidt argues that the five foundations concerns are mechanisms. Finally, moral systems have placed in evolution. For instance, Haidt suggests that moral systems could not have evolved without capacity for shared intentionality. Shared intentionality is the representations of tasks with others. For instance, a person can share a plan by bringing down a large prey, understanding each member's role in executing the plan. Shared intentionality would be a necessary condition for cooperative coordination activities a common purpose.⁶³

The foregoing account of moral psychology is a preliminary one which to distinguish moral systems from other systems is maintained (in sections 5 and 6). Nothing can count as a moral system, if it does not perform the proper function of enabling mutually beneficial cooperation. A system's activity is a moral system if it is, in fact, evidence that systems (i.e., be copied or reproduced) cause of persistence is not the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation. In other words, we can see our hands.

In order to identify a moral system, I propose to begin by laying down what is meant by mutually beneficial cooperation. At a minimum, when two or more individuals share a common goal, cooperation can occur among humans, animals, and even computers. To make it clear,

⁶³Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 31.

cooperation yields a net benefit for the cooperating individual.⁶⁴ For example, a team of killer whales gets more meat than could have been acquired by hunting alone. cooperation is also a cost for the individual; this is called *altruism*.⁶⁵ People who cooperate to advance a charitable cause expend energy, and money that they could have used for their own benefit. There are different currencies, depending on the nature of the cooperating organisms. In the case of humans, the form of benefit associated with cooperation is often in nature, and more generally in terms of reproductive success. In humans and other sentient animals, there are pleasures and costs associated with cooperation, such as pleasure/pain, or the satisfaction/fulfillment of desire.

Mutually beneficial cooperation is cooperation that benefits all cooperating parties. One of the great paradoxes of evolution is that altruism can be mutually beneficial. Although altruism, by definition, is a group of altruists are better off than individuals that do not engage in altruism. Consequently, groups of altruists may outcompete groups of non-altruists. This is a process known as *group selection*, which explicitly identifies group selection.

⁶⁴Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 22.

⁶⁵Michael Tomasello, *Why We Cooperate* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), 1.

⁶⁶Sober and Wilson, *The New Republic*; Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *The Moral Origins of Institutions* (Princeton University Press, 2011); Martin Nowak, *Supercooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other* (New York: Free Press, 2011).

as a mechanism that explains the evolution of moral systems, and selection was a driving force in human evolutionary history.

In human morality, individuals maintain and teach the rules of the moral system. They teach the rules to children, and they punish those who break the rules. This cooperation in human social structures allows mutual benefits to come from cooperative behavior. One possibility is that success in military competition is success in economic production and product success in creating a store of food for a group in a hostile environment. Taboos against consuming certain harmful substances would be a case in point.

Haidt suggests that all these forms of mutually beneficial cooperation have historical emergence and persistence of moral systems are instituted to motivate cooperative behavior in response to recurring adaptive challenges. When cooperative action succeeds in resolving the adaptive challenges, the benefits of cooperation are reapportioned to the cooperative solutions to adaptive challenges. This is a virtuous cycle. Groups with successful moral systems are imitated by other groups.

However, we must use systems of moral systems because they do not have the same function as moral systems. As a hypothesis, section 5, some food taboos

⁶⁷Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, p. 9.

⁶⁸Sober and Wilson, 186.

⁶⁹Kitchener; Haidt and Kesebir,

⁷⁰Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for the New York State Edition*, p. 10.

⁷¹Haidt and Joseph, *The Moral Machine*, p. 17.

perform the function of enabling mutually beneficial cooperation. The challenge of harmonizing these goals, some of which are those of the Benevolent, is to ensure that the benefits of cooperation are not undermined by the harmful behaviors that are often associated with the pursuit of self-interest.

What then, could explain the historical persistence of harmful behaviors? In this question, we are essentially asking, what are the mechanisms by which cultural information is stored in human minds and how is it transmitted from one person to another? The social learning process by which a mental state in one person is transmitted to another is a complex one, and it is one that is often influenced by a variety of factors, including the social context in which the behavior is observed, the social status of the observer, and the social status of the observed. According to anthropologists Robert Richerson and Peter J. Richerson, social learning is often influenced by a variety of factors, including the social context in which the behavior is observed, the social status of the observer, and the social status of the observed. People often preferentially adopt behaviors that are observed in others, and this is often because they believe that the behavior is beneficial. However, this is not always the case, and people often adopt behaviors that are harmful to themselves or to others. This is often because they believe that the behavior is socially desirable, or because they believe that the behavior is a sign of status. In some cases, people may adopt behaviors that are harmful to themselves or to others because they believe that the behavior is a sign of status, or because they believe that the behavior is socially desirable. In other cases, people may adopt behaviors that are harmful to themselves or to others because they believe that the behavior is a sign of status, or because they believe that the behavior is socially desirable. In some cases, people may adopt behaviors that are harmful to themselves or to others because they believe that the behavior is a sign of status, or because they believe that the behavior is socially desirable. In other cases, people may adopt behaviors that are harmful to themselves or to others because they believe that the behavior is a sign of status, or because they believe that the behavior is socially desirable.

⁷²Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, *Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution* (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 61.

⁷³Sripada and Stich, *Evolution, Culture, and the Irrationality of the Emotions*, 140.

⁷⁴Richerson and Boyd, 63.

⁷⁵Ibid., 63.

⁷⁶Ibid., 66.

⁷⁷Sripada and Stich, *Evolution, Culture, and the Irrationality of the Emotions*, 143.

bias. This occurs when a cultural variant is selected by an individual because it is the most common or popular in one's surrounding environment.

Chandra Sekhar Sripada and Stephen Stich also points out that individual learning can result in maladaptive cultural norms.⁷⁸ To substantiate this point, Sripada and Stich concentrate on food taboos. Such taboos can be traced to a food that could easily originate when a prestigious individual is rejecting what is not beneficial to a prestigious individual or a person's aversion (a Garcia aversion) to the food. Prestige bias could then take effect to imitate the gross individual aversion of the beneficiary food. Beneficial food becomes more dominant within a society even more people to adopt it. Eventually, the food as an off-limits may be established which hardly anyone dares to transgress the taboo. Prohibited food may be forgotten.

It is that taboos systems emerge and persist in this fashion of facilitating cooperation, with a suboptimal way these taboos have the proper function of enabling a line of inheritance. The canal clearly has the function of allowing newborns to pass from world outside to mothers with birth canals that have reproduced mother's behavior. Nevertheless, the larger birth canal is exceedingly narrow, risking both mother and child. Human birth canal performs its suboptimal function. On the other hand, Sripada and Stich account

⁷⁸Ibid., 151, 155.3

against beneficial food sources or development, but persistently using us to avoid harmful microbes. Rather, the explanation of their persistence has to do with avoidance of harm, not the desire to seek any beneficial cooperative function and the elements of moral systems.

The main lesson, here, is that moral systems are a valuable distinction systems by examining the processes that emerge and persist over time. A copied kind of function that their essential properties is a common function. Moral systems have the principle of mutually beneficial cooperation because the performance of this function is what explains why they persist. Non-moral value systems, such as harmful goals, do not have this virtue of being beneficial cooperation. Therefore, they do not have the function as moral systems, and that is why they are not.

It has been suggested that the method for classifying value systems and systems should begin with the experimental data that Haidt adduces in favor of his moral foundations. This is not the case, as Haidt does not include a function for any value system that Haidt counts. This is a major omission.

In sum, an accurate delineation of the moral domain must take account. However, using histories of function to distinguish moral value systems, a serious ambiguity must be dealt with. In the next section, I suggest a way that this ambiguity can be overcome.

It may be that, in some past period, before the function of enabling beneficial social cooperation was fully established, a value system

may be a moral system for some time, but eventually it is transformed into a moral system of one type or another. For example, a limb of one type may gradually become an appendage of another type. Millions of years ago, the ancestors of penguins had a limb that was an appendage adapted for diving. It was recently discovered that the appendages adapted for diving to be suitable for swimming. These are dense, thick bones that make them less buoyant. However, penguin bones are much lighter. These ancestors of penguins had the function of which was to fly, but penguins have a function which is not to fly, rather to swim. As a result of this lineage of convergence and took on a new one, the appendages changed and changes take place when it comes to moral systems. At some point in time, a value of enabling beneficial cooperation, the value may be lost during that time. But if a value system loses this function, it cannot be a moral system.

Now we can account of ambiguity in distinguishing moral systems and value systems. At a point where a system stops performing its function, this ambiguity can be removed through historical investigation should we have a understanding the mechanisms that cause the loss of a value system. If the mechanism does not currently involve the performance of the function of enabling beneficial social cooperation, then the value system is not a moral system.

⁷⁹Brian Handwerk, Why Did Penguins Stop Flying? National Geographic, May 20, 2013, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/05/130520-penguin-diving-swimming/>

moral system in point of the culture of honor in the American South. Cultures of honor have many parts of their culture that protect a person's reputation for strength by resorting to violence and tend to appear in environments where resources are vulnerable and there is no government apparatus relied upon to protect them. Psychologists Richard Nisbett and Donald T. Giner-Smith suggest that a culture of honor continues to exist in the American South. In a content analysis of interviews which they found young Southerners more angered by insults than young Northerners. Southern males, in a study, produced a release of cortisol and testosterone which was significantly larger than males in the North. Cortisol is a hormone associated with stress and anxiety, while testosterone is a hormone associated with aggressive behavior. Nisbett and Giner-Smith conducted a survey in 1990 that Southern respondents were more likely than Northerners to say that a violent response would be justified where a man's honor is at stake. At the historical level, the homicide rate in the American South was ten times that of the whole United States for the period 1865-1915, and a similar asymmetry exists today.

Nisbett and Giner-Smith argue that the culture of honor that continues to hold sway in the South is a holdover from a time when the culture of honor was a more effective means of dealing with disputes. They argue that the culture of honor is no longer a beneficial function. Instead, it is a source of violence and conflict.

⁸⁰Sripada and Stich, Evolution, Culture, and the Irrationality of the Emotions.

⁸¹Richard E. Nisbett and Donald T. Giner-Smith, *The Psychology of the Social Situation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

⁸²Sripada and Stich, Evolution, Culture, and the Irrationality of the Emotions.

⁸³Richerson and Boyd, *Not By Genes Alone*.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 21.

Southern culture was likely brought to the region by Scottish immigrants, who had herders for generations. The high portability of herds made them susceptible. In addition, the Southern regions, for some time, were sparsely populated. The presence of conditions made it beneficial for herders (who were typically men) to defend their reputations by using personal affronts.

If Nisbett and Cohen would seem that the Southern culture preserves the characteristic of moralistic systems, it operated to establish a code of conduct to which expected and encouraged their reputations. Generalized violence was held in effect of deterring in an environment where no other institutions could function. During this period, the Southern moral system.

However, the benefits associated with the Southern honor came to be reliably policed by the state. The majority of Southerners were agricultural. The persistence of the culture of honor is explained by its effect in bringing out the best of the culture of continued presence. It is likely a product of social conditioning. League found that Southern men generally do not think that a man's insult is a reason to view someone as a threat. They still believe that a man's insult is a reason to view someone as a threat. As a result, continue to follow honor norms because they think of opinion of them if they do. These norms facilitate mutually

cooperation. Thus, culture of honor no longer performs the proper function that of enabling beneficial social cooperation. In fact, the culture of honor to be analyzed is not a moral system, but no longer is.

8 Conclusion

Researchers in search of a descriptive definition of morality define morality, rather than a normative definition of morality, identifies properties that constitute moral systems as a descriptive kind. Such a definition would cite the properties that explain the persistence of moral systems. One especially important property is the fulfillment of systems perform in enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation. In fact, the definition of morality should not be understood solely with a focus on the rights of individuals, because moral systems are also concerned with the rights of the community, authority, and the system. In this score, I am in agreement with Jonathan Haidt. However, contrary to Haidt's suggestion, I argue that the difference between authority, purity, and moral systems is not the virtue of enabling beneficial social cooperation.

⁸⁵Sripada and Stich, Evolution, Culture, and the Irrationality of the Emotion