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Obfuscation and Watermarking of FPGA Designs Based on Constant Value Generators

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Abstract—Obfuscation is a technique which makes design less intelligible in order to prevent or increase reverse engineering effort. In this paper, a new approach to hardware obfuscation by inserting constant value generators (CVGs) is proposed. A CVG is a circuit that generates the same fixed logic value but will not be minimized by the synthesizer. CVGs can be used to create new logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit. They help to hide actual design performance information by tricking the synthesizer tools to generate deceiving delay reports through the false paths.

I. INTRODUCTION

Hardware piracy and other attacks are dire threats to FPGA designs. Side-channel signals can be exploited to deduce secret key on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Malicious hardware Trojan can be implanted to leak secret information, affect functionality, deactivate and destroy circuits. It is important to increase the reverse engineering effort of adversaries because many attacks rely on knowledge about the circuit internal structure. One possible solution is obfuscation, which aims to make the circuit structure and functionality difficult to perceive and comprehend so as to substantially increase the time and cost of reverse engineering [1]. Obfuscation is also often used to hide author's watermarks and user's fingerprints in hardware intellectual property (IP) protection [1].

Approaches to hardware obfuscation are vastly different. Some approaches focus on hardware description language (HDL) level, some operate with common design structure such as State Transition Graph (STG) while others introduce specific constructs. A comprehensive taxonomy of obfuscation transformations, which are also suitable for the protection of HDL sources, is presented in [2]. There were only a few studies thereafter on the application of these obfuscation transformations for HDLs. Classical Collberg's approaches were implemented for VHDL and Verilog in [3]. Almost all of them have no effect on the synthesized circuit. The rare exceptions have very high hardware overheads. Several VHDL-specific approaches which impact circuit and their overheads are presented in [4]. There are several approaches that manipulate with the STG. One approach uses the expansion of Control Flow Graph (CFG) state space and code-word concept [5]. Code-word is created step-by-step during the initialization. Several states are made dependent from the code-word bits. When the code-word is incorrect, the states are traversed in the wrong sequence. In stuttering circuits'

approach [6], a sequence of four structural transformations, namely retiming, resynthesis, sweep and conditional stuttering is employed. The circuit is transformed into an equivalent key-based circuit. When the key is wrong, the circuit is slower than expected. Another approach uses Simple Logical Implications (SLIs). Spawns from logic synthesis, they exploit the relation of type $(a = 0) > (b = 1)$ between two circuit nodes a and b [7]. SLIs are used to introduce fictive combinational loops to make circuit unintelligible without changing its functionality.

Watermarking and fingerprinting are often used hand-in-hand with obfuscation. One technique searches the correspondence between the outputs of STG and watermark bits [8]. If the correspondence is found, then the bits are reused as watermarked bits; otherwise new input variable will be added. An improved variant of this method is presented in [9], where the watermark bits are inserted into pseudo-randomly selected bits with a longer watermark detection input sequence to increase the reuse of existing output bits and the watermark stealthy. In [10], ways to modulate the power dissipation by power signature generators (e.g. shift registers) are proposed for watermarking. In [11], additional constraints are imposed on the scan-cell ordering problem for watermarking while minimizing the overall test power. Obfuscation of watermark bits is desirable except that it is not carried out at the HDL level in the abovementioned schemes.

II. LEXICAL AND CIRCUIT OBFUSCATION

There are two types of obfuscation for HDL: lexical and functional [12]. Lexical obfuscation affects only source code level. Its main disadvantage is the synthesized circuits before and after obfuscation are almost identical [12]. As the circuit remains unchanged, it is vulnerable to the simplest attack of logic synthesis [12].

Lexical obfuscation may be described as shown on Fig. 1, where V is the HDL source of the design, V^* is the lexically obfuscated source, obf is the obfuscation procedure, O is the big O notation in computational complexity, DD is the synthesis procedure, and Sch is the schematic representation of the synthesized circuit.

$V;$
 $V^* = obf(V);$
 $O(V) < O(V^*);$
 $Sch = DD(V) = DD(V^*);$

Fig. 1. High-level description of lexical obfuscation.

Some lexical methods for VHDL obfuscation may result in different expansion of Look-Up Tables (LUTs) due to the

heuristic of the synthesis algorithms. Their computational complexities are not fully explored. Some apparently lexical methods may change the design considerably, e.g., the method in [4] removes many levels of registers.

The main idea of *circuit* obfuscation is to create a more sophisticated and unintelligible circuit that has the functionality equivalent to the original design based on their externally observed behavior [12], as depicted in Fig. 2, where *func* is the functionality of the circuit.

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 $V_0$ ;
 $V' = obf(V)$ ;
 $Sch = DD(V)$ ;
 $Sch^* = DD(V')$ ;
 $Sch \neq Sch^*$ ;
 $func(Sch) \equiv func(Sch^*)$ ;
 $O(V') > O(V)$ ;
 $O(Sch^*) > O(Sch)$ ;

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Fig. 2. High-level description of circuit obfuscation.

III. CONSTANT GENERATORS

A. Theory and Implementation

Constant value generator (CVG) is a form of *opaque predicate*. Its value is known at obfuscation time and may possibly be deduced by the adversary only through rigorous analysis [2]. The “0” and “1” pins of the circuits are substituted by generating the appropriate logical values permanently, as shown in Fig. 3, where $V_{\{0,1\}}$ is a HDL description of the primitive, and V_{DD} and GND are the logical “1” and “0” sources, respectively.

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 $V_{\{0,1\}}$ ;
 $DD(V_{\{0,1\}}) = Sch_{0,1} \notin \{V_{DD}, GND\}$ ;
 $func\{Sch_{0,1}\} \equiv func\{V_{DD}, GND\}$ ;

```

Fig. 3. High-level description of constant generator.

To prevent the CVG circuit from being recognized and minimized by the synthesis tool, the sequential and combinational logic are mixed. Examples of such CVGs are shown in Fig. 4. Other techniques include the usage of signals with well-defined semantics (e.g., system reset and clock) as the inputs of CVGs.




Fig. 4. (a), (b): generators of constant values; (c), (d): original HDL sources; (e), (f): lexically obfuscated sources.

The CVGs from Fig. 4 are synthesized using Xilinx xst 8.1i. The synthesizer is unable to recognize constants and minimize these CVGs. Circuit (a) has two flaws. First, the synthesizer issues warning about the combination loop, which gives vital clue to the adversary. Second, if the input *src* is “1” during power-on, then it is possible for the output to return “1” before it is changed. The second flaw can be circumvented by connecting the CVG’s input to the system reset. Circuit (b) is free from these flaws, but it incurs more hardware resources and may produce glitches.

B. Complexity

Software metrics are typically used to measure the complexity of obfuscation transformations. The metrics should take into account the VHDL specific attributes.

The complexity of ‘0’-signal source (ground) against CVG (Fig. 4(b)), measured in terms of TCASC metric [14], are compared in Table I. For circuit obfuscation, the logical circuit complexity needs to be considered, which can be estimated by the total number of gates or the gate count on the critical path. More accurate design entropy metric [15] can be used in addition to lexical metrics.

TABLE I. COMPLEXITY MEASUREMENTS

Metrics	Constant ‘0’	CVG
<i>Lexical Metrics</i>		
Fan-In	0	3
Fan-Out	1	1
Process Coupling	0	0.75
Process Number	0	1
Signal Number	1	5
Number of Operators	1	5
Number operators per process	0	4
Mean Sensitivity List Size	0	3
TCASC	1	2.9
Total	4.0	25.65
<i>Circuit Metrics</i>		
Design Entropy	0	7
Number of Gates	0	2
Number of Wires	1	6
Total	1	15

C. Insertion and use

A straightforward application of the primitives is the substitution of constants in the source code by the outputs of CVGs. For example, the statement “if (*sig* = ‘0’) then ...” can be replaced by the statement “if (*sig* = *const_out*) then ...”, where *const_out* is the output of zero CVG. This transformation forces the adversary to analyze the zero generator functions. Usual lexical obfuscation transformations (identifiers scrambling, format removal, etc.) can be employed in order to make the codes illegible to human reader.

With the help of CVGs, compound functions can be built. For instance, logical *AND* and *OR* functions can be implemented using a 2-input multiplexor (mux) with the basic primitives G_0 and G_1 , as shown in Fig. 5(a) and (b), respectively, where s_0 and s_1 are real signals. These compound primitives will not be recognized by the synthesizer.

The CVGs can also be used to introduce fictive connections and increase the dependencies between circuit nodes. This can be accomplished by the insertion of multiplexor (mux) with its data inputs connected to the outputs of original circuit nodes, and its selector input connected to the CVG. The mux will permanently pass the same input to the output. In order to make the circuit more difficult to analyze, the nodes are carefully chosen for CVG insertion. For such fictive dependencies to evade the removal by the synthesizer, both input nodes of the mux should have large fan-ins and fan-outs, and they should not be ports and should not lie on the critical path.




Fig. 5. Obfuscated logic functions: (a) *AND*, (b) *OR*.

D. Watermarking

Several approaches exist to hide watermark with CVGs. One approach that employs the unused bits of LUTs [16] has a drawback that the LUTs with unused inputs (connected to ‘0’ or ‘1’) are apparent and the watermark bits can be easily removed by clearing those LUTs’ content. This shortcoming can be overcome by using our CVGs. Consider a 16×1 RAM LUT, where its unused bits are marked ‘U’. The output of the CVG is connected to the free inputs of the LUT as shown in Fig. 6(a). The LUTs that contain the watermark bits are thus concealed and substantial effort is required to identify them. The watermark can be further made to be an integral part of the existing design by reusing the original bits of the LUT via input ordering of LUTs with careful selection of CVG values.




Fig. 6. Watermark embedded in LUT: (a) with CVG; (b) extraction.

Consider an example of a 4-input LUT that implements the function, ‘1’ *and* s_0 *and* s_1 *or* s_2 , where s_0 , s_1 and s_2 are the existing signals of the design, ‘1’ is wired from CVG, r is the output signal, and ‘U’s are the unused bits. There are $n!$ (24 for $n = 4$) inputs permutations. The watermark insertion process is reduced to choosing the permutation which has the minimum number of ‘U’s and the bits match the watermark bits to be embedded. To increase the number of permutations and hence the number of reused bits, CVGs of complementary values and other logical functions can be used.

The watermark bits can be dispersed and “whiten” in a similar manner as in [9]. If the watermark length is k , then the length of insertion space $n \geq k$. k random numbers $[m_1 \dots m_k]$ from range $[1..n]$ without replications are generated. Every watermark bit is inserted in the m_j -th (j from $[1..k]$) position by the approach described above with the minimum number of U’s. As an example, for $k = 3$, $n = 8$, assume that the watermark bits “101” are to be embedded at randomly generated locations, $m_1 = 4$, $m_2 = 7$ and $m_3 = 1$. The two existing bits from the LUT’s content 11UU10UU10UU10UU will be reused.

Extraction of watermark can be done in different ways. One approach which uses bit-stream reverse engineering to analyze the LUTs’ content is described in [16]. But reverse engineering is not always possible. Another approach uses system testing principles and CVGs. There are two multiplexed CVGs as shown in Fig. 6(b). When the circuit operates in the normal

mode (i.e., the extraction signal is ‘0’), then the CVG addresses one part of the LUT. Conversely, when the circuit operates in the test mode (i.e., the extraction is ‘1’), then the second CVG addresses the other part of the LUT that contains the watermark. The watermark can be extracted during the system test procedure by passing a particular test sequence to the LUT’s inputs.

Alternatively, the LUTs can be configured to work like shift registers (SRL16) [17] to extract the watermark. When shift signal is inactive, SRL16 operates like an ordinary LUT. By sequentially shifting bits of all LUTs in cascade through the Shift Out pin shown in Fig. 6 (b), the watermark bits can be recovered in positions $m_1 \dots m_k$ of the output sequence. The content of the LUTs should also be restored by shifting in the extracted bits after verification. The only issue with this approach is that not all FPGAs have such LUT configuration option. Besides, the IP can be activated by a secret key through the scan chain. The SRL16s in cascade are first randomly initialized. Only valid users that possess the correct bits for the SRL16 cascade could authenticate and activate the IP.

E. Overheads

Typical FPGA projects may heavily under-utilize the available LUTs for many reasons. Several open source VHDL-designs from opencores.org [18] were synthesized and the overheads were estimated. The results are presented in Table II, where OS and OA denote the optimized speed and area, respectively. The projects were synthesized by Xilinx xst 8.1i for Spartan II 200 FPGA, which has 4-input LUTs. On average, nearly 50% of the LUTs is not completely utilized. The amount of free bits in the LUTs is sufficiently large for the implementation of various hardware protection described.

TABLE II. NOT COMPLETELY USED LUTS

Project	OS, %	OA, %	OS, bits	OA, bits
lq057	33.96	58.82	336	432
micro8	39.24	39.49	576	564
fpu double	46.24	54.25	84784	79432
fpu vhdl	47.24	50.64	3456	3104
Twofish	43.61	43.61	3192	3192
Interface vga80x40	42.94	51.67	672	708
mb jpeg	69.23	62.39	1040	852
Radio	46.57	49.07	1024	1028
68hc08	30.07	29.38	10160	9008
simple touse sha2	41.73	47.47	14384	15376
Mdct	95.24	95.36	17408	17420
Average:	48.73	52.92	12457	11919

IV. EXPERIMENTS

The impacts of CVGs insertion, such as overheads, minimization by synthesis tools and other side-effects are investigated. Configurations of 0 to 5 CVGs with different optimizations are explored on the ISCAS 85 combinational benchmark circuits [19]. The CVGs introduce new dependencies. They were inserted in nodes which: 1) have large fan-in and fan-out; 2) are not ports; 3) are not on the critical path. The CVG is similar to that of Fig. 4(b) except that it is based on latch instead of flip flop. So the signal *clk* is substituted by the enable input. Xilinx xst 8.1i synthesizer is

used with three optimization options: none, area and speed. Projects with pin constraints are examined. The results for 0, 1 and 5 CVGs are presented in Table III. The circuit names are appended with ‘\A’ and ‘\D’ to indicate that the percentage overheads are for area and delay, respectively. The acronyms OA, OS and iON in the table heading represent area optimization, delay optimization and unoptimized options with i number of CVGs, respectively. All results (except 5ON[7]) were computed relative to 0ON; Negative value means improvement over 0ON.

TABLE III. PERCENTAGE OVERHEADS AFTER INSERTION OF 0, 1, 5 CVGs

Title	0ON	OA	OS	1ON	5ON	OA	OS	5ON[7]
c432\A	0	-57	-43	1	9	-30	-21	5.6
c432\D	0	-3	-2	20	29	47	20	-
c499\A	0	-53	-43	1	7	-42	-39	2.3
c499\D	0	12	12	28	105	103	124	-
c1355\A	0	-84	-82	0	2	-73	-73	1.9
c1355\D	0	5	-4	29	88	82	90	-
c1908\A	0	-79	-60	0	2	-77	-69	1.7
c1908\D	0	4	0	1	43	44	50	-
c3540\A	0	-69	-60	0	1	-58	-51	0.9
c3540\D	0	-3	-3	32	81	62	62	-
c6288\A	0	-62	-45	0	0	-55	-62	0.7
c6288\D	0	-19	-31	0	18	6	-16	-

The area overheads grow almost linearly with the number of CVGs for each optimization option, although they are relatively low. On the contrary, the delay overheads reported by the synthesizer are unacceptably high. The actual delay incurred by the CVG is computed manually to be 6.29 ns for c3540 with 1 CVG. It consists of the fixed propagation delay of LUT (mux) and the delays of two wires (4.5 ns). The maximum delay difference for different routing paths is found to be 1.79ns. The delay computed for the original worst critical path and the same path after 1 CVG insertion are 40.19 ns and 38.69 ns, respectively. The large discrepancy between the actual and synthesizer reported delay overheads can be explained as follows. The tool is deceived by the CVGs to consider false critical path through the nodes that will never be excited. The path may pass through the CVG inputs whose values are immaterial. Careful CVG placements can make the reported path delay much larger than the actual critical path delay. This shows that CVGs have successfully hidden the actual design performance to avoid it from being targeted by the adversaries. Comparison with the approach [7] for 5 dumping cycles was shown in the last column, where its percentage area overhead is measured based on the number of transistors in ASIC implementation.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper presents an approach to circuit obfuscation by CVG insertion. It increases the complexity of HDL code of a design and its synthesized circuit. The proposed CVGs will not be minimized by different synthesizing tools. The approach incurs very low hardware and delay overheads but the synthesis tools will be fooled about the actual performance of the circuit. We have also explained how the CVGs can help to hide watermark or fingerprint in LUTs without incurring

additional overheads.

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