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Explaining the Cross-National Variation in the Relationship between Religious Organization Membership and Civic Organization Participation

Abstract

We examine the relationship between belonging to religious organizations and participating in nonreligious civic organizations through use of a large international sample of individuals. Moreover, we assess how this relationship is contingent upon social context, that is Protestant percentage, economic condition, and democratic level of a nation. Using data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010-2014), our multilevel analyses reveal that religious organization members are more likely than non-members to participate in civic organizations cross-nationally. In addition, societal context is found to moderate this association. Specifically, the differences between religious organization members and non-members in this regard are larger in societies characterized by a smaller Protestant population, poorer economic condition, and nondemocratic institutions. We discuss our findings in light of theories on religion, social capital, and social context.

Key words: civic organization participation; religious organizations; social context; multi-level analysis

1. Introduction

Scholars have found that religious organizations are places where people build social networks, learn civic skills, and nurture trust (e.g., Putnam 2000; Smidt 2003). Religious organizations, however, do not necessarily facilitate members in developing positive linkages to nonreligious civic organizations such as sport clubs and environmental associations (Iannaccone 1994; Whitehead and Stroope 2015; Wuthnow 1999). Civil society scholars have realized that although high social capital within a single organization should benefit organization members, it may also produce exclusive identities and out-group antagonism, thus escalating societal cleavages in the larger society (Berman 1997; Fiorina 1999; Paxton 2002; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). This understanding is embodied in Putnam's distinction between "bonding social capital" and "bridging social capital": The former represents homogenous groups characterized by isolated trust and networks that mainly help insiders, while the latter represents networks that connect people across social boundaries (Putnam 2000). This social-capital classification helps us understand the aforementioned issue as to whether religious organizations only bond members exclusively or whether these organizations also build "bridges" to other groups.

The issue of the "bridging" capacity of religious organizations has become significant globally as religious organizations have been growing steadily on a worldwide scale. In Africa, for example, Pentecostal organizations have expanded dramatically since the era of decolonization in the 1960s (Anderson 2001; Pew 2006). A similar phenomenon has occurred in Latin America, where Evangelical and Pentecostal organizations have spread and have ignited religious passion (Pew 2014). And this massive conversion to Protestant Christianity in the region has prompted some Catholic leaders to build voluntary and participatory organizations to

maintain membership of the Catholic Church (Trejo 2009). In addition, many non-Western religions have had to follow the Western model of what “religion” should look like in reaction to the global expansion of Christianity since the last century (Goossaert and Palmer 2011; Madsen 2007). Through imitating the institutional forms of Protestant-based organizations in the West, many non-Western religious organizations, such as the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation in East Asia, have successfully attracted hundreds of thousands of voluntary members (Yao 2012). Moreover, religious organizations’ relation to civic organizations is an important issue when one considers the latest social movements and political uprisings. The 2009 global financial crisis has triggered widespread participation in various social and political movements from Occupy Wall Street in the US to Arab Spring in the Middle East. Observers have noted that in some of these events religion plays an important role (Hoffman and Jamal 2014).

The growing influence of religious organizations in the world raises a question: Do these organizations build positive linkages to nonreligious groups? So far, empirical studies examining the relationship between belonging to religious organizations and participating in nonreligious civic organizations have mainly been limited to the U.S. population (e.g. Cavendish 2000; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Lam 2002; Lewis, MacGregor, and Putnam 2013; Schwadel 2005; Putnam 2000; Whitehead and Stroope 2015). Although a handful of studies in this regard used a cross-national sample of individuals, these earlier works suffered from some difficulties, such as focusing on a limited number of countries and confounding participation in religious organizations with participation in nonreligious organizations (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Sarkissian 2012). Therefore, the scholarship lacks clear expositions of this topic.

The current study is aimed at improving the understanding of the relationship between belonging to religious organizations and participating in nonreligious civic organizations on a

worldwide scale. We conduct a more generic test of the association in question by employing multilevel modeling using a comprehensive multi-national dataset that includes representative samples from 50 societies. Further, we investigate the moderating potential of societal religious, economic, and political contexts. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one that has accounted for the moderating effects of societal context on the “bridging” capacity of religious organizations.

There are sound reasons to expect that the relationship in question is moderated by societal context. First, in societies with a large Protestant population, Protestant groups may spread voluntary organizational forms to the whole society (Lipset 1994; Woodberry 2012), and this could lead to an increased likelihood of civic organization participation among people who are not members of religious organizations. Therefore, if religious organizations encourage civic organization participation, the differences in this regard between religious organization members and non-members may be minimized in societies with more Protestants. Second, the need for public goods such as health care and public education is often unmet in societies with poor economic condition where they lack sufficient resources to fund the provision of public goods. To help resolve the deficiency of public goods, religious organizations in these societies may put more effort into mobilizing members to participate in civic organizations. Thus, we expect that the differences in civic organization participation between religious members and non-members will be larger in societies with poorer economic condition. Third, nondemocratic regimes are generally hostile to civic organizations and take various measures to prevent citizens from joining them (Puddington 2016). But religious organizations in repressive settings could embolden members to participate in civic organizations by offering moral and material support, while people outside religious organizations may be more vulnerable to government suppression.

This may result in larger differences in this regard between religious members and non-members in less democratic societies.

In the next section, we briefly review the literature on the relationship between belonging to religious organizations and participating in nonreligious organizations. We then explain how this relationship may vary across societal context. Next, we test these hypotheses using multilevel analyses using data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010-2014). Lastly, we discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, provide several limitations of the study, and offer suggestions for future investigations.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Religious organization and nonreligious organization participation

There is a debate on the relationship between religion and nonreligious organization participation. Some scholars posited that a higher level of religious commitment might be related to less involvement in secular civic organizations (Iannaccone 1994; Wuthnow 1999). These scholars have noted that some religious groups in the U.S., for example, often make heavy demands on members' time, energy, and money, thus limiting members' involvement in nonreligious groups. Whitehead and Stroope (2015) found that congregations with high small group participation could insulate participants and deter them from engaging in activities not connected to their congregation. These studies suggest that religious organization may therefore fall short of generating bridging social capital.

Other scholars, however, have contended that religion is not necessarily at odds with nonreligious organization participation. Their works emphasize the empowering and mobilizing effects of religious organizations. Through participating in religious activities, people can 1) nurture social capital (Putnam 2000) and learn civic skills (Verba et al. 1998), and 2) spread

information and make direct recruitment for civic engagement (Lewis, MacGregor, and Putnam 2013; McAdam 1986; Wuthnow 1999). A group of empirical studies based on survey data collected in the U.S. found that joining in the various religion-related organizations, such as Bible study groups, leadership training programs, community outreach groups, was positively related to civic organization participation (Cavendish 2000; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Lam 2002; Schwadel 2005). These empirical studies also qualified that religious service attendance had a limited effect on civic organization participation because simply attending religious services may not provide sufficient civic skills or information relevant to nonreligious civic activity. The evidences from both sides of this debate suggest that religious organizations in the U.S. generally encourage participation in nonreligious civic organization, though in some cases, members of conservative religious groups in particular may not get involved.

Most past works regarding this debate have focused so far on the U.S., while a few studies have explored this issue on a worldwide scale. Ruiter and De Graaf (2006) found, based on their analysis of more than 50 societies, that individual religiosity was positively associated with participation in voluntary organizations, but they did not differentiate between religious and nonreligious voluntary organizations in their research. Sarkissian's study (2012) found a positive association between religious organization membership and nonreligious organization participation, but the research was limited to Muslim-majority countries and did not account for the hierarchical structure of the data. Because of these limitations in the literature, we do not know whether the positive association between belonging to religious organizations and participating in secular civic organizations, which was mainly found in U.S.-centered studies, was driven by the particular religious, political, and economic setting of the U.S. To advance the

knowledge on how the relationship in question plays out cross-nationally, we re-examine this issue based on a large international sample. We devise the following hypothesis:

H1: Individuals who belong to religious organizations are more likely than those who do not to participate in nonreligious civic organizations.

2.2. The cross-national variation of the relationship

The second purpose of the present study is to analyze whether societal context shapes the relationship between belonging to religious organizations and civic organization participation. We argue that the association between religious organization membership and civic organization participation varies across religious, economic, and political contexts.

2.2.1. Protestant percentage

Existing studies found that Protestantism and civic organization participation were positively interlinked. Lipset (1994: p.5) pointed out that compared with other religious traditions, “Protestants, particularly the non-state-related sects, have been ... more congregational, participatory, and individualistic.” And as Woodberry (2012) summarized, Protestantism was the first religious tradition to develop non-governmental organizations, while other religions were traditionally bound to the political power; Thus, Protestants were more active in establishing voluntary organizations than the followers of other religions. Moreover, scholars have recently noted the role of Pentecostalism in civic participation. The modern Pentecostalism, an emergent form of Protestantism which started from Los Angeles in 1906, has expanded exponentially in Latin America, Africa, and some regions of Asia during last decades (Cox 2001). Berger (2014) argued that there was an affinity between civic participation and Pentecostal faith which emphasizes individual agency and voluntary association. The active participation of many Pentecostal groups in public life has attracted scholarly attention. For

example, based on their fieldworks in twenty countries, Miller and Yamamori (2007) documented the dedication of Progressive Pentecostalism to social programs and health services. Taking Zambian Pentecostals as another example, there is a growing attention among them to social ministries since 1990s, of which preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS is at heart (M'fundisi-Holloway 2018). Recently, Pentecostal groups in some countries have become a key force shaping political process, as illustrated by the Brazil's 2018 presidential election (Polimedio 2018). In line with these arguments, several cross-national studies found that there were more civic organizations or more participants in civic organizations in countries with a larger Protestant population (Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Parboteeah, Cullen, and Lim 2004).

It is possible, therefore, that the difference between religious organization members and non-members in civic organization participation is smaller in Protestant-dominated societies. Past works suggested that in Protestant-dominated countries, an ethic which encourages voluntary association for collective affairs often becomes part of a nationwide culture (Lam 2002; Lipset 1994). This civic culture would likely spread across religious boundaries and encourage people, regardless of whether they were involved in religious organizations, to join civic organizations. In addition, the non-governmental organizational forms initiated by Protestants may be copied by other nonreligious groups (Woodberry 2012), which would provide more opportunities for people outside religious organizations to acquire civic skills and build networks. In sum, in societies with a large Protestant population, the societal culture would likely be conducive to civic engagement and there would be plenty of empowering and mobilizing channels outside religious organizations. Thus, these factors may help increase the civic participation rates of people who do not belong to religious organizations. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize as follows:

H2: The differences in civic organization participation between religious organization members and non-members are smaller in countries with a larger Protestant population.

2.2.2. Economic condition

In societies with poorer economic condition¹, religious organizations may play a more important role in mobilizing civic organization participation through 1) providing resources that are scarce in these societies and 2) undertaking a larger responsibility in social services. Cross-national research has found that economic prosperity facilitates participation in civic organizations (Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Parboteeah, Cullen, and Lim 2004). In prosperous societies, there are more resources – wealth and free time – available to the average citizen, which are believed to be a necessary condition for civic engagement (Verba et al. 1998). In societies with poor economic condition, however, the lack of social resources may be a serious obstacle deterring many people from participation in civic organizations. In this situation, religious organizations may contribute to civic organization participation by providing resources to members. International religious networks often transfer various resources donated by people in prosperous societies to religious groups in societies with poor economic condition (Kniss and Campbell 1997; Wuthnow 2010). In addition to this international support, local religious organizations may accumulate funding for civic organizations through collecting tithes from people who are able to contribute.

¹ Poorer economic condition does not mean “less developed.” In fact, post-colonial scholars have criticized a colonial discourse, which views the West as “superior” and “progressive” while defines the rest of the world as “less developed” and “backward,” as being in service to colonialism and imperialism (e.g., Said 1978; Ashcroft et al. 1995). This discourse is still influential in contemporary world. For example, Andreotti (2011) has pointed out that current educational policies and practices in the West are underlain by stereotypes that place the “Third World” at an inferior status in need of the assistance of the West.

The resources that religious organizations obtain may be directed to public goods provision. Civil society scholars have emphasized the importance of the voluntary sector² in supplementing the government's and the private sector's efforts to provide public goods (Rees and Mullins 2017; Salamon 2012; Salamon and Sokolowski 2003). But in many societies with poor economic condition, the government and the private sector may leave the need for public goods unmet. The governments in these societies would possibly find it difficult to raise sufficient revenues for public goods provision, and many people may not afford to purchase these services and goods from the market (Deacon 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Stasavage 2005). To fill the vacuum in public goods provision, religious organizations may sponsor civic organizations and may encourage members to join these kinds of organization. In fact, the role of religious organizations in social service provision may be particularly noticeable during the period of economic hardship. The financial crisis of 2009 in the US shocked global economy, especially hitting countries dependent on foreign finance inflows in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. This economic crisis has been found as resulting in a sharp rise in unemployment and causing a humanitarian crisis especially for those jobless (IMF 2010; Rajmil et al. 2014; UN 2009). Case studies and NGO reports noted that some religion-based groups worked for providing welfare and humanitarian aid for those in need (Manuel and Glatzer 2019; Molokotos-Liederman 2015).

There are multiple reasons for religious organizations to assume the responsibility in social services: Values and norms such as compassion and altruism motivate religious people to help others (Wuthnow 1991), and charitable work often facilitates religious proselytizing. In addition, religious leaders may view these activities as a chance to expand their social influence

² This is also called the third sector, or the non-profit sector.

and to advance their religious agenda (Masoud 2004; Sadowski 2006). To help meet the need for social services, religious organizations may work harder to mobilize members to join civic organizations. Based on these reasons, we propose that:

H3: The differences regarding civic organization participation between religious organization members and non-members are larger in countries with poorer economic condition.

2.2.3 Democratic level

A recent review reported that half of the countries in the world today could be labeled as democracies, while most of the remaining were one-party rule, military government, or absolute monarchy, all of which are classified under authoritarianism (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Compared with consolidated democracies that encourage people to form civic organizations to address their own issues (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013; Skocpol 1999; Tocqueville [1835]2010), authoritarian regimes are suspicious of civic organizations, especially since these organizations played a prominent role in the democratization of South Korea, Poland, and other countries (Huntington 1993; Kim 2000). Cross-national quantitative studies have found that in less democratic countries, people were less likely to join civic organizations and that fewer civic organizations existed (Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Paxton 2002; Halman 2003; Parboteeah, Cullen, and Lim 2004; Salamon and Sokolowski 2003).

Authoritarian regimes may undermine the association between belonging to religious organizations and civic organization participation. To prevent citizens from participating in civic organizations, the authorities in these countries use various tactics such as repression of violence and prohibition of foreign donations to these organizations (Puddington 2016). Due to the limitations that authoritarian regimes set on access to civic organizations, social resources

generated within religious organizations – such as trust and civic skills – may barely work. In this situation, even though religious members have more opportunities to be empowered and mobilized, they may be deterred from accessing civic organizations, or they may intentionally retreat from civic life to avoid suppression. Religious organizations under these regimes may thus become inward-looking and restrict their attention to in-group activities. Therefore, these religious organization members may not be as likely to participate in civic organizations as in democratic countries. We thus hypothesize:

H4: The differences regarding civic organization participation between religious organization members and non-members are smaller in less democratic countries.

Nevertheless, we also recognize an alternative perspective that predicts the opposite pattern: The bridging capacity of religious organizations may be stronger in less democratic societies. Current authoritarian regimes deal with civic organizations selectively, repressing those that are identified as challenging the status quo and tolerating those that present no or little threat to the authorities (Puddington 2017; Spires 2011). Since religious groups are primarily apolitical in nature, they are more likely to be tolerated by authoritarian regimes. In addition, religious organizations may be tolerated more as they offer social services which ameliorate social problems (Hunter 1998; Nasr 2001). And religious groups may enjoy a certain privileged legitimacy which protects their members from government repression (Smith 1996). Because of their apolitical nature, efforts in welfare provision, or privileged legitimacy, religious organizations can provide protection and resources to civic organizations under authoritarian regimes. In this situation, religious organizations and civic organizations may be tightly connected; Otherwise civic organizations may be vulnerable to government repression. But in democratic countries, the support from religious organizations is not indispensable for civic

organizations to survive: Religious organizations are not the only channel from which people in civic organizations can obtain resources, and moreover, freedom of association is protected by democratic institutions. Hence, religious organizations may be relatively loosely connected with civic organizations in democratic countries. As religious organizations may play a more important role for civic participation in less democratic countries, religious organization members may become more likely to join civic organizations in these countries. This expectation comports with previous research showing that the Roman Catholic Church was a crucial participant of high-risk activism in several Latin American countries ruled by military regimes (Loveman 1998). Based on this reasoning, we propose as follows:

H5: The differences regarding civic organization participation between religious organization members and non-members are larger in less democratic societies.

3. Data and method

Our main data source is the sixth wave of the World Values Surveys (hereafter, WVS), which was conducted between 2010 and 2014 and includes more than 86,000 respondents from 60 countries or territories (Inglehart et al. 2014). For convenience, we occasionally refer the upper-level units as “countries” or “nations” in the text, but it should be noted that some of these units are not a sovereign state. The WVS are representative surveys based on a form of stratified random sampling. In the first stages, a random selection of sampling points was made based on the given society’s statistical regions, districts, census, and so on. Following the sampling, a survey was carried out by professional organizations using face-to-face interviews or phone interviews. The questionnaire was translated into the national languages for surveyed societies. To examine the accuracy of the translation, many local versions of questionnaire were translated back to English. Also, pre-tests were conducted to identify inaccurate questions which were then

omitted from the local questionnaire. Using multiple group factor analysis and other statistical techniques, past research has shown that the questions concerning the civic organization membership were interpreted in the same way across societies (Paxton 2002). These studies show that the measures of civic organization participation are comparable across societies. The descriptive statistics of the study variables are displayed in Table 1.

3.1. Outcome variable

Following existing studies (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Parboteeah, Cullen, and Lim 2004; Lam 2006; Sarkissian 2012), we used civic organization membership as a dummy outcome variable for civic organization participation. Respondents were asked “whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of this type of organization: 1) church or religious organization 2) sport or recreational organization, 3) art, music, or educational organization, 4) labor union, 5) environmental organization, 6) professional association, 7) humanitarian or charitable organization, 8) consumer organization, 9) self-help or mutual aid group, 10) political party.” We excluded the options of church or religious organization and political party³, then we coded respondents who were active/inactive members of any other type of civic organization as 1, otherwise as 0.⁴ About 42.8% of respondents belonged to at least one type of civic organization.

³ Political party may not fall into the category of “civic” organization, so we did not include it in the outcome variable. We replicated the models to include political party membership, but the inclusion of this item did not substantially change the model results. In addition, some existing studies excluded union membership from their analysis because this may not be voluntary (Curtis et al. 2001). In models that we re-ran without taking into account union membership, the results were very similar to those we present in this article.

⁴ The outcome variable could be coded as a count variable and be estimated by multilevel Poisson regression techniques. Although the count variable specifies how many types of civic organizations respondents participated in, it does not indicate the time and resources that the respondents put in. It is possible that someone who joins only one type of civic organization spends more time on this one than someone who joins several types of civic organizations.

3.2. Key independent variables

Belonging to religious organizations was coded as a dummy variable, in which respondents who were active/inactive members of a church or religious organization were coded as 1, otherwise as 0. Besides church, temple, and mosque, religion-based organizations may include discussion groups, leadership training programs, community outreach groups, and so on. Of all respondents, 37.4% reported that they belonged to religious organizations.

Percent Protestant was calculated by dividing the number of respondents who reported having Protestant affiliation by the number of all respondents in each society. The Protestant percentage ranged from 0 in some countries to 0.71 in Zimbabwe. We took the natural log form of mean Gross Domestic Product per capita between 2010 and 2014 to represent the economic condition. The GDP data was obtained from the World Bank website. Among the surveyed societies in the sixth wave of the WVS, Rwanda had the lowest mean GDP per capita, i.e., 651 dollars, and Australia had the highest, i.e., 62,361 dollars.

We used the freedom index published by the Freedom House to measure democracy in each society. Freedom House analysts first construct a political rights score (i.e., electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government) and a civil liberties score (i.e., freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights) for each society, and then average the two scores to produce the freedom index. The original freedom index ranged from 1.0 (highest freedom) to 7.0 (least freedom). We reversed the index from 7.0 (highest freedom) to 1.0 (least freedom). This index has been widely-used score for measuring democracy in social science research (e.g., Bollen 1993; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

3.3. Control variables

We controlled for the effects of other religious variables. Some cross-national studies have noted the differences between religious traditions, especially between Protestantism and Catholicism, in civic organization participation (Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Lam 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2011). We thus included religious tradition (Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, other religionists, and those not affiliating with any religion) in the models. Religious service attendance ranged from 1 (never attending) to 7 (several times a week), and prayer frequency from 1 (never) to 8 (several times a day). The importance of religion was coded as a dummy (1= important, 0= not important). Previous research showed that these indicators of religiosity were related to civic engagement (e.g., Lam 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2011).

In terms of demographic variables, it has been found that people with higher educational level and income are more active in civic life (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1998). Educational attainment was coded from 1 (no education) to 7 (completed college education or higher), and income level from 1 (the lowest income group in that person's society) and 10 (the highest income group). Marriage has also been found to be influential for civic participation (e.g., Einolf and Philbrick 2014; Mesch et al. 2006). We coded respondents as 1 if they were married, and as 0 otherwise. Gender could be a factor in civic participation (e.g., Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994; Espinal and Zhao 2015), so we included this variable, with men set as the reference category. We also controlled for age (measured by years of age), which has been found to be associated with civic participation (Galston and Lopez 2006; Sander and Putnam 2006).

Regarding country-level control variables, we included the Gini index because studies have shown that income inequality often depresses civic participation (e.g., Lancee and de

Werfhorst 2012). A global financial crisis followed by widespread social and political movements occurred right before and during the study period of our research. We constructed two variables to control for the potential influences of the economic crisis and the social movements on civic participation. As unemployment rate has long been recognized as an important indicator for economic cycle (e.g., Hall 2017; Mortensen 1994), we calculated the share of respondents who self-reported as unemployed per country [the number of unemployed respondents / the number of respondents who had full-time job, who had part-time job, who were self-employed, and who were unemployed]. In addition, we controlled for the percentage of respondents who participated in petition, demonstration, boycott, or strike.

[Insert Table 1. About here]

3.4. Analytical strategy

Our analysis consists of two parts. We first examined the individual-level association between belonging to religious organizations and civic organization participation, then we explored how national factors interacted with individual belonging to religious organizations. We used multilevel modeling to incorporate both individual- and country-level variables as well as cross-level interaction. In this study, individual respondents were nested within different countries or territories.

The multilevel equations are shown below.

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_{ij}}{1 - \pi_{ij}}\right) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{1ij} + \beta_2'x_{ij}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_1'w_j + u_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_2'w_j + u_{1j}$$

For our binary outcome civic organization participation, we have $\Pr(Y_{ij} = 1) = \pi_{ij}$. In the level-1 equation, the log odds are a function belonging to a religious organization (X_{lij}) and a vector of additional individual-level covariates ($\mathbf{x}_{ij}$). This equation specifies a random intercept and a random slope for belonging to a religious organization that vary across societies. The level-2 equations show the random intercept and random slope as functions of a vector of society-level characteristics ($\mathbf{w}_j$). The level-2 equation for the random slope permits the relationship between belonging to a religious organization and civic organization participation to vary according to aspect of the societal context.

The multilevel logit models were fit in Stata 14.2 using Stata's `melogit` command with an unstructured covariance matrix specified for the random effects (StataCorp 2015). In addition, to facilitate interpretation, we used Stata's `margin` command to calculate predicted probabilities. The calculations of the predicted probabilities integrate over the random effects and average over the values of the other covariates in the model.

3.5. Strategies for addressing missing values

Several individual-level variables are missing for all respondents from some societies. Specifically, there is no information on prayer frequency and religious affiliation in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Egypt, and no information on religious service attendance in Kuwait, Qatar, and Morocco. Protest participation was not asked in the surveys of Bahrain, Belarus, Qatar, Singapore, and Uzbekistan, while the information about employment status is absent in Argentina. In addition, Gini data obtained from the World Bank does not provide information for Libya. Thus, analysis with these variables will exclude the 14,330 respondents from these ten countries, around 17% of the whole sample. Besides the missing observations of the ten

countries, there are 6, 165 more missing cases in the remaining sample, which is 7% of the whole sample.

We used two strategies to handle these missing data. The first was the listwise deletion of all the missing values, a common strategy adopted by most researchers who use the WVS data (e.g., Jung 2015; Lam 2006; Olson and Li 2015; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Schwadel 2017). This resulted in an analytic sample of 65,447 cases, 50 country-level units. We reported the model results based on this sample as our main findings (Table 2). The second strategy was a combination of listwise deletion and multiple imputation. We deleted the missing data of the ten countries. This missing data is presumably missing not at random (MNAR). In other words, the missingness of the data may not depend on the observed cases. We then imputed the missing values in the remaining sample using the chained equation method. Following the widely practiced procedure, we excluded those observations with missing data on the dependent variable in estimating the models. The model results based on the imputed sample, which contained 71,612 cases, are presented in Supplemental Table 2. As we discuss later, the results based on the listwise-deletion sample are consistent with the results obtained from the multiple imputation.

4. Results

4.1. Main results

Table 2 presents the results of the multilevel logistic regression models predicting civic organization membership. We first ran an unconditional model without any covariates (Model 1), which shows that the intraclass correlation (ICC) is about 0.286.⁵ This means that around 28.6%

⁵ $1.317 / (1.317 + \pi^2/3) = 0.286$. For a multilevel logistic regression model, the within-cluster variance (level-1 individual variance) is assumed to follow a standard logistic distribution, which is equal to $\pi^2/3$, or approximately 3.29.

of the total variance in the outcome variable is between-country. Since there is substantial variation in civic organization membership among societies, it is appropriate to use multilevel regression models to account for the between-country variance as well as the within-country variance.

In Model 2, we added all individual- and country-level key variables as well as controls. The model shows that religious organization membership is positively associated with civic organization participation. The odds of civic organization participation are 4.30 times as high for members of religious organization as for non-members ($\exp[1.458]$). This finding supports Hypothesis 1 and implies that, on a worldwide scale, belonging to religious organizations is positively related to participation in nonreligious civic organizations. This finding suggests that religious organizations generally tend to function as “bridges” across groups. Moreover, Model 2 shows that there is substantial cross-national variance in the slope of religious organization membership. We conducted a likelihood-ratio test between Model 2 and a model without the random slope of religious organization membership which is not shown. The likelihood-ratio test is significant ($\chi^2 = 515.55$, $P < 0.000$) and suggests that Model 2 improves the model fit relative to the model without the random slope. Heisig and Schaffer’s research (2018) has shown that it is necessary to include a random slope term for multilevel models. They demonstrate that the omission of a random slope term will substantially inflate the absolute t-ratio of cross-level interaction coefficient. Following Heisig and Schaffer’s work, therefore, we included the random slope term for all multilevel models with a cross-level interaction in the present study.

As for individual-level control variables, most of them are significantly related to the outcome variable. Religious service attendance is positively associated with civic organization participation. The odds of civic organization participation are 1.28 times ($\exp[0.035 \times 7]$) as high

for people who attended religious services several times a week as for those who never attended. This suggests that the influence of religious service attendance on civic organization participation is smaller than that of religious organization membership. This finding is consistent with the conclusion of some past works that it is the religion-related organizations rather than the religious services that mainly increases the participation of religious people in nonreligious organizations (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Schwadel 2005). Both prayer frequency and religious importance are negatively related to civic organization participation. Individuals affiliating with Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Orthodox Christianity and other religions report lower participation rates than those who have no religious affiliation. By contrast, Buddhists show higher participation rates than religious nones. Respondents with higher education and income level report higher probability of civic organization participation. Older people, women, and the married are less likely to join in civic organizations. In terms of country-level variables, the coefficients of the percent unemployed and the logged mean GDP are not significantly negative, while that of the percent protested is significantly positive. The percent Protestant, freedom index, and Gini index are not significantly related to civic organization participation.

Model 3 includes the cross-level interaction of religious organization membership and percent Protestant and shows that this interaction is significant and negative. This suggests that in societies with a larger Protestant population, the effects of religious organization membership on civic participation are weaker. Figure 1 presents the predicted probabilities of civic organization participation for religious members and non-members in societies with no Protestant respondents, with the mean of Protestant percentage, and with one standard deviation above the mean. The predicted probabilities for religious members are relatively stable across contexts, while the predicted probabilities for non-members increase when moving to societies

with larger Protestant shares. The gap in the predicted probabilities between the two groups is thus narrower in societies with larger Protestant shares. This finding lends support to Hypothesis 2.

[Insert Figure 1. About Here]

In Model 4, we added the cross-level interaction of religious organization membership and the logged mean GDP per capita between 2010 and 2014. This interaction is significantly negative. Figure 2 portrays the predicted probabilities of civic organization participation for religious members and non-members in societies with the mean of logged GDP per capita, one standard deviation above the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean. The predicted probabilities for religious members become higher in countries with lower logged GDP per capita. And the differences in the predicted probabilities between religious members and non-members are larger in countries with poorer economic condition. This finding supports Hypothesis 3.

[Insert Figure 2. About Here]

We set the freedom index to interact with individual religious organization membership in Model 5. According to the model results, there is a significant and negative interaction between freedom index and religious organization membership. Figure 3 displays this cross-level interaction. Going from less democratic societies (e.g., one standard deviation below the mean) to more democratic societies (e.g., one standard deviation above the mean), the predicted probabilities decrease for religious members while increasing for non-members. Thus, the gap between religious members and non-members in this regard is greater in less democratic countries, a finding lending support to Hypothesis 5.

[Insert Figure 3. About Here]

4.2. Sensitivity Analysis

We have conducted a series of sensitivity analysis for the core findings. First, it is possible that individual societies may be influential in the analysis. To explore this possibility, we implemented a strategy outlined by van der Meer et al. (2010) to calculate DFBETAs for each of the estimates we highlighted above. The DFBETAs for a number of the estimates revealed a few influential societies, but an examination of the specific estimates indicated that none of the substantive interpretations changed with the exclusion of any particular society from the analysis.

In addition, we used logged mean Gross National Product (GNP) per capita between 2010 and 2014 as a substitute for GDP per capita to represent the economic level of a society. As shown in the model (Model 1 of Supplemental Table 2), the interaction between the religious organization membership and the logged GNP per capita is significant and negative. This suggests that the moderating effect of economic level is robust across different measurements.

Moreover, we replaced the freedom index with the polity index, which is another widely-used score for measuring democracy in social science research (e.g., Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). The polity index, drawn from Polity IV project, is a measure for the authority characteristics of states in the world for purposes of comparative and quantitative analysis. The index accounts for competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. The polity index ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). According to model results (Model 2 in Supplemental Table 2), the effects of religious organization membership are larger in societies with lower polity scores. This

test provides support to the robustness of the finding on the moderating effect of countries' democratic level.

As we explained in the methodology section, we constructed a sample by using multiple imputations to address part of the missing data. We ran the models based on the multiple-imputation sample (Model 3 to 5 in Supplemental Table 2). The interaction coefficients between religious organization membership and societal factors are almost the same in the models based on the listwise-deletion sample and the multiple-imputation sample. This provides further evidence for the robustness of the findings.

5. Conclusion and discussion

Whether religious organizations encourage participation in secular organizations has long been of interest to scholars. As discussed earlier, religious organizations could merely function as bonding networks, which may have deleterious effects on the social cohesion of the larger society, or they may build “bridges” to secular groups and thus help minimize social cleavages (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Iannaccone 1994; Lam 2002; Lewis, MacGregor, and Putnam 2013; Putnam 2000; Schwadel 2005; Whitehead and Stroope 2015; Wuthnow 1999). This has become a global issue because, as noted by many observers and scholars, religious organizations have expanded rapidly and gained increasing influence in many parts of the world during the past decades. The research that has examined this relationship has mainly been limited to the U.S. so does not reveal the cross-national dynamics in this regard. To help fill this gap in the literature, this article has examined the cross-national association between belonging to religious organizations and participating in civic organizations and then explored the moderating potential of societal factors. We did this by constructing a dataset combined from the 2010-2014 wave of World Values Surveys, the Freedom House data, and economic data from the World Bank.

We find that belonging to religious organizations has a positive association with civic organization participation worldwide, which supports Hypothesis 1. This means that, in the early 21st century, religious organizations have generally facilitated participation in nonreligious civic organizations. This finding increases the generalizability of the conclusions from some studies that found a positive linkage between religious organizations and nonreligious civic organizations in the U.S. (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Lam 2002; Lewis, MacGregor, and Putnam 2013; Putnam 2000; Schwadel 2005). The finding that religious organization members are active in civic participation comports with the studies that highlight religion's relation to the latest wave of civic and political participation in many countries (e.g., Hoffman and Jamal 2014; Miller and Yamamori 2007). These studies have noted that, for example, the grassroot networks of Islamic organizations in Egypt and Tunisia facilitate civic participation during and after the Arab Spring, and that many Pentecostal churches are becoming more dedicated to social services. More broadly, our research echoes the argument of scholars such as Casanova (1994) and Smith (1996) that religion has not become private or invisible; Rather, religion has continued to play an important role in the public sphere.

Moreover, belonging to religious organizations is found to have a stronger association with civic organization participation in societies characterized by a smaller Protestant population, economic hardship, and nondemocratic institutions. It seems that religious organizations are more capable of promoting the "bridging social capital" where the general social context is less conducive to civic organizations. The moderating effects of these societal contexts have been found to be robust across different measurements. These findings provide more nuances to our understanding of the implication of religious organization in relation to social capital.

One specific finding on the moderating effects is that the differences in the likelihood of civic organization participation between religious organization members and non-members are less pronounced in societies with a larger Protestant population, which offers evidence for Hypothesis 2. As some scholars have shown (Lipset 1994; Woodberry 2012), Protestant groups often popularize a civic culture of voluntarism and relevant organizational forms. This influence of Protestant groups may spread across religious boundaries and could encourage the civic participation of individuals who do not belong to religious organizations. Consequently, a larger number of Protestant groups is related to fewer differences in this regard between religious members and non-members. This finding echoes an argument of previous research that certain religious values could become vital components of national culture, identity, and ideology, by which people's behavior and attitudes are shaped regardless of their own religious affiliation (Lipset 1990; Tropman 1995; Williams 2002).

In line with Hypothesis 3, lower GDP per capita is found to be associated with larger differences in civic organization participation between religious members and non-members. This may be because religious organizations accumulate and provide resources for civic participation and social services programs. Researchers on the voluntary sector have shown that religious organizations have been an important channel of money and other assistance to people in need (Wuthnow and Hodgkinson 1990). Particularly, a large number of case studies have documented the active role of religious organizations in social services and civic activities in less wealthy societies. For example, Christian missionaries introduced modern higher education and medical systems to China in the early twentieth century (Dunch 2001; Zhang 2007). In the contemporary Middle East, Muslim organizations have established various civic organizations, from clinics to sports clubs and from financial support groups to professional organizations

(Masoud 2004; Sadowski 2006). And both Christian and Muslim activists have been involved in social programs of development, disaster relief, and epidemic prevention in some regions of Africa (Bratton 1989; Campbell, Skovdal, and Gibbs 2011; Kawewe 1995). The current study adds to these case studies by showing that religious organization members are more active in civic organizations in societies with poor economic condition than their counterparts in more wealthy societies.

Moreover, our finding suggests that authoritarian regimes seem to be unable to block religious people from civic participation, which is different from the conclusion of much of the research on authoritarianism and civil society. Authoritarian regimes usually view civic organizations as potential challengers and thus try to prevent citizens from participating in these organizations. Many scholars and political analysts have argued that the restrictive measures imposed upon access to civic organizations have often been effective (e.g. Nathan 2003; Puddington 2016, 2017; Spires 2011). Cross-national studies lend support to this argument by showing that there were fewer NGOs and fewer participants in civic organizations in more authoritarian countries (Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Paxton 2002; Halman 2003; Parboteeah, Cullen, and Lim 2004; Salamon and Sokolowski 2003). Nevertheless, we find that the differences between religious members and non-members are larger in societies where the authorities are more hostile towards civil society, a finding in line with Hypothesis 5. It may be that religious organizations offer protection and logistical support for civic organization participation, which is difficult for people to obtain outside religious channels. This comports with existing studies that religious networks are one of the few organizational channels through which social mobilization can occur in repressive settings (Loveman 1998; Lu and Yang 2018).

There are some limitations in our study. Like many other macro–quantitative studies on religion and civic engagement, we cannot directly observe the intervening mechanisms by which societal context serves as a moderator. This limitation is due to the lack of measures in our data. To more completely examine the intervening mechanism of societal context, we need information on the degree to which religious organizations accumulate resources for civic engagement and provide moral and material support for civically active members. So far, to the best of our knowledge, there is no cross-national dataset containing such information on religion and civic engagement. We hope a new dataset including the information will become available in the future and will enable scholars to have a more nuanced understanding on religion and civic participation.

Furthermore, previous research has suggested that religious values such as compassion, voluntarism, and social gospel are important for civic engagement (e.g., Wuthnow 1991; Lam 2002). Unfortunately, the WVS does not offer measurements of the extent to which people accept these values. We thus are unable to examine the cross-national variation of the effects of these values. But past research has shown that religious networks that are embedded in religious organizations are the main mechanism of the religion-civic engagement link, and not religious beliefs and values (Lewis, MacGregor, and Putnam 2013). Our study therefore still shed light on the relationship between religion and nonreligious civic participation.

Another potential limitation in our research involves measurement equivalence. Studies have found that in cross-national surveys, measurements for subjective attributes such as values and attitudes may not have the same connotation in different countries (Davidov et al. 2014). Viewed in this way, the meaning of participation in civic organizations may be varied depending on the contexts. For example, it is possible that participation in certain types of civic

organizations, such as labor union, has a stronger political meaning in some countries than in others. Even a football club membership in some areas, such as FC Barcelona in Catalonia of modern Spain, reflects a strong political connotation. In terms of this issue, however, the WVS measures for civic organization participation have been tested and proven to be valid cross-nationally (Paxton 2002). In addition, a study that employed probabilistic scalogram analyses to Eurobarometer data found that questions on the extents to that people participated in civic organizations were cross-nationally equivalent in Europe (Gesthuizen et al. 2013). These studies have provided supportive evidence for the cross-national equivalence of the measurements regarding individual participation in civic organizations. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there may be unrecognized measurement/translation problems in our data and encourage additional qualitative research to explore this issue.

The cross-sectional nature of the data limited our capacity to establish causal ordering among our focal associations. Although we have provided a theoretical rationale for one direction of that association, the positive association between belonging to religious organizations and participating in civic organizations may be due to a selection effect. In other words, it is conceivable that some people are more inclined for civic engagement than others, and therefore they are active in both religious organizations and nonreligious organizations. Despite this possibility, the causal direction suggested in this study has also been substantiated by some longitudinal findings in this area. For example, one study using German panel data showed that after accounting for this reciprocal association, religious participation still had a significant, robust, and substantial effect on engagement in civic organizations and activities (Meißner 2012). This longitudinal research as well as the large number of relevant studies on the U.S. suggest that the association between religious organizations and civic organization

participation is not totally caused by the selection mechanism. Moreover, it would be difficult to make sense of the contingent relationships reported in this study from the vantage point of the selection effect thesis. In short, although we acknowledge that our reliance on cross-sectional data cannot rule out the possibility of selection effect, we believe that the arguments developed at the outset of this paper are better suited to explain the body of findings presented here.

Although we focus on percentage of Protestants as a moderating influence in the link between religious membership and civic engagement, future research may benefit from extending our findings to other religious traditions. Research has shown that non-Protestant religions have potential to promote civic engagement (Huang 2012; Sarkissian 2012; Vergani et al., 2017). For example, Buddhists' involvement in religious associations is associated with deeper civic engagement in the wider society in Malaysia (Huang 2012). Moreover, Vergani and his colleagues (2017) have documented a positive link between Islamic religiosity and civic engagement in Australia. As our sociological understanding of the relationship between non-Protestant religion and civic engagement is still in its infancy, a systematic comparison of the influence of other religious traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, and Islam would be a significant contribution to the literature on religion and civic engagement.

Another direction for additional research is to consider different types of civic organizations separately. In the present research, we focus on the general relationship between religious organization membership and civic participation and how this general relationship varies across contexts. Future research may explore the link between religious organization membership and specific types of civic organizations. For example, Maloney and Rossteutscher (2007) have differentiated civic organizations based on their primary goals: To serve entertainment purposes, economic interests, and general social interest. Another classification

approach is to distinguish between “old” civic organizations that aim for material interests and “new” civic organizations that emphasize postmaterialist values (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Analysis of how religion is related to different types of civic organizations and how this relationship differs depending on contexts may provide more fine-grained knowledge on religion and civic participation.

Although some unsolved issues remain, our research expands on the literature focusing on religion, civic participation, and societal context. We find that belonging to religious organizations is positively related to civic organization participation. This finding lends further support to the argument that religious organizations are able to generate “bridging social capital.” Moreover, members of religious organizations are found to be more active in civic organizations in societies that have a smaller Protestant population and are less prosperous and less democratic. This suggests that the capacity of religious organizations to create “bridging social capital” varies across societies. Our research echoes the literature which emphasizes the interrelationship between religion and social context. Early theorists such as Weber (1948) pointed out that religious belief, activity, and institutions were deeply shaped by social context. Recently, there has been a growing attention by researchers to how the social influences of religion are contingent upon social context (e.g., Jung 2015; Lam 2006; Olson and Li 2015; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006; Schwadel 2017). Extending this line of research, our study further shows that the link between religious organization and civic organization participation does depend on social context.

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Table 1: Summary statistics for all study variables (Individual N = 65,447; Society N = 50)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Individual-level variables</i>				
Civic organization participation	0.428	0.495	0	1
Belonging to religious organizations	0.374	0.484	0	1
Religious affiliation				
Protestant	0.133	0.340	0	1
Catholic	0.198	0.398	0	1
Orthodox	0.118	0.320	0	1
Jew	0.005	0.073	0	1
Muslim	0.243	0.429	0	1
Buddhist	0.044	0.206	0	1
Hindu	0.023	0.150	0	1
Other religions	0.037	0.188	0	1
No affiliation	0.199	0.399	0	1
Prayer frequency	5.287	2.684	1	8
Importance of religion	0.709	0.454	0	1
Religious services attendance	3.952	2.201	1	7
Age	42.222	16.664	16	99
Women	0.522	0.500	0	1
Education	4.704	1.591	1	7
Income Level	4.815	2.108	1	10
Married	0.552	0.497	0	1
<i>Society-level variables</i>				
Percent Protestant	0.132	0.188	0	0.709
Mean GDP per capita (logged)	2.113	1.188	-0.429	4.133
Freedom index	4.825	1.812	1.5	7
Gini index	38.678	9.512	24.8	63
Percent unemployed	0.155	0.109	0.023	0.451
Percent protested	0.290	0.179	0.042	0.848

Table 2: Multilevel logistic regression on civic organization participation (Individual N = 65,447; Country N = 50)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.402* (0.163)	-2.248*** (0.551)	-2.442*** (0.517)	-2.534*** (0.548)	-2.925*** (0.517)
<i>Individual-level key variable</i>					
Religious organization membership		1.458*** (0.099)	1.804*** (0.100)	1.869*** (0.187)	2.602*** (0.249)
<i>Individual-level controls</i>					
Religious affiliation					
Protestant ^a		-0.246*** (0.042)	-0.240*** (0.042)	-0.244*** (0.042)	-0.243*** (0.042)
Catholic ^a		-0.122** (0.039)	-0.117** (0.039)	-0.120** (0.039)	-0.117** (0.039)
Orthodox ^a		-0.307*** (0.054)	-0.308*** (0.054)	-0.306*** (0.054)	-0.307*** (0.054)
Jew ^a		-0.004 (0.138)	-0.003 (0.138)	-0.003 (0.138)	-0.005 (0.138)
Muslim ^a		-0.040 (0.054)	-0.039 (0.054)	-0.038 (0.053)	-0.037 (0.054)
Buddhist ^a		0.225*** (0.065)	0.222*** (0.065)	0.225*** (0.065)	0.220*** (0.065)
Hindu ^a		-0.483*** (0.110)	-0.470*** (0.111)	-0.468*** (0.110)	-0.472*** (0.111)
Other religions ^a		-0.195*** (0.058)	-0.194*** (0.058)	-0.192*** (0.058)	-0.191*** (0.058)
Prayer frequency		-0.017** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)
Importance of religion		-0.252*** (0.029)	-0.253*** (0.029)	-0.250*** (0.029)	-0.249*** (0.029)
Religious services attendance		0.035*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)
Age		-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Women		-0.340*** (0.019)	-0.340*** (0.019)	-0.341*** (0.019)	-0.341*** (0.019)
Education		0.242*** (0.007)	0.242*** (0.007)	0.242*** (0.007)	0.241*** (0.007)
Income Level		0.094*** (0.005)	0.094*** (0.005)	0.094*** (0.005)	0.094*** (0.005)
Married		-0.045* (0.021)	-0.045* (0.021)	-0.046* (0.021)	-0.045* (0.021)
<i>Country-level variables</i>					
Percent Protestant		0.594 (0.410)	1.865*** (0.562)	0.521 (0.404)	0.363 (0.401)
Mean GDP per capita (logged)		-0.393*** (0.089)	-0.300** (0.093)	-0.300** (0.100)	-0.284** (0.097)
Freedom index		0.036 (0.045)	0.004 (0.048)	0.040 (0.044)	0.058 (0.068)
Gini index		0.005 (0.012)	0.010 (0.011)	0.008 (0.012)	0.018 (0.011)
Percent unemployed		-3.645*** (1.000)	-2.786** (0.998)	-3.873*** (0.990)	-3.237** (1.098)

Percent protested		4.402 ^{***} (0.604)	3.781 ^{***} (0.637)	4.415 ^{***} (0.594)	4.095 ^{***} (0.655)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>					
Religious organization membership * Percent Protestant			-2.007 ^{***} (0.456)		
Religious organization membership * logged mean GDP per capita				-0.181 [*] (0.071)	
Religious organization membership * Freedom index					-0.214 ^{***} (0.047)
<i>Variance components</i>					
Intercept variance	1.317 ^{***} (0.265)	0.454 ^{***} (0.087)	0.476 ^{***} (0.090)	0.439 ^{***} (0.091)	0.488 ^{***} (0.093)
Random slope variance		0.485 ^{***} (0.104)	0.351 ^{***} (0.077)	0.438 ^{***} (0.094)	0.334 ^{***} (0.075)
Covariance of intercept and random slope		-0.022(0.069)	-0.012(0.056)	0.035(0.062)	-0.018(0.056)

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses.

^a Compared with No religion

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014)

Figure 1. Predicted probabilities based on the interaction between religious membership and percent Protestant

Figure 2. Predicted probabilities based on the interaction between religious membership and logged mean GDP per capita 2010-14

Figure 3. Predicted probabilities based on the interaction between religious membership and freedom index

Supplemental Table 1: Respondent frequency and country-level key variables per country

Society	Frequency	Percent Civic Organization Members	Percent Religious Members	Percent Protestant	Mean GDP per Capita between 2010-14(US\$)	Freedom Index
Algeria	1193	0.19	0.08	0.00	5281	2.5
Armenia	1030	0.08	0.03	0.00	3654	3.0
Australia	965	0.78	0.44	0.27	62361	7.0
Azerbaijan	1002	0.14	0.03	0.00	7259	2.5
Brazil	1425	0.38	0.73	0.27	12185	6.0
Chile	684	0.38	0.39	0.11	14751	7.0
China	1747	0.19	0.05	0.03	6259	1.5
Colombia	1468	0.49	0.68	0.02	7461	4.5
Cyprus	981	0.43	0.17	0.00	29450	7.0
Ecuador	1199	0.25	0.36	0.12	5618	5.0
Estonia	1435	0.34	0.14	0.08	17697	7.0
Georgia	1179	0.04	0.21	0.00	3907	4.5
Germany	1909	0.56	0.41	0.28	45419	7.0
Ghana	1552	0.54	0.94	0.56	1553	6.5
Hong Kong	970	0.53	0.32	0.00	36601	4.5
India	1480	0.89	0.58	0.03	1456	5.5
Iraq	1189	0.19	0.10	0.00	6127	2.5
Japan	1612	0.41	0.12	0.00	43966	6.5
Jordan	1192	0.16	0.11	0.00	3883	2.5
Kazakhstan	1500	0.23	0.09	0.01	11958	2.5
Kyrgyzstan	1458	0.49	0.19	0.00	1149	3.0
Lebanon	1072	0.49	0.22	0.01	8571	4.0
Malaysia	1298	0.29	0.27	0.00	10464	4.0
Mexico	1920	0.52	0.67	0.10	9873	5.0
Netherlands	1565	0.70	0.30	0.11	51417	7.0
New Zealand	645	0.85	0.45	0.39	39896	7.0

Nigeria	1759	0.66	0.93	0.27	2766	4.0
Pakistan	1188	0.23	0.16	0.00	1223	3.5
Palestine	988	0.34	0.18	0.00	2749	2.5
Peru	1104	0.44	0.47	0.13	6051	5.5
Philippian	1198	0.50	0.59	0.02	2533	5.0
Poland	839	0.28	0.26	0.00	13552	7.0
Romania	1433	0.20	0.20	0.09	9132	6.0
Russia	2065	0.18	0.06	0.01	13942	2.5
Rwanda	1527	0.83	0.68	0.20	651	2.5
Slovenia	968	0.51	0.20	0.01	23616	7.0
South Africa	2920	0.59	0.83	0.44	7263	6.0
South Korea	1062	0.53	0.47	0.23	24845	6.5
Spain	1005	0.25	0.17	0.01	29989	7.0
Sweden	1079	0.83	0.43	0.60	57653	7.0
Taiwan	1146	0.72	0.43	0.05	19262	6.5
Thailand	1100	0.66	0.29	0.00	5708	3.5
Trinidad	952	0.46	0.77	0.41	18765	6.0
Tunisia	1151	0.09	0.02	0.00	4201	2.0
Turkey	1534	0.10	0.02	0.00	11681	5.0
Ukraine	1500	0.23	0.13	0.02	3505	5.0
United States	2099	0.63	0.64	0.28	51400	7.0
Uruguay	739	0.28	0.23	0.08	14963	7.0
Yemen	921	0.19	0.08	0.00	1461	2.5
Zimbabwe	1500	0.57	0.93	0.71	909	2.0
Total	65,447					

Supplemental Table 2: Sensitivity analysis for the cross-level interaction between religious organization membership and national variables

Variable	Original Sample		Multiple-Imputation Sample		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<i>Intercept</i>	-2.631 ^{***} (0.556)	-3.036 ^{***} (0.485)	-2.051 ^{***} (0.570)	-2.109 ^{***} (0.563)	-2.164 ^{***} (0.551)
<i>Individual-level key variable</i>					
Religious organization membership	1.860 ^{***} (0.179)	1.889 ^{***} (0.155)	1.751 ^{***} (0.103)	1.921 ^{***} (0.195)	2.475 ^{***} (0.246)
<i>Individual-level controls</i>					
Religious affiliation ^a					
Protestant ^b	-0.244 ^{***} (0.042)	-0.244 ^{***} (0.043)	-0.213 ^{***} (0.040)	-0.216 ^{***} (0.040)	-0.216 ^{***} (0.040)
Catholic ^b	-0.121 ^{**} (0.039)	-0.117 ^{**} (0.039)	-0.102 ^{**} (0.036)	-0.102 ^{**} (0.036)	-0.102 ^{**} (0.036)
Orthodox ^b	-0.306 ^{***} (0.054)	-0.308 ^{***} (0.054)			
Jew ^b	-0.003 (0.138)	-0.007 (0.138)			
Muslim ^b	-0.037 (0.053)	-0.039 (0.054)			
Buddhist ^b	0.224 ^{***} (0.065)	0.228 ^{***} (0.068)			
Hindu ^b	-0.471 ^{***} (0.110)	-0.481 ^{***} (0.111)			
Other religions ^b	-0.192 ^{***} (0.058)	-0.190 ^{**} (0.059)	-0.107 ^{**} (0.035)	-0.106 ^{**} (0.035)	-0.106 ^{**} (0.035)
Prayer frequency	-0.016 ^{**} (0.006)	-0.015 [*] (0.006)	-0.017 ^{**} (0.006)	-0.017 ^{**} (0.006)	-0.017 ^{**} (0.006)
Importance of religion	-0.250 ^{***} (0.029)	-0.251 ^{***} (0.030)	-0.263 ^{***} (0.028)	-0.261 ^{***} (0.028)	-0.261 ^{***} (0.028)
Religious services attendance	0.035 ^{***} (0.007)	0.034 ^{***} (0.007)	0.034 ^{***} (0.006)	0.034 ^{***} (0.006)	0.034 ^{***} (0.006)
Age	-0.005 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.005 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.005 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.005 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.005 ^{***} (0.001)
Women	-0.341 ^{***} (0.019)	-0.338 ^{***} (0.020)	-0.335 ^{***} (0.018)	-0.336 ^{***} (0.018)	-0.336 ^{***} (0.018)
Education	0.242 ^{***} (0.007)	0.243 ^{***} (0.007)	0.240 ^{***} (0.007)	0.240 ^{***} (0.007)	0.240 ^{***} (0.007)
Income Level	0.094 ^{***} (0.005)	0.094 ^{***} (0.005)	0.095 ^{***} (0.005)	0.095 ^{***} (0.005)	0.095 ^{***} (0.005)
Married	-0.045 [*] (0.021)	-0.036 (0.021)	-0.045 [*] (0.020)	-0.045 [*] (0.020)	-0.045 [*] (0.020)
<i>Society-level variables</i>					
Freedom index	0.051 (0.046)		0.102 (0.080)	0.104 (0.079)	0.126 (0.077)
Polity index ^c		0.018 (0.026)			
Log mean GDP per capita		-0.256 [*] (0.105)	-0.425 ^{***} (0.123)	-0.401 ^{**} (0.126)	-0.421 ^{***} (0.123)

Log mean GNP per capita	-0.293** (0.104)				
Percent Protestant	0.412(0.413)	0.019(0.332)	1.972** (0.660)	1.639* (0.710)	1.635* (0.709)
Gini index	0.008(0.012)	0.024* (0.012)	0.004(0.012)	0.004(0.012)	0.004(0.012)
Percent unemployed	-3.775*** (1.008)	-3.040** (1.152)	-4.287*** (1.100)	-4.305*** (1.096)	-4.313*** (1.097)
Percent protested	4.329*** (0.605)	4.245*** (0.702)	3.076*** (0.715)	3.125*** (0.712)	3.107*** (0.712)
<i>Cross-level interactions</i>					
Religious organization membership * log mean GNP per capita	-0.190** (0.070)				
Religious organization membership * Polity index		-0.055** (0.019)			
Religious organization membership * percent Protestant			-2.125*** (0.480)		
Religious organization membership * log mean GDP per capita				-0.196* (0.079)	
Religious organization membership * freedom index					-0.199*** (0.047)
<i>Random effects</i>					
Intercept variance	0.460*** (0.094)	0.534*** (0.103)	0.669*** (0.069)	0.666*** (0.069)	0.666*** (0.068)
Random slope variance	0.433*** (0.093)	0.420*** (0.094)	0.562*** (0.064)	0.629*** (0.072)	0.566*** (0.066)
Covariance of intercept and random slope	0.035(0.063)	-0.031(0.067)	-0.090(0.168)	-0.088(0.188)	-.078(0.172)
Individual N	65,447	63,489	71,612	71,612	71,612
Country N ^c	50	48	50	50	50

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses.

^a The only difference between the models based on the listwise-deletion sample (Model 3 to 5 in Table 2) and the models based on the multiple-imputation sample (Model 3 to 5 in Supplemental Table 2) is that we combined the religious affiliation variable from nine categories (Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, other religions, none) into four categories (Protestantism, Catholicism, other religions, none). This is because there are only a few missing values in the religious affiliation variable in several countries, and thus the multiple-imputation model with the original nine-category variable failed to converge due to the small cell sizes. Since religious affiliation was treated only as a control in the models, we think the models using the multiple-imputation sample are still useful in checking the robustness of our findings.

^b Compared with religious none.

^c The Polity index does not include Hong Kong and Taiwan, so there are 48 higher-level units in the model with the polity index.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014)