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Living with the Dead as a Way of Life: A Materialist Historiographical Approach to Cemetery Asceticism in Indian Buddhist Monasticisms

Nicholas Witkowski*

This study challenges the long-standing scholarly conception that ascetic practice was incompatible with the institutional imperatives of the Indian Buddhist monastery in the “middle period.” Drawing upon the rich narrative tradition in Indian Buddhist law codes (*Vinaya*), I employ a new hermeneutical approach in order to demonstrate that cemetery (*śmaśāna*) asceticism remained central to the Buddhist monastic lifestyle. I begin with an extended methodological discussion that locates my approach—what I call materialist historiography—in a genealogy of scholarship that reads literary texts for an anthropology of everyday life. I then draw from a wide range of *Vinaya* narratives to argue that, despite the increasingly vocal presence of a Brahmanical purity party, the ascetic practices of residing in the cemetery, meditating on corpses, scavenging for goods on the charnel ground, and stripping corpses of their funeral shrouds remained an everyday affair in the monastery.

*Nicholas Witkowski, History Division, School of Humanities, Nanyang Technological University, 48 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore, 639818. Email: nwitkowski@ntu.edu.sg. I want to thank Paul Harrison, John Kieschnick, Oliver Freiberger, and Petra Kieffer-Pülz for their detailed comments on earlier versions of this piece. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of the JAAR.

INTRODUCTION

THIS STUDY seeks to accomplish a dual purpose. The first goal is to challenge the long-standing conception that ascetic practice was, by definition, incompatible with the institutionalized Indian Buddhist monastery.¹ Drawing primarily from the Indian Buddhist monastic legal codes (*Vinaya*),² I will demonstrate that a lifestyle of cemetery asceticism³ was, in fact, integral to the “middle period” Indian Buddhist monastery (c. 0–500 CE).⁴ The second goal of this study is to offer a historiographical approach to reading religious law codes (such as the *Vinaya*) for voices suppressed by an authorship claiming institutional authority over the community.

¹Following Max Weber’s sociology of charisma (e.g., Weber 1946, 243–50), scholarship on Indian Buddhism has generally adhered to the idea that asceticism was central to monastic communities only in the nascent stages of their development. Once Buddhist monastics gathered to live in the institutionalized setting of *vihāras* (“monasteries”), the antisocial practices of asceticism all but disappeared from monastic life (Frauwallner 1956, 124; Dutt 1924, 112ff.; Olivelle 1974, 1ff.; Gethin 1998, 98ff.; Yamagiwa 2001, 448; Bailey and Mabbett 2003, 235; Gombrich 2006, 95–105, and Schopen 2007, 75–76).

²For an overview of the *Vinaya* traditions, see Clarke 2015. Although there are multiple *Vinaya* schools evinced in textual sources, this study does not emphasize one of these legal traditions over another. I draw upon multiple legal codes to argue that ascetic practices were a fixture of monastic life across a range of Indian Buddhist traditions.

³The term “asceticism,” in the study of South Asian religions, has come to refer to a complex of practices in which the adept undertakes to limit his attachment to the pleasures (and anxieties) of the householder lifestyle. For a classic articulation of asceticism in South Asia, see Olivelle 1990. Following Olivelle, I understand cemetery asceticism as a set of practices that perform a reversal of culturally normative attachments to village, home, family, and property. When utilizing the terms “cemetery” or “charnel ground” (*śmaśāna*), I mean that structurally impure territory outside of the residential zone of the ancient Indian village to which corpses are transported for formal burial, cremation, or perfunctory abandonment to wild animals and the elements. The lists of Indian Buddhist ascetic practices, or *dhūtaguṇas* (lit. “qualities of purification”) (Dantinne 1991; Ray 1994; Abe 2001), include the term *śmāśānika*, often translated as “one who dwells in a cemetery.” However, in this article, I refer to a set of practices that are not easily categorized according to these canonical *dhūtaguṇa* lists. The most basic practice of cemetery asceticism I will treat is the physical presence in the cemetery that puts one’s body in contact with the ground touched by a corpse, thus rendering the individual ritually impure. The Buddhist manual of practice, the *Visuddhimagga*, for instance, states that any ground which has received a corpse automatically becomes the impure zone of a cemetery (for the English, see Nāṇamoli 1991, 75; for the Pāli, see Warren and Kosambi 1950, 61). For an anthropological account of ascetic sacrality defined by residence in the cemetery and contact with corpses in India, see Parry 1982. Two other important forms of cemetery asceticism I will discuss in this article are the practices of meditating on corpses and the retrieval of material goods from the charnel ground for use in daily life. The most detailed study of references to the ancient Indian cemetery in Buddhist literature is found in Kieffer-Pülz (1983). For a more recent discussion of cemetery rites, which deals with both Buddhist textual source materials and the modern anthropology of Sri Lanka, see Langer 2007.

⁴The time period I refer to here is that of the early institutionalized monastery, beginning roughly at the turn of the Common Era (Schopen 2007, 61) and ending in the fifth or sixth century. Schopen (2000, 1) refers to this early period of the institutionalized monastery as the “middle period” in Indian Buddhism.

At the turn of the Common Era, a process was initiated in which the norms of so-called “Brahmanical” communities began to spread throughout the Indian subcontinent. In recent years, scholarship on South Asian religions has refined scholarly conceptions of how Brahmanical ritual purity norms influenced conduct in early Buddhist monastic communities (see, for example, Bronkhorst 2007, 2011; Hüskens 2001; Langenberg 2016; Schopen 1992, 1995, 2006, 2007). Johannes Bronkhorst represents the consensus view among South Asianists, a position that understands Brahmanism as virulently opposed to contact with the dead. “Brahmanism looked down upon anything that had to do with dead bodies. Dead bodies were here considered impure, and Brahmanical ritual sought to get rid of dead bodies as soon and as efficiently as it could” (Bronkhorst 2011, 195–96). If, in a given locale on the subcontinent, Brahmanism began to exert increasing sway over the society and purity norms required the avoidance of contact with corpses, then, the argument goes, the Buddhist order would have refrained from cemetery asceticism to maintain their relationship to society at large (Schopen 2007).

In this article, I draw upon narratives from the *Vinaya* to challenge the view that the influence of a Brahmanically oriented *purity party*⁵ among Buddhist jurists was potent enough to eliminate the culture of cemetery asceticism in the institutionalized monastery. The *Vinaya* cases I discuss below feature descriptions of cemetery practices across a wide range of contexts. I argue that the legal *responsa*, which prohibit, curtail, or simply regulate these cemetery practices, suggest the vital presence of what I call an *ascetic fraternity*⁶ within monastic communities.⁷ The development of an approach to reading for evidence of ascetic fraternities in the cemetery below is predicated on a body of scholarship that recognizes that received textual sources in the study of religion are often profoundly biased against social movements, cultural norms, or even biological realities they find contrary to the social (and cosmic) order they seek to institute or

⁵I have adapted the term *purity party* from Morton Smith’s (1971, 111) description of a purity faction during Second Temple Judaism as the “Yahweh-alone party.” Like Smith, I see the textual representation of purity concerns as a reflection of sociological realities.

⁶The term *fraternity* is used advisedly and intentionally here. The evidence I have encountered in *Vinaya* sources, thus far, indicates that only male monastics are involved in these practices. Moreover, the textual references to problems of ascetic desire in the cemeterial context betray an intense authorial interest in male sexuality. I also use the term *fraternity* here to indicate the substantial institutional presence of ascetic practitioners. Although *Vinaya* sources do not permit one to specify the size of these fraternities, the development of a legal apparatus in response to cemetery asceticism suggests that scholars must revise the classic conception of the ascetic as an institutional outlier.

⁷This methodological approach of reading for historical data in what are primarily literary sources has benefitted first, and foremost, from the fine methodological overview Jan Nattier (2003, 63–69) provides to the “extraction” of historical data from Indian Buddhist texts in her translation and study of the *Ugraparipṛcchā*. See also Freiburger 2005; Clarke 2014, and now Langenberg (unpublished MS).

reinforce. The premise of this historiographical hermeneutics is that one can adumbrate the contours of a misrepresented community by reading against the grain of a legal code, which seeks to marginalize (or at least portray as marginal) this group. In this case, I argue, it is the cemetery asceticism of Buddhist monks that draws the ire of a purity party, disproportionately represented among the jurist-authors/compiler of the *Vinaya*.

The historiographical approach I propose is intended to both challenge and complement the current hermeneutical orientations in the study of Indian Buddhist textual traditions. I focus, in particular, on the *oeuvre* of Gregory Schopen on account of its outsized influence on the field of Buddhist law. Schopen is a prominent advocate for the reading of Buddhist narratives as literary texts.⁸ Schopen's approach should be understood as an indication that scholarship on Buddhist textual traditions is gradually beginning to join the broader post-war movement in the humanities that embraces poststructuralist literary theory. Poststructuralist literary theorists generally argue that texts cannot be counted on to represent historical reality. According to the proponents of poststructuralist hermeneutics, literary texts are constructed according to discursive logics that are unrelated to a unified authorial voice embodied in a particular historical context. If anything, texts communicate to their readers only the fragments of a cobbled-together, and likely discordant, set of ideological agendas.⁹ In one of his most theoretically developed pieces, Schopen echoes this poststructuralist orientation when he claims that "the vast majority of textual sources" are entirely unrepresentative of the social realities of their authors in that they are merely "formal literary expressions of normative doctrine." Whereas certain of his predecessors in Buddhist Studies incorrectly took Buddhist traditions, such as the *Vinaya*, to be "adequate reflections of historical reality," Schopen states that these texts "appear to be nothing more or less than carefully contrived ideal paradigms" (Schopen 1991, 3). Schopen's highly influential studies are representative of the recent methodological orientation in the study of Indian Buddhism. There is an intense focus on the ideological systems that animate texts and a general refusal to proffer arguments for the historicity of the narratives that constitute these traditions.

In contrast, what I hope to offer in this article is an interpretive framework that permits scholars to treat narrative traditions of the *Vinaya* not primarily as a set of literary tropes, but as an archive of historical data cataloging Indian monastic lifestyles during the early centuries of the

⁸I discuss other scholarly contributions to this literary approach below.

⁹For early instantiations of this textual approach, see Barthes 1967 and Foucault 1998. See below for a discussion of poststructuralist literary theory in the context of scholarship in religious studies.

Common Era. I will offer an approach to reading *Vinaya* texts that draws upon a tradition of scholarship I call *materialist historiography*. By *materialist historiography*, I mean an approach to reading highly stylized literary texts (such as the *Vinaya*) that seeks to distinguish rhetorical artifice from evidence for the social realities that inform the world of their authors.¹⁰ It is this hermeneutical approach that I will employ to carry out the primary task: demonstrating that cemetery asceticism was central to the lifestyle of the inmates of the Indian monastic institution. The structure of this article is as follows. In the next section, I will articulate what I mean by the methodological approach of materialist historiography. The subsequent sections will demonstrate how a materialist historiographical approach allows one to reframe the South Asian cemetery as a zone of Buddhist monastic asceticism.

EXCURSUS ON METHOD: BODILY PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE BASIS FOR A MATERIALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF CEMETERY ASCETICISM IN INDIAN BUDDHIST MONASTICISMS

I have noted the general refusal of scholarship in the wake of poststructuralist hermeneutics to proffer historiographical methods of treating *Vinaya* narrative. And this scholarly impulse is, indeed, well-founded. The strain of scholarship in Buddhist Studies that is skeptical of the premise that early Indian religious textual traditions—such as the *Vinaya*—might yield a historically accurate portrait of the Buddhist monastery is, in part, a reaction to a number of classic studies in the field. Many early scholars of Buddhist Studies often naively took narratives from the Buddhist textual traditions to be literal representations of historical realities. In his excellent article, “History, Tradition, and Truth,” C. W. Huntington (2007) notes that increasing methodological sophistication over the course of the twentieth century has led to a greater level of understanding that these literal readings of Buddhist texts were problematic. This tendency among scholars of the early Buddhist textual tradition is consonant with a broader trend among text scholars writing in the wake of the minimalist epistemologies of poststructuralism to view textual traditions as being hermetically sealed off from, and thus unrepresentative of, social realities. The historian and theoretician Frank Ankersmit succinctly expresses this view: “The past as the complex referent of the historical text as a whole has no role to play in historical debate. From the point

¹⁰I have coined this terminology based on the work of Paul Veyne (1978, 153).

of view of historical practice this referential past is epistemically a useless notion. . . . Texts are all we have and we can only compare texts with texts” (Ankersmit 1990, 281). Schopen’s characterization of the *Vinaya* as purely (or primarily) literary is consistent with this poststructuralist approach in the humanities. Huntington brings together an array of passages from Schopen’s corpus to make just this point.

The textual sources are “formal literary expressions of normative doctrine.” They are “intended—at the very least—to inculcate an ideal. This material records what a small atypical part of the Buddhist community wanted that community to believe or practice.” “Even the most artless formal narrative text has a purpose, and . . . in ‘scriptural’ texts, especially in India, that purpose is almost never ‘historical’ in our sense of the term. In fact what this [i.e., the exclusively textualist] position wants to take as adequate reflections of historical reality appear to be nothing more nor less than carefully contrived ideal paradigms.” (Huntington 2007, 214)

Among scholarship in premodern religious textual traditions, the field of late antiquity has developed an extraordinarily sophisticated theoretical apparatus for the incorporation of poststructuralist theories of narrativity into the study of ancient monastic legal and hagiographical traditions. As late antique methodological approaches have been an important touchstone for Schopen and other students of the Buddhist monastery, I will briefly draw the reader’s attention to one of the most full-throated accounts of how this literary approach treats Christian textual traditions that are analogous to the *Vinaya*. The prominent scholar of late antiquity, Elizabeth Clark, has argued that scholars in the field of “late ancient Christianity” “may safely assume that their texts lie in a largely unknown and dubious relation to the ‘reality’ of the ancient Church” (Clark 2004, 169–70). Clark follows Roger Chartier (1988) in arguing that “historical work should constitute an exercise in analyzing the process of representation, and that historians should refocus their task to examine the function of ideas in ideological systems” (Clark 2004, 170). Clark cites the hagiography of the fourth-century female saint, Macrina, as an example of how historians should read stories about the lives of monastics. What this text conveys is not “the events and people they depict”—in this case the reality of Macrina’s experiences—but the “socio-theological message” of the “(male) Christian writer” (Clark 2004, 181). If one follows Clark’s reading of narrative depictions of monastic lives, one should interpret *Vinaya* narratives as literary stylizations that reflect only the ideological universe of the writer and not as representations of social realities that exist outside of the textual imaginary. Clark’s approach to texts is representative of a

poststructuralist view of narrativity that can be traced back to Jacques Derrida's well-known claim in *of Grammatology*: "There is nothing outside of the text" (Derrida 1976, 158).

Schopen's poststructuralist inclinations are not unique to the field of Indian Buddhist Studies. Skepticism about the value of the early Buddhist narratives as representations of the social realities of everyday life in the monastery has been a consistent theme in discussions of Indian Buddhist historiography for more than a generation. Even scholars who have expressed interest in deploying *Vinaya* narrative for historiographical purposes have cautioned that these traditions represent only the imagination of their monastic authors.¹¹ The most systematic application of poststructuralist literary theory to *Vinaya* narrative is Damchö Diana Finnegan's dissertation. Pointing out the extent to which literary narrative, which comprises so much of the *Vinaya*, is constructed with the goal of generating particular responses in its presumed audience, Finnegan argues that the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* is "a complex text that positions itself differently for different readers" "and must be read with an eye to the particular positions it might take at any given narrative moment" (Finnegan 2009, 59). Drawing, in particular, upon the work of the German literary theorist Wolfgang Iser, Finnegan argues for an approach to the text that focuses exclusively on how the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* intends its "imagined readership"—or in Iserian terms, "implied reader"—to receive, or interpret, the text. Finnegan proffers a set of hermeneutical tools that are essential for the *Vinaya* scholar because it draws the reader's attention to the ideological cartographies that often exert a determinative effect on the construction of narrative. However, it is important to point out that Iser views the text as a literary "structure" that exists only in the shared imaginary between reader and author. Like Derrida, Iser conceives of the text as an ideological space that is hermetically sealed off from the historical realities of the societies in which it was conceived or compiled.¹²

While scholarship in recent decades favors a postructuralist epistemological minimalism, which focuses on the literariness of the text to the exclusion of the historical inquiry, materialist historians of religion, such as Carlo Ginzburg, have developed a wide range of hermeneutical tools that support the use of so-called "normative" sources, such as the *Vinaya*, for

¹¹Charles Hallisey states that the *Vinaya* only represents the "thought-worlds" of their authors (1990, 207). Steven Collins prefaces his *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities* with the disclaimer that he "cannot offer an immediate picture of what was in people's heads." He "can only offer what might have been in their heads, in so far as they thought in the manner available to us through its externalization in Pali texts" (1998, 82).

¹²According to Iser, "It is generally recognized that literary texts take on their reality by being read" (1980, 34).

their (often fragmentary and distorted) descriptions of popular cultural practice. In his now iconic study of popular religion in sixteenth-century Italy, *The Cheese and the Worms*, Ginzburg reads records of Vatican Inquisition trials for evidence of “heretical” beliefs and practice embraced on the level of local community. Ginzburg notes the challenge of studying “not ‘culture *produced* by the popular classes,’ but rather ‘culture *imposed* on the popular classes” (Ginzburg 1992, xv). Even though the authors of Inquisition records are deeply hostile to the “heresies” they document in the course of the trials, and one might therefore conclude that these texts can convey only the normative footprint of the “dominant [Vatican] culture,” Ginzburg argues that these authors “still permit us to define the latent possibilities of something (popular culture)” (Ginzburg 1992, xxi). It is for this reason that he promotes the idea that the careful reader can cull historical data from less transparent sources like “literary texts that strive to present an autonomous reality” by seeking out “uncontrolled elements” in the text.

Reading historical testimonies against the grain, as Walter Benjamin suggested—that is, against the intentions of the person or persons producing them (even if those intentions must of course be taken into account)—means supposing that every text includes uncontrolled elements. The same can be said of literary texts that strive to present an autonomous reality. Something opaque insinuates itself into them as well, much like the perceptions that sight registers without understanding them, as does the impassible eye of the camera. (Ginzburg 2012, 4)

In a direct challenge to Derrida, Ginzburg states that Inquisition trial documents evidence not only the ideologically orthodox discourse of their Church authors, but also “uncontrolled elements” (and by this he means voices of popular religiosity) that are external to the “autonomous” or “literary” reality of the text. In the nuanced reprise of his scholarly *oeuvre*, *Threads and Traces*, Ginzburg notes that, “by digging into the texts, against the intentions of whoever produced them, uncontrolled voices can be made to emerge.” Ginzburg drills down on the “habits and customs” of the everyday in premodern texts as the locus from which “we can trace involuntary historical testimonies” (Ginzburg 2012, 3–4).

In retrospective comments on method in his magisterial work of materialist historiography, *The Structures of Everyday Life*, Fernand Braudel explains that references to “everyday practices” function as a kind of textual unconscious that defy cultural and authorial intentionality. Braudel states that his approach presumes history is constituted by a series of

long-term equilibriums and disequilibriums. To my mind, the fundamental characteristic of the pre-industrial economy is the coexistence of the inflexibility, inertia, and slow motion characteristic of an economy that was still primitive, alongside trends—limited in the minority, yet active and powerful—that were characteristic of modern growth . . . I restricted myself to tangible criteria. I began with daily life, with those aspects of life that control us without our even being aware of them: habit or, better yet, routine—those thousands of acts that flower and reach fruition without anyone’s having made a decision, acts of which we are not even fully aware. (Braudel 1979, 5–7)

In their materialist historiography, *Daily Life of the Greek Gods*, Giulia Sissa and Marcel Detienne employ this Braudelian approach in order to distill an “anthropology” (Sissa and Detienne 2000, 13–27) of the leisure classes in the archaic period of Greece (eighth to fifth centuries BCE) from the ideologically inflected and highly literary corpus of Homer. Rather than reading Homer as a pure master-narrative representing only the authorship’s purported imagination about gods and legendary human figures, Sissa and Detienne recognize that descriptions of the “material life” of deities, are, in fact, references to the “everyday” world of the leisure classes in archaic Greece.

If we really seek to discover what the Greeks called the *ephemeral*, that is to say, the day-to-day, we must seize upon the pertinence of all the rules and manners that could so easily pass unnoticed. “What do they eat? What do they drink? How do they dress? What are their houses like?” (Sissa and Detienne 2000, 19)

What I wish to point out in Sissa and Detienne is that their approach to extracting data about everyday practices detailed in the Homeric cycles is predicated on an interrogation of the most tangible experiences of the gods. The most dependable evidence for a history of the Greek leisure class is derived from concrete descriptions of the body and its dispositions toward objects in daily life—dishes based on distinct recipes, wine of a certain quality, the dishware and goblets employed, as well as items such as dress and furniture. In contrast to poststructuralist hermeneutics, materialist historiography proposes a mode of reading that allows for the recovery of historical voices obscured by the literary or normative agenda guiding the process of textual production. Sissa and Detienne employ a Braudelian approach to demonstrate that historical voices suppressed by narrative agenda can best be recovered amidst references to the practices of everyday life. This contrast with poststructuralism is all the more pronounced in the context of the Inquisition documents discussed by

Ginzburg, in which under- or unrepresented historical communities are systematically excluded from the ranks of authorship.

Whereas poststructuralist logic dictates that the elite authorship is capable of effectively expunging the agency of these misrepresented communities from the textual record, Gabrielle Spiegel (2005) makes clear in her *Practicing History* that the agentive “experience” of the “historical actor” can never be completely determined by the linguistic structure into which they are initiated by the dominant culture. Rather than presume that the sign-system of the cultural text exerts a totalizing force that renders impossible the experience of agency, Spiegel (2005, 18–19) follows Dorothy Smith in arguing that historical actors perpetually, and ineluctably, engage in the making of new meaning out of their experience of the “‘bodily and material conditions’ of existence” (1987, 97). Smith challenges the Derridean conception of culture as pure textuality when she points out that the experience of material reality is, perforce, “situated outside textually mediated discourses in the actualities of everyday lives” (1987, 107). Borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* (Bourdieu 1977, 81), Spiegel finds that the historical agent’s experience of material conditions is rooted in “bodily dispositions” (Spiegel 2005, 19). According to Richard Biernacki, these bodily dispositions “have their own structure and coordinating influence” (Biernacki 1999, 75), which are rooted in what Clifford Geertz called “the informal logic of actual life” (Geertz 1973, 17).

Spiegel notes that a number of historians¹³ in recent years have begun to employ approaches that have, in one form or another, returned agent and intentionality to the historiographical project. One of the most compelling is the approach of “social phenomenology” Andreas Reckwitz has coined “to describe the subjective acts of (mental) interpretations of agents and their schemes of interpretation” (Reckwitz 2002, 247). Employing this approach, the historian may profitably mine social discourses for the “subjective acts” of agents that do not conform to a specific ideological framework, but which are, rather, ideologically promiscuous, and thus more likely to reflect the historical realities of un- or underrepresented communities. For the purposes of my work, I have adapted this approach, employing the term *bodily phenomenology* instead, because this framing

¹³My thinking about materialist historiography has also benefitted from that tradition of literary scholarship, represented by Erich Auerbach (1953, 547–48) and Stephen Greenblatt (1997), which focuses on the social realities that inform the world of the text, the orientation toward “thick description” set forth by anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz (1973), and scholars of religion, such as Gavin Flood, who discuss “the relation between the micro-narrative of the human person and the macro-history of a culture” (2013, 20). I am also indebted to scholars of Jewish law, such as Steven Fraade (2011, 3–15), who have exemplified a hermeneutical approach that takes seriously the relation between legal text and social realities.

shifts the emphasis from the more vague “subjective acts” to the social logic that emerges from textual references to specific “bodily dispositions.” Having outlined the distinction between the social logic of bodily agency and Derridean textualism, how might one develop this bodily phenomenology into a hermeneutical approach to reading monastic texts such as the *Vinaya*?

In her excellent piece, “Monks Baking Bread and Salting Fish,” Darlene Brooks Hedstrom “offer[s] a sensorial history of daily monastic living” (Brooks Hedstrom 2017, 183) based on the alimentary apparatus of the Christian monastic body articulated in the highly literary genre of monastic hagiography. Although the hagiographies—such as the aphoristic and nonlinear *Sayings of the Desert Fathers*—that Brooks Hedstrom relies upon for her sensorial history present a highly stylized portrait of monastic life over the *longue durée* of the fourth and fifth centuries CE and thus lack the documentary specificity of classic archival documents, she is able to reconstruct from these texts the lists of foods consumed in early Coptic monasteries, the techniques employed by monastery cooks, methods for harvesting produce, the relationship of physical spaces to alimentary behavior, and those discourses that framed the use of olive oil, the drinking of wine, or the imbibing of the Eucharist. In this piece, Brooks Hedstrom organizes and interprets the literary evidence in a manner that honors the integrity of the cultural networks of the late antique Coptic monastery, while presenting the monastic actors within this broader context as agents within the system. Brooks Hedstrom accomplishes this task by employing a phenomenology of corporeal experience that succeeds, in part, because it does not rely on generalized cultural discourse about the body, but rather on monastic actors’ precise descriptions of bodily sensation experienced by monastic actors.

In a 3 + 1 schematic for adapting this hermeneutic to the *Vinaya*, I have articulated a set of categories of textual evidence that allows for phenomenological precision in the description of sense experience within a cultural system that is consonant with the aims and approaches of materialist historiography outlined above. The first (and foundational) evidence for the historicity of a narrative element within texts such as the *Vinaya* is the presence of everyday objects. The second piece of evidence is the set of bodily practices by which social actors appropriate these objects in everyday contexts. Third is the social location of the bodily practice, which includes categories such as physical space, gender, economic status, and caste. A fourth narrative category that materialist historians employ, but only with caution, is constituted by interpretive discourses within textual traditions that go beyond mere descriptions of the social

function of objects and bodily practices and veer into the paranoid, or, alternatively, comedic rhetoric of hyperbole. Although this fourth approach must also be considered when attempting to extract historical data from highly stylized narratives, a materialist historiography seeks to segment out references to what social actors *actually did* from social commentary *about* the significance of these practices. In contrast to the categories of (1) object, (2) bodily practice, and (3) social location, the minefield of unconscious interpellation and conscious distortion that constitutes much of the rhetoric of interpretive discourse must be navigated cautiously if it is to yield historically valuable data.

Recent Precedent for a Materialist Historiography of the Vinaya

When considering precedents for this approach to reading for historical data in the *Vinaya*, one of the most important methodological studies in recent years is Amy Paris Langenberg's work discussing questions of agency among female monastics. Langenberg's choice of developing this line of historical inquiry by discussing tampon usage in *Vinaya* cases is ideal from the perspective of materialist historiography because these narratives emerge organically from the pragmatic deployment of a physical object of indisputable relevance to the everyday life of nuns. By taking this approach, Langenberg signals her interest in distinguishing between "which rules directly reflect a real historical landscape" in the Buddhist nunnery and those elements of *Vinaya* narrative "which belong to the realms of gender representation, rhetoric, or legal theorizing" (unpublished manuscript, 12).

Thus, before turning to the tampon, Langenberg introduces the *Vinaya* narrative tradition featuring the nun, Sthūlanandā, as a flagrant example of "gendered representational interpolation" that reflects stereotyped images of the undisciplined nun and not "a real historical landscape." In accordance with culturally determined notions of the "aesthetically transgressive female body," Sthūlanandā is pictured as fat and ugly in order to "dramatize the female face of monastic undiscipline" (Langenberg unpublished manuscript, 9–10). Whereas this stereotyped image of the undisciplined nun indicates the intrusion of what Langenberg understands to be "male priestly" discourse into textual representations of the order of nuns, the legal narratives about the use of tampons are largely free of these "gendered representational interpolations," of "humor," and of the "poetics of disgust" (Langenberg unpublished manuscript, 24).

However, Langenberg's careful study reveals that even *Vinaya* narratives about the pragmatics of tampon usage are punctuated by "male priestly" discourse. To illustrate the contrast, I first cite a *Vinaya* passage

Langenberg reads as concerned solely with the “practical and moral management” of menstruation.

The Lord was staying at Śrāvastī. The nuns got their menstrual periods month after month. The blood ruined the bedding and seating. Mahāprajāpati Gautamī briefed the Lord about this matter. “Is it suitable, lord, to wear a cloth shaped like an axle pin (*ānīcolaka*) for the purpose of protecting the bedding and seating?” The Lord replied, “A cloth shaped like an axle pin is suitable. The one whose period has come and whose blood flows is to wear a cloth shaped like an axle pin, that is, a bundle of scraps.” (*Bhikṣuṇī Prakīrṇaka* (Roth 1970, 309–10), as translated by Langenberg (2014, 91–92))

In this legal narrative, the statement of the problem of bedding and seating ruined by menstrual blood in monastic facilities utilized by nuns is followed by a solution that involves no censorious “male priestly” discourse. In the follow-up to this tonally neutral *Vinaya* rule, Langenberg discovers what is likely a subtle reintroduction of those deeply ingrained misogynist cultural discourses in the form of an incongruous link between the pragmatics of managing menstruation and female sexual desire.

Pushing it [*ānīcolaka*] in too shallowly is not suitable but neither is pushing it in too deeply in order to dispel the passion of desire. On the contrary, it should be pushed into the wound entrance loosely. Whichever nun inserts it too deeply, or too shallowly, in that way slaking her lust, commits a gross sin.” This is said regarding the matter of the cloth shaped like an axle pin. (*Bhikṣuṇī Prakīrṇaka* (Roth 1970, 309–10), as translated by Langenberg (2014, 91–92))

On Langenberg’s reading, this passage stands in stark contrast with the previous discussion of the *ānīcolaka* because the instructions it provides are premised on a narrative representation of women in ancient India as succumbing to lust while using tampons to manage their period blood flow. Whereas the former case simply seeks to solve the problem of blood on the “bedding and seating” through what Langenberg terms “menstrual technologies,” the latter case is “likely the interpolation of scholarly redactors interested in the articulation of monastic sexual virtue and the elaboration of *vinaya* law” (Langenberg unpublished manuscript, 24). By employing the term “menstrual *technologies*” (my italics), Langenberg signals that she understands the narrative in the former case to be a clinical description of what tool to use during menstruation and how to use it to avoid bloodying monastic facilities. The reason why the discourse of the lusty menstruant is difficult to countenance as historical reality is because

the focus is taken off the physicality of the object (here, the tampon), the bodily practice by which the object is deployed, and diverted into the purity rhetoric generated by male priestly cathexis.

COMMUTING TO THE CEMETERY: USING MATERIALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY TO REFRAME THE INDIAN CEMETERY AS A ZONE OF ASCETIC PRACTICE

The second half of this study will argue that the Buddhist monastic was presumed to be a staple in the social space of the Indian cemetery. By adapting the methodological approaches outlined above to a wide range of *Vinaya* narratives, I will demonstrate the value of a materialist historiography, and bodily phenomenology, in particular, for the purposes of extracting data about the historical realities of institutional monastic life. Before proceeding with textual analysis, I will review Schopen's argument in a recent couplet of articles (Schopen 2006 and 2007) that the practice of cemetery asceticism among Buddhist monastics would have been marginal, at best, in an increasingly Brahmanized society that was revolted by the prospect of ritual impurity. As I explain below, Schopen relies heavily on *Vinaya* rulings seemingly critical of cemetery practices as he makes his case that cemetery asceticism was historically marginal to the Buddhist monastic lifestyle. This is a peculiar move on Schopen's part because it is an effective reversal of his earlier view that the "ideal paradigms" appearing in an Indian Buddhist text should be viewed as merely "formal literary expressions of normative doctrine" (Schopen 1991). In the context of *Vinaya* cases, these "ideal paradigms" tend to be laid out in the verdict, at which point the monastic practice under consideration is either curbed or prohibited. It is my view that Schopen, in his recent article on cemetery practices (Schopen 2007), has abandoned this suspicion of "ideal paradigms," instead relying upon them as the foundation for his characterization of the institutionalized monastery. I argue that scholarly efforts should remain critical of the "ideal paradigm," or case ruling, as a method of gauging the conduct of Indian monks in daily life. If *Vinaya* cases are to serve as historical witnesses for life in the Indian Buddhist monastery, such evidence is most likely to appear not in the ruling, but in the descriptions of practices articulated in the narrative, or origin stories, upon which the ruling is based.

As I hope to demonstrate below, engaging the methodological approaches of materialist historiography is essential when attempting to extract data about the communities within the Indian Buddhist monastic institution that are mis-/un-/underrepresented in elite sources such as

the *Vinaya*. The historiographical approaches of Braudel, Ginzburg, and Sissa, among others, suggest that by reading for discursive fragments alluding to quotidian pragmatics, which is to say the objects and practices of the everyday, one can better navigate (and resist) the literary and ideological motifs colored heavily by master narratives that have led much of poststructuralist hermeneutics to sour on the historical project altogether. To this end, I will discuss several *Vinaya* narratives, which anchor Buddhist monastic practice of the middle period firmly in the ascetic space of the impure charnel ground. I will show how descriptions of objects, and then articulations of bodily gesture, are invaluable witnesses to the historical presence of this deeply ascetic strand of mainstream Buddhism attached to impurity practices. I will then examine how *Vinaya* verdicts contribute to our understanding of the objects, practices, and social locations detailed in the case narrative itself. Namely, how should we understand verdicts in which *Vinaya* jurists anxious about impurity either prohibit or regulate cemetery practices?

CONTEXTUALIZING THE DEBATE OVER CEMETERY ASCETICISM IN THE *VINAYA*

In his most developed statement on the role of cemetery asceticism in the Indian Buddhist monastery of the “middle period,” Schopen argues that the authors of the monastic law codes opposed the practices of the *śmāśānika*, or “the monk ‘who frequents cemeteries’” (Schopen 2007, 73). According to Schopen, the Buddhist monastic jurists were diametrically opposed to cemetery practice among monks because the former had adopted “brahmanical” conceptions of ritual purity. Schopen bases this claim on a textual (and scholarly) tradition, which suggests that the Brahmanical authorities in ancient South Asia regarded the *śmāśāna* as a zone fraught with danger on account of the ritual impurity of the decaying corpse. On this account, impurity in the ancient Indian world was highly mobile. When an individual entered the *śmāśāna*, he or she became susceptible to this ritual impurity.

The highly mobile nature of impurity meant that if Buddhist monks resided in a place populated by corpses they became agents capable of ritually polluting otherwise pure spaces into which they entered. According to Schopen, the Brahmanically oriented public regarded ascetics—and particularly those ascetics who engaged in “practices that involve some sort of contact with the dead or with dead bodies”—as “dangerously individualistic, prone to excess, culturally powerful, and not easy to predict: precisely the sort of thing that could create problems for an institution”

(Schopen 2007, 63). The fear that householders would recoil from the Buddhist order (*saṅgha*) if members of their ranks were thought to be ritually impure was enough to encourage monastic authorities to marginalize the practice of cemetery asceticism.

Schopen owes his conclusions about the role of cemetery asceticism, in part, to a distinctive interpretive approach to the legal narratives of the *Vinaya*. In general, *Vinaya* cases can be segmented into two literary components. The first is the origin narrative, which explains why it was necessary for the Buddha to adjudicate a certain issue. The second is the set of normative claims in the legal ruling intended to resolve the matter under dispute in the origin narrative. Schopen relies heavily upon the normative claims *Vinaya* authors/compiler make about their ideal community in his assessment of how monastic community culture should be characterized. Schopen acknowledges that though “some” Buddhist monks did engage in *śmāśānika* practices, “Vinaya masters” made “repeated efforts to contain and restrain” cemetery asceticism among members of the *saṅgha* (Schopen 2007, 96). This claim might suggest to a reader only that it was the *intent* of “Vinaya masters” to root out the *śmāśānika* lifestyle from the monastery. However, Schopen goes further, deducing from the fact that “[t]he *śmāśānika* monk is absolutely forbidden to go to a *vihāra* or to use anything that belongs to the monastic community” that “[t]he exclusion of this kind of monk from meaningful participation in his own monastic community is virtually complete” (Schopen 2007, 92–93). What Schopen is suggesting is that the process of institutionalization—in the form of introducing legal strictures—was certain to have *historical* implications for the entirety of mainstream Buddhist monasticism. Although the article relies primarily on textual sources produced by the Mūlasarvāstivāda “Vinaya masters,” Schopen states that his conclusions apply not only to Mūlasarvāstivāda monasticism but to “what much of mainstream Buddhist monasticism had become in the Middle Period” (Schopen 2007, 93). Although Schopen’s article remains ambiguous about the extent of the *śmāśānika* presence in the monastic institution—and thus, about the cultural power exerted by these ascetic monks in “Middle Period” Buddhism—the reader is left with the sense that monastic authorities during this period had, indeed, rooted out, or at least severely marginalized, those who engaged in *śmāśānika* practice.

However, Rita Langer has recently demonstrated that Schopen’s basic assumption about the social logic of ritual impurity, as it relates to contact of Buddhist monks with the dead, is problematic. Langer draws upon the “ample evidence in Indian literature” that makes clear “that what is deemed . . . indecent and polluted for ordinary people (such as shrouds) is

a sign of sincerity, a badge of honour, for ascetics” (Langer 2014, 137–38). If Buddhist monks are to be counted among the “ascetics” she refers to, then the same inverted social logic would apply to them. In fact, Langer goes on to cite an array of evidence suggesting that monastic practitioners, whose bodies had been rendered ritually impure, were particularly sought-after by the householder population on account of their status as holy men and holy women. Langer’s work and that of the scholars on which she depends suggest the broader Indian public not only viewed the association of monastics with the impurity of the cemetery as reasonable, but would have demanded regularized engagement of the Buddhist *saṅgha* with the dead for the order to maintain its sanctified status.

In what follows below, I demonstrate, in line with Langer and *contra* Schopen, a sustained pattern of Indian Buddhist monastic engagement with the ritually dangerous world within the confines of the cemetery. Whereas Schopen concludes from a methodological approach that privileges rulings in *Vinaya* cases that cemetery asceticism played a marginal role in the life of the institutionalized Buddhist monastery, my reliance on theorists of materialist historiography leads me to emphasize not the “ideal paradigms” articulated in case verdicts, but the initial descriptions of practices in the origin narrative to which the verdicts are responding. Whereas Schopen reads bans or limitations on cemetery practice outlined in these “ideal paradigms” as a record of shifts in the historical reality of life on the ground in the institutionalized Indian monastery, it makes more sense to see attempts to curb these elements of the monastic lifestyle as a record of institutional failures to contain the cultural power of impurity practices within the *saṅgha*.

READING AGAINST THE GRAIN OF CASE VERDICTS FOR EVIDENCE OF EVERYDAY CEMETERY PRACTICE AMONG MONASTICS

I begin with several stories from the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya* that illustrate the distinction between the descriptions of everyday practices in the context of the cemetery and the rules governing these practices.

A group of monks were urinating and defecating in the cemetery when the spirits¹⁴ complained saying, “How can you urinate and defecate while

¹⁴These passages from the *Cīvaravastu* (Section on Monastic Clothing) of the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya* generally refer to spirits living in the cemetery by the term *guishen* 鬼神. The implication is that the spirits are, or were at some point, connected to a particular rotting corpse. Monastic anxieties about interacting with spirits are a common theme in *Vinaya* passages set in a cemetery context.

in the place we live?” They brought this matter up with the Buddha and the Buddha said, “You should not do this!” (T. 1421 134c23–24)¹⁵

In this case, the “ideal paradigm” for monastic behavior set forth in the ruling is intended to resolve the problem raised in the origin story of how to relieve oneself in the cemetery without offending spirits of the dead. The ideal paradigm is derived from the normative directives issued by the Buddha. The narrative arc of this case bends toward an image of monastery officials simply banning urination and defecation in cemeteries, and of a docile monastic population duly abiding by institutional norms. But consider the ideal paradigm in a related case from the same section of the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya*.

There was a cemetery out in the wilderness and a group of monks, while meditating¹⁶ there, did not dare to relieve themselves. Because of this, they became ill. They brought this matter up to the Buddha and the Buddha said, “You should first snap your fingers¹⁷ and then relieve yourselves. If a spirit wishes to hear the teachings, chanting, or a *dharma* sermon, you should do it for them.” (T. 1421 134c24–27)

This case shares the problem of the origin story in the previous narrative, in which monks engage in the social practice of relieving themselves in the cemetery. However, the ideal paradigm differs dramatically. Whereas the monks in the previous case are simply ordered not to urinate or defecate in the cemetery, the latter case presumes the inevitability of monks relieving themselves in the presence of spirits of the dead. The monks in this latter case spend so much time “meditating” in the cemetery that urinating or defecating there is regarded as inevitable. And, the fact that this ruling prescribes a specific set of palliatives for engagement with angry spirits suggests that *Vinaya* jurists in this case accepted the presence of monks in the cemetery over an extended period of time.

The differences between the verdicts in these two cases are noteworthy, however, the distinctions are less methodologically significant for understanding the importance of the cemetery as a locus of everyday monastic activity than the descriptions of urination or defecation

¹⁵All references to the *Vinaya* designated by “T” refer to texts found in the *Taishō* collection (Takakusu and Watanabe 1924–1935). The *Vinaya* texts I cite in this article are early medieval Chinese translations (and reworkings) of texts originally produced in Indic languages.

¹⁶The term *jingguo* 經過 seems to refer to a walking meditation exercise that the monks were not permitted to abrogate long enough to use the latrines at the monastery.

¹⁷Elsewhere in the *Vinaya*, monks snap their fingers outside of latrines to alert the occupants that they, too, need to use the facilities.

common to both origin narratives. Although a modern reader is inclined to imagine the long arm of an effective state bureaucracy when considering enforcement of *Vinaya* verdicts, there is no need to presume this level of efficacy on the part of premodern monastic authorities. A Braudelian reading suggests that the everyday cultural norms appearing in the origin narrative—those practices the rulings are designed to limit or manage—are likely to remain stable over time, and are thus representative of historical realities. In other words, it is far safer to presume that monks did not stop urinating and defecating in cemeteries than to presume that *Vinaya* rulings successfully transformed long-term, or customary, behavior.

EVERYDAY OBJECTS AS HISTORICAL WITNESSES TO THE MONASTIC PRESENCE IN THE CEMETERY

It is for this reason that I will emphasize the descriptions of everyday practices over the ideal paradigms of the verdicts when reading for what Ginzburg calls the “uncontrolled elements” in a narrative (Ginzburg 2012, 3). When reading for “uncontrolled elements,” one should begin with physical objects in a *Vinaya* passage because their social functions are difficult to dismiss as mere “formal literary expressions of normative doctrine.” Anālayo agrees that textual references to physical objects, such as keys (literally, “door-opener”) to the monastic complex, are “unproblematic” representations of social realities because “[e]ven if the narration that comes with that description should turn out to be merely a product of imagination, this imagination will still reflect the type of door-openers used at the time the story came into being” (Anālayo 2012, 424–25).¹⁸ And, thus, regardless of a case verdict that purports to curtail certain monastic activities, those tangible objects of the everyday, such as the urine and feces, feature as “uncontrolled elements” in a legal narrative that cannot be dismissed as an “imaginary” or “autonomous reality.”

The value of physical objects as witnesses for everyday monastic practice in the cemetery is further illustrated by a number of seemingly innocuous textual references from the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya*.¹⁹ The following passage is representative of a number of *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* cases in which monks make their way into the cemetery to

¹⁸Here Anālayo has benefitted from the pioneering work of Oskar von Hinüber (1992 and 2006) on the value of *Vinaya* texts for the study of everyday life in the monastery.

¹⁹Like the passages from the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya*, this narrative from the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* also appears in the *Cīvaravastu* (see section below on “Scavenging for Clothing Among Corpses”).

retrieve objects essential to the monastic lifestyle. Here, the cemetery is not depicted solely as a dumping ground for bodies, but for objects discarded by householders in the community.

At that time, there were monks in the cemetery, who obtained seating bound with rope, wooden seating [bound with rope], and single seats [bound with rope]. Out of caution, they did not dare take them. They told the Buddha and the Buddha said, “I allow you to take them. After removing the two kinds of rope, animal skin rope and animal hair rope, you may keep what remains.” (T. 1428 850a12–14)

In this passage, the monks are interested in resupplying their stock of bedding and seating from this zone of impurity. However, thematically similar cases in this portion of the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* refer to monastics retrieving discarded items, which range from cloth that can be sewn into monastic robes²⁰ to farming implements (鑿鉤刀鎌), water containers (瓶澡灌), fans (杖扇), valuable metals (銅), and umbrellas (蓋) (T. 1428 850a5–21). Although the frequency of transit to this locale is not remarked upon in the passage, the nature of the goods the monks are retrieving suggests the regularity of their commutes to the zone of the dead. When considering the importance of textual references to material goods as witnesses to the historical presence of Buddhist monks in the cemetery, one might profitably consider a comparison to passages in the contemporaneous Brahmanical legal text, the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*, which permits the impure caste of *cāṇḍālas* to “take the clothes, beds and ornaments of those condemned to death” (Olivelle 2004, 183). This parallel to the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* is striking because the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* is explicit that it is the legal responsibility of *cāṇḍālas* to tend to the business of the charnel grounds. This vocation included the carrying out of executions on the charnel grounds and removing the dead from ritually pure residential areas to this zone of impurity. This parallel in the Brahmanical legal tradition between the practices of Buddhist monastics and *cāṇḍālas* hinges on textual references to these concrete objects of daily life. Just as *Vinaya* references to physical objects, such as keys or tampons, should be regarded as the textual foundation establishing the historical reality of certain practices in monastic communities, we should presume that references to everyday items scavenged from the cemetery serve an equally important function for the articulation of the regularity of a monastic presence in the cemetery.

²⁰See section below on “Scavenging for Clothing Among Corpses.”

THE CORPSE AS OBJECT OF MONASTIC MEDICAL PRACTICES: LOCATING THE MONASTIC BODY IN THE CEMETERY

I turn now to textual evidence representative of the rich bodily phenomenology of monastic cemetery practice that falls roughly under the category of medicine. In his classic, *Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India*, Kenneth Zysk argues that the institutional centrality of medicine to the Buddhist monastery was likely predicated on knowledge about human anatomy developed by monks during their experiences of “persistently focusing and concentrating on a decomposing corpse that had been thrown on a charnel ground (*sīvathika*)” (Zysk 1991, 35). This practice of *aśubhabhāvanā*, or “meditation on impurity,” is typically described in scholarship as a purely mental exercise of identifying one’s body with the decomposing corpse and thereby gaining spiritual attainment through recognition of the transience of one’s existence (Collins 1997, 194). However, Zysk argues that the intimate familiarity of a number of Buddhist texts with human anatomy must be predicated on a physical encounter with the decaying dead in the cemetery. Zysk goes further, linking Buddhist expertise in the mechanisms of the body acquired during corpse meditation in the cemetery to a detailed trans-sectarian medical literature circulating within *śramaṇic* movements during the second half of the first millennium before the Common Era (Zysk 1991, 27). Here, I will perform a materialist historiographical reading of just one case that exemplifies the medical tradition in the Buddhist monastery that sends monastics to the cemetery.

There was a group of monks, whose eyes were afflicted with illness and a doctor said, “Pulverize the orbital bones of a person and apply [the paste] to the eyes.” The group of monks said, “The Buddha does not allow us to take the bones of a corpse, tell us another method.” The doctor said, “There is no other way to cure it.” The group of monks thought, “If the World Honored One allows one to touch the bones of corpses when ill, the illness may be cured.” They brought this matter up to the Buddha and the Buddha said, “I allow you to take bone, in secret, that comes to the size of two fingers, pulverize it and apply it to the eyes.” (T. 1421 134c5–9)

I have noted Anālayo’s claim that it is difficult to assail the historicity of physical objects that appear in what might otherwise be regarded as the fictions of Indian Buddhist narrative. In her excellent piece articulating a methodological approach that allows for a history of the tampon in the Indian monastery, Langenberg extends the claims of Anālayo, arguing that physical objects can function as textual anchors within a narrative

upon which the historicity of entire social practices can be built. I argue that the grounds for the historical value of this account of monastic trips to the cemetery to gather bones for medicinal purposes lie, first, in the detailed phenomenology of object (corpse, specifically the orbital bones), second, in bodily practice (pulverizing and applying), and, finally, in social location (references to a medical practitioner). Just as Langenberg counts narratives about tampon usage historical on account of the detailed technical language by which the device is constructed and utilized in the nuns' community, the disciplinarily specific phenomenology by which the corpse is employed suggests the historical reality of a substantial monastic presence in the cemetery. Langenberg's approach is also instructive for a materialist historiography because she applies principles from ritual studies to *Vinaya* narratives that allow for a distinction between popular social practice ("practical and moral management") and the purity rhetoric ("poetics of disgust") that tends to obfuscate the realities on the ground.

In this case, the monks immediately go to consult a general physician, suggesting the customary nature of this response to physical ailment. The doctor then offers a prescription of sympathetic magic. The theory of such magic is that applying bones of the eye-socket works because the bone instantiates in material form the desired quality of good sight. At two subsequent points in the text, voices of resistance to this practice, which seem to be drawing upon concerns about impurity, are placed in the mouth of the Buddha. How should the reader treat these voices of resistance?

Scholarship on ritual contestations in post-exilic Judaism has long advocated an interpretive paradigm in which purity discourses are linked to different factions within the sociological constellation of forces in Second Temple society. When our monks state unequivocally that they are not permitted to take "the bones of a corpse," I would argue that this South Asian purity rhetoric ("poetics of disgust"), too, reflects the views of a more or less coherent sociological unit—a purity *party*. In this case, the purity party advocating the complete ritual prohibition of contact with corpses runs afoul of what appears to be a set of customary practices rooted in the disciplinary authority of the medical establishment. In his lengthiest cross-cultural study of ritual matters, Jonathan Z. Smith states that "ritual represents the creation of a controlled environment where the variables (the accidents) of ordinary life may be displaced precisely because they are felt to be so overwhelmingly present and powerful" (J. Z. [Smith 1987](#), 109). In other words, the views of the purity party are generally not embraced by the society at large, but rather are consigned to a normative imaginary preserved in the form

of textual elaboration.²¹ Read from the perspective of Langenberg and Smith, the compromise of the purity party with the everyday practices of the healing disciplines—permitting monks to harvest the orbital bone from corpses—jibes not only with the technical bodily phenomenology of medical practice, but also with a hermeneutical suspicion about the value of prohibitions enacted by the purity party as indicators of historicity.

BODILY PHENOMENOLOGIES OF CORPSE MEDITATION: TECHNOLOGIES OF POPULAR PRACTICE VS. PROHIBITIONS OF A PURITY PARTY

I have noted Zysk's claim that Buddhist medicine was predicated on meditative practices that placed the monastic in direct contact with the corpse. Here, I would like to demonstrate how the application of materialist hermeneutical principles to cases about cemetery meditation allow for the development of a more sophisticated historical portrait of the monk as cemetery ascetic. The fifth-century manual for practice, the *Visuddhimagga* (*The Path of Purification*), devotes an entire chapter to instructing its audience on the proper practice of corpse meditation (*aśubhabhāvanā*). According to the *Visuddhimagga*, the meditator is to wander among the charnel ground cremation fires observing burning corpses (*cankamantena addhakkhikena ālāhanaṃ olokontena cankamitabbaṃ*) in the middle of the night.²² Among the most visceral concerns expressed by the *Visuddhimagga* in the course of detailed explanations about how to carry out this practice is the potential for sexual arousal if a male monastic comes in contact with a female corpse. In fact, the *Visuddhimagga* goes so far as to ban meditation on female corpses for male monastics without sufficient experience because “recently dead” corpses “may even look beautiful” (*tad etaṃ adhunā mataṃ subhato pi upaṭṭhāti*).²³

²¹For a critique of J. Z. Smith's characterization of ritual and an alternative methodological approach, see Klawans (2006, 52). Steven Fraade, however, seems to agree with Smith's general approach when he states that the ritual frameworks for the Second Temple were “available to most Jews” only “through the iconic contemplation of texts” and not through “a regularly and directly lived experience.” “For most Jews, especially the majority in the Diaspora, the temple, its rituals, and most significantly, its hidden inner mysteries, could only be accessed through biblical accounts and their post-biblical elaborations and interpretations” (2011, 552).

²²For English, Nāṇamoli (1991, 75) and for Pāli, Warren and Kosambi (1950, 61–62).

²³See Nāṇamoli (1991, 174–75) for English and Warren and Kosambi (1950, 146) for Pāli.

The *Vinaya*, too, attempts to regulate the practice of meditating on female corpses for precisely the same reason.²⁴ The bodily phenomenology detailed in the following case from the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* tradition shares a number of narrative elements with the description of corpse meditation from the *Visuddhimagga*.

There was a laywoman named Excellent Light. When the sun was about to go down, she died. Her relatives then dressed [the body] and discarded [it] in the cemetery. There was a monk who was in that [place] to observe corpses, who, having seen her body, was filled with impure impulses. He felt around for the woman's sexual organ and was about to put his penis inside, when the body sat up. The monk was afraid and regretted his actions. "Have I committed a *pārājika* [offense]?" And the Buddha said, "Once you became disgusted, there was no desire. You have not committed a *pārājika*. You have committed a *sthūlātyaya* [offense]." (T. 1441 583 b3–7)²⁵

Just as the case discussing corpses as *materia medica* can be segmented into a description of monastic practices and a legal attempt to prohibit contact with impurity, this case on the corpse as *materia contemplativa* should be divided into two discourses: the first half devoted to a description of cemetery meditation and the second to the legal censure of this practice by a juridical purity party. The monk is initially accused of the category of offense known as *pārājika*, a transgression of the highest order. The ruling makes clear that by refraining from the sexual act with the female corpse he has avoided the *pārājika* of sexual congress, and is convicted only of the lesser offense of *sthūlātyaya*. Although the technical account on which the monk is found guilty is that of contemplating the sexual act, the experience that occasions the charge is precipitated by meditation on a female corpse in the cemetery.

One of the legal narratives from the section in the *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya* prohibiting sexual intercourse sheds further light on the anxieties of the purity party about monastic necrophilia. In this Mahāsāṃghika case, a monk "wandering" in the cemetery at night actually engages in sexual intercourse with a female corpse that has been delivered by her family to the cemetery. The family had intended to cremate the corpse

²⁴Although *Vinaya* references to meditation on female corpses tend to be relatively brief, these cases refer back to an extensive tradition of anxieties well documented in Liz Wilson's (1996) excellent *Charming Cadavers*. Whereas Wilson treats the symbolism of the female corpse as part of a "literary" tradition, I focus on *Vinaya* cases to develop a bodily phenomenology that hews closer to social realities.

²⁵Two levels of offense are mentioned in this case. The *pārājika* is the most severe level of offense a monk may commit, and the *sthūlātyaya* is the second most severe.

earlier that day but were thwarted by a sudden rainstorm. They then departed the cemetery, leaving the body unattended. The relatives did have time to coat the body in unguents, however, and it was these “sweet scents” that caused the monk to “take her to be a live person.” When the relatives discovered the monk’s crime, they cried out, “This is perverse! The Buddhist renouncer has not even left a corpse alone . . . These cracked vessels, do they have any morals at all?” When the Buddha confronts the offending monk, asking if he is aware of the *pārājika* prohibiting sex, he tries to excuse his behavior by noting that the woman was dead. The Buddha then states clearly that the *pārājika* of sexual intercourse also applies to “dead, sleeping, or conscious” persons (T. 1425 235b20–c12).

The following case from the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya* rules on a variation on the practice of *aśubhabhāvanā*, in which corpse material is retrieved by monks and brought back to the monastery to support their meditative practice.

Again, there was a group of monks who brought back the bones of corpses and placed them in the monks’ quarters, or brought the skulls of corpses and placed them on covered walkways or under their beds. A group of householders observed this and criticized them saying, “The monks are impure and despicable. How can they bring back the bones of corpses and keep them in the monks’ quarters as if it were a cemetery, or store the skulls of corpses as though they were storing alms-bowls?” A group of monks brought this matter up with the Buddha, and the Buddha said, “You should not do this! Nor should you grasp the bones of a dead person with your hands. This offence is a *sthūlātyaya*.” (T. 1421 134b28–c4)

Although the “ideal paradigm” articulated in the verdict is preoccupied with the specific imperative that monks avoid contact with corpses, evidence of “uncontrolled elements” in the first half of the case can be read as an allusive, yet coherent and relatively precise, phenomenology of a practice in which *materia comtemplativa* are gathered and deployed for technologies of meditation.

The building blocks of this phenomenology are the references to the physical objects employed: the “bones” and “skulls of corpses.” The text goes on to suggest that it was the practice of this “group of monks” to “bring” the “skulls” and “bones” to the monastic complex.²⁶ In the first

²⁶In fact, the text does not state from where the skulls and bones were retrieved. However, nearly all the narratives in this section of the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya* refer to corpse practices as taking place in the context of the cemetery. And within the case itself, the householders refer to the monastic complex when filled with corpse fragments as a “cemetery” (塚間).

half of the case, the reader learns of a method of “installing” (著) the skulls and bones throughout the monastery that is designed to overload the senses with the simulated experience of death. Bones are placed as installations—both within the privacy of monastic quarters as well as on the walkways crisscrossing the entire complex—to generate a powerful moment of nirvanic realization known in the Indian Buddhist tradition as *saṃvega*, or “aesthetic shock” (Wilson 1996, 15–17). Although it was only “a group of monks” who brought parts of corpses back to the monastery, the fact that they littered the bones throughout the trafficked areas of the complex suggests that all monks were intended to take part in this meditative practice. The expectation that the entire monastic population embraced this practice is further buttressed by the fact that the installations were public enough to attract the attention of householders, who we presume were mere casual visitors and not inspectors of private zones within the monastery.

In contrast to the straightforward description of this cemetery practice in the first half of the narrative, the second half of the case features the critique of an ideological party, referred to simply as “a group of householders,” which is troubled by the impurity issues that arise when monastics come into contact with corpses. Just as Langenberg is suspicious of the value of impurity discourses as representations of social realities in the context of tampon usage, it makes sense that the censure of these “householders”—labeling the monks “impure and despicable”—suggests not a social reality, in which members of the *saṅgha* abandoned the practice of gathering corpse *materia* for meditation, but, rather, a rhetoric of anxiety on the part of a misunderstanding minority aimed at monastic behavior regarded as normal by the bulk of the population. Although the rhetoric of impurity may have had a foothold among a certain party of ideological contenders, the work of Smith and Langenberg suggests that the social influence of these forces would have been limited indeed.

The following case from the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya* further testifies to the pervasiveness of an ascetic phenomenology in which a suite of involuntary bodily dynamics are set into motion when the visual sensibilities of a monk come into contact with a female corpse.

Again, there was a monk who went to the cemetery, where he was observing a recently deceased woman, beginning from the feet and moving up to the head. His desire was aroused, and he had sex with it [the corpse]. He brought this up to the Buddha and the Buddha said, “You should not first observe [the corpse] starting from the feet.” (T. 1421 134b18–20)

In this case, the monk is overcome by desire and has sex with the female corpse because he began the practice of *aśubhabhāvanā* by examining the corpse “from the feet and moving up to the head” (從足至頭觀新死女人). The rationale for this meditation technique is further articulated in a case from the *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya* that is not related to corpse meditation, but to the context of yet another cemeterial practice. In this narrative, a monk, who is robbed of his robes by thieves while traveling, is first told that he “should go to a cemetery” (應至塚間) and is then instructed on the proper procedure for removing clothing from a female corpse.

When you are taking the clothing of a dead female, and the female's body is not yet decomposed, you should place [yourself] at the head, and then take it (應往頭邊而取) [the clothing]. If the body is already decomposed, you may take it [the clothing] however you like. If it is the clothing of a dead male, then you may also take it however you like. (T. 1425 304a3–a5)

The concern in both cases seems to be that if a monk begins at the feet of the female corpse and works his way up, he will make visual contact with the female genitalia.²⁷ The *Vinaya* jurists are keen to avoid this situation because visual contact may trigger the sexual impulse in the monk. Although these passages deal with two very different cemetery practices, the descriptions of the disposition of the male monastic body toward the female corpse are remarkably consistent. The isomorphism between the two detailed descriptions of monastic bodily phenomenology in relation to techniques for male monastics negotiating the dangers of the female corpse suggests the abiding presence of the monastic ascetic figure in the social location of the cemetery.

SCAVENGING FOR CLOTHING AMONG CORPSES: VINAYA REGULATION OF PĀMŚUKŪLIKA TECHNOLOGIES AS EVIDENCE FOR ASCETIC FRATERNITIES IN THE CEMETERY

Although the act of removing clothing from a corpse in the case discussed above was occasioned by the practical matter of having one's robes stolen, this exigency is rooted firmly in the canonical ascetic tradition

²⁷Liz Wilson (1996, 86) discusses literary references to the spectacle of exposed female erogenous zones on the charnel ground and male monastic responses to visual contact with these corpses in Buddhist scripture.

known as *pāṃśukūlika*, or “wearing of refuse [cloth].” In the context of the cemetery, this practice refers to monastics stripping corpses of their funeral shrouds, dyeing the material, and then weaving it into monastic robes.²⁸ The cases in the *Vinaya* discussing *pāṃśukūlika* practice not only articulate a set of distinct bodily phenomenologies in the cemetery context, but often integrate these discussions of everyday objects, the technologies by which they are employed, and social location, into narratives about how the organizational structure of ascetic fraternities operates. These narratives mark a departure from the cases discussed above in that the voice of a juridical purity party is featured far less prominently in the “ideal paradigm” of the verdict. As the following case from the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* tradition makes clear, purity issues take a back seat to concerns about property rights over the *pāṃśukūla* (“rubbish heap”) fabric.

At that time, there was a large group of householders who carried a corpse and deposited it in the cemetery. There was a group of *pāṃśukūlika* monks who saw this and said to the other monks, “If we go to get *pāṃśukūla* fabric now, I think we can get a lot.” The other monks said, “You go by yourselves. We are not going.” The monks quickly headed off and obtained a lot of *pāṃśukūla* fabric. They brought it back and were washing and stitching it in the monastery. One of these monks saw another [who had stayed behind] and said to this monk, “Why didn’t you go with us to the cemetery to get material? We went to the cemetery and brought a lot of clothing back.” The monk said, “Bring it here and split it among us.” He answered, “You did not go with us. Why should we split it with you?” The two monks argued. The monks brought this matter up to the Buddha and the Buddha said, “It belongs to whoever went to get it.” (T. 1428 850b26–c5)

In cases involving property rights to *pāṃśukūla* material, the verdict is not a prohibition representing the purity party’s censure of cemetery asceticism, but, rather, in their departure from the “poetics of disgust,” a tacit acknowledgment of the pervasiveness of the practice in the Indian Buddhist monastery. The case narrative begins with a group of “*pāṃśukūla* monks” on the lookout for corpses from which they might strip the funeral shroud. As soon as the householders are spotted bringing their dead relative to the cemetery, the “*pāṃśukūlika* monks” jump into action, first alerting the rest of the monks to the prospect of retrieving “a lot” of fabric. When asked to accompany the group of *pāṃśukūlika*

²⁸The many permutations of this practice are detailed in Witkowski (2016 and 2017).

monks, the other monastery inmates decline for reasons that are not made explicit. The former then head off to the cemetery and soon return with what we are told is “a lot of *pāṃśukūla* fabric.”

It is clear from this passage that the members of the Buddhist order, labeled in this scene “*pāṃśukūlika* monks,” have no qualms about violating purity norms either by entering the cemetery or by making contact with a rotting corpse. The fact that the other monks offer no objection to entering the cemetery on ritual grounds raises the question of whether issues of impurity even informed the decision-making process of this monastic community. After returning to the monastery, the *pāṃśukūlika* monks get to work washing (or perhaps dyeing) and stitching the fabric (淨浣治) so that it might be worn. At this point in the narrative, the monks who stayed behind demand that the *pāṃśukūla* material retrieved be split between both groups. Therefore, we may conclude that even though only one group of monks actively incurred ritual impurity by walking onto the charnel ground and retrieving fabric from the dead, the wearing of *pāṃśukūla* material was accepted as a customary practice for the monastery as a whole.

Cases from other *Vinayas* confirm that regulation of the process of refashioning *pāṃśukūla* fabric was a matter that crossed sectarian lines. One rule from the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya* cautions monks against leaving *pāṃśukūla* fabric in their quarters without washing it for fear that it may become putrid and impure (拾糞掃衣未浣著房中臭穢不淨). A subsequent case from the same text forbids monks from washing *pāṃśukūla* fabric, either in a “clean pond” or “upstream” (於淨池中及上流浣糞掃衣) (T. 1421 135a15–18). Presumably the filth of the *pāṃśukūla* fabric would contaminate otherwise clean water sources.

The variety of cases discussing technologies for transforming *pāṃśukūla* fabric into proper robe material strongly support my claim that monastic communities, in spite of concerns about ritual impurity, did not prohibit or even curtail the practice. On the contrary, these legal discourses should be understood not as a form of censure, but as a regulatory apparatus.

Once, a monk was walking on a road not far from a cemetery. He saw a lot of *pāṃśukūla* in the distance. He gathered it up in a pile but then left. He then said, “I will return and then take it.” Other *pāṃśukūlika* monks saw it, thought it was *pāṃśukūla*, and took it. The monk returned and did not see the fabric. He returned to the monastery, saw the monks cleaning and repairing [the material] and said to them, “You stole my fabric, it’s a crime of theft.” They replied, “We didn’t steal, it’s *pāṃśukūla*.” They were concerned [and went to ask the Buddha]. The Buddha said,

“What was your mindset?” They replied, “We thought it was *pāṃśukūla* so we took it.” The Buddha said, “It is not an offense but you should not take *pāṃśukūla* gathered up in a pile.” (T. 1428 976c15–21)

As we have seen in the previous cases in this section, the legal framework in this narrative from the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* regulates both the technologies for transforming robe material scavenged on the charnel ground as well as disputes over ownership that arise among the various claimants in the ascetic fraternity. If this is indeed a regulatory framework governing whole monastic communities, it stands to reason that large segments of the monastery might be involved in these ascetic fraternities. In *pāṃśukūlika* cases, the applicability of ascetic bodily phenomenologies to large groups of individuals bears this claim out in a more concrete manner. In the two property cases discussed in this section, the entire monastic community is constantly on the look-out for “a lot (多) of *pāṃśukūla*” fabric. In both cases, heading to the cemetery to scavenge for *pāṃśukūla* fabric is an everyday occurrence among monastics. Fights between different cliques within the ascetic fraternity over property rights are common enough that regulations are required to define ownership. And, these cases share the *Mahīśāsaka-vinaya* imperative that monks arriving back at the monastery from the cemetery “should immediately clean” (應即淨浣) the *pāṃśukūla* fabric (T. 1421 135a16). It is upon returning to the monastery that the monks who have their fabric taken see the culprits from their ascetic fellowship “cleaning” (浣) and “stitching” (治) the material. The concern that fellow ascetic monks will pilfer cloth scavenged and placed into personal piles by other members of the Buddhist order is so great that a number of fairly graphic regulations are preserved in the *Vinaya* controlling the types of markers permitted when indicating one’s own stash. Some monks found it handy to use the “bones of corpses” (死人骨) whereas others designated their pile of *pāṃśukūla* fabric with a “red juice” (絳汁) easily mistaken for blood (T. 1421 136c12–17). The *Vinaya* jurists reject these items not on purity grounds but because they are too easily mistaken for the kind of detritus so common to the cemetery floor that other members of the ascetic fraternity scavenging around will not clearly recognize them as indicators of personal property.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The purpose of this study is to challenge the preponderant view among scholars that the institutionalized Indian Buddhist monastery was incompatible with the lifestyle of ascetic practitioners. I have sought to make this case in the context of the asceticism of cemetery practice, arguing

against Schopen's (admittedly cryptic) claims that the Brahmanical orientation of *Vinaya* jurists would render the ritually impure monk a pariah, and thus, a historical anomaly (if not impossibility) within the monastic institution. In order to challenge the scholarly reading habits often overdetermined by a seemingly conspiratorial attempt between philology and poststructuralism to limit the influence of historiography on premodern religious legal narratives (such as the *Vinaya*), I have introduced the materialist analytic of bodily phenomenology. The purpose of this tripartite emphasis on textual fragments referring to (1) physical objects, (2) bodily appropriation of these objects, and (3) social location is to demonstrate the historical presence of ascetic fraternities by problematizing agency within the network of visceral experiences Geertz calls the "informal logic of actual life." Relying upon references to the cultural logic of what Bourdieu has called "bodily dispositions" from a range of *Vinaya* texts, I have sought, first, to locate the Buddhist monastic in the cemetery on an everyday basis, and then, having established this intimate relationship between the monastery and the zone of the dead, proceeded to articulate the modes of ascetic practice undertaken there. Privileging bodily phenomenologies appearing in the origin narratives of cases as a barometer of cemetery asceticism over the normative claims about monastic behavior in the rulings of *Vinaya* jurists, I have argued that the expression of anxieties about ritual impurity in the Buddhist monastery remained the concern only of a minority Brahmanizing purity party. The range of *Vinaya* cases cited in this article suggest that cemetery asceticism remained culturally powerful and was thus extraordinarily resistant to attempts by the purity party to marginalize these practices during the period of Indian Buddhist monastic institutionalization.

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