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2018

van Dongen, E. (2018). Entangled loyalties : Qiaopi, Chinese community structures, and the state in Southeast Asia. In G. Benton, H. Liu, & H. Zhang (Eds.), The Qiaopi Trade and Transnational Networks in the Chinese Diaspora (pp. 5-32). doi:10.4324/9781315113043

<https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143786>

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The final version of this chapter was published in *The Qiaopi Trade and Transnational Networks in the Chinese Diaspora*, eds. Gregor Benton, Hong Liu, and Huimei Zhang. New York: Routledge, 2018, 5-32.

Entangled Loyalties: *Qiaopi*, Chinese Community Structures, and the State in Southeast Asia

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Introduction

Dialect, region, and lineage—these were the markers of belonging around which both Chinese emigrant communities and the *qiaopi* trade were organized. However, these local bases of identification could exist in tension with nationalist attachments, especially when crisis struck. The conflict between local and national principles of belonging in Chinese communities is reflected in the story of *qiaopi*, which concerns the local and regional bases of its operation channels, the state's efforts to incorporate these channels into state institutions such as banks and post offices, and the resistance against these efforts. This chapter discusses *qiaopi* through the lens of the main features of Chinese migration, the structure of Chinese community organizations, and the role of the state in their shaping and reshaping with a focus on Southeast Asia. The “state” in this context does not only include the sending state of China, but also the policies affecting Chinese communities before and under colonial rule and following decolonization in Southeast Asia.

Qiaopi trade developed in the nineteenth century, which was the era that witnessed mass migration and rapid developments in technology, communication, and transport. However, because *qiaopi* relied on the structural bases that were shaped in the long history of Chinese trade and emigration, and because some merchants were already engaged in the trade in the eighteenth century, a *longue durée* approach is required. This approach includes the period of early traders in Southeast Asia before the period of mass migration, as well as the period of colonial rule in the region. It also includes the period following state incorporation of *qiaopi* institutions in the mid-twentieth century, namely that of decolonization and the Cold War. Finally, it includes the period of economic reform and renewed Sino-Southeast Asian ties since the 1970s, which created the conditions for the interest in *qiaopi* in the PRC. Rather than understanding Chinese community formation and *qiaopi* channels as “traditional” markers that made room for the “modern” state, this chapter looks at the state *in* Chinese community organizations: their transformation was very much shaped by various political actors long before efforts were made to incorporate the *qiaopi* trade channels into state institutions. Similarly, the state played a central part in reviving these community forms after the Cold War.

Rather than understanding the “modern” state and “traditional” forms of community as binaries, they are perceived here as competing, co-existing, and entangled foci of loyalty on a wide-ranging spectrum. Nationalism, state building, and nation building are not linear processes, but complex processes of interaction in which state and nation do not necessarily coincide. The transition from empire to nation-state in Southeast Asia was equally fluid, as Anthony Reid has captured poignantly in the term “imperial alchemy,” or the fact that “in essence, imperial constructs were declared to be nation-states” (Reid 2010, 1). The evolution of the *qiaopi* system needs to be understood against the background of interactions with long-existing forms of community arrangement that were transformed in the process, but that persisted nevertheless. The story of Chinese community forms, and, consequently, the story of *qiaopi* that was based on the same configurations, is a story of adaptation and resilience, one of histories that need to be “rescued” from the nation-state.

When discussing the long-term history of the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia in view of the function of the *qiaopi* trade, we first need to revisit the scholarship on Chinese business activities in Southeast Asia. Much of this has focused on the “business success” of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, with explanations for this “success” centering around Confucianism, ethnic entrepreneurship, capitalism, and networks (Suryadinata 2007a: 41-46). Analogous to Max Weber’s argument in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), the Confucian explanation was especially popular during the 1980s. With the rise of Japan and the “Mini-dragons” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), scholars revised modernization theories that perceived of Confucianism as a “traditional” obstacle to “modernity” and development. For example, in *The Spirit of Capitalism*, Redding (1990) discussed Chinese capitalism as a distinct mode of development in which Confucian culture and familism were central.¹ Whereas this Confucian approach would emphasize the significance of the family, or values such as trust and responsibility, other works would focus more on ethnic aspects, relations (*guanxi*), and networks, as for example Hamilton (1996), or as popularized in notions such as “global tribes” and “bamboo networks.”²

In response to this essentialist understanding of Chinese business practices, others have pointed at the importance of economic and other structural components in Chinese business success. Economist Linda Lim has dismissed notions of ethnic networks in favor of the

¹ Gordon Redding, *The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism* (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1990). See also Yan Qinghuang, “Rujia chuantong yu Dongya he Dongnanya de haiwai huaren shangye” [Confucian tradition and the overseas Chinese trade in East Asia and Southeast Asia], in Yan Qinghuang, *Haiwai huaren de shehui biange yu shangye chengzhang* [Social change and commercial growth of the overseas Chinese] (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2005), 23-32.

² Murray L. Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, *The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs Are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia* (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1996); Joel Kotkin, *Tribes: How Race, Religion, and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy* (New York: Random House, 1993). On ethnic entrepreneurship, see H.E. Aldrich and R. Waldinger, “Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 16 (1990): 111-135. For a critical evaluation, see Min Zhou, “Revisiting Ethnic Entrepreneurship: Convergences, Controversies, and Conceptual Advancements,” *International Migration Review* 38.3 (2004): 1040-174.

internationalization of markets and industrialization as explanatory factors (Lim 1983). Other scholars have also argued for the inclusion of economic and sociopolitical elements to debunk simplistic understandings of cultural capitalism and ethnic entrepreneurship (Mackie 1992; Menkhoff and Gerke 2002; Gomez and Hsiao 2004). Yan Qinghuang has argued that both cultural and structural explanations have their limitations. Whereas the former lead to empty talk about “Confucian values” without taking into account the historical variations in these values, or how this connects to economic and political developments, the latter is too narrow-minded and discards cultural developments (Yan 2005, 37-38).

For our purposes, it is worthwhile to note that scholars of early Chinese traders in Southeast Asia, such as Curtin (1984) or Chang and Tagliacozzo (2011) have referred to the concept of “trade diaspora” or networks of merchants who operated as “cross-cultural brokers.” While these networks were certainly present and highly significant in trade and *qiaopi*, it is essential to rethink them as not based on “culture” or “ethnicity” in an abstract sense, but as shaped by the very markers of belonging of dialect, region, and lineage. “Ethnicity” in this context is a multi-layered concept that not only implies in-group competition, but also different levels of belonging. In addition, we also need to take into account the connection between these networks and the hometowns (*qiaoxiang*), which is also critical for our understanding of *qiaopi* (Liu 1998; Douw et. al 1999; Yow 2005).

The emphasis on “Confucianism” also fails to acknowledge the complex processes of identity negotiation that took place as Chinese traders remained connected to the hometown and set up families in Southeast Asia. The ideal “cross-cultural brokers” were those who had a foot in both Chinese and Southeast Asian societies—the so-called intermediate communities. Since these communities mostly had a high socio-economic status, this is also a differentiating feature that prevents us from understanding networks in any essentialized manner. Even though *qiaopi* researchers themselves note the importance of “trust” in the *qiaopi* trade, this is a highly contextualized form of trust. It was based on the trust between the emigrant and the family back home, between the emigrant and the remittance office, and between the remittance office and the sender of the *qiaopi* (Wang Weizhong 2009, 50-55). Trust in this context was also not a static concept, for it evolved from a personalized to a more systematized form (Jia Junying herein). As the following sections demonstrate, belonging and loyalty were multi-faceted. With these notes in mind, let us turn to the early Chinese traders, their networks, and their community organizations.

The Long-term View: The Early Traders

Understanding Chinese community formation and the principles behind *qiaopi* requires a *longue durée* approach. We naturally turn to Chinese migration to Southeast Asia for this purpose because due to geographical proximity and trading activities, Sino-Southeast interaction goes back many centuries. Even today, around 75 percent of the Chinese overseas—with official estimates of a total Chinese overseas population as high as 60 million in 2014—still resides in

Southeast Asia (Suryadinata 2007a; Zhang 2014).³ Today, the largest number of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia can be found in the countries of Indonesia (7.7. million), Thailand (7.1 million) and Malaysia (6.3 million), according to 2007 estimates by Li and Li (2011). The smallest ethnic Chinese communities of Southeast Asia reside in Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei. Singapore is a unique case because it is the only country outside of China where the ethnic Chinese constitute the majority of the population (2.7 million Chinese in 2007) (Li and Li 2011).

Although trade between China and the “Southern Seas” (*nanyang*) goes back two millennia, it was only with the expansion of this trade in the thirteenth century that Chinese communities developed in the region (Zhu 2008; Wade 2009).⁴ In the early fifteenth century, Zheng He’s expeditions (1405-1433) not only reached Southeast Asia, but also South and Western Asia and the East Coast of Africa. Anthony Reid has famously referred to the period between the mid-fifteenth and the seventeenth century as the “age of commerce” in Southeast Asia, with the emergence of port cities and commerce fuelling broader economic, political, social, and cultural transitions (Reid 1988, 1993).⁵ From then onwards, state support for maritime trade and state maritime power declined, but trade was legalized in the sixteenth century (to be banned again during the Qing dynasty), after which private junk trade increased. The rise of coastal ports for junk traders in Cochinchina led to an increase in emigration from South China (Wade 2009; Wang Gungwu 2009).⁶ South China, in this context, the land of the Yue, was in many ways closer to Southeast Asia, which is why Cartier (2001) has referred to South China as a “transboundary cultural economy” in her account of Chinese emigration.⁷

Histories of trade relations and the emergence of Chinese communities vary across Southeast Asia. For example, tributary relations between China and Siam allegedly go back to the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD). Already during the seventeenth century AD, the Chinese in Siam had become economically visible as a consequence of the junk trade between China and

³ This number is based on estimates from the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in 2014. Many studies cite much lower numbers. As Armstrong and Armstrong (2001: 1) note, differences in numbers are not only due to the unreliable nature of censuses in many countries, but also because of different definitions of what constitutes “Chinese.”

⁴ On the early trade between China and Southeast Asia, see Gungwu Wang, *The Nanhai Trade: The Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998 [1958]).

⁵ Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, 2 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988-1993). See also Geoff Wade and Sun Laichen, eds. *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century: The China Factor* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2010) and Gungwu Wang, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia” in idem, *Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and The Chinese*, 28-57 (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981); Roderich Ptak, *China’s Seaborne Trade with South and Southeast Asia, 1200-1750* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); and Anthony Reid, ed. *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (St. Leonards, Australia: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen and Unwin, 1996).

⁶ See also Pin-tsun Chang, “The First Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century” in Wade (2009).

⁷ The term Yue refers both to the Yue Kingdom (sixth-fourth centuries BCE) in South China and the peoples who inhabited the territory south of the Central Plains region between the fourth and third centuries BCE. On the Yue, see Erica Brindley, *Ancient China and the Yue: Perceptions and Identities on the Southern Frontier, c. 400 BCE-50 CE* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

the Nanyang. Apart from merchants and traders, the Chinese community in Ayutthaya consisted of scholars-officials, artisans, actors, doctors, and pig breeders (Skinner 1957; Tong 2010). In Malaya, Chinese settled as early as the fifteenth century under the Melaka Sultanate. From the end of the eighteenth century, they primarily engaged in urban port trade, mining, and rural agriculture (Purcell 1948).⁸ As for Singapore, archeological evidence has revealed trading links between China and Singapore during the fourteenth century, when Singapore was known as Temasek (Pan 1998). Interactions between China and Vietnam go back to the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 B.C.). During the Qin dynasty (221-206 B.C.), Northern Vietnam was controlled by Chinese dynasties, and this remained the case for the following ten centuries (Khanh 1993). Trade between China and the kingdoms of Cambodia can be traced back to the third to sixth century AD. The Chinese community was significant in Pnom Penh since the fifteenth century and evidence suggests that it was dominant in trade before the French occupation of Cochinchina in 1859 (Willmott 1967). Apart from monopoly farming, the Chinese worked in agriculture, pepper cultivation, market gardening, and trade (Skinner 1996).

Dialect and region, and below that sub-dialect and sub-region, were crucial structural principles of Chinese overseas communities, as they were in the Chinese areas where *qiaopi* trade emerged. Chinese belonging to the five main Chinese dialect groups (Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochiu, Hakka, and Hainanese) had been engaging in specific trades long before the start of mass migration during the mid-nineteenth century. Those belonging to the Hokkien group had been maritime traders since the 1500s, with destinations including the island of Taiwan, the Philippines, Java, Malaya, Borneo, and Siam. Many speakers of Cantonese were manufacturers and traders and could be found in great numbers in Malaya. The Teochiu group, many of whom went to Thailand, was known for shipbuilding, but they also worked on plantations and were rice traders. Hakka speakers, known for mining, forestry, and agriculture, migrated to Malaya (West Borneo) and Singapore (Wang 1991; McKeown 2010).

Already during the Song (960-1279) and Yuan (1279-1368) dynasties, Hokkien trading groups emerged. During the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in Fujian province, and later Xiamen, also in Fujian province, became central nodes of the Hokkien trade (Zhuang 2006: 223). Vast Chinese trading networks were formed from the thirteenth century onwards (Zhuang and Liu 2009: 3). The early Hokkien traders mostly conducted private trade and were part of a regional business network that spanned Korea, Kyushu, Taiwan, and Manila. Various principles underlay these networks, ranging from family ties, native places, lineages, guilds, and personal ties (Chin 2010). Other forms of business associations also already came into existence as the Chinese became involved in mining and plantation labour in Southeast Asia. A well-known example concerns the *kongsis* of Borneo, also found in Riau, Bangka, and Johor, a form of partnership between labourers, headmen, and those who provided capital (Zhuang and Liu 2009, 92-93).

⁸ Whether there was a permanent Chinese settlement during the time of the Malay Kingdom (fourteenth0-sixteenth century) is contested. See Purcell 1948, 18-20.

Chinese migrants were mostly male bachelors and temporary “sojourners.” Not having the intent to settle, but rather using migration as an economic strategy to support the family, *qiaopi* played a key part in the preservation of the family as an economic unit. It was common for these Chinese migrants to marry local wives, whilst at the same time maintaining a family in their place of origin, leading to a system known as the dual family system. In China, as in emigrant communities, social status was connected to family size, with larger families consisting of husband and wife, concubines in the hometown and place of settlement, and other kin of the husband. All members of the joint family were economically interdependent. The adoption of sons to assist in business and to increase male offspring was a common practice. Remittances were central in the preservation of the family: part of the money was saved for the marriage of the emigrant in the hometown; it would also be used for his burial in the hometown upon return. In addition, remittances were used for household expenditures (Chen 1978). However, remittances were also commonly recycled as investment capital and spent for commercial purposes (Takeshi Hamashita and Mei-fen Kuo herein).

With the dual family system, throughout Southeast Asia, intermediate communities such as the *mestizos*, *peranakans*, and *babas*⁹ gradually emerged through intermarriages between Chinese men and local women. It witnessed stable development in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Skinner 1996). Members of these intermediate communities often acted as middlemen in the revenue farming policies of colonial powers, which established themselves in Southeast Asia as early as the sixteenth century. In the system of indirect rule that was the *kapitan* system, those with prestige, leadership skills, and wealth were chosen to represent the Chinese community and to act as their leaders and representatives vis-à-vis local rulers (Li 2003, 315). As revenue farmers, Chinese gained licenses to operate as tax collectors for Chinese communities for products and services such as opium, spirits, gambling, and pawnshops. Farming companies engaged in competitive bidding to collect the taxes, which they kept for themselves in exchange for payment to the government (Skinner 1996). The intermediate communities, having a foot in both Chinese and local cultures, managed to fill occupational niches and to secure their economic position through tax farming under colonial rule.

In addition to being sojourners who did not receive the support of the Chinese empire—Wang Gungwu has referred to the Hokkien traders as “merchants without empires”—the Chinese were also subject to discrimination under colonial rule (Wang 1991, 79-101). In the Spanish, Dutch, British, and French colonies in Southeast Asia, Chinese were subjected to racial categorization and the exclusion from certain professions. In the Dutch East Indies, a system of collaboration between the Dutch and Chinese emerged, but already in 1740, a Chinese massacre occurred in Batavia, followed by attacks against ethnic Chinese in Java in the following years. In the 1850s, Chinese were categorized as “Foreign Orientals” distinct from both natives and

⁹ The terms refer to intermarriages between ethnic Chinese men and local women in this context. However, the term *mestizo* has also been used for other types of interracial marriages, whereas the term *Peranakan* can also refer to *Peranakan* Indians (Chitty Melaka and Jawi *Peranakans*). The term *Baba* is used specifically for the Straits Chinese. See Skinner (1996).

Europeans, a categorization that would remain in place until the Second World War (Govaars 2005). In the Philippines, Spanish rulers made a distinction between ethnic Chinese, *mestizos*, and natives or *indios*, with the term *mestizo* becoming submerged under the “Filipino” nation towards the end of Spanish rule (Hau 2014). Here, already in 1603, a Chinese massacre took place, followed by several other attempts to curb Chinese influence. In addition, Chinese were segregated from other inhabitants and were charged taxes and residence permit fees (Zhu 2008: 35-38). Because of these policies, we can understand why it became all the more relevant for Chinese communities to preserve ties with their hometowns.

The *peranakans* of Java only consisted of about 1-2 percent of the population (around 100,000 in 1810 and 250,000 in 1890), but their economic and social status was relatively high. Although the *mestizos* in the Philippines were more numerous (4.8 per cent or 120,000 by 1810 and 5.2 per cent or 290,000 in 1890), their status was overall lower (Chirot and Reid 1997, 46). The *babas* or “Straits-born Chinese” were originally also a small group. Under the British, many *babas* migrated from Melaka to Penang and Singapore, where they grew in numbers to about 9 to 10 percent of the total population of the Straits Settlements (Skinner 1996). Even though these intermediate communities were relatively small, their high socio-economic status and dominance in commerce and trade made them subject to being branded as “essential outsiders” (Chirot and Reid 1997). Several of the “classic” studies on the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries pay much attention to this aspect of their elevated socio-economic status, such as, for example Wickberg (1965) for the Philippines, and Willmott (1967) for Cambodia.

In the various countries of Southeast Asia, Chinese managed to fill existing economic niches and to negotiate their position within the colonial or local ruling systems. They were not only active in business, trade, agriculture, and handicraft, but they also undertook mining. In trade, they sold local products to foreign traders and delivered Chinese and European products to local markets. They also set up their own shipping companies to transport goods (Yan 2006, 5). With colonial expansion in Southeast Asia and rising demand in Europe for Southeast Asian products, Chinese gradually replaced existing traders and worked in mines and on plantations to meet demands for rubber, tobacco, coffee, sugar cane, and other products.

Apart from transformations in the global economy and the system of colonial rule that created the conditions for them to operate as tax farmers and traders, Chinese community forms also supported Chinese traders in organizing these activities. In the early Chinese migrant communities, temples functioned as the centre of political, business, and cultural life (Li 2003, 660). The early Fujian clan associations (*zongqinhui*) were based on what Yan Qinghuang calls “localized lineage,” a combination of bloodline, place, and dialect. These were social and cultural bodies that, apart from mutual aid and protection, served to preserve generational continuity and foster traditional values such as virtue and piety. They also served to celebrate Chinese festivals and to arrange marriages and promote education within the clan (Yan 2006, 2-3). Temples and shrines for ancestors and gods for protection remained central in this early community formation. Already in the eighteenth century, private schools (*sishu*) appeared in Chinese overseas communities, as for example in Batavia (Wu 2004, 191).

More formalized clan organizations (*shizonghui/shigonghui*) materialized in the early nineteenth century. Their functions included mutual protection and aid, as for example those based on the “five big surnames” in Penang, all of which originated from a single county in Southern Fujian (Yan 2006, 2-3). Lineage organizations in the Philippines, for example, go back to the late Qing dynasty and consisted of both single surname and combined surname organizations for those surnames that were rare. This allowed them to join forces with other surname groups and to gain influence (Zeng 2004, 111). Some of these clan organizations are associated with the early *qiaopi* trade, such as the Chen clan in Penang, which set up a shop that also undertook remittance trade as early as 1757 (Chen 2009, 113).

The nineteenth century also saw the emergence of more formal native place organizations (*huiguan*). Some, such as the Jiaying *huiguan* and the Zhongshan *huiguan* in Penang, go back to the early nineteenth century. Others were founded after the large-scale migration in the second half of the nineteenth century, especially after the 1870s, as discussed below (Li 2003, 660-661). The *huiguan* were similar in function to the clan associations, but instead of honoring lineage ancestors or those gods of the protected lineages, they honored regional deities (Yan 2006, 3-4). The make-up of the *huiguan* was complex. For example, *tongxiang* or “native place” could mean that members were from the same village, town, district, prefecture, or even province, or that dialect and clan lines intersected with these markers. In Southeast Asia, and particularly in Singapore, “bang” arranged around clan, native place, and dialect were prominent (Wu 2004, 186-187; Zeng 2004, 109). These markers of belonging were also crucial in the set-up of the *qiaopi* trade.

Mass Migration and the Development of *qiaopi*

Against this background of the existence of networks based on personal, family, and community ties along the intersecting lines of dialect, region, and lineage, the *qiaopi* trade developed in the mid-nineteenth century. This was the period of large-scale emigration from China that we need to understand in the context of the integration of Southeast Asia into a global trade system. It is estimated that one and a half million Chinese had reached Southeast Asia by the mid-nineteenth century, a number that would rise until about five million by the 1920s (Zhuang and Liu 2009, 4). In addition, vast developments in transportation and communication technology marked this period. Between the 1870s and the 1920s, the emergence of trans-oceanic shipping altered the face of migration. Also in the 1870s, the Universal Postal Union was set up. It replaced postal treaties between countries and standardized mailing rates and procedures, which reflects the growing interconnectedness between countries.

With the integration of Southeast Asia into a global trade system—in which the Treaty of Nanking (1842) was a significant turning point—Chinese labourers also arrived in Southeast Asia, where they worked in mines or on plantations. When Hong Kong became a British colony, the treaty ports of Xiamen (Amoy) and Shantou (Swatow) became key nodes of Chinese labour migration (McKeown 1999). As Purcell (1948) notes, an important change occurred in the region when Penang was founded in 1786 and Singapore in 1819. Hong Kong also came to play a vital

part in financial transactions between Southeast Asia and South China, with remittances passing through the Hong Kong exchange market (Takeshi Hamashita herein). Amidst these changes, during the late Qing, remittances from Chinese overseas became a crucial economic pillar in the *qiaoxiang* areas that served to balance foreign trade deficits (Zhuang and Liu 2009, 202).

The period between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century also saw the rise of the coolie trade, with labourers being shipped from China to Southeast Asia and the New World. Following the signing of treaties with foreign powers, the sea bans (*haijin*) of the Qing government were reversed, and large numbers of contract labourers or coolies filled the labour shortage that followed the abolishment of slavery. In Southeast Asia, recruited through special “heads” in port cities such as Macau, they worked in mines and on plantations. The contract specified the duration of the work, the salary, and the voluntary nature of the engagement, but in practice, many stayed on because of accumulated gambling, drinking, and smoking debts, they received very little salary, and they were forced or tricked into the agreement. For coolies destined for Southeast Asia, Singapore was a central collection point (Wu 2004, 9-10, 12-13). These newly arrived communities had different needs from the long-established intermediate communities. As opposed to previous migrants from the *qiaoxiang* in South China, these migrants had traveled from the port cities of Macau, Canton, and Hong Kong (Li 2003, 187).

During this period, with mass migration, new community forms or native place organizations (*huiguan*) for mutual assistance and ancestor worship expanded. The *huiguan*, which became numerous during the mid-nineteenth century, were originally based on the intersection of different “segments,” namely dialect, locality, and surname. Vertically, these consisted of different levels of identification, from provincial up to local levels. Horizontally, they could spread out across provinces, such as in the case of surnames (Crissman 1967). Within dialect groups, organizations around large temples for ancestor worship could further be divided based on annual and triennial ceremonies or based on local grouping in the homeland (Freedman 1960). These arrangements were an adaptation of lineage and place associations in Ming China based on the various “human ecologies” of the respective new environments (Kuhn 2008). According to Zeng Shaocong, the main difference between these traditional organizations in China and those in Chinese overseas communities was that the former were strictly formed based on administrative divisions, whereas the latter also adjusted themselves to different natural regions (Zeng 2004, 107, 160). In general, then, both vertically and horizontally, community formats were multi-faceted, and this would also be reflected in the make-up of the *qiaopi* trade channels.

Organizations based on specific trades and crafts (*hang*), such as those for masons, carpenters, or goldsmiths, also had a long history in Chinese emigrant communities. More formalized trading organizations (*hanghui zuzhi*), however, sprang up in the nineteenth century, such as for example the *Beichenghang* in Singapore, founded in 1868. In the twentieth century, more Western-style guild organizations (*tongye gonghui*) emerged. As opposed to the traditional organizations, these newer types were broader in orientation and went beyond the interests of one specific trade (Li 2003, 666-667). Trading guilds functioned as overarching organizations for

different kinds of other organizations, such as *huiguan* and trade organizations. In Singapore, trading guilds provided mutual aid, regulated apprentice training and wages, and established order in their respective trades. Well-known guilds were the Gambier and Pepper Society and the Sago Dealers' and Pineapple Preservers' guilds (Freedman 1960).

In colonial Southeast Asia, trading organizations and secret societies also had a wide range of functions. Secret societies were established in Singapore in the early nineteenth century and had members in the ten thousands. The *Tiandihui* (Society for Heaven and Earth) was managed along dialect lines, with an officer representing the Hokkien, Hakka, Teochiu, and Cantonese communities (Freedman 1960). Apart from serving to protect and control the Chinese, they also regulated economic activities and smoking, drinking, and gambling practices under colonial governments (Zeng 2004, 115). Other types of organizations included money loan associations for short-term credit and friendly societies that had similar mutual aid functions as the native place organizations (Freedman 1960). Charity organizations (*cishan shetuan*) provided medical care, poverty relief, set up schools, and promoted religion and cultural activities (Wu 2004, 188).

Community composition along the lines of dialect groups overlapped to some extent with the grouping of economic interests (Freedman 1960). This was also reflected in the *qiaopi* trade, where dialect groups also formed a central principle or arrangement. The corporate arrangement of the *qiaopiju* was intertwined with kinship loyalties in that some of the actors in the early *qiaopi* trade, such as the *shuike* or couriers, could work independently and relied on their networks instead. Here, the importance of *qiaoxiang* ties is revealed in the fact that newly arrived migrants would rely on couriers from the same hometown (Benton, Liu, and Zhang herein; Takeshi Hamashita herein). The *qiaopiju* would be arranged based on dialect groups. For example, in Singapore, in 1891, there were sixteen *shuike* with no fixed address in addition to officially ran *qiaopiju* shaped around the main dialect groups of Hokkien, Teochinese, Hainanese, Cantonese, and Hakka. Each of the dialect groups would then manage a number of offices based on the needs of that respective dialect group. In early twentieth-century Batavia, for example, the Fujian "bang" had over ten different *piju* (Xu 2007, 182, 249). The *huiguan*, trade associations, guilds, and temples also played a part in the collection of remittances. In smaller Chinese communities, such as for example in Laos, *qiaopi* would often be collected and go through places with larger and long-standing Chinese communities, such as Vietnam and Thailand, and from there to China, reflecting the transnational character of the system (Xu 2007, 138).

It is difficult to draw a clear line between the reliance of *qiaopi* traders on personalized networks and the emergence of remittance offices as main channels in the trade. Rather than operating *ex nihilo*, these offices transformed and incorporated previously existing practices (Liu and Benton 2016). The *shuike* were originally private traders who exchanged goods produced in China, such as silk and porcelain, with foreign goods. Gradually, they began to carry letters from the Chinese overseas back to their hometowns. Especially after the 1870s, with developments in transport and communication, *qiaopiju* served to handle the larger volume and frequency of

qiaopi. However, rather than a simple standardization of practices, networks based on ties of belonging could interest with these developments. In South China, for example, at the turn of the century, due to the increase in mail from Southeast Asia and the variation in destinations, a mail system consisting of four main areas was set up in Southern Fujian.

These *qiaopi* offices would often safeguard their business environment through native place ties (*xiangyi de guanxi*). Four big “networks” with at their centre Xiamen, Fuzhou, Xinghua, and Minxi emerged as “regional systems” (*diyu tixi*) in the Fujian *qiaopi* trade. Of these four “systems,” the Xiamen system was the eldest and largest in Fujian’s *qiaopi* history (Chen 2009, 114; Wang Dongxu 2009, 103-104). To take some examples from Southeast Asia that demonstrate the lack of a clear transition in practices, in Indonesia, individual *shuike* already carried *qiaopi* goods during the early nineteenth century, whilst *qiaopi* offices were numerous during the early twentieth century. In Myanmar, *shuike* were still quite vibrant in the 1920s and 1930s, but they operated in tandem with the already established *qiaopi* offices (Xu 2007, 245, 271).

With the British use of postal operations in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere in 1867, the Chinese also started to rely on postal services to send *qiaopi* (Xu 2007, 58). Gradually, the state would increase its control of the *qiaopi* trade and challenge the long-standing organizational structures behind it. However, at the same time, there was also resistance against these efforts, as manifested in the Singapore riots following the foundation of the Chinese Sub-Post Office in 1876 (Xu 2007, 183). By the early twentieth century, the *qiaopi* trade relied on remittance offices, banks, and post offices in a complex system of interaction. Even though the control of the state increased, there is no clear and fixed linear transition to state control, a process that also differed across localities in China and across the Chinese communities in various countries of Southeast Asia. Overall, however, political transitions of a national, regional, and global nature were crucial in shaping this transition to the state overseeing the sending of remittances.

The Grip of the State and the Transnational Imagination

Whereas the old voluntary community forms of the ethnic Chinese were local in nature and served the needs of the Chinese in their countries of destination, during the first decades of the twentieth century, in the context of growing “transnational and intra-regional activities,” but also due to the rise of nationalism, these organizations moved beyond the local (Liu 2002, 50). However, the tension between local affiliation and national affinity remained. For example, around the turn of the century, Chambers of Commerce became the overarching bodies for the different types of existing community organizations in Southeast Asia. In 1904, Chinese Chambers of Commerce (*Zhonghua zongshanghui*) were set up in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, and Manila, followed by Singapore in 1906. They served to protect the economic interests of the Chinese traders against colonial policies, liaise with Chinese communities, and act as bridges between the Qing government and the British colonial government. Chambers of Commerce could cooperate at transnational level or mobilize the existing community organizations for

various purposes (Wu 2004, 188-189). It was in these Chambers of Commerce that the *shuike* and *piju* owners were key actors, not only in China but also in the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. In the overseas communities, wealth translated into political power, and it was common practice to accumulate leadership positions in various bodies.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, overseas community leaders and businessmen had supported the construction of Chinese schools through remittances. During this period, however, schools had remained connected to the respective dialect and regional make-up of the community. During the late nineteenth century, new style schools emerged in overseas Chinese communities, with the strongest development in Singapore, Malaya, and Indonesia (Wu 2004, 191). At the turn of the century, schools developed in tandem with political developments in China. Reformer Kang Youwei's advocacy of reform and the restoration of the emperor received much support among conservative elites in the Nanyang. The *Baohuanghui* (Protect the Emperor Society) also had a branch in Singapore. The revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen established a branch of the *Tongmenghui* (Revolutionary Alliance) in Singapore in 1906 and visited it on several occasions in the years that followed. Several revolutionary newspapers also circulated in Singapore, such as the *Zhongxing ribao* (Resurgence Daily) (Zhu 2008, 153). Reformers and revolutionaries sought to weaken the "bang" divisions and unite the Chinese overseas behind their cause. After the 1911 revolution, the connection between politics and education became even stronger. Instead of being linked to dialect groups, the schools now became Chinese language schools. For example, in Singapore, under the influence of the famous entrepreneur, philanthropist, and educator Lim Boon Keng, Fujianese schools gradually exchanged the Hokkien dialect (*fangyan*) for Chinese language (*huayu*) education (Yan 2006, 13-14).

Other circumstances also spurred this "re-Sinicization" process of cultural and political identification with China. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the arrival of new Chinese migrants from China had led to the formation of communities unlike the intermediate communities as discussed above. The rise of "pure" Chinese communities (with Chinese men now marrying Chinese instead of local women), in combination with the end of the revenue system, led to the decline of *mestizos* and *babas* in particular, with only the *peranakans* retaining their cultural identity (Skinner 1996). In addition, with developments in communication and transport since the 1870s, such as ocean steamers, contact between Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and Mainland China became more frequent (Li 2003, 685). *Qiaopi* is also part of this larger story of the waxing and waning of Sino-Southeast Asian ties and negotiation processes about Chinese identity.

In Indonesia, in the early twentieth century, with the immigration of Chinese women and the rise of nationalism, *totok* or "pure" Chinese communities with Chinese schools and newspapers emerged. The Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (*Zhonghua huiguan*) was also founded in 1900. This community organization not only promoted Chinese language education through modern schooling, but it was also connected to Chinese newspapers and the promotion of Confucian values (Li 2003, 669). Govaars (2005) argues that this early process of "resinification" received impulses from Mainland China, Indonesian society, and colonial policies. In Siam, during the

early twentieth century, the “Chinese problem” was formed with a general strike against the Chinese in 1910, the arrival of anti-Sinicism under King Rama VI, and the founding of Chinese schools, newspapers, and organizations (Skinner 1957, 155). This period, which saw massive immigration during the 1920s and the rise of the rice merchants, was followed by economic nationalist policies, political repression, and cultural assimilation, such as the “Thai-ification” of Chinese schools. In Malaya, during the early twentieth century, like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, nationalism flourished and Chinese schools emerged. The *kapitan* system was dismantled and, instead, merchant-entrepreneurs headed community organizations (Pan 1998).

Nationalist sentiment reached its peak around the 1911 Revolution and again following the Mukden Incident and the Japanese occupation of Northeast China in 1931. The latter spurred the Nanjing government to mobilize the Chinese overseas through policies (Zhuang and Liu 2009, 182). However, even during the early twentieth century, when nationalism was on the rise, it did not simply replace local identification. *Qiaokan*, magazines and newspapers that were published in the *qiaoxiang* areas but that circulated to Chinese communities globally since the 1880s, reflect the co-existence and entanglement of local affinity modes and the emergence of pan-nationalist principles. One could also argue that the nationalist sentiment that surged during the 1920s and 1930s was but an extension of the strong “clan consciousness” in Chinese culture (Zhang and Liu 2009, 189). Relevant to note, however, is the fact that the *qiaopi* trade contributed to the strengthening of local and national affinity by using the *qiaokan* as a vehicle for advertisements. For example, already in the years after a regular ocean cruiser line was established between Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1840s, *shuike* would place business advertisements to attract remittances in Chinese newspapers when they returned to China (Xu 2007, 181). Through newspapers and *qiaokan*, it was these business interests that would become directly connected to questions of political and cultural affinity in the early twentieth century, both locally and nationally. Even though the *qiaokan* continued a tradition of local printing culture, in times of crisis, they could contribute to the formation of nationalist sentiment (Hsu 2000; Liu and Benton 2016).

This entanglement of local and national identification is reflected in the evolution of the *qiaopi* trade during the early twentieth century, during which it developed steadily. In Bangkok, for example, over fifty offices were registered, mostly operated by members of the Teochiu, Hakka, and Hainanese dialect groups. In addition to these, however, banks and post offices also handled remittances from Chinese communities. State efforts to control the *qiaopi* trade were hence already manifest. Following Guangxu’s 1896 edict and the signing of postal treaties with various countries that made the tariffs of the Universal Postal Union applicable within China, the Imperial Postal Administration (*Da Qing youzheng*) was set up. In 1907, in the Chinese business area of Bangkok, mail between Chinese communities and China was required to go through post office channels. *Shuike* delivering letters were required to pay a postal fee per letter and were subjected to fines if they failed to do so (Xu 2007, 59-61).

In the early twentieth century, the *qiaopi* trade would also witness standardization. For example, in the Philippines, in the 1920s, both *qiaopi* from Manila to Fujian and *huipi* (return

letters) from Fujian to Manila would be sent in a traditional Chinese-style envelope with a red banner on the left side of the envelope (Xu 2007, 159). In 1920s Myanmar, for *qiaopi* sent through postal offices, it was required to use a stamp for each individual *qiaopi* (Xu 2007, 274). Apart from postal offices, banks also became involved in the *qiaopi* trade. For example, the Quanzhou branch of the Bank of China was already engaged in managing remittances in the 1920s (Chen 2009, 112). *Qiaopi* traders, banks, and post offices co-existed in the space created by the Qing state's modernization efforts and international efforts to standardize trade and communication technology. In a later period, *qiaopi* offices of various dialect groups also organized themselves into trade associations to manage and regulate the trade in their "bangs," as for example in Singapore in the 1930s. There was even an overarching "Nanyang" association for Chinese remittance trade in 1940s Singapore (Xu 2007, 189). Hence, this was not a strict linear development: local, national, and regional loyalties continued to co-exist.

***Qiaopi*, the State, and Community Structures since the 1950s**

A number of political events influenced not only the *qiaopi* trade and its institutions, but also the overall relation between Chinese and family members overseas, as well as the institutions of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, during the second half of the twentieth century. These events included the foundation of the PRC in 1949 and the broader context of decolonization and the formation of the Cold War. Hitherto, the Chinese overseas had remained Chinese subjects; in 1909 this had been institutionalized with the Nationality Law based on *ius sanguinis*. After World War Two, however, the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia were considered to be a liability—"the Chinese problem" became an area of concern in diplomatic relations between China and Southeast Asian countries (Fang 2001). Especially since the CCP rule on mainland China in 1949, and in the context of decolonization and the Cold War, the Chinese in Southeast Asia were perceived of as a "Fifth Column" that would serve China's interests, first in an international Communist order, and later, after the Sino-Soviet split, in the form of an anti-Soviet bloc (Wang 1981, 279).

The "Chinese problem" not only implied that ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia were politically disloyal to their host countries; they were also perceived as being wealthy and economically dominant, which connects back to the history of the Nanyang traders (Suryadinata 2007a: 4). In response to this, a vital shift occurred in 1955 with the so-called Treaty on Dual Nationality between China and Indonesia. Since the earlier *ius sanguinis* had de facto led to dual citizenship under colonial rule, the 1955 law ended this ambiguity. From now on, Chinese nationals abroad were asked to choose a nationality—no dual nationality was allowed. This disengagement with the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), policies towards the Chinese overseas were discontinued and relatives of the Chinese overseas were persecuted because of "capitalist" associations (Fitzgerald 1972).

It is in this broader context that we need to understand the decline of the *qiaopi* trade during this period and the efforts of traders to circumvent state channels. Whereas the Chinese

state sought to incorporate existing channels and employ them as vehicles in class struggle (as they did for schools), the newly independent states of Southeast Asia sought to halt remittances as part of broader efforts at the protection of local economies and the economic, political, and cultural integration of Chinese communities. In the PRC, for example, by 1956, it was declared that the *qiaopi* trade had “entered socialism” (Chen 2009, 115). The degree to which the three “pillars” of the Chinese communities (native place organizations, schools, and newspapers) were being eradicated differed across the various countries of Southeast Asia, depending on factors such as the relative size of the community, its political system, and the relation with China (Wang 1981, 261-262; Suryadinata 2007a: 56). These reasons are, however, not fully explanatory; policies were also based on perceptions and prejudice.

In Indonesia, under Sukarno (1945-1967), the three pillars of the Chinese community—newspapers (apart from one, namely *Harian Indonesia*) and community organizations—were eradicated in an effort at cultural assimilation (Suryadinata 2007b). Even the celebration of Chinese cultural festivals was prohibited (Tong 2010). Economically, as in other countries, policies were designed to increase the share of the indigenous people in the economy, such as the *benteng* system during the 1950s. This system encouraged the development of indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs and restricted certain goods to these entrepreneurs only (Suryadinata 2007b). In 1959, laws to prevent the ethnic Chinese from engaging in retail trade outside of cities were put in place. Both in 1960, following these laws, and in 1965, after the PKI-30 incident, an abortive coup d’état associated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) that led to the killing of alleged Communists, many ethnic Chinese re-migrated from Indonesia (Suryadinata 2008). Under Suharto’s New Order (1967-1998), the policy of total assimilation was continued and even strengthened.

Similarly, in Thailand, after World War Two, economic nationalist policies and policies of political repression and cultural assimilation continued and were reinforced in the context of tensions in Southeast Asia (Skinner 1957; Pan 1998). Politically, in spite of some setbacks, such as the 1976 purge of Chinese students in response to the anti-government student movement, the Thai-Chinese also increasingly entered politics (Pan 1998). However, as opposed to elsewhere, and against Skinner’s prediction of total assimilation (which he connects to the prospect of upward mobility in Thailand that was not present to the same extent in colonial societies) by the fourth generation, the pillars of the Chinese community were not eradicated through policies. Thailand did not forbid Chinese ethnic organizations and Chinese newspapers (Tong 2010). In addition, there was more openness towards citizenship because of *ius soli*. The third generation of ethnic Chinese (and even the second generation) was considered Thai (Suryadinata 2007b).

After the independence of Malaysia in 1957, questions of political representation and economic dominance continued to loom large. Following ethnic riots in 1969, Malaysia pursued its New Economic Policy (NEP) (1970-1990) to increase the equity participation of the Malays, followed by the New Development Policy (1991), which has led to the rise of a Malay middle class. In addition, constitutionally, the Malays were privileged as *bumiputera* (sons of the soil) (Suryadinata 2007a). In the Philippines, under the Filipino First Policy (1948-1972) several

industries were nationalized (Hau 2000). During the rule of President Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986), the government actively pursued assimilation policies: Philippine Chinese schools became integrated into the national schools system, education was in the national language, and ethnic Chinese were encouraged to take up local citizenship (Suryadinata 2007b).

Against this broader background of the suppression of community arrangements, the *qiaopi* trade also became the subject of control. In the People's Republic of China, in 1952, the management of the *qiaopi* trade was formally transferred to the banking system (Wang Dongxu 2009, 104). Similar developments characterized the trade in Southeast Asia. In Thailand, for example, the foundation of the PRC was a turning point. After World War Two, the trade had initially seen a revival, with 113 offices present in Bangkok in 1947, the majority of which was operated by the Teochiu dialect group. After the foundation of the PRC, the Thai state sought to control remittances, but *qiaopi* traders used private channels and continued the trade. As policies became tougher, however, some closed doors voluntarily. Government control was not the only reason for the decline of the trade in Thailand; *qiaopi* traders also faced financial losses because of the collapse of the Nationalist Government currency and fluctuating exchange rates for the Hong Kong dollar. Also, the Chinese government did promote remittances from overseas Chinese after 1949, but these were to be transferred through state banks (Xu 2007, 88-91, 95).

Overall, both in the People's Republic of China and in the newly independent states of Southeast Asia, the attempt to control the remittance trade was part of the assertion of an independent economic and political course following the foundation of the PRC and decolonization respectively, whilst the banking and postal sectors were also developed. This effort to control was also part of broader efforts to shift the loyalty of the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia towards the host societies. With the 1955 Treaty on Dual Nationality, ethnic Chinese were encouraged to take up local nationality and became *huaren* instead of *huaqiao*. This policy also meant a significant shift in the relation between these communities and their homeland: the idea was that they planted roots in the host societies and were sojourners no more. Apart from controlling the channels of the remittance trade, assimilation policies hence served to eradicate the very need to connect with the homeland. With community forms wiped out to different degrees, local identities could not be expressed as before. Under the influence of the state, the primary spectrum of loyalty during this period became that of the host societies.

***Qiaopi* Research in the Context of China's "Rise"**

With the beginning of the reform and opening up period in the late 1970s, another transition emerged in the relation between the PRC and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. During this period, diplomatic ties with Southeast Asian countries were resumed. The Chinese government once again reached out to the ethnic Chinese, which it no longer considered to be a liability. It particularly sought investment from the Chinese overseas. Due partly to better relations with countries in Southeast Asia that had large Chinese populations, and following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war specifically, the PRC promulgated the 1980 Nationality Law. This

law reiterated the no dual nationality principle and served to clarify the status of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere (Suryadinata 2007a, 99).

More recently, the long history of connectivity between China and Southeast Asia outlined in this chapter has been used under Xi Jinping to justify the One Belt One Road (*yidai yilu*) initiative in Southeast Asia (*Xinhua* 2014). Emphasis on the Maritime Silk Road resembles the academic discourse on “oceanic culture” that *qiaopi* researchers have put forward (Liu and Benton 2016). However, since the academic discourse emphasizes regional over national identity, it also partly challenges this official discourse. The latter neglects the contradictions involved in the promotion of trading routes because it necessarily involves questions of region, dialect, and locality. That local identity remains crucial in the interest around *qiaopi* is clear from the emergence of *qiaopi* journals in the emigrant areas since the 1990s. For example, in the inaugural journal of *Qiaopi Wenhua* (Qiaopi Culture) from Chaoshan, a major *qiaoxiang* area in Guangdong province, the editors referred to *qiaopi* as “the knot to preserve the love of blood thicker than water between the Chaoshan people overseas and the family” (Wu 2003: 8). Published by the Research Centre on Chaoshan History and Culture, the journal considered Chaoshan *qiaopi* to be part of this local history and culture; *qiaopi* had “taken root in special soil” (Wu 2003, 8).

Following renewed Sino-Southeast Asian ties and global capitalism, several Southeast Asian countries manifested what has been described as a new wave of “re-Sinicization,” a process that involves both China’s soft power initiatives and the negotiation of Chinese identity on behalf of Chinese communities. Peter Katzenstein, for example, uses the term to refer to broad civilizational processes. These processes are not linear and one-directional and can involve both “re-Sinicization” and “de-Sinicization” (Katzenstein 2012, 7, 9). Hau (2014, 283) refers to “the revival of hitherto devalued, occluded, or repressed “Chineseness,” and “the phenomenon of increasing visibility, acceptability, and self-assertiveness of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.” The paradigm of “re-Sinicization” today, as opposed to older notions of “Sinicization” that denote a one-way process of “Han-ization,” hence refers to a process of interaction and negotiation regarding different understandings of “Chineseness.”¹⁰

Hau (2014, 312) has emphasized that recent manifestations of “re-Sinicization” in countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia are multi-layered because they are not only mediated by different historical experiences (colonial and postcolonial policies), but also by the divided nature of “China” itself (geographically, politically, and culturally), as well as by market motives. In a recent work, Nyíri and Tan (2017) also emphasize the centrality of capital in this process. Even though the PRC and Taiwan have long been involved in “re-Sinicization” efforts through policies towards the Chinese overseas, China’s position in the region has altered

¹⁰ According to the “Sinicization School,” the Manchus were “Sinicized.” Mary Wright and Ho Ping-ti famously advocated this view. Since the 1990s, Evelyn Rawski, Pamela Crossley, and Mark Elliott have challenged this view. See Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 55. 4 (1996): 829-850; Ho Ping-Ti, “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 57.1 (1998): 123-155.

vastly since economic reform in the late 1970s. Sino-Southeast Asian interaction received an extra impetus with the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) that came into effect in 2010.

The PRC's use of soft power in the form of the promotion of Chinese culture and language is widely known. Since 2004, China has set up a large number of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms under the aegis of the *hanban* of the Ministry of Education. However, local histories, practices, and sensitivities determine how Chinese culture is received in Southeast Asia. For example, in Indonesia, Confucius Institutes are called *Pusat Bahasa Mandarin* or Chinese Language Centres. Suryadinata (2012, 5) argues that the name *Lembaga Khonghucu* or *Lembaga Confucius* might be avoided because of sensitivity and because Confucianism is an "organized religion" in Indonesia, which explains why it was "de-recognized" under Suharto. Specifically targeted at the ethnic Chinese are the policies towards the "Chinese overseas" (officially referred to as *huaqiao huaren*). They have received less attention in scholarship, even though China has a vast policy apparatus in place for "overseas Chinese work" (*qiaowu gongzuo*), with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) being the main institution involved (Suryadinata 2017). In recent years, more efforts have been made to "go out" to the Chinese in Southeast Asia through OCAO visits to these community bodies. These organizations have continued to occupy a central place in China's efforts to reach out to the Chinese overseas. It is this re-engagement with the Chinese in Southeast Asia following the rehabilitation of the *guiqiao* (returnees) after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that has created the conditions for the renewed interest in Chinese communities in the *Nanyang* among Chinese academics.

The hand of the state that was involved in the revival of *qiaopi* after 1978 through state channels was equally visible in the re-founding of the "pillars" of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Especially since the 1990s, many Southeast Asian countries witnessed the arrival of large numbers of new migrants from the PRC, especially so in Mainland Southeast Asia. Whereas those Chinese who arrived in Southeast Asia before or after World War Two were from South China and became *huaren* in the 1950s, the new migrants were from different places within China, were Chinese nationals, and many of them were highly educated. The interaction process between the old and new migrants formed a key component in the dynamics of "re-Sinicization." The influx of large numbers of new migrants in relation to smaller historical communities has particularly been the case in the countries of Mainland Southeast Asia. For example, in Laos, with the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) programme in 1992 that sought to create a North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC) in the region, Chinese investment in agriculture, hydropower, and mining increased, accompanied by a surge in Chinese migration (Chang 2013).

Even though Chinese community organizations once more played a pivotal part in ties between China and Southeast Asia, they became transformed under globalization. Since the 1970s, although membership of Chinese community organizations could still be based on kinship or locality, it has become more open in practice. New types of organizations also emerged, such as those based on profession or alumni associations (Liu 1998). New migrants also set up their own organizations (Zhuang et al 2010). Apart from the hand of the state in this process, under

the influence of globalization, local organizations became transnationalized and transformed into “global” organizations of various bents. For example, in 1983, the Global Guangxi Native Place Federation (*Shijie Guangxi tongxiang Lianyihui*) was set up (Zeng 2004, 132). Membership hence became less restrictive and these organizations began to operate increasingly as a platform to facilitate business interactions. Their goal has increasingly shifted towards connecting ethnic Chinese globally. As part of this process, they have held regular conventions at which global ethnic Chinese can network (Liu 1998). For example, the Third Global Guangxi Native Place Federation was held in Kuala Lumpur and had around a thousand attendants. Here, ethnic Chinese from all over the world identified with the “highest level” of lineage and place, namely that of the Chinese nation and Chinese culture rather than the more locally conceived ties of blood and place (Zeng 2004, 133).

In Indonesia, it was only after the fall of Suharto in 1998, during the *reformasi* era, that ethnic political parties and several Chinese dailies and schools emerged, even though the latter took the form of trilingual schools (Suryadinata 2012). In 2000, the official celebration of Chinese New Year or *Imlek* was reinstalled, after decades of restrictions (Hau 2014). In 2005, a “strategic partnership” between the Republic of Indonesia and the PRC was announced; in 2006, both elements of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli* were integrated into citizenship law, but discussions on “indigenous Indonesian” identity continued (Suryadinata 2008). Against this background, and keeping in mind the presence of intermediate communities such as the *peranakans*, the culture that was re-emphasized under “re-Sinicization” impulses from Mainland China was the *totok* culture. For many *peranakans*, however, the “Chinese” culture that Beijing represents was not their Chinese culture.

In Malaysia, Chinese schools at the secondary level were not eradicated but they were subject to government control (Suryadinata 2007a). Those Chinese secondary schools that did not comply with the required monolingual education policy relied heavily on the Chinese community for funding and support (Raman and Tan 2015). Some private community-based university colleges, namely, the Southern College (*Nanyuan*), the Han Chiang College (*Hanjiang daxue xueyuan*), and the New Era College (*Xinjiyuan*), were established in the 1990s.¹¹ There has, however, also been resistance against renewed Chinese influence. The announcement that Xiamen University was to open a branch in Malaysia’s Selangor state in September 2015 met with online criticism. The campus, estimated to cost around USD 200 million, was partially funded by a Malaysian-Chinese business leader (Ang 2013). The Chinese media referred to the Malaysia branch of Xiamen University as a matter of the “return” of history and “gratefulness” towards Malaysia because the founder of Xiamen University, Tan Kah Kee, had accumulated his fortunes in Malaya (Xinhuanet, July 6, 2014). Discussions on Facebook, however, criticized the profit motives and national interests behind the move (“Xiada haishi ‘xiada,’” Facebook, July

¹¹ The Southern College was established in Johor state in 1990; the Han Chiang College was established in Penang state in 1996; the New Era College received its first batch of students in 1998. In 2004, there were plans to merge the three colleges, but these plans were abandoned because of obstacles such as the distance between the colleges and their different specializations (Raman and Tan 2015).

2015).¹² The case of Xiamen University reflects the different layers of negotiation regarding China's "rise" on behalf of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia—there are both opportunities and anxieties (Liu 2016).

In the Philippines, many Chinese *mestizos* who had become Filipinos, including high government officials and media figures, have once again emphasized their Chinese heritage (Hau 2000; Hau 2014). As elsewhere, apart from the ethnic Chinese who are third and fourth generation descendants of immigrants, new Chinese migrants have also found their way to the Philippines (Chang 2013). Here, the Chinese Filipinos have referred to new migrants as TDK (Tai Diok Ka) or "Chinese mainlanders" to distinguish themselves from these newer immigrants. In addition, renewed ties with China and increasing Chinese soft power have not been unproblematic, as the recent inflammation of the South China Sea conflict demonstrates (Hau 2014: 13).

Can we say that a pan-ethnic Chinese identity that unites ethnic Chinese beyond dialect, regional, and class divisions is on the rise? Jacobsen (2009, 69-70, 75) argues that the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia has been marked by "fluidity" and that the "disaggregation" of nations and states due to globalization has made room for "transnational ethnoscares"—ethnic groups and networks that are "deterritorialized." In other words, globalization leads to "an assertive resurgence of local identities thereby producing and increasing social and political awareness within ethnic groups." These local identities, however, are fragmented and always a response to specific historical experiences. In addition, although transnational forces play a role, the state remains a critical actor in the shaping of these identities. Identification processes take place against the background of the degree to which community pillars have been preserved, as well as against the background of the relation between the older immigrant communities and the new migrants.

Rather than understanding the rise of "ethnic" identity in Southeast Asia under global capitalism as a "deterritorialized" process, local histories and identities continue to determine the very understanding of what it means to be Chinese. In that sense, the broader story of Chinese identity negotiation in Southeast Asia is not dissimilar to the story of *qiaopi*, the interest in which is tied to the very question of local identity. In addition, the arrival of new migrants who are Chinese nationals and who are crucial actors in negotiations about Chinese identity in many Southeast Asian countries implies that "ethnic" identity can never be a "deterritorialized" process.

Finally, even though Chinese community organizations have been transformed, their transnational and global nature does not simply "replace" the local markers on which membership was initially based. Rather, these local markers have been reinterpreted in tandem with broader global developments. As noted for *huiguan*, the "native place" was never "fixed" in the first place—its scope could be one of different levels, ranging from the local to the provincial level. Similarly, the surname as a principle for community make-up did not have a clear regional connection and was combined with different levels of local affinity to demark its scope. The dialect group was always vast to begin with. The reinterpretation of locality under global

¹² I thank Pookong Kee for pointing out this discussion on the Malaysia branch of Xiamen University.

capitalism is hence a reinterpretation of its meaning rooted in the very flexibility of “native place,” dialect, or surname inherent in the set-up of community organizations.

Concluding Remarks: *Qiaopi* and Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia

From the above, several things can be derived in terms of *qiaopi* and the broader economic, political, and cultural ties between the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the *qiaoxiang*. Firstly, the long-term history of Chinese trade in Southeast Asia is relevant for an understanding of the development of the *qiaopi* trade in the nineteenth century. Already during this early period, dialect, region, and clan were central in the account of Chinese migration and community formation. *Qiaopi* is the broader story of the tie between Chinese communities and the home, but this early period already demonstrates that we need to understand “home” as a spectrum of entangled loyalties. Before mass migration, Chinese traders were sojourners who did not receive support from the Chinese state, and who were also subject to discriminatory policies under colonial rule. Nevertheless, intermediate communities emerged in the Nanyang, with the Chinese filling economic niches under colonial rulers and securing their socio-economic position. During this period, “home” was mostly the *qiaoxiang*, and dialect, region, and surname were the pillars of community life.

The *qiaopi* trade needs to be understood in tandem with developments in communication and transportation in the mid-nineteenth century. This was the period of mass migration and the emergence of the coolie trade that saw Chinese labourers shipped to Southeast Asia and the New World to work in mines and on plantations. With the arrival of large numbers of Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia, community grouping based on dialect, region, and surname became more numerous. The basis of community formation was also the basis for the set-up of the *qiaopi* trade. As local loyalties were challenged by nationalist beliefs around the turn of the century, these local markers of arrangement also had to compete with the arm of the state in the *qiaopi* trade. With new migrants arriving in Southeast Asia, the rise in female migration, and the end of the colonial revenue system, the long-term intermediate communities were faced with new forms of Chinese identity, strengthened by the presence of Chinese officials, reformers and revolutionaries.

During this period, Chinese schools, newspapers, and community groups served to unite the Chinese beyond dialect, regional, and clan lines for the Chinese cause. In the *qiaopi* trade, this period saw efforts to regulate the *qiaopi* trade through banks and post offices instead of relying on community forms. In both cases, however, this was not a story of linear transition, but rather a story of entangled local and national identification. Even though Chambers of Commerce arose, they did not simply replace the *huiguan*, but operated as umbrella organizations instead. In addition, it was mostly in periods of crisis or transition, such as the 1911 Revolution or the Japanese occupation of the 1930s, that nationalist principles were dominant. Similarly, the *qiaopi* trade did not simply become incorporated by the state; resistance and circumvention of state policies based on community constellations were part and parcel of the *qiaopi* story. In addition, elements of the early *qiaopi* trade could co-exist with institutions

that developed later. For example, in some places, *shuike* or couriers would co-exist with *qiaopiju*, but they would adjust to changing realities and collaborate instead of working individually.

As argued throughout this chapter, the story of *qiaopi* is not a story of “traditional” Chinese communities versus the “modern” state but rather one of the state *in* Chinese communities. The state was heavily involved in the creation and recreation of these communities under changing economic and political circumstances. The decline of the *qiaopi* trade in the 1950s is part of the broader account of decolonization, the Cold War, and economic nationalist policies. In this context, national governments suppressed the pillars of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. A policy of taking up local citizenship was encouraged during the 1950s. In this context, with the strong politicization of loyalties, ties between the Chinese communities and the homeland diminished under the fear of persecution. A contradictory policy of encouraging remittances through state channels remained in place in the People’s Republic of China. With the Cultural Revolution, ties became severed.

The renewed interest in *qiaopi* in the 1990s followed the expanding interaction between China and Southeast Asia within the broader context of global capitalism. However, during this period, rather than being a manifestation of a “deterritorialized” nationalism, the renewed emphasis on ethnic Chinese identity was directly related to state policies and state efforts to recreate Chinese community structures. The latter remained based on dialect, region, and surname, but, as in the past, the flexible nature of these markers allowed for a reinterpretation on a transnational scale. The regional identity agenda of *qiaopi* researchers also demonstrates that the spectrum of loyalties has all but made room for “the state” or “global capital.” Local and national identification modes need to be understood as a continuum rather than as a binary, with the state playing different parts in shaping and re-creating community arrangements over time. During the latest stage of migration, the dynamics between new and old migrants further complicate the picture of any linear transition, as neither the organizations, nor the migrants, nor the state are uniform agents. In other words, the spectrum of entangled loyalties has not diminished in scope.

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