Different game, same handicap : gender differences in negotiation depend on culture

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Different Game, Same Handicap:
Gender Differences in Negotiation Depend on Culture

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Different Game, Same Handicap:
Gender Differences in Negotiation Depend on Culture

Abstract

Three essays empirically examined how culture shapes gender differences in negotiation. In Essay 1, I meta-analyzed 148 studies and found that the more collectivistic the culture is, the less likely men performed better than women. The results indicate that whether men outperform women or women outperform men in negotiations depends on whether they are in societies that are high in individualism or high in collectivism. Essay 2 aims to explain why these cultural differences in negotiation performance occur by focusing on the role of cultural conventions in gender stereotyping within China. In Study 1, I confirmed that Chinese people conventionally stereotyped men negotiators as relational and women negotiators as aggressive, in contrast to the West. I then used Cultural Consensus Analysis to measure each individual's relative adherence to Chinese cultural conventions in gender stereotyping. The results showed that the gender gap in distributive negotiation outcomes (women performing better than men in China) was amplified among individuals who more strongly adhered to the cultural conventions. In Study 2, I manipulated cultural conventional knowledge, emphasizing relational vs. aggressive aspects of negotiating that reflect cultural differences in gender stereotyping. I found that when the conventional knowledge emphasizes building relations in negotiation, Chinese men had worse distributive gains than Chinese women, while when the conventional knowledge emphasizes aggressive negotiating, Chinese men had better distributive gains than Chinese women. Essay 3 is designed to demonstrate that cultural conventions do not only influence how people negotiate but how they react to others' relational and aggressive negotiating behavior by showing that patterns of backlash depend on the organizational type. The results showed that the salespeople

whose frequent customers work in SOEs gave the greatest backlash toward the aggressive men and women, and gave greater backlash against the relational women than against the non-relational women, but did not differ in the backlash against the relational and non-relational man; however, for the salespeople whose frequent customers work in MNCs, this backlash pattern was not found.

The essays suggest that culture is the key that drives gender differences in negotiations. Therefore, improving economic negotiation outcomes for women in collectivistic cultures is not as effective in helping to reduce gender inequality. In these societies, more attention should instead be made to decreasing negative stereotypes of women who seek relational outcomes.

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OVERALL INTRODUCTION

While cultures differ all over the globe, our stereotypes of men and women are remarkably similar. ... To this day, in the US, in China, and everywhere, men are expected to lead, be assertive, succeed. Women are expected to share, be communal, acquiesce to others.

— Sheryl Sandberg

The role of gender has long been considered an important issue in negotiation research (Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Kray & Babcock, 2006). Given the importance of negotiation in managing relationships, resource distribution, and economic value claiming and creation (Bowles, 2012), gender differences in negotiation can thus contribute to macro-level gender inequality within organizations (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) and across careers (Bowles, 2012; Bowles & McGinn, 2008; Kennedy & Kray, 2015).

Many empirical studies and theoretical reviews have stipulated that negotiation is an activity that is biased against women (e.g., Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2001a; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002b; Riley, 2001). Women negotiators have been found to be less assertive (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), less competitive, more accommodating (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998), and are more likely to favor strategies that protect social outcomes at the expense of economic outcomes (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2008). As a result,

women are often found to be less effective than their men counterparts in negotiations, especially in distributive negotiations (e.g., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 2005; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999).

One reason for such gender differences in negotiation is that profitable negotiation outcomes require behaviors that are congruent with agentic stereotypes of men (e.g., Kray et al., 2002b; Riley, 2001) and are antithetical to communal gender stereotypes of women (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Miles, 2010). Agentic characteristics primarily describe an aggressive, controlling, and confident tendency (Eagly & Johannesen - Schmidt, 2001). Some agentic workplace behaviors include speaking assertively, seeking to influence others, taking the initiative, often in a manner that is aggressive, ambitious, domineering, forceful, independent, and competitive (Eagly, Wood, & Diekmann, 2000). As such, being aggressive is a primary aspect of being agentic and can influence how people behave in negotiation, so agentic behavior is often operationalized as negotiator aggressiveness in negotiation literature (e.g., Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001b). Communal characteristics are primarily others-oriented or characterized by kindness, sympathy, sensitivity and being nurturing. Some communal behaviors include being concerned with the welfare of others, helpfulness towards others, being willing to follow, and eagerness to maintain relationships (Eagly & Johannesen - Schmidt, 2001; Eagly et al., 2000). Because being relational is a primary characteristic of being communal, the communal behavior is often operationalized as relational negotiating in negotiation literature (as reviewed by Bowles & Babcock, 2013). The gender

stereotypes of men being more aggressive and women being more relational are very pervasive and powerful in influencing how negotiators perform, what is expected of negotiators, and how the bargaining table is experienced differently for men and women (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Miles, 2010).

However, there are cross-cultural differences in the gender stereotypes. Recent research has demonstrated that gender stereotypes of men as aggressive and women as relational are more prevalent in highly individualistic cultures such as the United States (U.S.) (Cuddy et al., 2015). Specifically, the content of gender stereotypes varies across cultures in a way that stereotypes of men are more closely aligned with society's core cultural values than stereotypes of women. Therefore, while men are often stereotyped as being more aggressive and women being more relational in highly individualistic cultures (e.g., the U.S.), the reverse is true in collectivistic cultures (e.g., China, Korea) where men are stereotyped as being more relational and women as more aggressive (Cuddy et al., 2015). A follow-up study conducted by Shan, Keller, and Imai (2016) further demonstrated that these differences in gender stereotypes are also prevalent in the negotiation context. People in China (a highly collectivistic culture) were found to perceive relational negotiating as masculine and aggressive negotiating as feminine, which is opposite to how people in the U.S. perceived masculine and feminine negotiation behaviors (Shan et al., 2016).

While gender stereotypes have been shown to differ across cultures, it is still unclear how these differences impact negotiation behaviors and performance. In this thesis, I presented three essays that address this question. Essay 1 shows that whether

men outperform women or women outperform men in negotiations depends on the negotiators' cultures—whether it is a highly individualistic or collectivistic culture. Essay 2 demonstrates that gender differences in negotiation outcomes are driven by individual and contextual cultural conventions in gender stereotyping. Essay 3 demonstrates that culture does not only influence how people behave but how they react to others in negotiations as well, and the backlash effects against relational men and women are contingent on the organizational context.

The link between the three Essays is like this: Essay 1 aims to first reveal the understudied phenomena that gender differences in negotiation performance vary across cultures, such that the more collectivistic the culture is, the more likely women outperform men. Although Essay 1 builds the foundation of the theory, due to the methodological limitations, it was not able to disclose the black box behind the phenomena. To address this issue, Essay 2 was designed to empirically identify and test the causal mechanism that drives this gender difference, that is, the individual and contextual cultural conventions in gender stereotyping. Extending the conclusion of Essay 2, Essay 3 aims to further demonstrate that cultural conventional knowledge does not only influence negotiation outcomes but also how negotiation counterparts react to negotiators during and after negotiation. Specifically, by extending the Essay 2 Study 2's finding that exposure to different cultural conventional knowledge can change the pattern of gender differences in business to business negotiations, Essay 3 demonstrates that the culture and gender interaction has downstream effects which are contingent on the cultural values of organizational context. In the meantime, Essay 3

is also designed to explore the boundary effect of the theory in Essay 1 and Essay 2.

The relationship among the three essays is illustrated in Figure 1.

In a nutshell, three essays altogether partially contradict the quote by Sheryl Sandberg who contributes a lot to gender equality in the United States and thus provide alternative solutions for improving gender equality globally.

ESSAY 1

Are men better negotiators everywhere? A meta-analytical review of gender differences in negotiation performance in different cultures

Abstract

Although research has found that culture and gender each influence individuals' negotiation strategies and outcomes, less is known about their interplay. I integrate these two research streams by providing a meta-analytic review of the interactive impact of gender and national cultural values on negotiation performance. I reviewed 148 studies reporting negotiation outcomes from cultures varying in collectivism. Results showed that individualism-collectivism moderated the gender effect on negotiation performance such that the more collectivistic the culture is, the less likely men performed better than women. Implications for the role of gender and culture in negotiations and organizations more broadly are discussed.

Introduction

The idea that men are better negotiators than women is a major topic in research on negotiations (e.g., Craver, 2013; Kray & Thompson, 2005; Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, & Stuhlmacher, 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), as the ramifications of gender differences in negotiation performance go beyond the negotiation context (Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Kray & Babcock, 2006). Men's relative superiority in negotiation performance has been found to influence overall gender inequality within organizations (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) and across careers (Broverman et al., 1972; Miles, 2010). The effect of gender on negotiation performance, however, may depend on the negotiator's culture. To date, most studies on gender in negotiations have been conducted within individualistic and short-term-oriented societies (in particular, the U.S.). While the overall gender inequality in collectivistic cultures is even higher than in individualistic and short-term oriented cultures (Schwab et al., 2013), gender differences in negotiation performance may, in fact, be smaller, or even flipped.

I base the assertion on recent research on the relationship between cultural values and gender belief systems (Cuddy et al., 2015; Shan et al., 2016). Most theories on gender differences in negotiation performance are based on theories about gender belief systems (Kray & Thompson, 2005), which stipulate that men and women are expected to act in accordance with gender stereotypes and gender roles (Deaux & Major, 1987; Eagly, 1983; Eagly & Wood, 1991; Fiske & Stevens, 1993). In individualistic and short-term-oriented cultures, men are more likely to be

stereotyped as agentic, women are more likely to be stereotyped as communal, and societal expectations encourage men and women to behave accordingly when negotiating (Kray & Babcock, 2006). Moreover, because negotiation performance rewards agentic over communal behavior (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002a; Riley, 2001), men in individualistic and short-term-oriented societies are likely to outperform women. Gender stereotypes, however, are not universal. Stereotypes of men are typically closely aligned with society's core cultural values, and collectivistic societies, in fact, value communal behavior over agentic behavior (Cuddy et al., 2015; Shan et al., 2016). This suggests a critical boundary condition in how gender influences negotiation performance, as not all societies value the agentic behavior that facilitates negotiation performance equally.

In this paper, I examine how culture impacts gender differences in negotiation performance (i.e., the objective gain in negotiations) through a meta-analysis of gender differences in negotiation performance across societies with various levels of individualism-collectivism. I chose a meta-analysis rather than an experiment-based or survey-based study for two reasons. First, a single cross-cultural study may not capture the varying ways in which more than one cultural values vary across multiple societies and may not be able to identify which cultural values matter above and beyond others. A meta-analysis of different studies from across multiple societies enables us to capture the effects of different combinations of cultural values while also controlling for other variables. Second, many previous negotiation studies taken in societies higher in collectivism did not specifically address the question of gender

because similar patterns of gender inequality previously found in the U.S. and other relatively individualistic and short-term oriented societies was presumed. A meta-analysis enables us to capture a range of findings that were captured yet never explained.

The current paper contributes to the literature in two significant ways. First, I integrate research on gender (see Kray & Thompson, 2005 for a review) and research on culture (Gelfand & Brett, 2004) in negotiations by examining the interplay of the two factors on negotiation performance. In the process, I contribute to both research streams. I contribute to gender research on negotiation by demonstrating a boundary condition of gender differences in negotiation outcomes. Meanwhile, I contribute to cultural research on negotiation by demonstrating an indirect effect of differences in cultural values. Second, I contribute to research on gender inequality in organizations and across societies, more broadly, by demonstrating that the negotiation outcome-gender inequality link may depend on the cultural values of the society. I examine whether there are, in fact, societies where women outperform men in negotiation despite suffering from even greater overall inequality. This will shed light on our understanding of how to improve gender parity in various cultures.

In the following sections, I will first review extant literature on gender and culture in negotiations, then provide a theoretical explanation for examining the moderating role of individualism vs. collectivism (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 1991) and how these two cultural values may interact to moderate gender-performance relations in negotiation. I will then report the results of the meta-analysis. Finally, I will discuss

the implications of the meta-analytical results, especially the link between micro-level gender differences in negotiation performance and macro-level gender inequality.

Literature Review

Gender and Negotiation

In previous literature conducted primarily within individualistic and short-term-oriented societies, the negotiation table is considered to be an arena exclusively for men (Kray et al., 2001a; Kray et al., 2002a; Riley, 2001), as men in individualistic and short-term-oriented societies are considered to be more agentic and less communal¹ than women (Carol, 1982; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Kray & Babcock, 2006). Agentic characteristics primarily describe an aggressive, controlling, and confident tendency (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). Agentic behaviors at work include speaking assertively, influencing others, initiating tasks, and being aggressive, ambitious, dominant, forceful, independent, and competitive (Eagly et al., 2000). Communal characteristics describe being concerned with the welfare of others (i.e., descriptions of kindness, sympathy, sensitivity, and nurturance), helping others, accepting others' direction, and maintaining relationships (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001, Eagly et al., 2000). Communal behaviors at work include speaking tentatively, accepting other's direction, supporting and soothing others, and being affectionate, helpful, kind and relational (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001, Eagly et al., 2000).

1

Confirming the communal gender stereotypes, women have been socialized to have a greater concern for relationships than men and these gender differences have been found to permeate all aspects of the negotiation process (Kray & Thompson, 2005). First, women are reluctant to initiate negotiations (Hannah Riley, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007), thereby depriving themselves of the opportunity to improve their negotiation performance. Second, as masculine traits are associated with good performance in negotiation, women question their own ability to succeed in negotiation. Experiencing anxiety and self-doubt, women expect themselves to perform more poorly in the negotiation, set lower goals before the negotiation, make fewer demands during the negotiation, and thus obtain worse negotiation outcomes than men do (Faes, Swinnen, & Snellinx, 2010; Kaman & Hartel, 1994; Kray et al., 2001a; Kray et al., 2002a; Kray & Thompson, 2005). Third, when women negotiate, they frequently adopt an accommodating style (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998), dare not to be assertive (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), and are more likely favor strategies that protect their social outcomes at the expense of their economic outcomes (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2008). All these women's negotiation styles and strategies are less likely to deliver the economic benefits of a more competitive negotiation style (Kulik & Olekalns, 2012).

Underlying this consistent pattern is the notion that profitable negotiation outcomes require behaviors that are congruent with agentic behavior, which favors men (Kray et al., 2002a; Riley, 2001). Behavioral patterns required for profitable

negotiation are considered antithetical to communal behavior, which is most often associated with stereotypes of women (Broverman et al., 1972; Miles, 2010). As a result, communal gender stereotypes of women set women negotiators at a disadvantage while agentic gender stereotypes of men place men negotiators in an advantageous position (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Miles, 2010). This contrast is apparent in both people's beliefs that men have an advantage in distributive negotiations (in the United States, Kray et al., 2001a) and supported by meta-analytical evidence (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999).

Culture and Gender Interplay in Negotiation: Individualism vs. Collectivism

While theoretical claims on the role of gender in negotiations have been free of discussion of cultural context, empirical evidence of a gender gap in negotiation has been based predominantly on data from the U.S. Given that the U.S. is high in both individualism (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005), the generalizability of the findings beyond the U.S. context depends on whether the same gender effect applies to more collectivistic societies.

Research on the role of culture in negotiation points to differences in norms of negotiating behavior (Gelfand, Lun, Lyons, & Shteynberg, 2011a). Individualistic cultures place more value on economic exchanges than on relational exchanges (Sanchez-Burks, 2005). Consequently, in individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States), negotiation tends to be perceived as an impersonal, task-focused conflict that creates winners and losers (Brett & Gelfand, 2006; see a review in Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Gelfand et al., 2001; Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). By contrast,

collectivistic cultures place more value on relational exchanges than on economic exchanges (Namazie & Tayeb, 2006). And collectivistic cultures are more likely to emphasize relational outcomes and goals over immediate economic outcomes and goals (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006; Li, Channg, & Hsieh, 2010). Hence, in collectivistic cultures, relational outcomes of negotiation become primary goals, and economic gains become secondary goals. In addition, cultures also differ in the specific behaviors they engage in when managing conflict (e.g., Elsayed-Ekjiouly & Buda, 1996; Kagan, Knight, & Martinez-Romero, 1982). Individuals within individualistic societies are more likely to choose forcing as a conflict management style (Rahim, 2010), whereas individuals within collectivistic societies prefer withdrawing, compromising and problem-solving (Holt & DeVore, 2005). The agentic form of behavior that aids negotiation performance is therefore valued less in collectivistic societies, and this has an impact on negotiation behaviors and performance.

Therefore, culture plays an influencing role in gender differences in the process and outcomes of negotiation in two approaches. Firstly, culture plays a role by determining what type of behaviors and outcomes are valued in negotiations. Research has found that the contrasting cultural values associated with agentic vs. communal behavior that impacts different approaches to negotiation impacts differences in gender roles, expectations, and behaviors. For example, socially desired masculine traits in individualistic cultures like independence and assertiveness are not endorsed as socially desirable in collectivistic cultures, as found in Japan (Sugihara &

Katsurada, 2002) and China (Chia, Moore, Lam, Chuang, & Cheng, 1994). In fact, in collectivistic cultures, traits in favor of interpersonal relations, are highly valued as traits of men but not as traits of women (e.g., in China, Chang & Holt, 1994). This is also reflected in people's own attributes, as men in collectivistic cultures score higher than women on key communal attributes such as building and maintaining interpersonal relationships (e.g., in Turkey, Özkan & Lajunen, 2005; in China, Zhang, Norvilitis, & Jin, 2001).

Secondly, the cultural also determines the gender role expectation in negotiations. Cross-cultural differences in whether agentic or communal negotiation behaviors are valued have been found to influence the behaviors that men and women are expected to engage in during a negotiation, with masculinity associated with more agentic negotiation behaviors in the U.S. and masculinity associated with more communal negotiation behaviors in China (Shan et al., 2016). Given that gender belief systems also influence negotiators' overall performance (Kray & Thompson, 2005), I postulate that gender differences in negotiation performance depend on the cultural values of the society. I base the assertion on the fit between the values that the society espouses and the values that support agentic negotiating. Regardless of culture, being agentic, assertive, or self-focused helps negotiators claim more value in negotiations (Raiffa, 1982). Accordingly, in individualistic cultures where men are stereotyped as agentic, and women are stereotyped as communal (Eagly & Steffen, 1984), effective negotiation requires characteristics deemed as masculine but not feminine (Kray et al., 2002a; Riley, 2001). Thus, both men and women negotiators are more likely to

conform to their gender roles which result in men claiming more immediate value than women (Kray et al., 2001a); and stereotype-disconfirming women will be punished for not following the stereotype, which also impedes women from performing as well as men (Rudman & Phelan, 2008).

By contrast, in collectivistic cultures where men are stereotyped as more communal than women (Cuddy et al., 2015), men are less likely to engage in the type of agentic behaviors that make them more profitable from the negotiation itself. Instead, men are more likely to engage in behaviors that build relational capital in ways that undermine negotiation performance, yet aids them instrumentally in other ways through communal activities (Wong, Leung, Hung, & Ngai, 2007). Fulfilling these gender stereotypes, in collectivistic cultures, women rather than men have been found to be more likely to have higher ambition during the pre-negotiation process (Chen & Chen, 2012), initiate negotiations (Dai, 2005), choose aggressive and assertive negotiation strategies (Dai, 2005), receive less competitive offers from the counterpart (Castillo, Petrie, Torero, & Vesterlund, 2013), act more competitively when giving offers (Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, List, & Maximiano, manuscript), and be more persistent in the negotiation (Wang, 2000). All these agentic behaviors will lead to greater negotiation performance for women rather than men. As a result, within collectivistic societies, I expect that men will have an immediate disadvantage in negotiation performance where those who behave in accordance with their communal stereotypes will claim less value, and those who behave against the gender belief system of their own gender will incur backlash. Based on these cultural

differences in gender belief systems and their impact on negotiation behavior, I contend that the level of collectivism in the society will be negatively associated with men outperforming women in negotiations. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1: Collectivism moderates the gender effect on negotiation performance such that the more collectivistic the culture is, the more likely women negotiators outperform men negotiators.

Methodology

Literature Search

We used multiple sources to identify extant relevant empirical research that examined gender differences in negotiation performance. I searched primary research articles in online electronic databases that contained articles in English, including ABI/Inform, Google Scholar, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, PsycINFO, Web of Science, and databases that contain articles in Chinese, such as CNKI and Wanfang Data. I widened the search for primary research from non-US cultures by searching Google Scholar in Traditional Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Portuguese and Germany in Google Scholar and Google.com.

We searched the title, abstract, keywords, or full text of articles within these databases using negotiation-related terms in English (i.e., *negotiation, bargaining, conflict, mediation, and arbitration*), combined with gender-related terms in English (i.e., *gender, sex, male/female, and men/women*) were searched for possible inclusion. I searched for full text because there are studies that do not focus on gender difference

but report gender influence as a control variable. The search of the preceding electronic sources yielded 874 articles.

To comprehensively identify all relevant research to date, I searched for all negotiation performance research regardless of whether the research examined the role of culture or cultural differences, whether the research focused on gender differences or treated gender as a control variable. I also scanned the reference lists of reviews, theoretical articles and book chapters on gender and negotiation (e.g., Bowles, 2012; Kray & Thompson, 2005; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, & Amanatullah, 2009) and relevant published meta-analysis articles (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998). This manual search yielded additional 12 papers.

Finally, to address potential bias if data came from only published studies (Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2006), I also investigated relevant conference presentations and unpublished manuscripts from other researchers who study gender and negotiations. I received 19 articles from these authors. To further the comprehensiveness of the sample, I searched for papers that reported negotiation performance but did not report statistics for calculating effect sizes of gender differences. I contacted authors directly and requested additional statistics if necessary.

After using a variety of extensive search techniques introduced above, I reviewed 905 potential research reports for subsequent meta-analysis.

Criteria for Inclusion

Next, I reviewed each paper at least twice to examine whether it should be included in the meta-analysis. To be included in meta-analyses, empirical studies must meet the following criteria:

Firstly, I only recorded reports that contained the necessary information to allow the calculation of the direction of gender differences and their effect size. For those that did not report enough statistics, their authors were contacted to share enough statistics with us via email. This process ascertained an additional six studies to be included in the meta-analysis.

Secondly, I checked if there were any overlaps between samples reported in different papers written by the same author(s) and I excluded one paper accordingly (Ma & Jaeger, 2005).

Thirdly, I only included studies that reported objective final negotiation performance. For example, the dependent variable must be the causal product of at least a one-round negotiation. Therefore, I excluded studies that were limited to a negotiator's initial offer or demand (e.g., Barron, 2003; Kray, Locke, & Van Zant, 2012, Study 2), counter-offers (e.g., Cardella & Seiler, 2014), salary levels attributed to more than negotiation outcomes (Faes et al., 2010; e.g., Gerhart & Rynes, 1991), and one-round allocation or decision making outcomes (e.g., Greig, 2010). To focus on objective negotiation outcomes, self-reported or perceptual measures of negotiation performance (e.g., Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Putthiwanit, 2013) and anticipated negotiation performance (e.g., Kaman & Hartel, 1994) were also excluded. In addition, studies involving prisoner's dilemma or other

dilemma-related games (e.g., Brown-Kruse & Hummels, 1993) were excluded in this present research, as is the case in most other meta-analysis research on negotiation (e.g., Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). This is because these games put constraints on participants' actions, and findings from these games have been found to differ considerably from explicit negotiations (Walters et al., 1998).

Fourthly, due to a lack of enough effect sizes of sex role identification (Bem, 1977) in negotiation literature, I limited the comparisons to men and women participants based on dichotomous classifications of gender. Fifthly, I limited the sample of participants to adults. Sixthly, to ensure that the analyses address current societal conditions, I only included articles published within 30 years. Finally, to focus on the moderation effect of culture, studies that recruited participants in multiple cultures and did not report gender differences within each culture were excluded (e.g., Vetschera, Kersten, & Koeszegi, 2006).

Based on these selection criteria, I identified 98 articles that met the criteria for inclusion with a combined total sample size of 20680 participants from 27 countries (by May 2015). In this meta-analysis database, 28 articles contained multiple studies or multiple samples, which yielded 148 effect sizes of gender differences in negotiation performance. Table 1 shows the detailed summary of the cultural distribution of the studies included in the meta-analysis.

Coding

The meta-analysis included 148 effect sizes taken from the research articles. Twenty-eight articles provided at least two effect sizes, and the other 70 studies yielded a single effect size. Each effect size involved independent groups of participants. Two coders (the first author and a research assistant) who were familiar with coding articles for meta-analyses independently coded all variables. After coding, the intercoder agreement ranged from 71.5% (effect size) to 100% (e.g., the culture of the sample). All disagreements between coders were resolved through discussions after which 100% intercoder agreement on all data was obtained. Another two independent coders coded the four studies in Portuguese and reached a 100% agreement for each variable. Details on the study information gathered relative to gender effects, negotiation performance, and cultural dimensions are presented below.

Gender effect on negotiation performance. To estimate the effect size, I compared men and women on objective performance (final settlement of gains) reached through the negotiation. All statistics that show the relationship between participants' gender and their gain in negotiations were converted to Cohen's d as a common metric for meta-analysis. Positive d 's indicated that men's negotiation performance was better than women's negotiation performance, and negative d 's indicated women negotiated better than men. For the positive d , the greater the d is, the greater gender gap in negotiation performance is.

National culture as the moderator. To reduce subjectivity and increase the replicability of the coding process, I created a formal coding system. In accordance with the theory, I focused on the moderating effects of collectivism. I coded each

nation's collectivism index indicated by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). Also, I included masculinity and power distance using Hofstede's cultural indices as control variables. I converted individualism scores into a collectivism index, with a higher value indicating a more collectivistic culture. Given that the theory concerned the role of culture at the national level, all indices were measured at the national level and not at the individual level. All studies involve only intra-cultural negotiation.

In addition to the theoretical moderators, in order to precisely capture the relationship between gender, culture and negotiation performance, I also followed previous meta-analysis study recommendations (e.g., Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) to collect information of methodological moderators that may have had an influence on negotiation performance or moderate cultural and gender effects: (a) integrative potential of negotiation task (0 = distributive negotiation, 1 = mixed distributive and integrative negotiation, 2 = integrative negotiation) (e.g., Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), (b) dyad gender composition (0 = same gender, 1 = mixed gender) (e.g., Nadler & Nadler, 1987), (c) advocacy of negotiator (0 = self-advocacy, 1 = other-advocacy) (e.g., Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), (c) communication mode (0 = constrained communication, 1 = face to face) (e.g., Rosette, Brett, Barsness, & Lytle, 2011), and (d) type of outcome reported (0 = individual outcome, 1 = joint outcome) (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). The intercoder agreement was 100%. The results showed that none of these variables moderated cultural or gender effects on negotiation performance, and after controlling for all these variables, the focal

moderators remained the significant moderation effects. To reduce redundancy, in results reports, I only focus on the moderating effect of cultural values.

Nineteen studies compared joint gain between dyads with different gender compositions. The comparison statistics used for estimating the effect size in these studies were between joint performances of same-sex dyads. Joint outcomes for mixed-gender dyads were not taken for estimating effect sizes of gender differences in negotiation outcomes. In cases where both joint gain and individual gain were reported, the performance achieved by the individual was used. All effect size calculations were conducted using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Version 2 (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005).

Moderator Analyses

To assess the moderating effects of culture, I performed meta-analytic weighted least squares (WLS) regression analyses (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Firstly, for each effect size, I calculated the inverse variance weight, namely the inverse of each study's squared standard error that is inversely proportional to the variance. In statistical terms, an effect size's inverse variance weight w was calculated as following: $w = \frac{1}{SE^2}$, in which SE is the effect size's standard error, calculated as: $SE = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N-3}}$, in which N is the sample size. This allows us to correct the sampling error in effect sizes with a larger sample size provided with a greater weighting (indicating more accurate estimates of population parameters) than effect sizes resulting from smaller samples (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2011; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Wilson & Lipsey, 2001).

Secondly, I used an SPSS Macro and Syntax developed by Wilson (2010) for meta-analytic WLS regression analyses to test mixed (or random) effects models with their confidence intervals, standard errors, and homogeneity tests results. I used a mixed-effects model to consider heterogeneity among the studies rather than a fixed effect model because the latter one strictly assumes the populations of the effect sizes to be homogeneous (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Mixed effects models do not make this assumption, allowing us to consider the possibility of population parameter value variability that is not explained by the tested moderators (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Wilson & Lipsey, 2001). Meta-analysis researchers also have recommended using a random effects model because it assumes that sampling error and variability in the population of the correlations causes variability among studies (Aguinis, Dalton, Bosco, Pierce, & Dalton, 2010), without restricting inferences to the studies included in the sample (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). For meta-regression analysis, I entered the collectivism index, and the controlling variables, including masculinity and power distance index. All tests were two-tailed with alpha set at 0.05.

Tests of Publication Bias

To address the “file-drawer problem” (i.e., the bias for significant results to be more likely published and retrievable for a meta-analysis relative to nonsignificant results; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004), the fail-safe N was computed to represent the number of unpublished studies with effect size of zero that must exist to render the observed findings nonsignificant at the $\alpha = .05$ level (Rosenthal, 1991). With a fail-safe $N = 1363$ for overall gender effect on negotiation performance and decent

fail-safe N s for posthoc subgroups, I have confidence in the robustness of the results that the file drawer effect was not an issue.

Results

Overall Gender Differences in Negotiation Performance

An estimate of the population effect size was obtained by calculating the mean weighted effect size, cohen's d . The result showed that the overall mean weighted effect size (d) was .12 (CI: .04 ~ .20; $p < .001$), suggesting that men overall do slightly better than women in negotiations. However, the observed heterogeneity of effect sizes ($Q_w = 874.08$, $p < .001$) suggests that the gender differences in negotiation performance cannot be adequately reflected by this single overall effect size.

Moderation Effects of Culture

Hypothesis 1 examined the role of collectivism as a moderator of the gender-negotiation performance relationship. The result of Step 1 (Table 2) indicates that collectivism is a significant moderator of the focal relationship ($\beta = -.38$, $p < .001$). Hence, I obtained support for Hypothesis 1. Figure 2 illustrates the moderating effect of collectivism. The moderation effects of long-term orientation, masculinity and power were also not significant ($p > .78$).

Discussion

We conducted a meta-analysis of 148 studies with 20,608 participants to examine whether national culture significantly moderated the gender effect on negotiation performance. The meta-regression analysis revealed mixed results. I found that collectivism moderated the gender effect on negotiation performance. The more

individualistic the society was, the more likely men outperformed women. The more collectivistic the society was, on the other hand, the more likely women outperformed men.

Unlike the most recent meta-analysis paper that focused on person-based, situation-based, and task-based moderators in gender effects on negotiation performance (Mazei et al., 2015), the current work instead focuses on the understudied moderator, that is, national culture, and treats the tested moderators as controls. The primary studies considered in the previous meta-analysis (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) mainly recruited participants from the United States and European countries. By including more non-English articles such as papers in Chinese, Spanish, Germany, and Portuguese, the current study provided sufficient effects sizes from various cultures to calculate the culture and gender interactions in negotiation performance, addressing the limitation raised by Mazei et al. (2015).

Taken as a whole, the results point to collectivism as a societal-level condition that alters the relative negotiation performance of each gender. In the case of collectivism, the results point to a culturally guided emphasis on relationship building that does not only temper the effects of men dominance in negotiations but reverses the gender effect entirely, as women in highly collectivistic cultures outperformed men. These contrasts mimicked recent findings on cross-cultural differences in gender stereotypes in general (Cuddy et al., 2015) and specifically within the negotiation context (Shan et al., 2016). This suggests that gender belief system continued to serve as a mediating mechanism, albeit with divergent results. Future research can explore whether, in fact,

differences in gender-related negotiation outcomes are attributed to differences in stereotypes. Future research can also address potential behavioral mediating mechanisms, such as whether differences in negotiation outcomes are attributed to men in collectivistic cultures being more likely to forgo distributive claims, women in collectivistic cultures being more comfortable in making distributive claims, or differences between cultures in the type of backlash that occurs when each gender acts passively or aggressively during the negotiation.

Theoretical Implications

By examining how culture and gender interact in negotiation performance, this meta-analysis makes contributions in three areas of research. Firstly, this study contributes to research on gender in negotiations by incorporating culture as a moderator. Negotiation research has traditionally examined culture and gender in isolation. Negotiation scholars have long argued that men are better than women at negotiating (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) and developed substantial theories based on this assertion (see Kray & Thompson, 2005 for review). However, the results showed that these arguments could only be applied in highly individualistic cultures where men negotiate better than women. If we look at more collectivistic cultures, we can find equal performance between men and women, and women even outperformed men in highly collectivistic cultures. Just as Gelfand, Leslie, and Fehr (2008) pointed out, research on organizational behavior (including negotiation) can be counted as “global” only if we incorporate global perspectives.

Secondly, this work sheds light on the domain of culture and negotiations by theoretically arguing how gender roles and stereotypes serve as a mechanism that links culture and behavior within business contexts. As it stands, the meta-analysis shifts the previous discussion from “men are better negotiators” by theorizing that the effects of gender belief system depend on cultural values. I maintain the same premise that gender stereotypes and gender roles are important and do matter, but I also demonstrate that their effects are culturally conditioned. The implication of the findings is that researchers should theorize a more nuanced view about gender and negotiation given the moderating role of culture. Specifically, by reviewing how gender roles vary in culture, I propose a theory about how culturally-contingent gender belief systems impact negotiation behavior and outcomes and explained it by the cultural differences in emphasis on different negotiation outcomes, such as relational vs. economic outcomes. I demonstrate that negotiations, which are quintessential components of business activity, are shaped by culture, and at the same time, the cultural effects are specific to the role of negotiation in gender relations. This suggests that separately considering gender differences or cultural differences is insufficient in negotiation research. Culture and negotiations research, accordingly, would benefit from moving beyond just the old question of “are there cultural differences” or the more recently asked question “how do cultural differences vary across different situations” to a more nuanced perspective which asks the question “how does culture influence roles within specific situations.” In the future, therefore, negotiation researchers, and organizational researchers in general can consider the

interactive role of culture, social role and situation as a way of exploring culture's effect.

Implications for Practice

Our results also have implications for negotiation practice. In particular, I suggest that for practitioner negotiators, an oversimplified view of gender without considering the cultural context may lead to inappropriate stereotyping. This issue is particularly salient in inter-cultural negotiations because Americans may be prone to stereotyping people from collectivistic cultures and women in the same way (i.e., weaker than men) if they do not understand the nuanced relationship between culture and gender. The results suggest that the interaction between gender and culture should be considered as one important factor in determining whether a negotiation partner is more or less likely to engage in a value-claiming negotiation.

Our results also have implications for broader policies on gender inequality. In the past, the mainstream theory of gender and negotiations relied on the gender belief system of agentic men and communal women (e.g., Bowles, 2012; Kray & Thompson, 2005; Tinsley et al., 2009). This argument is predominantly based on empirical evidence from the United States, with the culture values typically characterized as individualistic and short-term oriented (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Compared to more collectivistic cultures, North American societies have lower overall gender inequality (Schwab et al., 2013). Within these lower inequality societies, negotiation has contributed to a gender gap in both organizational status (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013a) and income (Martin, 2007). Because societies with collectivistic cultures have

an even wider gender gap overall, it is not surprising that less attention has been made to the role of gender in negotiation performance in societies with collectivistic cultures. Given that negotiation outcomes contribute to overall gender inequality, women in collectivistic cultures should expect to perform even worse.

However, this present paper instead shows the opposite. For example, the meta-analysis showed that, in the highly collectivistic culture, China, women even do better than men in negotiations, despite women possessing much lower status than men compared to Western cultures (Schwab et al., 2013). This means that better economic performance in negotiations does not lead in the aggregate to greater resources in highly collectivistic cultures, as does it in individualistic cultures. This further suggests that different cultures have different weights on negotiation outcomes that contribute to macro-level gender inequality. In collectivistic cultures, perhaps it is not economic performance but relational negotiation outcome that leads to the ultimate gain in the social resource because the whole society values relations. Thus, it is possible that in various societies, whatever outcome the culture values, it becomes the most important capital that can be transferred to higher status and success.

Therefore, both practically and academically, improving economic negotiation outcomes for women in collectivistic cultures are not appropriate anymore in helping to reduce gender inequality. To realize gender equality in collectivistic cultures, more attention should instead be made to helping women become more culturally competent, for example, by increasing women's relational outcomes (Bowles &

Babcock, 2013) or by decreasing negative stereotypes of women who seek relational outcomes (e.g., China; Yang, 1994; Zhang, 2006).

Limitations

As in any meta-analysis study, there were limitations to this study that could be addressed in future research. First, while relational outcomes were two critical features of the theoretical argument, I did not capture these two constructs empirically. Future research can examine the specific ways in which the emphasis in relational vs. economic outcomes shape gender roles in negotiations such as through motivation (Curhan & Overbeck, 2008) or the construction of mental models (Van Boven & Thompson, 2003). Future research can also address the processes that influence how men and women negotiators in collectivistic cultures weigh relational concerns.

Second, due to limitations of variable inclusion in existing empirical studies, this current meta-analysis did not capture the specific mediating mechanisms that lead to gender differences in negotiation performance, so I was not able to assess the underlying reasons for why women's performance at micro-level does not translate into ultimate gains at macro-level in collectivistic cultures. Future research can examine these mechanisms and potential interventions. Also, the use of only a biological dichotomy of gender due to a lack of enough effect sizes in literature is a limitation, too, because sex role identification might also affect negotiation performance.

Third, given the interactive role of culture and gender in negotiation, future research can also address the role of gender in an intercultural context. For instance, scholars can address whether women from collectivistic societies are able to translate their negotiation success while negotiating within multinational corporation contexts, or whether women from individualistic societies are able to use their focus on relations to improve their negotiating ability within collectivistic multinational corporate contexts. Finally, there were some limitations due to limited data on gender and negotiation performance. In particular, to obtain research articles from collectivistic cultures, I used Chinese, Spanish, Germany, Japanese, Korean, and Portuguese language sources, but I failed to find any Japanese or Korean research that was suitable for this meta-analysis. Future research can examine additional collectivistic cultures or other related constructs to provide greater robustness and insight. I also call for more gender and negotiation research to be conducted in the Scandinavian cultures with higher femininity cultural indexes such as Norway and Denmark.

Conclusion

Despite these limitations, the current meta-analysis study made an important contribution to research on negotiations by demonstrating that gender and culture should not be treated as separate factors influencing negotiation performance and by demonstrating that the relationship between negotiation performance and gender inequality can be far more complex if we consider the role of the cultural context.

This study results suggest that when we talk about men and women negotiators, we must also ask the question of “where?”

ESSAY 2

Negotiating like a “man” or a “woman”?

Gender differences in negotiation outcomes driven by cultural convention

Abstract

Two studies were conducted to demonstrate that cultural conventional knowledge in gender stereotyping is the driver of gender differences in negotiations from two complementary angles. The results of Study 1 showed that Chinese women negotiators had better distributive objective outcomes than men negotiators. More importantly, such gender differences in negotiation outcomes were magnified among those who have stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping. It indicates that culture shapes gender differences in negotiations through its influence on individuals' conventional knowledge in gender stereotyping. In Study 2, adopting a dynamic view of conventional knowledge, I manipulated the knowledge about the cultural conventions in the industry, and the results showed that compared to when the conventional knowledge emphasizes aggressive negotiating, when the conventional knowledge emphasizes building relations, Chinese men had worse distributive negotiation outcomes, whereas Chinese women had better distributive negotiation outcomes. It indicates that culture shapes gender difference in a way that whatever the contextual conventional knowledge emphasizes in negotiation, men rather than

women strive to seize it. Altogether, two studies demonstrate that “culture as knowledge” serves as the driver of gender differences in negotiation.

Introduction

The results of Essay 1 suggest that there are indeed cross-cultural differences in gender effects on negotiation behaviours and outcomes. However, given the correlational nature of a meta-analysis, it is unclear if culture is the casual factor driving the gender effect. Such claims on causality cannot be made on the premise of mere group differences as there can be other contributing factors. For example, the effect of national cultures can be confounded with other societal factors related to gender differences—such as overall role-based gender segregation, educational opportunities for women, and prevailing religious and political ideologies—that can either reinforce or attenuate gender discrimination (Baskerville, 2003; UN Human Development Report, 2013). Gender differences between nations can also result from the different levels of economic development of the countries (Lynn & Martin, 1997).

Research suggests that gender stereotypes are the products of cultures (Brannon, 1996). Different cultures assert different beliefs about how men and women would and should behave (Gibbons, Hamby, & Dennis, 1997). Stereotypes of men are often more closely aligned with the core cultural values of society than stereotypes of women. For example, stereotypes of men in collectivistic (as compared to individualistic) cultures consist of more communal or relational traits than stereotypes of women (Cuddy et al., 2015). Particularly in the negotiation context, Chinese culture has been shown to describe men negotiators as relational while women negotiators as aggressive (Shan et al., 2016). Scholars examined how people categorize specific negotiation goals and behaviors as masculine and feminine across

the United States and China in different negotiation contexts and found that in business to business (B2B) contexts, Chinese people categorized aggressive goals and behaviors as feminine, but relational goals and behaviors, as masculine.

While cross-cultural differences in gender effect on negotiation have been demonstrated, it is still unclear whether culture is the driving force behind this difference. Moreover, the mechanism of culture affecting gender differences in negotiation performance is also unknown. It is important to note that, gender stereotypes are not merely descriptions of how people think about gender differences but also prescriptive expectations of what men and women should behave. In other words, gender stereotypes define what traits and behaviors are allowed or forbidden in different cultures (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Therefore, understanding the cultural impact on gender differences in negotiation requires an examination of how the cultural conventions describe gender differences. Because cultural conventional knowledge, which refers to learned understandings, perceptions, and beliefs about specific cultural behaviors in a certain domain and is shared and agreed by members in a given culture (Kovecses, 2010), defines gender stereotypes, which in turn influence negotiation behavior, conventional knowledge is supposed to affect gender differences in negotiation behavior through stereotyping.

Past negotiation literature has mainly focused on how conventions differ across cultures at the macro level with few studies showing how individuals' knowledge of gender stereotypes may influence their negotiation behavior and performance. It is important to go beyond the description of differences into an examination of the

mechanism at work in order to advance the field of negotiation (Gelfand et al., 2011a).

As such, this Essay aims to provide empirical evidence that conventional knowledge plays a key role in determining how gender gap manifests in negotiation.

To demonstrate conventional knowledge as the casual factor behind gender effects in negotiation, in this Essay, I examined the effects of conventional knowledge in terms of both individual difference and contextual factor. Defining culture as a reality shared by individuals at different levels, Study 1 sought to prove the causal mechanism of culture in gender differences by examining how variance in individuals' knowledge about the cultural convention in gender stereotyping influences their negotiation behavior and performance. I expect that those who adhere to the conventional knowledge in gender stereotyping at the perceptual level will behave more according to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping than those who less adhere to the conventional knowledge. Adopting the view of adaptive nature of cultural behaviors, Study 2 extends Study 1 by showing access to different cultural conventions that generate different gender stereotypes can create different patterns of gender gap in negotiation. I expect that those who are exposed to a cultural convention will behave consistently with the gender stereotypes that the cultural convention defines.

Traditionally, cultural research on negotiation has adopted a static view of cultural effects in negotiation and has generally ignored how cultural effects change based on the situational context (Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Morris & Gelfand, 2004). However, scholars in cross-cultural psychology have increasingly advocated a dynamic view of

culture in psychology (Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Morris & Gelfand, 2004). To provide a better insight into the causal mechanisms of culture in the negotiation context, I adopt a key theoretical assumption that individuals act on behalf of their cultural conventional knowledge, and they change their behavior when situational contingencies change (Gelfand et al., 2011a). According to this assumption, people's knowledge of cultural conventions are not viewed as static—they can be dynamically generated, amplified or even reversed (Gelfand et al., 2011a). In this dynamic process, cultural conventional knowledge in gender stereotyping can be learned and thus people can vary in the extent they have learned it, so some people are more likely to follow the cultural convention than others (Study 1), and conventional knowledge can also be generated dynamically within a situation (Study 2).

Theory and Hypotheses Development

Overall Gender Differences in Negotiation Created by Chinese Culture

Cultural psychologists have long argued that national cultures have different descriptions and prescriptions regarding appropriate social interactions (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995). In the context of negotiation, culture influences people's beliefs regarding which negotiating behaviors are appropriate or preferred (Gelfand et al., 2001). In other words, culture provides scripts and schemas for negotiation (Brett & Okumura, 1998). Research on the role of culture in negotiation has revealed that different cultures value different negotiating behaviors (Gelfand et al., 2011a). For example, American culture places more value on

economic outcomes than on relations (Sanchez-Burks, 2005). By contrast, collectivistic cultures like China value more on relations than on economic changes (Namazie & Tayeb, 2006) and are more likely to emphasize relational outcomes and goals over immediate economic outcomes and goals (Gelfand et al., 2006; Li et al., 2010).

Furthermore, research has demonstrated that collectivistic cultures, such as China, describe and prescribe men as more relational and less aggressive than women (Cuddy et al., 2015). In these cultures, Chinese men negotiators indeed have less aggressive ambition during the pre-negotiation process (Chen & Chen, 2012). They are reluctant to initiate negotiations (Dai, 2005), choose more cooperative and passive negotiation strategies (Dai, 2005), and are less persistent in the negotiation (Wang, 2000) than Chinese women negotiators. This is because, in distributive negotiation, maximizing the economic outcomes over distributive issues requires behaviors such as making aggressive first offers or using tough negotiation strategies (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2014). In other words, over distributive issues, the behavioral pattern required for a profitable negotiation is to be more aggressive and less relational (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Barry & Friedman, 1998; Miles, 2010).

As an empirical support, the meta-analytic result of Essay 1 has shown that women outperform men in China. Consistently, in the present experiment, it is also expected that:

Hypothesis 1: Chinese men negotiators have worse objective outcomes of the distributive issue than women negotiators in negotiations.

Conventional Knowledge as The Mechanism in Terms of an Individual Difference

Although Essay 1 found out that cultural index moderated the effect of gender in negotiation performance, it was not able to reveal if it is culture itself that works as a driver or other factors. Using the the dominant approach to studying negotiation (e.g., Cox et al. 1991, Mann 1980), Essay 1 is focused on researcher-defined theoretical constructs and treats differences among people within a culture as error variance. However, intra-cultural variation can be the key to capture the influence of culture, as intra-cultural variation may reflect variance in the dynamic relationship between the individual and the wider culture (Hong et al., 2000). Therefore, more fully capturing the role of culture in influencing gender differences in negotiation requires additional approaches. Cultural Consensus Theory (CCT) originally developed in Cognitive Anthropology, meets this need. Just as negotiation scholars conceptualize culture as a collective construct to the extent that they are shared across individuals (Gelfand et al., 2011a), Cultural Consensus Theory conceptualizes culture as knowledge toolkit that is shared among members of a population. Individuals who have learned how to think in culturally conventional ways have acquired cultural competence (Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986), or adhere to the cultural convention. In this view, culture is not an entity in which every member has the same belief but a heterogeneously distributed knowledge that different member accesses and adheres to the cultural conventions to a different extent (Adams & Markus, 2004; Atran, Medin, & Ross,

2005; Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2009; Chiu & Hong, 2005). This is because, within a certain society, different individuals are often exposed to common political and educational systems, media, dominant language, and national symbols to a different extent. This can produce substantial sharing of what is perceived to be typical behavior in one's culture. However, people have to acquire the knowledge of their cultural conventions by learning processes (Higgins, 1996; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). And due to difference learning motivations, ways, and experiences, individuals may differ in their knowledge about certain cultural conventions (GD'Andrade, 1987).

This variance in the knowledge of cultural conventions in gender stereotyping is likely to manifest in the gender variance in their behaviors and negotiation outcomes. Gender stereotypes of what is masculine and what is feminine negotiating are by nature categories of situation-specific behaviors (Shan et al., 2016), which are not only products of individuals' learning but are tools used by individuals for behaving accordingly (Murphy, 2002). Literature has established a widely-accepted theory that it is the extant conventions of gender stereotypes that result in stereotype-consistent gender differences in negotiation outcomes (Kray & Thompson, 2005). Empirical research shows that the stereotyped beliefs of gender permeate all aspects of the negotiation process for both sexes (Kray & Thompson, 2005) by inevitably (Devine, 1989) eliciting gender to be salient in pre-negotiation process (i.e., expecting less negotiation outcome, Kaman & Hartel, 1994) as well as negotiating process, and evokes stereotype-consistent behaviors (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005).

In this view, if people in a culture share an established convention on gender stereotypes about what masculine and feminine negotiators would be and men's and women's adherence to such convention can predict the gender differences in various negotiation outcomes, then it can be concluded that it is cultural conventional knowledge that works as a mechanism for driving such gender differences across cultures. Thus, going beyond simply comparing cultural groups at the collective level, in the present research, I further examined how individual adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping impacts gender differences in negotiation outcomes.

I expect that individuals who adhere to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping in their society are supposed to develop the "right" behavioral guides when negotiating and thus perform according to such gender stereotypes. It has been demonstrated that in the business to business negotiation context, Chinese people categorized aggressive negotiating as feminine but relational negotiating as masculine (Shan, Keller, & Imai, 2015). Therefore, in China, those who strongly adhere to the cultural convention that relational negotiating is masculine and aggressive negotiating is feminine, would behave according to such cultural convention so that the gender difference in value-claiming (men claiming less value than women) is magnified. In other words, the gender differences in distributive negotiation outcomes are expected to be greater in the individuals with stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping than in individuals with lower adherence.

Hypothesis 2: in China, adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping will moderate gender effect on objective negotiation outcomes such that the gender gap in the objective outcome (women better than men) in distributive negotiations is amplified in individuals with stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping in China.

Conventional Knowledge as The Dynamic Mechanism that Shapes Gender Difference

Cultural influence does not only vary across different individuals, but contexts within a culture can also shift cultural conventions of gender stereotyping (Kray et al., 2002a). Within one culture, there isn't just one convention used everywhere; there can be contexts with different conventions within a broader culture. As reviewed above, gender stereotypes are culturally conditioned knowledge. Therefore, they can be both acquired and generated dynamically, and in turn, results in stereotype-consistent cultural behaviors. Negotiators are cultural agents who are dynamically adapting their behavior to the salient cultural knowledge (Gelfand et al., 2011a). Cultural behaviors are goal-directed, adaptive and malleable. Therefore, when the cultural conventional knowledge changes, cultural behaviors change correspondingly (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010). Cultural behaviors by nature, in this sense, is considered as adaptive to a particular ecological niche and thus sensitive to situational contingencies (Gelfand, Severance, Fulmer, & Al-Dabbagh, 2012; Yamagishi, 2010). In this view, when negotiating, men and women should refer to the salient knowledge in gender stereotyping of their cultural group. In other words, how men and women

negotiate, depends on how the situational conventional knowledge defines gender stereotypes.

As reviewed above, the content of men's gender stereotypes are defined by the culturally valued behaviors in society, and the content of women's gender stereotypes are shaped by the culturally devalued behaviors (Cuddy et al., 2015). Because in contrast to the American culture where relations are deemphasized (Sanchez-Burks, 2005), in Chinese culture, relations are emphasized (Aycan, 2006). Relational negotiating is stereotyped as masculine but aggressive negotiating as feminine in China (Shan et al., 2016). Accordingly, the negotiating behavior that is valued in the conventional knowledge generates men's gender stereotype rather than women's. And thus men rather than women will behave according to such stereotype.

Based on the theory above, when the given cultural convention conveys the emphasis in aggressive negotiating, it will produce a gender stereotype that men rather than women should negotiate in an aggressive way. Therefore, men will adapt their behaviors to seek for winning the deal and care less about relations rather than women. To contrast, if the cultural convention emphasizes relational negotiating, it will define the gender stereotype of men but not women as relational, and thus men rather than women will strive to build and maintain good relations, jeopardizing their economic outcomes. Accordingly, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3: In China, when the cultural convention emphasizes aggressive negotiating in negotiations, Chinese men will have better objective outcomes than women in distributive negotiations; when the cultural convention emphasizes relational negotiating, Chinese men will have worse objective outcomes than women in distributive negotiations.

Overview of the Study

In a nutshell, building on cultural consensus theory and dynamic view of culture, the present work theorizes that people learn and accept culturally-generated beliefs of gender stereotyping to different extent, and particular cultural contexts can cue them to invoke particular cultural conventions, if they learned and accepted them, and so act in a culturally guided way. To identify and test culture as the driver of gender difference in negotiation outcomes, I conducted two negotiation experiments. In Study 1, using cultural consensus modelling, I measured each participant's individual adherence to the cultural convention of gender stereotyping by applying Cultural Consensus Modelling, and tested how this adherence moderated gender differences in different types of negotiation outcomes. In Study 2, I manipulated the cultural conventions in the industry and examined how exposure to certain cultural convention generates the gender stereotypes accordingly and thus change the manifestations of gender difference in China.

Study 1

Methodology

Participants

I recruited 62 Chinese (31 men and 31 women) undergraduate and post-graduate students from a large university in Beijing, China. All dyads were mixed-gender. To make the culture model more representative of Chinese culture, for the cultural consensus model analysis, I included both the 62 participants who participated the negotiation task and another 51 participants who only completed the CCT survey. There was one dyad who did not reach any agreement during the negotiation, and their data was not used in the following analysis.

Procedure

To register for the experiment, each participant must first complete an online pre-negotiation survey at least one day before the formal experiment and pass the filter questions (e.g., “Please select very masculine for this question”) to be qualified as a valid response. Before the formal negotiation, the experimenter confirmed that none of the participants was negotiating with someone they know. Upon arrival in the lab, the experimenter randomly assigned one member of each dyad to either buyer or seller and distributed confidential instructions to prepare for the negotiation. In the preparation period, participants were seated alone separately in different lab rooms and were provided with a printed package containing detailed information about each of their roles, priorities, and firm profits. Participants were given approximately 6 minutes to prepare for the negotiation task by reviewing these materials. After reviewing their instructions, the buyer-seller pairs were brought into a lab room which was equipped with a table and two chairs. Participants were given 15 minutes to negotiate. During the negotiation, participants were free to offer verbally whatever information, arguments,

and proposals they wished to offer, but they were prohibited from exchanging their printed role instructions. Immediately after negotiating, they completed a simulated contract together in the room where they negotiated, and then went to another separate room to complete a confidential post-negotiation survey. All participants were debriefed and thanked after they completed the study.

Negotiation Task

The task was a mixed-motive business negotiation adopted by previous literature (Bazerman, Maglioni, & Neale, 1985; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). Participants negotiated with a randomly assigned counterpart in a scorable negotiation exercise, in which they tried to reach a deal for a fictional transfer of a product from a manufacturing firm to a retailing firm. The exercise includes one distributive issue, namely the discount of the product, in which gain to one partner is at the other's equal expense, as well as integrative issues, for which participants have different priorities and gaining points, and thus could logroll in order to increase the total points score for both parties (Froman & Cohen, 1970; Pruitt, 1983).

Specifically, the seller plays the role of a salesperson in a leading manufacturer of refrigerators. The buyer plays the role of a purchasing representative of refrigerators for a major retail store. They have three issues to settle: discount terms, delivery time, and financing options. Discount terms is a distributive issue; financing terms and delivery time are integrative issues because firm profits are not equal for the two negotiators—the seller's company can achieve a higher profit on better financing term, and the buyer's company can gain higher profits on better delivery time. To gain more joint

gain, both parties could logroll or trade off on these two issues, but this was not stated explicitly in the instructions, so participants are left to discover it for themselves before or during the actual negotiation. To motivate participants to get involved in the negotiation process, the instructions indicated that their total company profit gained in the negotiation would be converted into their lottery tickets for a lucky draw of ¥100. The instructions for buyer and seller are attached as Appendix 1.1 and 1.2.

Variables and Materials

Adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping. To calculate adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping, I apply Cultural Consensus Theory (Romney et al., 1986) by adopting the Multi-Culture Latent Truth Rater Model (Anders & Batchelder, 2012, 2013), which has been used in organizational studies (e.g., Loewenstein & Mueller, 2016). This model is a new tool for uncovering whether groups of individuals are likely to give the same questions with the same answers, in other words, if and to what extent they have a shared system of cultural beliefs. It is a clustering method of analyzing data, and it forms clusters of respondents who agree with each other on the conventional gender stereotypes, rather than clusters of items. After years of endeavors of developing theory and technology for estimating collective beliefs in cultural anthropology and psychology, the Multi-Culture Latent Truth Rater Model was developed as a renewed analytic program using a hierarchical Bayesian inference, which allows for the simultaneous identification of multiple groups who agree on different conventions of cultural beliefs. I used the R package, CCTpack that was shared by Anders (2014).

The model analysis first identifies how many cultural conventions in gender stereotyping exist in China with the smallest Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) indicating the best fitting model. The second measure derived by Multi-Culture Latent Truth Rater Model analysis is intra-cultural competence (Romney et al., 1986), which I refer as individual adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping, namely to what extent the individual agrees with the cultural consensus (Anders & Batchelder, 2012, 2013) of what is masculine/feminine negotiating within their national culture. Intra-cultural competence, or adherence to cultural convention, is not a typical individual-level concept and instead should be conceptualized as a cross-level “frog-pond” concept (Bamberger, 2008; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000). Adherence to the cultural convention is contingent on each individual’s relationship to the larger pattern of cultural beliefs, so it is analogous to individual differences among frogs with different relationships to the rest of the pond.

For control variables, this model calculates item difficulty—how likely respondents are to know and give the cultural group’s answer to each item. The model also calculates a scaling bias and a shifting bias for each individual, capturing how each respondent uses the scope of the scale (scaling bias) and how each uses one end of the scale (shifting bias). These account for the tendencies to constrain responses to the top, middle, or bottom of the scale or use the whole scale. When analyzing both group-level or individual level cultural impacts, this model enables us to control for the influence of item- and respondent-level biases.

Cultural Consensus Model analysis was performed on survey data, which was

completed by all participants before they came to the lab for negotiation experiment (i.e., the pre-negotiation survey). For this survey, I used the items developed by Shan et al. (2016) which followed in an inductive two-stage process, drawing from previous research on lay categories based on Cultural Consensus Model (e.g., Keller & Loewenstein, 2011). All participants rated each goal or behavior on how masculine the goal or behavior in a business to business negotiation was on a 4-point scale with 1 = very non-masculine, 2 = slightly non-masculine, 3 = slightly masculine, 4 = very masculine, and how feminine on another separate 4-point scale with 1 = very non-feminine, 2 = slightly non-feminine, 3 = slightly feminine, 4 = very feminine. Along the pre-negotiation survey, I also measured some demographic variables as control variables. The whole survey is attached as Appendix 2.

Objective negotiation outcomes. After achieving an agreement in negotiation, the dyads signed a simulated contract indicating their objective negotiation outcomes, including the final discount, the financing term, and the delivery time. As mentioned above, the distributive outcome is the discount term, and the integrative outcomes are the financing term and the delivery time. All the outcomes were transformed to firm profits according to the role instructions. This contract is attached as Appendix 3.

Subjective negotiation outcomes. As shown in Appendix 4, subjective negotiation outcomes consisted of two aspects: instrumental outcome and relational outcome. The instrumental outcome was measured by the dimension of feelings about the instrumental outcome in Subjective Value Inventory (SVI, Curhan et al., 2006). Sample items are: “How satisfied are you with your own outcome?” (1=“Not at all satisfied,”

4="Moderately satisfied," and 7="Perfectly satisfied"); "Do you feel like you forfeited or "lost" in this negotiation?" (1="Not at all," 4="A moderate amount," and 7="A great deal").

Relational outcome refers to the perceived relations between the dyad as the result of the negotiation and was measured by two scales. One is a 7- point scale developed by Curhan, Neale, Ross, and Rosencranz-Engelmann (2008) (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal; e.g., "How much do you think your negotiation partner likes you?").

Another measurement of relational outcome is the sub-scale of feelings about the relationship (e.g., trust and establishing a good foundation for the future) in SVI, which has been empirically demonstrated as a valid tool to assess the subjective elements of negotiation by addressing a relational construct regarding the outcomes of an interpersonal interaction (Curhan et al., 2006) and has been used to measure relational outcome in previous literature (e.g., De Pauw, Venter, & Neethling, 2011).

Sample items are: "What kind of overall impression did the counterpart make on you?" (1="Extremely negative," 4="Neither negative nor positive," and 7="Extremely positive") "Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with the counterpart?" (1="Not at all," 4="Moderately," and 7="A great deal"). All subjective outcomes were measured in the individual post-negotiation survey, which has been attached as Appendix 4.

Results

Testing Hypothesis 1: Gender differences in distributive negotiation outcomes

Objective negotiation outcomes. Repeated measures analysis of variance

(ANOVA) yielded a significant interaction between gender and negotiation issue type in China, $F(1,58) = 6.06, p < .017, \eta^2 = .10$. No gender difference was found in the total points of the three issues, $F(1,58) = 0.19, p > .66$. However, Chinese men negotiators ($M = 1022, SD = 424.11$) gained significantly less profit than Chinese women negotiators ($M = 1378, SD = 424.11$) on the distributive issue, discount rate, $F(1, 58) = 10.57, p < .002, \eta^2 = .15$. This result means, on the purely distributive issue, women negotiated better than men in China, supporting Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, no gender difference was found in the individual gains on the two integrative issues, financing term, $p > .96$, or delivery time, $p > .53$. The result is illustrated in Figure 3.

Testing Hypothesis 2: Adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping moderates gender effect on distributive negotiation outcomes

Chinese participants' ratings in the pre-negotiation survey indicated one cultural consensus about what is masculine and what is feminine negotiating. The model with one cultural convention ($DIC_1 = 32316.58$) fit the data better than models with two ($DIC_2 = 33088.59$) or three ($DIC_3 = 44630.18$) cultural conventions. Consistent with the pattern in the DIC outcomes, a scree plot of the cue questionnaire data is suggestive of one cultural convention (showed in Figure 4). There was no gender difference in adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping, $p > .36$.

Objective outcomes. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, as shown in Figure 5, regression results showed that the moderation effect of adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping in gender effect on the total points was not

significant, $p > .49$. However, adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping positively moderated gender effect on the pure distributive negotiation issue, discount, $\beta = .88$, $t = 2.16$, $p = .036$, such that the gender gap in the pure distributive negotiation outcome (women better than men) was amplified in individuals with stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping. But adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping did not moderate gender effect on the joint gain, $p > .18$.

To further investigate the specific influence of the adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping, I did a post hoc regression analysis with the predictor as men's and women's adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping on negotiation outcomes. The results showed that for women negotiators, adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping positively predicted their distributive negotiation outcome, such that the more the women negotiators adhere to the cultural conventions in gender stereotyping, the better distributive negotiation outcome (discount) they got, $\beta = .44$, $t = 2.21$, $p = .04$; whereas adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping was not associated with men negotiators' outcome of the purely distributive issue, $p = .45$.

On the other hand, men's adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping positively predicted their joint gain, $\beta = .87$, $t = 6.14$, $p < .001$. No relations between women's adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping and their joint gain were found, $p = .74$. All the regression results are showed in Table 3a and Table 3b.

Subjective outcomes. The linear regression results also yielded significant moderation effects of participants' gender on subjective outcomes: among those who have stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping, gender difference (women > men) in instrumental outcome (e.g., how satisfied the negotiator is with the negotiation outcome) was greater than among those who have lower adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping, $\beta = .97$, $t = 2.20$, $p = .03$. On the other hand, adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping also amplified gender effect (men > women) on relational outcomes (e.g., to what extent the negotiation makes the negotiator trust the other party; how much the negotiator likes the other party), $\beta = 1.00$, $t = 2.33$, $p = .02$.

Discussion

In this study, contrary to the conclusions from previous gender and negotiation literature mainly conducted in the U.S. (e.g., Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), Chinese men negotiators had worse objective outcome of the purely distributive issue, worse instrumental outcome, but better relational outcome than Chinese women negotiators. More importantly, this gender gap in negotiation outcomes was amplified among the individuals who had stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping in China.

To reveal how exactly the adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping drives gender difference in negotiations, I did a post hoc regression analysis and found that women's adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping positively predicted their distributive negotiation outcomes, and men's

adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping positively predicted their joint gains. It is likely because, the requirement of maximizing joint gain over integrative negotiation issues, that is, being both competitive and relational, is exactly congruent with the cultural convention in the stereotyping of masculine negotiating in China: Chinese people categorized competitive goals and behaviors that are socially inappropriate as feminine, but competitive goals and behaviors that are socially appropriate, and cooperative goals and behaviors, as masculine (Shan et al., 2016).

On the other hand, gender differences in joint gains, the outcomes of the integrative issues, and the total points did not vary among individuals with different levels of adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping. Perhaps it is due to different behaviors required for successful distributive and integrative negotiation issues. For distributive negotiation issues, maximizing the economic outcomes over distributive issues requires more aggressive and less relational behaviors such as making aggressive first offers or using tough negotiation strategies (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Hüffmeier et al., 2014). However, profitable negotiating over integrative issues aim to expand the pie, to find agreements that are higher regarding the joint payoff for both sides. Thus, being merely aggressive and self-focused is not productive; neither is it advantageous to only focus on the other side's needs. Dual concern theory (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) suggests that maximizing the economic outcomes over integrative issues requires both a high concern for one's own as well as for the counterpart's interests (Rubin et al., 1994). If there is only a high concern for oneself, as showed by Chinese women's aggressive aspects (Miles, 2010), it may

result in lower joint gains (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006). On the other hand, if there is only a high concern for the other party, as manifested in Chinese men's relational aspects, it may also limit the discovery of integrative solutions by premature accommodating and reluctance to resist yielding (Calhoun & Smith, 1999; De Dreu et al., 2006).

Therefore, the gender differences over integrative negotiation issues and total points which include the outcomes of the integrative issues are less evident in China and are not sensitive to various levels of conventional knowledge in Chinese gender stereotyping. A meta-analytical report of U.S. studies has demonstrated that gender differences (men performing better than women) were more pronounced in distributive as compared with integrative negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). This variance in gender effects between distributive and integrative issues also applies to China in the present research.

Study 2

Study 1 shows that in distributive negotiations, the more negotiators adhere to the cultural convention that men negotiators are relational and women negotiators are aggressive, the more women outperform men in objective outcomes, and the more men perform women in relational outcomes. This finding indicates that the cultural convention in gender stereotyping drives the stereotype-consistent gender differences in negotiation outcomes. Complementing Study 1, Study 2 is designed to provide further evidence for the causal mechanism of gender differences in negotiations by

demonstrating that how men and women negotiate depends on how the situational cultural convention defines gender stereotypes.

In Study 2, participants were exposed to either the cultural convention that generates the gender stereotypes that men negotiators are relational, and women negotiators are aggressive (which is the existing cultural convention in China), or the cultural convention that primes the gender stereotypes that men negotiators are aggressive and women negotiators are relational (which is the American cultural convention). Gender differences were compared across these two experimental groups with such different cultural conventions.

Methodology

Participants

I recruited 142 Chinese (71 men and 71 women) undergraduate and post-graduate students from a large University in Beijing.

Manipulation

Participants were randomly assigned either the cultural convention that emphasizes the importance of relationships or the cultural convention that emphasizes the importance of aggressive negotiating. In the condition of the cultural convention that emphasizes relational negotiating, participants were informed that: “In the refrigerator business, the culture emphasizes the importance of good relations a negotiator builds with the business partner in each negotiation. Therefore, there is a strong convention in favor of building good relationships in negotiations, even sometimes at the expense of a negotiation win over the other. Those who build good

relations with business partners for their firm are considered as successful negotiators, as everyone values relationships building and maintaining in the refrigerator industry.”

In the condition of the cultural convention that emphasizes aggressive negotiating, participants were told that “In the refrigerator business, the culture emphasizes the importance of winning the deal of any negotiations for the firm. Therefore, there is a strong convention in favor of winning the immediate deals in negotiations without any concern for relationship-building. Those who win each deal for their firm in any negotiations are considered as successful negotiators, as everyone values winning any negotiation in the refrigerator industry.”

Manipulation check

After the negotiation, manipulation was checked via the following question: “Which aspect is a successful negotiator in refrigerator industry good at? Building good interpersonal relations / Winning the deals every time/ I am not sure.”

Control variables

Need for closure. Need for closure (NFC) refers to motivation to reach conventional and stable judgments (Kruglanski, 2013). Previous research has suggested that need for closure bolsters the desire to reduce ambiguity in the social context, so individuals with high need for closure are more likely to utilize cultural conventional knowledge as an easily available cue to guide their behaviors than those with lower need for closure (Fu et al., 2007; Gelfand et al., 2012). Individual’s need for closure also affects how people process and react to cultural information in

negotiation contexts (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012a). As a result, it is possible that those with higher need for closure are more likely to behave according to the cultural conventional knowledge that they are exposed to in the experimental condition. Thus, in the present study, I controlled for need for closure in all the analyses. Need for closure was measured with a shortened 15-item scale validated by Roets and Van Hiel (2011). Sample items are “I don't like situations that are uncertain;” “When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.”

Vertical Horizontal Individualism Collectivism. Previous research has suggested that vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism (VHIC) mediate national cultural effect on cooperative decision-making (Chen & Li, 2005) and conflict management styles (Komarraju, Dollinger, & Lovell, 2008). The findings of Essay 1 also indicate that national individualism and collectivism may shape gender differences in negotiation outcomes. As culture is a heterogeneously distributed knowledge that different member accesses and adheres to the core cultural values to a different extent (Adams & Markus, 2004; Atran et al., 2005; Chao et al., 2009; Chiu & Hong, 2005), it is necessary to measure individual values of individualism and collectivism and control for this measure in the analyses. Previous literature also concluded that agency and individualism on the one hand, and communion and collectivism on the other, are synonymous: agency and individualism both represent a focus on the self, whereas communion and collectivism both represent a focus on others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Thus negotiators with higher individualism and

lower collectivism might negotiate better than negotiators with lower individualism and higher collectivism. Considering the limited number of randomly assigned participants ($N = 30$ per cell), there is a possibility that the experimental groups differ in VHIC. To rule out the possibility that it is individual differences in VHIC that causes the difference in negotiation outcomes rather than the experimental manipulation, it is necessary to control for VHIC in the analyses. VHIC was measured by the 16 items (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Sample items are “I’d rather depend on myself than others;” “Winning is everything.”

Other materials, negotiation task, and procedure are the same as Study 1

Results

Two dyads did not reach an agreement, so they were not included in the analysis. Five dyads were deleted because these participants did not pass the manipulation check and they indicated that they did not fully understand the role instruction or they did not pass the filter questions in the post-negotiation survey (e.g., “This item is a tester, please select 4”).

Manipulation check

The manipulation check was successful: among those who were exposed to the cultural convention that emphasizes aggressive negotiating, 82% participants provided the right answer; among those who were exposed to the cultural convention that emphasizes relational negotiating, 94% participants passed the check. It indicates that most participants received the experimental manipulation well.

Hypothesis testing

To test Hypothesis 3, I conducted an ANOVA analysis with manipulated cultural conventions and gender as the independent variables and the objective outcomes as the dependent variable, controlling for VHIC and NFC. No significant interaction between gender and cultural convention was found on the total points, $F(1,117) = .05$, $p = .84$. However, the results yielded a significant interaction of gender and cultural convention on distributive negotiation performance, such that compared to when aggressive negotiating is emphasized in the cultural convention, when relationship is emphasized, Chinese men had worse outcome of the purely distributive issue ($M_{relation} = 1106.00$, $SD_{relation} = 444.74$; $M_{win} = 1253.95$, $SD_{win} = 491.21$), whereas Chinese women had better outcome of the purely distributive issue ($M_{relation} = 1294.00$, $SD_{relation} = 444.74$; $M_{win} = 1146.06$, $SD_{win} = 491.21$), $F(1,117) = 3.90$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 = .03$.

The contrast tests within condition between male and female distributive outcomes indicate that, controlling for VHIC and need for closure, when relationship is emphasized in the cultural conventional knowledge, men had worse outcome of the purely distributive issue than women, $F(1,53) = 4.73$, $p = .03$, $\eta^2 = .08$; when winning the deal is emphasized in the cultural convention, there was no significant gender difference in the outcome of the purely distributive issue, $p = .25$.

No such interaction was found for the joint gains or subjective outcomes, $p > .15$. The results are depicted in Figure 6a and 6b. However, the post hoc contrast tests within condition between male and female subjective outcomes controlling for VHIC, NFC and joint gain indicate that, when the cultural convention emphasizes relations, men ($M = 5.20$, $SD = 1.24$) had better relational outcome than women ($M = 4.77$, SD

= .90), $F(1,53) = 4.603, p = .04, \eta^2 = .08$; when the cultural convention emphasizes winning, men ($M = 4.85, SD = 1.09$) had better instrumental outcome than women ($M = 4.15, SD = 1.27$), $F(1,53) = 4.43, p = .04, \eta^2 = .07$.

When vertical horizontal individualism collectivism and need for closure were not controlled for, the interaction between gender and presented cultural convention was marginally significant over the outcome of the purely distributive issue, $F(1,122) = 3.12, p = .08, \eta^2 = .03$. No such interaction was found for total point, joint gains, or subjective outcomes, $p > .32$. All the results are shown in Table 4.

Discussion

In this study, I manipulated the cultural conventions that implicitly generated different gender stereotypes (as measured in Study 1) and found that whatever the cultural convention emphasizes, men seek for it, and women avoid such gain. Specifically, when the culture convention emphasizes aggressive negotiating (i.e., the content of American masculinity), men had better objective outcomes for the purely distributive issue than women, just like Americans (e.g., Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), whereas when the culture convention emphasizes the importance of relations in negotiation (i.e., the content of Chinese masculinity), men had worse objective outcome for the pure distributive negotiation issue than women.

On the other hand, consistent with Study 1, gender differences in joint gains, the outcomes of the integrative issues, and the total points did not vary across different cultural conventions that generate different gender stereotypes. I believe that it is the same reason that has been discussed in the discussion part of Study 1.

To reveal how exactly the contextual cultural conventional knowledge in gender stereotyping drives gender difference in negotiations, I did a contrast test and found that when the cultural convention emphasizes relations, men had worse outcomes of the purely distributive issue and better relational outcome than women; when the cultural convention emphasizes winning the deal, men had better instrumental outcomes than men. These results further suggest that what the cultural convention emphasizes, men rather than women seek to achieve it.

Discussion

Two studies in the present research altogether demonstrate that cultural convention in gender stereotyping is the key that determines how gender differences manifest in negotiation outcomes, including both objective gains and subjective outcomes.

Theoretical implications

The present research offers several contributions to existing theory and research. Firstly, it is the first to empirically demonstrate the cultural boundary of the gender gap in negotiation research. Previous literature mainly from the U.S. has established a convention that men outperform women in terms of financial gain (e.g., Craver, 2013; Kray & Thompson, 2005; Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), and women can only compensate by building good relations (Kennedy & Kray, 2015). However, the present research tells us that this is not globally generalizable. The results indicate that in China, the gender differences in negotiation outcomes are

reversed compared to in the U.S.: women instead have better objective negotiation outcomes and worse relational outcomes than men.

Secondly, the present research goes beyond showing a cultural comparison to further revealing the black box that works behind such reversed gender gaps across cultures. The results depict the picture of cultural conventional knowledge driving gender differences in negotiations from two complementing perspectives. First, the results of Study 1 indicate that those with stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping in negotiation exhibited greater gender differences in objective and instrumental outcomes (women better than men), compared to the cultural deviants. The results of Study 2 demonstrate that those who were exposed to the default Chinese cultural convention that emphasizes relations and thus defines men as relational exhibited the Chinese pattern of gender gap in negotiations, that is, women outperform men in distributive gains. By contrast, those who were exposed to the opposite cultural convention that emphasizes aggressive negotiating and thus defines men to be aggressive exhibited the opposite pattern of gender gap in negotiations, that is, men outperform women in distributive gains. Two studies altogether tell one story in which those who adhere to or are exposed to the Chinese cultural convention in gender stereotyping would exhibit greater gender gap that women outperform men in negotiations; those who do not adhere to such cultural convention do not exhibit such gender differences; and those who are exposed to the opposite cultural convention exhibit the opposite pattern of gender gaps. In a nutshell, the findings from two studies draw a converging conclusion that cultural conventional knowledge in gender

stereotyping is the driver that shapes the gender gaps in negotiations. In both terms, culture serves as a determinant of the gender gap in both distributive negotiation outcomes and subjective negotiation outcomes.

Thirdly, the present research suggests that we should use different criteria to evaluate negotiation performance of men and women in different cultures. The current research reveals that what successful performance means in a negotiation may be culturally dependent. Traditionally, being successful in a negotiation means achieving more tangible profits. However, different cultures value different things and view success differently. The theory of relational models of negotiation indicates that cultures differ in the emphasis they place on negotiating relationally and the importance of relational outcomes in intra-cultural negotiations (Gelfand et al., 2006; Liu, Friedman, & Hong, 2012b; Ramirez-Marin & Brett, 2011). Individualistic cultures place more value on economic outcomes and devalue relations (Sanchez-Burks, 2005). In individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States), therefore, negotiation tends to be perceived as an impersonal, task-focused conflict creating winners and losers (Brett & Gelfand, 2006; see a review in Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Gelfand et al., 2001; Markus et al., 1996). By contrast, collectivistic cultures place more value on relational exchanges than on economic changes (Namazie & Tayeb, 2006). Regarding outcomes, collectivistic cultures are more likely to emphasize relational outcomes and goals over immediate economic outcome and goals (Gelfand et al., 2006; Li et al., 2010). Thus, in collectivistic cultures, it is interpersonal relationships that produce economic outcomes, not economic outcomes that produce

relationships (Ramirez-Marin & Brett, 2011). And in all cultures, men are better at achieving whatever the cultural convention emphasizes than women. In this sense, “men are better negotiators than women” indeed applies in each culture, but in terms of different definitions of “good negotiator.” In the U.S., the successful negotiator is supposed to achieve good objective negotiation outcome, whereas, in China, the successful negotiator is expected to gain good relational outcomes. So in China, although women win at the aspect of financial performance, but lose in more important matters, that is, the relational outcomes.

Practical implications

Relatedly, the present research also contributes to negotiation and organization practice in three aspects. Firstly, at the individual level, negotiators must know that accurate cultural conventional knowledge can help them gain the negotiation outcomes that are valued by the societal culture. By contrast to the U.S., in China, the most important thing is to build relationship rather than winning the deal because relationship can be transferred to ultimate financial gain in the long term (Wong et al., 2007). Thus, international negotiators must learn such cultural conventional knowledge before they start a business negotiation with people in different cultures. Westerners may also mis-stereotype Chinese women and men in negotiation if lacking such cultural conventional knowledge.

Secondly, at the organizational level, these results suggest that among those who had stronger adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping, the gender

gap in both distributive and subjective outcomes became greater. It means that conventional knowledge can create culturally-rewarded gain in negotiations for different genders. As an application, managers can train international negotiators to be more culturally competent by teaching them the relevant cultural knowledge. After acquiring the cultural conventional knowledge in a specific society, negotiators can adjust their behaviors according to such knowledge and thus achieve the success that the company emphasizes. In addition, managers can also select and send different genders to the business negotiation with different cultures depending on which goal they want to achieve and which aspect the culture emphasizes, relational or economic.

Thirdly, the present research also offers implications to promote macro-level gender equality. It adds our knowledge that in different industrial cultures, the manifestation of gender gap can vary depending on the given conventional knowledge that produces different gender stereotypes. More specifically, men succeed more than women on the outcomes that the culture emphasizes, but women outperform men on the outcomes that the culture does not emphasize. As it stands, aiming to promote gender parity in China, organizational managers can create a certain organizational culture that deemphasizes relations to generate a new gender stereotype that women can be relational. In this way, women dare to be relational and seek for relational outcomes.

Fourthly, although there is no data collected from other cultures than China, in the present study, it would be theoretically relevant to identify whether Chinese are overall better or worse negotiators than people from other cultures at the national

level. Research shows inconsistent comparison results of negotiation outcome between Chinese negotiators and Western negotiators. For example, Liu et al. (2012b) found that Chinese negotiators focused too much on relationship and thus had worse joint gains than American negotiators only when negotiating with an in-group member plus under high accountability. Some studies found no cultural difference in either joint gain or individual gain between Chinese people and the Americans or the Canadians in the intercultural negotiation settings (Liu et al., 2012b; Ma, 2007). Semnani-Azad and Adair (2011) found that Chinese negotiators claimed and created more values than Canadian negotiators in intra-cultural negotiations. Leung, Chan, Lai, and Ngai (2011) found that in China, managers of multi-national companies (MNCs) are at a disadvantage in negotiating outcomes with their Chinese counterparts when compared to local competitors because the local Chinese managers use *guanxi* network in negotiations, but MNE managers perceive that cultural practices such as *guanxi* are problematic. Although empirical research has not drawn a conclusion the cultural comparison of negotiation outcome between Chinese people and people from other cultures, the existing research points to an important moderator, that is, the relational or non-relational context. Future research could study the moderating effect of this factor and see if, in non-relational context, the agentic Chinese women will contribute to the overall performance of Chinese negotiators as compared to people from other cultures.

Limitations

As in all studies, there were limitations with respect to the present studies and could be addressed in future research. Firstly, in the current research, I did not include the behavioral coding in the negotiation process. Future research can code the negotiation behaviors and strategies that directly lead to good or bad objective and subjective outcomes, to provide practical suggestions for women about how to improve their relational outcome in China. Future research can also address the processes that influence how men and women negotiators in Chinese cultures weigh relational concerns.

Secondly, the samples used in the present two studies consisted of undergraduate students who have limited work experience and negotiation experience, but the simulated negotiation in the lab is a professional buyer-supplier negotiation. It is important to note, however, that prior studies of culture find similar results using samples of students and adult employees (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011b) and that the students samples comprised senior-level undergraduate and graduate students with years of work experience. It suggests that the use of student participants is not a significant limitation of this research. I will also address this issue in Essay 3 by recruiting practitioner negotiators in the field.

Thirdly, although I operationalized culture using both individual difference measures by CCT and by manipulating the cultural conventions, I only sampled individuals from China, which somewhat limits the generalizability of the effects to other cultures (e.g., North America and Europe). I will address this issue by collaborating with American and Israeli researchers to demonstrate that culture drives

gender differences within and across cultures. It is possible that people in Western cultures would show the same pattern of results with different manifestation of gender gap. This is an empirical question that future research would have to address.

Fourthly, although the present paper shows the consequence of individual adherence to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping in negotiations, it was not able to examine the motivation for people to follow such cultural conventions. To identify why some individuals are following and why others are cultural deviants, future research can motivate individuals to behave normatively or counter-normatively by showing the difference and similarity between their personal values and their cultural conventional values (Kreuzbauer, Chiu, Lin, & Bae, 2014; Savani, Wadhwa, Uchida, Ding, & Naidu, 2015).

Lastly, the current research was not able to capture how Chinese women could enjoy both economic and relational outcomes at the same time. As suggested by Kennedy and Kray (2015), the trade-off between economic and relational goals is not a must. However, it is hard to be accomplished in Chinese culture, where by default, negotiation is a highly relational context. It is because Gelfand et al. (2006) theorized that negotiating parties who are both high in relational self-construal accessibility should be less effective at creating high economic outcomes yet at the same time more effective at fostering relational outcome. Gelfand et al.'s proposition that focusing on relationships reduces negotiating efficiency is consistent with dual concern theory (Rubin et al., 1994) and supported by results of several previous studies and theoretical reviews (e.g., Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Fry, Firestone,

& Williams, 1983; McGinn, Neale, & Mannix, 1995; Schoeninger & Wood, 1969).

And a follow-up research also showed that highly relational contexts could drive economic and relational outcomes in opposite directions (Curhan et al., 2008). In Chinese culture, the negotiation context is a highly relational context, and the relational self-construal of Chinese people is higher than American people (Bresnahan, Chiu, & Levine, 2004). Therefore, in China, there is an assumption that relational and objective outcomes would be negatively correlated. However, this can be a very promising topic to study in the future. Future studies can try to answer the million-dollar question of “How can Chinese women accomplish both economic and relational outcomes simultaneously.”

Conclusion

Despite these limitations, the current research made a significant contribution to research on negotiations by demonstrating that cultural conventional knowledge in gender stereotypes is the causal mechanism that drives and shapes the manifestations of gender gap in both objective and subjective outcomes in distributive negotiations.

ESSAY 3

Backlash against men and women in buyer-supplier negotiation:

Depends on the organizational culture

Abstract

Extending prior findings, Essay 3 shows that cultural conventions in gender stereotyping do not only influence how people negotiate but also how others react to negotiator's relational and aggressive negotiating behavior by demonstrating that the amount of backlash depends on the organizational type. Organizational type indicates whether the organization's practices are more closely aligned with general national norms. I conducted an online experiment among the negotiation practitioners in the real world. The results indicate that the practitioners whose frequent customers work in SOEs gave the greatest backlash toward the aggressive men and women, and gave greater backlash against the relational women than against the non-relational women, but did not differ in the backlash against the relational and non-relational man; however, for the practitioners whose frequent customers work in MNCs, this backlash pattern was not found. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Introduction

Essay 2 demonstrates that it is cultural conventional knowledge that drives the gender differences in both economic and subjective, especially relational outcomes in distributive negotiations. Extending the conclusion of Essay 2, Essay 3 aims to further demonstrate that cultural conventional knowledge does not only influence the various negotiation outcomes but also how negotiation counterparts react to negotiators during and after negotiation. Meanwhile, Essay 2 also shows that exposure to different cultural conventional knowledge can change the pattern of gender differences in business to business negotiations. To extend this finding, Essay 3 also aims at demonstrating that the culture and gender interaction has downstream effects which are contingent on the cultural values of organizational context.

Backlash refers to social and economic reprisals in terms of negative evaluation and treatment towards an individual who behaves counter stereotypically (Rudman 1998). Backlash is known to cause sabotage in many organizational contexts (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Therefore, studying backlash sheds lights on understanding the struggles faced by women in stereotypically masculine domains that require counter-stereotypical behaviors to succeed, and helps women to succeed in these domains without being socially disapproved (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013b).

When women violate gender roles, they suffer backlash in the form of negative evaluations and treatment (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). Considerable research based on the data collected in the United States showed that agentic or aggressive rather than communal or relational women are more likely to receive both social and work

penalization than agentic men in organizations (e.g., Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Previous theories on backlash suggest a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” effect for only women negotiators in the United States (Catalyst, 2007). For example, past research has shown that women suffered more backlash than men for using assertive or aggressive language (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013b).

But this effect can be qualitatively different on both men and women negotiators who violate their gender stereotypes in the Chinese culture. Because Chinese women negotiators are stereotyped as aggressive and thus are “OK” to negotiate aggressively, while men are expected to be relational in B2B negotiation (Shan et al., 2016), relational women and aggressive men are instead stereotype violators. Given the reversed gender stereotypes in China in negotiation context, this essay tries to answer the following questions: 1) What are the backlash effects in Chinese culture? 2) How do people view and react to a woman in China if she challenges women’s gender stereotypes and seeks for better relational outcomes?

While answering these questions, the current work also aims to reveal the boundary effect of societal cultural influence by focusing on two different types of organizations in China. The rapid economic growth and globalization in China have attracted multinational companies (MNCs) to enter the world's largest emerging economy, which was dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for decades. MNCs and SOEs have been found to adhere to the Chinese conventional culture at significantly different levels, such that the organizational culture of SOEs strongly

adhere to the conventional cultural values in China while the organizational culture of MNCs does not (Cooke, 2008; Giacobbe-Miller, Miller, Zhang, & Victorov, 2003; Ralston, Terpstra - Tong, Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006). This polar difference in organizational cultures has a great impact on how the managers in MNC and the managers in SOE perceive the importance of relations in negotiation context (Leung et al., 2011). Hence, I propose that the organizational type, MNC vs. SOE, will further moderate the backlash effects in negotiations. By revealing the backlash patterns in China and this key moderator, organizational type, the current research provides insights for understanding how the role of gender in negotiations in China creates conditions that help or hurt women's career advance, as an alternative solution for promoting gender equality in China.

In addition, I chose practitioner negotiators to participate in this study for the following reasons. Professional negotiators are generally too busy to participate in research projects, which is invariably the case in experimental negotiation research (Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, & Thompson, 1994). Because it is difficult to recruit professionals to participate in negotiation research projects (Moore & Murnighan, 1999), most empirical negotiation research relies on student samples (Agndal, 2007; Ramsay, 2004). Research showed that only 3 percent of empirical negotiation-related studies are based on the experience of practitioner negotiators (Buelens, Van De Woestyne, Mestdagh, & Bouckennooghe, 2008). At the same time, observers have long noted a considerable gap between organizational research findings and management practices (Rynes, Bartunek, & Daft, 2001). A possible reason for the divide is the

withdrawal of researchers from field studies back into laboratory experiments and the excessive use of student participants in such laboratory manipulations (Anderson, Herriot, & Hodgkinson, 2001). To address this issue, in Essay 3, I chose to recruit the real-world salespeople, who are professional negotiators.

Theory and Hypothesis Development

Existing Theories of Gender and Backlash in Negotiation in Western Cultures

The Western literature argues that the relational gender stereotypes of women set women negotiators at a disadvantage while the agentic gender stereotype of men results in an advantage for men negotiators (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Miles, 2010). Specifically, as some scholars (e.g., Kray et al., 2002b; Riley, 2001) pointed out, the behavioral pattern required for successful negotiation is congruent with the stereotype and gender role of men, such as assertive, competitive, aggressive (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), and ambitious (Miles, 2010), but conflicting with the gender stereotype and the communal or relational gender stereotypes of women (Broverman et al., 1972; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). These gender stereotypes and the consistent gender differences permeate all aspects of the negotiation process for both sexes (Kray & Thompson, 2005) by inevitably (Devine, 1989) eliciting gender to be salient in pre-negotiation process (i.e., expecting less negotiation outcome, Kaman & Hartel, 1994) and negotiating process, and evokes gender-stereotypic behavior (Bowles et al., 2005).

Based on the descriptive stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), women are expected to be relational, whereas men are expected to be

aggressive (Eckes, 2002; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Expectancy Violation Theory (Burgoon, Stern, & Dillman, 2007) predicts that the behaviors that confirm these expectations are received more favorably than the counter-stereotypical behaviors. More importantly, it creates greater self-presentational concerns only for women but not for men in negotiations. It is because men who behave cooperatively create positive expectancy violations and thus are surprisingly welcomed (Heilman & Chen, 2005), trusted (Olekalns & Smith, 2005) and perform well (Burgoon, Stern, & Dillman, 1995), whereas women who behave aggressively produce negative expectancy violations, and thus are distrusted and disliked (Kulik & Olekalns, 2012; Olekalns & Smith, 2005).

Gender roles suggest not only prescriptions but also proscriptions, such as negative feminine characterizations of weakness and gullibility (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Research has demonstrated that non-assertive, other-advocating women suffer a leadership backlash (for example, lower presumed competency) because their behavior is associated with the high negative feminine and low positive masculine characterizations (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013).

Stereotypically warm women negotiators were also evaluated as gullible and thus received more deceptions from their counterparts than non-warm women (Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014). As it stands, Western women face a “damned if they do and damned if they don’t (Catalyst, 2007)” dilemma on negotiation table: if they behave in accordance with their gender stereotype and role of women, they will get despised, whereas if they behave in a counter-stereotypical way, they will receive

backlash. This impression management dilemma exclusively against women severely undermines gender parity by causing negative consequence for women's leadership in organizational contexts (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). For instance, in a distinctly masculine arena (e.g., financial planning), women who are acknowledged to have been successful were less liked and even more personally derogated than equivalently successful men, and these negative evaluations decreased subsequent recommendations for organizational reward allocation for women (Heilman et al., 2004). In negotiation context which has been understood as a masculine domain (e.g., Kray et al., 2001a; Kray et al., 2002b; Riley, 2001), the dilemma even magnifies its influence for women negotiators. Specifically, assertive, self-advocating women negotiators suffered a social backlash (e.g., being disliked), and nonassertive, other-advocating suffered a competence backlash (i.e., lower presumed competency), whereas men negotiators did not suffer any backlash consequences in any condition (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013b).

Culture Determines the Gender Difference in Backlash Received

By contrary, in highly collectivistic cultures such as China, gender roles and stereotypes are reversed that women are stereotyped as agentic and men are stereotyped as communal (Cuddy et al., 2015; Shan et al., 2016). According to the Expectancy Violance Theory (Burgoon et al., 2007), therefore, it may be the relational women who would incur more backlash than aggressive women in China. Some indirect evidence supports this notion. Research showed that interpersonal relationship (i.e., *guanxi*, as a powerful and important capital in China, is viewed as

masculine and instrumental (Xu & Li, 2014). Tensions arise when Chinese women dare to challenge the hegemonic expectations for appropriately gendered behavior, that is running *guanxi* (Xu & Li, 2014). Women feel challenged when utilizing *guanxi*, as they are more likely to refer to *guanxi* as “crude instrumentalism” and “coercive generosity” (Yang, 1994). It is because the relational behaviors involved in building good *guanxi* are opposite to the content of gender stereotypes of women in China (Shan et al., 2016). As a result, the violation of this social expectation, such as frequently engaging in the practice of *guanxi*, usually incurs a bad reputation for women in China (Yang, 1994; Zhang, 2006). That is why Chinese women are less likely than men to use *guanxi* (i.e., interpersonal relations) to gain capital compared to Chinese men, and therefore, *guanxi* comprises a more significant proportion of the overall capital obtained by men than by women (Hussain, Scott, Harrison, & Millman, 2010).

Effects of Different Types of Organizations Where the Negotiator Works

However, the influence of Chinese culture on backlash effects may have a boundary effect. Research has found that the organizational context, such as organizational type, can mitigate the national effects by providing alternative cultural knowledge. For example, societal culture is unlikely to have a strong effect on outcomes in a multinational company with a strong organizational culture (Gelfand et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2011a). Scholars have argued that culture exerts influences on individual behaviors through multiple layers that consist of various levels nested within each other from the most macro-level of national cultures, organizational

cultures, to the cultural knowledge at the individual level (Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005). People from different kinds of organizations may share some common values of their national culture but vary in their local organizational cultures, which are shaped by the type of industry, the headquarter's national culture, as well as the values of the founders and owners (Leung et al., 2005). Additionally, research has also demonstrated that the relative success of individual-level strategy sets depends on the organizational culture, particularly on the culture's relative emphasis on agentic versus communal behaviors (Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Kabanoff, 1991). Applying the principle that the stereotypes of men go aligned with the core cultural values (Cuddy et al., 2015) and that exposure to different cultural conventions can alter gender differences in negotiations (Essay 2), it is reasonable to infer that chronological exposure to different organizational cultures may also create different conventional knowledge in gender stereotyping and different backlash patterns in negotiations.

Therefore, organizational culture has the potential to influence how people react to men and women negotiators who violate their gender roles. According to the literature, Chinese employees in MNCs are more chronically exposed to both local and foreign cultures and management styles, whereas the inherent mindset of SOEs implicitly prevents the promotion of foreign cultural influence as it may be considered as a betrayal of the past and an admittance of internal failure (Cooke, 2008). Research has also shown that SOEs indeed adhere to Chinese cultural values more than other organizational types in China by having a higher hierarchical organizational culture (Ralston et al., 2006), in which maintaining good relations is supremely important

(Hong & Engeström, 2004). *Guanxi* has also been demonstrated to be more important in SOEs than any other types of enterprises (Luo, Huang, & Wang, 2012). By contrast, the organizational culture of MNCs may lack the opportunity to establish a shared set of values and norms regarding the importance of interpersonal relations (Roth & Kostova, 2003). This difference may cause the difference in negotiations. For example, the B2B negotiators who work for MNCs tend to value the importance of economic negotiation outcomes in terms of profits, which is contradictory to SOE's emphasis on relational negotiation outcomes (Leung et al., 2011). *Guanxi* practices like gift giving were even perceived to be controversial by the MNC managers in buyer and supplier relations (Millington, Eberhardt, & Wilkinson, 2005). Given this significant organizational cultural difference in the emphasis in relations between SOEs and MNCs, Chinese women who use relational approach to negotiation would violate their gender roles and thus get more backlash than the non-relational women in SOEs but not in MNCs. In the meantime, in the SOE context, Chinese men would not get any backlash by using relational or non-relational negotiation styles, due to the positive violation expectancy effect (Burgoon, Stern, & Dillman, 2007).

In previous negotiation research, agentic behavior has been operationalized as negotiator assertiveness or aggressiveness (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Hannah Riley et al., 2007). An aggressive women negotiator would incur more backlash than an aggressive man negotiator (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013b). Because Chinese people categorize masculinity as relational and femininity as aggressive in negotiations (Shan et al., 2016), aggressive men negotiators are considered to violate

their gender stereotypes. However, it is unlikely that Chinese practitioner participants would strike more backlash against aggressive men than aggressive women. This is because Chinese culture emphasizes the importance of relations in negotiation context (Shan et al., 2016). In China, if a negotiator adopts an aggressive negotiating style, he or she has already been considered as culturally counter-normative and seen as arrogant and offensive (Ma & Jaeger, 2010). Then no matter men or women, such negotiators will receive the most backlash.

Based on the literature review and the theory above, I expect that:

Hypothesis 1: Participant's organizational type will interact with the target's gender and the target's negotiating style on the amount of backlash received. Specifically, (H1a) if the negotiation practitioners work in SOEs, both aggressive men and aggressive women will receive greater backlash than the other styles, and (H1b) if the negotiation practitioners work in SOEs, relational women will receive greater backlash than non-relational women, but the amount of backlash against relational men and non-relational men will not differ; (H1c) for the negotiation practitioners who work in MNCs, this backlash pattern will be less apparent.

Effects of Different Types of Organizations Where the Negotiator's Frequent Buyer Customers Work

The theory above has focused on the direct effect of the focal negotiator's (i.e., the sales people as the participants who gave backlash in the experiment) organizational type on the gender and backlash effects in negotiations. Nevertheless, besides the focal negotiator's organizational culture, the negotiator's frequent buyer customer's

organizational culture is also likely to influence the gender and backlash effects. The literature has paid little attention to this specific question so far. But theories from intercultural negotiation literature can help predict and explain how negotiator's frequent customer's organizational culture can influence the negotiators' evaluation and treatment towards their counterparts.

In the intercultural negotiation, negotiators from different cultures have significantly different expectations about what it is like to negotiate with the other, and thus have different assumptions about appropriate behaviors (Adair, Taylor, & Tinsley, 2009). So intercultural negotiators often adjust their behaviors and perceptions to fit the counterpart's cultural values (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001). This clash occurs not because negotiators stay anchored on their knowledge about negotiating in their own culture, but rather because they try to adjust to their counterpart's cultural knowledge about negotiating (Adair et al., 2009). In other words, when intercultural negotiators adapt, they are more likely to use the cultural knowledge of the other party's than the cultural knowledge of their own culture.

The negotiations between different types of organizations that adopt different organizational cultures are by nature inter-cultural negotiations. In inter-firm transactions in the real world, it is possible that the negotiators negotiate with people who work for other types of negotiations. For example, people who work in SOE may often negotiate with people who work in MNCs (e.g., Leung et al., 2011). In this case, transplanting the findings in inter-cultural negotiations (Francis, 1991), negotiators may also adjust their mental models in response to each other's organizational culture,

using their stereotypes about each other's organizational culture determined by the organizational type. Because negotiators have acquired experience from previous negotiations they have frequently conducted, they have formed a knowledge base on what kind of cultural knowledge to be used when facing their frequent buyer customers.

Based on the theory above, relational women violate their gender roles only in SOE contexts but not in MNC contexts. Thus, when controlling what types of organizations the participants work for, if their frequent buyer customers are from SOE, they will give more backlash against relational women than non-relational women. And the rest of interaction patterns in SOE context should be the same with the Hypothesis 1. However, if their frequent buyer customers are from MNCs, this interaction effect would not be that apparent. Therefore, I expect that:

Hypothesis 2: Participant's organizational type will interact with the target's gender and the target's negotiating style on the amount of backlash received. Specifically, (H2a) when the negotiation practitioners' frequent customers work in SOEs, both aggressive men and aggressive women will receive greater backlash than the other styles, and (H2a) when the negotiation practitioners' frequent customers work in SOEs, relational women will receive greater backlash than non-relational women, but the amount of backlash against relational men and non-relational men will not differ; however, (H2c) for the negotiation practitioners whose frequent customers work in MNCs, this backlash pattern will be less apparent.

Methodology

Participants

I recruited 919 real-world salespeople who are negotiation practitioners from China via an online outsourcing platform, Sojump. There were 541 men, 377 women, and 1 chose the gender as “other,” with an average age at 32.7. A breakdown of sample size in each cell is described in Table 5.

Procedure

A scenario spanning five rounds of a buyer-supplier negotiation revised from the research by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013b) was used to collect data on how buyer and supplier employees react to the different behavioral styles of negotiators based on gender. I manipulated target negotiator sex (men vs. women), and negotiation style (aggressive vs. non-relational vs. relational), yielding a 2 *3 between-subjects design. In all conditions, participants are instructed to envision themselves in the role of a business development manager (the seller role) in a buyer-supplier negotiation. Participants experienced the negotiation round by round. They read their offer and the negotiator’s counteroffer (which are static across conditions) and then clicked to the next screen to advance to the next round of the negotiation. This continued for five rounds. After going through all five rounds of the exchange, participants were then asked how they would interact with the target negotiator in social and business contexts as the backlash measurements.

Hypothesis Variables

IV-Gender of target negotiator. Participants were randomly assigned to a scenario detailing a negotiation against “张帅” (a common man’s name in Chinese) or “张丽” (a common woman’s name in Chinese).

IV-Negotiation style. Negotiator’s negotiation style was manipulated using scripts previously developed and pre-tested by Amanatullah and Morris (2010). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which the negotiator behaves either in an aggressive, polite but non-relational, or relational way during the negotiation. In each round of the negotiation, two statements were presented as direct quotations from the target negotiator, one responding to the business development manager’s offer and the other justifying the negotiator’s next counteroffer, for a total of eight statements manipulated based on negotiation style. The aggressive style condition used adjectives such as “insulting” and “unreasonable” in response to the manager’s offer, and the baseline condition (i.e., polite, but non-relational) used phrases such as “I appreciate that offer” and “thank you” to demonstrate softness, and the relational condition used words such as “I fully understand your perspective” and “you know the last thing I would do is to hurt our partnership.” When making counteroffers, aggressive negotiators used threats such as “may be forced to accept alternative offers from another company” and “refuse to buy it at this price,” whereas polite but non-relational negotiators make more gentle statements, such as, “I was hoping you might find this salary reasonable,” and relational negotiators make long-term relationship-oriented statements, such as “I will owe you a debt of gratitude as I

develop this relationship” and “I will owe you a debt of gratitude as I develop this relationship.”

Moderator. There are two moderators including the participants’ organizational types, and the organizational type of participants’ frequent buyer customers in their sales work, including SOE and MNC.

DV-Backlash. Backlash was measured by items developed by Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013b), capturing social-based sanctions (e.g., “How interested would you be in interacting socially with XX?”) and business backlash (e.g., “How would you like to keep doing business with XX?” “How does this negotiation make you trust XX in the future?”). All responses vary on a scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“Extremely”), so a lower score represents a greater backlash.

Control Variables

Need for closure. Need for closure refers to motivation to reach conventional and stable judgments (Kruglanski, 2013). Previous research has suggested that high need for closure would inhibit the negotiator from using the other party’s cultural knowledge to develop his own mental models (Liu et al., 2012a). To eliminate the potential influence of this epistemic motivational factor, I controlled for need for closure in all the analyses. Need for closure was measured with a shortened 15-item scale validated by Roets and Van Hiel (2011). Sample items are “I don't like situations that are uncertain;” “When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.”

Manipulation Check

I measured perceptions after each round using ratings on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “Extremely”) of the negotiator’s: aggressiveness, personalness, and relation-orientation. As another manipulation check, after the whole experiment, I also measured the perceptual intention of the negotiators based on the concept of relational negotiating on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “Extremely”) (Gelfand et al., 2006): “to what extent do you think the negotiator intend to do?” on five aspects to check the relational negotiation style: Develop mutual trust; develop mutual liking; demonstrate that s/he understands your perspective; commit to continuing the relationship; make use of personal relationship to sweeten the deal.

All the materials can be found in Appendix 5.

Results

Manipulation Check

To test the manipulation of aggressive, non-relational, and relational negotiation style, I used a repeated measures ANOVA with participants’ ratings of the negotiator’s aggressiveness, personalness, vs. relation-orientation after each round as the within-subjects repeated measure, and negotiation style (aggressive vs. non-relational vs. relational) as the between-subjects independent variables. Results showed a significant main effect for negotiation style, $F(2,916) > 32.45, p < .001$. Negotiation counterparts in the aggressive condition ($M = 3.58, SD = .81$) were characterized as significantly more aggressive than negotiators in the baseline condition ($M = 3.11, SD = .77$) and the relational condition ($M = 3.10, SD = .79$).

Negotiation counterparts in the relational condition (Personalness: $M= 2.88$, $SD= .75$; Relational orientation: $M= 2.98$, $SD= .76$) were characterized as significantly more personal and relation-oriented than negotiators in the baseline condition (Personalness: $M= 2.42$, $SD= 0.73$; Relational orientation: $M= 2.35$, $SD= 0.77$), which were rated as more personal and relation-oriented than negotiators in the aggressive condition (Personalness: $M= 2.42$, $SD= .73$; Relational orientation: $M= 2.35$, $SD= .76$).

In addition, to test the relational negotiation style was perceived as relational, I had participants rate to what extent the perceived intention of the negotiator is relational. The ANOVA results showed that the counterpart's intention in relational condition ($M = 3.61$, $SD= 0.66$) was significantly more relational than the counterpart's intention in the baseline condition ($M= 3.39$, $SD= 0.68$) and aggressive condition ($M= 2.91$, $SD= .88$), $F(2,916) = 71.94$, $p = .00$.

Hypothesis Testing: Participant's Own Organizational Type

To test Hypothesis 1—whether participants' own organizational types influences their backlash against male and female negotiators with different negotiation styles—I subjected the social and business backlash measures to an ANOVA with gender of negotiator (male vs. female), and negotiation style (aggressive vs. non-relational vs. relational) as the independent variables, and the organizational type of the participants' frequent customers and NFC as the control variables. Gender main effects were insignificant, $p = .65$. There were no two-way interactions, either. The three-way interaction of gender of negotiator, negotiation style, and participants' organizational types was insignificant, $p = .59$. Thus, hypothesis 1 is not supported.

Hypothesis Testing: Participants' Frequent Buyer Customer's Organizational Type

To test Hypothesis 2—whether organizational types of participants' frequent buyer customers influences participants' backlash against men and women negotiators with different negotiation styles—I subjected the backlash measures to an ANOVA with organizational types of participants' frequent customer (MNC vs. SOE), gender of negotiator (men vs. women), and negotiation style (aggressive vs. non-relational vs. relational) as the independent variables, and participants' own organizational type and NFC as the control variables. Consistent with H2, ANOVA analysis yielded a marginally significant interaction between target's gender, target's negotiation style, and organizational style of participants' frequent buyer customer on business backlash (e.g., “How would you like to keep doing business with XX?”), $F(2,678) = 2.78, p = .06, \eta^2 = .01$. When not considering the aggressive negotiation style of the counterpart and only comparing the non-relational and relational style, the three-way interaction was more significant, $F(2,460) = 6.00, p = .015, \eta^2 = .01$. This interaction effect is depicted in Figure 7. The effects on social backlash were not significant.

To better understand the interaction, I conducted multiple pairwise mean comparisons between experimental conditions under one single organizational type of the participants' frequent buyer customers. The results showed that only the participants whose frequent buyer customers work in SOEs differed in their backlash against the women negotiator with different negotiation styles. They gave greatest business backlash against the aggressive woman negotiator ($M = 4.39, SD = 1.56$), with significant difference from the relational woman negotiator, $p = .01, p_{\text{Bonferroni}}$

= .04, and the non-relational woman negotiator, $p = .00$, $p_{\text{Bonferroni}} = .00$; and they gave greater business backlash against the relational woman negotiator ($M = 5.01$, $SD = 1.25$) than against the non-relational woman negotiator ($M = 5.73$, $SD = 1.11$), $p = .003$, $p_{\text{Bonferroni}} = .01$. However, the participants whose frequent buyer customers work in SOEs gave the same amount of backlash against the non-relational ($M = 5.35$, $SD = 1.07$) and relational man ($M = 5.38$, $SD = 1.21$); and they gave the greatest backlash against the aggressive man ($M = 4.60$, $SD = 1.60$), $ps < .003$.

On the other hand, among the participants whose frequent buyer customers work in MNC, there was no difference between the backlash against the aggressive, non-relational, and relational woman and man negotiator, $p > .25$. These results are illustrated in Figure 8.

Discussion

Essay 3 extends my prior empirical research by showing a downstream effect of gender stereotypes in China on women negotiators and by demonstrating the boundary effects that not all organizations in China have consistent backlash patterns, as some do not adhere to the Chinese cultural conventions. The results revealed that organizational type of negotiation practitioners' frequent buyer customers determined how negotiation practitioners react against the target negotiator: sellers whose frequent buyer customers work in SOEs were more likely to engage in backlash against relational women compared to polite but non-relational women, whereas the backlash of negotiation practitioners whose frequent buyer customers work in MNCs

did not depend on the target negotiator's gender. On the other hand, the participants' own organizational type did not have any effects on the backlash pattern across different experimental conditions.

The results deviate from all previous negotiation research on gender and backlash conducted in the U.S. For example, Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013b) showed that the aggressive negotiation style is the condition that causes the differences in backlash against men and women negotiators. However, the current findings indicate that it is the relational negotiation style that causes gender differentiation in receiving backlash. It is because in American culture, being agentic and assertive reflects the core cultural values of individualism (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Thus it describes men's gender roles and women who behave like that get punished (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). By contrast, Chinese culture emphasizes relations instead and thus being relational is considered masculine (Shan et al., 2016). So relational women get punished, and relational men are welcome in the context of Chinese culture. In China, if a negotiator adopts an aggressive negotiating style, which is culturally counter-normative and seen as arrogant and offensive (Ma & Jaeger, 2010), then no matter men or women, such negotiators would receive the most severe backlash, as shown in the present results.

It is notable that the focal participants' organizational type did not influence the backlash effects. The backlash pattern was only affected by the organizational type of the negotiation practitioners' frequent buyer customers. A potential reason for this phenomenon is: People refer to their frequent buyer customers' organizational culture to guide their actual penalizing behaviors, rather than using their own cultural

knowledge formed in their own organizations. This is consistent with the literature findings that intercultural negotiators adjust their behaviors and perceptions to fit the counterpart's cultural values (Adair et al., 2001) because, during the intercultural negotiating, they use their counterpart's cultural knowledge about negotiating to guide their own behaviors (Adair et al., 2009).

In the field sample in the current study, there are many cases in which the sellers and their frequent buyer customers do not share the same organizational cultures. For example, a negotiator from an SOE is not likely to act in terms of actual punishment against a woman gender-role violator from an MNC, because the SOE negotiator knows that the MNC negotiator may have an excuse to behave according to her own organizational culture that being relational is OK for women. However, when giving backlash against someone who violates the gender roles of their own organizational culture, in the focal negotiator's mind, there is no such excuse, and thus she deserves the punishment.

Theoretical Contributions

As the first to examine gender and backlash effects in Chinese culture, the present work provides a new theoretical outlook on when gender role expectations influence impression formation. The organizational context moderates gendered expectations for women. This suggests that while the content of gender role expectations may be relatively fixed within a national culture, the application of those expectations depends on the situational context of organizational culture. Perceivers may interpret the same behavior exhibited by a target individual as confirming or violating gender

role expectations based on the organizational context or the negotiation context.

Negotiation researchers in the future can identify more other organizational contexts in which the national cultural effects are overridden.

The present research contributes specifically to gender and negotiation research by showing that organizational type, as an indicator of to what extent the organizational culture adheres to the national cultural convention, shapes how practitioners react to negotiation counterparts. Organizational context has been under-studied in gender and negotiation research (Kolb, 2012). By locating the research of how negotiator's gender plays out in backlash effects in different organizational contexts, we will be in a better position to understand cultural effects in gender and negotiation research. I believe that the theoretical reason working behind is that SOEs provide a clear cultural convention regarding gender stereotypes and MNCs do not. The institutional literature on MNC tells us that the cultural knowledge in MNCs is shaped by the combination of the cultural knowledge of the host country and the cultural knowledge of the headquarter country, and this may result in a differentiated and even fragmented knowledge system (Kostova, Athanassiou, & Berdrow, 2004). In China, MNC contexts have this combined cultural knowledge of both local and foreign cultures, whereas SOE contexts implicitly prevent the promotion of foreign cultural influence (Cooke, 2008) and thus more adhere to the cultural convention of China (Ralston et al., 2006). This has theoretical implications for global business.

More broadly, the present research also offers insight into gender roles and the behaviors that trigger backlash. The finding that relational women receive more

backlash compared to non-relational women only in SOE context but not in MNC context suggests that backlash is not about women's behavior per se, but rather about the fit of that behavior with the situational context, which cues role expectations. It is also notable that both aggressive men and women got severe backlash in SOE context but not in MNC context. Previous literature only focused on the backlash against the gender role violators, especially women. However, the current research suggests that backlash is about more than just punishing women, but to reinforcing cultural conventions by penalizing whoever violate the established cultural convention, in both gender area and broader cultural context. In China, the broader cultural context is a relational context. Therefore, both the aggressive men and women who violate the relational cultural convention got serious backlash. As such, it is worth considering backlash more broadly in future research. Future research can investigate whether the backlash against Chinese women may be alleviated in the contexts where agentic behaviors are culturally valued and thus feminine behaviors fit the core cultural values. Future research also benefits from studying the motivational mechanism of giving backlash in terms of reinforcing or maintaining the existing cultural convention.

The present study also contributes to the methodology of negotiation research by incorporating both real-world practitioner sample and experimental design. Essay 3 departs from a traditional investigation of gender and negotiation using university students by recruiting the real-world practitioners who work in the buyer and supplier negotiation field. This increases the ecological validity of the conclusions and sheds lights on how negotiators treat men and women counterparts in the real world.

Meanwhile, the experimental design also increases the internal validity for the manipulated gender and negotiation style, allowing the necessary control to test the hypotheses.

Practical Implications

The practical implications focus on how the behavior of women and their organizations can help women negotiators avoid backlash. Firstly, I find that in the SOE context, women received better treatment than men if they negotiate in a polite but non-relational way. The women practitioners in organizations that adopt the conventional Chinese culture with a great emphasis on relations are recommended to use this negotiation style to avoid being penalized in their work settings. Secondly, the findings indicate that in the MNC context, Chinese women receive the same backlash with men, no matter what style the negotiator adapts. It suggests that to improve gender equality, Chinese women can get more access to the international negotiation context.

Thirdly, the present findings also point to a practical solution to gender disparity in China, that is, organizations can improve gender equality by creating or promoting a strong organizational culture that overrides the national culture, such as the international culture in MNC. Organizations can minimize negative violations for relational women negotiators by creating strong situations (Magnusson & Endler, 1977) that explicitly specify when it is OK to seek for relational outcomes and that signal that relational negotiation behaviors are encouraged for both men and women. When such organizational culture is conveyed explicitly, men and women negotiators

are equally likely to recognize opportunities for successful negotiation (Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006) and women may incur less backlash for relational negotiating.

Limitations and Future Research

The limitations in the present paper can suggest potential research direction in the future. Firstly, I have only two major types, and thus there could be subtle differences that can be captured by looking at specific organizational cultural features. Although both organizational types of the focal sellers and the seller's frequent buyer customers significantly influence how they give backlash against relational women compared to men, whether the key driver is organizational culture in the emphasis of relations is still in a black box. Future research would benefit from identifying the mediators that serve as the causal mechanism. Future researchers can also directly examine how organizational cultures impact the backlash effect in negotiations in lab context by manipulating the organizational culture in negotiation simulations (e.g., Curhan et al., 2008).

Limited to organizational type, this research is only the first step to explore how organizational contexts can influence backlash effects on gender in negotiation. Future research can certainly explore more. For example, the status of the target women can be a further moderator. Research suggests that in high-status organizational roles and professions like law, the agentic behavior is seen as legitimate for both women and men (Ridgeway, 2011; Tinsley et al., 2009). And the more women there are in senior leadership roles, the less likely one style of behavior is to dominate (Ely, 1994). To the extent that backlash stems from a perceived

incongruity between women's ascribed and achieved standing, it may decrease when we have more women taking senior leadership.

Thirdly, the negotiation context used in this study is a limitation for theory generalizability, too. The simulated negotiation context is a buyer-supplier negotiation, which is a part of the participants' work. When going through the description of the negotiation, participants might recall how they usually negotiate with their customers in their work, and the simulated counterpart in the negotiation would represent a person from another company in participants' minds. That is why participants would use their frequent customers' conventional knowledge to frame the backlash. If we use other kinds of negotiation context like salary negotiation or promotion negotiation, the participants would think that the counterpart is from their own organization and thus may use their own organizational cultural convention to guide their backlash.

Lastly, I acknowledge that the exclusive use of experiment and especially the stimuli used in the experiment is a limitation of this work. Though the manipulation check indicates that the aggressive style was perceived as more aggressive than the other styles and that the relational style was perceived as more relational than the other styles, the stimuli did not keep everything else constant while only varying aggressiveness, politeness, and relationality. The manipulation only controlled for the offers and counteroffers to be static across different conditions. So, it is possible that some other unmeasured confounds might influence the backlash patterns, such as perceived professionalism and perceived competence.

Conclusion

Despite these limitations, the current experiment recruiting practitioner negotiators made a significant contribution to research on negotiations by demonstrating that backlash effects against relational women negotiators are contingent on whether the organization of the participants and the participants' frequent customers adhere to Chinese cultural conventions. The results demonstrate that organizational culture influences how real-world negotiators react to women who violate their gender roles. As a result, gender and backlash effects in the future should be studied in concrete organizational context. In the future, when we talk about negotiation backlash against men and women, we must also ask the question of "what kind of organization in which culture?"

CONCLUSION

The dissertation is the first to examine cultural effects in gender differences in negotiations and provides a new theoretical perspective and solutions to the problem of gender inequality across cultures.

In contrast to the previous assumption made in existing literature that men negotiators outperform women, in Essay 1, I found that the performance of men negotiators being better than women negotiators depends on whether the national culture of the negotiators is collectivistic, as women negotiators are more likely to outperform their men counterparts in highly collectivistic cultures. This meta-analysis research demonstrates that the effect of culture cannot be neglected in tackling this complex issue of gender differences in negotiation performance.

To reveal the black box behind this moderation effect, with two lab experiments, Essay 2 further demonstrated that cultural conventional knowledge is the causal mechanism of the cross-cultural gender differences in negotiation performance found in Essay 1. Adopting a dynamic view of conventional knowledge, I found that those who strongly adhere to and those who are exposed to the cultural convention in gender stereotyping are more likely to behave according to the gender stereotypes of that culture. Specifically, the gender gap in distributive negotiation outcomes (i.e., women performing better than men in objective outcome and men performing better than women in relational outcome in China) was amplified among individuals who more strongly adhered to the cultural conventions. I also found that when the conventional knowledge emphasizes building relations in negotiation, Chinese men

had worse distributive gains than Chinese women, whereas when the conventional knowledge values aggressive negotiating, Chinese men had better distributive gains than Chinese women.

Extending the conclusion of Essay 2 and exploring the theoretical boundary of Essay 2, Essay 3 further demonstrated that culture does not only influence how men and women negotiate but also how much backlash men and women receive when they violate their gender stereotypes. Particularly, backlash effects against relational women negotiators are contingent on whether the organization adheres to Chinese cultural conventions. In SOE cultural context where there is strong adherence to the Chinese cultural convention, people's backlash against relational women negotiators were greater than relational men negotiators. However, in the MNC context where the organizational culture did not follow the Chinese cultural convention, there were no differences in backlash imposed between genders.

To summarize, future research on gender effects in negotiation has to take the culture of the society, organizations, and individuals into consideration. It is because culture is the driver that shapes the manifestations of gender difference in negotiations.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Appendix 1.1 Instruction of buyer (Essay 2)

Refrigerator Market Exercise

Note: You have 5 minutes to read this instruction. During the negotiation, please do not let your counterpart read your own instruction. Before the experimenter starts to record, please do not communicate with each other in any ways.

Background information

In this exercise, you will have the chance to negotiate with another participant. You will be given a role to play, and you will interact with another student with whom you will need to negotiate. Your goal is to earn as much profit in a wholesale refrigerator negotiation. This kit contains all the materials you need to prepare for the task, including role information, negotiation instructions, a transaction receipt for recording your settlements, and a survey to be completed at the end of the exercise.

Your Role: Purchasing Agent.

You will play the role of the Purchasing Agent for Fridges-R-Us, a retail appliance store. In this exercise, you must imagine you work as a buyer of refrigerators Fridges-R-Us. Your goal is to arrange a profitable sales term with the Sales Representative (your negotiation partner) of FrigidAir, a manufacturer of refrigerators. The “terms” you must make deals on are: the delivery time of refrigerators to the store, the discount amount the store will receive for their bulk business, and the financing (at what interest rate stores will have to pay outstanding bills to your company). And the contract duration.

Negotiation simulation procedure.

You will be randomly paired up with one participant who plays the role of the FrigidAir Salespeople, whom you will meet at a designated negotiation station. You will then have fifteen minutes to settle four issues with your partner and to reach an agreement. When you have finished your negotiation, you will need to complete a simulative electronic contract based on the agreements you have made. You will then privately complete a post-negotiation survey.

Rewards and prize money.

The deals you make during the negotiation will translate into a “commission.” The commission you earn during the negotiation will be totaled and converted into points. You will be given 1 ticket towards the cash draw for every \$100 you earn in the task, so the more points you earn, the more tickets you will receive. However, you will only be entered into the draw if you complete all the portions of the study. Once I have finished running this study, I will give away one cash prize of \$100 via a draw!

Key Information for Purchasing Agent.

Here is the key information you need in order to perform well as the Purchasing Agent for Fridges-R-Us in the Refrigerator Market. NOTE: It is very important that you understand this key information (and it will help you succeed in the negotiation).

- You are a Purchasing Agent for Fridges-R-Us, and it is your job to create a distribution partnership with FrigiAir, who manufactures the refrigerators you sell to the public.

Negotiation Issues

There are only four negotiable issues for you to debate with the Purchaser: **delivery time, discount terms, financing terms, and contract duration**. You must negotiate on behalf of your company and try to agree on an option for each issue. It is very important that you come to an agreement with your partner, as your company really wants you to set up a distribution relationship. Failure to reach an agreement will result in an impasse, which means no profit for Fridges-R-Us or FrigidAir.

YOUR PRIORITIES:

You work for FrigidAir, who wants:

1. To **get fast delivery** once an order is placed.
2. To **get a large discount** from the standard wholesale price.
3. To get a **low interest rate** on outstanding balances.
4. To settle a contract duration.

The specific options for each issue, and the profit brought by each option are listed on the next pages.

Delivery Time. You must agree with the Salesperson from FrigidAir on what will be the delivery time for any refrigerators you order in the future.

- *This is the most important issue to your firm. The faster the delivery is, the more profit your firm makes.* You can get more profit for your firm for negotiating a fast delivery time than for any of the other issues. Below is the calculation of your firm's profit for each delivery time. The column on the left lists all the possible settlements you can achieve for Delivery Terms. The column on the right tells you what each settlement is worth for your firm. Notice that Option A gives your firm the greatest amount of profit.

Delivery Time Options	Profit
A: Same day delivery	\$4000
B: Next day delivery	\$3500
C: 3 day delivery	\$3000
D: 5 day delivery	\$2500
E: 7 day delivery	\$2000
F: 9 day delivery	\$1500
G: 11 day delivery	\$1000
H: 13 day delivery	\$500
I: 15 day delivery	\$0

Discount Terms. You must agree with the FrigidAir Salesperson on what will be the discount terms for any refrigerators you order in the future.

- *Discounts are the second most important thing to your company. The larger the discount Fridges-R-Us receives, the more money stays in your firm's pocket.* You will earn profit for your firm by negotiating for a larger discount. The calculating for the cost of each discount is written below. Again, notice that the possible settlements are in the left-hand column, and the amount of profit you earn for your firm for each settlement is in the right-hand column. The closer you can get to option A the more profit it will mean for your firm.

Discount Term Options	Profit
A: 40% Discount	\$2400
B: 35% Discount	\$2100
C: 30% Discount	\$1800
D: 25% Discount	\$1500
E: 20% Discount	\$1200
F: 15% Discount	\$900
G: 10% Discount	\$600
H: 5% Discount	\$300
I: 0% Discount	\$0

Financing terms. You must agree with the FrigidAir Salesperson on what will be the financing terms for any refrigerators you order in the future.

- *Financing is the third most important issue to your firm. You will earn some profit for negotiating better financing terms.* “Better” for you means a lower interest rate on balances unpaid 14 days after placing an order. The column on the left lists all the possible settlements you can achieve for Financing Terms. The column on the right tells you what each settlement is worth for your firm. Notice again that the Option A offers the most profit for your firm.

Financing Term Options	Profit
A: No interest	\$1600
B: 1% interest	\$1400
C: 3% interest	\$1200
D: 5% interest	\$1000
E: 7% interest	\$800
F: 9% interest	\$600
G: 11% interest	\$400
H: 13% interest	\$200
I: 15% interests	\$0

Contract Duration. You must agree with the FrigidAir Salesperson on how long the terms that you have negotiated will be valid (e.g., 0.5 or 15 years).

- During the contract duration, you and your partner must make deals according to the terms that you have negotiated. You cannot change or break the contract during this period. Your firm does not give you any instruction on the length of contract duration. You can make decision according to the principle of maximizing your firm’s benefit.

Summary of Issues and Commissions: Purchasing Agent

Here is a summary sheet of all the available options,
and the profits you can earn for your firm for each option.

Delivery Time		Discount Terms		Financing Terms	
Options	Profit	Options	Profit	Options	Profit
A: Same day delivery	\$4000	A: 40% Discount	\$2400	A: No interest	\$1600
B: Next day delivery	\$3500	B: 35% Discount	\$2100	B: 1% interest	\$1400
C: 3 day delivery	\$3000	C: 30% Discount	\$1800	C: 3% interest	\$1200
D: 5 day delivery	\$2500	D: 25% Discount	\$1500	D: 5% interest	\$1000
E: 7 day delivery	\$2000	E: 20% Discount	\$1200	E: 7% interest	\$800
F: 9 day delivery	\$1500	F: 15% Discount	\$900	F: 9% interest	\$600
G: 11 day delivery	\$1000	G: 10% Discount	\$600	G: 11% interest	\$400
H: 13 day delivery	\$500	H: 5% Discount	\$300	H: 13% interest	\$200
I: 15 day delivery	\$0	I: 0% Discount	\$0	I: 15% interests	\$0

Appendix 1.2 Instruction of seller (Essay 2)

Refrigerator Market Exercise

Note: You have 5 minutes to read this instruction. During the negotiation, please do not let your counterpart read your own instruction. Before the experimenter starts to record, please do not communicate with each other in any ways.

Background information

In this exercise, you will have the chance to negotiate with another participant. You will be given a role to play, and you will interact with another student with whom you will need to negotiate. Your goal is to earn as much profit in a wholesale refrigerator negotiation. This kit contains all the materials you need to prepare for the task, including role information, negotiation instructions, a transaction receipt for recording your settlements, and a survey to be completed at the end of the exercise.

Your role: Sales Representative.

You will play the role of the Sales Representative for FrigidAir, a manufacturer of refrigerators. In this exercise, you must imagine you work as a seller of refrigerators for FrigidAir. Your goal is to arrange a profitable sales term with the Purchasing Agent (your negotiation partner) of Fridges-R-Us a retail appliance store. The “terms” you must make deals on are: the delivery time of refrigerators to the store, the discount amount the store will receive for their bulk business, the financing (at what interest rate stores will have to pay outstanding bills to your company), and the contract duration.

Negotiation simulation procedure.

You will be randomly paired up with one participant who plays the role of the Purchasing Agent for Fridges-R-Us, whom you will meet at a designated negotiation station. You will then have fifteen minutes to settle four issues with your partner and to reach an agreement. When you have finished your negotiation, you will need to complete a simulative electronic contract based on the agreements you have made. You will then privately complete a post-negotiation survey.

Rewards and prize money.

The deals you make during the negotiation will translate into a “commission.” The commission you earn during the negotiation will be totaled and converted into points. You will be given 1 ticket towards the cash draw for every \$100 you earn in the task, so the more points you earn, the more tickets you will receive. However, you will only be entered into the draw if you complete all the portions of the study. Once I have finished running this study, I will give away one cash prize of \$100 via a draw!

Key Information for Sales Representative.

Here is the key information you need in order to perform well as the Sales Representative for FrigidAir in the Refrigerator Market. NOTE: It is very important that you understand this key information (and it will help you succeed in the

negotiation).

- You are a Sales Representative for FrigidAir, and it is your job to create a distribution partnership with Fridges-R-Us, who sells your refrigerators to the public.

Negotiation Issues

There are only four negotiable issues for you to debate with the Purchaser: **delivery time, discount terms, financing terms, and contract duration**. You must negotiate on behalf of your company and try to agree on an option for each issue. It is very important that you come to an agreement with your partner, as your company really wants you to set up a distribution relationship. Failure to reach an agreement will result in an impasse, which means no profit for FrigidAir or Fridges-R-Us.

YOUR PRIORITIES:

You work for FrigidAir, who wants:

1. To get a **high interest rate** on outstanding balances.
2. To **give low discounts** from the standard wholesale price.
3. To **give slow delivery** once an order is placed.
4. To settle a contract duration.

The specific options for each issue, and the profit brought by each option are listed on the next pages.

Financing terms. You must agree with the Purchaser from FrigidAir on what will be the financing terms for any refrigerators they order in the future.

- *Financing is the most important issue to your firm. You can get more points for negotiating a high interest rate than for any of the other issues.*

“Better” for you means a higher interest rate on balances unpaid 14 days after placing an order. The column on the left lists all the possible settlements you can achieve for Financing Terms. The column on the right tells you what each settlement is worth for your firm. Notice that the Option I offers the most profit for your firm.

Financing Term Options	Profit
A: No interest	\$0
B: 1% interest	\$500
C: 3% interest	\$1000
D: 5% interest	\$1500
E: 7% interest	\$2000
F: 9% interest	\$2500
G: 11% interest	\$3000
H: 13% interest	\$3500
I: 15% interests	\$4000

Discount Terms. You must agree with the Purchaser from FrigidAir on what will be the discount terms for any refrigerators they order in the future.

- *Discounts are the second most important thing to your company. The smaller the discount Fridges-R-Us receives, the more money stays in your firm's pocket.* You will earn more profit for your firm by negotiating by giving a smaller discount. The possible settlements are in the left-hand column, and the amount of profit you earn for your firm each settlement is in the right-hand column. The benefit for each discount is copied below. The closer you can get to option I the more profit, it will mean for your firm.

Discount Term Options	Profit
A: 40% Discount	\$0
B: 35% Discount	\$300
C: 30% Discount	\$600
D: 25% Discount	\$900
E: 20% Discount	\$1200
F: 15% Discount	\$1500
G: 10% Discount	\$1800
H: 5% Discount	\$2100
I: 0% Discount	\$2400

Delivery Time. You must agree with the Purchaser from FrigidAir on what will be the delivery time for any refrigerators they order in the future.

- *This is the third important issue to your firm. The longer the delivery time is, the more profit your firm makes.* You will earn some profit for your firm for negotiating a better delivery time. As your company prefers to deliver refrigerators only once or twice a month to save costs. Below is the calculation of your firm's profit for each delivery time. The column on the left lists all the possible settlements you can achieve for Delivery Terms. The column on the right tells you what each settlement is worth for your firm. Notice that Option I gives your firm the greatest amount of profit.

Delivery Time Options	Profit
A: Same day delivery	\$0
B: Next day delivery	\$200
C: 3 day delivery	\$400
D: 5 day delivery	\$600
E: 7 day delivery	\$800
F: 9 day delivery	\$1000
G: 11 day delivery	\$1200
H: 13 day delivery	\$1400
I: 15 day delivery	\$1600

Contract Duration. You must agree with the Purchaser from FrigidAir on how long the terms that you have negotiated will be valid (e.g., 0.5 or 15 years).

- During the contract duration, you and your partner must make deals according to the terms that you have negotiated. You cannot change or break the contract during this period. Your firm does not give you any instruction on the length of contract duration. You can make decision according to the principle of maximizing your firm's benefit.

Summary of Issues and Commissions: Sales Representative

Here is a summary sheet of all the available options, and the profits you can earn for your firm for each option.

Financing Terms		Discount Terms		Delivery Time	
Options	Profit	Options	Profit	Options	Profit
A: No interest	\$0	A: 40% Discount	\$0	A: Same day delivery	\$0
B: 1% interest	\$500	B: 35% Discount	\$300	B: Next day delivery	\$200
C: 3% interest	\$1000	C: 30% Discount	\$600	C: 3 day delivery	\$400
D: 5% interest	\$1500	D: 25% Discount	\$900	D: 5 day delivery	\$600
E: 7% interest	\$2000	E: 20% Discount	\$1200	E: 7 day delivery	\$800
F: 9% interest	\$2500	F: 15% Discount	\$1500	F: 9 day delivery	\$1000
G: 11% interest	\$3000	G: 10% Discount	\$1800	G: 11 day delivery	\$1200
H: 13% interest	\$3500	H: 5% Discount	\$2100	H: 13 day delivery	\$1400
I: 15% interests	\$4000	I: 0% Discount	\$2400	I: 15 day delivery	\$1600

Appendix 2

Pre-negotiation survey (Essay 2)

qualtrics.com

Please think about a scenario where a purchase representative is negotiating with a sale representative over the price of a product for wholesale.

1. There are different possible goals that the purchase representative may have while negotiating. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the goals are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Getting the best possible deal for the manager	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ensuring that the other party gets a good deal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ensuring that the manager appears generous	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ensuring that the manager does not get embarrassed or loses face	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Helping the other party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Feeling satisfied from the negotiating	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

>>

qualtrics.com

2. There are different possible behaviors that the sales representative may have before negotiating. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the motives are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Exploring alternative deals and making comparisons before negotiating	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Conducting a systematic calculation to determine the bottomline (minimum agreement) before negotiating	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Developing a set of strategies and tactics to use while negotiating	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Conveying to acquaintances that negotiating would be very easy for the manager	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Conveying to acquaintances that negotiating would be difficult for the manager	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

>>

3. There are different possible behaviors that the sales representative may have at the beginning of the negotiation. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the behaviors are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Initiating a negotiation even when the other party indicates that the deal is not negotiable	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Initiating a negotiation even when the manager is satisfied with the current deal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Initiating a negotiation even when the other party is a friend or acquaintance	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Initiating a negotiation even when the manager is in the presence of several other acquaintances	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
This item is a tester, please select "Very non-masculine," "Very non-feminine," and "Very negative"	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Accepting the initial offer without negotiating when the other party indicates that the deal is not negotiable	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Accepting the initial offer without negotiating when the other party is satisfied with the current deal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Accepting the initial offer without negotiating when the other party is a friend or acquaintance	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Accepting the initial offer without negotiating when the manager is in the presence of several other acquaintances	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Accepting the initial offer without negotiating despite knowing that the offer given by the other party is negotiable	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Making a deal before asking the terms of the deal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Quitting without any negotiating if the manager can't afford the other party's initial offer	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

>>

4. There are different possible behaviors that the sales representative may have while negotiating. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the behaviors are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Initially offering a better deal for the other party than what the other party expects	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Initially offering only one deal and asking the other party to "take it or leave it"	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Initially offering a deal that is much worse for the other party than what the other party expects	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Making a counteroffer that is much worse for the other party despite it appearing that the other party may suffer from the outcome or does not make much profit from the deal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Making a counteroffer that is much worse for the other party despite the other party saying that the current deal is the bottomline	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Making a counteroffer that is much worse for the other party despite the manager's initial offer being rejected	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Making a counteroffer that is much worse for the other party despite the other party already giving a satisfactory offer	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Offering a compromise deal when the manager's initial offer is rejected	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Continuously haggling over every penny	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Making the negotiation as short as possible	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

>>

5. There are different possible behaviors that the sales representative may have while negotiating. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the behaviors are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Demanding that the other party offers something extra	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Demanding to talk with the other party's superior if the deal is not attractive	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Demanding the best offer that the other party can ever give	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Promising to introduce some of the manager's contacts to the other party to sweeten the deal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Promising the other party a long-term business arrangement if the offer is good	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pretending to leave the negotiation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Pretending not to be interested in the other party's product	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pretending to be an expert about the other party's product	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Probing the other party to find out what the other party's bottom line is	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Threatening to find an alternative	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Lying about what the manager can afford now	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Telling the other party about better alternative offers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

>>

6. There are different possible behaviors that the sales representative may have while negotiating. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the behaviors are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Mentioning that one does not care about the money	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mentioning the flaws of the other party's product	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mentioning the personal relationship between the manager and the other party, if any	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mentioning shared traits or experiences between the manager and the other party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Raising detailed evidence to persuade the other party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Revealing the manager's "bottomline" (minimum amount willing to offer)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Providing excuses for why the manager makes an offer that is less desirable to the other party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
This item is a tester, please select "Very masculine," "Very feminine," and "Very positive"	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Complaining that the other party's offer is too painful to bear	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Continuously chit-chatting with the other party with little discussion about the terms of the negotiation itself	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Continuously discussing the deal without discussing anything personal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Praising the other party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Saying "I'm sorry" frequently	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Asking for very detailed information about the product or service	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

>>

7. There are different possible behaviors that the sales representative may have while negotiating. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the behaviors are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Using a domineering tone throughout the negotiation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Using fast paced speech	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Speaking louder than the other party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Listening attentively to the other party's defense	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Not giving the other party a chance to speak	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Interrupting the other party's speech	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Staring sharply at the other party	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Remaining calm when the other party gives an aggressive counteroffer	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Blushing with embarrassment during the whole negotiation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Laughing joyfully throughout the negotiation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

>>

8. There are different possible behaviors that the sales representative may have at the end of the negotiation. Please rate separately how masculine and how feminine each of the behaviors are.

	How masculine?				How feminine?			
	Very non-masculine	Slightly non-masculine	Slightly masculine	Very masculine	Very non-feminine	Slightly non-feminine	Slightly feminine	Very feminine
Ending the negotiation and accepting the other party's offer when it appears that the other party may suffer from the outcome or does not make much profit from the deal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ending the negotiation and accepting the other party's offer when the other party says the current deal is the bottomline	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Can't help laughing when taking advantage of the other party at the end of the negotiation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Still hesitating over whether or not to make a deal at the end of the negotiation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
If they cannot reach an agreement, keep returning to the other party and negotiating until one gets a satisfactory offer	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

We will now ask some questions about yourself.

How do you rate yourself in terms of masculinity and femininity?

-5=Totally Feminine 5=Totally Masculine

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5
----	----	----	----	----	---	---	---	---	---	---

My way of behaving is

What is your sexual orientation?

- ☐ Exclusively heterosexual
- ☐ Predominantly heterosexual, only incidentally homosexual
- ☐ Predominantly heterosexual, but more than incidentally homosexual
- ☐ Equally heterosexual and homosexual
- ☐ Predominantly homosexual, but more than incidentally heterosexual
- ☐ Predominantly homosexual, only incidentally heterosexual
- ☐ Exclusively homosexual
- ☐ No socio-sexual contacts or reactions

How old are you?

(years)

What is your country of origin?

☐ Canada

☐ Other

What is your country of origin?

☐ Canada

☐ Other

How long have you resided in the country above?

☐ < 1 year

☐ 1-5 years

☐ 6-10 years

☐ 11-15 years

☐ >15 years

What is your ethnicity?

What is your primary cultural identity?

Do you remember responding to a similar survey?

☐ Yes

☐ No

Were there issues or concerns about the survey that you have comments about?

>>

Appendix 3

Contract (Essay 2)

Electronic Contract on Refrigerator Deals

Please sign this contract together to record your deal terms.

Buyer's information (Please match with the online survey):

Name

Gender

Seller's information (Please match with the online survey):

Name

Gender

1. Financing (at what interest rate Fridges-R-Us will have to pay outstanding bills to FrigidAir):

?% interest

2. Discount term:

?% Discount

3. Delivery time:

? day delivery

4. Contract duration

? years (can use decimal)

5. Negotiation duration (minute):

6. At the beginning, who gave the first offer for the discount?

Purchasing Agent

Sales Representative

Simultaneously

What is the value of the first offer for the discount?

? %

>>

Appendix 4

Post-negotiation survey (Essay 2)

Your name? (or the nickname you provided in the online survey)

Your phone number? (only used for matching your data)

What is your gender?

Male

Female

Other

Which is your role in the negotiation?

Purchasing Agent

Sales Representative

General Instructions: For each question, please click a number from 1-7 that most accurately reflects your opinion. You will notice that some of the questions are similar to one another; this is primarily to ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire. Please simply answer each question independently, without reference to any of the other questions.

1. How satisfied are you with your own outcome—i.e., the extent to which the terms of your agreement (or lack of agreement) benefit you?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

2. How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your counterpart(s)'s outcome(s)?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

3. Did you feel like you forfeited or "lost" in this negotiation?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 A great deal
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------------

4. Do you think the terms of your agreement are consistent with principles of legitimacy or objective criteria (e.g., common standards of fairness, precedent, industry practice, legality, etc.)?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
--------------	---	---	--------------	---	---	-------------

5. Did you "lose face" (i.e., damage your sense of pride) in the negotiation?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 A great deal
--------------	---	---	--------------	---	---	----------------

6. Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator?

1 It made me feel less competent	2	3	4 It did not make me feel more or less competent	5	6	7 It made me feel more competent
---	---	---	--	---	---	---

7. Did you behave according to your own principles and values?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

8. Did this negotiation positively or negatively impact your self-image or your impression of yourself?

1 It negatively impacted my self- image	2	3	4 It did not positively or negatively impact my self- image	5	6	7 It positively impacted my self- image
--	---	---	--	---	---	--

9. Do you feel your counterpart(s) listened to your concerns?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

10. Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
--------------	---	---	--------------	---	---	-------------

11. How satisfied are you with the ease (or difficulty) of reaching an agreement?

1 Not at all satisfied	2	3	4 Moderately satisfied	5	6	7 Perfectly satisfied
------------------------	---	---	------------------------	---	---	-----------------------

12. Did your counterpart(s) consider your wishes, opinions, or needs?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
--------------	---	---	--------------	---	---	-------------

13. What kind of "overall" impression did your counterpart(s) make on you?

1 Extremely negative	2	3	4 Neither negative nor positive	5	6	7 Extremely positive
-----------------------------	---	---	---------------------------------	---	---	-----------------------------

14. How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart(s) as a result of this negotiation?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

15. Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart(s)?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

16. Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your counterpart(s)?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Perfectly
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

17. How much did negotiating with your negotiation partner make you like him or her?"

1 not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 a great deal
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------------

18. How much do you think your negotiation partner likes you?

1 not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 a great deal
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------------

>>

Please select the options that best represent your feelings. We promise that your responses are confidential. It is only for academic research.

	1 Not at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 Extremely
As the role you played in the negotiation, are you willing to keep a business relationship with the counterpart in the future?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
How interested would you be in working with the counterpart?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would you be to ask the counterpart to be part of the project team?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Is the counterpart the type of person you like to work with?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
This is a tester, please click the number four.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
How interested would you be in interacting socially with the counterpart?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
If the counterpart invited you out for drinks after work, how likely would you be to go with her [him]?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Is the counterpart the type of person you like to socialize with?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

To what extent do you think you understand the given instruction?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 very well
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

To what extent are you willing to win the drawer prize?

1 Not at all	2	3	4 Moderately	5	6	7 Extremely
-----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	---	----------------

Please click >> to submit your response. After submitting, please go to the experimenter to receive the compensation by reporting the right response to the tester. Thank you.

>>

Appendix 5

Appendix 5.1. Essay 3: manipulation of aggressive/non-aggressive/relational negotiator behavior

A.1. Assertive condition

Round 1: Your offer is insulting; it is way too high for me. You would be foolish not to seriously consider my counteroffer.

Round 2: I have other offers that are looking much more desirable right now. If you do not consider this counteroffer, I may be forced to make a deal with another firm.

Round 3: Your offer is unreasonable; I refuse to purchase it at this non-affordable price. There is no way you can possibly expect me to purchase more than this.

Round 4: I am shocked that you would offer me such a high price. I strongly suggest you accept this offer because I refuse to pay that much.

A.2. Non-assertive condition

Round 1: Thank you for that offer, and I hate to press you but my firm was hoping to pay less. I believe this price will benefit both your firm and mine.

Round 2: I appreciate your offer but, unfortunately, I just cannot accept. I believe this price serves as a reasonable compromise.

Round 3: I feel I am making some progress, but unfortunately still cannot accept. I was hoping you might find this price reasonable.

Round 4: While I cannot accept that offer, I feel I am nearing a satisfactory middle

ground. I think both you and I will be happy with this price.

A.3. Relational condition

Round 1: I fully understand your perspective. But I am so sorry. Currently, my firm is not able to afford this price. I will owe you a debt of gratitude as I develop this relationship.

Round 2: You know the last thing I would do is to hurt our partnership. It is only because my firm is really not able to afford it. Trust me, at this price, I can cooperate with each other for years.

Round 3: friend, I really feel you are a wonderful person to cooperate with. It is just that I have no choice. Both of us know that this offer will benefit our firms' relationship in the long run.

Round 4: Thank you so much for making an effort to make this deal happen, but my firm would really suffer from this price. I think this will be a good first step in building mutual trust and commitment.

Appendix 5.2. Essay 3: backlash scale items

B.1. Work-based backlash

How interested would you be in working with 张丽 [张帅] in a sales team?

If you were the manager of a sales team, how likely would you be to hire 张丽 [张帅] to be part of your sales team?

Is 张丽 [张帅] the type of person you like to work with?

B.2. Personal backlash

How interested would you be in interacting socially with 张丽 [张帅]?

If 张丽 [张帅] invited you out for drinks after work, how likely would you be to go with her [him]?

Is 张丽 [张帅] the type of person you like to socialize with?

B.3. Leadership backlash

To what extent do you believe 张丽 [张帅] would make a good leader?

Would you like to be on a project team led by 张丽 [张帅]?

B.4. Business backlash

How would you like to keep doing business with 张丽 [张帅]?

Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with 张丽 [张帅]?

How does this negotiation make you trust 张丽 [张帅] in the future?

TABLES

Table 1: Cultural Distribution of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis (Essay 1)

Culture	Collectivism	<i>k</i>	Example citations
Ecuador	92	1	(Patton, 2004)
Columbia	87	2	(Cardenas, 2014)
Fiji	86	2	(Henrich & Henrich, 2014)
Papua New Guinea	86	2	(Tracer, 2004)
Ghana	85	2	(Barr, 2014)
Bolivia	84	2	(Gurven, 2004)
Peru	84	4	(Castillo et al., 2013; Henrich & Smith, 2004)
Taiwan	83	5	(Chen & Wang, 2013; Lin, 2014)
China	80	16	(Dai, 2005; Hu et al., 2008; Ma, 2007; Semnani-Azad & Adair, 2011; Zhang & Han, 2004)
Chile	77	1	(Henrich & Smith, 2004)
Kenya	75	4	(Gwako, 2014)
Tanzania	75	2	(Marlowe, 2004)
Greece	65	1	(García-Gallego et al., 2013)
Turkey	63	2	(Yurtsever et al., 2013)
Brazil	62	5	(Castro, 2008; Pfaff et al., 2013)
Russia	61	2	(Ziker, 2014)
Iran	59	1	(Semnani-Azad et al., 2012)

India	52	4	(Andersen et al., manuscript)
Spain	49	2	(García-Gallego et al., 2013; Leon-Perez et al., 2011)
Israel	46	1	(Nelson, Bronstein, Shacham, & Ben-Ari, 2015)
Poland	40	1	(Pietrzak et al., 2014)
Germany	33	11	(Dittrich et al., 2014; Sucky et al., 2013)
Mongolia	29	1	(Gil-White, 2004)
Canada	20	9	(Semnani-Azad & Adair, 2011; Thornicroft, 2011)
Netherlands	20	3	(Hong & Wijst, 2013; Jones & Jelassi, 1990)
The United Kingdom	11	1	(García-Gallego et al., 2013)
The United States	9	61	(Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2005; Dalton et al., 1987a; Kray et al., 2004)

Note. k = number of effect sizes. As suggested by previous research (Park et al., 2012),

Because collectivism was not available for Bolivia, a multilevel analysis was done without Bolivia included and another multilevel analysis was done with collectivism of a nearby country, Peru. No substantial difference was found for the overall results.

The index of Mongolia came from another separate study (Rarick, Barczyk, Pruett, & Inge Nickerson, 2014).

Table 2: The Moderating Effect of Cultural Dimensions on Gender Differences in Negotiation Performance (Essay 1)

Cultural value indices	β	SE	-95% CI	95% CI	Model Q	Residual df
					28.39***	139.92
Collectivism	-.38***	.00	-.02	-.00		
Long-term orientation	-.09	.00	-.01	.00		
Masculinity	.03	.01	-.01	.01		
Power distance	.04	.01	-.01	.02		

Note. $\dagger p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$; β = standardized regression coefficients; SE_{β} = standard error of the standardized regression coefficients; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval around the standardized regression coefficients. All the results are based on the random effects model (Wilson & Lipsey, 2001).

Table 3a: Regression analyses testing effect of negotiator's gender and individual adherence to the cultural convention of gender stereotyping on the outcome of the purely distributive issue

<i>Outcome of purely distributive issue</i>			
Variable	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Gender	259.57	115.15	.30**
Adherence	125.72	83.44	.21
Step 2			
Gender	-227.29	251.70	-.26
Adherence	-307.58	216.49	-.52
Gender * Adherence	332.18	154.01	.88**

Note. All results controlling for scaling bias and shifting bias in the survey. $R^2 = .21$

for Step 1; $R^2 = .28$ for Step 2. Gender is coded as 0 for men and 1 for women.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 3b: Regression analyses testing effect of negotiator's gender and individual adherence to the cultural convention of gender stereotyping on the outcome of purely distributive issue

Variables	<i>Pure distributive gain</i>				<i>Joint gain</i>			
	B	SE B	β	R^2	B	SE B	β	R^2
<i>For men</i>								
Adherence	79.82	103.92	.16	.30	847.10	137.87	.87***	.69
<i>For women</i>								
Adherence	312.90	145.58	.44**	.38	107.21	323.06	.07	.21

Note. All analyses controlled for scaling bias and shifting bias in the survey. Gender is coded as 0 for men and 1 for women.

*** $p < .001$ * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 4: Results of the ANOVA with gender and experimental condition as independent variables

Independent Variables	<i>F</i>	<i>Partial η^2</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Controlling for Need for Closure and VHIC</i>			
Gender	.13	.00	.72
Cultural Convention	.03	.00	.86
Gender * Cultural Convention	3.90	.03	.05
<i>Not Controlling for Need for Closure and VHIC</i>			
Gender	.23	.00	.63
Cultural Convention	.00	.00	1.00
Gender * Cultural Convention	3.12	.03	.08

Table 5: Breakdown of sample size for Essay 3

	Gender	N	Total
<i>Participants' organizational type</i>			
MNC	Men	218	410
	Women	192	
SOE	Men	246	388
	Women	142	
<i>Participants' frequent customers' organizational type</i>			
MNC	Men	208	367
	Women	159	
SOE	Men	201	324
	Women	123	

Table 6: Results of the ANOVA with target's gender, negotiation style, rater's organizational type, and rater's frequent customers' organizational type as independent variables

Independent Variables	<i>F</i>	<i>Partial η^2</i>	<i>p</i>
Target's gender * Target's negotiation style *	.53	.59	.00
Rater's organizational type			
Target's gender * Target's negotiation style *	2.78	.06	.01
Rater's frequent customers' organizational type			

Note: All analyses controlled for the other independent variable and NFC.

FIGURES

Figure 1: Overall Diagram of Three Essays

Figure 2a: Gender Differences in Negotiation Performance as a Function of Each Culture's Collectivism Index (with the bubble size proportional to the weight given to each study, Essay 1)

Figure 2b: Gender Differences in Negotiation Performance as a Function of Each Culture's Collectivism Index (with the bubble size proportional to the weight given to each study, after removing two small sample outliers Essay 1)

**Figure 3: Gender Differences in Distributive and Integrative Negotiation Issues
in China (Essay 2, Study 1)**

Figure 4: Scree Plot for the One-Culture Latent Truth Rater Model (Essay 2, Study 1)

Figure 5: Gender Gap in the Distributive Negotiation Outcome Moderated by Individual Adherence to The Cultural Convention in Gender Stereotyping
(Essay 2, Study 1)

Figure 6a: Men and Women's Distributive Negotiation Outcomes Moderated by Cultural Convention Condition (Essay 2, Study 2)

Figure 6b: Men and Women's Joint Gains Moderated by Cultural Convention Condition (Essay 2, Study 2)

Figure 7: Business Backlash Against Men and Women Negotiators by Experimental Negotiation Style Condition and Organizational Type of Participants' Frequent Buyer Customer (a lower score represents a greater backlash, Essay 3)

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