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Chang, Jun Yan

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Essence of security communities: explaining ASEAN

Jun Yan Chang

Abstract. Despite its stated goal of establishing an ASEAN Community by 2015, ASEAN is not a security community. This article demonstrates this by firstly identifying three models of the security community, the Deutschian Model I, the constructivist Model II, and the instrumental Model III; and subsequently applying these to ASEAN. Although the paradox of the 'long peace' of ASEAN seems to be validated by Model III, such is mistaking cause for effect. Through a process of critique, the shortfalls of the three security community models are highlighted and consequently addressed through conjoining the Aberystwyth School of Critical Security Studies to the 'security community' concept in a Model IV critical security community formulation to achieve a holistic and comprehensive concept relevant to the world today. Employing Model IV to assess ASEAN, the puzzle of whether ASEAN is a security community is laid to rest; its security is not truly comprehensive, its people are not emancipated, and its various domestic and transnational instabilities affect it adversely.

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aims to establish the ASEAN Community comprising the three pillars of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) in 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). As this target approaches, questions of the APSC, which subscribes to a 'renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other actions in any manner inconsistent with international law and reliance of peaceful settlements of dispute' (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), remain evident. What does a 'political-security' community mean with reference to the original 'security community' conceptualisation by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues? Is ASEAN a security community as envisaged by Amitav Acharya? Such questions are further emphasised by security oddities within and between the various member states themselves. Can ASEAN possibly be a security community given the intense problems faced between member states, like the territorial claims over the Spratlys between Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam; and also internal instabilities such as the Rohingya community in Myanmar, which also has a subsequent spillover effect on the rest of ASEAN already (Hunt, 2 August 2015)? Is there thereby a mismatch between the 'security community' formulation of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, and the original by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues?

Whether ASEAN is actually a security community is therefore a very puzzling question, and various answers across the entire gamut have been posited thus far (Collins, 2013, p. 29), ranging from ASEAN as not even a 'community' but an 'imitation' (Jones & Smith, 2002) to it progressing 'towards the ascendant or mature level' of a security community which however 'looked more promising in the early 1990s than in the later part of the decade' (Acharya, 2001a, p. 208). The objective of this article is therefore to comprehensively address the puzzle of whether ASEAN is actually a security community through a critique of the concept of the 'security community' and its three variant models, refining this concept to include the elements of comprehensive security and emancipation, and consequently utilising the three current models and this new 'critical security community' model to assess ASEAN.

In order to tackle this central question, this paper proceeds in four main steps. First, it highlights the different models of security communities, identifying three existing models to start with: the Deutschian, the constructivist and the instrumental security community models.

Second, I further critique these three models and argue that the ‘security community’ concept in its current constructivist and instrumental reincarnations is no longer viable in today’s context due to three shortcomings: deficient attention paid to the element of ‘internal peace’ since Deutsch’s original model, the state-centricity of the models, and their top-down elitist approaches. Third, since ‘security,’ by its very nature, is a derivative concept meaningless by itself and hence requiring a referent object—the being or thing which is to be secured (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 4)—this paper thus proposes that ‘critical security’ be conjoined to ‘security community’ in a ‘critical security community’ formulation to better encompass the referent object of ‘security’ epistemologically, ontologically and praxeologically, in order to capture meaningfully the concept of ‘security’ today. Fourth, this paper contends that ASEAN is not a security community by applying these four models in a *qualitative* analysis of ASEAN so as to resolve the puzzle of the ASEAN security community completely. In aid of these aims, this article is divided into five main sections. The first examines the original Deutschian security community. Subsequently, the second highlights the constructivist security community model whilst the third the instrumental model. The fourth compares the three models and thereafter, the fifth introduces ‘critical security studies’, specifically the Copenhagen, Paris and Aberystwyth Schools, and conjoins the latter to the concept of the ‘security community’ before the article is concluded. Each of the models identified is also consequently utilised to evaluate ASEAN in its relevant section.

Model I: the Deutschian Security Community

According to its progenitors, a security community is a community in which there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’; it is thus ‘a group of people’ who has become ‘integrated’, and by integration, it is meant that there is a ‘sense of community’ and attainment of ‘institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to *assure* for a “long” time, *dependable expectations of “peaceful change”* among its population’ (Deutsch, 2003, pp. 123-125, emphasis added) *cf.* (Deutsch, 1998, pp. 270-283; Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 5). The Deutschian security community hence comprises elements of ‘non-war’ as well as ‘internal peace,’ and is not just a non-war community in which war is absent (Wæver, 1998, pp. 69-70). Indeed, Deutsch explicitly differentiated a ‘no-war community’ from a security community and further noted that political entities fearing the outbreak of large-scale violence in civil wars do not make a security community (Deutsch, 1961, p. 99).

Such security communities could then be attained via a variety of possible integrative processes, the common denominator within these a transaction wherein interdependence and reciprocity matter a great deal; as Deutsch identified, ‘[a]ll communities among people are characterized by the existence of a significant amount of transactions among them’ (Deutsch, 1961, pp. 98-103), whether in terms of the densities of traffic in goods or people for trade or travel, or the flow of information across time and space. The Deutschian security community is therefore *transactionist* in nature. Deutsch further divided security communities into two types: (1) amalgamated, where there is a ‘formal merger’ of ‘previously independent units’ into a single unit with a common government, such as the United States; and (2) pluralistic, with the ‘legal independence of separate governments’ being maintained still, such as the African Union (AU); and the differences between these two simply ‘allowances for the much looser organisation’ of the latter and ‘the less stringent requirements for their establishment and preservation’ (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 6; 115).

It is immediately apparent that ASEAN is by no means an amalgamated security community. Nor has political functionalism ever been intended, with the fundamental principles of ASEAN enshrining the Westphalian sovereignty worshipped and adhered to by

its member states. Indeed, ASEAN frequently deflects criticism leveled at its inadequacies through the excuse that it was never intended to achieve political functionalism. However, of the twelve conditions essential for the success of an amalgamated security community posited by Deutsch, only two are important for a pluralistic variant: (1) 'the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making'; and (2) 'the capacity of the participating political units to respond to each other adequately without resort to violence' (Deutsch, 2003, p. 140). Such conditions have thus often led scholars to presume that only liberal democracies can succeed in security community building. Sorpong Peou therefore proposed four criteria to judge the success of security community building: (1) rich experience in conflict management; (2) small size of membership; (3) democratic values; and (4) political leadership (Peou, 2001, pp. 96-98). These criteria can be utilised to assess ASEAN as a pluralistic Deutschian security community.

Firstly, ASEAN's survival and longevity as Asia's only multipurpose regional organisation, as well as its role in concluding the Cambodian-Vietnamese War, which began when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, have been trumpeted as ASEAN's crowning accomplishments (Acharya, 2007). *Prima facie*, these might be recognised as evidence of a rich experience in conflict management. On the other hand, as John Ravenhill emphasised, ASEAN's endurance relative to the other short-lived multilateral organisations within the region, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), is 'a double-edged sword' (Ravenhill, 2009, p. 222) as despite its survival since its formation in 1967, ASEAN's list of achievements is very sparse relative to its age; the European Union (EU)—supranational organisation *par excellence*—counting from its original formulation as the European Coal and Steel Community, is a mere fifteen years older. Furthermore, neither Cambodia nor Vietnam was part of ASEAN during the period of their conflict, making the conflict management extramural; conversely a contemporary invasion of East Timor in 1975 by Indonesia went unchallenged by ASEAN. Although ASEAN deserves credit for incentivising Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia through membership, there were other actors involved in the eventual Peace Accords of 1991, signed in Paris under United Nations auspices and creating the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Such qualified success in conflict management has thus led Michael Leifer to describe the notion of a distinctive ASEAN peace process as a 'category mistake' since ASEAN's mode of activity 'has been expressed primarily in an informal process of confidence-building and trust creation, and has never been directed to solving specific intramural problems' (Leifer, 1999, pp. 25-26). This sweeping of intramural disputes under the carpet, hiding it from plain sight but not addressing the root causes of conflict, was also evidenced in Singapore's handling of the dispute over Indonesia's *Bung Tomo*-class corvette, the KRI *Usman Harun*, named for the Indonesian marines executed for attacking Singapore's MacDonal House in 1965 during *Konfrontasi*. Although both states now considered the matter 'closed', Singapore will not allow the warship to call upon its ports, nor would the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) engage in military exercises with the ship. Hence, even ASEAN 'boosters' acknowledge that ASEAN's mechanisms are informally based on confidence-building, conflict avoidance, and voluntary enforcement (Caballero-Anthony, 1998; Simon, 2008), leaving the prospect of proper conflict management hanging.

Secondly, despite the relatively small size of ASEAN (the EU boasts twenty-eight in comparison), there are two significant difficulties regarding membership. The first is the decision making processes adopted by the organisation, the so-called 'ASEAN Way':

Reputedly, ASEAN's socio-cultural norms are particular to Southeast Asia (based on Malay cultural practices) and are designated 'the ASEAN Way'. They emphasize processes of consultation and consensus building, which are used to reach common organizational positions. The ASEAN Way 'stresses informality, organization

minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to consensus and peaceful resolutions of disputes’ (Narine, 2008, pp. 413-414)

Due to this emphasis on informal consultation and consensus, it is no surprise that ASEAN has often been referred to as a ‘talk shop’. The failure in 2012 by ASEAN’s foreign ministers in Cambodia to even issue a joint communiqué for the first time ever in ASEAN’s history due to differences in the perspectives over China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea (Bower, 2012) was a notable breakdown to the ‘talk shop’ however, further underlining the organisation’s precariousness. The other issue at stake is the incongruence between Southeast Asia, the region, and ASEAN, the organisation; for instance, although newly independent Timor-Leste wants to join, ASEAN ‘has been less than eager to let it in’ (Emmerson, 2007, pp. 426-428). Both problems interact in a vicious cycle, incongruence limiting consensus and consensus (or rather lack thereof) further emphasising incongruence. The haze suffered periodically by Singapore and Malaysia over the burning of forests in Sumatra, Indonesia despite the legally binding ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution signed in 2002 is a case in point.

Thirdly, in terms of political values, the ten ASEAN member states certainly do not fare well on the democratic scale as Table 1 below indicates.

State	Political Rights Rating	Civil Liberties Rating	Freedom Rating	Status
Brunei	6	5	5.5	Not Free
Cambodia	6	5	5.5	Not Free
Indonesia	2	4	3	Partly Free
Laos	7	6	6.5	Not Free
Malaysia	4	4	4	Partly Free
Myanmar	6	6	6	Not Free
Philippines	3	3	3	Partly Free
Singapore	4	4	4	Partly Free
Thailand	6	5	5.5	Not Free
Vietnam	7	5	6	Not Free

In Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World 2015* (which analysed the level of freedom and democracy within states in 2014), none of the ASEAN states achieved ‘Free’ status, with more than half of them being tagged ‘Not Free’, indicating their lack of democratic values.

Last but not least, political leadership of ASEAN is somewhat indeterminate. ASEAN’s Secretary-General, appointed by the ASEAN Summit (comprising the member states’ heads of governments)—the supreme policy-making body of the organisation—functions as a chief administrative officer serving for a non-renewable five-year term; the Chairmanship of ASEAN, which hosts agenda-setting powers, is rotated annually (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008). With such a setup, power remains in the hands of the governmental heads, with the Chairman having an increased influence whilst the Secretariat only fulfils administrative functions. Cambodia’s chairmanship denying a joint communiqué in 2012 as highlighted earlier demonstrates this point. Moreover, although Indonesia is a natural regional hegemon and acknowledged by the rest as *primus inter pares*; its position of leadership has been questioned

¹ Freedom House’s indicators of political rights rating, civil liberties rating, and freedom rating are indirectly proportional to the level of such liberties; 1 is the best, 7 the worst.

as a result of the economic weakness it displayed during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC); other ASEAN states, such as Singapore and Thailand, have also associated the quest for regional order with a balance of power and have therefore continued to rely on 'external countervailing power', primarily in the form of the US, to ensure their security, thereby curtailing further Indonesian influence (Emmers, 2005, pp. 645-665). The political leadership of ASEAN is therefore often in flux; with emphasis again on the 'ASEAN Way' of achieving consensus through consultation. Hence, ASEAN largely flouts the criteria identified for a pluralistic security community above and is thus not a Model I Deutschian security community.

Model II: the Constructivist Security Community

Subsequently, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett focused solely on pluralistic security communities when they reformulated Deutsch's concept. They defined a security community as 'a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change', and additionally divided these into two ideal types according to 'their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalisation of their governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it', with *loosely-coupled* pluralistic security communities observing the very minimal of these three properties, and *tightly-coupled* ones 'more demanding', comprising a 'mutual aid' society with a form of functionalism or supranationalism (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 30). The Nordic Council is an example of a loosely-coupled pluralistic security community whilst the EU is arguably the epitome of the latter.

The 'distinctive feature of a security community', to Adler and Barnett, is that the dependable expectations of peaceful change and the resultant stable peace is 'tied to the existence of a transnational community', with 'community' taking on added emphasis whereby it is defined by three 'core' characteristics: (1) members' common beliefs and values; (2) direct and many-sided relations; and (3) 'communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term self-interest and perhaps even altruism' (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 31; Taylor, 1982, pp. 25-33). Consequently, Adler and Barnett underscored the role of sociological or constructivist theories in the formation of security communities; whereas rationalist explanations—modeled after the Rational Man Model—of self-interest, interdependence, and reciprocity, can 'contemplate' the 'non-war' element of security communities since such can be derived from 'instrumental decisions' calculated to expand 'immediate security and economic interests'; only sociological theories of shared identities and culturalist elements influencing behaviour can equally reflect that, and yet 'allow for the possibility that interstate interactions can transform the identities and interests of states', building mutual trust and creating a collective identity capable of inducing dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler & Barnett, 1998, pp. 34-48). Such ideational factors are thus critical for a security community and their reformulated security community is therefore *constructivist* in nature.

In addition, since Model II is socially constructed and path-dependent, Adler and Barnett further acknowledged three phases in the development of a security community: (1) a nascent phase whereby a security community is not explicitly sought but is a by-product of coordinating relations to increase mutual security, lower transaction costs, and 'encourage further exchanges and interactions'; (2) an ascendant phase defined by 'increasingly dense networks', rising institutionalism, deepening mutual trust, 'and the emergence of collective identities', preventing war; and (3) a mature phase in which an 'ideational threshold' has been crossed and war becomes completely *unthinkable*—inter-state war between the various member states of the mature pluralistic security community has been socially bred out (Adler & Barnett, 1998, pp. 50-57). The stage of progress is hence positively correlated to the degree of tightness outlined above; mature security communities tend to be tightly-coupled whereas

nascent security communities are likely to be loosely-coupled. An example of a security community in the nascent phase is the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the expanded EU is arguably an ascendant security community; whilst the leading, most developed states in the international system, the United States and Western Europe, form a mature Model II security community.

Given the disputes and potential flashpoints between the ASEAN states, such as over the Spratlys, ASEAN cannot possibly be mistaken for an ascendant or mature security community within which there is mutual trust and conflict becomes 'unthinkable'. However, from initially classifying ASEAN as a 'defence community', Acharya has stood out as the foremost champion of ASEAN as a Model II security community of the nascent type based on a collective identity, claiming that:

The exercise in collective identity formation has contributed to ASEAN's progress toward a security community by lessening the likelihood of inter-state military confrontation. Four elements have been crucial to this process: multilateralism, norms, symbols, such as the ASEAN-Way of consensus-seeking and informal and non-legalistic decision-making procedures, and a shared quest for regional autonomy (Acharya, 1998, p. 219)

Moreover, Acharya further argued that such collective identity derived from 'incremental socialisation' rather than 'preordained cultural sources'(Acharya, 2001a, p. 71).

However, two significant problems can be identified, one logical and one empirical. The first logical dissent is one posed incisively by Nicholas Khoo, that Acharya's independent variables: norms such as non-interference, non-use of force, the pursuit of regional autonomy, and the 'ASEAN Way', seemed to be a 'red herring' due to the deficiencies present in Acharya's account of the origins of these norms, particularly why such norms arose in ASEAN but not others (Khoo, 2004, pp. 38-41). Thus, to Khoo, Acharya mistook effect for cause. The next is an empirical challenge. From surveys conducted by the ASEAN Secretariat in 2012, though only 19% of the general public in the ASEAN states' capital cities has never heard of ASEAN, 76% lacks a basic understanding about ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013, p. 1), thereby throwing any 'incremental socialisation' of a general collective identity, or classification as a community, into serious doubt. The lack of a collective identity is unsurprising due to the absence of a regional shared history. Donald Emmerson, tracing the etymology of the binomial expression 'Southeast Asia', noted that whereas 'Asia' could plausibly be 'traced back through more than three thousand years of written records', 'southeast' was simply a geographical convenience used by the Western colonial powers to refer to places south of China and east of India; consequently, warfare rather than scholarship popularised the term as World War II (WWII) necessitated the making of maps denoting the 'Southeast Asian' region (Emmerson, 1984).

Furthermore, Acharya's 'incremental socialisation' is no doubt made more difficult as the region is a *mélange* of diversities; political, geographical, economic, and socio-cultural (Weatherbee, 2009, pp. 9-18). Politically, not only are there differences in the political values and civil liberties between the various ASEAN member states (see Table 1 above), there are also many differences in the regime types between them, with an assortment ranging from military juntas like Thailand, pseudo-democracies like Malaysia, to communist/socialist states like Vietnam. Geographically, though Southeast Asia is a predominantly maritime region, differences remain embedded between maritime Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, and continental Southeast Asia such as landlocked Laos. Such geographical differences play out in the economic realm as well.

State	GDP (PPP) [USD billion]	GDP Real Growth Rate [%]	Per Capita GDP (PPP) [USD]
Brunei	30.21	-0.7	73,200
Cambodia	49.96	7.0	3,300
Indonesia	2,676.00	5.0	10,600
Laos	34.40	7.4	5,000
Malaysia	746.10	6.0	24,700
Myanmar	242.00	7.7	4,700
Philippines	692.20	6.1	7,000
Singapore	445.2	2.9	82,800
Thailand	985.50	0.7	14,400
Vietnam	510.70	6.0	5,600

Source: Compiled from 'The World Factbook', Central Intelligence Agency, available at: accessed 15 August 2015.

Table 2 above clearly demonstrates the economic diversity within ASEAN, with Indonesia's economy the largest, compared to the insignificant size of the smallest Laotian economy; in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) after adjusting for purchasing power parity (PPP), Singapore is the richest, with Malaysia a far third whilst the rest are very poor. Within the socio-cultural field, be it in terms of ethnicity, language, or religion, the diversities are even more distinct as glaringly illustrated in Table 3 below.

State	Top 3 Ethnic Groups (%)	Official Languages	Main Religion (%)
Brunei	Malay (65.7) Chinese (10.3) Indigenous (3.4)	Malay	Muslim (78.8)
Cambodia	Khmer (90) Vietnamese (5) Chinese (1)	Khmer	Buddhist (96.9)
Indonesia	Javanese (40.1) Sundanese (15.5) Malaya (3.7)	Bahasa Indonesia	Muslim (87.2)
Laos	Lao (54.6) Khmou (10.9) Hmong (8)	Lao	Buddhist (66.8)
Malaysia	Malay (50.1) Chinese (22.6) Indigenous (11.8)	Bahasa Malaysia	Muslim (61.3)
Myanmar	Burman (68) Shan (9) Karen (7)	Burmese	Buddhist (89)
Philippines	Tagalog (28.1) Cebuano (13.1) Ilocano (9)	Filipino English	Catholic (82.9)
Singapore	Chinese (74.2) Malay (13.3)	Mandarin English	Buddhist (33.9)

	Indian (9.2)	Tamil Malay	
Thailand	Thai (95.9) Burmese (2) Others (1.3)	Thai	Buddhist (93.6)
Vietnam	Viet (85.7) Tay (1.9) Thai (1.8)	Vietnamese	Buddhist (9.3)

Source: Compiled from ‘The World Factbook’, Central Intelligence Agency, available at: accessed 3 August 2015.

Donald Weatherbee summarised such diversity succinctly:

In fact, beyond the macrogeographic unity of the latitude–longitude box, there are few qualities that we usually associate with a world region to be found in Southeast Asia. There is no region-wide identity such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, culture, and history such as we find in the Arab world, Western Europe, or, with the exception of Brazil, Latin America (Weatherbee, 2009, p. 11).

Hence, in light of both logical and empirical challenges, limited by the lack of a common history, and exacerbated by geographical, political, economic, and socio-cultural diversities, the argument that ASEAN is a security community based on an *ersatz collective identity* is quite a *non sequitur*, leading David Martin Jones and Michael Smith to disparagingly label ASEAN as an ‘imitation community’ instead (Jones & Smith, 2002).

Model III: the Instrumental Security Community

On the other hand, one shortfall of Deutsch’s original work was the failure to adequately globalise the concept of the security community since the ‘sense of community’ within the North Atlantic region is historically more developed and taken for granted than compared to the many identity struggles taking place in the developing world. Hence, Acharya, prior to his constructivist turn as outlined above, retained the Deutschian pluralistic security community as the conceptual foundation whilst setting out different parameters in identifying conditions, suggesting four basic requirements for a regional security community most appropriate to the developing world: (1) ‘the total absence of armed inter-state conflict’; (2) the ‘absence of a competitive military build-up or arms race’; (3) ‘the existence of formal or informal institutions’ and regimes which ‘serve to reduce, prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and disorder’; and (4) ‘a high degree of political and economic integration as a necessary precondition of peaceful relationships’ (Acharya, 1996, pp. 177-179). Although Acharya subsequently affixed this instrumental approach with features from the constructivist security community of Adler and Barnett with his expanded analysis in his later book which ‘makes a case for [a] sociological approach to the study of complexities of regionalism [*sic*], focusing on the role of norms, socialisation and identity as central explanatory tools in the making and unmaking of security communities’ (Acharya, 2001a, p. 4), the groundwork of the instrumental security community had been laid. Studies employing such a Model III security community include those by Naison Ngoma on the SADC (Ngoma, 2003, 2004). Model III, at its most fundamental roots, therefore ignores the liberal democratic values of Model I, is centred almost solely on a ‘non-war’ element, and thus purely functional and *instrumental* in nature.

That the region known as Southeast Asia has maintained what Timo Kivimäki has called the ‘long peace of ASEAN’ (Kivimäki, 2001) despite the various disputes and potential

actually decreased, such as Singapore's and Malaysia's. Such trends thereby indicate the absence of a competitive arms race amongst the ASEAN members instead.

Furthermore, regarding the third condition, although the ASEAN Charter did not establish any formal dispute settling mechanisms, the 'ASEAN Way' has nonetheless been effective as an informal regime that has regulated behaviour amongst the ASEAN states despite its frailties, especially in terms of decision making and actually managing conflict (as highlighted earlier). Its achievement is evident in ASEAN's undertaking of key leading roles in other regional institutions within the Asia-Pacific, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and promulgating the 'ASEAN Way' in these organisations, such that Acharya had wrote about an 'Asia-Pacific Way' (Acharya, 1997).

Fourthly, although ASEAN is by no means a functionalist organisation in the political sense, networks have nevertheless been increasing within the political arena, so much so that the standing joke is that attending all the various ASEAN-linked meetings take up so much time that the ASEAN politicians simply have none left to make war! ASEAN has achieved progress in different measures of political development, with 'increased participation by organisations such as academic institutions, think-tanks, and civil society organisations in ASEAN meetings and activities' (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, p. 3). Spillover effects onto the security and military realm remain lacking however. For instance, although individual ASEAN states responded quickly to the MH370 crisis, such as Vietnam sending out search planes almost immediately, there were neither collective nor coordinated efforts by ASEAN as a whole in the hunt for the missing plane. Nonetheless, perhaps the greatest sign of integration lies within the economic realm as Table 5 below hints.

Table 5: Selected Intra-ASEAN Economic Indicators				
Indicators	Year	Value	Year	Value
Value of Total Trade in Goods				
Intra-ASEAN Total	2004	US\$ 260.9 Billion	2011	US\$ 598.2 Billion
Intra-ASEAN Share	2004	24.3%	2011	25%
Value of Inward FDI				
Intra-ASEAN Total	2000	US\$ 0.85 Billion	2011	US\$ 26.27 Billion
Intra-ASEAN Share	2000	3.9%	2011	23%

Intra-ASEAN trade has more than doubled from 2004 to 2011, whilst the increase in the intra-ASEAN share of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an even more staggering sixfold. Hence, ASEAN fulfills all four criteria of a Model III instrumental security community to a large extent, thereby creating a paradox of 'long peace' versus all the various instabilities within ASEAN.

A Critique of the three models

Thus far, employing the three models as analytical tools, ASEAN is not a Model I or II security community although it is arguably a Model III, thereby creating the ASEAN paradox—ASEAN as an instrumental security community despite the instabilities within it. In this regard however, two criticisms can be made of Model III. Firstly, it is somewhat tautological, mistaking the effect of 'no-war' as the causal factor of a security community. Secondly, Model III appears only as a veneer of a security community, perhaps being closer to a limited regional 'international society' of the English School variant wherein a society of states are 'bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another' (Bull, 2002, p. 13; Tan, 2012).

Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, the use of Model III is still widespread, particularly in the developing world see for instance (Bellamy, 2004, pp. 118-149; Shaw, 2001). The crux of the problem lies with three deficiencies within the 'security community' concept as a subsequent comparison of the three models below shows. A cautionary note ought to be sounded here at this point however. Although I have parsed the security community literature into three types, the applications of the 'security community' concept by the various authors often do not follow clear-cut boundaries of the paradigms I have identified; rather, the edges are often blurred and murky, case in point being Acharya's analysis of ASEAN.

A comparison of the three models identified above highlights further criticisms of the 'security community' concept. First of all, despite the use of the Deutschian variant as the common conceptual foundation, the newer Models II and III are not mere reincarnations. As Emmerson puts it, 'Acharya, Adler, and Barnett [were] well aware of the transactional focus of Deutsch's approach, but in their efforts to revive his perspective this aspect has been set aside' (Emmerson, 2005). Thus, on the epistemological scale, whereas the Deutschian security community is objective, the constructivist security community is more interpretative, with the instrumental security community somewhere in between. Hence, although Model III holds similarities to the nascent constructivist security community, the crucial difference is that the former is more materialistic, whereas the latter is ideational. In this respect, Model III is closer to Model I which focuses on material transactional flows. Importantly, the three models also disagree on the background condition of liberal democratic values in the formation of a security community. Deutsch offered little explicit guidance, mostly taking these for granted since such principles were already so well-embedded in his area of study, the North Atlantic (Deutsch, 1998, pp. 273-281; Deutsch et al., 1957, pp. 46-69); Adler and Barnett were undecided, calling for 'better specification and identification of the role of cognitive structures' (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 40; M. Barnett & Adler, 1998, pp. 425-426); whilst such liberal democratic values were plainly unnecessary in Model III. Thus, whereas the element of 'internal peace' was as crucial as the element of 'non-war' in Model I, the former is absent in Model III (refer to Table 6 below).

It is however apparent that domestic stability is necessary for the regional cooperation that leads to a security community, and three reasons can be offered herein: (1) 'the security of people and credible usage of the term'; (2) 'the linkages between intra- and inter-state conflict'; and (3) 'the volatility and uncertainty associated with instability' (Nathan, 2004, p. 3). Hence, Model III applied to regional political entities like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ignored the feature of 'internal peace' given the domestic instability of these African states, such as the *Boko Haram* in Nigeria. Liisa Laakso thus proclaimed that 'the concept of security community is not useful in the African context' (Laakso, 2005, p. 492). Moreover, such a deficiency is not limited to Model III solely. Even the 'nascent' or 'embryonic' security community of Model II opens itself to such criticism; with such labels being appended and used to qualify the notion of 'security communities' due to the domestic uncertainties within such arrangements (Laakso, 2005, p. 492). Therefore, the current disregard for the element of 'internal peace' within Models II and II is one great shortfall.

Exacerbating this is the state-centricity of all three models, though Model II is arguably directed more towards the community; all three models are thus ontologically holistic. In the past:

The concept of security has traditionally been related more to states than to people. Since the seventeenth century, when the current system of states began to emerge, international security has been understood and practiced with reference to the needs and interests of states. Although, in its early origins, the state was conceived as an

instrument for producing security for its citizens, it became the subject of security with the establishment and retrenchment of the state-system (Bilgin, 2003, p. 203).

Threats to the security of the state were hence taken to be those affecting Westphalian norms of sovereignty and territoriality, such as infringements on the primacy of the state's governing apparatus or on the integrity of the state's geographical boundaries. Hence, whilst the three models would have worked before, a solely ontologically holistic security community concept fails abjectly when it is applied in the context of the world today as the referent object of security has changed due to globalisation, the rise of non-state actors, and the information revolution. These three interlinked phenomena reinforced each other, 'changing the nature of governance, affecting sovereignty, and created a diffusion of power' (Nye & Welch, 2013, p. 287) away from the state right down to the individual, thereby further shifting the referent object of security further away from the Westphalian state. Nontraditional threats such as climate change or cyber conflict have thus increasingly come to the forefront of international security. A state or community suffering from these unconventional threats can hardly be called a 'security community' in spite of having fulfilled both Deutschian elements of 'internal peace' as well as 'non-war.' Thus, the second greatest shortfall of the three models is their inability to deal with the changes wrought by developments in today's political scenes since they are not *comprehensive* enough.

Related to the state-centricity of the three models is their praxeology of a top-down approach. Whether it is the transactional focus of Model I, the social construct of Model II, or the instrumentality of Model III, these security community models can be criticised as being elitist in approach; Model I transactions being institutional, Model II incremental socialisation being elite-driven, and Model III focusing on structural measures and elitist networks (refer to Table 6 below for a comparison of the different models).

Hence, due to the deficient attention given to the element of 'internal peace' especially in Models I and II, aggravated by the contextual irrelevance of all three models of the security community because of their focus on the statist referent object, and exacerbated by their top-down elitist approach, there is a need to reformulate a 'new' security community model in order for the concept to remain relevant. Doing so would also put completely to rest the ASEAN puzzle highlighted at the beginning of this article.

Model IV: the Critical Security Community

In order to ameliorate the shortfalls in the current concept of the 'security community', the logical turn is therefore to Robert Cox's other paradigm of theory, critical theory (Cox, 1981). Various scholars have questioned the Westphalian state as the referent object of security in today's world; and once the referent object of security is called into query, there is a need to 'also question the *nature* and *scope* of security' (Mutimer, 2013, pp. 69, emphasis original). This shift from a traditional security studies focus to a non-traditional focus is a rethinking of security involving an 'analytical two-step'; the first involves the *deepening* of theoretical approaches, 'uncovering and exploring the implications of the idea that attitudes and behavior in relation to security are derivative of underlying and contested theories about the nature of world politics'; the second, following deepening, is the *broadening* of the 'agenda of security studies beyond that of the hitherto militarised and statist orthodoxy' to include other sectors such as the societal (Booth, 2005b, p. 14; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 4).

Although there are three broad theoretical feeder roads into the critical theory tradition: (1) the Marxian tradition; (2) the work of Antonio Gramsci; and (3) Frankfurt School critical theory (Booth, 2005a, p. 261; Wyn Jones, 2001, pp. 5-8), critical approaches to the study of security is nonetheless an entire landscape of ideas and concepts, ranging from constructivism

to radical feminism. Despite this, it is possible to identify ‘a set of spatial narratives that emphasises the emergence of different “schools of thought”, each anchored by a geographical referent point’: the Copenhagen, Paris, and Aberystwyth Schools (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 3). The Copenhagen School is an *analytical* approach associated with Barry Buzan and Wæver (Buzan, 1983; Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Emmers, 2013; Smith, 2000). It is developed around three main ideas: (1) securitisation, framing a concern as a security issue; (2) sectors, broadening the security agenda to include the political, economic, societal, and ecological sectors in addition to the military; and (3) security complexes, ‘an analytical scheme to analyse how security concerns cohere in regional formations’ (Wæver, 2012, pp. 52-53). The Paris School is mostly inspired by French sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu, and associated with Didier Bigo, and is a *poststructural* approach that is committed to ‘detailed, empirical investigations of actual practices by various agencies’ (Wæver, 2012, p. 54), thereby concentrating on the conduct of everyday security practices, ranging from policing to border control, in order to determine how ‘security professionals and bureaucracies “do” security: that is, how security practices are conducted across a range of different contexts, and often in ways that diminish any supposed distinction between internal (policing) and external (military) security’ (Bigo, 2002; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, pp. 9-10). Last but not least, the Aberystwyth School, also referred to as the Welsh School, is a *normative* approach linked to Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, whom had ‘self-consciously developed a brand of “Critical Security Studies” that challenged the definition of security purely in terms of military threats to the state, and instead linked the study of security to the expansive goal of human emancipation’ (Booth, 2007; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, pp. 9-10; Wyn Jones, 1999). For this reason, the Aberystwyth School has also been regarded as Critical Security Studies (CSS), with caps, as opposed to critical security studies as a useful generic label to group critical approaches to security studies; Wyn Jones thus refers to the former as ‘CSS-as-project’ and the latter as ‘CSS-as-label’ (Wyn Jones, 2005, p. 215).

In order to formulate a ‘security community’ concept that is relevant today, critical security studies needs to be conjoined to the Deutschian concept so as to achieve a ‘critical security community’ concept that is *comprehensive ontologically, epistemologically and praxeologically*. In this regard, the Copenhagen School is unsuitable as it bears the same flaw as the first three models in that since the process of securitisation is ‘discourse-centric, and because states dominate the discourse, it follows that states will remain the dominating referent’; securitisation therefore suffers ‘from being elitist’, as Booth puts it (Booth, 2007, p. 166). Meanwhile, as the Paris School works via poststructural methods, bringing to light the convergence of a general ‘politics of unease’ and understanding insecurity as a ‘product of security discourses and security policy’ (Bigo, 2002; Wæver, 2012, p. 54), it lacks both a proper referent object for use and is furthermore not comprehensive enough for the goal at hand. The Aberystwyth School is ideal however. Firstly, it is focused on emancipation, seeing security and emancipation as irrevocably linked. As Ken Booth emphatically highlights:

‘Security’ means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as *individuals* and *groups*) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security (Booth, 1991, pp. 319, emphasis added).

Therefore, the referent object of security is both the individual *and* the group, a more bottom-up approach. Secondly, in the Aberystwyth project of a theory of world security, the idea of

‘overlapping emancipatory communities’ is an important building block since such a community recognises ‘the right of individuals to express themselves through multiple identifiers of difference, celebrating equality over identity’ (Booth, 2005c, p. 109; 2007, pp. 138-139). Third, Critical Security Studies is comprehensive. In this regard, the Aberystwyth School’s emancipation project goes beyond that of Johan Galtung’s ‘positive peace’ as the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1969), and is closer to Jon Barnett’s concept of ‘peace as freedom’, which defined ‘peace as *the goal and process of expanding people’s freedoms*’, through combining Galtung’s ‘peace as the absence of violence’ with Amartya Sen’s ‘development as freedom’ concepts (J. Barnett, 2008, p. 82; emphasis original), although the Aberystwyth School goes beyond a *concept* and further suggests a *commitment* as well when ‘security is conceived as a process of emancipation’ (Booth, 1991, pp. 321-322). Hence, the Aberystwyth School’s project of a critical theory of security creates ‘a theoretical commitment and a political orientation concerned with the construction of world security’ through ‘reconceptualising the ontology, epistemology and praxis of security’ and ‘emancipatory politics and networks of community at all levels’ (Booth, 2007, pp. 30-31). Ontologically, it combines the individual and the community; epistemologically, it conjoins equality and identity, a cosmopolitan ideal that transcends the objective-interpretive divide; praxeologically hence, uniting the Aberystwyth School and the ‘security community’ concept in a bottom-up ‘critical security community’ formulation sparks a political orientation towards enhancing dependable expectations of peaceful change amongst members of a critical security community ‘through emancipatory politics and networks of community at all levels’ (Booth, 2007, pp. 30-31).

Refining Deutsch’s concept therefore, a critical security community, or Model IV, is thus defined as one in which a group of *people* has a shared sense of community and there is an attainment of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to *ensure* common, comprehensive and dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. Table 6 below compares the four models of the security community.

Model	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Name	Deutschian	Constructivist	Instrumental	Critical
Epistemology	Objective	Interpretative	Objective	Objective; Interpretative
Ontology	Holistic (State)	Holistic (Community)	Holistic (State)	Individual; Holistic (Community)
Praxeology	Top-Down	Top-Down	Top-Down	Bottom-Up
Elements	Internal Peace; Non-War	Non-War/ Internal Peace	Non-War	Internal Peace; Non- War; True Comprehensive Security; Emancipation

Model IV comprises not just the elements of ‘internal peace’ and ‘non-war,’ but also truly comprehensive security as well, one that not only includes other sectors of security, such as economic, like the state-centric Asia-Pacific concept of ‘comprehensive security’ coined in Japan (Dewitt, 1994, pp. 1-4), but one which also includes the individual as the referent object of security, and with emancipation as true security. The critical security community hence ameliorates the three flaws in the other three models of the security community highlighted in the preceding section.

ASEAN as a Security Community: A Final Cut

Applying the Model IV critical security community to ASEAN, it is at once clear that ASEAN fails on several counts. Firstly, on the issue of truly comprehensive security, although the ASEAN principle of comprehensive security goes beyond the requirement of traditional security and ‘takes into account non-traditional aspects vital to regional and national resilience, such as the economic, socio-cultural, and environmental dimensions of development’, this notion is still state-centric and fails to consider the individual (Acharya, 2001b; ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, p. 8). Not only that, human security—the other main critical security paradigm which considers the individual as the referent object of security (though human security fails to place as much emphasis on emancipation as the Aberystwyth School does)—is not acknowledged within the APSC blueprint at all, with some analysts deeming human security to be incompatible with the ‘ASEAN Way’ even (von Feigenblatt, 2009). Transnational non-traditional security threats affecting individuals have hence not received proper attention. For instance, piracy, sea robbery, smuggling and trafficking is prevalent in the region, and as Ian Storey emphasised, in spite of ‘a recent drop in pirate attacks, violence at sea remains a problem in Southeast Asia, where a number of political, geographic, and economic factors make the region’s seas a particularly opportune space for sea-borne criminals’ (Storey, 2008, p. 9). ASEAN has thus been called a ‘support network for the governing elite’ (Collins, 2007, p. 213) rather than a true community.

Secondly, on the issue of emancipation, the failings of ASEAN are even more apparent. Although it is almost impossible to operationalise and measure emancipation, and no one has done so to the best of my knowledge, an approximation (however admittedly imperfect) can be made for the conditions promoting emancipation based on Booth’s description of ‘emancipation as the politics of inventing humanity’ and that ‘equality is the condition for humanity’ (Booth, 2007, p. 256; 273); and following Jon Barnett’s suggestion of ‘a multivariable or composite indicator’ comprising measures of ‘the provision of economic opportunities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, protective security and equity guarantees’ in his ‘peace as freedom’ concept (J. Barnett, 2008, p. 85). Such an approximation for the conditions promoting emancipation would hence combine political, economic, and social measures in the form of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index, Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties, the Human Development Index (HDI), Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) overview of national social security systems, and the GINI Index.² Though these measures arguably quantify human existence, they still serve as analytical tools to illuminate the shortfalls towards qualitative emancipation such that a commitment could be made towards emancipation as a process.

On top of their dismal political conditions in terms of political rights and civil liberties (refer to Table 1 above); the ASEAN states also fare badly in terms of the CPI, which measures the perception of the corruption of the public sector, as well:

State	Global Rank	Score
ASEAN		
Brunei	Not Available	Not Available
Cambodia	156	21

² In addition to Jon Barnett, I am also inspired here by the emancipatory graduation of the liberal peace as well as the post-liberal peace identified by Oliver Richmond (Richmond, 2011).

³ On a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).

Indonesia	107	34
Laos	145	25
Malaysia	50	52
Myanmar	156	21
Philippines	85	38
Singapore	7	84
Thailand	85	38
Vietnam	119	31
Others		
Denmark	1	92
North Korea	174	8
Somalia	174	8

Of the ten ASEAN states, only Singapore and Malaysia scored more than 50 in the CPI, and out of 175 states and territories (North Korea and Somalia ranked joint 174), a full five ASEAN states ranked below 100 even.

Likewise, a lot more work needs to be done in the economic realm as Tables 8 and 9 below show:

State	Global Rank	Economic Freedom Rating
ASEAN		
Brunei	62	7.18
Cambodia	72	7.02
Indonesia	80	6.89
Laos	Not Available	Not Available
Malaysia	74	7.00
Myanmar	143	5.28
Philippines	51	7.29
Singapore	2	8.54
Thailand	102	6.62
Vietnam	114	6.42
Others		
Hong Kong (territory)	1	8.98
Venezuela	152	3.89

Economies	Global Rank	GINI Index	Date of Information
ASEAN			
Brunei	–	–	–
Cambodia	72	37.9	2008 (estimate)
Indonesia	81	36.8	2009
Laos	82	36.7	2008
Malaysia	31	46.2	2009
Myanmar	–	–	–
Philippines	42	44.8	2009

⁴ Out of 141 economies; the higher the rank, the more unequal the income (1 the worst); for the GINI Index, 0=perfect equality, 100=perfect inequality.

Singapore	30	46.3	2013
Thailand	64	39.4	2010
Vietnam	78	37.6	2008
Others			
Lesotho	1	63.2	1995
Hong Kong	11	53.7	2011
Kazakhstan	122	28.9	2011
Sweden	141	23.0	2005

Source: 'The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Distribution of Family Income – GINI Index', Central Intelligence Agency, available at: accessed 15 August 2015.

From Table 8 above, the ASEAN states clearly need to work on the 'cornerstones of economic freedom': '(1) personal choice, (2) voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, (3) freedom to enter and compete in markets, and (4) protection of persons and property from aggression by others' (Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2014, p. 1), with every state ranking worse than 50 with the exception of Singapore. This is worsened by the high GINI indexes—a measure of the degree of inequality in the income distribution of an economy—of the ASEAN states (Table 9). Singapore, which has been ranked the world's most expensive city in 2014 according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, is the worst amongst ASEAN and it also has the second-widest wealth gap amongst advanced economies in Asia, next to Hong Kong (Leyl, 2014; "Singapore named the world's most expensive city," 2014). In the face of such severe disparities, the prospect for emancipation remains dim and shackles remain on the less fortunate individual.

Furthermore, ASEAN is also lacking in the social conditions promoting emancipation:

State	Scope of Coverage	Existence of Programmes Anchored in National Legislation in Terms of Social Security Policy Areas							
		Sickness (cash)	Maternity (Cash)	Old Age	Employment Injury	Invalidity	Survivors	Family Allowances	Unemployment
Brunei	VL	K	L	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Cambodia	NA	NA	L	N	NA	NA	NA	NA	L
Indonesia	VL	K	L	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	L
Laos	L	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Malaysia	VL	K	L	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	L
Myanmar	VL	Y	Y	L	Y	L	L	N	N
Philippines	L	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	L
Singapore	SC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Thailand	C	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vietnam	SC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y

State	Global Rank	HDI Value
Brunei	30	0.852

⁵ Definitions of scope of coverage as per the International Labour Organization, (International Labour Organization, 2014, p. 195); Legend: Y – yes; N – no; L – limited; K – only benefit in kind (e.g. medical benefit); NA – not available; VL – very limited; C – comprehensive; SC – semi-comprehensive.

Cambodia	136	0.584
Indonesia	108	0.684
Laos	139	0.569
Malaysia	62	0.773
Myanmar	150	0.524
Philippines	117	0.660
Singapore	9	0.901
Thailand	89	0.722
Vietnam	121	0.638

As Table 10 above illustrates, only Thailand has a ‘comprehensive’ scope of legal coverage encompassing all eight social security policy areas. Singapore and Vietnam have a ‘semi-comprehensive’ scope, with national legislation covering seven policy areas whilst Laos and the Philippines belonged to the ‘limited’ group which only has legislation over five to six policy areas. The rest of the ASEAN states were only ‘very limited’ in their social security policy area legislations, simply covering one to four policy areas. With regard to the HDI, for 2013, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) considered a HDI value of 0.735 as high. Assuming that a high HDI value indicates social conditions ripe for emancipation as the condition of ‘inventing humanity’ would conceivably require certain thresholds in human development, from Table 11 above, only Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore have reached that level, with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar falling short of even the medium human development value of 0.614. Judging from such political, economic and social indicators, true emancipation in the ASEAN states seems difficult to achieve.

Thirdly, with regard to internal peace, events playing out across the ASEAN states emphasise a ‘fleeting peace’ rather than a ‘long peace.’ In Thailand, near-daily gun and grenade attacks in protest-hit Bangkok after nearly four months of protests against the incumbent government led to a military coup in 2014 after which martial law was enforced. A year on, the military junta remains firmly in power and it even recently ‘passed a new law forbidding unsanctioned protests’ in July 2015 ("Thailand Enshrines Unsanctioned Protests Ban in Law," 2015). In Cambodia, six demonstrators were detained in July 2015 by the police for protesting a new Cambodian law that requires non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to ‘report their activities and finances to the government’ ("Arrests Made at Cambodia NGO Law Protest," 2015). Even in much vaunted-Singapore, riots had taken place, the first in more than forty years whilst in Myanmar, human rights abuses continue against the Rohingya, even after the release of peace icon, Aung San Suu Kyi ("Aung San Suu Kyi: The halo slips," 2013); and the list goes on. Indonesia and the Philippines are also faced with armed separatist movements as well in West Papua and Mindanao respectively. Given such a laundry list of domestic instabilities across the region, ASEAN hardly fulfills the internal peace element of a security community. Hence, developing a holistic and comprehensive Model IV, the critical security community, and utilising it to assess ASEAN completely resolves the ASEAN paradox and demonstrated conclusively that ASEAN is, *ipso facto*, not a security community.

Conclusion

Despite the stated goal of an APSC in 2015, ASEAN is not a security community in the traditional Deutschian sense, nor is it a constructivist security community. Although it appears to be a Model III instrumental security community, such is mistaking the effect of the ‘long peace’ of ASEAN for the cause. Reexamining the ‘security community’ concept through a process of critique thereby further highlights three deficiencies in the concept: the withdrawal of the element of ‘internal peace’, its state-centric nature, and its top-down approach to security.

Thereafter, through conjoining the Aberystwyth School of Critical Security Studies to the ‘security community’ concept in a critical security community formulation to achieve a more holistic and comprehensive concept that better captures the meaning of security epistemologically, ontologically, and praxeologically, the ‘security community’ concept is made more relevant in the world today. Subsequently employing this Model IV to explain ASEAN, the puzzle of the ASEAN ‘security community’ is laid to rest and it is conclusively shown that ASEAN is not a security community; its security is not truly comprehensive, its people are not emancipated, and its various domestic and transnational instabilities affect it adversely.

A number of criticisms could conceivably be made of the ideas set out in this article. First and foremost, I acknowledge that the issue of emancipation is, without doubt, a highly controversial one, and a criticism often applied to the Aberystwyth School. Its implications are challenged ideologically, its applications questioned even by friendly critics, with ‘orthodoxies and establishments’ resisting ‘its threat to their interests’, and others claiming that they are ignorant of what the term even means; but yet emancipation is crucial as it remains the highest ideal of the invention of humanity since Man is born in metaphorical chains, and not free (Booth, 2007, pp. 110-114). True security is achieved only through emancipation and hence the importance of conjoining it to the concept of the ‘security community’. Second, Model IV, the critical security community, can be said to be such a utopian and unattainable concept that it is worthless as it lacks analytical value in the real world. However, it is precisely its comprehensive idealness that gives it true value, serving as an ideal type to commit towards in the process of emancipation. The third potential criticism is related to the preceding one, that it is unfair to use this ideal model to gauge ASEAN as political functionalism had never been an intention of ASEAN right from its founding in 1967. Yet, ASEAN itself set the goal of an ‘ASEAN Community’ and an ‘ASEAN Political-Security Community’ by the end of 2015; in this regard, ASEAN cannot ‘have its cake and eat it too’, to use a popular idiom; ASEAN cannot both assume the trappings of a community or a functionalist international organisation, and then turn aside criticism levelling those very accoutrements against it by asserting that it had never meant to wear them in the first place.

The security community concept is worth investigating as it represents a path towards stable peace, whether based on the democratic ideal in the democratic peace thesis or the more Kantian approach of cosmopolitanism (Bellamy, 2004; Kant, 1983; Kupchan, 2010; Russett, 1996). In this regard therefore, though the Model IV critical security community was applied to ASEAN in this article, it could also be used in future research to analyse other security communities, such as the more conventionally accepted ascendant Model II European Union security community, which might lead to surprising results, especially given the cracks in the fabric of EU solidarity that have been exposed recently due to events like the 2008 recession—which resulted in the Greek debacle in 2015—and the subsequent widening of these cracks in the ongoing European migrant crisis; both threats of a nontraditional nature. Unfortunately, there is neither space nor time within this article to consider the EU security community fully. Finally, developing these models, particularly the ideal type Model IV with its composite indicator for an approximation of the conditions promoting emancipation, would enable different security communities across the world to be compared in a similar manner beyond a simple ‘threshold test’ of an absence of war (Roberts, 2010, pp. 6-7) as well, a comparison that has heretofore been difficult to accomplish⁶ due to the different circumstances in the formation of different security communities.

⁶ The extant literature on security communities has not compared different security communities per se, but looked at different security communities individually, such as Adler and Barnett’s *Security Communities* or Bellamy’s *Security Communities and Their Neighbours*. The exception is perhaps Kupchan’s *How Enemies Become Friends*.

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