<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Managing tensions in the South China sea: comparing the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam approaches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Li, Jianwei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10220/19859">http://hdl.handle.net/10220/19859</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>NTU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 273

Managing Tensions in the South China Sea: Comparing the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam Approaches

Li Jianwei

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore

23 April 2014
About RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies when it was established in July 1996, RSIS’ mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis,
- Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy,
- Foster a global network of like-minded professional schools.

GRADUATE EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (MSc) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations, Asian Studies, and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Thus far, students from more than 50 countries have successfully completed one of these programmes. In 2010, a Double Masters Programme with Warwick University was also launched, with students required to spend the first year at Warwick and the second year at RSIS.

A small but select PhD programme caters to advanced students who are supervised by faculty members with matching interests.

RESEARCH

Research takes place within RSIS’ six components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (Centre for NTS Studies, 2008); the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN, 2008); and the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS, 2011). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region.

The school has four professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to conduct research at the school. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations, and the Bakrie Professorship in Southeast Asia Policy.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.
ABSTRACT

Although disputes in the South China Sea are in general under control since 2009, developments show that China-Philippines and China-Vietnam are two key relationships that have experienced incidents leading to fluctuating levels of tension in the South China Sea region. This study reviews the evolution of these two relationships in relation to bilateral disputes in the South China Sea and the respective approaches to managing these disputes, with emphasis on the post-2009 period. By comparing the China-Philippines and China-Vietnam approaches, it intends to analyse the differences/similarities and their implication on the management of the South China Sea disputes, as well as their bilateral relations in a broader sense.

********************


Jianwei was a visiting fellow with the China Programme at RSIS from 1 February to 31 March 2013.
Managing Tensions in the South China Sea: Comparing the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam Approaches

Introduction

Although the disputes in the South China Sea are in general under control since 2009, developments show that China-Philippines and China-Vietnam are two key relationships that experienced incidents leading to fluctuating levels of tension in the South China Sea region. China-Philippines and China-Vietnam, respectively, have made efforts to handle both incidents and tensions through various approaches. This study reviews the evolution of these two relationships in relation to bilateral disputes in the South China Sea and the respective approaches to managing these disputes, with emphasis on the post-2009 period. By comparing the China-Philippines and China-Vietnam approaches, the study intends to analyse the differences/similarities and their implication on the management of the South China Sea disputes as well as their bilateral relations in a broader sense.

Methodologically, the study applies a qualitative approach through a comparative case study of the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam cases. Thus, the study is analytical through a comparison of two empirical cases.

The key concept in the study is conflict management. In the context of this study, the concept of conflict management is defined as a process encompassing different techniques and means used to manage various dispute and conflict situations. These techniques and means include conflict prevention, conflict avoidance, conflict containment, conflict transformation, and conflict resolution.

The study is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of post-2009 China-Philippines and China-Vietnam relations in relation to their South China Sea disputes, focusing on main incidents and interactions (or lack of interactions) in dealing with them. The third section offers comments and analysis on the approaches reflected from recent developments in these two bilateral relations. In the final section, the two relationships are compared and assessed by offering the author’s observations.

Post-2009 Developments: Tensions and Management

China-Philippines over the South China Sea

Since diplomatic relations were established in 1975, China-Philippines relationship has in general been developing smoothly. Although rows emerged due to overlapping claims in the South China Sea, they were prevented from escalating out of control. The most serious ones before 2000 are the 1995 Mischief Reef (Meiji Reef in Chinese) and 1997 Scarborough Reef (Huangyan Island in Chinese) incidents. Since then, China and the Philippines had been working towards management and cooperation until 2008. The year of 2009 witnessed the start of a potential increase of tension in their bilateral relation with regards to the South China Sea. This tendency is reflected from bilateral spats over several issues.
Legal spat over maritime claims

In February-March 2009, the interpretation and application of Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding straight baselines and Article 47 of UNCLOS regarding the archipelagic baselines became an issue in the South China Sea disputes. On 2 February 2009, Bill 3216 was adopted by the House of Representatives of the Philippines to define the archipelagic baselines of the Philippine archipelago, and it was reported that both the Kalayaan Islands Group (KIG)\(^1\) and Scarborough Reef were included in the Philippine archipelagic baselines. China responded by reiterating its sovereignty claim to both Huangyan Island and the Nansha Islands and to “their adjacent waters”. China also expressed “hope that the relevant country can earnestly abide by” the Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and “refrain from taking actions that may complicate and increase disputes” in the South China Sea. Further developments relating to the baselines of the Philippines is that on 10 March 2009, President Arroyo signed the Republic Act No. 9522 which did not include the KIG and Scarborough Reef within its archipelagic baselines, but the baselines there “shall be determined as ‘regime of islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121” of UNCLOS.\(^2\) China responded by reiterating its statement on 3 February and by protesting against the Republic Act No. 9522 after it was submitted by the Philippines to the United Nations.\(^3\)

To fulfill the obligation set by UNCLOS, by 13 May 2009, all relevant parties of the South China Sea dispute submitted their cases to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In 2009, no immediate communication was done between China and the Philippines in relation to their separate notes to the United Nations, in response to the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam of May 2009. Nearly two years later, on 5 April 2011, the Philippines sent a Note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in response to China’s May 2009 Notes with the attached maps displaying the “nine-dashed lines”. In this Note, the Philippines stated that “under the international law principle of ‘la terre domine la mer’…, the extent of the waters that are adjacent to the relevant geographical features are definite and determinable under UNCLOS, specifically under Article 121 (Regime of Islands) of this said Convention.”\(^4\) Furthermore, in this note, the Philippines seemed to suggest that there was “no legal basis for claiming sovereign rights and jurisdiction over any resources in or under the waters within the nine-dashed line outside the waters adjacent to the islands.” In response to the Note of the Philippines, China sent a Note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 14 April 2011. China stated that “China’s Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.” China did not mention or attach any map to this Note. However, the “nine-dashed lines” on China’s map will continue to arouse

---

1 Part of the Spratlys (Nansha Islands in Chinese).
both political and scholarly debates.5 Also in this note, China clearly stated that prior to the 1970s, the Philippines “had never made any claims to Nansha Islands or any of its components” and it is since 1970s that the Philippines “started to invade and occupy some islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands”. The Note further stated that the Philippines’ occupation “constitutes infringement upon China’s territorial sovereignty”.6

At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) Retreat on 19 July 2011 in Bali, the Philippines’ Foreign Minister Albert F. del Rosario openly criticised China by saying that “the new introduction of China of the 9-dash in 2009 becomes the core of the problem.”7 In August, a forum entitled “The Spratly Islands Issue: Perspective and Policy Responses” was held in Manila. At the forum, Rosario again stated that “China’s claims in relation to the U-shaped line are baseless”.8 On 22 January 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China by sending a note to the Chinese Embassy in Manila, calling on the Arbitral Tribunal for a ruling that:

“[d]eclares that China’s rights in regard to maritime areas in the South China Sea, like the rights of the Philippines, are those that are established by UNCLOS, and consist of its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II of UNCLOS, to an EEZ under Part V, and to a Continental Shelf under Part VI; [and d]eclares that China’s maritime claims in the SCS based on its so-called nine-dash line are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid.”9

On 19 February, the Chinese Ambassador in Manila returned the Philippines’ note and its attached notification making clear that China refused to accept them.10 On 16 July 2013, the Arbitral Tribunal held its first meeting at which a draft set of Rules of Procedures to govern the proceedings were sent out to China and the Philippines for their comments.11 Believing that the Philippines’ unilateral submission to arbitration was in principle against the principle of the DOC, and the relevant statements therein were flawed in facts and law, China refused to participate in the proceedings. It

---

was in line with China’s position of direct negotiation and consultation with its neighbouring countries on resolution of their territorial disputes. The Philippines submitted its Memorial on March 30, 2014.  

**Administrative spat over resources development**

Revitalising domestic economy is one of the targets for Aquino III government. The potential oil and gas resources in the sea area around the Spratlys are important to the Philippine economy. With regards to the March 2005 Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) signed by the oil companies from China, the Philippines and Vietnam, Aquino III commented at a ceremony on 4 January 2011, that the Philippines should not have gone into the JMSU and started oil exploration in offshore area off Palawan. Oil and gas exploration in the disputed sea area around the Spratlys re-appeared as a source of tensions.

In early 2011, the Philippine Government endowed a U.K.-based company Energy Forum with a two-year contract to explore the oil and gas resources in the disputed area in the South China Sea. On 2 March, the Philippines claimed that the seismic survey vessels of Forum Energy Philippines Corporation (FEPC) were harassed by Chinese marine surveillance vessels. On 23 March, the FEPC completed the work program for Service Contract 72 (SC 72) located in the Reed Bank (Lie Tan in Chinese) and announced on its website that it would immediately “begin processing the data with the aim of further evaluating the commercial potential of the block, and to help identify the best location for possible appraisal wells to be drilled.” When responding to a question regarding to this announcement, the spokesperson for Chinese Foreign Ministry responded:

> “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and its adjacent waters. Oil and gas exploration and exploitation by any country or company without the permission of the Chinese Government constitute infringement on China’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, which is invalid.”

Three of the 15 oil blocks which were listed for bidding by the Philippines on 30 June are located to the Northwest of Palawan. The Philippines denies China’s claim over this sea area. At the above-mentioned forum in August 2011, Rosario declared that the Reed Bank, located 85 nautical miles from the nearest coast of Palawan, “is part of the continental shelf of the western coast of Palawan Province in the Philippines”. He further stated, “The Reed Bank can only be exclusively developed by

---


17 Ju, “South China Sea Policy of the Philippines,” op. cit., 86.
the Philippines and foreign investors could be invited to assist in developing the area in accordance with Philippine laws.18

Besides oil and gas exploration, fishing has also become a source of tension in 2011. On 25 February, the Philippine fishing vessels found at the vicinity of Jackson Atoll in the Spratlys were warned by Chinese law enforcement vessels.19 On 25 March, six Chinese fishermen were arrested by the Philippines in the Spratlys sea area.20 Again on 18 October, a Chinese fishing vessel was "harassed by a Philippine warship when it was carrying out normal fishing activities."21

**Territorial spat over insular features**22

On 10 April 2012, the Philippines' biggest naval vessel BRP Gregorio Del Pilar attempted to intercept Chinese fishing boats which were reported taking shelter from a storm in the lagoon of Scarborough Reef. The incident over the Scarborough Reef re-emerged. Similar incident first surfaced on 30 April 1997, when Philippine naval vessels prevented three Chinese boats from approaching the reef and hoisted the Philippine flag, but this time the incident dragged on much longer.

The tensions over Scarborough Reef had been fluctuating and reached a peak on 7 May when Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying met with the Philippines' Chargé D'affaires in Beijing and criticised the Philippine side for having made serious mistakes by escalating tensions and stated that "China has made all preparations to respond". Diplomatic negotiations resumed on 9 May and both countries stated their desire to find a solution to the situation. At the same time, both sides continued with a tough stand, and the stalemate resulted in spilled over negative impacts to other areas of bilateral relations. First, it aroused strong nationalistic feelings from both countries. In the Philippines, protesters had been shouting slogans such as "China, Bake Off the Panatag Shoal, Stop Poaching". In China, protesters responded with "Get out of Huangyan Island". Second, bilateral trade and tourism slowed down. China is the fourth largest market for tourists to the Philippines; the number of tourists from China had increased by 77 per cent during the first three months of 2012. However, since 16 May, during the incident, no Chinese tourist groups visited the Philippines. Third, the existence of tensions in the water area of the Reef prevented fishermen from normal fishing activities.

Another incident over one insular feature remained relatively low key. It was reported in May 2013 that three Philippine naval vessels were navigating to Second Thomas Reef (Ren’ai Reef in Chinese) with the aim of repairing the wrecked navy transport ship when two Chinese surveillance ships and a naval frigate blocked Philippine ships and then kept close inspection over such area.23 It was in 1999

---

when the former WWII ship ran aground on Second Thomas Reef to mark the reef under its
territory.\textsuperscript{24} Manila lodged an official protest over China’s patrols around Second Thomas Shoal by
claiming it as an “integral part” of the Philippines, and the Philippine Secretary of Defense declared
that his country “will fight for what is ours up to the last soldier standing”.\textsuperscript{25} China confirms “its
indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, including Ren’ai Reef, and its adjacent waters”.\textsuperscript{26}
This spat lasted until 19 June when, as commented, “due to humanitarian consideration, China
allowed the supply of food and change of personnel to be carried out by the Philippine navy”.\textsuperscript{27}

As long as the sovereignty dispute remains unsettled, incidents such as disputes over Scarborough
Reef or Second Thomas Reef may occur again. It is necessary for both countries to peacefully
manage the situation and to prevent tension from re-occurring in the future. Political wisdom is
needed to find creative means to address the situation and to create mechanisms to reduce the re-
emergence of tension in the future.

\textbf{China-Vietnam over the South China Sea}\textsuperscript{28}

Since full normalisation of relations in late 1991, tension in China-Vietnam relations has primarily
been caused by differences related to territorial disputes. Parallel with rounds of negotiations, there
were periods of tensions relating to all the territorial disputes, i.e. overlapping claims to the Paracel
and Spratly archipelagos, to water and continental shelf areas in the South China Sea and in the Gulf
of Tonkin, and to areas along the land border through the 1990s until the end of 2000. A \textit{Land Border
Treaty} was signed on 30 December 1999, and joint demarcation work was finished on 23 February
2009.\textsuperscript{29} On 25 December 2000, the \textit{Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic
Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin} was reached together with the \textit{Fishery Agreement
in the Gulf of Tonkin}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Second Thomas Shoal `could be the next flashpoint’, Taipie Times, May 30, 2013, 2013,
http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/05/30/200363520.
\item Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Statement by the spokesperson of China’s
\item “Chinese military expert say due to humanitarian consideration China allowed the Philippine Navy carry out
21/1121728787.html.
\item This China-Vietnam study is partly deprived from Ramses Amer and Li Jianwei, “Recent Developments in the
South China Sea – An Assessment of the Core Bilateral Relationship Between China and Vietnam”, in \textit{Maritime
Security Issues in the South China Sea and the Arctic: Sharpened Competition or Collaboration?}, ed. Gordon
Houlden and Nong Hong, 41–75, \textit{Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House. Further reading
include: Ramses Amer, \textit{The Sino-Vietnamese Approach to Managing Boundary Disputes}, Maritime Briefing,
vol. 3, no. 5, (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 2002); Ramses Amer, “The
Sino-Vietnamese Approach to Managing Border Disputes – Lessons, Relevance and Implications for the South
China Sea Situation,” in \textit{The South China Sea: Cooperation For Regional Security and Developments,
Proceedings of the International Workshop, co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the
Publishers and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 2010), 251–271; Ramses Amer, “Sino-Vietnamese Border
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Successful resolution of the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin issues do contribute to cooperative and friendly bilateral relations in various fields. How the experiences could transfer to the success of the last issue of the South China Sea proper seems to be limited at the moment. There was no noticeable tension in both 1999 and 2000 relating to the disputes in the South China Sea. Up to 2008, China-Vietnam interaction over the South China Sea issue showed a pattern of continuous dialogue with limited tension, and the tension were mostly caused by oil exploration and fishing in overlapping claimed sea area. During the period of 2009-2011, there were periodic increases in the level of tensions. In response, the two sides implemented management efforts resulting in the “Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues” (hereinafter known as Agreement on basic principles) in October 2011.

Differences between China and Vietnam increased in 2009. In early May 2009, Vietnam submitted a “Partial Submission” relating to Vietnam’s extended continental shelf in the “North Area” of the South China Sea as well as a “Joint Submission” together with Malaysia relating to the “southern part” of the South China Sea to the CLCS. Both submissions prompted China to protest and reiterate its claims in the South China Sea. On a more positive note, Government-level delegations dealing with territorial issues met on two occasions in 2009, in August and in November, respectively. Vietnam also protested about the arrest of Vietnamese fishermen by China on several occasions in 2009 and also in 2010. Furthermore, Chinese fishing bans led to Vietnamese protest in 2009 and 2010.

In response to the heightened tension, the Prime Ministers of the two countries held talks in Hanoi on 28 October 2010 and decided to “seek satisfactory solutions to existing issues relating to” the South China Sea. According to the official Vietnamese report, the two sides also “reached consensus on speeding up negotiations on basic principles to settle sea issues, and satisfactorily settling fishermen and fishing boat issues”. The official Chinese report did not mention anything about fishermen and fishing boats.

Open differences relating to activities in the South China Sea continued during the first half of 2011 and the most serious incidents occurred in late May and early June. Two incidents on 26 May and 9 June, respectively, were related to Vietnamese oil exploration activities in areas that Vietnamese considers to be within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf to the east of the Vietnamese coast, and that China considers as under its “jurisdiction”. Vietnam accused China of cutting the cables of the explorations ships operated by Vietnam, while China accused Vietnam of illegal activities within an area under its “jurisdiction”. During the 9 June incident, China also accused

31 For an overview of incidents during this period see Amer, “The Sino-Vietnamese,” op. cit., 264–267.
33 See Amer and Li, ‘Recent Developments in the South China Sea’, op. cit., 53–56.
Vietnam of chasing away Chinese fishing boats. In connection with the incidents, Vietnam explicitly rejected China’s claim within the so-called “nine-dashed lines” in the South China Sea.

After this public display of differences and tension relating to the activities in the South China Sea, the two countries took action to reduce the level of tension. Vietnam dispatched a Special Envoy to Beijing to discuss the situation with Chinese leaders. The two sides agreed to “speed up the tempo of negotiations so as to early sign an ‘Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between Vietnam and China’” as well as to “boost the implementation” of the DOC and of “follow-up activities so that substantial progress will soon be achieved.”

Two significant developments took place in October 2011: the Agreement on basic principles was signed in Beijing on 11 October, and the first high-level summit between the two countries since 2008 took place on 11-15 October when the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), Nguyen Phu Trong, visited China.

The Agreement on basic principles stated that the government-level delegations of both countries “agree that the satisfactory settlement of sea-related issues between Vietnam and China is suitable for the basic interests and common aspirations of the two countries’ people and helpful for regional peace, stability, co-operation and development.” They also agreed that on the basis of “common perceptions of the Vietnamese and Chinese leaders reached on sea-related issues” to “solve sea-related issues pursuant to” a set of “principles” divided into six points.34

During his visit to China, Trong met with China’s then President and Secretary-General of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Hu Jintao, and other Chinese leaders. In the Joint Statement issued in connection with the high-level summit, considerable attention was devoted to maritime issues. It was stated that the two sides “exchanged views in a sincere and straightforward manner on the sea issue, stressing their political will and determination to settle disputes via friendship, negotiation and talks in order to maintain peace and stability” in the South China Sea. The two sides agreed to “speed up negotiations on the sea issue, seek basic and long-term solutions acceptable to both sides”. The two sides also stated that they “will firmly speed up negotiations on the demarcation of areas beyond the mouth of the Tonkin Gulf and actively discuss co-operation for mutual development on this area.” 35

China’s then Vice-President, Xi Jinping, made an official visit to Vietnam on 20-22 December 2011. He held meetings with Vietnamese leaders. The two sides reviewed the overall collaboration between the two countries including territorial issues.

In February 2012, Vietnam’s Minister of Foreign Minister, Pham Binh Minh, made an official visit to China. In talks with his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, the two reviewed the bilateral relationship

34 For a detailed overview see Amer and Li, “Recent Developments in the South China Sea,” op. cit., 53–56; The text of the Agreement is reproduced as Annex in Amer, “China, Vietnam”.
including territorial issues and reiterated the two sides’ commitment to settle their differences by peaceful means. In late February, Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Ho Xuan Son, held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Zhang Zhijun, in Beijing. They agreed to establish working groups at the “department level to negotiate on the delineation of the sea area outside the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf mouth and cooperate in jointly developing this area”. They also agreed to set up working groups to cooperate in “less sensitive sea domains, including sea environment protection, scientific research out at sea, search and rescue activities and mitigation of damage caused by natural calamities”. Finally, they agreed to launch a “hotline between the two foreign ministries”. The hotline was opened on 2 March.

On 21-22 May 2012, the “first-round of talks at the departmental level” was held in Hanoi on the “demarcation of areas outside the mouth of” the Gulf of Tonkin in Hanoi. This signalled the resumption of talks relating to this area which started in January 2006. The second round of talks was held in Beijing on 26-27 September, 2012. The third round of talks was held in Hanoi on 29-30 May 2013. Two observations can be drawn here. First, when tensions increased in bilateral relations due to tension regarding the South China Sea, undergoing negotiations over the said area became inactive from 2009 to 2011. Second, clear improvement has been made in the third round of talks. Some more concrete arrangements have been raised. Both sides proposed positions in more details on relevant issues relating to maritime delimitation. Agreement was reached on strengthening negotiation over the issue of joint cooperation in the said area. A group of technical experts will be formed to carry out joint survey.  

From 29 to 30 May 2012, the first round of talks on “co-operation in less sensitive fields at sea” was held in Beijing, and cooperation principles and mechanisms were agreed upon. The second round of talks was held in Hanoi from 6 to 8 November. The third round of talks was held in Beijing from 22 to 24 April 2013 and three priority projects were identified in relation to joint search and rescue, environmental protection of the seas and islands in the Gulf of Tonkin, and comparative studies on Holocene-era sedimentary evolution in Yangtze Delta and Red River Delta. The fourth round of talks was convened in Hanoi from 24 to 26 September. At this round, the content of the agreements was agreed over the three projects. The next step is to go through relevant procedure to sign agreements so by the end of 2013 which would imply that two projects could be started.

Two high-level summits took place in 2013. The first was Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang’s State visit to China from 19 to 21 June 2013. In connection with the visit, an agreement between Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and China’s Ministry of Agriculture on “the establishment of a hot line on unexpected incidences in fishing operations at sea” was signed. In the

Joint Statement from the State visit, it was stated that the two sides had reached “consensus that the two Parties and States should maintain regular exchanges and dialogues”. They would “persistently seek fundamental and long-term solutions acceptable to both sides through consultations and friendly negotiations”. It was agreed to “intensify negotiations of the Working Group on the sea off” the Gulf of Tonkin as well as to “increase negotiations of the Working Group on Viet Nam – China cooperation in less sensitive issues at sea”. The two sides also agreed to “properly settling emerging issues with a constructive attitude, not letting the issue affect the overall situation” of their relationship as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea.” Finally, the two sides “reached consensus on the comprehensive and effective implementation” of the DOC.  

The second visit was Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s visit to Vietnam on 13-15 October. At the end of the visit, China and Vietnam issued a joint statement on further deepening their comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership in the new period, in which the role of high-level contacts between the two countries was hailed as irreplaceable, and both sides are committed to maintaining high-level contacts and visits and promoting high-level contacts in various forms. Like in the previous joint statement signed during Sang’s visit, sea issues were given high attention. Both sides emphasised cooperation and dispute management in relation to the sea issues. They agreed to “exercise tight control of maritime disputes and not to make any move that can further complicate or expand disputes, to make good use of the hotline between the two Foreign Ministries to manage and control disputes at sea as well as the one between the two Agriculture Ministries to promptly and suitably deal with problems arising from fishery activities at sea.” Both sides “will continue to actively discuss and seek efficient measures to control disputes and maintain the overall good bilateral relations, and peace and stability in the South China Sea”.  

Despite these positive developments, some incidents displayed that differences relating to the South China Sea still exist. This can be seen from official Vietnamese complaints in 2012 in response to (i) China’s fishing ban; (ii) the arrest of Vietnamese fishermen; (iii) the opening up of blocks for oil concessions in the South China Sea; (iv) Chinese activities relating to the establishment of the city of Sansha; and (v) an incident in late November in which Vietnam claimed that Chinese fishing boats had “blocked” and “severed” the cable of a Vietnamese seismic survey vessel in the vicinity of Con Co island in an area located within Vietnam’s continental shelf and EEZ. China’s main complaint was in response to the adoption of Vietnam’s “Law of the sea” also referred to as “Maritime Law”.  

There were also some incidents in 2013 that led to Vietnamese complaints in response to China’s activities in the South China Sea, e.g. legislative decisions and development plans affecting the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, activities in the two Archipelagos, and law enforcement activities by China against Vietnamese fishing boats in the Paracel area.

---

Dispute Management Approaches

As the respective countries were undergoing bilateral disputes over the issues in the South China Sea, efforts have been made from relevant countries on managing the situations. However, since 2009, outstanding differences have shown up between China-Vietnam and China Philippine approaches.

China-the Philippines: ad hoc mechanism

After the Mischief incident, China and the Philippines held talks leading to an eight-point code of conduct in the Joint Statement of the Republic of Philippines and the People’s Republic of China Consultations on the South China Sea and on other Areas of Cooperation of August 1995. This works as a model to initiate a more active role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the South China Sea, which led to the DOC signed between the ten ASEAN countries and China in November 2002. In 1996, China and the Philippines issued a joint press release in which both sides agreed to set up bilateral consultation mechanisms including three working groups in charge of fishery, marine environmental protection and confidence building respectively. In particular, for the aim of promoting confidence, practical cooperation was raised in the fields including search and rescue, anti-piracy and counter-smuggling. In the 2000 joint communiqué between the two foreign ministers, both reaffirmed the positive work by the confidence-building working groups and agreed to promote practical cooperation between the two militaries, in fields such as information sharing and disaster relief to promote maritime security. Therefore, during the period from 1995 to 2000, the two countries moved to initiate mechanisms for confidence building through practical measures rather than directly managing conflicts which may have resulted from the disputes.

Such cooperative environment was further promoted under the Arroyo Administration. Exchange of visits between the top leaders in the two countries played an important role in setting the tone for both countries to manage their maritime disputes. It was between the top leaders of China and the Philippines that the concept of joint development was first raised to manage their differences in the South China Sea. At the meeting between Deng Xiaoping and his Filipino counterpart Aquino on 16 April 1988, Deng was quoted by saying, “after many years of consideration, we think that to solve the issue (of Nansha/the Spratlys), all parties concerned could explore joint development under the premise of admitting China’s sovereignty over them.” The March 2005 JMSU agreement was highlighted during Hu Jingtao’s state visit to the Philippines in 2005. In the joint statement issued during Hu’s visit, both agreed to “continuously make efforts to maintain peace and stability in the

45 Li and Amer, ‘Recent Practices’, op. cit., 94.
South China Sea region and extend the welcome to the China-the Philippines-Vietnam JMSU."  

However, this wishful thinking has not been materialised. At the end of the first stage of work in 2008, the project came to an end due to domestic politics in some country. The maritime disputes prevail and bilateral tensions in relation to the South China Sea increase since 2009 in particular after Aquino III took office. Regarding the resolution of the South China Sea issues, both countries emphasised the importance of peaceful settlement. Both agreed that direct communication would help ease tensions. However, there appears a divergence of approaches to dispute settlement in recent developments. China wants to resolve the disputes through direct diplomatic means, i.e. bilaterally. At the same time China's practice of promoting coordination with ASEAN is to manage the overall situation in relation to the South China Sea. According to China, the DOC, as well as a possible future Code of Conduct (COC) when ready, is not for dispute settlement but conflict management for peace, security and stability of the region. 

On the other hand, the Philippines have turned to alternative practices beyond bilateral means. It has tried to get a unified voice within ASEAN, to get support from its treaty ally of the United States, and to go for international jurisprudence. 

First, the Philippine has been promoting one voice within ASEAN to deal with China in efforts on two attempts. The first attempt is to push for a legally binding COC. In the first half of 2011, the top leaders and officials of the Philippine Government travelled through the key countries of ASEAN for such a purpose. In April, during Rosario’s visit to Vietnam he agreed with Vietnam counterpart to mutually push ahead for the COC. In May, Aquino III visited Thailand and Brunei. During the visit, he was trying to persuade the two countries to press China to reach a COC. The second attempt is to promote the ASEAN-China Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFFC). At an August forum, Rosario promoted the concept of ZoPFFC. He explained that under the ZoPFFC, the relevant disputed features in the South China Sea would be segregated from the undisputed waters in accordance with international law, specifically the UNCLOS. In the Joint Communiqué of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on 19 July 2011, the ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) was asked, with the assistance from maritime legal experts, to seriously study the proposal of ZoPFFC. 

Second, more clearly than before, the Philippines have turned to the U.S. for security reassurance in dealing with a bigger neighbouring country like China. The U.S.-Philippine alliance relationship was considered as the basis of Aquino III’s government. Since Aquino III took office, the U.S. has provided economic and military assistance to the Philippines, openly expressing its plan to improve the

48 Li and Amer, “Will the China-Philippine Standoff”, op. cit.  
49 Ju, ‘South China Sea Policy of the Philippines’, op. cit., 90.  
Philippines’ capability in protecting the sovereignty over the islands by providing the Philippines with new military equipment and strengthening bilateral military cooperation. In February 2011, Rosario stated that the U.S. was the only strategic partner of the Philippines. In March, then U.S. secretary of State Clinton exchanged views over the phone with her Filipino counterpart Rosario. Both emphasised the need to ensure maritime security in the Asia Pacific and agreed that a way forward was the conclusion of a binding regional code of conduct in the South China Sea. Also in June, the Philippines and the U.S. carried out one bilateral and one multilateral military exercise in or near the South China Sea area. During the Scarborough Reef incident, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs posted a message on its official website stating that Clinton had firmly reiterated that the U.S. would honour its treaty obligations under its Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines and urged claimant countries to clarify and settle their claims legally in accordance with international law including the UNCLOS. At the ASEAN-U.S. Ministerial Meeting held on 11 July 2012, Clinton echoed the Philippine position in promoting one common ASEAN voice by saying, “[w]hat might be a challenge today for some of ASEAN’s members, if left unaddressed by all of ASEAN, could lead tomorrow to issues that may become problems for (the rest of) other ASEAN members.” This was interpreted in reference to the tensions in the South China Sea.

Third, the possibility of international jurisprudence has been explored and put into practice. In Aquino III’s Nation Address of 25 July 2011, it was raised that “[w]e are also studying the possibility of elevating the case on the West Philippine Sea to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, to make certain that all involved nations approach the dispute with calm and forbearance.” On 22 January 2013 the Philippines brought China to arbitration “under Article 287 and Annex VII of UNCLOS” to challenge “the validity of China’s nine-dash line claim” and to “desist from unlawful activities that violate the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines under the 1982 UNCLOS”. From the perspective of the Philippines, it “has exhausted almost all political and diplomatic avenues for a peaceful negotiated settlement of its maritime dispute with China.” It is the first time that international jurisprudence is invoked in relation to the South China Sea issues.

---

54 Ju, “South China Sea Policy of the Philippines”, op. cit., 86.
59 Note 10, ‘Statement: The Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China, January 22, 2013’.
60 Ibid.
In order to manage their territorial disputes, China and Vietnam initiated a system of talks and discussions which was both highly structured and extensive, and from bottom to top they were as follows: (i) Expert-level talks; (ii) Government-level talks, i.e. Deputy/Vice-Minister; (iii) Foreign Minister-level talks; and (iv) High-level talks, i.e. Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Secretary-Generals of the CPC and the CPV. This system of talks was gradually established following the full normalisation of bilateral relations in late 1991 and has contributed to positive management of the China-Vietnam disputes in relation to the South China Sea.

The talks at the expert- and government-levels deserve further attention. Talks at the expert-level were initiated in October 1992; up to late 1995, the talks focused mainly on the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin issues. Talks at the government-level began in August 1993 and the thirteenth round of talks was held in January 2007. There have also been meetings and talks that have not been included in the official rounds. The first achievement was the signing of an agreement on 19 October 1993 on the principles for handling the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin disputes. It was further agreed that joint working groups were to be set up at the expert-level to deal with the two issues. The joint working group on the land border held sixteen rounds of talks from February 1994 to December 1999 when the Land Border Treaty was signed. The joint working group on the Gulf of Tonkin met seventeen times from March 1994 to December 2000 when the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin was signed. Talks at the expert-level on the disputes in the South China Sea proper, the so-called “sea issues”, were initiated in November 1995 and the eleventh round of talks was held in July 2006.

The negotiation process resulting in the signing of a treaty relating to the land border on 30 December 1999 reflected the substantially higher degree of progress made in negotiations on the land border as compared with talks on other border disputes up to the end of 1999. In 2000, the negotiations on the Gulf of Tonkin issue were stepped up with a view of reaching an agreement within that year. This goal was reached on 25 December 2000. Thus, the deadline for resolving the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin issues, were met in 1999 and 2000, respectively.

Less progress has been achieved with regards to the disputes in the South China Sea proper, i.e. the competing sovereignty claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos as well as the overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea. Talks have been initiated and since August 2009, the focus of the Government-level Talks over border issues is over the sea issues. Although talks continue all

---

61 For a broad overview on the border issues in Sino-Vietnamese relations see Amer, “Sino-Vietnamese Border,” op. cit., 295–309.
through, both parties have yet to agree on which disputes to be included on the agenda. Vietnam pushes for the inclusion of the Paracels as an issue alongside that of the Spratlys, whereas China only wants to discuss the latter issue. To further complicate matters, China seems to view the disputes over water and continental shelf areas as part of the Spratly conflict whereas Vietnam seems to view them as separated from that conflict. It seems as though Vietnam does not want to initiate talks relating to the areas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea proper as it would be interpreted as giving legitimacy to China’s claims to those areas. Thus, of the three South China Sea issues to be addressed by the two countries there is only agreement on putting one on the agenda for talks, namely the Spratly archipelago, which is a multilateral conflict situation involving other claimants as well.

With recognition of the importance on managing bilateral dispute, especially after the 2009-2011 increase in tension, China and Vietnam emphasises the importance of communication by high-level talks in the three Joint Statements of October 2011, June 2013 and October 2013, with the last one encouraging high-level talks “in various forms”.

Since 2005, additional talks have been initiated. Although they are not directly dealing with territorial issues, they work to create good environment for future discussion on thorny issues of territorial disputes. The first is China-Vietnam defence and security consultation mechanism, headed by Vice-Defence Minister level generals from both countries. The first round of defence talks started in April 2005 and was targeted to be held annually. On 6 June 2013, the 7th Defence and Security Talks was held in Beijing. The solidarity between the two militaries contributes to a great extent to positive management of the dispute situation. The second is a series of talks of China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation. This mechanism is cross-department including different ministries. The first meeting was held in Hanoi on 11 November 2006. Because the purpose of such mechanism is promote all-around cooperation by coordination, sea issues can be discussed, in particular when tension occurs this mechanism can act as a security valve. Cooperation can reduce sense of tensions. For example, after the May-June 2011 tension it was at the 5th meeting on 6 September 2011 when proper handling of sea issues was emphasised and more negotiations were encouraged to reach agreement on the basic principles. In addition, hotlines were established, one between two foreign ministries and the other between agriculture ministries with the latter dealing with fishery issues including dispute fishery cases.

---

65 In the joint communiqué issued during Vietnamese President Troung’s visit to China in June 2013, it was written that ministries of agriculture from both countries would establish hotlines to deal with fishery cases. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China-Vietnam Joint Communiqué,” June 21, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1052237.shtml.
Conclusions

The most evident feature shown from the above empirical overview is that between China and Vietnam there are established forms of dialogues and talks at different levels to address differences and tensions. On the other hand, between China and the Philippines there are no such established forms of dialogues. In fact, between China and Vietnam, the structure of talks has been developed continuously since the early 1990s, and the two sides have agreed on mechanisms and principles to better handle and manage their differences. Between China and the Philippines, both countries currently lack stablished forms of dialogue and mechanism that can be contrasted with the mid-1990s when the two sides even agreed on a bilateral “code of conduct” to be observed in the South China Sea.

The different tension management approaches of the two relationships can be observed when comparing China and Vietnam’s response to the deep tensions in 2011 with the response by China and the Philippines to the tensions in both 2011 and 2012. China and Vietnam reached the Agreement on basic principles in October 2011 and took steps to implement the agreement in 2012 and 2013. In addition, in October 2011, the two countries held the first high-level summit which was vacant for three years since 2008. At the summit, the South China Sea issues were directly addressed. The respective high-level summits of June and October 2013 confirmed this trend. Between China and the Philippines, no equivalent progress has taken place. Both countries depend on ad hoc diplomatic negotiations to reduce the tensions in relation to their maritime disputes. This has been shown very obviously in the Scarborough Reef incident of 2012. Even into the peak of tensions, the Philippines failed to appoint their ambassador to China. In the end, two envoys were chosen to send to Beijing to handle the negotiations. The 18th Foreign Ministry Consultations (FMC) was held in Manila on 19 October 2012. However, this regular bilateral foreign-minister-level mechanism has not touched maritime dispute issues, but a venue for the two countries to discuss bilateral, regional and multilateral issues of mutual concern in general, including promoting areas of cooperation in various fields, such as trade and investment, tourism, culture and education, defence and security, agriculture and fisheries, transportation and communication, and consular matters. The Philippines’ recent move to go for arbitration is an obvious divergence from bilateral mechanisms. However, at the moment, it is hard to predict its impacts on bilateral relations. Clearly a lack of a bilateral mechanism to invoke to when maritime disputes occur would negatively affect the effectiveness in bilaterally handling such issues and open doors to other options.

From the history of the China-Philippines relations relating to the South China Sea issues, the period from 1995 to 2000 seems to be more proactive years in promoting bilateral mechanisms in managing the issues which otherwise could lead to tensions. In August 1995, the first bilateral code of conduct in the South China Sea region was reached between the two countries. In 1996, some bilateral

---

66 Some of the observations relating to the China-Vietnam relationship are derived from Amer and Li ‘Recent Developments in the South China Sea’: and from Amer, ‘China, Vietnam’.
consultation mechanisms including three working groups were agreed to be set up in charge of fishery, marine environmental protection and confidence building respectively. It was due to mutual political will resulted from the realisation of the need for such a dispute management mechanism. Such cooperative interaction positively affected other disputant parties as well as ASEAN as a whole to lead to the DOC. Partially due to the ASEAN-China confidence-building mechanism, in particular strong political will from both countries in relation to the China-Philippine management in their disputes, the South China Sea remains reasonable calm up till 2009. The improvement in the overall bilateral cooperative relations contributed positively to the bilateral success in handling differences and promoting cooperation in the disputed sea area, including the trilateral 2005-2008 JMSU. However, it seems unfortunate that under such positive relations no bilateral mechanisms were formally established in relation to managing the South China Sea issues. The China-Philippine relations were negatively affected by the recent development of their maritime disputes, which was obviously shown in the 2012 Scarborough Reef incident. The obvious lack of some mechanism in coordinating or managing their differences in relation to South China Sea disputes could easily turn the situation out of control. This would be detrimental to bilateral relations and confidence building. In view of both countries’ consensus on not letting their maritime issues affect the general friendly relations, there is an urgent need for such a mechanism.

A summary of the main achievements by China and Vietnam displays that the demarcation of the land border has been completed. In the Gulf of Tonkin, both the boundary agreement and the fishery agreement have entered into force. On-going talks and discussions on the remaining territorial disputes in the South China Sea is a further indication of the importance placed by both countries on managing and avoiding tension.

However, continued efforts are needed. In the Gulf of Tonkin, successful completion of the negotiations on the delimitation of the so-called mouth of the Gulf is important. An interim approach could be a bilateral joint development arrangement in relevant agreed waters in the mouth area. The continued implementation of the fishery agreement is essential. The collaboration relating to the maintenance of order in the Gulf through joint-patrols needs to be expanded. In the South China Sea, it is essential to avoid future confrontation in the area, not only for bilateral relations but also for the stability in the region. It is also necessary to move both the bilateral and multilateral conflict management process forward. Although formal settlements of the disputes are unlikely in the current situation there is room for further progress both bilaterally and multilaterally in managing both disputes and the broader security situation in the South China Sea.

At the bilateral level, the October 2011 Agreement on basic principles has enhanced the mechanisms for management of sea-related issues and disputes through a de facto bilateral ‘code of conduct’ and the High-level Summit of October 2011 signalled a renewed high-level push for better management of the sea-related issues. This high-level push continues as displayed by the June 2013 High-level summit and the October 2013 visit to Vietnam by Li Keqiang. The combination of these two factors has created more conducive conditions to manage disputes and to reduce tension between China
and Vietnam in the South China Sea. This addresses the need to enhance and expand the bilateral management approach relating to the South China Sea issues.

As has been the case since full normalisation of the China-Vietnam relations, overlapping claims to the sea area to the East of the Vietnamese coastline will most likely be the subject of continued differences between the two countries. The risk of incidents and periodic tension is likely to persist. Developments in 2012 and 2013 support this prediction. On a more positive note, the initiation of “department level” talks on the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin and the initiation of talks on “co-operation in less sensitive fields at sea” display that the two sides are making progress in implementing the Agreement on basic principles.

One issue that remains to be addressed is the lack of mutual agreement on the scope of talks on the South China Sea. Only the Spratlys is on the agenda. China opposes the inclusion of the Paracels. Vietnam opposes the inclusion of areas to the east of the Vietnamese coast where Vietnam claims to continental shelf and EEZ areas extend beyond the limit of the so-called ‘nine-dashed lines’ claim by China.

At the regional level, all three countries are parties to the DOC. China, the Philippines, and Vietnam can positively contribute to the successful implementation of the DOC, and also to the process of further developing the conflict management mechanisms needed to maintain stability, and avoid tension and confrontation in the South China Sea. A possible future regional “code of conduct” applicable to the South China Sea within the framework of the ASEAN-China dialogue, could contribute to such a development.

Through the comparative case study analysis, the differences in approach between the China-Philippines case and the China-Vietnam case, respectively, have been clearly displayed in this study. The comparison has highlighted how the existence and utilisation of bilateral mechanisms has helped China and Vietnam manage tension relating to developments in the South China Sea. On the other hand, there is absence of similar mechanisms between China and Philippines, and the two sides have failed to contain incidents in the South China Sea from causing periodically deep tensions.

From a conflict management perspective, China and Vietnam have, since the full normalisation of relations in 1991, sought to manage their border disputes through the establishment and development of a system of talks. This approach has resulted in both formal settlement of disputes – land border and Gulf of Tonkin – and in better management of disputes and incidents in the South China Sea. Between China and the Philippines, attempts were made to establish mechanisms for conflict management in the 1990s and 2000s but they have not been sustained, and in recent years the absence of such mechanisms has been in evidence.
RSIS Working Paper Series

1. Vietnam-China Relations Since The End of The Cold War
   Ang Cheng Guan (1998)

   Desmond Ball (1999)

3. Reordering Asia: “Cooperative Security” or Concert of Powers?
   Amitav Acharya (1999)

4. The South China Sea Dispute re-visited
   Ang Cheng Guan (1999)

   Joseph Liow Chin Yong (1999)

6. ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ as Justified, Executed and Mediated by NATO:
   Strategic Lessons for Singapore
   Kumar Ramakrishna (2000)

7. Taiwan’s Future: Mongolia or Tibet?
   Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung (2001)

8. Asia-Pacific Diplomacies: Reading Discontinuity in Late-Modern Diplomatic Practice
   Tan See Seng (2001)

9. Framing “South Asia”: Whose Imagined Region?
   Sinderpal Singh (2001)

10. Explaining Indonesia’s Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy
    Terence Lee Chek Liang (2001)

11. Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation
    Tan See Seng (2001)

    Nguyen Phuong Binh (2001)

13. Framework for Autonomy in Southeast Asia’s Plural Societies
    Miriam Coronel Ferrer (2001)

    Ananda Rajah (2001)

15. Natural Resources Management and Environmental Security in Southeast Asia: Case Study of Clean Water Supplies in Singapore
    Kog Yue Choong (2001)

16. Crisis and Transformation: ASEAN in the New Era
    Etel Solingen (2001)

17. Human Security: East Versus West?
    Amitav Acharya (2001)

18. Asian Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations
    Barry Desker (2001)

19. Multilateralism, Neo-liberalism and Security in Asia: The Role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum
    Ian Taylor (2001)

20. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping as Issues for Asia-Pacific Security
    Derek McDougal (2001)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. The Contested Concept of Security</td>
<td>Amitav Acharya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Security and Security Studies After September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Democratisation In South Korea And Taiwan: The Effect Of Social Division On Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations</td>
<td>Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?</td>
<td>Tan See Seng</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>International Responses to Terrorism: The Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control of Terrorism by Regional Arrangement with Particular Reference to ASEAN</td>
<td>Ong Yen Nee</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization</td>
<td>Nan Li</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges, and Warfighting</td>
<td>Nan Li</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11</td>
<td>Barry Desker</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of September 11 For American Power</td>
<td>Evelyn Goh</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Not Yet All Aboard….But Already All At Sea Over Container Security Initiative</td>
<td>Irvin Lim</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulation in East Asia: Still Perverse?</td>
<td>Andrew Walter</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Indonesia and The Washington Consensus</td>
<td>Premjith Sadasivian</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Liquidity Support and The Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience</td>
<td>J Soedradjad Djiwandono</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
41. A UK Perspective on Defence Equipment Acquisition

42. Regionalisation of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership
   Mely C. Anthony (2003)

43. The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round
   Razeen Sally (2003)

44. Seeking Security In The Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia In The Emerging Asian Order
   Amitav Acharya (2003)

45. Deconstructing Political Islam In Malaysia: UMNO’S Response To PAS’ Religio-Political Dialectic

46. The War On Terror And The Future of Indonesian Democracy

47. Examining The Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case
   Eduardo Lachica (2003)

48. Sovereignty and The Politics of Identity in International Relations
   Adrian Kuah (2003)

49. Deconstructing Jihad; Southeast Asia Contexts
   Patricia Martinez (2003)

50. The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion

51. In Search of Suitable Positions’ in the Asia Pacific: Negotiating the US-China Relationship and Regional Security

52. American Unilateralism, Foreign Economic Policy and the ‘Securitisation’ of Globalisation

53. Fireball on the Water: Naval Force Protection-Projection, Coast Guarding, Customs Border Security & Multilateral Cooperation in Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror from the Sea
   Irvin Lim (2003)

54. Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy
   Chong Ja Ian (2003)

55. Pre-emption and Prevention: An Ethical and Legal Critique of the Bush Doctrine and Anticipatory Use of Force In Defence of the State

56. The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Implications for Regional Economic Integration
   Helen E S Nesadurai (2003)

57. The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operation
   Joshua Ho (2003)

   Irvin Lim (2004)

59. Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia
   Andrew Tan (2004)

60. Testing Alternative Responses to Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding and Beleaguering in the Real World
   Chong Ja Ian (2004)
61. Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004

62. Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Issues: A Study of Human and Drug Trafficking in East Asia

63. Outlook for Malaysia’s 11th General Election

64. Not Many Jobs Take a Whole Army: Special Operations Forces and The Revolution in Military Affairs.

65. Technological Globalisation and Regional Security in East Asia
   J.D. Kenneth Boutin (2004)

66. UAVs/UCAVS – Missions, Challenges, and Strategic Implications for Small and Medium Powers

67. Singapore’s Reaction to Rising China: Deep Engagement and Strategic Adjustment

68. The Shifting Of Maritime Power And The Implications For Maritime Security In East Asia
   Joshua Ho (2004)


70. Examining the Defence Industrialization-Economic Growth Relationship: The Case of Singapore
   Adrian Kuah and Bernard Loo (2004)

71. “Constructing” The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry
   Kumar Ramakrishna (2004)

72. Malaysia and The United States: Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement
   Helen E S Nesadurai (2004)

73. The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform
   John Bradford (2005)

74. Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment
   Catherine Zara Raymond (2005)

75. Southeast Asian Maritime Security In The Age Of Terror: Threats, Opportunity, And Charting The Course Forward
   John Bradford (2005)

76. Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives
   Manjeet Singh Pardesi (2005)

77. Towards Better Peace Processes: A Comparative Study of Attempts to Broker Peace with MNLF and GAM
   S P Harish (2005)

78. Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics
   Amitav Acharya (2005)

79. The State and Religious Institutions in Muslim Societies
   Riaz Hassan (2005)

80. On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies
   Riaz Hassan (2005)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81.</td>
<td>The Security of Regional Sea Lanes</td>
<td>Joshua Ho</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relationship and Reform in the Defence Industry</td>
<td>Arthur S Ding</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.</td>
<td>Autobiography, Politics and Ideology in Sayyid Qutb’s Reading of the Qur’an</td>
<td>Umej Bhatia</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87.</td>
<td>Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88.</td>
<td>China’s Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends &amp; Dynamics</td>
<td>Srikanth Kondapalli</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.</td>
<td>Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the Bush Doctrine</td>
<td>Simon Dalby</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.</td>
<td>Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of the Riau Archipelago</td>
<td>Nankyung Choi</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92.</td>
<td>The Impact of RMA on Conventional Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis</td>
<td>Manjeet Singh Pardesi</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93.</td>
<td>Africa and the Challenge of Globalisation</td>
<td>Jeffrey Herbst</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94.</td>
<td>The East Asian Experience: The Poverty of ‘Picking Winners’</td>
<td>Barry Desker and Deborah Elms</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.</td>
<td>Bandung And The Political Economy Of North-South Relations: Sowing The Seeds For Revisioning International Society</td>
<td>Helen E S Nesadurai</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96.</td>
<td>Re-conceptualising the Military-Industrial Complex: A General Systems Theory Approach</td>
<td>Adrian Kuah</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99.</td>
<td>Securitizing/Desecuritizing the Filipinos’ ‘Outward Migration Issue’in the Philippines’ Relations with Other Asian Governments</td>
<td>José N. Franco, Jr.</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.</td>
<td>Securitization Of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis To India</td>
<td>Josy Joseph</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
102. Securitizing border-crossing: The case of marginalized stateless minorities in the Thai-Burma Borderlands
Mika Toyota (2006)

103. The Incidence of Corruption in India: Is the Neglect of Governance Endangering Human Security in South Asia?
Shabnam Mallick and Rajarshi Sen (2006)

104. The LTTE’s Online Network and its Implications for Regional Security
Shyam Tekwani (2006)

105. The Korean War June-October 1950: Inchon and Stalin In The “Trigger Vs Justification” Debate
Tan Kwoh Jack (2006)

106. International Regime Building in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Cooperation against the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs
Ralf Emmers (2006)

107. Changing Conflict Identities: The case of the Southern Thailand Discord
S P Harish (2006)

108. Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities?
Christopher B Roberts (2006)

109. TEMPORAL DOMINANCE
Military Transformation and the Time Dimension of Strategy
Edwin Seah (2006)

110. Globalization and Military-Industrial Transformation in South Asia: An Historical Perspective
Emrys Chew (2006)

111. UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime
Sam Bateman (2006)

112. Freedom and Control Networks in Military Environments
Paul T Mitchell (2006)

113. Rewriting Indonesian History The Future in Indonesia’s Past
Kwa Chong Guan (2006)

114. Twelver Shi’ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects
Christoph Marcinkowski (2006)

115. Islam, State and Modernity: Muslim Political Discourse in Late 19th and Early 20th century India
Iqbal Singh Sevea (2006)

Ong Wei Chong (2006)

117. “From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI”
Elena Pavlova (2006)

118. The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry
Adam Dolnik (2006)

119. The Many Faces of Political Islam
Mohammed Ayoob (2006)

120. Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (I): Thailand and Indonesia
Christoph Marcinkowski (2006)

121. Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (II): Malaysia and Singapore
Christoph Marcinkowski (2006)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama</td>
<td>Mohamed Nawab</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Islam and Violence in Malaysia</td>
<td>Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Between Greater Iran and Shi'te Crescent: Some Thoughts on the Nature of Iran’s Ambitions in the Middle East</td>
<td>Christoph Marcinkowski</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Thinking Ahead: Shi'te Islam in Iraq and its Seminaries (hawzah 'ilmiiyyah)</td>
<td>Christoph Marcinkowski</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Richard A. Bitzinger</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>Contested Capitalism: Financial Politics and Implications for China</td>
<td>Richard Carney</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>War, Peace or Neutrality: An Overview of Islamic Polity's Basis of Inter-State Relations</td>
<td>Muhammad Haniff Hassan</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>The Ulama in Pakistani Politics</td>
<td>Mohamed Nawab</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>China’s Proactive Engagement in Asia: Economics, Politics and Interactions</td>
<td>Li Mingjiang</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>The PLA’s Role in China’s Regional Security Strategy</td>
<td>Qi Dapeng</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>War As They Knew It: Revolutionary War and Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Ong Wei Chong</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>Indonesia’s Direct Local Elections: Background and Institutional Framework</td>
<td>Nankyung Choi</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Contextualizing Political Islam for Minority Muslims</td>
<td>Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern / Post-modern Navies of the Asia Pacific</td>
<td>Geoffrey Till</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>Sulawesi: Aspirations of Local Muslims</td>
<td>Rohaiza Ahmad Asi</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
143. Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Suharto Indonesia  
Noorhaidi Hasan (2007)

144. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and The Maritime Balance of Power in Historical Perspective  
Emrys Chew (2007)

145. New Security Dimensions in the Asia Pacific  
Barry Desker (2007)

146. Japan’s Economic Diplomacy towards East Asia: Fragmented Realism and Naïve Liberalism  
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2007)

147. U.S. Primacy, Eurasia’s New Strategic Landscape, and the Emerging Asian Order  
Alexander L. Vuving (2007)

148. The Asian Financial Crisis and ASEAN’s Concept of Security  
Yongwook Ryu (2008)

149. Security in the South China Sea: China’s Balancing Act and New Regional Dynamics  
Li Mingjiang (2008)

150. The Defence Industry in the Post-Transformational World: Implications for the United States and Singapore  
Richard A Bitzinger (2008)

151. The Islamic Opposition in Malaysia: New Trajectories and Directions  
Mohamed Fauz Abdul Hamid (2008)

152. Thinking the Unthinkable: The Modernization and Reform of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia  
Farish A. Noor (2008)

153. Outlook for Malaysia’s 12th General Elections  
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Shahirah Mahmood and Joseph Chinyong Liow (2008)

154. The use of SOLAS Ship Security Alert Systems  
Thomas Timlen (2008)

155. Thai-Chinese Relations: Security and Strategic Partnership  
Chulacheeb Chinwanno (2008)

156. Sovereignty in ASEAN and the Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea  
JN Mak (2008)

157. Sino-U.S. Competition in Strategic Arms  
Arthur S. Ding (2008)

158. Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism  

159. Interpreting Islam On Plural Society  
Muhammad Haniff Hassan (2008)

160. Towards a Middle Way Islam in Southeast Asia: Contributions of the Gülen Movement  
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman (2008)

161. Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia  
Evan A. Laksmana (2008)

162. The Securitization of Human Trafficking in Indonesia  
Rizal Sukma (2008)

163. The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) of Malaysia: Communitarianism Across Borders?  
Farish A. Noor (2008)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>A Merlion at the Edge of an Afrasian Sea: Singapore’s Strategic Involvement in the Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Emrys Chew</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Political Risk of Overseas Investments</td>
<td>Friedrich Wu</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>The Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites</td>
<td>Jennifer Yang Hui</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>Beibu Gulf: Emerging Sub-regional Integration between China and ASEAN</td>
<td>Gu Xiaosong and Li Mingjiang</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>Islamic Law In Contemporary Malaysia: Prospects and Problems</td>
<td>Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>&quot;Indonesia’s Salafist Sufis&quot;</td>
<td>Julia Day Howell</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia</td>
<td>Mohammed Nawab Mohamed Osman</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>Islamizing Formal Education: Integrated Islamic School and a New Trend in Formal Education Institution in Indonesia</td>
<td>Noorhaidi Hasan</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>The Implementation of Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty: Bilateral and Regional Implications</td>
<td>Do Thi Thuy</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>The Tablighi Jama’at Movement in the Southern Provinces of Thailand Today: Networks and Modalities</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>The Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at Across Western, Central and Eastern Java and the role of the Indian Muslim Diaspora</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>Significance of Abu Dujana and Zarkasih’s Verdict</td>
<td>Nurfarahislinda Binte Mohamed Ismail, V. Arianti and Jennifer Yang Hui</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>The Capacities of Coast Guards to deal with Maritime Challenges in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Prabhakaran Paleri</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>China and Asian Regionalism: Pragmatism Hinders Leadership</td>
<td>Li Mingjiang</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>Livelihood Strategies Amongst Indigenous Peoples in the Central Cardamom Protected Forest, Cambodia</td>
<td>Long Sarou</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>Human Trafficking in Cambodia: Reintegration of the Cambodian illegal migrants from Vietnam and Thailand</td>
<td>Neth Naro</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>The Philippines as an Archipelagic and Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges, and Perspectives</td>
<td>Mary Ann Palma</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185.</td>
<td>U.S. Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia: From Manifest Destiny to Shared Destiny</td>
<td>Errys Chew</td>
<td>(2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188.</td>
<td>Informal Caucuses within the WTO: Singapore in the “Invisibles Group”</td>
<td>Barry Desker</td>
<td>(2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191.</td>
<td>The Arrival and Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at in West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>(2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198.</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime in East Asian waters: Military and intelligence-gathering activities, Marine Scientific Research (MSR) and hydrographic surveys in an EEZ</td>
<td>Yang Fang</td>
<td>(2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Future of U.S. Power: Is China Going to Eclipse the United States? Two Possible Scenarios to 2040</td>
<td>Tuomo Kuosa</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>Swords to Ploughshares: China’s Defence-Conversion Policy</td>
<td>Lee Dongmin</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Asia Rising and the Maritime Decline of the West: A Review of the Issues</td>
<td>Geoffrey Till</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>From Empire to the War on Terror: The 1915 Indian Sepoy Mutiny in Singapore as a case study of the impact of profiling of religious and ethnic minorities.</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Enabling Security for the 21st Century: Intelligence &amp; Strategic Foresight and Warning</td>
<td>Helene Lavoix</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian Regionalism</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers and John Ravenhill</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>India’s Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities</td>
<td>Colonel Harinder Singh</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>A Response to Fourth Generation Warfare</td>
<td>Amos Khan</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute: The Interplay of Nationalism and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>Mapping the Religious and Secular Parties in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi, Indonesia</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>The Aceh-based Militant Network: A Trigger for a View into the Insightful Complex of Conceptual and Historical Links</td>
<td>Giora Eliraz</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>Evolving Global Economic Architecture: Will We have a New Bretton Woods?</td>
<td>Pradumna B. Rana</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Transforming the Military: The Energy Imperative</td>
<td>Kelvin Wong</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>ASEAN Institutionalisation: The Function of Political Values and State Capacity</td>
<td>Christopher Roberts</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>China’s Military Build-up in the Early Twenty-first Century: From Arms Procurement to War-fighting Capability</td>
<td>Yoram Evron</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>Darul Uloom Deoband: Stemming the Tide of Radical Islam in India</td>
<td>Taberez Ahmed Neyazi</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Grounds for Cautious Optimism?</td>
<td>Carlyle A. Thayer</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>Emerging Powers and Cooperative Security in Asia</td>
<td>Joshy M. Paul</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222.</td>
<td>What happened to the smiling face of Indonesian Islam?</td>
<td>Martin Van Bruinessen</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning in Cross-Country Perspective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224.</td>
<td>Winds of Change in Sarawak Politics?</td>
<td>Faisal S Hazis</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225.</td>
<td>Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World and Its</td>
<td>Li Mingjiang</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for the Next Stage of Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228.</td>
<td>Monetary Integration in ASEAN+3: A Perception Survey of Opinion</td>
<td>Pradumna Bickram Rana, Wai-Mun Chia &amp;</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>Yothin Jinjarak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229.</td>
<td>Dealing with the “North Korea Dilemma”: China’s Strategic Choices</td>
<td>You Ji</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.</td>
<td>Street, Shrine, Square and Soccer Pitch: Comparative Protest Spaces</td>
<td>Teresita Cruz-del Rosario and James M.</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Asia and the Middle East</td>
<td>Dorsey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231.</td>
<td>The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the landscape of Indonesian</td>
<td>Farish A Noor</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islamist Politics: Cadre-Training as Mode of Preventive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radicalisation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Prospects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Studies and History textbooks of Indonesia, from Primary to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary Level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theoretical Implications for Changes of Third-World Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oriented Institution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235.</td>
<td>Getting from Here to There: Stitching Together Goods Agreements in</td>
<td>Deborah Elms</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.</td>
<td>Indonesia’s Democratic Politics and Foreign Policy-Making: A Case</td>
<td>Iisgindarsah</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study of Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2007-2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237.</td>
<td>Reflections on Defence Security in East Asia</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238.</td>
<td>The Evolving Multi-layered Global Financial Safety Net: Role of Asia</td>
<td>Pradumna B. Rana</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239.</td>
<td>Chinese Debates of South China Sea Policy: Implications for Future</td>
<td>Li Mingjiang</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
241. The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign Policy: The case of Philippines-China relations since 2004
   Aileen S.P. Baviera (2012)

242. The Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR) of Jakarta: An Ethnic-Cultural Solidarity Movement in a Globalising Indonesia
   Farish A. Noor (2012)

243. Role of Intelligence in International Crisis Management
   Kwa Chong Guan (2012)

244. Malaysia’s China Policy in the Post-Mahathir Era: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation
   KUIK Cheng-Chwee (2012)

245. Dividing the Korean Peninsula: The Rhetoric of the George W. Bush Administration
   Sarah Teo (2012)

246. China’s Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security
   Zhang Hongzhou (2012)

247. By Invitation, Mostly: the International Politics of the US Security Presence, China, and the South China Sea
   Christopher Freise (2012)

248. Governing for the Future: What Governments can do
   Peter Ho (2012)

249. ASEAN’s centrality in a rising Asia
   Benjamin Ho (2012)

250. Malaysia’s U.S. Policy under Najib: Ambivalence no more?
   KUIK Cheng-Chwee (2012)

251. Securing the State: National Security in Contemporary Times
   Sir David Omand GCB (2012)

252. Bangladesh-India Relations: Sheikh Hasina’s India-Positive Policy Approach
   Bhumitra Chakma (2012)

253. Strengthening Economic Linkages Between South and East Asia: The Case for a Second Round of “Look East” Policies
   Pradumna B Rana and Chia Wai-Mun (2013)

254. The Eurozone Crisis and Its Impact on Asia
   Pradumna B Rana and Michael Blomenhofer (2013)

255. Security Identity, Policymaking Regime and Japanese Security Policy Development
   Bhubhindar Singh (2013)

256. The Rising Chorus of Chinese Exceptionalism
   Benjamin Ho Tze Ern (2013)

257. Iran: How Intelligence and Policy Intersect
   Robert Jervis (2013)

258. Enhancing Global and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Management and Resolution
   Ibrahim A. Gambari (2013)

259. A New Containment-Policy – The Curbing of War and Violent Conflict in World Society
   Andreas Herberg-Rothe (2013)

260. The Strategy of Coercive Isolation in U.S. Security Policy
   Timothy W. Crawford (2013)

261. Beyond its Mineral/Natural Resources: Why Africa Matters to the World
   Ibrahim A. Gambari (2013)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>James M. Dorsey</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>Regional Cyber Security: Moving Towards a Resilient ASEAN Cyber Security Regime</td>
<td>Caitriona H. Heinl</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264</td>
<td>Safety in Numbers: Problems of a Smaller U.S. Nuclear Arsenal in Asia</td>
<td>Christine M. Leah</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>South Korea’s Middle-Power Engagement Initiatives: Perspectives from Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Sarah Teo, Bhubhindar Singh and See Seng Tan</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td>About Face - The Relational Dimension in Chinese Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Benjamin Ho Tze Ern</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>Of Auxiliary Forces and Private Armies: Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Conflict Management in Maguindanao, Mindanao</td>
<td>Maria Anna Rowena Luz G. Layador</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>Popular Mandate and the Coming-of-Age of Social Media’s Presence in Indonesian Politics</td>
<td>Post-Reformasi</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269</td>
<td>Old Society, New Youths: An Overview of Youth and Popular Participation in Post-Reformasi Indonesia</td>
<td>Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute in the Context of China-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Dynamics</td>
<td>Zhang Yun</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271</td>
<td>Nuclear Deterrence: The Wohlstetter-Blackett Debate Re-visited</td>
<td>Rajesh Basrur</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td>Economic Integration between South Asia and East Asia: A Perception Survey of Asian Opinion Leaders</td>
<td>Pradumna B. Rana and Wai-Mun Chia</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273</td>
<td>Managing Tensions in the South China Sea: Comparing the China-Philippines and the China-Vietnam Approaches</td>
<td>Li Jianwei</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>