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Security Identity, Policymaking Regime and Japanese Security Policy Development

Bhubhindar Singh

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
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ABSTRACT

 Compared to the Cold War, Japan’s post-Cold War security policy has undergone significant change. This is especially visible in the new means Japan has adopted, both outside and within the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, in contributing to regional and international affairs in military-strategic terms. Challenging realism’s dominance, this paper captures this shift through the use of collective identity, more specifically, Japanese security identity. It argues that Japan’s security policy expansion is captured by the shift in Japan’s security identity from a peace-state to an international-state. To understand this shift, the security identity is studied in the context of the Japanese security policymaking regime. Three elements of the regime are studied: the agents involved in the security policymaking process, the decision-making structure, and the role of the U.S. in Japan’s security policymaking process. The combined effect of these elements determines the dominant security identity and Japanese security policy.

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Security Identity, Policymaking Regime and Japanese Security Policy Development

Introduction

It is widely recognised that Japanese security policy has undergone significant change when comparing the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. This change is especially visible in the new security roles that Japan’s Self-Defence Force (SDF) has adopted. Four areas stand out: the inclusion of humanitarian and disaster relief duties in the SDF’s mandate, as well as peacekeeping following the passage of the ‘Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations’ (also known as the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL)) in 1992; the deepening and widening of the responsibilities of the SDF within the U.S.-Japan defence cooperation mainly in the form of rear-area logistical support to the U.S. military following the revisions of the defence guidelines passed by the Japanese National Diet in 1999, and greater interoperability between the two militaries in the first decade of the 2000s following Japan’s proactive participation in the U.S.-led war on terror; joining other concerned states in combating the rise of piracy incidents when Maritime SDF (MSDF) destroyers were deployed off the coast of Somalia to guard vessels from Japan and other countries; and finally, diversifying security partnerships outside of the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan signed strategic partnerships with Australia (2007), India (2008), Vietnam (2010) and the Philippines (2011) to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation through ministerial meetings, military exchanges and joint exercises.

These changes have been well documented in the extant literature that falls in the realism tradition of international relations theory. Even though some of these developments would fall under the human security categorisation, they are collectively understood as clear indications in support of Japan’s move away from its minimalist or constrained security policy to a greater military role internationally, described in the literature as ‘normalisation’ or remilitarisation’. Authors from the neorealism (or structural realism) strand argue that these changes were due to the transformation of the international system in the post-Cold War period characterised by enhanced anarchy due to the instability of the U.S.-led unipolarity and the unfavorable shift in the East Asia balance of power against Japan’s interests resulting from tensions on the Korean Peninsula, China’s rise in economic, political and military terms, and Japan’s territorial disputes with China (Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands), South Korea (Takeshima or Tokdo Islands) and Russia (Kurile Islands or Northern Territories) (See Waltz
2000, 1993; Layne 1993). Along with the instability from the shifting East Asia balance of power, authors from the neoclassical realism strand added other variables from the domestic level, referred to as the ‘black-box’, to explain Japan’s security policy expansion in the post-Cold War period. These include the gradual erosion of the normative structures that constrained Japanese security policy during the Cold War, Japan’s long-running economic recession since the early 1990s that precluded the practice of defining its national interests solely in the language of economics, and changes within the Japanese political system that resulted in the increased importance of security issues featured on the national agenda (See Boyd and Samuels 2005; Green 2003; Hughes 2004, 2009; Hughes and Krauss 2007; Pyle 1992, 2007; Samuels 2007).

This paper challenges the abovementioned literature on two accounts – the conclusions or expectations reached by the realist analyses and their neglect of the collective identity variable. The realist works ended with two conclusions – Japan will pursue strategic independence from the US and adopt more combat roles in regional and international security affairs (See Waltz 2000, 1993; Layne 1993). Both these conclusions have not materialised. Instead of strategic independence, Japan has repeatedly reaffirmed and strengthened the US-Japan security relationship through various bilateral agreements. That has led to strengthened bilateral defence cooperation including the expansion of the SDF’s roles in the alliance relationship, strengthened interoperability between the two militaries, joint development and deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system, and the convergence of interests in relation to the regional and global security environment. The U.S.-Japan security relationship, which offers Japan conventional and nuclear security cover against potential threats, remains the central pillar of Japanese post-Cold War security policy. Though the SDF’s roles have expanded and become more diverse with wider geographical coverage, it is important to note that these have occurred only in a limited way - mainly in rear-area logistical duties or in non-combat support roles. Limits are attached when the SDF is deployed overseas. That implies Japan’s security policy was still made in an environment where traditional restrictions on the SDF remained strong.

Nevertheless, Japan’s security role has certainly expanded and the SDF’s role within this bilateral relationship has undergone significant change. The developments within Japanese security policy that point towards an expanded security role have occurred in the context of Japan playing a more responsible role in regional and international affairs. The
missions have largely been for humanitarian and disaster relief with an international dimension, that is, Japan joining other countries to address global security challenges. These developments were not motivated solely by national power augmentation or balance of power demands but efforts that reinforce Japan’s middle power status. At the onset of the post-Cold War period, the Japanese security policymaking elite recognised that the economics-based policy required a revision due to a shift in the normative structure in the post-Cold War period – a point brought home by Japan’s experience in the 1990-1 Persian Gulf War. The result of this revision has been the added contribution by Japan to the military-strategic dimension of regional and international affairs both independently and in the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

These developments in the SDF’s role in the post-Cold War period are best captured by the change in role conceptions or collective identity in Japanese security policy. Unlike its Cold War peace-state identity that produced a minimalist security policy, the adoption of new security roles by the Japanese military was captured by a new identity conception that incorporated an international dimension in military terms into Japanese security policy. More specifically, the argument here is that the change we are witnessing in Japanese security behaviour is explained by the shift in the dominant security identity from the peace-state during the Cold War period to the international-state security identity in the post-Cold War period.

The notion of utilising security identity in analysing Japanese security policy is not new. According to Oros (2008), Japanese security policy is shaped by a security identity defined as domestic antimilitarism that comprises three principles: no traditional armed forces, no use of force by Japan except in self-defence and no Japanese participation in foreign wars (p. 5). The argument presented here differs from Oros in four ways. First, though Oros agrees that Japanese post-Cold War security practice has undergone change, he attributes this to the changes within the domestic political forces and the international strategic environment, not a result of a shift in the domestic security identity. The argument here places the cause of the changes in Japanese security policy on the security identity variable. Second, unlike Oros’s domestically focused security identity, the focus of this paper is on Japan’s security identity portrayed overseas. This identity refers to Japan’s position in regional and international security affairs and the kind of security role(s) it aspires to assume in contributing to external peace and stability. Third, whilst in agreement with Oros on the
continued relevance of antimilitarism in the Japanese security debate and policymaking process, this research argues that antimilitarism in Japanese post-Cold War security policy is reflected in a different way. The normative framework of the post-Cold War period in which Japan has been able to carve out an advanced security role without contravening the social and legal constraints at home displays another dimension to Japanese security identity – internationalism.

Fourth, this paper analyses Japan’s security identity at the level of Japanese domestic politics, namely in the context of Japan’s security policymaking regime in the two periods under study. The relationship between the security identity and the security policymaking regime is that the dominant security identity within the regime sets the parameters of the security policy debates, privileges a certain set of security interests and determines the outcome of the security policy. Within the security policymaking regime, three core elements are highlighted – the agents/actors involved in the security policymaking process, the decision-making process for security policy, and finally, the role of the US in this process. During the Cold War, Japan’s security policymaking regime was supported by the peace-state security identity that had mainly a self-defence focus. Together with the legal and social restrictions, the self-defence focus was reinforced by the policymaking process that was controlled by the civilian bureaucracy and politicians that adhered to the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine. This left little or no room for those actors that pushed for an activist security policy in military terms within the security policymaking process. Any attempt to break from the self-defence focus came only after intense pressure from the U.S. In this instance, the policymaking process was mired in immobilism and institutional rigidities, susceptible to external pressure from the U.S. This dominant peace-state security identity was challenged during the post-Cold War period. The former immobilist or reactive state characterisation was challenged by a more proactive feature in the security policymaking process. This activism was facilitated by the increasing dominance in the security policymaking process of politicians and bureaucrats that supported an activist security role for Japan’s SDF in external security affairs. They displayed a strengthened internal dynamic in setting Japan’s security policy interests, managing the decision-making process, and also actively devising means to bring about peace and stability in the regional and international security environment that were suitable to Japan’s domestic conditions. These moves saw a reduction in the U.S. pressure on Japan’s security policymaking process. This behaviour led to the transformation of Japan’s security identity from a peace-state to an international-state.
This paper is structured in the following manner. It begins with a conceptual discussion of the relationship between security identity and security policymaking regime. The second section discusses Japan’s security policymaking regime’s peace-state security identity during the Cold War and the resultant minimalist security policy. The final section discusses the changes to the security policymaking regime resulting from the adoption of the international-state security identity during the post-Cold War period that produced a more activist security policy for Japan. It is important to note this paper is confined to the period starting from the onset of the postwar period to the end of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s political rule in August 2009, when it suffered an electoral defeat to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the national general election. The reason for selecting this period is that the foundation for an activist security policy for Japan was laid during the LDP’s dominant tenure of the political system. Nevertheless, the DPJ’s security policy practice will be discussed in the concluding chapter – a discussion that will show that the DPJ is committed to pursuing an activist or internationalist security policy as well.

Security Identity and Policymaking Regime

This section aims to examine the notions of collective identity, in this case security identity, and the security policymaking regime and how their interaction shape Japanese security policy behaviour.

Security identity

Security identity is understood as a collective identity within the state’s national identity. Though integrally linked to other domains of national identity, it is possible to analyse security identity independently in conceptual and empirical terms. States possess specific role conceptions that shape their security behaviour and determine the outcome of their security policy. Security identity, according to Oros (2008), is referred to as collectively held principles that provide the overarching framework which determines a state’s policy in the domain of security affairs. These principles shape the actions and decisions of the security policymaking elite and other major actors within the state that are responsible for the formulation of the state’s security policy (pp. 9-10). The effect of these principles is that they determine the collectively held ideas that shape the outcome of a state’s security policy implemented to achieve its security objectives and interests (Legro 2009). The security
identity, defined by the collectively held principles, becomes dominant in shaping the state’s security policy only when actors within the state and society perceive it to be legitimate and embrace its impact (Oros 2008, 9-10; Bukovansky 2002).

The notion of security identity shares several essential features common to other collective identities. First, a security identity is shaped by various factors, material and non-material, operating at both the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, the material factors include the state’s geo-strategic position, territory and population size; and the non-material ones include the historical, political, social and cultural contexts that the state is embedded in. At the international level, the security identity is also shaped by its position and interactions with other actors in the international system. The identity informs states who they are, who others are and how they are related in a particular context. The combined effect of all these factors, at both the domestic and international levels, results in an intersubjective reality that shapes and reinforces a particular collective identity (Bukovansky 1997, 210), resultanty informs the state what action is possible, and allows other states to understand its actions (Chafetz et al 1998/99; Dittmer and Kim 1993). Second, like all identities, security identity is a social and relational concept requiring an Other (Neumann 1996). The Other does not necessarily have to be a state but it can be an idea, history, place or an international order (Hopf 2002, 3; Legro 2009); and it does not necessarily have to be an out-group but can be within the subject of analysis - Japan, in the case of this paper (Brewer and Brown 1998, 564 cited in Hopf 2002, 10).

Third, at any given time, multiple identities, which include clashing conceptions, coexist, pushing actors to behave in varying ways (Saideman 2002). An identity assumes a dominant position through a process of negotiation. Despite the constant competition from other identities, collective identities can be stable and enduring. What this means is that the security interests of the state that shape the collective identities can also be stable. However, the dominant collective identities can also undergo change. This change might come through repeated interaction with a competing identity (Chafetz et al 1998/99, xi) and/or result when the competing identity furthers a state’s interests more than the previous one (Bukovansky 1997, 217). A shift in the dominant collective identity shaping policy is likely to emerge under two conditions: first, whenever there are competing definitions of identity that call for contradictory behaviour; and second, whenever collective identity definitions are no longer relevant to the historical conditions (Barnett 1999, 10; Dittmer and Kim 1993, 6-7). This
competition for dominance between identities is particularly stiff during periods of crises or structural transformation. The ascendancy attained by one identity over others is also followed by the rise of a particular set of interests or preferences, which are determined by the situations the state finds itself in and the type of actors that dominate the policymaking elite (Wendt 1999, 230; Hopf 1998, 175). However, it is important to note that the coexistence and competitive nature of multiple identities is not about the existence of one identity and the extinction of others. Even if one identity achieves dominance in one period, the subordinate identities persist in the background to structure future debates and competition (Saideman 2002, 184).

As discussed above, this paper discusses two sets of security identities - the peace-state identity and the international-state - that have largely dominated Japanese security discourse and debates during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The main point of the paper is not to show the competition between the various identities during each of the periods, as this point is already well documented in the extant literature (Berger 1998, Hook 1996, Katzenstein 1996, Oros 2008). Instead, the paper aims to illustrate the transformation of the dominant security identity that shaped Japan’s security policy behaviour during the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods, along with the domestic conditions that supported these identities. We discuss the origins of each of the identities as follows.

**Peace-State Identity:** The origins of the peace-state identity lie in Japan’s defeat in WWII and the American occupation of Japan (1945-52). The American Occupation authorities led General Douglas MacArthur to impose a series of reforms that aimed to democratise and demilitarise Japan (Dower 1999; Welfield 1988). One of the significant and probably the most controversial reforms was Japan’s adoption of the Peace Constitution or Article 9. Imposing a legal restriction on the use of force as a tool in its security policy and the maintenance of the war potential, Article 9 became the embodiment of the peace discourse in Japan. It was embraced by Japanese state and society and attempts by the US to reverse the demilitarisation process following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1951 and the subsequent intensification of the Cold War were resisted by Japan, led by Yoshida Shigeru

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1 The peace clause of the Constitution, Article 9, reads as follows:

*Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.*

(taken from Hook and McCormack 2001, 8)
and his followers. Their position was based on Yoshida’s vision of constructing Japan as a merchant nation (shōnin kokka), in which all efforts were concentrated on achieving the main goal of economic resuscitation and development, whilst maintaining a low profile in military-strategic affairs (Berger 1996: 336-337). Defined by the Yoshida Doctrine, this security strategy was supported by the peace-state security identity.²

Despite challenges from those who were opposed to the shōnin kokka vision in the 1950s, the peace-state identity dominated Japan’s national security discourse, especially in terms of Japan’s role in external security affairs. That was especially the case from the 1960s onwards, following the mishandling of US-Japan Security Treaty Revision Crisis (AMPO) by the anti-Yoshida politicians (led by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke) and the success of Ikeda Hayato’s (Kishi’s successor) announcement of the income-doubling plan in the 1960s (See Samuels 2007, 34-6). While Yoshida was not convinced about its long-term appropriateness, the peace-state identity was certainly the main conception that shaped his vision of Japan’s Cold War security policy. In fact, most Japanese prime ministers (with the exception of Nakasone Yasuhiro) not only grounded Japan’s security policy in that strategy but also strengthened the principles by institutionalising measures that supported a low-profile security role for Japan. Described as a ‘unique’ approach to national security (Muto 2001, 176), Japanese security policy entailed narrowly defined security interests that focused on self-defence objectives and de-emphasised external security issues. Whatever external focus there was, it was predominantly defined by economic objectives resulting from a repeated practice of the separation of economics from politics (seikei-bunri) by the security policymaking elite when formulating Japan’s security policy. The outcome was the adoption and entrenchment of values and legal structures within Japanese state and society that collectively defined and supported Japan’s peace-state security identity (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993).

² At this point, it is important to highlight that the Yoshida Doctrine’s definition is contested. This is because there is no official historical record that clarifies the definition and Yoshida himself did not specifically refer to such a doctrine or strategy. One of the most common definitions of the Yoshida Doctrine is: (1) the reliance on the US for Japan’s security; (2) the maintenance of a limited defence capability; and (3) the concentration of its international efforts on economic development. For the contested nature of the Yoshida Doctrine, personal interviews with Igarashi Takeshi (Tokyo, 22 September 2005) and Tanaka Akihiko (Tokyo, 6 September 2005); and Pyle (1987: 245, fn. 5). For the features of the Yoshida Doctrine, interview with Tanaka Akihiko (Tokyo, 6 September 2005) and Berger (1993: 140)
The notion of constructing Japan as an international-state is not a post-Cold War phenomenon but a continuation of a process that began in the late 1970s (Igarashi Takeshi, Interview, Tokyo, 22 September 2005; Pyle 1992, 74). Due to a range of external and internal factors, efforts were made to incorporate a new sense of internationalism into Japan’s national purpose. Although Ōhira Masayoshi (1978-1980) initiated the process in the area of Japanese foreign and security policy, it was Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-1987) who adopted the bold initiatives that set Japan on the course of distancing itself from the Yoshida Doctrine and its related peace-state security identity. Nakasone saw the world at being at a crossroad and with how Japan could play a part in shaping international politics over the next several decades (Edström 1999, 120). Not only did Nakasone share the view that Japan’s future was dependent on the international community, he went a step further to declare that the future of the international community depended on Japan (Edström 1999, 120). For him, it was important that Japan maintained its ‘supplementary regional power’ position (Takahashi 2001) within the Pax Americana structural context. Nakasone introduced his ‘grand design’ to transform Japan into an international-state (kokusai kokka), which entailed, amongst other dimensions, Japan’s assumption of an active role in global military-strategic affairs and a revision of Japan’s politically passive image (Pyle 1992, 89; 1987, 254-68).

In the Cold War context, Nakasone’s identification of Japan as an international-state meant an increase in responsibility in confronting the communist threat from the Soviet Union. He introduced bold policies that directly challenged those that were formed under the peace-state identity label, as his strategy entailed a bigger role for Japan through the promotion of greater integration into U.S. military strategy. These policies included the approval to transfer military technology to the U.S. - which was announced during his trip to Washington in January 1983 to meet President Ronald Reagan - a clear departure of the

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3 Note two important points relevant to the utilisation of ‘international-state’ identity in this paper. First, the argument here focuses on Japan becoming an international-state in the area of security or military-strategic issues. It was already an international-state in other areas, such as economics, finance, technology and investment. See the chapters in Hook and Weiner (1992). Whilst these chapters discuss the extent to which Japan is an international-state in areas related to economics, politics and society, a discussion on security issues was clearly absent. Second, the use of the label ‘international’ to describe Japan’s new security role is not new (See Okawara 1990, Ryu 2005 and Soeya 2005). This is not surprising, as the Japanese government has repeatedly used the label ‘international’ to describe its role in post-Cold War regional and international affairs, which incorporates a security role expansion in external security affairs. This research however attempts to bring the debate forward by showing how the security policymaking regime has embraced the internationalism in relation to the activities of the SDF in regional and international security affairs.

4 See Edström (1999) for a historical overview of how the word internationalisation entered into Japan’s national discourse.
Yoshida Doctrine’s Three Principles of Arms Exports; the announcement of Japan’s willingness to contribute in patrolling the Sea of Japan to check on any intrusion from Soviet submarines and other naval activities during an emergency – a reversal of Japan’s inactive security posture within the US containment strategy; and the show of bold support during the Group of Seven (G-7) meeting in Williamsburg in May 1983 for the U.S. decision to confront the Soviet installation of SS-20 nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia – a clear declaration of Japan’s alignment with the West. In the context of these moves, Nakasone likened Japan to America’s ‘big aircraft carrier’ (ōkina koku bokan), which was subsequently interpreted in the media as ‘an unsinkable aircraft carrier’ (fuchin kubō) due to his interpreter’s translation (Pyle 2007, 272). At home, Nakasone also challenged long-held taboos that had resulted in Japan’s passive security role owing to its peace-state identity. These came in the form of attempts to break the 1 percent limitation on defence spending and publicly talking about the constitutional revision of Article 9 (Pyle 2007, 272-4; 1987, 266-8).

Despite his bold actions, Prime Minister Nakasone’s transformation of Japan’s identity was limited. While he was successful in triggering public debate, which notably facilitated Tokyo’s capacity to undertake more security responsibilities alongside the U.S., Nakasone was unable to transform Japan’s peace-state identity entirely. Nakasone’s limited success was attributed to the resistance of the bureaucracy and the continued presence of strong adherents to the Yoshida School in Japanese politics during the Cold War period. However, the transformation of Japan’s security identity from a peace-state to international-state gained momentum in the post-Cold War period. The shift in the international material and normative structures following the end of the Cold War period compelled Japanese policymakers to assess Japan’s minimalist role in regional and international security affairs. The international-state security identity became part of the official discourse as Japan renegotiated its role in the new regional and international security environment. The

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5 One example was Japan stepping up joint military cooperation with the US forces and other Pacific nations in the Rim of Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises (Pyle 1992, 103).

6 In the post-Cold War period, many competing identities emerged to account for the developments in Japan’s security policy. They include Japan as a ‘global civilian power’ (Hughes 1999; Funabashi 1991-92), Japan as a ‘normal’ state (Hughes 2004; Singh 2001 and 2002; Ozawa 1994), and Japan as an ‘ordinary’ state or country (Inoguchi 2003; Inoguchi and Bacon 2006). Japan as a ‘normal state’ or ‘ordinary power’ can be subsumed under the international-state category. In fact, the use of the international-state term is preferred for the following three reasons. First, it is difficult to define the term ‘normal’ state or ‘ordinary’ state in academic terms. This is reflected by the lack of consensus in the academic literature on the definition of what a ‘normal’ state or an ‘ordinary’ state is. This term is usually used in the policy-based literature to describe the recent advancements in Japan’s role in security and military affairs. Second, the ‘normal’ state or ‘ordinary’ state phrases owe their origins to the attempts made by the previous
trajectory of the Japanese post-Cold War security policy suggests that politicians within the LDP who supported an activist security policy had succeeded in incrementally reconstructing Japan’s security identity in such a way that the ‘peace-state’ label no longer dominated Japanese security discourse and defined its security policy. Instead, the Japanese government was gradually sending out messages to the international community of a reformed Japan that was willing to adopt an activist security policy in regional and international security affairs. Japan expanded its security roles, scope and functions in regional and international security affairs to fulfil its responsibilities as a member of the international community both independently and in the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. The expansion of Japan’s security roles did not signal an unravelling of the domestic constraints defined by antimilitarism. Peace as a collective idea remains strong within post-Cold War Japan. However, the means towards achieving peace now includes a more active role in the military-strategic dimension of regional and international affairs.

Identity-Regime

This section explores the relationship between security identity and institutional structure in the production of security policy. This is in line with Barnett’s (1999) hybrid constructivist and institutionalist approach. It is important to incorporate the institutional context for two reasons. In theoretical terms, the dominant collective identity is supported by an institutional structure. The focus here is on how a particular security identity supported by an institutional structure triggers specific kinds of behaviour. Though the policymaking process may comprise practices that relate to competing visions, the security policy outcome is usually determined by a set of dominant practices. Once these dominant practices are

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Japanese governments beginning in the 1970s to construct Japan as an ‘international-state’. Third, the use of the ‘international-state’ label corresponds to Japan’s official security discourse. It has frequently expressed the need for Japan to adopt international responsibilities in the areas of economics and military-strategic matters. Yanai Shunji (Interview, Tokyo 24 May 2006) and Tokuchi Hideshi (Interview, Tokyo 14 September 2005) also rejected the use of the ‘normal’ state conception in capturing the changes to Japanese post-Cold War security policy. Accordingly, the use of the term civilian power also serves as an inappropriate characterisation for the developments in Japan’s post-Cold War security role. Civilian power, as used by Maull (1990) and Funabashi (1991–2), had a specific meaning. It was particularly used to refer to Japan’s role expansion in the post-Cold War period through the use of its economic and technological strengths and increased participation in UNPKOs. However, Japan’s security role has expanded beyond the remit of being a global civilian power. Apart from UNPKOs, Japan’s security role has occurred in the form of providing the US military rear-area support during periods of crises and peace. While the SDF’s missions remain focused on promoting peace, the use of the military is increasingly accepted as a legitimate tool of its foreign and security policy with the corresponding decline in its aid budget – a direct challenge to the civilian power characterisation.
institutionalised, they become quite durable, stable and have a collective impact on the promotion of a specific identity and its related security policy behaviours. This arrangement results in a mutually reinforcing relationship between the collective identity and the institutional structure. In empirical terms, Japan’s security policymaking structure displays distinctive features, making the incorporation of the institutional structure an essential element in understanding the production of its security policy. Japan’s security policy formation process is shaped by, according to Chai (1997), Japan-specific ‘symbolic boundaries and images’, according to Katzenstein and Okawara (1993), specific domestic social and legal norms, and according to Berger (1998), a unique political culture defined by antimilitarism. This paper builds on these existing works that stressed the importance of the domestic institutional structure through incorporating the collective identity variable, more specifically, security identity.

The production of a security policy understood in an institutional context is a result of a collection of elements. These include the institutional structure, actors, and processes and procedures (both formal and informal ones) and external factors. This collective is referred to here as the security policymaking regime. The outcome of the policy or behaviour from the interaction of these elements is dependent on the dominant collective identity that is embedded in the policymaking regime. The dominant collective identity reflects the dominant normative structure responsible for the formation of security policy. It sets the parameters in all aspects of the security policymaking process and reflects the dominant security interests that influence the policy. In this paper, we study three elements of the security policymaking regime - the agents/actors, the decision-making structure and the US pressure. These are critical elements of the Japanese security policymaking process and important determinant of the dominant security identity. The combination of these three elements reflects the normative structure of the policymaking regime that reflects the dominant identity conception and the outcome of the security policy. It is best understood in normative terms as a particular collective identity of the policymaking process tends to repeatedly produce a similar policy. For the purpose of this paper, we study two outcomes of Japanese security behavior - minimalist and internationalist security policy.7

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7 Any two sets of separate identities can have overlapping interests or features. However, a clear distinction is made here for two main reasons. First, both peace-state and international-state security identities have particular definitions that result in different security policy behaviour. Though the concept of peace is at the centre of both identities, each of the identities is a product of a separate normative structure that supports a specific security policy for Japan. The peace-state identity results in a low military role for the SDF and an international-state
The first element is the agents who are involved in the security policymaking process. The question asked by this element is who is in and who is out in the policymaking process. This would, in turn, suggest whose interests are incorporated (and become dominant) and whose are excluded (Barnett 1999, 16; Oros 2008). The ‘in’ agents are those who control the policymaking process by influencing which interests of the state are met, and the ‘out’ ones belong to the marginalised group whose interests are excluded from influencing the security policy outcome. In the case of Japan, the agents involved in the security policymaking process (also known as the security policymaking elite) loosely comprise the Prime Minister, officials from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and Cabinet Secretariat, the Chief and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the ministers and other high-ranking political appointees and bureaucrats from various ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (previously known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)) and others, selected members of the LDP and DPJ, opposition parties and academia in Japan.

The people in this group could be broadly classified into three subgroups – mainstream conservatives, revisionists, and progressives (Boyd and Samuels 2005). Based on Yoshida’s shōnin kokka, mainstream conservatives (that included Yoshida Shigeru, Ikeda Hayato, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Miyazawa Kiichi) envisaged Japan directing all efforts toward achieving the main goal of economic development and technological autonomy, while keeping a low profile in military-strategic affairs (Berger 1996, 336-337). Also known as the pragmatists, this group supported the retention of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution to maintain a minimalist security policy. Though they were committed to strengthening the U.S.-Japan security relationship, they deflected U.S. pressure on Japan to acquire military capabilities that were regarded as inimical to Japan’s strategic interests and also resisted pressure for Japan’s participation in international military missions. Developing an autonomous defence capability was understood as an economically and politically costly

security identity results in a more active military role in regional and international security affairs. Second, the distinction between the two identities is made for methodological reasons so as to highlight the significant change in Japan’s security policy between the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. This significant change is best shown when the two categories of identities are treated separately.

8 What is referred to as revisionist here is normal nation-alist for Samuels (2007), military realist for Mochizuki (1983/84) and Tamamoto (1990), and the assertive conservative right for Togo (2010). For a detailed discussion on the historical background, policies, and members of these groups, and their debates on security issues, see Samuels (2007, 18-36) and Togo (2010).

9 For other classifications of the political actors involved in the debates on national security policy, see Berger (1998) and Oros (2008).
option (Samuels 2007, 32-33; Boyd and Samuels, 2005, 26; Berger 1998, 104). Opposing this vision were the revisionist politicians (that included Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichirō, and Kishi Nobusuke). Like the mainstream conservatives, they supported the existence of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. However, they viewed Japan’s delegation of full security responsibilities to the U.S. as a ‘humiliation’ (Inoguchi and Bacon 2006, 2). They pushed for a greater degree of security independence from the U.S. through a policy of autonomous defence and an activist security policy. To support this, the revisionist politicians called for a revision of Article 9 to allow Japan to pursue rearmament and widen the SDF’s role in external security affairs (Samuels 2007, 30; Boyd and Samuels, 2005, 3). On the extreme left were the progressives who comprised the intellectuals, labour activists and left of centre politicians from the JSP and Japan Communist Party (JCP). Led by the main opposition party JSP, this group supported the policies of pacifism, unarmed neutrality and the abolition of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Inoguchi and Bacon, 2006, 2). Despite these principles, the progressives supported Yoshida’s strategy of practicing a minimalist security policy defined by the peace-state identity (Hook 1996, 27-37; Samuels 2007, 30; Boyd and Samuels 2005, 19; Pyle 1992, 44-5).

The second element is the decision-making structure for Japan’s security policy. For this element, we ask the question, to what extent did Japan’s decision-making structure facilitate an internal dynamic that promoted an activist security policy in military terms? In answering this question, we analyse the role of the bureaucracy over the security policymaking process. Here, the type of ministries involved and their extent of influence over the process is examined. The role of the prime minister and his leadership are also examined. They determine the extent of influence the prime minister could exercise over the security policymaking process. The influence of the JDA/MOD is also explored here, namely the kind of influence, or lack thereof, this institution exercised over the security policymaking process. Finally, this element also analyses whether the decision-making process related to security policy was rigid/immobilist or flexible in relation to the implementation of an activist security policy.

The final element is the influence of the U.S. in Japan’s security policymaking process, namely the strength of U.S. pressure (beiatsu). The question asked here is to what extent the U.S. pressure influenced Japan’s security policy in terms of Japan’s involvement in external security affairs. As a result of the U.S. role as the occupying authority and the
existence of the U.S.-Japan alliance (including the provision of U.S. military bases in Japan), U.S. pressure has been regarded as an important factor in shaping Japan’s security policy. The feature is captured, rightly or wrongly, by the concept of ‘karaoke diplomacy’, as introduced by Inoguchi and Jain (2000). According to this concept, Japan’s foreign policy options are likened to the list of songs in a karaoke machine. The menu of policy options (especially the essential ones) for Japan is provided by the U.S. This practice leaves little room for leaders in Japan to exercise innovation in choosing independent policy responses. Although Tokyo has some leeway in deciding whom, when, where, what or how it will engage internationally, Japan’s eventual policy choice reflects compliance with U.S. directives (see Inoguchi and Jain 2000, xv).

**Peace-State Security Identity: Minimalist Security Policy**

Japan’s peace-state security identity during the Cold War repeatedly produced a minimalist security policy defined by self-defence principles, with a low priority on external military-strategic issues. That was supported by the following features of the security policymaking regime.

In terms of agents, the security policymaking process during the Cold War was dominated by mainstream conservatives or Yoshida School politicians. As discussed earlier, this group of politicians resisted any attempt to expand Japan’s role in external affairs outside the confines of economics. They deflected repeated pressure from both the U.S. and the revisionist politicians for Japan to acquire stronger military capabilities and participate in military missions that were beyond Japan’s national territory (Boyd and Samuels 2005, 26). Owing to the astute leadership of Yoshida and his followers, they were able to unify all three main political groups within the Japanese political environment, as discussed above, around the Yoshida Doctrine as the foundation of Japanese security policy. On the one hand, the mainstream conservatives ensured the continued support of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (in line with the revisionists), but on the other hand, they supported Article 9 (in line with the demands of the JSP). Subsequently, most Japanese prime ministers (except for Nakasone) not only grounded Japan’s security policy in that strategy but also strengthened the principles that defined Japan’s external security role predominantly in economic terms, supporting Japan’s low profile in regional and international military-strategic affairs.
The decision-making process displayed a weak internal dynamic within the security policymaking elite to promote policies that would have expanded Japan’s external security role and responsibilities. That was due to several reasons. First, the objectives of the Yoshida School politicians were supported by officials in the Japanese bureaucracy. As this institution dominated the Japanese policymaking structure, support from the bureaucracy was crucial in the formation and maintenance of the consensus on the SDF’s low profile in external military-strategic affairs (Campbell 1989, Rix et al 1988, Fukui 1977, Baerwald 1977). The large civilian bureaucracy oversaw all aspects of Japan’s security policy, controlled mainly by civilian officials from MOFA and the economics-focused ministries, MITI and MOF, with the civilian and military officials from the JDA playing a supporting role. That resulted in a practice where economic perspectives of external security issues received greater emphasis than military-strategic ones (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, 92-3; Samuels 2007). Major policy decisions on defence were made based on the consensus achieved through an inter-ministerial coordination arrangement at the National Defence Council\(^\text{10}\) (restructured as the Security Office in 1986) located in the Cabinet Secretariat. Though the JDA members were allowed to participate, the discussions were dominated by the civilian officials from the economics-based ministries that routinely, both formally and informally, ensured that the economic and political aspects dominated the security policymaking process over defence and security issues (Katzenstein 1996, 106; Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, 93). In discussions of national security issues, such as those related to defence build-up plans, the National Defence Council was dominated by Yoshida School adherents who repeatedly pushed limited security policy objectives focusing on national defence and a low military involvement in external affairs. When they did push for an expanded security policy (displayed in the passage of the 1976 NDPO), the main objective was not to support the SDF’s expanded external security role (a demand of the revisionist politicians) but to further extend civilian control over areas of security policy which were then informally in the hands of the U.S. and Japanese militaries (Berger 1998, 104).\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) The National Defence Council was tasked to review major defence policy decisions before they were presented to the Cabinet for final approval (Berger 1998, 50).

\(^{11}\) The SDF’s role relative to other ministries strengthened in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This was not only because of its superior technical knowledge in military matters but also due to its close links with the US military through consultations and negotiations on building stronger defence cooperation, joint studies and joint military exercises. The SDF became an important source for receiving US demands, requests and expectations of Japan’s defence roles and missions (Katahara 2001, 77, 79), though it occurred more behind the scenes of the security policymaking process.
The sole dominance of the bureaucracy in the security policymaking process was tempered from the mid-1970s. That was when the bureaucrats and the LDP politicians, especially the defence *zoku* (tribe) which comprised experts in defence issues, strengthened cooperation in policymaking. Though this new arrangement facilitated greater involvement of the politicians, it did not shift the focus of Japan’s security policy. As the cooperation flourished, both the politicians and the bureaucrats from MOFA, MITI and MOF relied on each other in promoting the consensus based on the Yoshida Doctrine. They reinforced each other’s policy stances during and after negotiations on Japanese security policy, leaving the JDA with a low key role (George Mulgan 2003; Katahara 2001, 77). The consensus between the politicians and the bureaucrats was legally backed up by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) – an important bureaucratic organ that was responsible for official interpretations of Article 9 and various aspects of Japan’s security policy (Samuels 2007, 49). Due to the integral influence of legal issues in Japanese security debates and the SDF’s roles and limitations, the CLB played an influential role in limiting an overseas security role for the SDF in legal terms and preserving Japan’s minimalist security policy (See Samuels 2004; 2007, 49-52). The Cabinet, in this arrangement, was a ‘rubber-stamping’ institution that supported the consensus and discussed matters that were already approved by the LDP policy committees, namely the Policy Affairs Research Committee, its sub-committees and the General Affairs Committee; hence, showing little agency in shaping the policymaking process (Estévez-Abe 2006, 637).

Second, the weak internal dynamic to produce a more activist security policy was a result of the weak position of the JDA and the SDF officers within the security policymaking regime. Due to the mistrust of the military within Japanese state and society, the military’s role was kept ‘quasi-legitimate’ (Berger 1998, 83) and was denied an independent position within Japanese security policymaking and planning. Its main task was perceived to be centred on self-defence, that is, to defend Japan from physical attacks (Katzenstein 1996, 104). The JDA had a status of an agency rather than a ministry, led by a director-general,

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12 The CLB provided legal advice on all critical aspects of Japanese security policy, including the SDF’s constitutionality and its limitations, interpretations of collective self-defence operations, SDF’s overseas deployment and definition of the use of force. During the Cold War, the CLB was made up of officials from the various civilian ministries but no defence agency official had ever been assigned to the bureau. All proposed legislation, speeches, regulations were vetted by the officials at the CLB and the interpretation by the CLB became the official interpretation of the politicians and bureaucracy. Yoshida and his followers relied on the CLB to deflect pressure from the US and those within Japan that pushed for an expanded security role in regional and international security affairs. This facilitated the maintenance of a narrow security policy as captured by the peace-state identity conception (See Samuels 2007, 49-52). Also see Samuels (2004).
rather than a minister under the prime minister’s office. This institutional characteristic of the JDA pointed to its inferior status within the bureaucracy and its weak influence in security policymaking (Oros 2008, 61; Samuels 2007, 52). Moreover, the JDA was subjected to strict civilian control displayed in many ways. First, the director-general of JDA had to be a civilian state minister; that position was assisted by two vice-ministers, who were also civilian officials. The highest ranking SDF officers, namely the chief of staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, were subject to civilian supervision and direction. Second, within the defence agency, the MOF, MOFA and MITI not only controlled the security policymaking process, as discussed above, but their influence also penetrated the top, middle and lower levels of JDA’s organisational structure. Their presence was also dominant in the negotiation and implementation stages of policies in various areas of the agency. The JDA’s budget was controlled by the MOF through the appointment of an official as JDA’s administrative vice-minister; an official from MOFA occupied the Policy Office; an official from MITI controlled the Equipment Bureau; and senior officials from other ministries were brought in to reinforce civilian control in the JDA (Samuels 2007, 52-53). Third, JDA officials were also seconded to other ministries for exposure to the work and ethics of non-military areas. In such a policymaking structure, the influence of military professionals, experts in defence and security issues, was subordinated and circumscribed by the entrenched civilian bureaucracy (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, 95-7; Hughes 2009, 55).

Third, the weak internal dynamic to produce a more activist security policy was augmented by the weak position of the prime minister in providing leadership and policy direction in the security policymaking process (George Mulgan 2003). Though the postwar Constitution legally granted the prime minister control of the SDF and ‘relative freedom in foreign affairs’ (Shinoda 2007, 19, 25), the function was limited due to mainly three reasons: first, the weak presence of political appointees in the ministries, hence, keeping the influence of the prime minister and other politicians low over the bureaucracy’s dominance in the security policymaking process; second, the prime minister was unable to rely on support from politicians inside the LDP, especially those belonging to the defence zoku, as it usually consisted of members from various factions, and the defence zoku could not be seen to be too close to the prime minister (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, 93); and third, the prime minister’s role was to seek a consensus for a policy over a wide range of groups in politics, business and bureaucracy before making a foreign policy decision, and a role that was more
policy-oriented and aggressive in nature was viewed with suspicion by politicians (Hosoya 1974, 368; Angel 1988/89).

This point becomes especially important in explaining the inability of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to break the dominance of the Yoshida Doctrine’s influence on Japan’s security policy in the Cold War period. As a member of the revisionist camp, Nakasone’s mandate was to expand Japan’s security policy objectives away from the strong economics and self-defence focus. To promote his more active security agenda, Nakasone introduced a set of administrative reforms to gain greater control of the policymaking process – from a traditional bottom-up approach to a top-down (presidential) approach (Shinoda 2007; Angel 1988/89). Though he saw some success (such as the formation of the Security Council and the reorganisation of the Cabinet Secretariat, and better coordination between various ministries and agencies in the context of a domestic or international crisis faced by Japan), Nakasone faced severe constraints from the institutional arrangement that was dominated by the interests of the dominant bureaucracy, especially the economic ministries (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993, 93-5). He was able to push some of his active security policy agenda over the bureaucracy following his reforms of the policymaking structure but these did not result in the expansion of Japan’s security role in regional and international security affairs.

The above features of the decision-making process predisposed Japan to produce a minimalist security policy within the normative structure that was defined by the peace-state security identity. Any initiative that hinted at an expansion of Japan’s low key security role usually failed. Those that were successful were characterised as ‘too little, too late’, hampered by the immobilist and incremental defence policymaking process (Hellman 1977, 332; Keddell 1993). The repeated practice of a peace-based security policy led to an ‘institutionalised inertia’ (Grimes 2003) in the security policymaking process that precluded Japan from breaking away from the economics-based security policy to formulate a more

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13 On example illustrated by Angel (1988/9) was that bureaucrats from the finance and foreign affairs ministries and the defence agency assigned lower ranking officials (instead of the administrative vice-ministers) to serve at the Cabinet Secretariat offices as this allowed the ministries to retain influence over these officials (pp. 599-600).

14 Examples of these successes include: Nakasone’s use of personal advisors to circumvent the bureaucracy to strengthen Japan’s relations with South Korea in 1983, which led to his successful visit to South Korea in January of that year; Nakasone’s show of direct support to the US missile deployment in Europe during the Williamsburg Summit in January 1983; the revision of the 1967 three principles of arms exports to allow the export of military technology to the US; and strengthening the authority of the Kantei in crises management (Shinoda 2007, 28-37).
activist security policy. That security policymaking structure inhibited decisions that departed from the ‘normal’ which was defined by self-defence and low involvement in external military-strategic affairs. It reinforced the immobilist structure within Japanese security policy decision-making and resulted in Japan becoming reactive to the international environment and external pressure from the US. This leads to the third element of the security policymaking regime.

As a former occupier and security guarantor, the U.S. applied constant pressure on Japan, either implicit or explicitly, to ease its reliance on the policy of seikei-bunri (separation of politics from economics) and assume a larger security role in the alliance relationship. This was especially true since the 1970s when Cold War tensions intensified (represented by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea) and Japan emerged as the second most powerful economy in the world. Okawara Yoshio, Japan’s ambassador to the U.S. during the period 1980-85, admitted that the U.S. had pressured Japan to strengthen its defence capabilities and assume international responsibilities as a member of the Western Alliance (Okawara 1990, 121). The dominance of the alliance in Japanese security policy treated Japanese security interests as identical to those of the U.S. due to the extensive bilateral political and economic relations between the two countries. Hellman (1977) wrote ‘[b]eyond the US alliance, there has been virtually no strategic policy regarding external threats or regional conflict’ (p. 329). This point is well articulated by Miyashita (1999) in the context of Japan’s aid policy. He argued that the asymmetric interdependence between Japan and the U.S. (in the areas of the export market and security) led to the widespread belief within Japan that it had more to lose if the bilateral relationship experienced difficulties. According to Miyashita (1999), that resulted in Japan giving in to U.S. pressure and the U.S. gaining substantial bargaining leverage over Japan.

In summary, Japan’s Cold War security policy was an outcome of a set of beliefs, practices and policies supported by the peace-state security identity within the security policymaking regime. That arrangement was defined by the consensus between politicians from the Yoshida School and civilian bureaucrats from MOF, MITI, and MOFA that

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15 Needless to say, the Japanese prime ministers, members of the LDP, and the bureaucracy were supportive of the close relationship with the US in all aspects of the bilateral relationship, including security policy. The support from the Japanese prime ministers of the US served two functions. First, they allowed them to avoid domestic responsibilities for implementing controversial policies raising the breakdown of the US-Japan relationship as a consequence (Angel 1988/9, 588). Second, the conservative politicians in the LDP relied on the US to push for an agenda that would expand Japan’s security role.
dominated the policymaking structure. Japan displayed a weak internal dynamic within the Japanese security policymaking elite to develop a wider security role or internationalism in its security policy due to the marginalisation and suppression of revisionist politicians and defence officials who supported a wider security role for Japan in global security affairs, accentuated by the weak position of the prime minister in the security policymaking process. Any policy that hinted at an expanded security policy was hampered by the rigid or immoblist decision-making process in relation to external security affairs, and came mostly from U.S. pressure (beiatsu). These enduring features during the Cold War produced a security policy that not only prioritised Japan’s economic objectives/interests but also framed Japan’s role in regional and international affairs in mainly economics terms. That approach resulted in a minimalist security policy that limited the SDF’s mandate to national defence and excluded external security affairs.


The policymaking regime that supported the peace-state security identity was challenged in the post-Cold War period. That led to the emergence and the subsequent strengthening of the normative structure that supported the international-state security identity within the Japanese security policymaking regime that produced an activist security policy. That is discussed below.

The end of the Cold War ushered in major changes to the Japanese political sphere. Apart from the brief hiatus in LDP rule during 1993-1994, there were three other significant developments relevant to the actors featured in the Japanese security policymaking regime. First, the political power of mainstream conservatives declined. Prominent figures of this camp, such as Miyazawa Kiichi, Gotōda Masaharu, Kaifu Toshiki, Katō Koichi, Kōno Yohei, Koga Makoto and Nonaka Hiromu, experienced either a severe reduction of influence within the LDP and in the security policymaking process or departed from the political scene (Boyd and Samuels 2005: 27-41). Second, revisionist politicians replaced them as the dominant political force within the Japanese political system. That was reflected by the accession to power of Prime Ministers Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Mori Yoshirō, Koizumi Junichirō, Abe Shinzō and Aso Taro. As these politicians incrementally dominated the political system, they exercised greater control over the formulation of Japan’s national security objectives and
interests. As discussed earlier, they were keen in raising Japan’s profile in external security affairs, accepting the Japanese military as a legitimate tool of its security policy and, in various degrees, revising the Peace Constitution to support the new SDF roles in regional and international security affairs. The position of the revisionist politicians was strengthened by a third development - the demise of the JSP as the main opposition party and political force within the Japanese political system in the post-Cold War period. This development followed as the JSP/SDPJ shifted away from its core principles, as discussed above, and became a coalition member with the LDP in 1994. The more centrist DPJ replaced the JSP/SDPJ as the main opposition party in Japan and eventually took over the national government following the historical electoral victory over the LDP in 2009. What is important here is that the demise of the JSP/SDPJ led to the removal of strong ‘psychological and political obstacles’ (Kohno 2007, 40) from the Japanese domestic political environment for a more advanced SDF role in regional and international military-strategic affairs. The DPJ, as the main opposition party, had a security policy posture that was more similar to the LDP (Pekkanen and Krauss 2005, 437). Though there were divisions within the DPJ itself, the policy of strengthening Japan’s military contribution to regional and security affairs was common between the LDP and DPJ. The two parties differed in the means and specific conditions of Japan’s security role expansion – a development discussed in more detail in the conclusion.

With the shifts in the political sphere described above, the decision-making process also developed a stronger internal dynamic to formulate a more activist security policy for Japan. The foundation of this change came with the institutional and administrative reforms carried out during the period 1996-2001 by revisionist politicians. Initiated by Prime Minister Hashimoto, the main purpose of these reforms was to strengthen national leadership in times of peace and crises. That required a modification of Japan’s traditional structure policymaking, as discussed under the peace-state security identity, and the strengthening of the central authority of the Japanese government over the policymaking process, namely the prime minister and his Cabinet (Shinoda 2007, 63; Mishima 1998).

The reforms included measures to strengthen the support structure for the prime minister and the Cabinet. That was especially evident in how the Cabinet Secretariat (Naikoku Kanbō) and the Cabinet Office (Naikakufu) were reformed. The Cabinet Secretariat saw an expansion in its functions in terms of drafting and planning of policies and creation of new positions with new roles or functions with a more flexible mandate. Unlike previous
practices, these positions were opened to individuals from both outside and inside the
government (George Mulgan 2003, 87). The reforms also saw the replacement of the Prime
Minister’s Office (Sōrifu) with the Cabinet Office as part of the reorganisation undertaken by
Hashimoto in the late 1990s. This body empowered the prime minister greater control in the
exercise of central leadership over the initiation and coordination of government policy
(George Mulgan 2003, 87-88). As part of the reforms, the Prime Minister’s Official
Residence (Kantei) was also reorganised to facilitate a wider influence on the policymaking
process. The reorganisation led to an increase in the number of staff assisting the prime
minister. To the existing Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) and its three deputies, an additional
three assistant CCS and five special advisors were added to the team. As their appointments
were political, it gave them greater influence in the policymaking process especially in terms
of coordination over the ministries (George Mulgan 2003, 88). As part of the reforms, the
Kantei broke away from traditional practice related to the recruitment of staff, as new
positions were made based on flexible appointments of officials rather than relying on
transfers from the traditional strong ministries that imposed their interests on the
policymaking process. Moreover, high-level appointments from ministries were screened to
ensure suitability (Shinoda 2007, 64-70). Apart from the issue of personnel, administrative
reforms also led to the creation of ad-hoc offices for specific policy areas to ensure
institutional flexibility and further coordination in policy between ministries (Shinoda 2007,
75).

Unlike George Mulgan (2003) who argued that administrative reforms have had
limited impact on the policymaking process (p. 89), the argument here regards these reforms
as important since they contributed to the normative shift within the policymaking regime
leading to the implementation of an activist security policy (also see Shinoda 2006). The
reforms led to the three important changes relevant to Japan’s security policy decision-
making process. First, the bureaucracy no longer had the same dominance over information
and the various aspects of the security policymaking process as they did during the Cold War.
The number of ministries and agencies were reduced from 20 to 14 and bureaucrats were no
longer permitted to testify in parliament. The reforms shifted the power in the policymaking
process from the bureaucracy to the prime minister and the Cabinet, and other institutions,
such as the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Secretariat and Kantei. Unlike the peace-state security
identity, the Cabinet and other institutions not only strengthened their coordination role over
the ministries and agencies in the policymaking process but also their role to initiate and draft
policy initiatives (Boyd and Samuels 2005, 38; Calder 2009, 150). Moreover, there was also a strengthened centralisation of the power of politicians within ministries. The control of politicians over the policymaking process vis-à-vis the bureaucrats was strengthened through the introduction of junior or deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries, which had direct impact on the strengthening of the Cabinet’s role, coupled by a similar impact on the role of the prime minister, over the policymaking process (George Mulgan 2003, 89; Estévez-Abe 2006, 645).

Second, the administrative reforms bills addressed the other cause of impasse in Japanese Cold War security policy under the peace-state security identity - the consensus-style decision making process. The strengthening of the central authority of the Kantei and the prime minister allowed them to overcome conflicting interests of various dominant ministries by adopting a top-down approach in the policymaking process – referred to by Krauss and Nyblade (2005) as the presidentialisation of the office of the Japanese prime minister. As mentioned above, this process facilitated security policy debates based on national interests rather than any ministry’s interests (Shinoda 2007, 64). However, as Pekkanen and Krauss (2005) have pointed out, consensus remains an important feature of the security policymaking process in the post-Cold War period. Instead of forming consensus at the factional level within the LDP or between the LDP and the bureaucracy as in the Cold War period, consensus is now reached in the political sphere, such as between parties in the ruling coalition and/or between the ruling coalition and other opposition parties (pp. 441-442). More importantly, the consensus on an activist security policy, which included the expanded SDF contribution to regional and international affairs, became fairly strong.

Third, the centralisation of the policymaking structure around the prime minister, the Cabinet and the Kantei resulted in a shift in the balance of power between ministries in the security policymaking regime. The economic ministries and MOFA were no longer dominant in defining or setting the security policy objectives. The JDA/MOD and the SDF officials, marginalised in the Cold War period, became increasingly more involved and integrated in the security policymaking process from the 1990s. JDA’s/MOD’s widening role in the security policymaking process was evident since the update of the US-Japan defence guidelines in 1996 and the expansion of Japan’s SDF role beyond national defence expressed in new security policies and doctrines implemented in the post-Cold War period (Green 2003, 63; Katahara 2001, 70). One indication of this development was the reformation of the
Security Consultative Committee - the principal coordinating mechanism for the U.S.-Japan alliance – to the Two-plus-Two meeting in 1996, which consisted of representation from both the foreign and defence ministers of Japan and the U.S. The inclusion of the director-general of the JDA along with the foreign minister in this meeting had an equalising effect between the two ministries and raised the JDA’s involvement in matters relating to U.S.-Japan security relations (Hughes 2009, 55; Katahara 2001, 82). Along with shaping the U.S.-Japan security relationship, the JDA/MOD and SDF also played a critical role in pursuing defence diplomacy through the promotion of security dialogues and defence exchanges with neighbouring states during the post-Cold War period (Katahara 2001, 82).

Outside of external security relations, the JDA/MOD and SDF officers also played a key role domestically in the debates and coordination process of Japan’s defence policies and doctrines. Previously a distrusted body, the SDF became more involved in the security policymaking process from Hashimoto’s period especially in an advisory role to the Prime Minister, contributing to the discussions on defence and security issues at the National Diet (a role that was banned by the 1952 National Safety Agency order), and participating as staff members at the Cabinet’s National Security Affairs Office (Nagashima 1998 cited in Katahara 2001, 82). In recognition of its elevated role in the policymaking process, the JDA was upgraded from an agency to a ministry in 2007 after 53 years with the head holding a ministerial position. This elevated status granted the defence minister and the civilian and military officials within the MOD new powers and greater involvement in the security policymaking process especially in using the SDF to contribute to regional and international peace and stability.  

The changes in the decision-making feature of the security policymaking regime outlined above led to the deliberate incorporation of an international dimension into Japan’s post-Cold War security objectives and the widening of the SDF’s roles and responsibilities in regional and international security affairs both outside and within the U.S.-Japan security relationship. One of the initial milestones during the early years was the incorporation of humanitarian and disaster relief activities into the SDF’s mandate through the passage of the IPCL in 1992. The passing of the peacekeeping legislation was the result of a push by the revisionist politicians within the top leadership of the LDP, such Ozawa Ichirō, who was the

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16 For details of the reformed JDA/MOD and SDF officers roles in the security policymaking process, see Hughes (2009, 53-65).
leading advocate of Japan’s contribution to international society through an SDF deployment (Yamaguchi 1992, 166; Samuels 2003b); members of the defence zoku; and like-minded bureaucrats within MOFA (George 1993, 565). Even though these issues were traditionally overseen by MOFA, there was a realisation within the security policymaking elite that MOFA’s lead in drafting the IPCL would not have been suitable for the achievement of the objective that was strictly defined by the deployment of the SDF to UNPKOs. In order to achieve the passage of IPCL, a centralisation of the policymaking process was required. The Kantei took control of the drafting of the bill. This move facilitated inter-ministerial coordination that led to the successful drafting and passage of the PKO legislation (Shinoda 2007, 58-59). Without Kantei’s lead, as Shinoda (2007) asserted, the IPCL would not have been passed (p. 62).

Subsequently, Japan also displayed political will to revise its security role in the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship despite strained bilateral relations during and in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. The Japanese leadership was aware that the changes required of Japan’s role within the bilateral security relationship would mean a widening of Japan’s security responsibilities in maintaining regional peace and stability. What followed was a decision by Japan’s security policymaking elite to update the U.S.-Japan security relationship in line with the strategic challenges of the post-Cold War period. In more precise terms, that meant increased bilateral defence cooperation despite the existence of domestic constraints. Following the Hashimoto-Clinton summit in 1996, the security policymaking elite including the civilian and military officials from the JDA, pushed for the development of a regional role for the SDF alongside the U.S. military. They formulated means to allow the SDF to assist the U.S. military in times of crises over a larger geographical area, though with limits. The Japanese leadership suggested and agreed for the SDF to engage in rear-area roles, such as to evacuate Japanese based overseas in the areas of conflict, to cope with a large-scale refugee problem during a crisis, to support UN sanctions, including a sea blockade if a conflict erupted in the Asia-Pacific region, and to provide logistical support to the U.S. military in ‘areas surrounding Japan’ (Japan Times, 4 May 1996).17

17 Apart from developing an active humanitarian and disaster relief role and a strong US-Japan security relationship, the Japanese security policy-making elite also demonstrated an internal dynamic in providing ‘thought leadership’ in the construction of the regional security architecture suitable in the post-Cold War period. Japan promoted a multilateral security dialogue in Asia, in the form of the Nakayama proposal, which eventually led to the formation of the ARF in 1994 (Midford 2000).
The Japanese government’s activist approach towards security policy was most evident during the U.S.-led global war on terror. It was premised on a commitment from the Japanese leadership not to repeat the heavily criticised response to the 1990-1 Persian Gulf Crisis when Japan’s contribution was confined to economic support. It displayed an internal dynamic in carving out an appropriate role in the fight against terrorism on the basis of Japan being a responsible member of the international community. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Satō Yukio, Japan’s Representative to the UN, informed the 56th UN General Assembly that ‘combating terrorism is also Japan’s own responsibility’, emphasising the keen interest Japan had in participating in international efforts meant to challenge the threat posed by international terrorism (MOFA 2001a). In carving out Japan’s responsible role in response to the September 11 attacks, Prime Minister Koizumi relied on the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution. He said, “The Preamble to the Constitution states that Japan will strive to achieve a respectable position in international communities. We have to act differently from the past (when Japan acted passively in international affairs)” (Mainichi Daily News, September 18, 2001. Parenthesis from original).

Breaking from past practice, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō took advantage of the administrative and institutional reforms that facilitated the exercise of a top-down decision-making approach in formulating Japan’s response to the U.S.-led war on terror. The Kantei, not MOFA, was central in the development of the activist security policy during Koizumi’s government. This centralised arrangement bypassed the traditional consensus-seeking process within the LDP and core ministries. With this arrangement, Koizumi expertly used the strengthened position of the Kantei to push through anti-terrorism legislation for the SDF’s deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and another bill that authorised an SDF deployment for a humanitarian mission in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)) even when fighting was underway (Shinoda 2007, 93-6). Deputy CCS Furukawa Teijiro said, “If the Kantei has not handled this issue [personnel contribution to OEF], we could not have done this quickly” (Shinoda 2007, 93. Parenthesis added). Moreover, unlike the 1990-1 Persian Gulf Crisis, Prime Minister Koizumi wasted no time in characterising the events of September 11 as a ‘crisis’ for Japan (Shinoda 2003, 28-9; 2002; Singh 2006). That crisis discourse spread and was internalised by the top officials of the Koizumi government and the entire bureaucracy (Shinoda 2003, 28). This framing of the September 11 attacks added a sense of urgency within all institutions that were responsible for the formulation of Japan’s
proactive response. This crisis discourse facilitated the Japanese government’s efforts to expand its international role in global security affairs.

This strengthened activism challenged the rigid or immobilist characteristic of Japanese security policymaking process defined by the peace-state identity, as witnessed in the context of Japan’s participation in the war on terror. According to Tokuchi Hideshi, the quick passage of the ATSML by the Diet surprised everybody and changed the perceptions of the international community that Japanese security policymaking process was slow and immobile (Personal Interview, Tokyo, 14 September, 2005). That change becomes obvious when Japan’s responses to the 1990-1 Persian Gulf Crisis and the U.S.-led war on terror are compared. Compared to the failed UN Peace Cooperation Corps Bill during the 1991 Persian Gulf Crisis and even the IPCL bill that was passed in 1992, the bills that authorised the SDF deployment to both OEF and OIF were passed relatively quickly by the Lower and the Upper Houses of the Diet. According to one estimate, the total time taken for deliberation of the ATSML in both houses was only 62 hours, whereas the IPCL took 179 hours (Shinoda 2002). Another estimate states that the ATSML took three weeks and 33 hours of Diet debate, while the IPCL took nine months (Hughes 2004, 15). The quick decision-making structure displayed during the global war on terror was not a temporary development in the Japanese security policymaking process but a permanent feature that continues to produce a more responsive security response to regional and international crises. For example, in response to North Korea’s alleged nuclear test in October 2006, Abe Shinzo, Koizumi’s successor, adopted a quick response that included the imposition of Japanese sanctions against North Korea (even before the U.N. Security Council had adopted a resolution against North Korea), the closing of all Japanese ports to North Korean ships and cargo and a ban on all visits by North Koreans to Japan (Hughes and Krauss 2007, 164).

The activism on the part of the Japanese leadership occurred in the context of reduced pressure from the U.S. against Japan in the realm of security policy. This activism shown by the Japanese security policymaking elite did not materialise in the form of an independent security policy even though there were instances of such behaviour. Instead, it was expressed in the form of a pragmatic approach based on the recognition that an enhanced

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18 Some examples include Japan’s questioning of the US security commitment following the 1990-1 Persian Gulf Crisis and the 1998 Taepodong Crisis, Japan’s engagement policy towards China following the Tiananmen Incident, and Japan’s acquisition of intelligence satellites following the 1998 Taepodong Crisis.
international and regional security role for Japan would only be legitimised under the aegis of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. The U.S. continues to shape and influence Japanese security policy decisions. This was the case during the Cold War era and continues to be the case now. All the post-Cold War Japanese prime ministers, across both the conservative and socialist political spectrums, recognised the core importance of the U.S. for Japanese security policy practice. However, unlike the Cold War period, the U.S. pressure in the post-Cold War period did not automatically result in the security policymaking elite’s decision to conform to U.S. demands to expand the SDF’s role in the maintenance of peace and stability in regional and international security affairs alongside the U.S. military. Instead, the security policymaking elite displayed political will in developing a security policy based on common strategic interests to address the asymmetrical nature of the bilateral relationship. Japan’s show of increased agency through an expanded security role, characterised as being a reliable ally, was in response to maintain a strong U.S.-Japan security relationship and, in turn, reinforce its military presence in Asia. Enhanced efforts to widen the SDF’s role within the U.S.-Japan security relationship from the security policymaking elite have contributed to the replacement of its ‘free-rider’ or ‘Japan as a follower’ image with ‘Japan as a reliable ally’ image (also see INSS Special Report 2000).

The weakened U.S. pressure was most revealing from the manner Japan formulated its response to the U.S.-led war against terrorism. Although it was clear that Japan’s proactive response in the U.S.-led anti-terror campaign was to display a strong commitment to the U.S., the security policymaking elite persistently defined Japan’s response not as a result of U.S. pressure but as its own initiative (Midford 2003, 335-336). The reports of Deputy Secretary Armitage urging Japan to ‘show the flag’ during his meeting with Japan’s ambassador to the U.S., Yanai Shunji, were denied by Prime Minister Koizumi. He said, “We’ve received no such request. However, the important thing is not what the United States asked us to do. It is what we can offer to combat terrorism” (Mainichi Daily News, September 18, 2001). Emphasising his willingness to support U.S. retaliatory efforts, Prime Minister Koizumi said, “We support the U.S. as an ally and plan to provide as much support as possible, while taking

19 There were instances during the early post-Cold War period of US pressure that led Japan to back down from its foreign policy objectives. Some examples include Japan’s rejection of membership in Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal and its suspension of loan aid to Iran for a hydroelectric power in 1995 (Miyashita 1999, 703-704). However, what is important to note is that the focus here is on US pressure in the area of Japan’s contribution to regional and international security affairs in military terms. This pressure weakened over the course of the post-Cold War period showing the weakening of an element of the institutional culture that supported Japan’s peace-state security identity.
our own initiatives to exterminate terrorism” (Nikkei Weekly, September 24, 2001; MOFA 2001b. Emphasis added). The US also reciprocated. It displayed caution by not pressuring Japan on how it should contribute to the war on terror (Shinoda Tomohito, Personal Interview, Tokyo, September 12, 2005).

Japan had also displayed activism by crafting a security role that was useful to U.S. military objectives during the fight against terrorism. That has been referred to by Midford (2003) as ‘manufactured gaiatsu’, defined as ‘a time-honoured practice whereby the Japanese government requests foreign pressure in order to give it an excuse to do what it wants to do anyway’ (pp. 335-6). The gaiatsu (from the U.S.) was manufactured by Japan in several ways. The MSDF approached the commander of the U.S. Navy to propose ways Japan could be of assistance to the U.S. military that included the escorting of U.S. battle fleets to the Indian Ocean and intelligence-gathering. In the face of immense opposition at home, the MSDF approached the U.S. Navy to request U.S. pressure on Japan to despatch the advanced air-defence Aegis destroyer and P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft to the Indian Ocean. The defence lobby group in the Diet was also urged to lobby high-ranking officials in the U.S. State Department and National Security Council to support a ‘push’ for Japan’s active participation in OEF. The widely reported ‘show the flag’ comment allegedly made during the meeting between Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Ambassador Yanai Shunji could also be perceived as manufactured gaiatsu. As mentioned earlier, Koizumi denied such a request from the U.S. Moreover, a diplomat present at the meeting with Deputy Secretary Armitage also could not confirm the ‘show of flag’ comment (Midford 2003, 335-336).

In summary, the shift in the dominant security identity within the security policymaking regime had a direct impact on the kind of security policy that was produced in the post-Cold War period. Japan displayed an activist security policy in which the SDF was mandated to contribute to regional and international security environment, both independently and alongside the U.S. The security policymaking elite’s widening of Japan’s military contribution to international affairs was supported by a reformed security policymaking regime. The former immobilist or rigid characterisation of the security policymaking process was replaced by a more proactive feature. That was supported by the emergence of revisionist politicians who replaced the dominance of Yoshida School adherents on the political scene.
and the security policymaking process, the strengthened positions and influence of the prime minister, Cabinet and Kantei over the security policymaking process allowing for a more top-down decision-making style and an increase in the influence and involvement of both civilian and military officials from the JDA/MOD in the security policymaking process, especially in terms of influencing the outcome of Japan’s security objectives, doctrines and policies. Under the reformed policymaking regime, Japan displayed a strengthened internal dynamic in setting its security policy objectives and controlling the decision-making process related to security policy. Instead of being influenced by intense U.S. pressure, Japan actively devised its own means to bring about peace and stability in the regional and international security environment.

Conclusion

The aim of the paper was to analyse the cause for Japan’s security policy expansion in the post-Cold War period. It argued that Japan’s security policy expansion is captured by the shift in Japan’s security identity from a peace-state to an international-state. That collective identity shift is understood in the context of the Japanese security policymaking regime. Three elements of the regime were studied - the agents, the decision-making process and the role of the U.S. In the Cold War period, the dominant normative structures that expressed a minimalist security policy were defined by the peace-state security identity. It was characterised by low activism within Japan in carving out an overseas security role, a high-level of pressure from the U.S., a policymaking process dominated by the Yoshida School adherents and a bureaucracy that suffered from immobilism while implementing an activist security policy in military terms. In the post-Cold War period, the shift in the normative structures resulted in the Japanese security policymaking elite pushing for an activist security role in external security affairs in military terms. That was a result of the increased dominance of revisionist politicians in the policymaking process, greater centralisation of decision-making in the area of security policy within the Kantei, Cabinet and the politicians with a concomitant decline in the dominance of the bureaucracy and especially the economics-based ones and greater involvement of the JDA/MOD and SDF in the security policymaking process. These changes challenged the immobilist characterisations of the security decision-making process and decreased pressure from the U.S. in the area of security policy. That reflected Japan’s embrace of internationalism and the emergence of the international-state identity in shaping Japan’s security behaviour.
The aggregate impact of the shift in Japanese security identity in the context of the security policymaking regime leads one to conclude that Japan’s contribution to regional and international affairs in military terms will face less domestic inertia. It is important to note that the SDF’s increase in prominence in the security policymaking structure does not signal a weakening of civilian control over security policy. The civilian leadership in the security policymaking structure remains strong, as made evident by the removal of General Tamogami Toshio, chief of the ASDF, following his voicing of contrarian historical views and policy positions from the official stance. It was the civilian leadership that pushed for reforms in the Japanese political system that allowed for a more active security policy overseas. As a result of the activism, the traditional characterisation of Japan as a ‘reactive state’ and the fear of international isolation have reduced currency in describing contemporary Japanese security policymaking and practice. Those that prescribed to these views overlook the efforts of the Japanese leadership’s ability to implement security measures that are in tune with the emergent trends in the post-Cold War order that are in line with the constitutional constraints to contribute responsibly to regional and international security affairs.

Though the paper largely focused on the LDP-led policies, the argument can also be applied to the DPJ-led government. Under the DPJ-led government, the normative structures supported by the international-state security identity within the security policymaking regime were also reinforced to facilitate Japan’s activist security policy in regional and international affairs.

In terms of actors, the DPJ, though mainly described as a centre-left party, is a party that supports an expanded role for the SDF in external security affairs. Though restricted by its coalition partner, the SDPJ, the DPJ has shown willingness for the SDF to engage in international peace cooperation activities and even in crises resolution efforts both independently and/or alongside the U.S. military, as discussed earlier. Such a position is supported by the presence of politicians such as Ozawa Ichirō, Maehara Seiji, Nagashima Akihisa and former Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko that either are or have been actively involved in the security policymaking process. The DPJ has also strengthened the centralised decision-making structure within the Cabinet and Kantei in all areas, including security.

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20 For analyses on DPJ’s security and foreign policy, see Nakasone (2010), Easley, Kotani and Mori (2010), Hagström (2010), Sneider (2011a); Green (2011) and Hughes (2012).
policy. One of DPJ’s main campaign pledges during the August 2009 elections was to shift power away from the bureaucracy to the politicians. Since its accession to power, some measures taken by them have been the disbandment of the administrative vice-ministers coordination meetings, which were held without the involvement of the politicians before the Cabinet meetings to resolve the inter-ministerial questions, and the addition of 100 political appointees from the Diet to top ministerial positions (Green 2011, 113). These moves by the DPJ have contributed to the reform process facilitating a strengthened internal dynamic within the security policymaking process that is less rigid but more responsive to security issues. The U.S. continues to be the main pillar of DPJ’s security policy. However, U.S. pressure, as under the LDP, is less of a determining factor in shaping DPJ’s security objectives and policy. The security policymaking elite under the DPJ-led government has shown initiative in pursuing an activist security policy aligned with U.S. strategic interests. That point might not be evident in light of the on-going Futenma base relocation issue, seen as the contributing reason to Hatoyama’s premature departure after 10 months in office. However, even in regard to this issue, the U.S. has lifted the pressure off Japan. Unlike his visit to Tokyo in October 2009, Secretary Robert Gates, in a subsequent visit to Tokyo in January 2011, did not push Japan on the Futenma issue but chose to focus on the deepening of bilateral security cooperation (Barnes 2011).

A clear example of this activism was DPJ’s announcement that Japan will not retreat from external security affairs following the Great East Japan Earthquake, which was the country’s worst natural disaster in recent history. The earthquake triggered a devastating tsunami that swept away villages and towns and caused meltdowns and explosions of the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Even though the nuclear reactors were brought to a cold shut down in December 2011 and the government started reconstruction efforts in affected areas, there will still be long-term consequences on the Japanese economy and society from the strain of the high reconstruction costs on Japanese finances, radiation released from the nuclear plant and the overall low level of confidence towards the Japanese leadership to see through the reconstruction of north-eastern Japan successfully. Some analysts had opined that the ‘triple crises’ would lead Japan to look inward (Sneider 2011b). However, that has not been the case. In his first policy speech at the National Diet since becoming prime minister, Noda said to the 179th session of the Diet, “…that Japan was determined to repay the world by contributing to a better future for all humankind. We will unfailingly put those words into action” (Noda 2011). Just before making his first trip
overseas for the U.N. General Assembly, Noda said that he would like to reassure the world leaders of Japan’s ‘will and ability’ to continue to contribute to solving various global issues even faced with the devastating consequences of the triple crises (Hayashi, Nishiyama and Sekiguchi 2011). In a MOFA report, it stated that “[t]he Government of Japan will continue to make appropriate and active contribution to the international community in humanitarian assistance in spite of the recent serious domestic natural disaster, the Great East Japan Earthquake’ (MOFA 2011)”. What this means is the normative shift in security policymaking regime is a permanent feature that will continue to facilitate Japan’s advance role in regional and international affairs in military terms.
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