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<td>Chrisnandi, Yuddy; Priamarizki, Adhi</td>
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Explaining the Trajectory of Golkar’s Splinters in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Yuddy Chrisnandi and Adhi Priamarizki

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore

17 July 2014
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

During the New Order regime, Golkar (Golongan Karya) played a crucial role in garnering political support whilst upholding Suharto’s iron-clad reign. The abrupt fall of the Suharto regime however, ushered in a completely new political vista for the once hegemonic Golkar. Several “splinter-parties” have decided to break-away within the Golkar Party itself, re-emerging as new political vehicles due to various reasons. This paper revisits and analyses the emergence of three of Golkar’s splinters: the Hanura, Gerindra, and Nasdem parties. It examines how their background originating as haranguing factions and splinters within Golkar influences their political behaviour, in turn providing an analysis on the background of the establishment of these personality-led parties, the differences amongst the parties as well as their prospects within the sphere of Indonesian politics. This paper argues that the electoral performance of the three parties is sustained and highly dependent upon both the strong personalities and financial backing of their respective leaders.

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Yuddy Chrisnandi is a lecturer at the Political Science Master Programme, National University, Jakarta, Indonesia, and a candidate for Professor of Political Science, National University. He has written several books: Reformasi TNI, Kesaksian Para Jenderal, Beyond Parlemen, Strategi Kebangsaan Satrio Piningit, and Post-Soeharto Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia. His research interests include civil-military relations, political parties, and public policy. Yuddy recently published an article with a research team from Universiti Malaysia Sabah titled The Politics of Pride, Prestige and Power in Contemporary Indonesia-Malaysia Relations. Yuddy has a Bachelor's degree in Economics from Padjajaran University, Bandung, Indonesia, and a Master’s Degree in Economics from University of Indonesia, Depok. He also holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Indonesia, Depok.

Adhi Priamarizki is an Associate Research Fellow in the Indonesia Programme of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. His research interests include Indonesian politics, Indonesian military history, and civil-military relations in Southeast Asia. Adhi holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations from Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, Indonesia, and a Master’s Degree in Strategic Studies from RSIS.
Introduction

Following the implementation of Law No. 2/1999 on political parties by former president Bacharuddin Jusuf Habbibie, the multiparty system has been championed as the more prominent feature of the rapidly democratized Indonesian political landscape in the post-Suharto era.\(^1\) The implementation of such a law replaced the three-party system that had previously been dominated by the single hegemonic political vehicle of the New Order, Golkar or Golongan Karya [the Functional Groups], for almost 26 years.\(^2\) In the 1999 General Elections (GE), Indonesia witnessed an exuberance of new political parties.\(^3\) A total of forty-eight new political parties joined the 1999 election, the first free and fair democratic election since the 1955 GE.\(^4\) While the number of political parties may seem overwhelming, such a political turnout is not surprising given the degree of plurality of Indonesian society.\(^5\) In the 2004, 2009, and 2014 GE respectively, 24, 38, and 12 national political parties competed.\(^6\)

One of the more interesting aspects surrounding the dawn of post-Suharto politics is the emergence of wholly new autonomous political parties established and headed by former prominent members of the Golkar party. In the early days of post-Suharto Indonesia, the Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong [MKGR, Colloquy Familial Mutual Cooperation] Party was headed by Mien Sugandhi, the Partai Keadilan Persatuan, PKP [Justice and Unity Party] was led by Edi Sudrajat,\(^7\) and the Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB [National Functional and Care Party] was founded by Suharto’s daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut). Nonetheless, these three parties failed to pass the parliamentary threshold. Nevertheless, three of Golkar’s splinters managed to survive, namely: (i) the Hati Nurani Rakyat - Hanura [People’s Conscience Party], established on 21 December 2006 and led by Gen (Ret.) Wiranto; (ii) the Gerakan Indonesia Raya - Gerindra [Greater Indonesia Movement], established on 6 February 2008 and led by Prabowo Subianto and; (iii) the Nasional Demokrat - Nasdem [National Democrat Party], established on 26 July 2011 and headed by Surya Paloh – Surya Paloh being one of the movers and shakers in Indonesian media world who controls Metro TV (one of Indonesia’s largest television stations). The leaders of these parties were Golkar key figures during the Suharto and Reformasi eras. More importantly, they had modelled their

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\(^1\) The Law No.2/1999 was then modified by Law No. 31/2002 and Law No. 2/2008.

\(^2\) The implementation of the three parties system intended to simplify the existing political party system of the New Order from 9 parties and one golongan karya (working group) to two parties and one golongan karya.

Islamic parties such as the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), the Islamic Educational Movement (Perti) and the Indonesia Islamic Union Party (PSII) were incorporated into the United Development Party (PPP) while nationalist parties such as the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the Indonesia Independence Supporters Bond Party (IPKI), the Large Society Deliberation Party (Murba), the Catholic Party, and the Indonesia Christian Party (Parkindo) were fused with the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). This was carried out after the 1971 General Elections.

\(^3\) There were 141 new political parties registered in the Ministry of Law and Human Rights to compete in the 1999 election. Nevertheless, only 48 parties passed the verification process by the General Elections Commission (KPU).

\(^4\) Team 11, which was chaired by Nurcholis Madjid, verified 48 political parties to run in the 1999 general elections. The selection consisted of administrative and factual verification for the existence of those political parties, starting from the party’s structure to the number offices.


\(^6\) The declining number of political parties is attributed to the implementation of electoral thresholds in the 1999 General Elections and parliamentary thresholds in the 2004 General Elections and 2009 General Elections stating a minimum requirement of votes for parties to advance into the next stage of the elections. The parliamentary threshold in 2004 is 2%, 2.5% in 2009 and 3.5% of total national votes. Besides the 12 national political parties, there are also three Aceh regional political parties in the 2014 General Elections.

\(^7\) Mien Sugandhi and Edi Sudrajat had served in the Sixth Development Cabinet (New Order Cabinet) as the Minister of Women’s Affairs and Minister of Defence and Security subsequently.
own parties after Golkar following its experiment with the convention system of nominate a presidential candidate from within the party. The emergence of Golkar’s splinters generates some intriguing questions:

1. Why did Golkar’s splinters emerge within the advent of the post-Suharto political landscape?
2. What are the differences among them?
3. How do they differ with the original party (Golkar)?
4. Can we interpret that the decline of Golkar’s achievements in the 2009 General Election (GE) corresponds to an increase in the support of its splinters?
5. Will political party fragmentation be a crucial factor in contributing to the continuity of Indonesia’s multiparty system?
6. What are the future trends in Indonesia’s political landscape with regards to the party system?

This research is notable for three reasons. First, although the fate of the Golkar party during the post-Suharto regime had been discussed quite extensively, the discussion on the Golkar’s splinters had been rather very limited. While the study of Saiful Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi in 2010 focuses primarily on the emergence, ideology and a few analyses on the Gerindra, Hanura and Golkar constituents, this paper aims to provide an analysis on the background of the establishment of Gerindra, Hanura and Nasdem including the differences between these parties and their prospects within Indonesian politics. Presumably, the splinters did not perform well in the past GEs prior to 2014. Nevertheless, with the increasing support towards the splinters, particularly during the 2014 GE (See Table 1), it is necessary refocus one’s attention towards these parties and how their background as ex-Golkar splinters in particular influence their political behaviour. Secondly, an analysis on the formation of those new parties and their development can be a basic assumption when it comes to making future predictions on Indonesia’s multi-party system and the impact of party fragmentation towards political parties’ electability. Finally, it strengthens previous scholarly discussions inferring that Indonesia’s political culture is moving away from more politik aliran [identity politics] to a more personalised-based voting behaviour.

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Table 1: Vote Shares of Golkar, Gerindra, and Hanura, 1999-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22.44%</td>
<td>21.62%</td>
<td>14.45%</td>
<td>14.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.46%</td>
<td>11.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasdem</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6.72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Elections Committee and Kompas.com

This article argues that the three political parties—Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem—having similar historical linkages with Golkar have branched out a different trajectory from its antecedent. Golkar, often seen as a post-hegemonic party, is still a relatively well-institutionalised party. Meanwhile, the other three parties differ in terms of the personal traits and characteristics of their founders.

This paper is divided into the following manner. The first section of this paper presents a brief history of Golkar’s fragmentation, particularly after the Golkar presidential convention in 2003. It then elaborates on the various dynamics of Golkar’s splinters, namely Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem, and tries to find essential linkages among the three political parties. Finally, a conclusion concerning this research and the possible future trajectories of the three Golkar splinters will be discussed.

Golkar’s Fragmentation

Golkar served as one of Suharto’s main political mechanisms/organisations along with the military [Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI] and the Indonesian civil servant corps [Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia, KORPRI]. Golkar originated from the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups [Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, Sekber Golkar], founded on 20 October 1964 by a number of military (particularly Army) officers to counter-balance the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party [Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI] and its wing organisations at that time. On 4 February 1970, Golkar decided to join the 1971 election and ever since, the party became Suharto’s main political vehicle to legitimise his authoritarian rule in Indonesia. Although Suharto never became the Chief of Golkar, he had served as Golkar’s ultimate patron through his position as the Chief of the Board of Patrons [Dewan Pembi]a. As its paramount leader, Suharto was able to manage and resolve conflicts within the party. The fall of Suharto in May 1998 brought severe damage to the party. The fragmentation of the Golkar party began during the early days of the Reformasi. The fall of Soeharto triggered turbulence within Golkar followed by factionalism in the party.

There were at least three main factions within the Golkar party, divided based on ethnicity and region consisting of the Sulawesi group (led by Jusuf Kalla), the Sumatra group (led by Akbar...
Tandjung) and the Javanese group (represented by Agung Laksono). These three groups are in constant rivalry in their bid to claim the overall party chairmanship. Interestingly, although they belong to the same party, each of them had been involved in various power plays in a vicious struggle to remain on top. For instance, when the Sumatra group was at the helm of party chairmanship, the Sulawesi group that dominated the parliament was hesitant in supporting Akbar Tandjung as the vice-presidential candidate in the 2001 vice-presidential election.

The power struggles of Golkar’s competing factions through clientistic ties have characterised the party’s organizational dynamics. Correspondingly, the situation has produced a relatively weak programmatic profile and an absence of a dominant leader within Golkar. In the New Order era, Suharto had managed to place himself above all as Golkar’s foremost patron while maintaining a strong grasp over it. Suharto’s strategy was also to create internal rivalries within aimed at preventing the emergence of alternative power centres that had contributed significantly to the prevalence of factionalism within Golkar. Additionally, the persistence of the patron-client relations system in some party strongholds had galvanised the inherent factionalism.

Such fragmentation continued even when Akbar Tandjung, having the ambition of becoming presidential candidate took part in the 2004 Golkar convention. This convention was organized in order to nominate a Golkar presidential candidate for the 2004 GE. In an interview with the writers, Akbar Tandjung denied the rumour that he had used the Golkar Party convention as a stepping stone for him to become president. Akbar mentioned that the convention intent was to prove that the “Golkar Baru [New Golkar]” jargon as a democratic entity can be trusted. The convention was also aimed at democratising the party’s policies while determining Golkar’s next presidential candidate. Akbar was confident that he could easily win the presidential ticket because of his success in leading Golkar in winning the majority vote in the 2004 GE, after its sharp decline during the 1999 GE (see Figure 1). Additionally, he was convinced that Golkar’s functionaries at the district level would support him in the convention. However, Akbar never accomplished his vision. There were four other strong contenders for Golkar’s presidential ticket: (i) Wiranto; (ii) Aburizal Bakrie; (iii) Surya Paloh and; (iv) Prabowo Subianto. The convention was particularly crucial as it represents the impetus and inspiration for losing yet influential candidates to establish their own political parties.

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13 Ibid p. 345
16 The 2004 GE was divided into two elections, legislative and presidential elections. It was the first time that direct presidential elections were held in Indonesia.
17 Interview with Akbar Tandjung on 14 February 2014 in Jakarta.
Golkar held the first round of the Convention on 10 April 2003. None of the candidates were able to secure more than 50 per cent of the total votes (see Table 2). In the end, Akbar Tandjung had to compete in the run-off with runner up Wiranto. Wiranto incidentally was able to secure the party’s ticket with 315 votes as compared with Akbar Tandjung’s 227 votes (see Table 3).

Table 2: Result of the First Round of the Golkar Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Akbar Tandjung</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aburizal Bakrie</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Surya Paloh</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Prabowo Subianto</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Result of the Second Round of the Golkar Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Akbar Tandjung</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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19 Initially, one of the party’s senior members, Jusuf Kalla, wanted to join the Convention. However, he decided to opt-out and accepted Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s proposal to become his vice presidential candidate.
21 Ibid.
With Golkar’s success in the legislative elections, Wiranto was confident that he could gain significant support during the 2004 presidential elections. He invited Solahuddin Wahid from PKB (National Awakening Party) to become his vice presidential candidate, hoping that Wahid’s background as one of the most respected Kiai [clerics] among the Nahdliyin (Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) followers) – the biggest Islamic organisation in Indonesia – could boost public support towards the pair.  

However, they failed to gain significant support from the electorate, particularly those who had voted for Golkar in the legislative elections. As a non-active cadre and someone that can even be considered as an outsider in Golkar, Wiranto failed to exploit Golkar’s machinery to its maximum. As one can see, Golkar’s clout in the regions and districts did not measure up to its performance in the legislative elections. Additionally, the Jusuf Kalla’s factor also played a crucial role in dividing the energy and focus of Golkar’s organisation in the regions. Wiranto did not consult with Akbar Tandjung in the selection of his vice presidential candidate for the 2004 presidential elections. This impudence made the chairman reluctant to mobilize Golkar’s resources to support the Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid pair. The fragmentation within the Golkar party during the 2004 presidential election process

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22 In the 2004 legislative election, Golkar and PKB received 21.58 percent and 10.57 percent of the total votes respectively. The initial assumption was that the Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid pair could clinch about 32 percent of total votes in the presidential election. Wiranto intended to gain votes directly from PKB supporters, particularly its NU-based voters. Nevertheless, Megawati also adopted the same strategy by choosing Hasyim Muzadi which was head of NU at that time, as her vice president candidate. Saiful Mujani, William Liddle, and Kuskrido Ambardi, *Kuasa Rakyat: Analisis Perilaku Pemilih Dalam Pemilu Legislatif dan Pemilu Presiden Pasca Orde Baru [People’s Power: Voters Behaviour Analysis on Legislatice and Presidential Elections after New Order Era]*, (Bandung, Mizan: 2010) p. 144-145.
continued when Akbar decided to support Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi in the runoff while other Golkar key figures supported Yudhoyono-Kalla. Akbar dismissed key figures such as Fahmi Idris and Marzuki Darusman for having dissenting political preferences, and he even rejected Jusuf Kalla because of Kalla’s decision to run as Yudhoyono’s vice president.

Akbar’s political manoeuvres created grievances among other Golkar key figures. In the 2004 Golkar Congress, Akbar’s oppositions teamed up to overthrow him from the party chairman’s seat. To secure his position, Akbar tried to consolidate Golkar’s executives at the provincial and district levels. He also allegedly distributed money to obtain their support. Additionally, he amended the party’s constitution in favour of his political interest. In the end Jusuf Kalla, who had bigger financial support to ‘buy’ votes from Golkar’s executives, defeated Akbar Tandjung.

Based on the aforementioned background, the Golkar party was very vulnerable to being manipulated by its top elites, i.e. Akbar Tandjung, to meet his own political ambitions. The practice of money politics in turn had created a personality-based patronage trend in Golkar party. The practice of money politics, particularly when nominating candidates for presidential, legislative and local direct elections, had undermined the decisional autonomy of Golkar, as argued by Tomsa (2008). Those vulnerabilities had prompted other Golkar elites to leave the party and establish their own party to serve their political ambitions. As we can see from the five candidates at the Golkar Convention during the 2004 election, three of them had established their own political parties as a solution to the frustrating political struggle within Golkar, namely Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra), Wiranto (Hanura) and Surya Paloh (Nasdem). The first two established their political parties in anticipation of the 2009 General Elections while Surya Paloh built Nasdem to run in the 2014 General Elections after he failed to win Golkar’s chairmanship in the 2009 Golkar National Assembly in Pekanbaru, Riau Province.

Based on these internal rifts, the trend of factionalism within Golkar will most likely persist over the next few years. The disagreement towards Aburizal Bakrie’s presidential nomination has clearly shown the existential cleavages within the party. Nevertheless, Akbar Tandjung himself had admitted that Golkar has factions within. As Golkar’s dependency on a patron-client system persists, its factionalism is likely to continue.

24 Ibid.
Golkar’s Splinters: Old Wine New Bottle

Hanura

Hanura was established on 21 December 2006 by several retired generals including Wiranto, Fachrul Razi, Bernard Kent Sondakh, Subagyo H. S., Chaeruddin Ismail, Suaidi Marabessy, Budhy Santoso, Ary Mardjono, Fuad Bawazier (former Minister of Finance), Tuti Alawiyah (former State Minister of Women Empowerment), Elza Syarief (lawyer), Anwar Fuadi (TV personality), and prominent civilians who come from different backgrounds. Hanura’s establishment is inseparable from the various political activities and ambitions of its chairman Wiranto, who aim to become the Indonesian president after his fruitless venture with Golkar in the previous election as described in the previous section. The establishment of the party was preceded by the birth of a mass organisation named Perhimpunan Kebangsaan (PK), established on 20 September 2005 by Wiranto and some other prominent political figures such as Marwah Daud Ibrahim and Yus Usman Sumanegara. Soon after, there was a suspicion that Wiranto formed the mass organisation as the basis for his new political party, which would use the same name. His manoeuvre was then viewed as an attempt to build political networks across the archipelago. Wiranto realised that to transform the PK into a new political party would be counter-productive. Therefore, he set up Hanura while PK remained independent and non-partisan, although the latter can be considered as the impetus behind the formation of Hanura. This party has a grand vision to “achieve national self-reliance and people’s prosperity.”

According to Wiranto, the reason to establish Hanura Party is to untangle the various problems in Indonesia that needs to be solved immediately. Wiranto focuses on the importance of a strong and compassionate leadership to give the country a bright future ahead. The leadership does not necessarily authoritarian, but it must be able to bring Indonesia to a better condition. General elections as an instrument of democracy must produce a “ruler that can provide winds of change” as well as a visionary not only a managerial leader. Additionally, one of Hanura’s prominent figures, Ary Mardjono argued that the raison d’etre of Hanura party is to establish Wiranto as president of Indonesia so as to provide the change needed for Indonesia.

Ideologically, Hanura shares the same platform with other nationalist political parties, such as the Democratic Party [Partai Demokrat, PD] by upholding the nationalist-religious stand. Hanura tries to be a catch-all party by accommodating two main political streams in Indonesia, the nationalists and the Islamic groups. Hanura also aims to win votes from Golkar’s supporters who feel that their party had betrayed its real identity. Additionally, the floating mass and the Democratic Party’s young voters are included with Hanura’s target of potential supporters. Ary Mardjono admitted that Hanura does not...
have a strong grassroots or a specific constituent, but the party aims to gather young voters in the 2014 General Elections to cover up its inherent shortcomings.\(^\text{36}\)

Politically, Hanura tries to present an image as a check and balance to the ruling coalition. Hanura does not join in the government’s Joint Secretariat [Sekretariat Bersama, Sekber]\(^\text{37}\) and is constantly active in criticising government policies and performance inside and outside parliament, through support for demonstrations or via parliamentary debates. For instance, Hanura rejected the government’s plan to raise the fuel subsidy in 2012 and 2013. In the Bank Century corruption saga, Hanura joined the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle [Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP] and Gerindra as “opposition” parties that consistently requested for the Corruption Eradication Commission [Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK] to solve the scandal.\(^\text{38}\) Additionally, Hanura tries to present an image of a “clean” party by supporting the anti-corruption agenda. This strategy is relatively successful since none of Hanura’s legislators had been charged in a corruption case. This is consistent with the National Survey Institute [Lembaga Survei Nasional, LSN] survey on public perception towards political parties. 12.5 per cent of the respondents had the impression that Hanura was free from corruption. Even though the number is small, Hanura tops other parties in this aspect.\(^\text{39}\)

In 2009, Hanura managed to pass the parliamentary threshold\(^\text{40}\) and became the 9\(^\text{th}\) political party in the parliament (see Figure 2). At the local parliamentary level, Hanura has 900 legislators across Indonesia and the party has 17 representatives in the national parliament [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR].

However, Hanura’s gain in the 2009 legislative election was insufficient to provide a single party nomination for the presidential election,\(^\text{41}\) forcing the party to consider a political coalition with Golkar. Together with Golkar, Hanura nominated Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto as president and vice president candidates, respectively. In the presidential election, the pair failed to win the election with 12.41 per cent of the total votes and finishing in last position (see Table 4).

\(^{36}\) See ibid.

\(^{37}\) Sekber consists of 6 political parties that support the SBY-Boediono administration, namely: PD, Golkar, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP).


\(^{40}\) The 2009 parliamentary threshold was 2.5 percent of the total national votes.

\(^{41}\) A political party needs at least 20 percent of the total votes if they want to nominate a presidential candidate by using single-party nomination. If they get less than 20 percent, then they need to build coalition with other parties to reach the 20 percent requirement.
As briefly discussed earlier, Hanura’s existence is inseparable from Wiranto. He established Hanura as his political vehicle in the 2009 presidential election. During Hanura’s First National Meeting in 2011, the party prematurely declared Wiranto as its presidential candidate for the 2014 presidential election, long before the 2014 GEs. Additionally, based on CSIS survey in March 2014, Wiranto’s electability is inconsistent with public support towards Hanura. Wiranto has a better popularity than Hanura. While Wiranto is publicised as the third most popular candidate after Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, Hanura is in the fourth position among the other political parties. It shows that Hanura’s existence is closely related to the concept of the “presidentialisation of politics” in political parties as argued by Poguntke and Webb. Poguntke and Webb define presidentialisation of politics as a situation whereby the leader has an absolute power with none of the cabinet members having the ability to challenge it.42 Accordingly, Hanura only serves as the political machine of its patron, Wiranto.

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Consequently, Hanura is undergoing a “shift in intra-party power for the benefit of the leader,” including having a high concentration of power resources in Wiranto’s hand as the party leader. Wiranto has the final say over almost all the party’s strategic decisions. He does not necessarily need to consult with the party’s high-ranking executives in the decision-making process. The recent internal party conflict over Wiranto’s decision to take Hary Tanoesudibjo (Hary Tanoe) as his vice-presidential candidate exemplifies such a scenario. On 3 July 2013, Wiranto and Hary Tanoe unilaterally announced their presidential bid, despite some objections from Hanura’s top executives such as Fuad Bawazier (founder). According to Mr Bawazier, Wiranto had violated the party’s decrees, which stipulates that the final nomination for presidential and vice-presidential candidate should be decided via a National Executive Meeting [Rapat Pimpinan Nasional, Rapimnas]. Wiranto-Hari Tanoe’s early nomination shows that Wiranto, who has the highest position as party leader, can override the organisational mechanism based merely on his strategic judgment. More importantly, all strategic decisions of the parties had been intentionally aligned with his political interests. Wiranto attempts to secure the financial resources to utilise Hari Tanoe’s media networks in order to support his candidacy and if possible, increase Hanura’s electability. This analysis is supported by Wiranto’s decision to install Hari Tanoe as the party’s Department Head of Elections Campaign. As the party’s Department Head of Elections Campaign, Hari Tanoe will have more opportunities to create political marketing strategies to improve the party’s electability. On the other hand, by installing Hari Tanoe as the Department Head of Election Campaign, Wiranto expects him to immediately utilise his media networks to socialise the party’s campaign and their candidacy.

The hasty presidential candidature of both Wiranto and Hari Tanoe involves a relatively risky move for the future of the party. It had sparked resentment among the party’s cadre as the appointment skipped the cadreisation process within the party, blatantly displaying Wiranto’s authoritarian character as Hanura’s chairman. With Hanura failing to gain significant votes in the 2014 GE, the party has withdrawn the Wiranto-Hari Tanoe’s candidacy. On the other hand, Hanura had joined with the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the Nasdem coalition to nominate Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla as their presidential and vice presidential candidate respectively.

Thus far, none of Hanura’s legislators have been implicated in corruption cases. In parliament, Hanura had been actively promoting the anti-corruption agenda, including pressuring the

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43 Interview with Fuad Bawazier, 10 February 2014, Jakarta.
44 Hary Tanoe is a media tycoon with a net worth of $1.7 billion, who owns the Indonesian MNC Group, a media network supported by major TV stations such as Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI), Global TV, MNCTV, Sindo TV and numerous radio stations, print media and online news portals.
government over transparency issues involving the Bank Century scandal and applying some initiative in checking the executive branch of the government [Hak Angket] as seen in the case of the “Tax Mafia”. Like other personality-centred parties such as PD, PDIP, and Gerindra, the existence of a party patron is crucial for at least two reasons. Firstly, they are useful in resolving conflicts within the parties’ structural organisation. Secondly, they act as magnets to attract voters to their parties. Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi (2010) have argued that PD’s success in the 2009 is related to SBY’s good performance during his first term. Megawati’s status as Sukarno’s heir and Prabowo’s image as a “strong leader” were also believed to be the main ingredients in attracting voters to the PDIP and Gerindra respectively. Therefore, Wiranto’s role in Hanura still needs to be assessed carefully in the future. However, for the time being it is safe to say that Hanura cannot escape from the trend of the presidentialisation of political parties in Indonesia.

Hanura aims to hold a “succession” convention sometime after 2014 elections. The party has a regulation that ensures all capable party members can join in the competition to replace Wiranto as the party’s chief. Although Wiranto is the party’s central figure, he is not the only Hanura founder. The appearance of Hari Tanoe within Hanura had provided an alternative power base within the party, adding more potential names to replace Wiranto. However, Hari Tanoe’s resignation from the party has since changed the equation.

Gerindra

Gerindra was established on 6 February 2008. The party’s sole ideology is Pancasila as stated in the 1945 Constitution [Undang-undang Dasar 1945, UUD 45]. The reason in establishing Gerindra was similar to Hanura – the likelihood of Prabowo Subianto being elected as Chairman of Golkar was very slim as Jusuf Kalla was, at that time, the Chairman of the Party and wanted to retain his position. Together with several key figures including Fadli Zon and Hasyim Djojohadikusumo (Prabowo’s brother), Prabowo decided to establish Gerindra. His partners believed that Prabowo was the right person to take over the nation’s leadership in the 2009 presidential election. Some of the names who established Gerindra Party during then were Muchdi Pr, Ahmad Muzani, Halida Hatta, Tanya Alwi and Amran Nasution among others.

In his interview with Kompas, Prabowo explained the objective behind the establishment of the Gerindra party. It is mainly to transform Indonesia into “a winning nation”. Indonesia has the potential to become a big nation with its abundant natural resources. Nevertheless, the absence of a strategic vision has destroyed its dream of becoming a big and prosperous nation according to him. Gerindra incorporated such a goal into six actionable plans: (i) building a strong economy system; (ii) implementing the people’s economy; (iii) having food and energy self-sufficiency while practising

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49 Mujani and Liddle, “Voters and the New Indonesian Democracy,” p. 137
51 At that time, Prabowo was one of the members of Golkar Board of Patron. See http://partaigerindra.or.id/sejarah-partai-gerindra# (accessed 10 July 2013).
52 See http://partaigerindra.or.id/sejarah-partai-gerindra# (accessed 10 July 2013)
water conservation; (iv) improving Indonesia's human resources quality; (v) improving Indonesia's infrastructures and; (vi) having a clean and corruption-free government.  

Furthermore, Fadli Zon and Ahmad Muzani had indicated Gerindra was established to accommodate Prabowo's idealism in building Indonesia. It was only until February 2008 that Gerindra was officially formed. The discussion on the need of a political party to champion Prabowo's ideals was largely the foundation for Gerindra's formation. Initially Prabowo did not have an intention in establishing a political party. Fadli admitted that he was the one who persuaded Prabowo to form a political party, while Hasyim named the party "Indonesia Raya Movement".

Although there was no official statement indicating that Gerindra was established solely to support Prabowo, it is clear that the party served as Prabowo's political machine to compete in the 2009 presidential election. However, since Gerindra was only able to secure 4.46 per cent of the total votes, the party was not able to nominate Prabowo as its presidential candidate. Gerindra teamed up with Megawati's PDIP to nominate Megawati and Prabowo Subianto as the president and vice president candidates. The two parties are perceived as sharing similar ideologies of the nationalist-Pancasila variety. Unfortunately, the pair lost out to SBY-Boediono, securing only 26.79 per cent of total votes.

Even though the party had derived its model from Golkar, Gerindra has acquired a broad voter-ship beyond its traditional constituency. The party aims to appeal to former president Suharto's sympathisers as well as people who live in the transmigration and rural areas. Additionally as Gerindra’s chief patron, Prabowo had portrayed himself as a nationalist and patriotic leader. Certain sectors of the electorate see him as a successor of Sukarno. This image is accompanied by the party's populist stance in various aspects, for instance on oil subsidies and overseas expenses incurred by parliament members.

Most of Gerindra's constituents are from the lower class or in Ahmad Muzani's term the "Wong Cilik". Gerindra positions labours, farmers, fishermen and the informal sector workers as their main constituents. According to Muzani, before Prabowo formed Gerindra, he has been actively representing farmers by involving in the Association of Indonesian Farmers (HKTI).

As with any other personality-based party, the "presidentialisation of politics" character of Gerindra is very strong. Gerindra is closely associated with Prabowo and vice versa. Prabowo's power within the party is very strong, marked by his comments regarding dynamics within the party.

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54 Fadli Zon is Gerindra's vice chairman and Ahmad Muzani is the party's secretary general.

55 Interview with Fadli Zon on 11 February 2014 in Jakarta. Interview with Ahmad Muzani 13 February 2014 in Tangerang.

56 Interview with Fadli Zon on 11 February 2014 in Jakarta.

57 There is a rumor that Prabowo had been willing to become Megawati’s deputy in the 2009 election because the two have an agreement to support Prabowo as the presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election.


60 Interview with Ahmad Muzani on 13 February 2014 in Tangerang.
For instance, when the DPR wanted to build a new parliament building heavily criticised by the general public, Prabowo reprimanded one of Gerindra’s legislators, Pius Lustrilanang, for being supportive of the controversial initiative.61 Pius subsequently turned down his support in building the new building in the DPR. Another instance is when Fami Fachrudin (former Head of Gerindra Central Executive Board) was unilaterally expelled from the party for being disloyal to Prabowo Subianto. According to Fami, there was internal friction within the party structure and those who were perceived as being disloyal to Prabowo Subianto were expelled from the party’s structure.62 A similar tone had also been expressed by Halida Hatta (one of the founders of Gerindra) when she decided to resign from the party.63 According to her, Gerindra has turned away from its original objectives having no clear cadre promotion mechanism within the party. This implies that Gerindra’s decisions regarding promotion had been heavily influenced by the patron’s influence and not a merit-based system.64 In this type of organisational environment, the power of the supreme patron is very powerful. He/she can make any strategic decisions to supporting or serving his/her interests. That said, Gerindra and Hanura share the same institutional problem, which is the centralisation of power in the hands of a supreme patron. Furthermore, these facts also support the concept of presidentialisation of politics as argued by Poguntke and Webb.65

However, there is a difference between Gerindra and Hanura. Gerindra seems more concerned about the future of the party if Prabowo fades away from the political arena. Gerindra can be seen as a “dynastic” political party. The reason is primarily because there are several Prabowo relatives within the party’s structure, the party’s organisational wings, or closely related to the party’s existence. As mentioned above, Hasjim Djojohadikusumo is one of the founders of Gerindra. In the party’s structure, Gerindra also has Aryo Djojohadikusumo (Hasjim’s son) who sits as the Gerindra Deputy Secretary General and Chair of Tidar (Tunas Indonesia Raya, the party’s youth wing). Prabowo’s nephew, Rahayu Saraswati holds another important position in Tidar. One interpretation of this fact is that Prabowo realised the need to ensure the continuity of Gerindra and Djojohadikusumo’s influence within the party if he steps down in the future. He may realise that in a political environment where personal association with the party is very influential may lead to a weak party institutionalisation. Blood lines could be the alternative institutional mechanism in ensuring the continuity of the party, avoiding major breakups while retaining the influence of its founders. From the perspective of party institutionalisation as argued by scholars like Huntington (1968)66 and Panebianco (1998)67, this kind of institutionalisation perhaps can be seen as the weakness of party institutionalisation typical of political parties in the Third World. However, if one tries to analyse it from

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64 Nonetheless, Ahmad Muzani argued that the authority for Prabowo, as the head of advisory council, to appoint important positions and direct the party’s policies is legitimate based on Gerindra’s constitution. Interview with Ahmad Muzani on 13 February 2014 in Tangerang.
65 See Poguntke and Webb, 2005, p. 3
a different perspective, this kind of institutionalisation is an inherent feature of political parties in new democracies and not merely to ensure the survival of the party.

In the 2014 Legislative GE, Gerindra performed remarkably by obtaining 11.81 per cent of votes – notably higher than the 2009 Legislative GE. Gerindra also formed a coalition with the National Mandate Party (PAN), the United Development Party (PPP), the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS), Golkar and the Crescent and Star Party (PBB) to designate Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa as their presidential and vice presidential candidate in the 2014 Presidential Elections.  

**Nasdem**

Nasdem as a political party originate from a mass organisation under a similar name. Nasdem as an organisation was established by Surya Paloh, a media tycoon who owns Metro TV (one of the Indonesian news channels). Since its beginning, many experts have predicted that the organisation is the basis for a new political party to serve Surya Paloh’s political ambition after he was defeated by Aburizal Bakrie in the 2009 Golkar Congress in Pekanbaru. The mass organisation was declared in January 2010 by several prominent figures such as Anies Baswedan (Rector of Paramadina University), Didik J. Rachbini (member of PAN), Syafii Maarif (academician) Rizal Sukma (CSIS), Jeffrie Geovanie (businessman), Budiman Sudjatmiko (PDIP) and many others. Interestingly, there were names still affiliated with a number of political parties such as Ferry M. Baldan and Meutia Hafidz (Golkar), Budiman Sudjatmiko (PDIP), Jeffrie Geovanie (Golkar) and Akbar Faisal (Hanura). This sparked controversy among political parties, particularly Golkar, who questioned those members’ loyalty. Golkar in particular was quite concerned about the hidden agenda of Nasdem because Surya Paloh at that time was still a member of Golkar and there were some reports that Golkar members in the regions had also joined in with the mass organisation.

Eventually, Nasdem as a political party was formally established in July 2011 despite Surya Paloh’s constant denial about the establishment of the party. The ideology of the party is Pancasila. Interestingly, the party promotes a new platform called “The Indonesian Restoration” [Restorasi Indonesia], a concept with a relatively vague objective. Surya Paloh mentioned Indonesian leaders’ and political parties’ legitimacy crisis due to various corruption cases as the main reason for him to

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73 Interview with Sugeng Suparwoto (Vice Chairman of Nasdem), Rio Capela (Secretary General of Nasdem) and Ferry Mursidan Baldan (Golkar member) in Jakarta on 24 February 2014.
establish Nasdem Party. Therefore, the party launched “Restorasi Indonesia [Indonesia Restoration]” campaign to untangle the crisis.74

In 2011, Hary Tanoe joined Nasdem Party, but he later jumped ship to Hanura. The collaboration between the two media tycoons was believed to be a formidable force in driving the party to a prominent position within the future political constellation in Indonesia through constant media coverage of the party. Arguably, the success of Nasdem in qualifying for the Indonesian Electoral Commission’s [Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU] verification process can be seen as a success of this strategy. Nasdem has also surprisingly achieved beyond expectation in the 2014 Legislative Elections. According to the survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) in December 2012, Nasdem would only gain 5.2 per cent of the total votes.75 Meanwhile, the CSIS Survey in early 2014 noted that Nasdem could only secure about 3.2 per cent of the total votes.76 In reality, Nasdem earned 6.72 per cent of the total votes in the 2014 Legislative Elections.

Like the previous two parties — Hanura and Gerindra — Nasdem is also a personalistic party in which the power of their patron override the party’s mechanism in supporting and serving the patron’s political interests. In February 2013, Surya Paloh declared himself Chairman of Nasdem Party and announced his cabinet. He replaced Rio Patrice Capella as the Chairman of the party through a congress, which had allegedly been orchestrated to announce Surya Paloh as its chairman.77 Just before Surya Paloh announced his new position, Hary Tanoe decided to leave the party because he thought that he could not fight for his idealism if he stayed with Nasdem. Hary Tanoe’s political move was followed by three other Nasdem executives and numerous Nasdem cadres in the regions.78

This event strengthened the argument of the ‘presidentialisation of politics’ and the personalisation of political parties in Indonesia. First, as mentioned above, Surya Paloh as the founder and supreme patron of the party can override the party’s strategic decision. Nasdem’s decisional autonomy is managed not through a democratic mechanism but by the political interests of Surya Paloh. Based on previous experiences, he can override the party’s mechanism when nominating a candidate. Again, it shows that even a new party like Nasdem is not free from the trend of “presidentialisation of politics” of political parties. Secondly, Nasdem’s institutional mechanism is also very weak. The exodus of Nasdem’s cadres at the national and local levels to other political parties (particularly Hanura) shows that the value infusion of the party is also very weak. The concept of “Indonesian Restoration” is vague — being unable to inspire some of its cadres to retain their affiliations with Nasdem. Thirdly, media plays an important role in supporting the popularity of political

76 CSIS Survey March 2014.
parties. Undeniably, media has contributed significantly in boosting a candidate’s popularity – a primary foundation in improving electability. A hostile relation between a candidate and the media definitely compromises candidacy. Nasdem’s members consist of a large number of media figures that may have an effect on the party’s vote gathering strategy. Among the above mentioned Golkar splinters, Nasdem has the most sophisticated media team, both in the mainstream and social media. The party has been regularly conducting talks and visits at various universities across the archipelago to raise potential votes from academicians and students.

As a new comer, Nasdem does not aim for a particular segment in society as its constituents. However, based on some surveys, most of the party’s voters are from the younger generation (17-34 years). Nasdem also has a few prominent figures in attracting potential voters. To tackle those issues, the party chooses legislative candidates who have massive influence in their electorate areas in order to gather more votes.\(^7\) So far, Nasdem together with PDIP, PKB, and Hanura have nominated Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla as its presidential candidate.\(^8\)

Furthermore, Nasdem had built strong support outside Java. This situation emerged primarily because of Surya Paloh’s background as a Sumatran and his experience in the previous Golkar convention in which he gained tremendous support from Jusuf Kalla as a notable non-Javanese politician. Nasdem also concentrated its efforts in the 2014 Legislative Elections in acquiring substantial votes outside Java.\(^8\) Moreover, Mr Paloh’s position as one of the founding fathers of FKPPI (Communication Forum for Retired Soldier’s Children) provides an opportunity to gain additional support from families of retired soldiers.

Undeniably, Surya Paloh’s reign acts as the party’s dynamo which means he controls all of the party’s decisions. Although there is no official restrictions for its cadres in becoming party leader, Surya Paloh is most likely involved in the succession process as the party does not have a potential power-balancer to his power.

**Conclusion and Future Trajectory**

The absence of hegemonic power and political ambitions of competing factions have led to fragmentation within the Golkar party which caused the emergence of the party’s splinters. This article has demonstrated that Golkar’s splinters are unable to escape the trend of the “presidentialisation of politics” and personalisation of political parties. It is particularly due to the historical ties between the parties and their founders. The parties were established primarily to support their political interests and ambitions. In this context, almost all of them, except Nasdem, compete for the presidential position in the 2009 election and forthcoming elections. Furthermore, the founders of Hanura (Wiranto), Gerindra (Prabowo) and Nasdem (Surya Paloh) have the power to impose their decisions as they can override the parties’ institutional mechanisms. Consequently, those parties are heavily influenced by the decision of their founders as the supreme patron. In terms of decisional autonomy, although they are relatively free from outside interference, the main challenges are how to create an

\(^7\) Interview with Rio Patrice Capela on 24 February 2014 in Jakarta


internal institutional mechanism that can oblige all members, including the patrons, to abide by the
democratic institutional mechanism and to avoid the unilateral decision-making system imposed by
the patron.

Nevertheless, the fact that all of Golkar’s splinters can be categorised as personalistic parties,
is not unique in Indonesia. Their ancestor, Golkar, is under heavy influence from its chairman Aburizal
Bakrie. The difference between Golkar and the three splinter parties is the existence of a stronger
institutional mechanism in guaranteeing the Golkar chairman’s authority in expelling party’s members
when they challenge or criticise Aburizal’s decision.\(^{82}\) This difference is a result of a long period of
organisational institutionalisation that began after the New Order era.\(^{83}\)

The future of the three parties remains unclear. They have the potential to exploit the
popularity of their patrons. However, it will only work in a situation where the patrons have a
substantial positive image from the public. The risk of relying on a single figure is dangerous for the
party’s future. The demise of a party leader can undermine the party’s potential to grow bigger. The
key is how the three parties can create a sustainable and fair promotion including a cadre-isation
mechanism that can give incentives for younger cadres to compete for the highest position in a
relatively fair environment before the patrons lose their influence over the parties. It is important to
note here that the dynastic succession of Gerindra might be a compelling alternative to minimise
resistance and potential breakup. However, again, this is not a long-term solution to ensure the
party’s continuity. The Democratic system needs support from political parties who can create a
democratic environment within the parties’ organisation.

In general, Golkar and its splinters (Hanura, Gerindra and Nasdem) had performed well in the
2014 legislative election, passing the parliamentary threshold. Among those parties, Golkar and
Gerindra together with PKS, PAN, PBB and PPP had announced Prabowo-Hatta as their candidate.
Meanwhile, Nasdem and Hanura have joined PDIP and PKB to support Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla’s
candidacy.

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\(^{82}\) See for instance “Sebagian DPD Golkar Sesalkan Kritik Akbar Soal Pencapresan Ical [Some Golkar Branches
Regret Akbar's Criticism over Ical Presidential Candidature]” Sorotnews.com 7 January 2013

\(^{83}\) See Tomsa (2008).
Table 5: Hanura, Gerindra, and Nasdem in Comparison

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<td>21 December 2006</td>
<td>Wiranto as President</td>
<td>Independency and People’s Welfare</td>
<td>First time voters - Disappointed Golkar voters - Floating Mass</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
<td>Jokowi-JK</td>
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<td>GERINDRA</td>
<td>6 February 2008</td>
<td>Prabowo as president</td>
<td>Developing people’s welfare, social justice, and political system based on nationalism and religiosity within Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
<td>Lower income class (Labour, Farmer, Fisherman, etc.) - Floating Mass</td>
<td>11.81 %</td>
<td>Prabowo-Hatta</td>
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<td>NASDEM</td>
<td>26 July 2011</td>
<td>Indonesia Restoration</td>
<td>A strong nation which is economically sovereign and culturally dignify</td>
<td>Young voters (17-34 years) - Floating Mass</td>
<td>6.72%</td>
<td>Jokowi-JK</td>
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Source: Official Websites, Interviews with Hanura, Gerindra, and Nasdem members, and General Elections Committee (KPU) website
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