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Fostering Public Service Motivation through Workplace Trust: Evidence from Public Managers in Taiwan

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FOSTERING PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION THROUGH WORKPLACE TRUST:
EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC MANAGERS IN TAIWAN

Abstract

Existing literature addressing antecedents of public service motivation (PSM) focuses on personal predisposition and institutional shaping. The authors offer a new angle to the germane studies, arguing that workplace trust as a result of human interaction and personal choice has a bearing on PSM. It is postulated that, when public managers perceive the trustworthiness of citizens, colleagues, and agency leaders, their PSM increases. The authors test this proposition by using data collected from middle managers working in the Taiwan central government and receive strong support. We conclude that this study brings trust into the study of PSM, facilitates interdisciplinary dialogues, and thus helps make PSM a type of cross-boundary knowledge.
Introduction

Public service motivation (PSM), first proposed by Perry and Wise (1990), has raised attention levels for the study of motivation in public organizations. PSM refers to one’s predisposition to serve the community and public interest (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). The concept is also defined as “the belief, values, and attitudes that…concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate” (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). PSM is all the rage lately. It, as an internal motive, helps enhance worker job satisfaction and organizational commitment; promotes reform support and organizational citizenship behavior; and reduces turnover intention and perceived red tape (Naff & Crum, 1999; Pandey, Wright, & Moynihan, 2008; Scott & Pandey, 2005; Taylor, 2008). It also determines whether one prefers government employment to business employment (Vandenabeele, 2008).

Given the importance of PSM, scholars have tried to identify its antecedents through two approaches. The first approach centers on a person’s inherent predispositions. Strong monetary preferences are incompatible with PSM (Bright, 2005) whereas a desire for job security, functioning as a crowding-in motivational factor, can lead to extra effort in public service (Chen & Hsieh, 2012; Frank & Lewis, 2004). The second approach focuses on institutional shaping (Perry & Vandenabeele, 2008). Institutional shaping can occur in organizations where structural settings such as red tape and hierarchical control stifle one’s PSM (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007). It can appear in a society where people’s gender, age, and education are embedded in social structures and expectations such that demographic factors determine one’s PSM (Vandenabeele, 2011). It is also possible that institutional shaping happens in families and religious gatherings where individuals nourish PSM through parental modeling, voluntary work, and religious
socialization (Perry, 1997; Perry, Brudney, Coursey, & Littlepage, 2008; Vandenabeele, 2011).
The institutional approach perfectly reflects Perry’s (2000) assertion that PSM as a type of
motivation is grounded in cognitive and affective responses to social contexts.

Despite bountiful empirical evidence, both approaches give little attention to human
processes: while the dispositional approach lays too much emphasis on context-free psychology,
the institutional approach assumes that individuals passively react to institutional demands with
little choice. In the present study, we propose a new approach by introducing civil servants’
interpersonal trust at work into PSM research as interpersonal trust connotes individual choice as
well as the dynamics of human interaction. We ask whether public managers’ perceived
trustworthiness of various social actors in their worksite including citizens, colleagues, and
agency leaders enhances their PSM. Our speculation is not anecdotal, but instead, endorsed by
existing research. Interpersonal trust is not an uncharted terrain in public administration.
Empirical evidence shows that public managers’ trust in supervisors enhances organizational
commitment and reduces turnover intention (Albrecht & Travaglione, 2003; Nyhan, 2000); trust
in colleagues leads to helping behaviors such as knowledge sharing (Soonhee Kim & Lee, 2006);
trust in citizens results in more citizen participation, and accordingly more democracy (Yang,
2005). Because PSM closely pertains to commitment to the public sector, altruism, helping, and
public values such as democracy (Camilleri, 2006; Sangmook Kim et al., 2012), we can
reasonably anticipate a nexus between interpersonal trust at work (thereafter workplace trust) and
PSM.

Examining the role of workplace trust first advances the theory of PSM antecedents.
Workplace trust first delineates a dynamic process in which individuals modify their beliefs
according to human interactions, different from the view of static influence mentioned in both
dispositional and institutional approaches. This study also facilitates interdisciplinary dialogue by allowing the influx of theories in political science, sociology, and psychology into PSM research. For example, we need the theory of social capital (Putnam, 2001) and attraction-selection-attrition (De Cooman et al., 2009) to capture how public managers’ trust/distrust in citizens influences PSM. We need the theory of social learning and social cognition (Bandura, 1977, 1989) to understand how public managers learn from their colleagues’ benevolence and transform it into PSM. We need the theory of politics-administration dichotomy and strategic alignment (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole, & Walker, 2011; Berman, Chen, Jan, & Huang, 2012) to comprehend why trust in agency leaders reinforces PSM. Findings of the present study shed light on practices as well. When social interactions foster civil servants’ PSM, their service propensity is more likely to transcend “cheap talk” (Farrell & Rabin, 1996) and be transformed into real actions (Houston, 2006), as trust represents well-established collective commitment (Robertson & Tang, 1995) that provides a psychological buffer for civil servants to serve the public interest with little reservation.

We test our hypotheses using data collected in 2010 from public managers working in Taiwan, a country where the separation of powers resembles other democratic presidential systems in the world. We first briefly review the literature of interpersonal trust and explain why we expect the main causality to be trust leading to PSM. Next, we develop three hypotheses, discussing how PSM is reinforced by civil servants’ trust in citizens, colleagues, and agency leaders respectively. This section is followed by analysis and implications.

**Interpersonal Trust and PSM: The Causality Issue**

Trust is a source of constructive social relations on which compromise and cooperation can be developed (Brown & Ferris, 2007). Contemporary theories suggest that trust influences
participation in political and civic life (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). It is also
deemed a social virtue, as Fukayama (1995) describes. Given its importance, increasing
discussions on trust emanate from sociology, political science, and psychology. Focusing on
interpersonal trust, the topic of the present study, psychologists and sociologists provide
competing views regarding its source (Delhey & Newton, 2003). Psychological theories suggest
that a person’s propensity to trust in strangers (i.e. generalized trust) (Yamagishi & Yamagishi,
1994) is a result of certain personality traits, such as optimism (Allport, 1961). By contrast,
sociological theories claim that interpersonal trust is a product of experience (Hardin, 2006)
because individuals constantly modify trustful and distrustful feelings in response to changing
circumstances (Delhey & Newton, 2003).

Although both views seem plausible, Newton (2001) offers reasons why interpersonal
trust is more likely a cognitive process grounded in rational choices (Castelfranchi & Falcone,
2001; Uslaner, 1999). He first argues that trust statistics in any given society often increase or
decrease rapidly, not likely to be a result of personality or childhood socialization, but instead, a
rational response to variations in the external world. In addition, if trust stems from personality
traits, it has to be constant not only over time but also across the board and therefore we should
expect little difference between one’s interpersonal trust and political trust (i.e. trust in political
regime and authorities, see Mishler & Rose, 2001). However, empirical evidence shows a weak
or non-existent relationship between them (Kaase, 1999; Uslaner, 2002; Zmerli & Newton,
2008), implying that personality and childhood learning are not the primary determinants of
trust. Thus, trust is more a social response, a concept beyond a reflection of inherent or early-
learned nature (Newton, 2001).
Following this line, we argue that the main causality between trust and PSM should be trust causing PSM. When we treat trust as a source causing PSM, the causal mechanism should be interpreted as “individuals form their trust in workplace actors through interactions and learn benevolence from them, accordingly enhancing their PSM.” This logic hints that PSM as a socially grounded predisposition (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008) can be fostered by workplace trust nourished through social interactions. By contrast, if we deem PSM a source causing trust, the causal mechanism should be interpreted as “individuals first have a propensity to serve the public interest, and the belief in serving people increases one’s tendency to trust people.” In this situation, trust is merely a reflection of an inherent personality trait or early-learned value, incompatible with Newton’s (2001) view of trust as a social response. In sum, trust is not only an inherent nature but a core element of civic culture (Inglehart, 1990), so we adhere to the main causality of workplace trust causing PSM. ¹ In some cases, the enhanced PSM can in turn reinforce one’s workplace trust. We elaborate on this reciprocal relationship in the next section.

**Hypotheses**

Public managers’ workplace trust is often reflected in their trust in citizens, trust in colleagues, and trust in agency leaders. While they are all positively predictive of PSM, the underlying mechanisms are different. We start from the discussion of trust in citizens.

**Trust in Citizens**

The relationship between trust in citizens and PSM can be best captured through the lens of social capital (Putnam, 2001). Social capital refers to core values and norms of social organizations that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1995), and interpersonal trust—portrayed by mutuality, empathy, reciprocity, civility, respect, solidarity, toleration, and voluntarism (Newton, 2001)—serves as the foundation of collective behavior, on which social
capital is accumulated (Putnam, 1993). Trust in strangers (citizens are usually strangers in civil servants’ eyes) makes people accommodate others’ preferences and facilitates a healthy society (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Sociologists indicate that people who trust strangers tend to engage in voluntary actions, community issues, giving to charity, and many other civic duties such as serving on a jury (Putnam, 1995).

Considering that PSM is a synergy of compassion, self-sacrifice, and public interest, trust in citizens as a moral and altruistic tendency (Mansbridge, 1999) should be in line with the growth of PSM for public managers. Yang (2005) defines administrators’ trust in citizens as “administrators’ belief that the citizens who are affected by their work, when they are involved in the administrative process, will act in a fashion that is helpful to administrators’ performance” (p.276). In the same article, Yang (2005) also addresses that the interaction between citizens and public administrators can go beyond private exchange because both citizens and public administrators have democratic connotations and public administrators require a sense of civic duty as their public service ethic (Mosher, 1982). However, trust in citizens involves risks as citizens may act opportunistically by taking advantage of rules not clearly specified. If public managers perceive that citizens are not honest and trustworthy, they may lose their motivation to serve the public interest as their devotion could be in vain, as Blau (1960) indicates in his argument about public sector workers’ reality shock. This reality shock may trigger the effect of attrition (De Cooman et al., 2009) and eventually reorient public managers to attach less importance to intrinsic and serving values but greater importance to instrumental rewards (Buurman, Dur, & Van den Bossche, 2009).

While public managers’ perceived trustworthiness of citizens enhances their PSM, the ameliorated PSM can in turn foster their trust in citizens (i.e. reciprocity). According to Hosmer
(1995), trust is often directed by informal obligations, norms, as well as the belief in kindness and compassion. From this perspective, commitment to the public interest as norm-based PSM, compassion, and self-sacrifice as affective PSM can improve civil servants’ trust in citizens.

_Hypothesis 1: Trust in citizens is positively correlated with PSM._

**Trust in Colleagues**

The impact of trust in colleagues on PSM should be understood through the lens of social learning and modeling (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Indeed, a theory of PSM is premised on not only endogenous self-concepts but also preferences learned in social processes (Perry, 2000). We suspect that civil servants can learn good will from coworkers. Their trust in colleagues’ benevolence, sincerity, and professional ethics should constitute a pivotal part of their value system, foster their willingness to repay, and nourish their belief in altruism (the effect of modeling, see Ormrod, 2008), eventually leading to a higher level of PSM.

This speculation is further endorsed by evidence from empirical studies in educational psychology, showing that trust is contagious (Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 1999; Tschannen-Moran, 2001). School teachers who demonstrate a strong faith in their colleagues also trust the principal and students, implying the spillover effect of trust in workplaces. A more recent study even shows that teachers’ trust in colleagues is predictive of their commitment to students through the function of collective efficacy, meaning that teachers’ trust in colleagues results in collective beliefs in organizing teaching practices to make a positive difference for their students (Lee, Zhang, & Yin, 2011). In the case of public managers, trust in colleagues can reinforce their trust in citizens through spillover effect and accordingly enhances their PSM. Or alternatively, trust in colleagues may form collective efficacy among public managers and strengthen their commitment to the general public.
Self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon, Turban, Brown, Barrick, & Judge, 2003), also referred to as SDT, helps conceptually link PSM and trust in colleagues as well. SDT first distinguishes autonomous motivation from controlled motivation. Autonomous motivation includes intrinsic motivation (the activity itself is an internal reward) and identified motivation (the activity is judged valuable or useful) whereas controlled motivation is comprised of introjected motivation (the activity helps avoid anxiety, shame, and pressure) and external motivation (the activity satisfies an external demand or obtains an external reward contingency). PSM, apparently, is a type of autonomous motivation.

Not everyone chooses a public sector job because of more opportunities to serve the public interest. In many cases, a high level of job security and high pay, two controlled motivations, are more important than serving people (Crewson, 1997; Jurkiewicz, Massey, & Brown, 1998). However, it does not mean that their PSM can never be enhanced. According to SDT, satisfaction with relatedness can help individuals internalize their extrinsic work values and thus transform controlled motivation into autonomous motivation. Public sector workers may gradually perceive the value of PSM once their need for relatedness is met. Relatedness, a need for being connected to others, is often captured by questions asking people whether they feel close to, attached to, and valued by their colleagues or teammates (Hollenbeak & Amorose, 2005; Richer & Vallerand, 1998), resembling the meaning of trust in colleagues. Since relatedness helps transform controlled motivation into autonomous motivation, public managers’ perceived trustworthiness of colleagues as a symbol of relatedness should enhance PSM, a type of autonomous motivation.

Enhanced PSM can promote organizational citizenship behavior or OCB (Sangmook Kim, 2006). The underlying logic is that a compassionate response and self-sacrifice at work
often take the form of prosocial and altruistic behaviors (Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1999; Lilius et al., 2008). Given that trust in colleagues and OCB are inseparable (McAllister, 1995), we expect that improved PSM can in turn reinforce civil servants’ trust in colleagues.

Hypothesis 2: Trust in colleagues is positively correlated with PSM.

Trust in Agency Leaders

Public managers’ trust in agency leaders (political appointees) should be positively correlated with their PSM. This positive association is first found in the literature of trust in leadership rooted in generic management. Literature suggests that civil servants’ trust in organizational leaders and higher level managers is triggered when people perceive procedural and distributive justice, organizational support, substantial feedback, and a leader’s integrity and capability (Albrecht & Travaglione, 2003; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Nyhan, 2000). Typical consequences include positive work attitudes, improved job performance, and organizational citizenship behaviors such as altruism, civic virtue, and conscientiousness (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Altruism and civic virtue can spill over to the general public. A recent study of PSM shows that public managers’ PSM increases when they perceive that leaders and higher level managers empower them and cut red tape for them in reforms (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007).

In addition to providing support as senior public managers do to their subordinates, agency leaders can foster service excellence through the mechanism of political-managerial alignment (Berman et al., 2012). As Meier and O’Toole (2006) claim, high performance in the public sector results from the effort of both politicians and managers. However, conflicts often exist between them as principal-agent theory suggests. While agency leaders generally have a bird’s eye view of organizations and pay greater attention to the compromise among stakeholders, public managers holding their professional and technical views can feel frustrated
by the consequence of such compromise—ambiguous goals (Chun & Rainey, 2006). We suspect that poor political-managerial alignment as represented by public managers’ distrust in agency leaders will not only bring detrimental effects to organizational performance (Boyne, Jung, & Walker, 2012), but also compromise public managers’ work morale and service motivation.

We expect a reciprocal relationship between PSM and trust in agency leaders as well. Why? In a modern democratic regime, agency leaders are called on to play the role of the conservator/steward of public service values (Kee & Newcomer, 2008; Terry, 2002). While exercising conservatorship/stewardship, they hold public managers accountable for their actions so that commitment to the mission and goals of the organization is secured. Improved PSM, especially the interest in policy making and commitment to the public interest, can orient public managers to exhibit more trust in agency leaders’ virtue, morality, and adherence to public benevolence (Terry, 2002).

\[ H3: \text{Trust in agency leaders is positively correlated with PSM.} \]

Data

Data used in the current study were collected from middle managers working in the central government in Taiwan. Taiwan, a developed nation situated near the southeastern shores of Mainland China, employs the system of separation of powers that resembles other democratic presidential systems in the world, such as that in the United States. We emphasize that the goal of the present study is the advancement of the general theory instead of international comparison. Similar to many studies conducted outside the US or UK (e.g. Kjeldsen & Jacobsen, 2012; Ritz, 2009), we do not examine the context of Taiwan in detail.

In a fourteen-grade hierarchy, the grades of middle managers are generally between seven and nine. The project was funded by the National Science Council (NSC 98-2410-H-004-
035-NU2) and obtained contact information for all 1,189 middle managers working in central
government from the Directorate-General of Personnel Administration, Executive Yuan in
Taiwan. We selected middle managers as survey targets because the flow of information and the
exchange of knowledge intensively occur at the middle level in most bureaucracies. The
questionnaire was originally designed in the summer of 2009. On the 27th of December in 2009,
a professional focus group was called to examine the validity of the questionnaire. We finalized
the questionnaire in early January of 2010, and soon after, we sent pre-contact letters to all
potential respondents. The mail survey officially started on the 5th of January in 2010. To boost
the response rate, we sent follow-up postcards on the 18th of January to those who did not reply.
The survey was concluded on the 31st of January. Among all collected responses, we found 8
cases where surveys were not answered by middle managers. The error was a result of the
misplacement of non-middle managers in the survey list or subordinates answering for their
supervisors. After deleting these invalid cases, we successfully collected 774 responses. The
response rate reached 65.1%.

Because the data came from a self-reported questionnaire with a cross-sectional design,
Harman's single-factor test was used to assess whether common-method variance was a concern
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Thus, all indicators (including all workplace trust and PSM items)
were entered into a single factor using a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and an exploratory
factor analysis with the VARIMAX rotational method was also conducted to verify the testing
result (see Table 1). The poor fit statistics (e.g., Comparative Fit Index = .380) as well as the
proportion of variance explained by each factor reported in Table 1 (the highest is 11.508%)
provide evidence against the presence of common-method variance as there is no one general
factor that accounts for a majority of the total variance. The measures of dependent and independent variables are discussed next.

**Variables**

Perry (1996) first explored the dimensionality of PSM and proposed a four-dimension construct, which includes attraction to policy making, commitment to the public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice. The authors selected 14 items (3 for attraction to policy making and compassion; 4 for commitment to the public interest and self-sacrifice) with 1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree from the original PSM scale developed by Perry (1996). The most fundamental criterion applied to item selection was translation—whether an item could be translated to Chinese with little tweaking of the meaning. The factor analysis presented in Table 1 supports that the four constructs of PSM are salient and distinct. Cronbach’s alpha value for each construct is between .58 (attraction to policy making) and .81 (compassion). Cronbach’s alpha for the global PSM index (the summation of 12 items) is .80.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

Several ordinal questions with 1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree were employed to measure workplace trust. Items used to measure trust in citizens and trust in agency leaders were adapted from Yang (2005) and Nyhan (2000) respectively. Cronbach’s alpha for both constructs are over .70. The construct of trust in colleagues consists of four items asking about the situation for information sharing, the sincerity of interaction, and the faith in the colleagues’ professional ethics. Cronbach’s alpha for this construct also reaches .74. In Table 1, all of the workplace trust items appear to load heavily onto the corresponding factor, indicating the validity of these constructs.

[Insert Figure 1 Here]
To further ensure convergent and discriminant validity of these PSM and workplace trust constructs, CFA was performed (see Figure 1). Overall, the model yields an acceptable fit to the data (McDonald & Ho, 2002) as Comparative Fit Index is .906 and Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation is .048. The result also illustrates that these constructs are significantly valid in terms of discriminant validity (the extent to which a construct is truly distinct from other constructs) and convergent validity (the extent to which indicators of a specific construct share a high proportion of variance in common) (Hair, 2006). For example, in Figure 1, none of the correlations between any pair of latent variables is larger than .9 (the highest score is .69), which indicates that each of these constructs captures a certain concept that others do not. In addition, the CFA result also reveals evidence of convergent validity. It is suggested that the size of factor loading for each survey item is an important consideration for convergent validity (Hair, 2006). It is preferable that standardized factor loading is .5 or higher. As shown in Figure 1, most standardized factor loadings exceed the value of .5, which demonstrates convergent validity for the constructs used in this study. Please refer to the Appendix for more details regarding measurement of variables.

There are several control variables in the current study: age, gender, job tenure, agency function, span of control, a promotional position, private sector experience, inflexible formalization, and the pursuit of pay as a reason for job selection. Age is treated as a statistical control because it is thought to be predictive of public employee motivation (Jurkiwicz & Brown, 1998). Empirical evidence also supports that gender and service tenure are correlated with PSM (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997). Because empirical studies of job tenure often separate current job tenure from service tenure or organizational tenure (Bedeian, Ferris, & Kacmar, 1992), this study follows this approach by controlling for current job tenure. The
authors also suspect that managers in service delivery agencies (i.e. line organizations) express stronger PSM due to the nature of their work, in comparison to those holding a position in non-street level institutions (e.g. staff organizations). Span of control as measured by the number of employees supervised should be negatively related to PSM as managers need to sacrifice the time and energy spent on public service for supervision of subordinates. A promotional position may bring individuals a positive emotional status and accordingly enhance PSM. Additionally, those switching into the public sector from private industry and non-switchers may exhibit different levels of PSM due to the sector imprinting effect (Boardman, Bozeman, & Ponomariov, 2010; Chen, 2012). Inflexible formalization, resembling red tape, can destroy PSM (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007). Finally, we control for pursuing pay as a reason for job selection. According to a recent empirical study (Chen & Hsieh, 2012), pursuing high pay implies the love of money, evil, and motivation crowding out, thus undermines PSM. However, pursuing stable pay implies basic competence and motivation crowding in, thus enhancing PSM. We report descriptive statistics for all abovementioned variables in Table 2.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

**Statistical Findings**

This study aims to explore whether public managers’ trust in different segments of society is related to the variance of PSM. The pairwise correlation coefficients of main variables presented in Table 3 provide some preliminary evidence. As predicted, the global index of PSM is positively correlated with all workplace trust variables. Although the correlations between workplace trust and the four facets of PSM are seemingly positive, trust in citizens does not significantly relate to compassion. Thus, whether the four PSM dimensions are uniformly influenced by interpersonal trust at work requires further investigation.

[Insert Table 3 Here]
The nature of the dependent variable, PSM, enables this study to model variable relationships with OLS regression. However, the violation of homoscedasticity was detected as the Breusch-Pagan post-regression test suggested the model to be heteroscedastic. As a result, the authors fixed this problem with robust standard errors. Table 4 displays the results of OLS regression. In general, trust variables are related to PSM positively, which is in line with our conjecture. Additionally, the results for each single dimension of PSM, as dependent variables, slightly differ from the results in the global index model (Model 5), so they are placed in Table 4 for comparison. It is worth mentioning that the variance inflation factor (VIF) test does not detect any multicollinearity problems in these models as all VIF values are lower than 2.

[Insert Table 4 Here]

In Table 4, Model 1 (attraction to policy making as the dependent variable) and Model 3 (compassion as the dependent variable) show opposite results on the workplace trust-PSM relationship. In Model 1, trust in citizens ($B = .147, p = .002$) and trust in agency leaders ($B = .117, p = .005$) are both positively related to a surge of attraction to policy making. Trust in colleagues is found to be insignificant, although it is approaching the significance level at $\alpha = .05$ ($B = .088, p = .075$). In Model 3, however, only trust in colleagues is significant among the three workplace trust variables ($B = .087, p = .006$). Trust in agency leaders is not significant, but is approaching the significance level at $\alpha = .05$ ($B = .047, p = .073$). The coefficient of trust in citizens is surprisingly negative but not statistically significant ($B = -.027, p = .365$). The last finding calls for more in-depth discussion.

The rest of the OLS regression models are virtually identical and provide supporting evidence for the hypotheses of this study. In Model 2, trust in citizens ($B = .072, p = .031$), trust in colleagues ($B = .088, p = .010$), and trust in agency leaders ($B = .153, p = .000$) are positively
related to commitment to public interest, as expected. Model 4 (self-sacrifice as the dependent variable) demonstrates that trust in colleagues ($B = .105, p = .012$), trust in democracy ($B = .155, p = .001$), and trust in agency leadership ($B = .172, p = .000$) are all positively associated with self-sacrifice at $\alpha = .05$. Finally, the global index of PSM is used as the dependent variable in Model 5. As shown, the coefficients of trust in citizens ($B = .076, p = .002$), trust in colleagues ($B = .105, p = .000$), and trust in agency leaders ($B = .128, p = .000$) are all positive and statistically significant, which yield remarkable support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.

Concerning the influence of control variables, male respondents demonstrate higher levels of commitment to public interest, while a promotional position is related to attraction to policy making, a rational motive. Those who work in a service agency are inclined to show the virtue of self-sacrifice and the commitment to serve the public interest. Pursuing stable pay is associated with all PSM constructs but self-sacrifice. Additionally, age yields a positively significant coefficient in most models except Model 1, meaning that older managers tend to express higher levels of PSM than their younger counterparts. Inflexible formalization is also uniformly but negatively associated with commitment to public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice. The rest of the control variables are, however, not statistically significant.

Generally the findings support our hypotheses. Although the OLS results show that coefficients of trust in colleagues in Model 1 and trust in agency leaders in Model 3 fail to reach the significance level at $\alpha = .05$, their bivariate correlation coefficients in Table 3 are significant at the level of $\alpha = .01$. There is, however, an unexpected finding: trust in citizens fails to predict compassion. One of the possible reasons is that the construct of trust is comprised of trust in citizens’ ability (“Citizens don’t understand what you are doing”), good will (“Citizens want to help you with your job”), and honesty (“You cannot rely on citizens to always tell the truth”).
Compassion may be related to citizens’ good will and honesty but not their ability, accordingly leading to insignificant correlation. Another possible reason is “real world miseries.” Citizens’ selfishness and dishonesty may discourage public servants and destroy their compassion. However, many selfish and lying citizens, such as prostitutes, drug addicts, or even the homeless, may have various stories miserable enough to arouse civil servants’ compassion. In other words, the negative impact of selfishness, dishonesty, and refusing to cooperate on civil servants’ compassion may be countervailed by the positive effect of “real world miseries.” Of course, the conjecture of “real world miseries” is not well grounded in theories and thus requires further evidence to prove it.

**Implications**

Unlike conventional views that investigate PSM antecedents through the lens of either institution shaping or personal predisposition, this study introduces workplace trust into the study of PSM. We ask whether public managers’ trust in citizens, colleagues, and agency leaders fosters their PSM. Answering this question is a breakthrough in developing the theory of PSM antecedents. First, while conventional perspectives emphasize that PSM is passively influenced by either institutions or inherent predispositions, the present study holds a view that public managers interact with people, modify their trust, and accordingly form their PSM. Therefore, PSM is not only a result of environmental or dispositional determination but also a result of personal choices of trust. Public managers’ PSM is not static, depending on how they interact with citizens, colleagues, and agency leaders in their daily life.

Second, along this line, our approach makes up the insufficiencies left by those who found the change of PSM at work over time. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated the change of PSM by examining time-series data (Kjeldsen & Jacobsen, 2012) or organizational tenure in
cross-sectional data (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007), but their methods do not allow them to further pinpoint the reasons leading to the change. Although arguing that workplace trust determines the change of PSM at work is not entirely precise, we offer possible factors in the present study for scholars to further investigate how organizational socialization and interpersonal dynamics matter in modifying public managers’ PSM over time.

Finally, bridging workplace trust and PSM allows the influx of multidisciplinary theories into the research of PSM. We use the theory of social capital and attraction-selection-attrition to connect the dots between trust in citizens and PSM; we link trust in colleagues to PSM with the use of social learning theory and self-determination theory; we construct the relationship between trust in agency leaders and PSM on politics-administration dichotomy and political-managerial alignment. The current approach creates an interface between public administration and other disciplines, increases interdisciplinary dialogues, and integrates PSM research with knowledge in psychology, sociology, and political science simultaneously. This approach also provides a new channel that allows public administration scholars to introduce their own research to other disciplines. This is particularly important when public administration has long faced an identity crisis.

The present study contributes to the practice as well. A strong tie between trust and PSM acts as a catalyst that enables public managers to transform their service propensity into real actions. The main reason is that trust represents well-established mutual commitment (Robertson & Tang, 1995) in collective actions and thus provides a psychological buffer for civil servants to pursue the public interest with little hesitation. With evidence of this tie, public administration scholars may be more confident to argue that PSM is not only “cheap talk” (Farrell & Rabin, 1996). Public civil servants with high PSM can really talk the talk and walk the walk (Houston,
Therefore, facilitating a trust environment enhances not only civil servants’ PSM but also the possibility to transform their motivation into practice.

Suggestions for Future Research

Some limitations exist in this study. More effort should be made in the future to improve the quality of research. The first limitation appears in the use of the PSM construct. We designed the questionnaire back in 2009 and happened to miss Kim’s (2009) revised measurement scale of PSM published in the *American Review of Public Administration*. In this article, Kim (2009) questions whether items used to measure attraction to public policy making in Perry’s (1996) original design are valid in the Korean context and thus develops new items to more precisely capture the essence of interests in policy making in Korea. Given that Taiwan and Korea share similar cultural backgrounds (e.g. Confucianism) and democratic experiences (e.g. transition from authoritative ruling to modern democracy), Kim’s revisions may be more suitable for the context in Taiwan. Indeed, a low Cronbach’s alpha for attraction to policy making in the present study (.58) confirms Kim’s doubt. More recently, Kim et al. (2012) developed an international instrument of PSM and included public values in addition to the original four dimensions. It is another interesting angle that researchers may consider.

Trust measurement can be improved as well. Existing literature shows that the faces of trust are multi-dimensional, including willingness to risk, benevolence, reliability, competence, and honesty (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 1999). In the present study, we simply adopt trust measures used in previous studies (e.g. Yang, 2005), but unfortunately, these previous studies failed to carefully differentiate the content of trust. As we addressed, trust in citizens’ competence may have relatively minor influences on PSM whereas trust in citizens’ good will and honesty may carry a more direct and strong impact on PSM. Future research
should go beyond the scope of the current study and address different faces of trust to more precisely uncover influences of different faces of trust.

Finally, according to the literature reviewed in the present study, the main causality between workplace trust and PSM is trust causing PSM, but meanwhile, reciprocity also exists. Methodologically, OLS is not the most ideal modeling solution for reciprocal relationships. OLS was employed due to the following reasons. First, so far no method can concurrently capture three reciprocal relationships in one model. In addition, not all reciprocities concern every single dimension of PSM. For example, asserting that attraction to policy making enhances trust in colleagues does not sound very reasonable. However, the fact remains that we fail to statistically examine reciprocity in the present study, and this should be improved. Future studies may consider using simultaneous equation modeling methods, but the prerequisite is that scholars need to narrow down the research scope (i.e. focusing on one type of trust) and select the most reasonable PSM dimensions for modeling. With the evidence from simultaneous equation modeling, scholars may be able to provide more accurate answers for the chicken-and-egg problems embedded in the research of both trust and PSM.

In sum, different from existing research that focuses on either predispositions or institutional shaping, we studied public managers’ workplace trust as a result of human interaction and personal choice. The present study only scratches the surface of interpersonal dynamics in PSM. New research agendas in the future should cross the boundary of public administration, bring more workplace and even societal factors in, and make PSM a type of interdisciplinary knowledge.
References


For Peer Review


Endnotes

1 It is not our intent to entirely rule out the possibility that some public servants are inherently more compassionate, and because of this, they exhibit stronger trust in people. As Delhey and Newton (2003) contend, the research of trust often involves chicken-and-egg problems and social scientists are unable to make much progress if cross-sectional data are used. In fact, the causality issue is common in PSM research as well (Wright, 2008). Given there is no general rule about how to determine the direction of causality, plausibility is so far the best standard on which researchers can rely (Delhey & Newton, 2003).

2 In fact, the SDT typology proposed in 2000 by Ryan and Deci (2000) has integrated motivation between intrinsic and identified motivation. However, SDT-based conceptual studies (Sheldon et al., 2003) and empirical studies (Gagné et al., 2010) exclude integrated motivation as it is hard to measure and hard to distinguish from either intrinsic or identified motivation. The present study follows this line.

3 The original item of “Most social programs are too vital to do without” (compassion) is translated into “Many social welfare programs are indispensable” in our PSM construct because “too vital to do without” reads awkward in Chinese. In addition, “social program” is not a widely used term in Chinese, so we use “social welfare program.” The original item of “I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else” (self-sacrifice) is translated into “I would risk my career for the public good of society” in our PSM construct because “one of those rare” can be hardly translated into Chinese. “I would like to know more about what people need in my community” is not in Perry’s original design. However, it is very close to an item in the most recent JPART publication by Kim et al. (2012) about international instrument of PSM: “It is fundamental that public services respond to the needs of the citizens.”

4 The normalized estimate of Mardia’s coefficient was used to assess the multivariate normality of the data. Bentler (2006) suggested a value of three or smaller so that modeling statistics would not be affected. In our analysis, however, the resulting normalized estimate was 72.66. Because the data did not meet the requirement of multivariate normality, fit indices reported here were computed using the Satorra-Bentler robust method, a commonly used strategy for dealing with nonnormal data (Finney & Distefano, 2006).

5 The measured variable, Trust1-1, is below .5 but is very close to the preferable value.

6 Kim’s (2009) revised measurement of attraction to policy making includes three items: “I am interested in making public programs that are beneficial for my country or community I belong to”; “Sharing my views on public policies with others is attractive to me”; and “Seeing people get benefits from the public program I have been deeply involved in brings me a great deal of satisfaction.”
<table>
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<tr>
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Table 3  Bivariate Correlation Coefficients

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**statistical significance p < .01
Table 4 OLS Regression: Trust Enhancing PSM

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<th>DV: Public Interest</th>
<th>DV: Compassion</th>
<th>DV: Self-Sacrifice</th>
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| N | 673 | 672 | 677 | 669 | 658 |
| F | 4.72** | 8.30** | 5.00** | 10.50** | 12.24** |
| R-square | 0.091 | 0.147 | 0.090 | 0.181 | 0.202 |

*statistical significance p < .05; **statistical significance p < .01
Figure 1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Appendix A: Variable Measurement

**Dependent Variables: PSM (1=strongly disagree; 6=strongly agree)**

Attraction to policy making (Cronbach’s alpha = .58)
- PM1: Politics is a dirty word (rev)
- PM2: I don’t care much for politicians (rev)
- PM3: The give and take of public policy making doesn’t appeal me (rev)

Commitment to the public interest (Cronbach’s alpha = .73)
- PI1: It is hard for me to get interested in what is going on in my community (rev)
- PI2: I consider public service my civic duty
- PI3: I unselfishly contribute to my community
- PI4: I would like to know more about what people need in my community

Compassion (Cronbach’s alpha = .81)
- COM1: I am often moved by the plight of the underprivileged
- COM2: I am often reminded how dependent we are on one another
- COM3: Many social welfare programs are indispensible

Self-sacrifice (Cronbach’s alpha = .76)
- SS1: Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievement
- SS2: I would risk my career for the public good of society
- SS3: Contribution to the society is my obligation
- SS4: I think people should give back to society more than they get from it

PSM global index (14 items) = .80

**Independent Variables: Trust (1=strongly disagree; 6=strongly agree)**

Trust in citizens: When you have contact with citizens on your duty, they… (Cronbach’s alpha = .71)
- Trust1-1: They don’t understand what you are doing (rev)
- Trust1-2: You cannot rely on them to always tell the truth (rev)
- Trust1-3: They want to help you with your job
- Trust1-4: Their only concern is whether their personal interests are well protected (rev)

Trust in colleagues (Cronbach’s alpha = .74)
- Trust2-1: My colleagues share important information related to work with no reservation
- Trust2-2: I keep strong faith in my colleagues as they have a high level of professional ethics
- Trust2-3: In this organization, there seems to be an invisible barrier between people (rev)
- Trust2-4: My interaction with my colleagues is transactional and insincere (rev)

Trust in agency leaders (Cronbach’s alpha = .88)
- Trust3-1: I have confidence that my chief executive is technically competent at the critical elements of his/her job
- Trust3-2: When my chief executive tells me something, I can rely on what s/he tells me
- Trust3-3: My chief executive will back me up in a pinch
- Trust3-4: I feel that I can tell my chief executive anything about my job
Control Variables

- Age (interval)
- Gender (male = 1; female = 0)
- Job tenure (interval)
- Agency function (serving the public = 1; other = 0)
- Span of control: Number of employees supervised in the current job (interval)
- A promotional position: The current position is obtained through promotion in the same organization or advancement from another organization (yes = 1; no = 0)
- Private sector experience: At least one of the last three jobs is in the private sector (yes = 1; no = 0)
- Inflexible personnel formalization: An index variable combined by (i) Formal rules make it hard to remove indolent workers; (ii) Formal rules make it hard to reward good performers; (iii) The formal system for filing complaints is clear and easy to follow (rev); (iv) Formal rules for promotion are clear and easy to follow (rev) (Cronbach’s alpha = .65)
- High pay as a reason for job selection: How important is high pay for you as a reason for choosing the current job? (very unimportant = 1; very important = 6)
- Stable pay as a reason for job selection: How important is stable pay for you as a reason for choosing the current job? (very unimportant = 1; very important = 6)
Appendix B: Correlation Matrix for Measured and Latent Variables

|     | 1   | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9   | 10  | 11  | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15  | 16  | 17  | 18  | 19  | 20  | 21  | 22  | 23  | 24  | 25  | 26  |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1   | .100 |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 2   | .333 | .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 3   | .276 | .333| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 4   | .157 | .238| .321| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 5   | .031 | .133| .392| .100| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 6   | .000 | .148| .368| .437| .100| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 7   | .043 | .161| .352| .631| .100| .100| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 8   | .075 | .081| .225| .444| .465| .100| .100| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 9   | .008 | .087| .071| .277| .277| .505| .454| .657| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 10  | .012 | .072| .102| .181| .179| .300| .282| .477| .541| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 11  | .028 | .044| .095| .222| .315| .411| .369| .274| .325| .219| .627| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 12  | .073 | .089| .126| .312| .371| .517| .430| .479| .372| .532| .546| .100| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 14  | .156 | .079| .107| .166| .073| .087| .116| .077| .053| .041| .140| .070| .131| .092| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 15  | .187 | .081| .139| .137| .006| .015| .062| .040| .015| .024| .053| .054| .008| .102| .382| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 16  | .057 | .011| .074| .105| .125| .133| .151| .019| .086| .091| .173| .187| .194| .166| .205| .360| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 17  | .110 | .009| .071| .113| .104| .106| .094| .052| .126| .157| .184| .201| .139| .123| .063| .155| .082| .100|     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| 18  | .119 | .044| .061| .040| .039| .033| .008| .060| .022| .019| .005| .063| .050| .071| .314| .522| .485| .100| .100|     |     |     |     |     |
| 19  | .110 | .007| .114| .113| .121| .181| .138| .115| .151| .150| .223| .191| .195| .146| .104| .047| .179| .067| .559| .100|     |     |     |     |
| 20  | .130 | .032| .142| .095| .032| .046| .036| .003| .027| .006| .084| .065| .076| .037| .240| .258| .130| .211| .316| .344| .100|     |     |     |
| 21  | .175 | .068| .208| .184| .112| .109| .058| .064| .051| .124| .100| .099| .127| .113| .199| .238| .118| .132| .424| .387| .513| .100|     |     |
| 22  | .146 | .125| .131| .156| .137| .158| .103| .030| .113| .080| .119| .141| .152| .123| .108| .048| .123| .009| .164| .237| .206| .273| .100|     |
| 23  | .171 | .123| .146| .146| .135| .142| .106| .047| .124| .102| .133| .151| .123| .148| .124| .098| .138| .004| .171| .245| .210| .279| .823| .100|
| 24  | .209 | .176| .164| .149| .167| .179| .139| .010| .086| .092| .192| .224| .179| .204| .159| .134| .241| .096| .246| .298| .230| .314| .676| .717|
| 25  | .179 | .099| .147| .148| .177| .196| .134| .033| .089| .065| .133| .216| .170| .128| .145| .110| .177| .028| .246| .254| .230| .263| .504| .545|
| 26  | .179 | .147| .148| .177| .196| .134| .033| .089| .065| .133| .216| .170| .128| .145| .110| .177| .028| .246| .254| .230| .263| .504| .545| .643|

Note: PM=Policy Making; PI=Public Interest; COM=Compassion; SS=Self-Sacrifice; Trust1=Trust in Citizens; Trust2=Trust in Colleagues; Trust3=Trust in Agency Leaders.