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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Sergeichik, Vladimir V.; Ivaniuk, Alexander A.; Chang, Chip-Hong</td>
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Obfuscation and Watermarking of FPGA Designs Based on Constant Value Generators

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Abstract—Obfuscation is a technique which makes design less intelligible in order to prevent or increase reverse engineering effort. In this paper, a new approach to hardware obfuscation by inserting constant value generators (CVGs) is proposed. A CVG is a circuit that generates the same fixed logic value but will not be minimized by the synthesizer. CVGs can be used to create new logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit. They help to hide actual design logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit. Help to hide actual design logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit. Help to hide actual design logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit. Help to hide actual design logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit. Help to hide actual design logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit. Help to hide actual design logic primitives, embed watermarks and introduce fictive interdependencies in the circuit.

I. INTRODUCTION

Hardware piracy and other attacks are dire threats to FPGA designs. Side-channel signals can be exploited to deduce secret key on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Malicious hardware Trojan can be implanted to leak secret information, affect functionality, deactivate and destroy circuits. It is important to increase the reverse engineering effort of adversaries because many attacks rely on knowledge about the circuit internal structure. One possible solution is obfuscation, which aims to make the circuit structure and functionality difficult to perceive and comprehend so as to substantially increase the time and cost of reverse engineering [1]. Obfuscation is also often used to hide author’s watermarks and user’s fingerprints in hardware intellectual property (IP) protection [1].

Approaches to hardware obfuscation are vastly different. Some approaches focus on hardware description language (HDL) level, some operate with common design structure such as State Transition Graph (STG) while others introduce specific constructs. A comprehensive taxonomy of obfuscation transformations, which are also suitable for the protection of HDL sources, is presented in [2]. There were only a few studies thereafter on the application of these obfuscation transformations for HDLs. Classical Collberg’s approaches were implemented for VHDL and Verilog in [3]. Almost all of them have no effect on the synthesized circuit. The rare exceptions have very high hardware overheads. Several VHDL-specific approaches which impact circuit and their overheads are presented in [4]. There are several approaches that manipulate with the STG. One approach uses the expansion of Control Flow Graph (CFG) state space and code-word concept [5]. Code-word is created step-by-step during the initialization. Several states are made dependent from the code-word bits. When the code-word is incorrect, the states are traversed in the wrong sequence. In stuttering circuits’ approach [6], a sequence of four structural transformations, namely retiming, resynthesis, sweep and conditional stuttering is employed. The circuit is transformed into an equivalent key-based circuit. When the key is wrong, the circuit is slower than expected. Another approach uses Simple Logical Implications (SLIs). Spawned from logic synthesis, they exploit the relation of type \( a = 0 > (b = 1) \) between two circuit nodes \( a \) and \( b \) [7]. SLIs are used to introduce fictive combinational loops to make circuit unintelligible without changing its functionality.

II. LEXICAL AND CIRCUIT OBFUSCATION

There are two types of obfuscation for HDL: lexical and functional [12]. Lexical obfuscation affects only source code level. Its main disadvantage is the synthesized circuits before and after obfuscation are almost identical [12]. As the circuit remains unchanged, it is vulnerable to the simplest attack of logic synthesis [12].

Lexical obfuscation may be described as shown on Fig. 1, where \( V \) is the HDL source of the design, \( V^{obf} \) is the lexically obfuscated source, \( obf \) is the obfuscation procedure, \( O \) is the big \( O \) notation in computational complexity, \( DD \) is the synthesis procedure, and \( Sch \) is the schematic representation of the synthesized circuit.

\[
\begin{align*}
  & V = obf(V); \\
  & O(V) < O(V^{obf}); \\
  & Sch = DD(V) = DD(V^{obf}).
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 1. High-level description of lexical obfuscation.

Some lexical methods for VHDL obfuscation may result in different expansion of Look-Up Tables (LUTs) due to the
heuristic of the synthesis algorithms. Their computational complexities are not fully explored. Some apparently lexical methods may change the design considerably, e.g., the method in [4] removes many levels of registers.

The main idea of circuit obfuscation is to create a more sophisticated and unintelligible circuit that has the functionality equivalent to the original design based on their externally observed behavior [12], as depicted in Fig. 2, where \( \text{func} \) is the functionality of the circuit.

\[
\begin{align*}
V_i; \\
V' = \text{obj}(V_i); \\
\text{Sch} = DD(V_i); \\
\text{Sch} = DD(V_i); \\
\text{Sch} \neq \text{Sch}'; \\
\text{func}(\text{Sch}) = \text{func}(\text{Sch}'); \\
O(V') > O(V_i); \\
O(Sch') > O(Sch); \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 2. High-level description of circuit obfuscation.

III. CONSTANT GENERATORS

A. Theory and Implementation

Constant value generator (CVG) is a form of \textit{opaque predicate}. Its value is known at obfuscation time and may possibly be deduced by the adversary only through rigorous analysis [2]. The “0” and “1” pins of the circuits are substituted by generating the appropriate logical values permanently, as shown in Fig. 3, where \( V_{0,1} \) is a HDL description of the primitive, and \( V_{DD} \) and \( GND \) are the logical “1” and “0” sources, respectively.

\[
\begin{align*}
V_{0,1}; \\
DD(V_{0,1}) = \text{Sch}_0 \neq \{V_{DD}, \text{GND}\}; \\
\text{func}(\text{Sch}_1) = \text{func}(V_{DD}, \text{GND}); \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 3. High-level description of constant generator.

To prevent the CVG circuit from being recognized and minimized by the synthesis tool, the sequential and combinational logic are mixed. Examples of such CVGs are shown in Fig. 4. Other techniques include the usage of signals with well-defined semantics (e.g., system reset and clock) as the inputs of CVGs.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{const}_i & \equiv \text{sch}_i \text{ and src}_i; \\
\text{const}_i & \equiv \text{sch}_i; \\
\text{process} & \left( \text{sch}_i, y \right); \\
\text{begin} & \text{if } (y = \text{sch}_i) \text{ then } \text{var} \left( \text{sig} \equiv \text{sch}_i \text{ and } \text{src}_i \right); \\
\text{end} & \text{ end process}; \\
\text{case} & \left( \text{sch}_i \right) \text{ of } \text{DD} \left( \text{sig} \right) \text{ => } \text{DD} \left( \text{sch}_i \right); \\
\text{begin} & \text{if } \left( \text{DD} \left( \text{sig} \right) \equiv \text{DD} \left( \text{sch}_i \right) \right) \text{ then } \text{var} \left( \text{sig} \equiv \text{sch}_i \text{ and } \text{src}_i \right); \\
\text{end} & \text{ end process}; \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 4. (a), (b): generators of constant values; (c), (d): original HDL sources; (e), (f): lexically obfuscated sources.

The CVGs from Fig. 4 are synthesized using Xilinx xst 8.1i. The synthesizer is unable to recognize constants and minimize these CVGs. Circuit (a) has two flaws. First, the synthesizer issues warning about the combination loop, which gives vital clue to the adversary. Second, if the input \( \text{src} \) is “1” during power-on, then it is possible for the output to return “1” before it is changed. The second flaw can be circumvented by connecting the CVG’s input to the system reset. Circuit (b) is free from these flaws, but it incurs more hardware resources and may produce glitches.

B. Complexity

Software metrics are typically used to measure the complexity of obfuscation transformations. The metrics should take into account the VHDL specific attributes.

The complexity of ‘0’-signal source (ground) against CVG (Fig. 4(b)), measured in terms of TCASC metric [14], are compared in Table I. For circuit obfuscation, the logical circuit complexity needs to be considered, which can be estimated by the total number of gates or the gate count on the critical path. More accurate design entropy metric [15] can be used in addition to lexical metrics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metrics</th>
<th>Constant ‘0’</th>
<th>CVG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fan-In</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan-Out</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Coupling</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Number</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Number</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Operators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number operators per process</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Sensitivity List Size</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCASC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>25.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2. High-level description of circuit obfuscation.

C. Insertion and use

A straightforward application of the primitives is the substitution of constants in the source code by the outputs of CVGs. For example, the statement “if (sig = ‘0’) then ...” can be replaced by the statement “if (sig = \text{const}_\text{out}) then ...”, where \( \text{const}_\text{out} \) is the output of zero CVG. This transformation forces the adversary to analyze the zero generator functions. Usual lexical obfuscation transformations (identifiers scrambling, format removal, etc.) can be employed in order to make the codes illegible to human reader.

With the help of CVGs, compound functions can be built. For instance, logical \textit{AND} and \textit{OR} functions can be implemented using a 2-input multiplexor (mux) with the basic primitives \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \), as shown in Fig. 5(a) and (b), respectively, where \( x_0 \) and \( x_1 \) are real signals. These compound primitives will not be recognized by the synthesizer.

The CVGs can also be used to introduce fictive connections and increase the dependencies between circuit nodes. This can be accomplished by the insertion of multiplexor (mux) with its data inputs connected to the outputs of original circuit nodes, and its selector input connected to the CVG. The mux will permanently pass the same input to the output. In order to make the circuit more difficult to analyze, the nodes are carefully chosen for CVG insertion. For such fictive dependencies to evade the removal by the synthesizer, both input nodes of the mux should have large fan-ins and fan-outs, and they should not be ports and should not lie on the critical path.
### Watermarking

Several approaches exist to hide watermark with CVGs. One approach that employs the unused bits of LUTs [16] has a drawback that the LUTs with unused inputs (connected to ‘0’ or ‘1’) are apparent and the watermark bits can be easily removed by clearing those LUTs’ content. This shortcoming can be overcome by using our CVGs. Consider a 16×1 RAM LUT, where its unused bits are marked ‘U’. The output of the CVG is connected to the free inputs of the LUT as shown in Fig. 6(a). The LUTs that contain the watermark bits are thus concealed and substantial effort is required to identify them. The watermark can be further made to be an integral part of the existing design by reusing the original bits of the LUT via input ordering of LUTs with careful selection of CVG values.

Consider an example of a 4-input LUT that implements the function, ‘1’ and s₀ and s₁ or s₂, where s₀, s₁ and s₂ are the existing signals of the design, ‘1’ is wired from CVG, r is the output signal, and ‘U’s are the unused bits. There are n! (24 for n = 4) inputs permutations. The watermark insertion process is reduced to choosing the permutation which has the minimum number of ‘U’s and the bits match the watermark bits to be embedded. To increase the number of permutations and hence the number of ‘U’s and the bits match the watermark bits to be recovered in positions m₁ … mₖ of the output sequence. The content of the LUTs should also be restored by shifting in the extracted bits after verification. The only issue with this approach is that not all FPGAs have such LUT configuration option. Besides, the IP can be activated by a secret key through the scan chain. The SRL16s in cascade are first randomly initialized. Only valid users that possess the correct bits for the SRL16 cascade could authenticate and activate the IP.

### Overheads

Typical FPGA projects may heavily under-utilize the available LUTs for many reasons. Several open source VHDL-designs from opencores.org [18] were synthesized and the overheads were estimated. The results are presented in Table II, where OS and OA denote the optimized speed and area, respectively. The projects were synthesized with Xilinx xst 8.1i for Spartan II 200 FPGA, which has 4-input LUTs. On average, nearly 50% of the LUTs is not completely utilized. The amount of free bits in the LUTs is sufficiently large for the implementation of various hardware protection described.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>OS, %</th>
<th>OA, %</th>
<th>OS, bits</th>
<th>OA, bits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2ofish</td>
<td>43.61</td>
<td>43.61</td>
<td>3192</td>
<td>3192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interface_vga80x40</td>
<td>42.94</td>
<td>51.67</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mb reopen</td>
<td>69.23</td>
<td>62.39</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lq057</td>
<td>33.96</td>
<td>58.82</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>micro8</td>
<td>39.24</td>
<td>39.49</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fpv double</td>
<td>46.24</td>
<td>54.25</td>
<td>84784</td>
<td>79432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fpv vhdl</td>
<td>47.24</td>
<td>50.64</td>
<td>3456</td>
<td>3104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twofish</td>
<td>34.61</td>
<td>34.61</td>
<td>3192</td>
<td>3192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>46.57</td>
<td>49.07</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>1028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simple_touse_sha2</td>
<td>41.73</td>
<td>47.47</td>
<td>14384</td>
<td>15376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdct</td>
<td>95.24</td>
<td>95.36</td>
<td>17408</td>
<td>17420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>48.73</td>
<td>52.82</td>
<td>12457</td>
<td>11919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. Experiments

The impacts of CVGs insertion, such as overheads, minimization by synthesis tools and other side-effects are investigated. Configurations of 0 to 5 CVGs with different optimizations are explored on the ISCAS 85 combinational benchmark circuits [19]. The CVGs introduce new dependencies. They were inserted in nodes which: 1) have large fan-in and fan-out; 2) are not ports; 3) are not on the critical path. The CVG is similar to that of Fig. 4(b) except that it is based on latch instead of flip flop. So the signal clk is substituted by the enable input. Xilinx xst 8.1i synthesizer is
used with three optimization options: none, area, and speed. Projects with pin constraints are examined. The results for 0, 1 and 5 CVGs are presented in Table III. The circuit names are appended with "A" and "D" to indicate that the percentage overheads are for area and delay, respectively. The acronyms OA, OS and ON in the table heading represent area optimization, delay optimization and unoptimized options with i number of CVGs, respectively. All results (except 5ON[7]) were computed relative to 0ON; Negative value means improvement over 0ON.

### TABLE III. PERCENTAGE OVERHEADS AFTER INSERTION OF 0, 1, 5 CVGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>0ON</th>
<th>OA</th>
<th>OS</th>
<th>1ON</th>
<th>5ON</th>
<th>OA</th>
<th>OS</th>
<th>5ON[?]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c3540A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c3540D</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c6288A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c6288D</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The area overheads grow almost linearly with the number of CVGs for each optimization option, although they are relatively low. On the contrary, the delay overheads reported by the synthesizer are unacceptably high. The actual delay incurred by the CVG is computed manually to be 6.29 ns for c3540 with 1 CVG. It consists of the fixed propagation delay of LUT (mux) and the delays of two wires (4.5 ns). The maximum delay difference for different routing paths is found to be 1.79 ns. The delay computed for the original worst critical path and the same path after 1 CVG insertion are 40.19 ns and 40.19 ns, respectively. The large discrepancy between the actual and synthesizer reported delay overheads can be explained as follows. The tool is deceived by the CVGs to minimize the complexity of HDL code of a transistors in ASIC implementation.

### V. CONCLUSION

This paper presents an approach to circuit obfuscation by CVG insertion. It increases the complexity of HDL code of a design and its synthesized circuit. The proposed CVGs will not be minimized by different synthesizing tools. The approach incurs very low hardware and delay overheads but the synthesis tools will be fooled about the actual performance of the circuit. We have also explained how the CVGs can help to hide watermark or fingerprint in LUTs without incurring additional overheads.

### REFERENCES


