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GLOBALIZATION AND MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH ASIA: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Emrys Chew

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Singapore

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to demonstrate the relevance of the historical method and the importance of identifying long-term globalizing patterns in understanding the military-industrial transformation and militarization of South Asia. Out of this particular historical matrix would flow the events of 9/11, as well as ongoing developments in the global ‘war on terror’, fought out in the wider periphery of South Asia.

Across a levelled and shell-shocked post-9/11 landscape, it has become even more important to apply this vital long-term perspective to our understanding of the present, so as to avoid the twin pitfalls of myopia and amnesia: viewing the ‘modern’ phenomenon of South Asia’s militarization in deracinated form, and thereby failing to recall the broader connections and long-term patterns; or, at best, giving only cursory attention thereto. What is new today, on the other hand, is the raising of stakes in a world of nation-states having volatile nuclear capabilities and rapid internet communication; and, in the midst of pre-existing indigenous rivalries, the capacity of local warlords, resistance fighters or jihadists to re-export ‘terror’ as far afield as the core of the Western metropole.

The paper examines the roots and ramifications of military-industrial globalization in South Asia, locating them firmly within the dynamic military cultural context of the subcontinent’s history. In so doing, it strives to redress perceived imbalances in the contemporary emphasis of current debates about the nature and impact of globalizing supra-national forces. It also seeks to review possible implications of long-term trends and patterns for the future security of the region.

Emrys Chew was educated at the Anglo-Chinese School and Junior College, Singapore, and the University of Cambridge, England. From Cambridge University, he obtained both a BA with First Class Honours in History (1995) and a PhD (2002). His BA dissertation, a study entitled ‘The Naning War, 1831-1832: Colonial Authority and Malay Resistance in the Early Period of British Expansion’, was awarded the University prize for Imperial and Commonwealth History and subsequently published (Modern Asian Studies, May 1998). His doctoral thesis, entitled ‘Arming the Periphery’, traced the development and dynamics of arms trade networks in the Indian Ocean during the nineteenth century: an age of hitherto unprecedented Western imperial and industrial expansion as well as indigenous transformation and crisis in Asia and Africa. Emrys has since published an article about the impact of arms transfers on military culture and colonial warfare in Indian Ocean societies, particularly in light of contemporary debates on the global ‘war on terror’ (‘Militarized Cultures in Collision’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, October 2003). He has also taught undergraduate courses on Imperial and Post-colonial History at the University of Cambridge, examining cross-cultural interactions that have generated and shaped much of the modern world.
GLOBALIZATION AND MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
IN SOUTH ASIA:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment seat;
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho’ they come from the ends of the earth!

Rudyard Kipling

Kipling’s famous ‘Ballad of East and West’ was set in an area of South Asia that is now Pakistan. It points to a relationship in which ‘the twain’ do meet: in this case, two men from different worlds facing each other across the barrel of a gun. The romance of imperialism is dead, and the white man as colonial master has long departed the subcontinent. Yet, in an ironic twist, South Asia is the globe’s only region where two strategic rivals remain locked in an ongoing hot-cold war spanning some six decades, a peculiar subcontinental relationship in which disputes could easily precipitate a major crisis with escalation potential. Meanwhile, from global Cold War to transnational ‘war on terror’, the military-industrial landscape of modern India and Pakistan has continued to be shaped by countless waves of cross-cultural interaction amid the shifting sands of international politics.

All this suggests that the history of globalization has a longer lineage than just a matter of decades, and its impact has been more profound. Growing interconnectedness between regions of the world—expressed as evolving networks of collaboration or escalating patterns of conflict—has been evident for centuries, and especially since the imperial and industrial expansions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Between the world crises of the eighteenth century and the cataclysm of the First World War, the forming and transforming of socio-economic, political and cultural relationships across porous borders and turbulent frontiers both fuelled and facilitated transfers of increasingly sophisticated military hardware and technology, resulting in an arming of the ‘periphery’ in South Asia.

In the dawn of Western great power rivalry and the twilight of Mughal rule on the subcontinent, regional elites and successor states competed for resources and products in the all-India military bazaar, while the English East India Company found ways to harness the sinews of military-fiscal power to establish a British Raj over against Western and
indigenous opponents. From the mountain passes of Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier, across the rivers, plains and cities of the subcontinent, into the jungles of Sri Lanka, the tentacles of colonial authority and commerce, capitalism and technological progress, meshed with the tangled realities of indigenous crisis to provoke anti-colonial protest and religious civil strife in an increasingly militarized zone.

In this sense, the ‘globalized’ character of military-industrial development and armed conflict in South Asia today has clear historical antecedents. Across a levelled and shell-shocked post-9/11 landscape, it has become even more important to apply this vital long-term perspective to our understanding of the present, so as to avoid the twin pitfalls of myopia and amnesia: viewing the ‘modern’ phenomenon of South Asia’s militarization in deracinated form—severed from its roots in the historical past—and thereby failing to recall the broader connections and long-term patterns; or, at best, giving only cursory attention thereto. What is arguably new, on the other hand, is the raising of stakes in a world of nation-states having volatile nuclear capabilities and rapid internet communication; and, in the midst of pre-existing indigenous rivalries, the capacity of local warlords, resistance fighters or jihadists to re-export ‘terror’ as far afield as the core of the Western metropole.

This paper examines the roots and ramifications of military-industrial globalization in South Asia, locating them firmly within the dynamic military cultural context of the subcontinent’s history. In so doing, it strives to redress perceived imbalances in the contemporary emphasis of current debates about the nature and impact of globalizing supranational forces. It also seeks to review possible implications of long-term trends and patterns for the future security of the region.\(^1\)

**Contemporary Debates and Definitions**

Globalization is a contemporary ‘umbrella’ word used to describe the progressive increase in the scale of social processes from a local or regional to world level. Stemming from both national and international roots, it refers to a multiplicity of quantitative and qualitative transformations—variegated in nature, multi-dimensional in character—brought about by the augmentation and acceleration of social, political, economic and cultural relationships across the borders of countries, regions and continents, resulting in a more interconnected,\(^2\)

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\(^1\) I am grateful to Gyanesh Kudaisya and Dipankar Banerjee for their insights and comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

\(^2\)
interdependent world system.²

By this definition, the military-industrial configuration of South Asia is indeed the ‘globalized’ by-product of myriad cross-border interactions, emerging out of a complex interplay between the motive forces of a changing world order and the crises of indigenous societies. In military-strategic terms, transfers of military hardware and technology in South Asia have accelerated largely as a result of a world power having to maintain its hegemony and contain its rivals, or a South Asian power having to augment its military capabilities for purposes of resistance or conflict. In political-economic terms, the development of the South Asia defence industry has been driven by Western (and in the most recent case, American-led) global expansion, as well as by regional transformation and indigenous crisis in Asia. Shaped by these military-strategic and political-economic imperatives, the defence establishments of India and Pakistan were at first armed directly by foreign powers. But their pursuit of greater military-industrial self-reliance has led to a progressive ‘global diversification’ of companies and corporations, the ‘internationalization’ of supply networks, production systems, labour forces, management and financing. As this global military market unfolds across the subcontinent, however, the territorial boundaries of nation-states become more porous, and national sovereignty is diluted and reconfigured, allowing for the arming of groups and individuals beyond the interstices of state power, encompassing states in the wider South Asian ‘periphery’ such as Sri Lanka and Afghanistan.³

The arming of South Asia may be explained, in part, by military-strategic imperatives, generated according to shifts in global alliances and alienations over the past half-century or so. Witness the periodic arming of India by the United States. In the struggle against Japan and its Axis partners during the Second World War, the American-supported and funded defence production effort turned British India into a major arms producer and base for military operations in China, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. At the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947, military assets were then divided roughly between India and Pakistan in the proportion 64:36, to reflect the communal balance. In terms of the balance of power in South Asia, this subsequently gave independent India enough firepower to fight Pakistan to a standstill in 1948, as well as overwhelm the Nizam of Hyderabad’s forces that year, and

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overrun the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu in 1961. Yet, with the fledgling nation’s financial resources channelled into nation-building and only limited access to vital defence technologies, the Indian military machine proved inadequate for resisting the onslaught of Chinese forces during the India-China war of 1962, which ended in traumatic defeat for India.

Between the 1950s and 1965, India obtained military assistance from the United States in their bid to contain communist China. In the late 1950s, this included substantial quantities of surplus World War II American weapons, several advanced but largely defensive systems, air defence technology transfers, and $80 million in cash subsidies; and then, from 1963-65, substantial material and technical support to modernize India’s ground and air forces. Between the late 1960s and early 1990s, however, US-Indian relations cooled in the light of America’s rapprochement with China and realignment with Pakistan; and transfers of military hardware and technology ceased. Only from the late 1990s has the US-Indian relationship revived, under the shadow of nuclear proliferation, with the need to develop India as a counterweight to Chinese ascendency once again informing American strategic thinking.

On the other hand, whilst pursuing a policy of official non-alignment through much of the Cold War era, India simultaneously maintained a military connection with the Soviet Union as part of a wider strategic alignment against China-US-Pakistan alliances. Around the time of the India-China war in 1962, the USSR began providing assistance to India’s defence establishment in the form of high-altitude helicopters and a MiG-21 factory. Large quantities of Soviet-designed but Indian-manufactured weapons were produced thereafter. Soviet assistance reduced Indian dependence upon the West, and empowered New Delhi to counter the Chinese, who were assisting Pakistan by the 1960s. Fears of American encirclement following the arrival of nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise in Indian waters in

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5Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, pp. 132-34. While the US concentrated on modernizing India’s army and air force, Britain assumed responsibility for India’s navy during that burst of military co-operation with the West in 1963-65.

6Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, pp. 136-37, 268-98; V. M. Gobarev, ‘The US should treat India as an ally’, in W. Dudley (ed.), *India and Pakistan: Opposing Viewpoints* (Farmington Hills, Michigan: Greenhaven, 2003), pp. 118-28; P. R. Chari, ‘Implementing the Indo-US. Nuclear Deal: A Pyrrhic Struggle’, *India Defence* (7 January 2006); S. Devare, *India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 32-34. India has even been able to acquire a Falcon radar system from Israel, a close ally of the United States. On the other hand, concerns surrounding India’s efforts to gain nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities cloud the issue of helping India develop space launch and satellite capabilities that it claims are necessary to counter the growing security threat from China. Technologies used in commercial satellite and space launches could facilitate India’s strategic missile programmes.
1971, and closer American ties with both China and Pakistan, further increased New Delhi’s reliance on Moscow, prompting India to embark on the largest conventional arms-buying spree in the subcontinent’s history. The Soviet Union, beset with mujahidin resistance soon after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, would in turn look to India as a quasi-ally who might open a ‘second front’ to Pakistan’s southwest in order to divert military resources away from the Afghan frontier.7

For its part, Pakistan remains the only South Asian state capable of contesting India’s regional dominance. Ironically, the arming of Pakistan has arisen from largely related military-strategic considerations: the United States and China seeking to expand their influence or contain rivals in the region, and Pakistan wanting to acquire weaponry in its contention against India. It was held that a stronger Pakistan could counter Soviet influence as well as resist Indian pressure in South Asia. However, the arming of both India and Pakistan enabled them to fight three wars with each other, the last of which culminated in the traumatic break-up of Pakistan itself and an open-ended arms race ever since.

Although Pakistan received around one-third of British India’s military assets in 1947, Pakistan inherited few fixed installations and military-industrial facilities other than the obsolete defensive infrastructure of the Northwest Frontier and naval facilities at Karachi and Chittagong. After the first India-Pakistan war in 1948, Pakistan quickly became dependent on the United States for most of its military hardware and technology. Between 1954 and 1965, Islamabad received over $630 million in American cash subsidies and over $670 million in concessional sales and defence-support assistance.8 But when American arms transfers were practically terminated in the mid-1960s, Pakistan attempted to build up an indigenous defence industry with mainly Chinese help.

China began rendering military assistance to Islamabad in the early 1960s and became Pakistan’s principal arms supplier after 1965. Although this did not prevent Pakistan’s defeat in the third of its wars with India, resulting in the loss of East Pakistan and emergence of independent Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan had obtained by the late 1970s more than 1,000 Chinese T-59 tanks (constituting 75 per cent of its tank force) and 300 Chinese aircraft (perhaps 65 per cent of its air force). The Chinese also constructed a tank-rebuild factory and improved a light-arms plant and repair facility for the aircraft at Kamra near Taxila.9

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mid-1980s, Chinese nuclear and missile assistance to Islamabad further enabled Pakistan to keep pace with India’s nuclear programme. By 1998, Pakistan was in a position to detonate six nuclear devices—equalling the combined achievement of Indian nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998—and to continue highly publicized missile testing in competition with India.\textsuperscript{10}

Meanwhile, in two major policy shifts, the United States resumed massive financial and military aid to Pakistan. Motivated by enhanced US interest in Gulf oil and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, America sought to sustain Pakistan’s strategic co-operation and support Afghan \textit{mujahidin} in the war against the Soviet Union. From the Carter administration, Pakistan obtained some ships and other equipment, but from the Reagan administration, Pakistan received over $3 billion worth of cash subsidies, F-16 aircraft, attack helicopters, tanks and howitzers. Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, America once again enlisted Pakistan’s help in a war in Afghanistan, this time as a support base and partner in tracking down Al-Qa’ida and Taliban leaders who had fled to Pakistan. By 2003, the Bush administration had written off $1 billion of Pakistani debt and offered a $3.2 billion five-year economic and military aid package, commencing in 2004.\textsuperscript{11}

Against fluctuating trends in worldwide military expenditure, and fluid patterns of arms production and consumption in the international arms bazaar, the arms race between India and Pakistan continues apace with augmented military spending and accelerating weapons-procurement programmes. Despite an overall decline in global military expenditure between 1988 and 1998, reflecting the end of the Cold War, military spending in South Asia has kept well on track: between 1978, 1994 and 2004, it went from $3.45 billion to $7.5 billion to $19.6 billion in the case of India; and from $819 million to $3.5 billion to $3.33 billion in the case of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{12} South Asia’s share of world military expenditure more than doubled (from 0.8 to 2 per cent) over the last decade of the twentieth century, reflecting the military build-up between India and Pakistan. It saw the biggest increase in military spending for any region in 2004, largely because India boosted its defence budget by a staggering 19 per cent. In terms of both military spending and arms transfers during the 1990s, South Asia supplied aircraft, 144 were MiG-19/F-6s that, together with French Mirage III s and Mirage Vs, formed the backbone of Pakistan’s air force.

experienced the highest average annual growth rate of any region, with 5 per cent.\textsuperscript{13}

Perhaps the most solid manifestation of this arming of South Asia has been the expansion and transformation of the military-industrial complex, at the very centre of state-sponsored arms transfers and production. As we have seen, independent India and Pakistan found it impossible to establish self-sufficiency in defence production without the necessary wealth and technology. Both states pursued instead a policy of ‘self-reliance’, which required the development of an indigenous military-industrial base for support, with varying degrees of dependence on reliable foreign sources for access to technologies, supply of components and complete systems. Over-reliance on licence production and direct procurement brought its own perils: import dependency, insufficient funding for critical and strategic technologies, and industrial underperformance. But more recent state-sponsored efforts have generated a new wave of ‘joint-venture’ military-industrial development, supplied by multi-national companies and international circuits of arms production, and served by global networks of information and finance. By enabling ‘cross-fertilization’ with technological innovation in the Western metropole, these hybrid efforts aim to eliminate technological gap and time lag in the South Asian periphery.

The Indian defence industry has relied on licence production and direct acquisitions as the principal form of supply for much of its existence. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the Soviet connection enabled a state with a sizeable trained workforce but slow-growing economy to maintain a fairly advanced defence establishment. India received preferential payment terms, in line with other socialist and developing countries, and could exchange Indian-manufactured goods for military equipment and components, MiGs, tanks and ships. But the oversupply of Soviet equipment reduced India’s incentive to develop its own weapons or seek other sources, and alienated Western suppliers. India was prevented from selling its Soviet-originating but Indian-made arms on the international market, thus depriving India of a valuable source of military revenue. The arms themselves had a limited shelf life: Soviet reluctance to share technology and India’s limited capacity for reverse-engineering Soviet products meant India ultimately lacked the capabilities to repair second-rate weapons or reconstruct the manufacturing process once the Soviet arms export establishment disintegrated. Although production patterns during the 1980s and 1990s show that India was able to initiate several projects for indigenous manufacture—including the Main Battle Tank Weapon ‘Arjun’ and the 5.56-mm INSAS assault rifle—Indian arms

exports in the 1990s were neither of the kind nor quality that proved internationally competitive, even in the non-Western world.\textsuperscript{14}

Then, from the mid-1990s, India’s defence industry entered a new phase of self-reliance, emphasizing multi-national co-operation in areas of joint production, as well as indigenous private-public sector interaction and civil-military partnerships. In this respect, the Indian defence industry’s transition from ‘autarky’ to ‘going global’ has been consonant with worldwide trends in the US-led global defence industry: consolidation and diversification following the end of the Cold War and emergence of new international security conditions; increased competition among manufacturers and progressive internationalization of defence production efforts; and, with growing cross-border interactions, a greater willingness of the state to countenance the participation of private enterprise in its strategic industries.\textsuperscript{15}

By 2005, the Indian military-industrial complex would include an aircraft manufacturing conglomerate (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited); seven other large defence public sector units (DPSUs), for the production of electronics, ships, missiles, and other strategic materials; 40 ordnance factories; and a research organization dedicated to defence science and technology. The Indian Government has permitted foreign direct investment of up to 26 per cent in the defence industry, and private sector involvement of up to 100 per cent. New joint projects are already in the pipeline, to be developed in collaboration with India’s DPSUs, possibly with a wider arms export strategy in mind: in the field of aerospace, involving two Russian design bureaus and American aviation giant Lockheed-Martin; in missile production, involving the Russians and European missile manufacturer MBDA; and in submarine manufacture, involving the French. Meanwhile, over 15 licences have been issued domestically to private companies, for the production of military vehicles and weapons systems, while private enterprises like the Krasny Marine Services look well placed to revitalize India’s naval-industrial complex.\textsuperscript{16}

For the Pakistani defence industry, licence production and direct procurement have likewise proved to be the main mode of supply. While it could also draw upon a substantial


skilled workforce, financial, technological and industrial limitations have circumscribed Pakistan’s long-term aspiration to become the arsenal of the Islamic world. Pakistan is capable of supplying simpler arms to its Islamic neighbours, and some weapons systems have been bankrolled by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Yet Islamabad must still procure the most advanced military hardware and technology from the international arms market or its allies, under preferential payment terms.

From the mid-1960s, Pakistan developed the capability to manufacture virtually all its small arms—including a machine-gun and the G-3 rifle, both under West German licence, and the 106-mm recoilless rifle, an American design—as well as most ammunition, explosives, shells and mortars. During the 1980s, it acquired the means to completely reconstruct its Chinese-supplied tanks, as well as its Chinese and French-supplied aircraft. Over the past two decades, naval-industrial facilities have also been modernized, centering upon indigenous establishments (like the Karachi Naval Dockyard, and Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited) and indigenous shipbuilding (such as the Larkhana-class patrol and Jalalat-class missile boats). But Pakistan remains heavily dependent on Chinese and (US-led) Western sources for new tanks, military vehicles and aircraft of all kinds, artillery, missiles, electronics and other strategic materials. Apart from its technical capacity for the delivery of nuclear weapons the American F-16 has, in particular, become a political symbol of America’s commitment to support the Pakistani nation-state against India and other opponents in the wider world.  

In this connection, the arming of South Asia has also manifested itself as a creeping militarization beyond the official jurisdiction of the state: the arming of ‘non-state actors’ such as local warlords, regional resistance groups and worldwide terror networks. If South Asia remains one of the world’s most militarized zones, it is not simply on account of rivalries between global or regional powers in Asia. Modern India and Pakistan are nation-states constructed out of the myriad societies and often polarized communities of the subcontinent, whose growing sense of alienation, independent aspirations and volatile ambitions have required only weaponization in order to trigger fresh waves of violence.

D. K. Palit, a Sandhurst-trained Indian general, once characterized India-Pakistan wars as ‘communal riots with armour’. The two major conflicts of 1948 and 1965—and

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Kargil crisis of 1999—were collisions over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir; the conflict of 1971 was over divided territories and communities that became Bangladesh; and near-clashes in 1955, 1987, 1990 and 2002 were motivated by the same communal tensions.\textsuperscript{18} Even as ‘homegrown’ terrorists and ‘guest’ militants continue to make rival areas of Kashmir their main theatre of operations, the fragile fabric of the nation-state has itself been exposed and fundamentally challenged by a host of powerful indigenous forces: a series of secessionist movements in the case of India; and militarism and Islamic revivalism, in addition to regionalism and separatism, in the case of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{19}

Apart from ongoing political-military instability in Kashmir, India has faced challenges from other secessionist movements. With Pakistani support, the Sikhs have fought for ‘Khalistan’, an independent Sikh state in the Punjab. Separatist and autonomist movements have gained momentum among the Nagas, the Mizos and other tribal groups in India’s northeast, along the border with Bangladesh. There has also been trouble with Tamil separatists in southern India, leading to wider entanglements with Tamil extremists in Sri Lanka’s civil war. As a way of pressuring Colombo to negotiate a peace settlement with moderate Tamils, New Delhi allowed the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu to provide sympathetic financial and military aid to extremist Tamil groups in northern Sri Lanka. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were thus transformed into a world-class terrorist movement. But the policy backfired spectacularly in 1987, when India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement whereby Sri Lanka acknowledged India’s security concerns and allowed India to move in to disarm the Tigers. Instead of surrendering their weapons to the Indian Peacekeeping Force, the Tigers first turned them on their Tamil rivals and then on the surprised Indian troops. Between 1987 and 1990, Indian forces were drawn into a bitter and futile conflict in the jungles of northern Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{20}

Pakistan’s involvement in the dying stages of the Cold War conflict between America and Russia, fought out in neighbouring Afghanistan, would bring an equally bitter harvest and further militarization. Arms seeped from supply conduits established by the CIA and

were channelled by the Pakistan military security agency (ISI) to select groups of Afghan
mujahidin. Traditional arms bazaars in the Northwest Frontier (such as at Darra), along with
new centres of production adjacent to the Afghan frontier, added to the flow of weapons by
replicating machine-guns and rifles and even US-supplied stinger missiles. The birth of a
‘Kalashnikov culture’ in the mid-1980s made it possible to hire arms on the streets of Karachi
for a small sum of money: criminal gangs and rival sectarian groups (such as the muhajirs in
Karachi and Hyderabad) soon possessed firepower surpassing that of the police and security
forces.21

Meanwhile, Afghan mujahidin financed their military operations with drug money. Local warlords became drug-lords as traditional opium fields in autonomous tribal areas of Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province boosted their production dramatically in the unsettled conditions created by the influx of three million Afghan refugees after 1979. Heroin followed the same clandestine routes out of the country as weapons found their way in, later to surface on the streets of the Western metropolis. As the West, China, and Arab states poured in money and military supplies for the militants, the jihad in Afghanistan assumed a life of its own and spawned a second generation of mujahidin who called themselves Taliban, the ‘students of Islam’. With the Taliban’s support of Osama Bin Laden, and the subsequent Al-Qa’ida attacks on America between 1998 and 2001, it was only a matter of time before the United States and Pakistan found themselves drawn into the dynamics of a more nebulous global conflict—the ‘war on terror’.22

Military-industrial globalization in contemporary South Asia broadly suggests a scenario in which indigenous military developments have, up until recently, proved largely subordinate to the global and regional interests of others. Yet, as the volatile military cultural context of the subcontinent might indicate, there had been episodes in the earlier history of globalization when this was clearly not the case.

**Historical Roots and Ramifications**

Growing interconnection between regions of the world, manifested in evolving networks of collaboration as well as escalating patterns of conflict, has been evident for centuries. But the

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global forces of Western imperial and industrial expansion, gaining momentum from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, brought new motive forces and motors of change. Between the world crises of the late eighteenth century and the cataclysm of the First World War, the forming and transforming of social, commercial, political and cultural relationships across porous borders and turbulent frontiers both fuelled and facilitated transfers of increasingly advanced military hardware and technology.23 This served to arm the periphery in South Asia long before the birth of modern India and Pakistan. As we shall see, however, the Western great power presence on the subcontinent was constrained by native powers whose indigenous military capabilities would—in addition to weapons and techniques acquired from the Europeans—create an almost ‘revolutionary’ impact on Indo-European relations, politics and society. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, a number of these indigenous military establishments would achieve technological near-parity with their Western counterparts.24

To begin with, it was ‘industrious revolutions’ and industrialization—occurring within the framework of a wider struggle for supremacy in Europe—which first enabled the modernization of the defence industry. From clusters of workshops to chains of factories, state-led initiatives spearheaded military innovation and industry across the West, pushing arms trade and technology by stages into higher gear. New technologies in metallurgy and steam power were applied to weapons and warfare, with devastating consequences. The progressive commercialization of war, military service, arms manufacture and supply would climax in the construction of a military-industrial complex, capable of producing anything from small arms to heavy armaments, ammunition and explosives to pontoon-bridges and warships.25

Just as it was an age of unprecedented industrial transformation, it was also an era of Western imperial expansion. While industrialization modernized the arms industry, imperialism ‘globalized’ it. In the early phases of Western expansion, European soldiers

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24 See D. B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1990); and P. J. Marshall, ‘Western Arms in Maritime Asia in the Early Phases of Expansion’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 14:1 (1980). Historian Peter Marshall has argued that while the potential capacity for Europeans to wage war more effectively than Asians had perhaps existed since the ‘military revolution’ of the seventeenth century, only in the early nineteenth century could the full force of this potential be felt on Asian battlefields: it was only then that arms production in Europe was accelerating, shipping costs to the East were falling, European governments were displacing the trading companies and taking a direct interest in Asia, and territorial possessions in India were providing the British with new resources of men and money. Marshall’s thesis warrants reconsideration in the light of the dynamics of military-industrial globalization advanced in this paper, particularly given the vitality of indigenous military industries in South Asia between 1750 and 1850.
entered the services of Asian kingdoms and helped spread the knowledge of firearms. But the transfer of military hardware and technology between the European seaborne empires and the states of Asia was itself relatively sparing. Under the constraints of the prevailing mercantilist ethic, the English in coastal India were major importers of muskets yet reluctant arms dealers. What altered this cross-cultural relationship was the ebb and flow of great power rivalry, which gathered pace during the second half of the eighteenth century and fed into the mainstream of late nineteenth-century ‘new imperialism’. Imperial activity tended to destabilize frontiers: great power competition distorted judgments and encouraged preemptive strike; and the men on the spot, fired by personal ambition, fomented their own convenient crises. By augmenting and accelerating arms transfers from the Western metropole, the new industrial and imperial dynamic would eventually arm parts of the periphery with the most modern rather than the most obsolete of weapons.

Western great power rivalry was fought out in the South Asian periphery as far back as the mid-eighteenth century. The British and the French clashed on the subcontinent between 1740 and 1815 as part of a worldwide extension of their European conflict. Then, in a nineteenth-century version of the Cold War, Britain and Russia played the ‘Great Game’ in Afghanistan between 1828 and 1907, countering each other’s expansion by diplomacy, subversion and other means of informal influence. Global military-strategic imperatives played their part in the arming of the region even then, although it is important to note here that the balance of military-industrial power favoured indigenous forces initially, before equalizing and finally tipping in favour of the West.

The Anglo-French duel for empire was fought with blazing intensity in southern India during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), erupting again during the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), and persisting as a security threat up until the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). In the early stages of the conflict, neither European power possessed sufficient manpower or military resources to achieve its objectives on its own. Instead, just as state-sponsored arms exports and cash subsidies comprised a major component of wartime diplomacy in Europe, massive arms shipments were supplied by the European trading companies to indigenous allies in South Asia: ‘hardly a ship came’ in the

1760s, ‘that did not sell them cannon and small arms’. In a rising crescendo of profit and violence, the East India Companies of both Britain and France now bartered weapons for commodities and concessions, or sold military services to Indian armies to further military-strategic ends.

By the 1760s, the British (in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta) had managed to turn the tide against the French (in Pondicherry). The breakthrough came in 1765, when the English East India Company acquired the vast land revenues of Bengal that enabled it to build and finance a huge native army, supplied from its own arsenals. It was a pioneering demonstration in the ‘global diversification’ of a trading company. As one early commentator observed:

A Company which carries a sword in one hand, and a ledger in the other, which maintains armies and retails tea, is a contradiction, and if it traded with success, would be a prodigy.

By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, this novel experiment in ‘military-fiscalism’ had paved the way for a British Raj in India. Even though the French were still arming indigenous opponents of the Raj, it was the British arms trade that had become the largest in the world, inundating South Asia not merely with swords but sophisticated muskets.

And yet, however prodigious it proved to be, this British experiment in military-fiscalism can only be understood properly within the context of older patterns of governance.

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29J. R. McCulloch, ‘Indian Revenues’, Edinburgh Review, 45 (1827), p. 365. For a modern treatment of the English East India Company’s history, see H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Of course, there was global diversification of trading activities as well as trade goods, and the British traded more than just tea and arms. The end of the American Revolutionary War (1782-83) and the passing of Pitt’s Commutation Act (1784) consolidated British control of the wider ‘country’ trade, and encouraged the activities of powerful and capital-rich agency houses and agents adept at both the commodity trade—in tea, spices, opium, indigo, calicoes, cotton piece goods, raw silk, pottery, and saltpetre—as well as the arms trade.
30C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830 (London: Longman, 1989), p. 130; cf. H. A. Young, The East India Company’s Arsenals and Manufactory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937); and D. Harding, Small Arms of the East India Company 1600-1856 (London: Foresight Books, 1997), vol. 1: Procurement and Design. From the establishment of the first military depots, workshops and armouries on the subcontinent in the late 1760s, up until the end of Company rule in 1858, the arsenals of the English East India Company were capable of producing their own gunpowder, brass ordnance, gun-carriages, percussion caps, bullets and other military stores. The only important articles of military equipment the Company did not manufacture in India itself were small arms. Although some were purchased in India and produced in several of the Indian states, the bulk were procured by the Company from its own network of workshops and factories in Birmingham and London, which supplied weapons of high standard for service not only in India but elsewhere.
in South Asia. The East India Company’s experience of global diversification must likewise be viewed alongside indigenous examples of military-industrial globalization. Long before British global power dominated the subcontinent, the Mughals from Central Asia ruled India as a ‘gunpowder empire’, their authority resting as much on military hardware and technology as political organization and wealth.\textsuperscript{31} Mughal small arms and heavy armaments, produced in state arsenals and foundries since the seventeenth century, served as instruments through which opponents could be overwhelmed and brought within the governance of Mughal military-fiscalism.

By the mid-eighteenth century, however, South Asia was convulsed by wider regional transformations and crises. Mughal India, like many of the old imperial centres of monsoon Asia, was hollowed-out to a mere shell of its former glory through the ascendancy of provincial elites, breakaway satrapies and successor states. It was further challenged by tribal breakouts in the resurgence of great warrior coalitions from Arabia and Central Asia, as well as the breaking-in of sustained European capital flows and commerce.\textsuperscript{32} The waning of Mughal hegemony paved the way for greater autonomy among the lower ranks of India’s ‘hierarchy of kings’ and other forms of indigenous capitalism: the revenue and military entrepreneurs, the big bankers, and the warrior peasant lords of the villages. All derived wealth from commodity trade, all speculated in money profit, and most needed cash to buy muskets, cannon, elephants and other symbols of power and status. The English East India Company was drawn into—and benefited greatly from—this turbulent scenario of war and opportunity: playing off one state against another, selling its own services and supplies in the ‘all-India military bazaar’.\textsuperscript{33}

Military-industrial globalization on the subcontinent proved to be a double-edged weapon. Arms and ammunition figured prominently among the stock-in-trade bartered to petty rajas for spices, but the stakes were raised when great princes like the Nizam of Hyderabad were drawn into this volatile military market. An internal arms race ensued, even as indigenous military production and technology began to assume a progressively ‘modern’ complexion. There was some reliance on European mercenary officers who served as military advisers, and some dependence on direct weapons procurement. But the bulk of firearms used by the armies of the regional magnates were, in fact, manufactured in local factories such as those at Lucknow, Pondicherry, Hyderabad, and Lahore. State arsenals and magazines sprang

\textsuperscript{32}Bayly, \textit{Imperial Meridian}, pp. 16-74.
up in the former Mughal heartland around Delhi, producing cannon, muskets, gunpowder and shot equal to—if not exceeding—European standards. Three Indian armies, in particular, developed the capabilities to challenge British colonial authority on the subcontinent. They were the forces of the Maratha Confederation, the state of Mysore, and the Sikhs. With their foreign-assisted but largely homegrown military establishments, each had the capacity to deal a crippling blow to the Company’s military machine before the great mutiny-rebellion of 1857 finally finished off Company rule.³⁴

Soon after the Mughal emperor had submitted to his ‘protection’ in 1784, Mahadji Scindia, the greatest of the Maratha warlords, proceeded to establish his own ‘military-industrial complex’ near Agra. The Maratha ordnance factories emphasized adaptation rather than innovation, but incorporated relatively sophisticated indigenous technology and involved local manufacturers. These developments so alarmed the English East India Company that it forbade Britons to serve as gunners with the Marathas and sought to curtail the trade in muskets. But with the assistance of French and Portuguese military advisers, Scindia went on to create one of the finest armies in India—including the 27,000-strong brigade known as the ‘Deccan Invincibles’—supplied from Scindia’s arsenal at Agra. By combining these new weapons with new battlefield tactics, the Marathas came close to defeating the British on several occasions. During the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-5), Arthur Wellesley’s success at Assaye owed more to a bayonet charge than any advantage in firepower conferred by Western arms, and the hero of Waterloo later called Assaye the hardest-fought battle of his entire career.³⁵

Then, there was the military establishment of Mysore. The military foundations had been laid by the great warlord Haidar Ali, who was one of the first to appreciate the advantages of flintlock over against matchlock technology. In their wars against indigenous opponents, both Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan obtained flintlock muskets from European, predominantly British, sources. European mercenaries, predominantly French, were also employed, and workshops and armouries were established for the maintenance and subsequent manufacture of firearms. But the ‘Tiger of Mysore’ would turn and bite one of the hands that fed it. In the wars of the 1780s, two-thirds of the arms used by Mysore against the

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East India Company were of British manufacture. By 1799, following the siege of Seringapatam in which Tipu Sultan was himself killed, the British recovered 52,000 flintlock muskets of British and French origin, as well as 47,000 flintlock guns of indigenous manufacture. Even more remarkable was the fact that there were only 320 matchlocks, all of which appeared unserviceable. This extremely small stock of what was then the Indian standard firearm attests to the modernity of Mysore’s military establishment: small arms which generally continued to be used in other parts of India well into the nineteenth century were already being regarded as obsolescent by Mysore as early as the 1770s-80s. After Tipu’s downfall, however, the French advisers and local manufacturers were removed, and nothing remains of the ‘eleven armouries for making and finishing small arms’. 36

But finally, in order to defeat their opponents in the Sikh Wars (1845-49), the British had to deploy armies equal in size and superior in artillery firepower. This was no mean feat since, by the time of his death in 1839, the great ‘Lion of the Punjab’ Ranjit Singh had built up a 150,000-strong army, of whom about 65,000 were regulars ‘trained by European soldiers of fortune and supported by... guns of a type more modern than those used by the British’. 37 Like the Marathas and Mysore before them, the Sikhs relied on a combination of Western (mainly French) military advisers, direct weapons procurement, and indigenous arms production at the military-industrial establishment in Lahore.

In the wider South Asian periphery, a contest between Britain and Russia was being played out in Afghanistan, to the northwest of British India and to the south of an expanding Czarist presence in Central Asia. The ‘Great Game’ was a clandestine war of espionage and bribery, with occasional military-strategic pressure, as both European powers kept each other at bay by maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer state between them. 38 But even then, as now, the course and contours of the global conflict would be shaped by its indigenous military cultural context; and the arming of South Asia would manifest itself as a creeping

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36 Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, pp. 95-98; R. Wigington, The Firearms of Tipu Sultan 1783-1799 (Hatfield: John Taylor Book Ventures, 1992), pp. 7-8, 12, 32-33; Lieutenant E. Moor, A narrative of the operations of Captain Little’s Detachment... during the late Confederacy in India, against the Nawab Tippoo Sultan Bahadur (London, 1794), pp. 478-79; A. Beatson, A view of the origin and conduct of the war with Tippoo Sultaan (London, 1800), p. 158. See also I. Habib (ed.), Confronting Colonialism: Resistance and Modernization under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan (London: Anthem, 2002). In addition to small arms, Mysore developed the ability to deploy artillery with stunning effect, and also pioneered efforts to build a navy.


militarization beyond the grasp of state authority.

The weakening of Mughal as well as Ottoman and Safavid authority had opened up these empires to attacks by powerful but unstable warrior coalitions of Afghan, Persian or Central Asian origin. As far back as the 1720s, Afghan tribal armies had eradicated Safavid influence from much of southeastern Afghanistan, and sacked many key cities in western Iran. Mughal India also suffered: Delhi capitulated to the armies of the Persian, Nadir Shah, in 1739. The untamed frontier of Northwest India remained in a state of perpetual flux: a new Afghan kingdom emerged to consolidate its hold over western Iran and Afghanistan, Sindh and the Punjab; northern India was invaded four times by the Afghans in 1747 and 1759-61, and menaced again in 1797; while the frontier and its society were progressively militarized and populated by warlike tribes such as the Afridis, Pathans and Baluchis.39

The British attempted to annex Afghanistan until they realized that the intractable Afghans could be bought more easily than fought. The British offered money, manipulated the tribal chiefs, and managed to turn Afghanistan periodically into a client state. Yet the instability persisted: it was a potent combination of deep mistrust of the British; perceived threat from Russia; fears of Ottoman or Persian aggression; Islamic revivalism and growing militancy among the frontier tribes; plus a further manifestation of forward policy. Britain’s ploy of installing a puppet regime failed twice, leading to anti-colonial resistance and outright war in 1839-42 and 1878-80. From the British occupation of the Punjab in 1849 up until 1914, over 52 punitive military expeditions were mounted into tribal no-man’s-land, as well as ongoing small-scale engagements along the shifting frontier line between British India and Afghanistan.40

Between the 1880s and 1900s, the British found themselves providing military equipment as well as financial assistance, leading to further militarization of the region. Initially, British subsidies and arms supplies were intended to centralize and strengthen the Afghan state. But the matter of ‘open and unrestrained’ arms transfers from British India to the Amir of Afghanistan grew more problematic over time. Afghan loyalties became questionable and security threats emerged out of the leakage of rifles from Kabul to the hostile frontier tribes.41 Furthermore, despite the negotiation of the Durand Line (1893), which set an ‘official’ boundary for British Indian and Afghan influence over the tribes of the Northwest Frontier, it was apparent to agents on the spot that illicit arms shipments were

39 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, pp. 36-39.
41 ‘Armaments in Afghanistan’, Arms and Explosives, July 1901, p. 100.
finding their way from the Gulfs of Persia and Oman—along clandestine routes, across porous borders—into the hands of the tribesmen. Significantly, a part of this arms trade was also financed by drug money—opium revenues and indigenous credit facilities—originating from within British India itself.42 Large quantities of modern rifles from the West thus began to replace the indigenous jezail (tribal rifled musket) with which Afghan warriors had hitherto been armed.43 The ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ arming of nineteenth-century Afghanistan would lead to a third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919; sixty years before the onset of a costly Russian (Soviet) occupation; and eighty years before yet another world power was drawn into the tribal politics of the militarized zone, with its globalized networks of terror.44

Future Impact and Implications

Every age presents its unique set of circumstances and challenges, with new constellations of world powers, regional intermediaries and local forces dominating the political firmament. Yet the unfolding history of over two centuries of military-industrial globalization in South Asia reveals longer-term patterns of collaboration and conflict that continue to reverberate.

First, there is the perennial crisis of small arms proliferation in South Asia. Travelling through Bengal in the mid-1820s, Bishop Heber of Calcutta noted that ‘country arms’ were readily available in a supposedly de-militarized district of British India; a musket could be bought for 20 rupees, while a brace of pistols cost just 16 rupees.45 Traversing the streets of Karachi in the mid-1980s, one could just as easily and cheaply acquire an assortment of semi-automatic weapons.46 In the long shadows cast by the Anglo-Afghan wars, the ancient rifles

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43 British Foreign Office [FO] 539/79/1, India Office to Foreign Office, 7 May 1880; India Office [IO] L/P&S/18, Memorandum D 182, Appendix T, ‘The Arms and Ammunition Traffic in the Gulfs of Persia and Oman’; A. Keppel, Gun-running and the Indian North-West Frontier (London: J. Murray, 1911), pp. 49-50; Moreman, ‘The British and Indian Armies and North West Frontier Warfare’, pp. 40, 46-47, 58. The locally-made jezail continued to outclass the small arms employed by British Indian troops for years after the First Afghan War, enabling resisting Afridis, Mahsuds and Pathans to harass British forces from out of range, combining superior marksmanship with skirmishing tactics in guerrilla warfare. The progressive adoption of Snider, Martini-Henry and Lee-Metford rifles by British forces redressed the imbalance for a time, but by the early 1890s, substantial numbers of modern precision-arms were also beginning to reach the Afghans, Baluchis, and other hill tribes—via Muscat—thus offsetting any British superiority in firepower. The intractability of the region’s terrain, in conjunction with the tactics and strategy of tribal warriors, and the influx of even more lethal weapons, would ultimately jolt the British into developing a specific training doctrine suited to military operations in the Northwest Frontier.
46 Talbot, India and Pakistan, p. 231.
of British regimental life and the Gulf arms trade survived—restored or modified—to be effective sniping weapons against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Likewise, in the aftermath of the global Cold War conflict, at least one independent analyst has observed the ongoing impact of recycled military firearms in the South Asian periphery: emerging ‘gun cultures’ linked to organized crime and political movements, insurgencies and sectarian violence.\(^4^7\) For regional gun control associations such as the South Asia Small Arms Network, the task is to progressively disarm the periphery: promoting collaborative efforts between governments and civil society aimed at curbing small arms proliferation.

Second, there is the potential crisis of arms escalation linked to interlocking crises across Asia. Just as an arms race developed among successor states in Mughal India, and this crisis was part of a more general crisis confronting the other Asian land empires, so the dynamics of military build-up between India and Pakistan are similarly connected to military developments around the rest of Asia. Military-strategic polarization and build-up along the lines of a global Iron Curtain, dividing communist East from capitalist West, has long given way to fears of a globalized Asian ‘nuclear weapons chain’: fully-interactive, multi-national, extending from Israel and Iran in the West, and Pakistan and India in the South, to China and North Korea in the East. While they are not necessarily contiguous, all the ‘links’ in the chain may have missiles capable of reaching at least two other nuclear weapons states, or have access to missile technology of ever-increasing range. Moreover, the chain is inherently unstable; the ‘weakest link’ could precipitate nuclear catastrophe. Iran’s efforts at uranium enrichment have not so far yielded nuclear armament, but this could just be a matter of time. Iraq as a rogue state has been removed from the equation, yet the danger of armed insurgency still poses a threat to regional security. Apart from possible crisis arising from their own strategic rivalry or internal instability, India and Pakistan must ensure—in the complex web of relationships involving the United States, Russia, China, Israel, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan—neither South Asian power becomes the object of a superior nuclear alliance, or the subject of third-party (and terrorist) machinations.\(^4^8\)

Third, and finally, there remains the persisting conundrum of the worldwide ‘war on terror’. In a further ironic twist to Kipling’s ‘Ballad of East and West’, a more nebulous global confrontation has taken shape around the South Asian periphery, in which ‘the fault


\(^{4^8}\) Cohen, India: Emerging Power, pp. 189-90; Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, p. 305. Islamabad’s nuclear programme is a further concern, especially following revelations about the movement of nuclear and missile technology to and from Pakistan. Leakage of its nuclear expertise is a potentially destabilizing factor in Northeast Asia (via ties to North Korea), the Persian Gulf region (via Saudi Arabia and Iran), and the Middle East (via Libya).
lines between civilizations [have become] the battle lines of the future’, while the ‘two strong men’ are neo-conservative America and a supposed monolith called militant Islam. In fact, the West has intoned the language of crusade and civilizing mission for centuries, and their Evangelical zeal has been echoed in indigenous society by a long discourse of Islamic revivalism, incorporating strands of both anti-colonial protest and jihad. Osama Bin Laden originated from the same part of the world as Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, founder of the ultra-fundamentalist Wahhabi movement. Just as the Wahhabis from Arabia had embodied a more extremist dimension of Islamic revivalism during the late eighteenth century, so an array of eclectic millenarian and jihadi movements would do the same across the rest of the Islamic world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Islamic extremists who emerged from these movements would not only sanction the force of arms, but also involve themselves in the arms trade. A century before the Taliban, ‘the fiery exhortations of the mullas’ and ‘the revived activity of the Hindustani fanatics’ had proved crucial in galvanizing anti-colonial resistance and arms transfers across the Northwest Frontier where Kipling set his poem. Decades before Osama and his terrorist training camps, a ‘holy’ Afghan named Khalifeh Khair Mahomed had developed ‘a keen interest in gun-running’, emigrating to Persian Baluchistan where he supplied ‘countrymen who made the annual pilgrimage to the Gulf for the purchase of arms’. Long before American-made and supplied military equipment was turned on the Americans themselves, British-made weapons—transported to the Gulf by British shipping agencies, backed by British insurers and banks—were being acquired by Islamic warriors to be used against British colonial forces out in the periphery. What has changed in the twenty-first century is the capacity of extremists in today’s world to re-export their ‘terror’ to the urban frontiers of the Western metropole, suicide bombings and all.

As had been the case with the British and their collaborators a century ago, the main difficulty facing America and its allies in the ‘war on terror’ is that the porous frontier itself is part-problem and part-solution. Like the Northwest Frontier of British India, Pakistan as an

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ally in the war against terrorism remains a potential source of Islamic radicalism linked to terror, apart from also being a loose cannon in the nuclear weapons arena.54 Like British attempts to transform Afghanistan into a client of the Raj via puppet regimes presiding over a centralized Afghan state, the path for America in contemporary Afghanistan (and Iraq) is similarly fraught amid the shifting alliances and alienations of tribes and warlords, where there is little distinction between religion and politics. Moreover, there is a danger that events flowing from the war against terrorism will produce a similar radicalism in the West: isolationism, Islamophobia, racism and religious revivalism that could echo—albeit in a very different form—the policies of the Taliban. In a world where the global village becomes the turbulent frontier, and moderates of East and West get caught in the crossfire, the ultimate reconciliation may only take place at ‘God’s great Judgment seat’.

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