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Twelver Shi’ite Islam:
Conceptual and Practical Aspects

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Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
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With Compliments

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ABSTRACT

Recent political events surrounding the Iranian “nuclear crisis”, as well as the still unsettled fate of Iraq have resulted in a renewed interest in the Shi’ite dimension of Islam among political observers. This paper attempts to present an outline of some of the “essential features” of Twelver Shi’ite Islam as it distinguishes itself today from majority Sunnism. In particular, the different approaches of Sunnite and Shi’ite Muslims towards the issue of religious and political authority - resulting in history often in violent clashes - have been highlighted. Moreover, throughout their history, Shi’ites had put high emphasis on intellectual pursuit and reasoning, on philosophy and science. Although the paper focuses of the “Twelver Shi’ites” (today numerically and politically the strongest Shi’ite group), the today rather un-political Iṣmāʿīlīs or “Sevener” Shi’ites, too, shall be referred to briefly, as they have also some pockets in Singapore among the Indian Muslim community. Of special interest to the political observer of contemporary Islam shall be the status of Shi’ite clerics (Arab. ‘ulamā’) vis-à-vis their Sunnite colleagues.

Dr Christoph Marcinkowski (b. 1964 in Berlin) is an award-winning German scholar in Islamic, Southeast Asian, and Iranian studies and has spent several years in Iran (1984-86) and Malaysia (1995-2004). He had been Senior Research Fellow (1999-2002) and Associate Professor of History (2002-04) at the International Institute of Islamic Thought of Civilization (ISTAC), Kuala Lumpur, and Associate Research Scholar and member of the editorial staff of Encyclopaedia Iranica at the Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, New York City (2004-05). Currently, he is Visiting Research Scholar at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) as well as Visiting Affiliate at the Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore (NUS). He has published widely on issues pertaining to Islamic history and culture in Iran, Iraq, and Southeast Asia.

Dr Marcinkowski is the author of Religion and Politics in Iraq. Shi’ite Clerics between Quietism and Resistance (Singapore, 2004). His eighth and latest book, Shi’ite Islam in Southeast Asia. Basic Concepts, Cultural and Historical Aspects, Contemporary Implications, is forthcoming at Singapore University Press. Presently, he is working on a new book on contacts between Hadramaut in southern Arabia and Southeast Asia.
Introduction
Recent political events surrounding the Iranian “nuclear crisis”, as well as the still unsettled fate of Iraq have resulted in a renewed interest in the Shi’ite dimension of Islam among political observers. The events in mainly Shi’ite Iraq and Iran should also be of concern to policy-makers in Southeast Asia, and this not only because of the possibility of the almost certain occurrence of ‘solidarity effects’ among Muslims of the region in general if America decide to wage war against Iran.

According to The World Factbook,1 published annually by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, in 2005, Islam was the second largest religion in the world and among which 15% of them are Shi’ites. This makes up about 15% of Muslims population. The majority of these Shi’ites are Twelver Shi’ites and they are concentrated mostly in Iran (c. 90%), the Republic of Azerbaijan (c. 75%), Iraq (c. 60-65%), and also in Bahrain (more than 60%) although in Bahrain, the state is under Sunni rule. In Lebanon, the Twelvers constitute with more than 40% the largest single religious group in the country. There are also large minorities in Qatar (c. 20%), Afghanistan (about 19%), Pakistan (about 20% of the total population, especially around Lahore), Tajikistan (c. 5%), and India (especially in Oudh (Lucknow), and on the Deccan (Hyderabad)). They are also to be found in large numbers in Kashmir (in both parts of the Indian and Pakistani-occupied areas) and in the eastern, oil-producing Persian Gulf regions of Saudi Arabia, where they are the majority (11% of the kingdom’s total population).2

Within this setting, the recent phenomenon of a Shi’ite revival and “conversion” from Sunnism to Shi’ism among Southeast Asian Muslims appears to warrant particular

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1 Available online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
attention.³ Solid knowledge of the basic concepts of Shi’ism (as distinguishing it from Sunnism), as well as on the nature of Islamic civilization as manifested in Southeast Asia, is indispensable in order to arrive at a fact-oriented, less sensational and sober evaluation of current events. Such an approach must not necessarily mean a “tension” between sound historical research on the one hand, and the requirements of a think-tank like IDSS that has to assist politicians in their daily decision-making on the other.

From “Supporters” to “Shi’ites”: The Emergence of the Term Shi‘ah

In Arabic, the word shī‘ah conveys the meaning of “party”, “partisans”, “group”, or “supporters” and alike.⁴ To the knowledge and understanding of the present writer, it appears only in this rather neutral sense in the Qur’an (such as in 28:15 and 37:83), since “Shi’ism” (as we know it today) is a later historical development. A translation of shī‘ah as “sect” is, to my mind, still possible, however, without interpreting “into it” the meaning of “Shi’ite”. The following four passages may suffice:⁵

As for those who divide their religion and break up into sects (shiya’an), you have no part in them in the least: their affair is with Allah: He will in the end tell them the truth of all that they did (6:159);
Say: "He has power to send calamities on you, from above and below, or to cover you with confusion in party strife (shiya’an), giving you a taste of mutual vengeance - each from the other. See how We explain the Signs by various (symbols); that they may understand (6:65);
Turn you back in repentance to Him, and fear Him: establish regular prayers, and be not you among those who join gods with Allah. Those who split up their Religion, and become (mere) sects (shiya’an), each party (hizbi) rejoicing in that which is with itself! (30:31-32);

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³ I have tried to address this issue in my book Shi’ite Islam in Southeast Asia. Basic Concepts, Cultural and Historical Aspects, Contemporary Implications (forthcoming at Singapore University Press).
⁴ The adjective (qualifying masculine nouns) is shī‘ī.
⁵ Qur’anic citations are to the English translation by ‘Abdullāh Yūsuf ‘Alī, an updated version of which has been published recently by the Islamic Book Trust Kuala Lumpur: see ‘Abdullāh Yūsuf ‘Alī, trans., The Holy Qur’ān. Text and Translation (Kuala Lumpur, 2005).
Truly Pharaoh elated himself in the land and broke up its people into sections (shiya‘an), depressing a small group among them: their sons he slew, but he kept alive their females: for he was indeed a maker of mischief (28:4).

At any rate, in early Islamic history, that is to say, in the period following immediately the death of Muhammad in 632 C.E., the term shī‘ah appears to have been used in this very sense, i.e. “partisans”, “followers”.

The Muslim community (ummah) differed after Muhammad’s death on who should lead them in future. Revelation had ceased and some parts of the community were of the view that Muhammad did not appoint someone who should succeed him as political leader, but had left it rather to the ummah as a whole to decide. This faction could be referred to as “proto-Sunnites”. Another faction held the view that Muhammad did in fact appoint a successor, in this case from his own family, namely his cousin and son-in-law ‘Ali b. Abī Tālib, a highly-revered warrior and husband of his only surviving daughter, Fātimah. It was this group, which became later known as “the Shi‘ites” par excellence. In historical reality, however, Muhammad was succeeded as a political leader by three of his associates or “Companions” (sahābah) who assumed the humble title of “caliph”, i.e. “successor” (khalīfah). All of them came to power under rather dubious circumstances that have been made the focus of attention by Shi‘ite authors throughout Islamic history. The politicking and struggles for leadership immediately following the death of Muhammad have been analyzed most comprehensively in an authoritative study by Wilferd Madelung 6 of recent date and shall thus not be repeated here.

In 656—the year that ‘Uthmān was murdered—the last of the three caliphs that had ruled one after the other, ‘Ali was finally elected caliph by a part of the community. Another faction favoured Mu‘āwiyyah, a relative of ‘Uthmān. The partisans of ‘Ali were by then known as Shī‘at ‘Ali, “the party of ‘Ali”, and those who favoured Mu‘āwiyyah as Shī‘at Mu‘āwiyyah. Mu‘āwiyyah was to become the founder of the first dynasty in Islam, the Umayyads (r. 661 to 750 C.E.), who were despised not only by the Shi‘ites and also by larger sections of rest of the Muslim community for the supposed “godless” character

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of their rule. It was, however, already during Mu‘āwiya’s lifetime that his supporters styled themselves as ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jamā’ah, “People of the customs [of Muhammad] and of the community”, by this “appropriating” the right to speak on behalf of the entire ummah and stamping the Shi‘at ‘Alī as heretics. Today, the term ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jamā’ah, today somewhat out of fashion in other parts of the Sunnite world, is still often applied in daily discourse by Sunnite Malays in Malaysia when referring to themselves as the supposed guardians of Islamic “orthodoxy”. Both terms, “Sunnite” as well as “Shi’ite”, are thus highly politicized terms and rather empty shells that tell us nothing about the actual beliefs held by their respective followers.

In Shi’ite as well as Sunnite sources, those members of Muhammad’s family that were considered closest and most dear to him – his daughter Fātimah, ‘Alī, and their two sons al-Hasan and al-Husayn - were respectfully referred to as “People of the House” (Ahl al-Bayt) or “Family of Muhammad” (Āl-i Muhammad), a term which would include later also their descendents. Descent from Ahl al-Bayt is until today considered prestigious and generations of Muslims, again Shi’ite as well as Sunnite, have spent their energy on meticulous research that led to the preparation of genealogical trees (Arab, singular, shajarah), not all of them necessarily being beyond doubt with regard to their veracity. Throughout the Muslim world, those who claim descent from the Prophet through Ahl al-Bayt, use to prefix the term sayyid, “lord”, to their given name if they are men, and sayyidah, “lady”, if they are women. In Southeast Asia, the term sharīfah instead of sayyidah is more common.

The differences between the Shi‘at ‘Alī and the supporters of the Umayyads signified not only a political conflict, but were also of consequence with regard to the issue of how to apply and interpret what was to develop later on into sharī’ah or Islamic law. It is important to keep in mind that these basically political differences between the Ahl al-Bayt and their supporters (i.e. the early Shi’ites) on the one hand, and those who rejected their claims on the other, have also shaped the respective Shi’ite and Sunnite views on some key issues pertaining to the Qur’an, the “Traditions” (hadīth [in Arabic a singular, in English often also used as plural], reports recording the practice of the Prophet Muhammad, his sunnah), on the role of personalities in and the interpretation of

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7 The term “Sunnite” is derived therefrom.
major events of Islamic history, as well as on weltanschauung in general. For instance, throughout history, Shi’ites have been accused (to my mind erroneously, as I have tried to show elsewhere) by their opponents of manipulating the corpus of the Qur’anic text in order to “make their point”. Subsequently, both “denominations”, Shi’ites and Sunnites, developed their own corpus of hadith and legal literature. Hadith accepted by the Shi’ites contain in their chains of narrators (Arab. isnād) usually a high proportion of people from or close to the Ahl al-Bayt, whereas those accepted by the Sunnites are mostly based on the “Companions” (sahābah) and those who based their reports on them. Moreover, with regard to what was to become Twelver Shi’ism later on, it has to be emphasised, that the very term hadith includes also reports from the twelve Imāms and Fātimah.

Authority in Islam – the Shi’ite Way

Shi’ite Muslims in general, regardless of which particular sect, are of the view that Muhammad’ family (i.e. Ahl al-Bayt and the Imāms from their progeny) were the most authentic source of knowledge about the Qur’an, the best-qualified teachers of Islam after the Prophet, and the most trusted carriers and protectors of Muhammad’s sunnah, due to many emphasized sayings ascribed to him. They also believe that by Muhammad’s direct order, ‘Alī was appointed successor on many occasions, that he was the rightful leader of the Muslims after Muhammad’s passing, and that to follow Muhammad’s true sunnah one must support ‘Alī’s successorship. Moreover, in the particular view of the Twelvers, the appointment to the Imamate does not happen as an act of arbitrary selection, let’s say because one’s capabilities as a political leader or qualities as a warrior. Appointment is rather a true “act of God,” that is to say, through “divine designation” (nass), thus acting

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through the Prophet (in the case of ‘Alī) or through the Imāms (when appointing a successor).

To sum up, the main differences between Shi‘ites and Sunnites until the early Umayyad period, which could also be considered as the formative period of political Shi‘ism,\(^\text{11}\) focused on the question of leadership, i.e. “the Imamate” (imāmah). As a result of this, Shi‘ism split up into numerous sub-divisions, most of them somewhat united in their reverence of ‘Alī as the head of their movement in history, but often differing on the particular approach to be followed vis-à-vis the Umayyads and subsequent Sunnite dynasties, which had been viewed as usurpers. Some of those groups, which ought to be referred to as religious “sects”, ascribed to ‘Alī and their leaders rather supernatural quasi-divine qualities. They differed often also with regard to the particular line of genealogical descent from ‘Alī. Most significantly, however, Shi‘ites in general (with the exception of the Zaydites, who are to be encountered today almost exclusively only in Yemen) tend to reject the claim of the Sunnites to speak on behalf of the Prophet and Islam, and thus de facto the legitimacy of the entire Sunnite religious establishment. In should be mentioned here only in passing that this circumstance is also of some consequence in terms of the fate of contemporary Southeast Asian Shi‘ism in a country as thoroughly dominated by Sunnism as Malaysia.

Throughout the pertinent Islamic literature - Shi‘ite as well as Sunnite - the leader of the Islamic ummah is mostly referred to as Imām. More commonly, this term is used when referring to the head of a particular branch of Shi‘ism. Twelver Shi‘ism, with which we are primarily concerned here, was by then only one of those many branches. In early Islamic heresiographical literature they are referred to as al-Imāmiyyah, “Imamites”. The “Imamites” or “proto-Twelvers” could well be described as “sober Shi‘ites” as they do not assign to their Imāms any quasi-divine qualities, contrary to several other branches of Shi‘ism which were in this regard often branded throughout medieval Islamic literature as “extremists” (ghulāt). As we shall see later, Shi‘ites in particular put special emphasis on political as well as spiritual leadership of the Muslims when referring to the Imamate. Each branch of them developed a corpus of literature defending their particular sect’s

\(^\text{11}\) The formative period of Shi‘ism has been investigated in an excellent study by S. H. M. Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shi‘a Islam (London, New York, and Beirut, 1979).
claim to leadership. With regard to the Twelvers, perhaps the most famous work on this topic, written by a leading 11th-century authority, is Mufid’s Book of Guidance, which is also very popular among Sunnite “converts” to Shi’ism in Southeast Asia.

It is worth mentioning here in passing that Ansariyan Publications in Ghom, Iran, which republished the English translation of Mufid’s work, is perhaps one of the most popular distributors of Shi’ite literature in a variety of languages. Their website is also of interest in order to get an idea of the literature converts to Shi’ism are mainly drawing upon. Yayasan Fatimah (the “Fatimah Foundation”) in Jakarta, Indonesia, appears to be one of the main distributors of Shi’ite literature in Southeast Asia.

Quietism vs. Activism? The Twelve Imamīs

The issue of the “legitimate” line of the Imamate and the question of how to respond appropriately (resistance or quietism?) to Umayyad, and subsequently Abbasid, rule, perceived by Shi’ites as oppression, contributed further to the “branching out” of the Shi’ite movement. Here, we shall concentrate on the Imamites, the “proto-Twelvers”. The Ismā’īlis, too, shall be referred to in brief where deemed necessary in order to make out their often contrasting views.

Contrary to what is generally known about and thought of Shi’ism – even by many Twelver Shi’ites themselves – the actual course of Islamic history seems to teach that the lives of almost all of the Imamīs were characterized rather by quietism, intellectual enquiry, and scholarship than by rebellious attitudes towards their political surrounding. It is essential to elaborate this remarkable point a bit further: Although it is true that ‘Alī’s entire career as leader of the Muslims was filled with several military conflicts and fights against rebels (among them the notorious Mu‘āwiyah, as governor of Syria his most formidable foe), we, nevertheless, do encounter two facets in one of the

15 A list of the publications distributed in Southeast Asia by Yayasan Fatimah can be viewed at http://www.fatimah.org/pustaka/inggris_penerbit_a.htm (accessed on March 17, 2006).
same person with different decisions made under different circumstances. During the caliphates of his three predecessors, for instance, ‘Alî’s attitude could well be seen as quasi-quietist, as he did not attempt to assume power by force. In 661 C.E., after ‘Alî’s murder during prayer, his son al-Hasan, the second Imâm of the Twelvers, continued at first the war against Mu‘āwiya. However, after many of his troops had deserted him, he decided to step down in order to avoid further bloodshed. In 669, al-Hasan, too, was murdered. His younger brother al-Husayn became the third Imâm. It was only in 680, after the inhabitants of Kūfah in Iraq had sent an urgent request for help against their brutal governor, that al-Husayn decided to refuse to give his oath of allegiance to the Umayyad regime. When he finally embarked on his fatal trip to Kūfah, he came with the little band of his closest followers and members of his family, not with a large army, although it would not have been difficult for him to muster a large number of troops. The ensuing massacre of al-Husayn and his relatives and friends at the plains of Karbalā’ by largely superior Umayyad forces continues to traumatize the Islamic ummah until today. Husayn’s particularly brutal slaughter added a dramatic note to the religious idea of “suffering on God’s way”. In Shi’ism, the killing of the Prophet’s grandson by fellow Muslims is remembered annually by the performance of Ta’ziyyah, an issue that shall be addressed again shortly.

Al-Husayn’s only surviving child ‘Alî, known as Zayn al-‘Âbidīn, “Ornament of (God’s) Servants”, had been an eye-witness of the drama of Karbalā’. He is considered the fourth Imâm by the Twelvers and spent his time mostly in Medina, dedicating himself entirely to prayer and scholarship. His son Muhammad al-Bāqir, the fifth Imâm, too, steered clear of the dangerous cliffs of daily politics. It is important to note that al-Bāqir, an eminent scholar and transmitter of Traditions in his own right and as such respected by Shi’ites and Sunnites alike, was a contemporary of the formative period of Islamic legal scholarship during the first half of the 8th century C.E.

Most remarkably, however, his son Jaʿfar al-Sādiq, the sixth Imâm of the Twelvers, was significantly involved in the training of Muslim legal scholars, among them Abū Hanîfah, the founder of the Sunnite Hanafite “school”, which is today predominant in Turkey, the Balkans, and Central Asia. As a matter of fact, Jaʿfar’s own legal system became known as the jaʿfarī madhab, or “the fifth legal school of Islam”,

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named after him. Ja‘far’s significance as a scholar was such that the Twelvers are until today also known as Ja‘farīs when referring to legal matters. It is important to note that - even though being a scholar and personality of this caliber and standing - Ja‘far deliberately kept strict neutrality during the civil war that led to the overthrow of the Umayyads and the takeover by the Abbasids around 750 C.E. His son Mūsā al-Kāzim, the seventh Imām, too, followed a similar line. During the first half of the 9th century C.E., the Abāsid caliph al-Ma’mūn tried unsuccessfullly to win Mūsā’s son ‘Alī al-Ridā, the eighth Imām of the Twelvers, to cooperate with the regime. Al-Ridā, who was considered the head of the descendents of the Prophet’s family, refused and had to pay with his life. Indeed, all Imāms, with the exception of the last, are said to have suffered a violent death. The ninth, tenth, and eleventh Imāms spent their lives either under close supervision at the Abbasid court, in voluntary seclusion, or in prison, respectively.

The Hidden Imām

The case of the twelfth and last Imām is a somewhat different from what has been discussed so far, as it is connected with the belief in the Mahdī (“The Rightly Guided One”), a kind of eschatological saviour, a belief that is shared by Sunnites and Shi’ites alike.16 Similar to the “Second Coming” of Christ, the Mahdī, too, is supposed to “return” just before the “end of the world” and the “day of judgment”. Sunnites, too, believe in the coming of a Mahdī, but they differ on his identity. They either believe that he is yet to be born, or that he was born recently and has yet to emerge. Both, Sunnites as well as Shi’ites, do, however, agree that this person will bring absolute peace and justice throughout the world by establishing Islam as the global religion. In Twelver understanding,17 the eleventh Imām al-Hasan al-‘Askarī had fathered a son during his incarceration in the Iraqi town of Sāmarrā’, who was given the same name as the Prophet - Muhammad. According to Twelver Shi’ite tradition, the baby was somehow smuggled

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out of the prison and became the twelfth Imām after the death of his father. This twelfth Imām is considered by the Twelvers to be the Mahdī. He is believed to have been hidden by God from his enemies by entering into subsequent kinds of “occultation” or “concealment” (ghaybah).  

The first of them is referred to as “minor occultation” during which he is said to have communicated with the faithful only through his representatives who alone knew about his whereabouts. After several years, he is believed to have entered into a “major occultation” that is supposed to have taken place in either 939 or 941 C.E. (depending on the sources). During this “major occultation”, which is believed to continue until this very day, he is not accessible to anyone. The main contention against this made by Sunnites is that it would be against the laws of nature that he is still alive – after more than 1,000 years in concealment. Shi’ites use to counter by stating that some of the prophets mentioned in the Qur’an, too - such as Jesus and Elias - , are considered to be still alive by all Muslims.

We are not concerned here with the question of the veracity of these beliefs. What can be said with some degree of certainty, however, is that the lives of the Imāms seem to give evidence to a rather quietist political attitude from their part. Moreover, also relevant in the context of the further development of Twelver Shi’ite Islam is that the inaccessibility of the Twelfth Imām (due to his “major occultation”) resulted in a question – a “crisis” according to some scholars - of religious/legal and political authority. The Imām was considered by the Twelvers the sole and supreme legitimate source for the interpretation of Islamic law and head of the Islamic ummah as a whole.

Now that he was “gone” (whether forever or with an option to “return” shall not concern

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21 Already in 944, C.E., only 3 years after the beginning of the “major occultation”, a tomb with a mosque (later known as “Al-'Askariyyah”) was erected on the burial site of the eleventh Imām. In the further course of history, a magnificent golden dome was constructed above the tomb which was destroyed by Sunnite extremists in February 2006. This event has led to the outbreak of widespread sectarian violence throughout Iraq.
us here), who was to provide guidance to the Twelver Shi‘ite community? In fact, this question was already somewhat present in the past during the presence of any of the previous Imāms as geographical distance as well as political oppression had often hindered them from maintaining constant contact with the faithful. Respected and learned local Shi‘ites might have filled in the gap, perhaps even being authorized by the Imāms, and we have just seen that the Twelfth Imām himself had entrusted some of them with communicating on his behalf with the community. However, the de facto complete absence of the Imām and the numerical increase of the community even in distant parts of the Islamic lands demanded some theoretical as well as practical answer to the question of “legitimate authority” in Twelver Shi‘ism. It should be noted that this issue has in the past attracted also the attention of Western scholars. This interest that has since then increased due to the 1979 revolution in Iran, and it might again come to the forefront within the context of the unsettled future of Iraq and what is referred to in the media as the “Iranian nuclear crisis”.

It is not intended here to go into detail with regard to if and how the question of authority was answered by Twelver Shi‘ites in the course of history. Political activism and open resistance, more “popular” during those days among wider strata of the Shi‘ites and also favoured by other Shi‘ite groups, had led most often to disaster, massacre, persecution, and, ultimately, failure. As a matter of fact and in the light of the just outlined actual course of the biographies of the Imāms, “original” Twelver Shi‘ism tends to be rather quietist. This quietism is not only in line with the history of the Twelvers as a - compared with other Shi‘ites – politically insignificant minority through most of the Middle Ages and early modern times, but also with the practising of taqiyyah, usually translated as “dissimulation”. We shall soon return to the issue of taqiyyah.


23 For a good overview on the developments in the Iranian context see Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi‘ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago, 1987), and idem, ed., Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism (Albany NY, 1988).
Another means of responding to political and religious persecution that shall only be mentioned here in passing - although somehow relevant in the Southeast Asian context - is emigration. A particularly “popular” destination in this regard was the mountainous far-away region of Yemen in southern Arabia, and here especially Hadhramaut. In 930 C.E., Ahmad b. ‘Īsā b. ‘Alī b. Ja‘far - apparently a Shi‘ite -, a respected descendant of the Prophet and great-grandson of the sixth Imām, emigrated to Yemen together with one of his sons and two descendants of the seventh Imam Mūsā al-Kāzim. He became known as Ahmad “al-Muhājir” (“the emigrant”) and is considered the ancestor of the Bā ‘Alawī sayyids of Hadhramaut.24 In the course of history, many of those sayyids “converted” to Sunnism, following the Shāfi‘ite “school” of Islamic law, and migrated as merchants to India and Southeast Asia. They are traditionally accredited with furthering the spread of Islam in the eastern archipelago through Sufism based on the thought of the celebrated medieval Sunnite intellectual and mystical thinker Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 C.E.).25

Taking the Shortcut: The Ismā‘īlī da‘wah

As Twelver Shi‘ism was abstaining from political activism, those Shi‘ites who were in search for somewhat quicker solutions to their plight, turned to other, more “attractive”, branches of the Shi‘ite movement, among them the Zaydis and the Ismā‘īlis.26 In particular the Fatimids, the main branch of the Ismā‘īlī movement, appealed to the Shi‘ite masses as they were able to establish a powerful state of their own in the Sunnite heartlands. Moreover, in contrast to the Twelvers, their Imām was not “hidden” but very much “present” in the person of the Fatimid Caliph-Imām, who demanded from his

26 For the to date most comprehensive treatment of the Ismā‘īlī political and spiritual movement see Farhad Daftary, The Isma'īlis: Their History and Doctrines (New York, 1992).
followers to promote actively the “rights of the Prophet’s family”. From their capital Cairo (al-Qāhirah, “the Victotious”), which was actually founded by them, the Fatimids controlled from the 10th century onwards Egypt, and, at times, Syria, Hijaz, Yemen, and large parts of Northern Africa. Cairo’s Al-Azhar university, too, was a creation of the Shi’ite Fatimids. The Fatimids became the most formidable foe of Sunnite Islam and of the political powers based on it, such as the Abbasid caliphate and the powerful Turkish Seljuk sultanate. In medieval Sunnite heresiographical literature, Ismā’īlis are usually referred to as Bātiniyyah, i.e. those who rely on an esoteric (bātini) interpretation of the Qur’an vis-à-vis the exoteric (zāhirī) quasi-literal approaches of Sunnite “state” religion. Ismā’īlī Shi’ism, especially of the Fatimid period, which lasted in Egypt until 1171 C.E., is accredited with important and innovative contributions in philosophy and science that have been branded by Sunnites as being in contrast with “revealed religion”. Today, the London-based Institute of Ismaili Studies tries to revive the inquisitive spirit of medieval Ismā’īlism by commissioning scholarly editions and English translations of the works by major Ismā’īlī scholars of the past. Several Western leading scholars of Islam are currently assisting in this task. To the mind of the present writer, the medieval Ismā’īlī scholarly tradition constitutes a very interesting approach of combining - within the framework of the Islamic tradition - faith with reason, the lack of the latter is today usually lamented - even by many Muslims themselves.

Aside from their significance in the fields of Islamic philosophy and science, the activities of the Ismā’īlīs are also of importance in the context of the spread of Shi’ism. This spreading of “the message” was known in Arabic as da’wah (literally “invitation [to Islam]”), originally a term also known to other Muslims, but usually associated in particular with the Ismā’īlī movement. From their power base in Cairo, the Fatimids sent their propagandists, known as dā‘īs, in particular to the Sunnite dominated areas of the Muslim world.

Some dā‘īs, however, where also active in converting non-Muslims in India to Islam. The Ismā’īlī da’wah in the Sunnite heartlands, in particular in Iraq and Iran, had been persecuted severely, and subsequently many Ismā’īlīs emigrated to India, in

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particular to Multan and Sindh, where there were able to establish states of their own, after having converting the local rulers. These *da‘wah* activities went often along with trade. Muslim merchants could reach Southeast Asia only through the sea routes leading via the Indian emporia. Although it has not yet been proven, it is highly probable that Ismā‘īlī missionaries, too, might have reached the Malay-Indonesian archipelago by that time, i.e. the 11th and 12th centuries. Under the Mongol onslaught of the 13th century, Ismā‘īlism in general began to decline and lost much of its vigor. Being now basically a spiritual movement”, Ismā‘īlism blended with Sufism (*tasawwuf*, i.e. Islamic mysticism). Here, we have referred to the Ismā‘īlīs mainly because of the significance of their intellectual and spiritual contribution (*vis-à-vis* Sunnite legalism) and the political activism that went along with it.

**Interpreting the Will of the Imām: Aspects of Twelver Shi’ism in the Period of the “Major Occultation”**

Twelver Shi’ite Islam took a different course. Due to the “absence” of the Twelfth Imām, the most learned members of the Shi’ite community were often seen by the faithful as his rightful representatives. This complex development cannot be addressed here in full, although it is highly significant, as particular rights and duties, such as those pertaining to *Khums* (“the Fifth”), Friday prayers’ sermon (*khutbah*) (or the appointment of deputies in this regard), and the declaration of *jihād*, were considered the sole prerogative of the Twelfth Imām. On the first glance, this emergence of a “learned class” of ulama is somewhat reminiscent to the developments in Sunnite Islam. However, in the case of the Shi’ites, this “learned class” had yet no access to public and official functions as no Twelver Shi’ite state with a religious administrative system existed. This situation did not much change during the period of the Buyid dynasty (mid 10th to mid 11th century), who had been Iranians and (according to our present knowledge) Twelver Shi’ites. The Buyids opted for coexistence with the existing Abbasid state, which they choose to control rather than to destroy. Nevertheless, the Buyids were not only patrons of science,
letters, and art, but also of Twelver Shi’ite learning, and several of the most authoritative figures of Shi’ite learning flourished under their rule. The Buyid era has been termed - somewhat misleadingly, perhaps - the “Renaissance of Islam”, as Islamic intellectual life in general experienced a certain “rebirth”. A very significant side-effect of the Buyid age - with certain long-term effects for the Twelver Shi’ite community at large - was the foundation of the Shi’ite study centre at Najaf in Iraq by the jurist Abu Ja’far Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Tūsī (d. 1068), known among Twelver Shi’ites as “Shaikh al-Tā’ifah” (the teacher of the [Shi’ite] community), which could well be called the “birth hour” of the Twelver Shi’ite educational system and hierarchical structure of its scholars. The institutionalization of Shi’ite days of commemoration, such as ‘Âshūrā’ which shall be discussed soon, too, falls into that period. As all political and religious power during the time of the “major occultation” could well be considered illegitimate, Twelver scholars did not see any difficulty in arranging themselves with Buyid temporal power. This quietist feature, which can also be observed throughout the rest of Twelver Shi’ite history, is remarkable and quite in contrast to what is usually thought of Shi’ism, especially in the light of events in post-1979 Iran that had led to the (in the light of what has just been said) rather abnormal circumstance of the establishment of clerical rule. Another very significant feature of this period that has a bearing on the Twelver Shi’ite intellectual tradition to this day is the flourishing and further development of Islamic speculative theology (kalām) and philosophy by Shi’ite scholars, pre-eminent among them being al-Sharīf al-Murtadā’ (d. 1041 C.E.). Buyid tolerance protected these scholars and intellectuals from the fanaticism of their opponents. The end of the Buyids under the onslaught of the Sunnite Seljuk Turks towards the middle of the 11th century interrupted this development temporarily. When considering the fact of prevailing quietism throughout Twelver Shi’ite history, it should be kept in mind that the Buyid era - aside

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30 For a comprehensive introduction to the Twelver Shi’ite scholars of the Buyid period see Wahid Akhtar, *The Early Imamiyyah Thinkers* (New Delhi, 1988).
31 See J. E. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam. The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age* (Leiden, 1992), a work, which, otherwise, draws a fascinating and comprehensive picture of the intellectual and cultural achievements during the Buyid period.
from the Mongol period – was the only point in time before the Safavid dynasty (r. 1501-1722) when Twelver Shi’ites had also obtained some degree of political influence.

In spite of the horrible destructions and loss of lives, the coming of the Mongols to Iran and Iraq and the destruction of the Abbasid universal Sunnite caliphate caused by them in 1258 brought relief to the Twelver Shi’ites as it did to other minorities, in particular the Christians. This was primarily so because the Mongols (known in the context of Iranian history as the “Ilkhan”), being non-Muslims at the time of their arrival, did not favour any of the religious groups to the other. Khwâjah Nasîr al-Dîn Tûsî (d. 1274), the famous Shi’ite philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, theologian, and physician (to name only a few of his fields of contribution), was perhaps the most eminent scholar of that period. The Twelver Shi’ite religious study centers, too, flourished under Ilkhanid rule, and al-Hasan b. Yusûf b. ‘Alî b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillî (d. 1326) contributed to the blending of philosophy and traditional religious scholarship into one coherent religious and intellectual system. One of the Ilkhanid rulers even converted to Twelver Shi’ite Islam, an act, however, that had no long-lasting positive effects on the Twelvers as his successors were Sunnite Muslims.

More relevantly, however, also within the context of the spread of Islam in South and Southeast India, is the following: The total exhaustion of the surviving population and the terrible general situation of the Muslim community in Iran and Iraq in the aftermath of the Mongol onslaught had brought about a weakening of Sunnite “orthodoxy” and legalism. One reason for this was the disappearance of Sunnite caliphal power that had stood behind it. A major result was the gradual blending of Sufism with folk Islam and popular movements, alongside with a strong reverence for the Twelver Imâms, without necessarily being “officially Shi’ite”. Almost all of the Suﬁ “orders” (Arab. plur. tariqât), for instance, referred to ‘Alî as the “pole” (qûb), first member in the chain of transmission of spiritual knowledge. In Iran and Iraq, Shi’ite tendencies had been always present in the past among the populace, tendencies that now could come somewhat stronger to the surface. Most of those “Persianized” Sufi orders spread and
“branches out” in particular to India from where they took the way further east, to what is now Malaysia and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{33}

With regard to Iran, this period of “blending” culminated finally in the establishment of the Safavid state (1501-1722), a period which marked the watershed in Twelver as well as Iranian history.\textsuperscript{34} The Safavids, originally a Twelver Shi’ite Sufi order turned militant that incorporated strong elements of folk Islam, were able to unify the Iranian lands by founding a monarchy. Under their rule, Twelver Shi’ite scholars were - for the first time in their history - encouraged to join the administrative fabric of the political order. As outlined by the administrative manual \textit{Dastūr al-Mulūk},\textsuperscript{35} Twelver ulama became now part of “the system”, for instance, as appointed religious judges.\textsuperscript{36} However, it is very important to state at this point that – contrary to their Sunnite “colleagues” - they were not entirely dependant from the state as they received also other income, such as from \textit{Khums} (the “Fifth”). \textit{Khums}, a kind of additional “income tax” that is to be paid by the faithful and in part received by the Twelver ulama, shall be referred to again further below. From the Safavid period onwards, it had been those additional funds that had enabled them to stay also politically independent and to raise their voice when they saw it fit.

The Safavid period was also the time of the great revival of Islamic philosophy, known as \textit{hikmah} (“wisdom”), perhaps the most significant contribution of the Safavid period and personified in high-calibre scholars such as Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631 C.E.) and above all Mullā Sadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1640 C.E.).\textsuperscript{37} This philosophical movement is usually referred to as “The School of Isfahan” or the “Ishrāqī (i.e. Illuminationist) School”. The

\textsuperscript{33} See J. S. Trimingham, \textit{The Sufi Orders in Islam} (Oxford, 1971), which is, to the mind of the present author, still the most comprehensive work on the subject.

\textsuperscript{34} It should be noted here that several “Persianized” Twelver Shi’ite states in southern India acknowledged the suzerainty of the Safavids. This is of some consequence with regard to the issue of the historical presence of Twelver Shi’ism in Southeast Asia, as outlined by me in my forthcoming book \textit{Shi’ite Islam in Southeast Asia}.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Dastūr al-Mulūk} (Regulations for Kings), one of only a few surviving relevant sources, has been translated and studied recently: see C. Marcinkowski, \textit{Mīrzā Rāfī’ā’s Dastūr al-Mulūk: A Manual of Later Safavid Administration. Annotated English Translation, Comments on the Offices and Services, and Facsimile of the Unique Persian Manuscript} (Kuala Lumpur, 2002).

\textsuperscript{36} However, another remarkable feature that cannot be elaborated here further is that the Safavid rulers established also a parallel quasi-secular legal administrative system which has been described in detail in the \textit{Dastūr al-Mulūk}. Apparently, this was done in order to keep the ulama in check.

\textsuperscript{37} For an introduction to his thought see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, \textit{Mulla Sadra and His Transcendent Philosophy} (Tehran, 1997, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.).
Illuminationist School believed that true wisdom was the product of both reason and intuition. One could arrive at a part of the truth through the philosophy of Aristotle and the Islamic rationalist philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037). This “partial truth”, however, was not sufficient. In order to arrive at “full truth”, one would have to achieve mystical vision or illumination through fasting, self-denial, and mystical practices. The “Ishrāqī” philosophers referred to this world of visions as the “realm of images”. These images would give the individual access to divine truth. It is remarkable that this intellectual movement came about in Iran at a time when legalism was predominating in large parts of the remainder of the Islamic world.

The Safavids, who claimed descent from the Prophet and who legitimated their political power religiously, had been able to rein in the ulama by integrating most of them into the administrative framework. However, the collapse of the Safavid state in 1722 and the ensuing vacuum of political power that saw foreign invaders as well as several regional dynasties and warlords fighting each other, left the Shi’ite ulama as the sole independent point of reference, at least in the eyes of wider strata of the population.

Also during the 18th century, theological issues among the Twelver Shi’ite learned community, dating back already to the early 17th century (if not to the formative period of Islam itself), came again to the surface, dividing them into two camps known as Aḵbārīs and Usūlīs. They shall be referred to here in brief only insofar as they have a certain bearing on the unsolved question of authority in Shi’ite Islam.

The Aḵbārīs (from Arab. khabar, plural. akhbār, “news”, “report”, as synonym to hadīth) on the one hand were of the view that knowledge on Islam and its stipulations is to be derived solely from the Traditions of the Prophet and the Imāms. They did not accept the other tools usually employed in Islamic jurisprudence and advocated by their fierce opponents, the Usūlīs, such as analogy etc. The Aḵbārīs had been initially influential, especially in the 17th century, but were finally overcome by the Usūlīs, their fierce opponents among the Twelver scholars. Ultimately, the akhbārī position went into the direction of assuming the necessity of a kind of “inspiration” by the hidden Twelfth Imām through a living representative known as “Gate” (bāb) when interpreting the Qur’an and the Traditions. The Shaykhīs, an offshoot of the Aḵbārīs, went a step further that culminated finally in the Bābī and Bahā’ī movements that have actually left Islam.
The *Usūlīs* (usūl being the Arab. plural. of *asl*, “root”, “origin”) were to become the mainstream factor of Twelver jurisprudence from the late 18th century onwards and have since then dominated Shi’ite legal as well as political thought. Their rise to prominence is in fact one of the results of the collapse of Safavid power in the early 18th century. During Iran’s Qājār period (1781-1925), an era marked by several episodes foreign political intervention and lost wars, *usūlī* ulama were able to challenge royal power at a variety of occasions, sometimes from within Iran, sometimes from neighboring Iraq. The emergence of the idea of *taqlīd* (here solely in the context of “emulation” of a living leading legal Shi’ite scholar and to be discussed shortly) goes back to the 19th century and the Qājār period. Moreover, the final steps toward the establishment of a kind of hierarchy with appellations such as “Ayatollah” (“Âyat Allāh”, literally “Sign of God”), too, were taken during that period.

Unfortunately, the limitations set by the present study do not allow us to elaborate here further on the role played by Twelver ulama in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, known as *Mashrūṭiyat* in Persian, and on the interchanges that took place in the course of it between the Shi’ite clerics of Iraq and Iran. Here, it suffices perhaps to state that the Constitutional Revolution was an attempt to preserve the religious and cultural framework of the country by adopting a parliamentary system with a constitutional monarchy. Shi’ite ulama in and outside the country took sides either in favour or against the abolishment of absolutistic Qājār rule. The failure of the Constitutional Revolution, a project, which could well have led to the birth of some sort of “indigenous Islamic form of democracy” that could be of interest to today’s discourse on political Islam, led ultimately to the end of the Qājār regime and the establishment of the Pahlavī monarchy which lasted until 1979.

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Under the Pahlavī regime (as well as in neighbouring Iraq, for that matter), Shi’ite clerics became from the early 1930s onwards increasingly marginalized from society, due to various reforms introduced by the new regime, such as somewhat more progressive legislation pertaining to women’s rights and the secularization of large sectors of society. Especially after World War II, however, some of those measures, such as the cult intending to glorify pre-Islamic Iran introduced by the last Pahlavī ruler from the 1960s onwards, were increasingly perceived as alien by wider strata of the Iranian population. Economic difficulties during the 1970s that resulted in a high rate of unemployment as well as the often brutal dealing of the regime with its political opposition contributed to unrest that ultimately led to its fall in the course of the revolution of 1979.41

Ayatollah Khomeini’s (Khumaynī) idea of a supposed leading, decisive political role for Twelver Shi’ite ulama, as expounded by him in a series of lectures subsequently published under the title “On the Government of the Islamic Jurisprudent” (Persian: Velāyat-e faqīh),42 is usually seen as the quasi “inspiration” of the revolution. Contrary, however, to what is commonly thought, in particular in the West, one should note that the revolution was rather brought about by a variety of political forces that were as distinct from each other as the Marxist Tūdeh Party or the clerical ultras around Khomeini, and by dissidents as different in their political outlook and social analysis as Ayatollah Murtadā Mutahharī (1920-79)43 and ‘Alī Sharī‘atī (1933-77).44 Moreover, the majority of the leading Ayatollahs stayed either silent or even opposed Khomeini’s concept of Velāyat-e faqīh, preferring a rather quietist approach. One of them was the Najaf-based

41 For an interpretation of those events from the point of view of a convert to Twelver Shi’ism who is at the same time a professor of Islamic Studies at Berkeley see Hamid Algar, Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Four Lectures) (Oneonta NY, 2001, rev. and expanded ed.).
“Grand Ayatollah” Sayyid Abū ’l-Qāsim al-Khū’ī (1899-1992), who at one point was considered the premiere leader of the Twelver Shi’ites across the world. ⁴⁵

It is hoped that the above discussion has sufficiently demonstrated that there does not exist something such as an “authoritative, coherent, or dominating view” among Twelver Shi’ites with regard to how to arrange the political affairs of the community during the time of the Twelfth Imām’s “major occultation”. In particular with regard to policy-making, this is important to understand in order to arrive at an appropriate and fact-oriented picture of current Twelver Shi’ite politically thought, a picture that is still all too often dominated by fears and anxieties caused by sensational reports on events such as the current “nuclear crisis”. Although Twelver Shi’ite Islam cannot not necessarily be described in terms of a kind of “peace movement reminiscent” to the “Flower Power” era of the 1960s, it has been, and still is, to the mind of the present writer, essentially quietist in nature. This is quite contrary to views that tend to overestimate a political role that Shi’ite clerics are supposed to play. In a remarkably article entitled “Fear not the Shias”, Stephen Schwartz, director of the Islam and Democracy Program at the Washington-based non-partisan think-tank Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, stated that,

[u]nlike the Saudi Wahhabis, Shia Muslims have never sought to impose their dispensation on the whole of the Islamic world community; nor have they attempted to impose theological conformity within their own ranks. Their tradition recognizes the rights of minorities, because they have always been a minority, and esteems differences in opinion, because their very existence erises from controversy and debate. In Iran, Shia Islam took an anti-Western direction that had more to do with the history of the Iranians and their relations with Britain and the United States than with their understanding of Islam. Elsewhere in the Islamic world – in places like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Albanian lands – Shias are best known for their commitment to education, enlightenment, the liberation of

⁴⁵ Marcinkowski, Religion and Politics in Iraq, pp. 89-92.
women, social justice, progress and, most important, independence of thought, or ijtihad.\(^{46}\)

We shall leave it with this for the time being and turn our attention now to some of the \textit{practical} issues of Twelver Shi’ite Islam, as distinguishing it from Sunnism. We will return to issues pertaining to political Shi’ism in the course of the third chapter, when dealing with the context of Southeast Asia.

\textbf{Aspects of Twelver Shi’ite Social Life and Religious Practice}

Twelver Shi’ites differ not significantly with regard to the tenets and prescriptions that are part of the Sunnite “five pillars of Islam”, such as daily ritual prayer and fasting. However, they do categorize them in the following manner, dividing them into \textit{Usūl al-Dīn}, “Roots of Religion” or matters of belief, and \textit{Furū al-Dīn}, “Branches of Religion” or “legal” matters:\(^{47}\)

\textit{Usūl al-Dīn}, “Roots of Religion”:

1. \textit{Tawhīd} (Oneness): The Oneness of God
2. ‘\textit{Adl} (Justice): The Justice of God. According to Twelver thought, God is bound by His own promise of justice. This concept is not shared by mainstream Ash’arite Sunnism as they see in it a contradiction to His omnipotence. The Mu’tazilites, however, a today almost extinct line of Sunnite theological thought, agree with it.


\(^{47}\) Essentially from the Mongol period onwards, especially since Hasan b. Yusūf b. ‘Alī b. al-Mutahhar al-Hillī’s (d. 1326) well-known treatise \textit{Al-Bāb al-hādī ‘ashar}, the principles of Twelver Shi’ite theology appear to have been arranged in the above way. I have based this on several rather apologetic but nevertheless authoritative works of more recent date which are readily available in English and (according to my own observations) also very popular among “converts” to Shi’ism, especially in Southeast Asia: Muhammad Ridā Muzaffar, \textit{The Faith of Shi’a Islam} (Dubai, n.d., reprint) [title of the Arab. original: \textit{Aqā’id al- al-imāniyyah}]; Ja’far Sobhani, \textit{Doctrines of Shi’i Islam. A Compendium of Imami Believes and Practices} (London and New York, 2002); Muhammad Husayn Āl Kāshīf al-Ghitā, \textit{The Origins of Shi’ite Islam and its Principles} (Qumm, 1982, reprint) [original title in Arabic: \textit{Asl al-shī‘ah wa usūluhā}].
(3) **Nubuwwah** (Prophethood): The belief in the prophethood of Muhammad and all the other prophets mentioned in the Qur’an. This includes also the belief in their infallibility (‘ismah), which the Sunnites do not accept.

(4) **Imāmah** (political and spiritual leadership): God has appointed specific leaders to lead and guide mankind — a prophet appoints a custodian of the religion before his death. Imāms do not receive Revelation but do share the prophetic attribute of infallibility.

(5) **Ma’ād** (Belief in the Afterlife, bodily Resurrection and the Day of Judgment).

**Furū’ al-Dīn**, “Branches of Religion”:

1. **Salāt** (Prayer), obligatory prayers five times a day, namāz in Persian.
2. **Sawm** (fasting), fasting during the month of Ramadān.
3. **Hajj** (Pilgrimage), performing the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during lifetime.
4. **Zakāt** (Poor-rate), paying the poor-tax.
5. **Khums** (the “Fifth”), paying another tax. Khums is of special significance for securing the financial independence of Twelver clerics thus enabling them to take a more active stand in public life and politics than their Sunnite colleagues, who are today mostly state-employees.
6. **Jihād** (literally “Struggle”), struggling “for the sake of God”. Traditionally, in Shi’ite as well as Sunnite pertinent literature, this is usually presented as referring to the “inner struggle” or “greater jihād” (al-jihād al-akbar) against the evil within one's soul in every aspect of life. The “lesser jihād” (al-jihād al-asghar) is the one usually in Western literature referred as “Holy War”.
7. **Al-Amr bi’-l-Ma’rūf**, literally “commanding [and enforcing] what is good”, thus also putting into action the stipulations of Islamic law.
8. **Al-Nahī ‘an il-Munkar**, literally “forbidding what is evil”, connected with the previous point.
9. **Tawallā**, loving the family of the Prophet (Ahl al-Bayt) and their followers, i.e. the Shi’ites.
10. **Tabarrā**, dissociating oneself from the enemies of Ahl al-Bayt and the Shi’ites.
Remembering Karbalā’: Taʿziyyah

Aside from certain Shi’ite key issues, such as Imāmah and Khums, for instance, most of the above-mentioned items are agreed upon by Sunnites and Shi’ites. However, there are also several aspects of “devotional practice” that continue to cause ruptures between Sunnites and Shi’ites up to the present day. Some of them shall be referred to in the following as they have also a bearing on Shi’ite social life in the Southeast Asian context. Others, such as ziyārah or the visiting of shrines and tombs of the Imāms and their descendants, shall be disregarded here as they have no direct bearing on the daily life of Shi’ites in the Southeast Asian context.

One of them is the Shi’ite performance of Taʿziyyah. The tragic death of al-Husayn – after all the grandson of the Prophet - and his relatives and companions in the battle of Karbalā in 680 C.E. on the tenth day (‘Âshūrā) of the Islamic lunar month of Muharram is until today commemorated every year throughout the Shi’ite world. The particular ceremonies that take place during that time in countries and regions with a significant Twelver Shi’ite population are known as Taʿziyyah (“consolation”). The term taʿziyyah is usually, somewhat misleadingly, translated into English as “Passion Play”, in reminiscence to medieval European Christian liturgical drama and mystery plays. Taʿziyyah, however, involves often processions with theatrical performances and rituals of self-mortification during which the male participants beat their chests and backs with chains. In some parts of the Indian subcontinent men cut also their forehead with a sword, a practice that had been banned by leading Shi’ite scholars of Iraq and Iran.49 During those days of mourning, Shi’ite preachers, in Persian called rawza-khwāns, retell the story of al-Husayn and his friends in lamenting voice, moving the listeners often to tears. Sometimes, however, they use the occasion also to “remind” the audience to “remember” the “great injustice” (Arab. and Pers. zulm) suffered in history (and present) by the Shi’ites at the hands of “tyrants” – Sunnite, Shi’ite, as well as non-Muslim ones. As a

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48 It should be noted here in passing, that the paying of respect to the tombs of saintly persons is also a feature of mainstream Sunnism.
matter of fact, *Ta’ziyyah* gatherings, which are often attended by crowds of several ten-thousands, had in the past often been banned for “security concerns”, especially during the years of the Saddam dictatorship in Iraq and also during the rule of the last Shah of Iran. It is noteworthy that some of the major demonstrations against the Shah that led finally to the Iranian revolution and to his overthrow had often taken part during those Muharram processions. The therefrom resulting violent clashes with the army and police left hundreds dead, thus fuelling only further the zealous spirit of the attending crowd, as they could now identify even “better” with the tragic events of the past. *Ta’ziyyah* in the style just outlined goes perhaps back to the 10th century C.E., when its public celebration (along with that of other particularly Shi’ite significance and flavour) was sanctioned for the first time by the Iranian Buyid dynasty, who themselves where most probably Twelver Shi’ites.\(^{50}\) Although Sunnites, too, use to condemn the killing of al-Husayn they usually consider the Shi’ite Muharram ceremonies as “exaggeration”. Especially in Pakistan, violent clashes between Shi’ites and Sunnites use to occur on a regular basis especially during the Shi’ite mourning ceremonies. Throughout the Shi’ite world, a particular local flavour is added to those ceremonies when the Shi’ite elegies are chanted in the local language. As noticed by the present writer at several occasions, Shi’ite Muslims in Malaysia, for instance, have “created” their own corpus of elegies in the Malay language.\(^{51}\) Due to the, for Shi’ites in particular, somewhat less encouraging situation in that country, Muharram ceremonies, attended also by a yearly increasing number of Malay Muslims, use to be performed only on the exterritorial compound of the Iranian embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

### “Temporary Marriage” (*mut‘ah*)

Another point of heated controversy between Shi’ites and Sunnites is the issue of “temporary marriage” (*nikāh mut‘ah*) and its permissibility, which the former accept and the latter reject. Recently, this issue had also caused some discussion in Southeast Asia, in particular in Malaysia. The issue of *mut‘ah* (as it is usually simply referred to) is

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\(^{50}\) See C. Marcinkowski, “The Buyid Domination as the Historical Background for the Flourishing of Muslim Scholarship During the 4th/10th Centuries,” *Iqbal Review* 45, no. 4 (October 2004), pp. 83-99.

\(^{51}\) We shall return to the situation in Malaysia in the course of the third chapter.
highly controversial in the Islamic world. Twelver Shi’ites do consider it something already referred to in the Qur’an and thus beneficial in daily life, whereas Sunnites tend to see in it nothing more than extramarital sex and fornication. Apparently in accordance with the historical facts, Shi’ites usually state that mut’ah was practiced at the time of the Prophet, that it was thus endorsed by him, and that it was only abolished (along with other practices of the time of the Prophet) by the second caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khattāb (r. 634-44 C.E.). Both, Shi’ite and Sunnite scholars, seem to agree that the Prophet tolerated it and that his Companions did in fact practice it, which is quite remarkable in the light of the harsh criticism from the part of the Sunnites today. Sunnite scholars of the past, such as al-Tabarī, Ibn Kathīr and Imam Muslim, were of the view that Qur’an 4:24 refers to “temporal marriage”. It was practised during the lifetime of the Prophet who is said to have “encouraged” his Companions, some of whom practiced mut’ah even during the rules of both Abū Bakr (r. 623-34) and ‘Umar, the first and second caliphs, respectively. The further course of the debate in history has been recorded in some detail by Gribtez in his study and shall thus not concern us here further. In the following, a mere outline of major characteristics of its practice shall be given.

According to all legal “schools” of Islamic law, mut’ah is a fixed-time marriage which with a preset duration. After the expiry of this period, the marriage is automatically dissolved. In some aspects, mut’ah is similar to “permanent marriage” (nikāh), with the major difference that a date of expiration for the marriage is already stated in the marriage contract. The duration is decided by the couple involved. There are no restrictions about minimum duration. Mut’ah can also be transformed into a “permanent marriage” if the couple wishes to do so. Once married, the couple is

52 According to a highly authoritative source, Imam Muslim (Tradition no. 3432), Qur’an 4:24 was revealed on the occasion of the battle of Hunayn in the year 9 AH/631 C.E., thus only one year before the death of the Prophet. In Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali’s translation, 4:24 runs as follows: “Also (prohibited are) women already married, except those whom your right hands possess: thus has Allah ordained (prohibitions) against you: except for these, all others are lawful, provided you seek them in marriage) with gifts from your property – desiring chastity, not lust. Seeing that you derive benefit from them, give them their dowers (at least) as prescribed; but if, after a dower is prescribed, you agree mutually (to vary it), there is no blame on you, and Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise” (emphasis mine).

53 According to Imam Muslim, Tradition no. 3248.

54 See A. Gribtez, Strange Bedfellows. Mut’at Al-Nisa’ and Mut’at Al-Hajj: A Study Based on Sunni and Shi’i Sources of Tafsir, Hadith and Fiqh (Berlin, 1994).

55 The following description of the Twelver Shi’ite practice of “temporary marriage” is based on Al-Sayyid al-Imām Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Khū’ī (tr. M. Faizal Haq), Articles of Islamic Faith (al-Fatawa) (Accra, 1982) [title of the Arabic original: Tawdhih al-masā’il].
considered husband and wife, just as in the case of a “permanent marriage”. However, in
contrast to a “permanent marriage”, mut’ah does not need a formal divorce (talāq) upon
expiry of the contract. According to Shi’ite law, however, it is recommended (mustahab)
to either extend the marriage or to transform it into a permanent one. If the woman wants
to marry another man after the expiry of the mut’ah she can do so without observing the
usual ‘iddah (menstrual period after a divorce, during which a woman may not marry
another man).

There are other stipulations more with regard to mut’ah that have aroused the
anger of Sunnites. According to Twelver Shi’ite law, the husband may end the mut’ah
before the contract expires. If he does so and they have had sexual intercourse, he must
pay her the full dowry (mahr). In case they have not had intercourse, he must give her
half that amount, although the recommended precaution is that he should give her the full
mahr. Other significant aspects involving a “temporary marriage” are that (1) the couple
does not inherit from each other, as the marriage is not considered “permanent” and
subsequently man and women are really “united”; (2) the husband is considered
financially responsible for any offspring from this type of marriage; (3) the relations
between man and woman are not considered to lead to a family life (as the marriage is
not a permanent one); thus, the woman is allowed to work and spend her money as she
chooses and she does not need to provide for a family; as a result, the husband does not
need not to take care of his wife’s expenses; (4) the wife may leave her house against her
husband’s will.

Another highly significant aspect of mut’ah, especially with regard to its practice
in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious context such as Southeast Asia, is that only in this
particular form of marriage Twelver Shi’ite jurisprudence\(^56\) (fiqh) allows Muslim men to
marry women from followers of other monotheistic religions with “revealed” scriptures
(Ahl al-Kitāb, “People of the Book”). By convention, this is usually meant to refer to
Christians and Jews, although during certain periods of Islamic history, Zoroastrians, and

\(^{56}\) For an introduction to Twelver Shi’ite fiqh see Muhammad Bāqir al-Sadr, Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence: According to Shi’i Law (London, 2005) [title of the original Arabic: Duras fi ‘ilm al-usūl
(Discourses on the Science of the Principles of Jurisprudence)]. For the Sunnite perspective see
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge, 2005, 3rd ed.), and Wael
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni usul al-fiqh (Cambridge, 1999, new
ed.).
even Hindus and Buddhists, seem to have been included in this category. Twelver Shi’ism does not provide for “permanent marriage” with “People of the Book”, apparently based on Qur’an 2:221. Thus, for a Twelver Shi’ite Muslim, a “marriage-like” relationship with a woman from that “category” would only be possible under the rules and stipulations of mut’ah. In contrast to this, Sunnite Islam (in particular the Hanafite “school” of law, which is usually considered the most liberal one) does allow “permanent marriage” with Ahl al-Kitāb, based on Qur’an 5:5.

At any rate, as a kind of further “stimulator” for the practicing of mut’ah serves the circumstance that Twelver Shi’ite jurisprudence does not limit the number of wives that a man is allowed to marry in “temporary marriage” to the maximum of four (as it does, with the rest of the Muslims, in the case of “permanent marriage”). According to the Shi’ite view, this is mainly because the husband is not required to support his wife. Thus, the marriage is not considered permanent and the conditions for the restriction of having no more than four wives do not apply. On the other hand, a woman who is still a virgin (apparently, regardless of her age) does still need the consent of a “legal guardian” (wali) if she wishes to enter into mut’ah. Apparently, this is mainly in order to protect her “inexperience”. Even though there are no requirements in Shi’ite jurisprudence for having witnesses or a written contract when entering a marriage, most people prefer to resort to both. In practice, however, this contract tends to be completed in the presence of a Shi’ite cleric.

In particular among Malaysian “converts” to Twelver Shi’ism (former Sunnites), the issue of mut’ah appears to have caused special interest and it would be sheer impossible to list the large number of websites reflecting the online queries and discussions that are current among them regarding this topic. Obviously, there are several “advantages” that contribute to the continued popularity of mut’ah, especially among

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57 “Do not marry unbelieving women (idolaters) until they believe: a slave woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she allures you. Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers until they believe: a man slave [sic!] who believes is better than an unbeliever, even though he allures you. Unbelievers (but) beckon you to the Fire. But Allah beckons by His Grace to the Garden (of Bliss) and forgiveness, and makes His Signs clear to mankind: that they may celebrate His praise” (emphasis mine).

58 “This day are (all) things good and pure made lawful unto you. The food of the People of the Book is lawful unto you and yours is lawful unto them. (Lawful unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are believers, but chaste women among the People of the Book, revealed before your time - when you give them their due dowers, and desire chastity, not lewdness. If anyone rejects faith, fruitless is his work, and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good)” (emphasis mine).
young Shi‘ites: Some people who had experienced the ups and downs of a “permanent marriage” and who have gone through a divorce might decide to go for mut‘ah instead. Moreover, some might argue that - more in line with contemporary lifestyles - mut‘ah enables younger partners “to get to know each other better” before entering into a long-term commitment. In practice, however, such an arrangement tends to lead often into a “permanent marriage”, as a female virgin would require her “legal guardian’s” consent to marry, which is usually granted only if the target of this arrangement is a “permanent marriage”. Parents might hardly give their consent to a mut‘ah that is based on pure pleasure. Another reason to opt for mut‘ah, even as a long-term, quasi “permanent”, solution, is that it gives women in particular more personal freedom than a “permanent marriage” does, as already mentioned earlier. Others might choose mut‘ah with somebody they do not intend to enter in anykind of sexual or married relationship with, but with whom they have to spend a lot of time, for instance, as colleagues when sharing alone the same office. Lastly, mut‘ah might also be used (or misused, depending on the perspective) solely for the purpose of obtaining sexual pleasure. It goes without saying that this point has been used most frequently by Sunnites in their rejection of the whole institution of “temporary marriage”.

“Prudent Dissimulation” (taqiyyah)

Other issues between Sunnites and Shi‘ites that are, at times, also a point of contention in particular among Southeast Asian Muslims are the practices of taqiyyah (dissimulation of one’s actual beliefs in times of danger) and taqlīd (“imitation”, “emulation”). Usually, they are associated solely with the Shi‘ites by their opponents. However, similar as in the case with the rules pertaining to the “modest dressing” of women, widely known as hijāb, Taqiyyah, too, does not constitute a part of either Usūl al-Dīn or Furū‘ al-Dīn which have been discussed earlier. Nevertheless, when confronted with this issue, Shi‘ites usually refer to the following two passages of the Qur‘an which seem to sanction it:

Anyone who, after accepting faith in Allah, utters Unbelief – except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in Faith - but such as open their
breast to Unbelief – on them is Wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a
dreadful Penalty (16:106);
Let not the believers take for trustees [or: confidants; Arab. awliyā’;
‘Abdollāḥ Yūsuf ‘Alī has “friends or helpers”] Unbelievers rather than
Believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from Allah: except
by way of precaution [Arab. tattaqū, from the same root as taqiyyah], that
you may guard yourselves from them [Arab. tuqātan, again from the same
root as taqiyyah]. But Allah cautions you (to remember) Himself; for the
final goal is to Allah (3:28; emphasis mine).

Shi’ites usually tend to see in these two verses the key message that they should
not take non-believers as “trustees” (awliyā’) or “condidantes” against fellow (in
particular Shi’ite) Muslims. The stronger translation “trustees” favoured here by me –
instead of ‘Abdollāḥ Yūsuf ‘Alī’s erroneous and somewhat weaker interpretation “friends
or helpers”, which is usually also “read into” the Qur’anic text by the wider Muslim
public – is, to the mind of the present writer, entirely legitimate. This is because the
equivalent to “friends” in Arabic would be asdiqā’. Friendship with non-Muslims, in
turn, is completely acceptable and even encouraged in Islam. Moreover, Shi’ites – in the
course of history often a minority severely persecuted by Sunnite “state” Islam - see in
taqiyyah a means of self-preservation. Without the intention of appearing somewhat too
“apologetic” here on behalf of the tenets of Twelver Shi’ism, one could well argue that –
far from being an act of hypocrisy – the practicing of “dissimulation” would rather be
recommended by common sense when facing deadly danger. Sunnites, in turn, usually do
not accept taqiyyah and blame Shi’ites for practicing it. It might be retorted, that history,
too, has proven that the practicing of taqiyyah had been nothing that strange to Sunnite
Muslims themselves, as they, too, might have practiced it when being presented by the
Spanish Inquisition of 15th-century Spain with the prospect of being burnt at the stake.

Some of the classical views on taqiyyah that were held by early leading Shi’ite
scholars of the Buyid period have been studied by Kohlberg.59 Here, it shall suffice to

refer to only two of those scholars: The first one, Al-Kulaynī (d. between 939 and 941 C.E.),\(^{60}\) was the compiler of *al-Kāfī* (“The Sufficient”), the most famous one of the four canonical collections of Twelver *Hadīth*. Until today, Twelvers ascribe to Al-Kulaynī a high degree of authenticity as he was a contemporary of the events leading to the “major occultation” of the Twelfth Imām which is supposed to have taken place in the same year of his death. In order to make his point, al-Kulaynī usually preferred to select Traditions rather than giving his own opinion, but this selecting is often telling with regard to the views that he himself might have held with regard to the practicing of *taqiyyah*. He quotes Muhammad al-Bāqir, the fifth Imām as stating that “the practicing of *taqiyyah* is *always* necessary in a desperate situation. The person intending to practice *taqiyyah* knows best how to do that”,\(^{61}\) and several other Traditions to that effect, thus putting the final decision into the responsibility of the individual believer. At another occasion, he quotes a Tradition even to the effect of a steadily increasing significance of *taqiyyah*, as injustice and oppression, too, are thought to increase continuously with the progress of time.\(^{62}\)

The other early scholar to be referred here is Ibn Bābawayh, known as “al-Shaykh al-Sadūq” (d. 991 C.E.),\(^{63}\) one the most authoritative Twelver Shi’ite scholars of the late 10th century C.E. He was the compiler of another canonical collection of Traditions and the author of a well-known creed. In this creed he states that the practicing of *taqiyyah* is obligatory (*wājib*) at all times and that “one who forsakes it is in the same position as he who forsakes prayer”,\(^{64}\) that is, he would commit a grave sin. According to this scholar, the practicing of *taqiyyah* remains in fact an absolute necessity until the awaited return of the hidden twelfth Imām – the Mahdī.\(^{65}\)

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\(^{60}\) For an introduction to Kulaynī and his work see C. Marcinkowski, “Al-Kulayni and His Early Twelver Shi’ite *Hadith*-Compendium *Al-Kāfī*. Selected Aspects of the Part *Al-Usūl-min al-Kāfī*,” *Islamic Culture* 74, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 89-126.


\(^{65}\) Ibid, pp. 97-98.
Tenor of all his traditions seems to be that the practicing of *taqiyyah* should finally be based on common sense and not on some “hidden agenda”, as Shi’ites had been (and are still, as the most recent gruesome experiences in Iraq and Pakistan show) the prime target of persecution.

Shi’ite scholars of more recent times have held similar views. In the following, three of them shall be referred to in brief. All three of them seem to agree that what we call today “common sense” should prevail and that it is up to the individual believer to decide on which particular action to take.

Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Āl Kāshif al-Ghitā (1877-1954) was one of the most eminent Iraqi Shi’ite scholars of the first half of the 20th century and played also a considerable part in Iraqi politics during that period. In his until now among Shi’ites popular work *Asl al-shī’ah wa usūluhā*, also published in English under title *The Origins of Shi’ite Islam and its Principles*, Āl Kāshif al-Ghitā tries to defend Twelver Shi’ite practices that had led to controversies with the Sunnites, among them being *Taqqiyyah*. His view of the issue appears to be characterized by a certain degree of moderation, focusing on rather practical matters. Āl Kāshif al-Ghitā appears not to give preference to one particular option in political discourse, that is to say, neither to *taqiyyah* or quietism, nor to open resistance to a political system conceived as oppressive or unjust by Shi’ites. Rather, his more realistic and flexible approach makes the individual decision dependent on the prevailing circumstances and opportunities.

Shaykh Muhammad Ridā al-Muzaffār, too, has written on the issue of *taqiyyah* in his authoritative creed *Aqā’id al-imāmiyyah* (literally “Beliefs of the Imamites”, i.e. the Twelvers). Shaykh Muzaffar was one of the most influential Iraqi Shi’ite scholars of the 20th century. With regard to the question whether Shi’ites should participate in a non-Shi’ite, or even non-Muslim government, Muzaffar seems to be of the view that such a participation – perhaps even as cabinet ministers - would principally be permissible, or

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69 On his biography see Marcinkowski, *Religion and Politics in Iraq*, p. 75.
even necessary, in order to benefit the Shi’ite community as a whole and to avert harm from it.\footnote{Muzaffar, \textit{The Faith of Shi’ite Islam}, pp. 108-09; Marcinkowski, \textit{Religion and Politics in Iraq}, p. 77.}

The last Shi’ite scholar to be referred to here in the context of the issue of \textit{taqiyyah} is the Iranian Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’\text{"}{
\text{"}i (1903-81), a traditional cleric but also one of the foremost 20\textsuperscript{th}-century Shi’ite philosophers and intellectual figures.\footnote{On his biography see Marcinkowski, \textit{Religion and Politics in Iraq}, pp. 78-79.} Tabataba’\text{"}{
\text{"}i, among Shi’ites usually simply referred to as “‘Allamah”, “The Learned”, is particularly remembered for his monumental innovative Arabic Qur’an commentary (\textit{tafsir}) \textit{Al-M\text{"}{
\text{"}z\text{"}{
\text{"}an} (“The Balance”). His writings appear to be particularly popular among “converts”.\footnote{See, for instance, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’\text{"}{
\text{"}i (tr. W. C. Chittick), \textit{A Shi’ite Anthology} (Qumm, n.d., reprint).} He is equally popular among advocates as well as opponents of the current political system in Iran. Cooperation between Tabataba’\text{"}{
\text{"}i and Sayyid Husayn Nasr (now a well-known Professor of Islamic philosophy in Washington DC) in the 1960s led to the publication of a book in Persian, entitled \textit{Shi’ah dar Isl\text{"}{
\text{"}am} (Shi’ism in Islam), translated into English and published subsequently by Nasr.\footnote{Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’\text{"}{
\text{"}i (tr. Sawayed Hossein Nasr), \textit{Shi’\text{"}{
\text{"}a} (Albany NY, 1977, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.).} Both events had been witnessed by Tabataba’\text{"}{
\text{"}i, who died in 1981.}

\textbf{“Emulation” (\textit{taqlid})}

The last issue, here only referred to in brief, is the Twelver Shi’ite practice of \textit{taqlid}, another point of heated debate between Sunnites and Shi’ites. \textit{Taqlid}, in the present context, refers to the practice of following the earlier leaders of a community, as opposed to the \textit{taqiyyah} practice of dissimulation, which is considered a necessity in situations involving concrete dangers to honour, life, property, family, and source of income, especially when facing a “hopeless situation,” such as internal political oppression by a an all-powerful regime (as that of the last Shah), or an invasion from outside (such as the 1980-88 war between Iraq and Iran).\footnote{Ibid., pp. 223-24, and 224-25.}
context, is to be understood in the sense of “following the legal rulings of a Shi’ite Muslim jurist” and not in that of “blind following”, as which it is often translated in Sunnite and Western, literature on Shi’ite Islam.

In presently prevailing Twelver Shi’ite thought, Shi’ites who have not reached the level of *ijtihād* or “independent reasoning with regard to legal matters” (and who are thus not mujtahids themselves) are required to follow the rulings of a leading jurist, a mujtahid. In Shi’ite Islam, mujtahids are usually also referred to as “Ayatollahs” (lit. “Signs of God”). The most senior ones among them are called *marja’,* which is a singular in Arabic, the plural being *marāji’*. Commonly, those “senior ayatollahs” are also referred to as *marja’ taqlīd,* which literally means “Source (or “Reference”) of Emulation”. In English-language, journalism-style, writing they are usually called “grand ayatollahs”. In Twelver Shi’ite Islam, *marāji’* are in practice the third highest authority on religion and law, right after the Prophet and the Imāms. *Taqlīd,* “following”, has to be done by the ordinary faithful with regard to Furūʿ al-Dīn, i.e. the “Branches of Religion” or “legal” matters, discussed earlier. However, “following” is not permissible with regard to Usūl al-Dīn, the “Roots of Religion” or matters of belief, such as the Oneness of God, which ought to be based on one’s individual conviction and reasoning. One of the most senior *marja’ taqlīd* of today is Sayyid ‘Alī Sīstānī, who is residing in Najaf, Iraq, but who was born around 1930 in Mashhad, Iran.

*Marāji’* produce usually a “manual of reference” in Arabic for the believers, often simply referred to as Risālah (“Treatise”). The arrangement of topics (from ritual purity until matters of burial and inheritance) has remained virtually unchanged in the course of the last 100 years. The “manuals” are usually translated into several other languages, such as Persian, Urdu, and English. Available are also several translations into Indonesian of similar works by leading Shi’ite clerics, such as by Ayatollah ‘Alī

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Khāminah’ī (Khamenei), Iran’s “Supreme Leader”. They are thus also accessible to Malay-speaking Muslims.

Concluding Remarks

In the view of the present contributor, it needs to be distinguished between what should be referred to as “Intellectual Shi’ism” as a tradition of classical Muslim thought with a long historical footing in the region on the one hand, and “Political Shi’ism” following the events that have taken place in Iran since 1979, on the other. The latter trend appears to be noticeable in the Middle East only since the early 1980s. At the first glance (and perhaps based on rather short-range considerations), contemporary policy-makers might be more interested in “Political Shi’ism” rather than its intellectual tradition. However, in order to avoid rashness in their judgment of current events, they should also be aware of the intellectual facet within this religious tradition, a facet which could prove a valuable asset in the future. Moreover, such an approach could contribute to a strengthening of the forces of moderation within Islam and the fostering of a climate of dialogue. Lastly, not the demonization of “The Other”, but rather the building of bridges of cooperation and understanding where possible, is essential.

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<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Rewriting Indonesian History The Future in Indonesia’s Past</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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