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Title	Globalization : implications of and for the modern / post-modern navies of the Asia Pacific
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Citation	
Date	2007
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4396
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No. 140

**Globalization: Implications of and
for the Modern / Post-modern
Navies of the Asia Pacific**

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Singapore

15 October 2007

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ABSTRACT

Navies both reflect and help determine the nature of the societies in which they operate. This is as true at the international level as it is at the domestic and national levels. It is the contention of this paper that the navies of the Asia Pacific, as elsewhere, are developing in ways which reflect competing attitudes towards, and involvement in, the process of globalization. In brief two models or paradigms of naval development seem to be emerging. The first is the traditional model of naval roles and capabilities in which naval developments reflect national concerns and a nation-state-centred view of international society, that will sometimes tend to be associated with a certain wariness about globalization. The second paradigm, however, in part derives from more positive attitudes towards globalization. In this non-traditional approach, there is relatively more focus on the international system, and the nation's place within that system. Inevitably, this feeds through to rather different conceptions of the roles and required capabilities of naval forces. For want of anything better, this paper will label these traditional and the non-traditional paradigms "modern" and "post-modern" respectively. In crude terms, the modern paradigm of naval development may be said to envisage competition between navies, while the post-modern is more cooperative and collaborative in nature, perhaps aimed against some common adversary at sea or on land.

It is the further contention of this paper that naval development in the Asia Pacific illustrates both of these paradigms and that most navies in the area are developing roles and capabilities that mix the characteristics of the two paradigms together. In this way, a review of naval development in the area should tell us something about the impact of globalization and associated post-modern system-centred ways of thinking about international relations on the emerging security architecture of the Asia Pacific in the twenty-first century.

Biography of GEOFFREY TILL

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Geoffrey Till is the Professor of Maritime Studies at the Joint Services Command and Staff College and a member of the Defence Studies Department, part of the War Studies Group of King's College London. He is the Director of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies.

In addition to many articles and chapters on various aspects of maritime strategy and policy defence, he is the author of a number of books. His most recent are a major study *Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century* for Frank Cass, published in 2004 [completed with the aid of a research grant from the British Academy] and *The Development of British Naval Thinking* published by Routledge in 2006. He has completed a major study of the impact of globalisation on naval development especially in the Asia-Pacific region. This will appear next year as an Adelphi paper for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. His works have been translated into 9 languages, and he regularly speaks at staff colleges and academic conferences around the world.

Professor Till has just completed a study of maritime security in Southeast Asia at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he was a Senior Fellow. In 2008, he will be taking up the Kippenberger Visiting Chair at the University of Victoria, Wellington, New Zealand

Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern / Post-modern Navies of the Asia Pacific

Introduction

Navies both reflect and help determine the nature of the societies in which they operate. This is as true at the international level as it is at the domestic and national levels. It is the contention of this paper that the navies of the Asia Pacific, as elsewhere, are developing in ways which reflect competing attitudes towards, and involvement in, the process of globalization. In brief two models or paradigms of naval development seem to be emerging. The first is the traditional model of naval roles and capabilities in which naval developments reflect national concerns and a nation-state-centred view of international society, that will sometimes tend to be associated with a certain wariness about globalization. The second paradigm, however, in part derives from more positive attitudes towards globalization. In this non-traditional approach, there is relatively more focus on the international system, and the nation's place within that system. Inevitably, this feeds through to rather different conceptions of the roles and required capabilities of naval forces. For want of anything better, this paper will label these traditional and the non-traditional paradigms "modern" and "post-modern" respectively. In crude terms, the modern paradigm of naval development may be said to envisage competition between navies, while the post-modern is more cooperative and collaborative in nature, perhaps aimed against some common adversary at sea or on land.

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Globalization and the Post-modern State

Three broad chronological eras in the wider world environment can be discerned, that have been called the "pre-modern" and the "modern" with the a third, the post-modern era now

beginning to emerge.¹ Very crudely, the first period is characteristic of agricultural states with limited economic interdependence and insufficient surpluses to invest in further development, the second by the “Realist” interactions of states shaped by industrial mass production and the third, animated by aspirations for a cooperative world system of openness and mutual dependence operated by states moulded by, and for, the contemporary information economy that is such a characteristic of contemporary globalization. Today, some of these pre-modern states are still to be found in Africa; most states in the Asia Pacific are predominantly modern, while most post-modern states are located in North America or, most especially, Western Europe. These categories are all matters more of degree than of kind of course, and some “modern” Asia-Pacific states have “post-modern” tendencies, some of them (such as Australia, Singapore and Japan) quite strongly.

The trend towards state post-modernism is clearly accelerated by increasing globalization. The more globalized countries are, the more open their economies, the more likely is their manufacturing capacity to be relocated elsewhere, the more outward-looking their interests and the more likely they are to advocate and support free trade. All these are the characteristics of the post-modern state.

Modern states, by contrast, will be warier about the implications of globalization for their own security and sovereignty, more protectionist in their economic policy, and less inclined to collaborate with others in the maintenance of the world’s trading system. Either way, such attitudes will inevitably have their effect on the security policies of states, be they modern or post-modern.

The Security Implications of Globalization

Because of its effect on the state, and state practices, globalization is the central fact of the strategic environment of the early twenty-first century. Some, in the traditions of the Nineteenth Century Manchester school, welcome the onset of globalization hoping that it will usher in an era of peace and plenty by replacing earlier, competitive, aggressive balance-of-power politics with a much greater sense of international community. Others see globalization as undermining their way of life, their independence, their beliefs and their

¹ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century* (pp. 37–43), London: Atlantic Books, 2004. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (pp. 22–26), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

future prospects. Still others dispute assumptions of globalization's assumed longevity and worry, on the contrary, about its prospective if not imminent collapse. Either way, the present and future state of globalization will be a major determinant of the shape and nature of world politics of states. Governmental attitudes to globalization will in turn be a major determinant of strategy and defence and naval policy and therefore of the size, shape, composition and function of navies.

Before we look specifically at its naval consequences, however, several points need to be made about the general defence implications of globalization. Firstly, it encourages the development of a "borderless world" in which the autarchy of the national units of which it is composed is gradually being whittled away by the development of a variety of transnational economic and technological trends. The focus will increasingly be on the system, not its components; military plans and strategy will, the post-modern argument goes, need to serve that system as a whole. Nations will become relaxed about their borders because they have to be. But this cuts both ways; they will be relaxed about the borders of other nations too. In a globalizing world, systems thinking pulls strategists forwards geographically. This forward-leaning approach to the making and implementation of strategy has been a marked characteristic of European and American defence thinking for a decade now. Thus Tony Blair in early 2007, said:

The frontiers of our security no longer stop at the Channel. What happens in the Middle East affects us ... the new frontiers for our security are global. Our Armed Forces will be deployed in the lands of other nations far from home, with no immediate threat to our territory, in environments and in ways unfamiliar to them.²

Secondly, globalization is a *dynamic* system since, amongst other things, trade and business produces a constantly changing hierarchy of winners and losers and, historically, conflict seems to be particularly associated with economic volatility.³ New players in the game have to be accommodated, its victims supported and future directions anticipated. The defence of the system has therefore to be constant, and proactive rather than merely intermittent and reactive. This calls for continuous action along all the diplomatic, economic, social and military lines of development, with the latter's requirements based on the need to "shape the international security environment".

² Tony Blair, *Reflections on 21st Century Security*, Speech on HMS Albion, Plymouth, 12 January 2007.

³ Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World* (pp. lix–lxii), London: Allen Lane, 2006.

Thirdly, globalization depends absolutely on the free flow of trade—and this goes largely by sea. This has always been the case, but the invention of the container has revolutionized the process. Indeed,

It is no exaggeration to say that the shipping container may have transformed the world, and our daily lives, as fundamentally as any of the other more glamorous or complex inventions of the last 100 years, the internet included.⁴

The arrival of a container ship like the *Emma Maersk* half a mile long, stacked 200 feet high with containers carrying 45,000 tons of goods, probably mainly from China, which is expected to be turned around in 24 hours, illustrates the sheer scale of this revolution. Not only does the modern shipping industry make globalization possible; it is itself profoundly globalized. Over 60 per cent of ships fly flags different from the nationality of their owners. In many cases these owners are in fact multinational corporations. A ship's crew, cargo and itinerary will be totally international and quite possibly insured, brokered and operated in still other countries too.⁵

Accordingly the whole concept of globalization is profoundly maritime. Low and decreasing sea-borne freight rates mean that the shipping costs of a \$700 TV set from China to Europe is no more than about \$10. This helps keep European costs of living and rates of inflation down, encourages China to industrialize (thereby improving life for its citizens) and makes possible industrial relocation, most obviously from Europe and North America to the Far East, and the diversification of production lines around an increasing number of countries.⁶

Seaborne commerce therefore produces a mutually-dependent community of industrial production and consumption. The world has increasingly been seen as a tight, interconnected nexus of countries and regions with high degrees of mutual economic, and therefore political, inter-dependence. As already noted, post-modernists would conclude that this is likely to reduce the likelihood of conflicts between states and to increase levels of

⁴ Oliver Burkman, "The Shipping News", *The Guardian*, 27 January 2007. See also Marc Levinson, *The Box* (pp. 264–278), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

⁵ Daniel Y. Coulter, "Navies and Globalization: An Estranged Couple", in Robert H. Edwards and Ann L. Griffiths, *Intervention and Engagement: A Maritime Perspective*, Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2003.

⁶ Facts and arguments of this sort may be found in "Shipping and World Trade" reports, available at www.shippingfacts.com and the OECD's report, *The Role of Changing Transport Costs and Technology in Industrial Relocation*, May 2005.

international cooperation against anything that seems likely to threaten a system on which all depend.

International shipping, especially in the shape of the container, underpins the prospect of further beneficial growth in world trade. But to have that effect it needs to be predictable, traceable, compliant with detailed pick-up and delivery schedules, and secure. This provides both an opportunity and a challenge, not least because sea-based globalization is potentially vulnerable to disruption. In itself, this is not new, for Mahan warned us of this over a century ago:

This, with the vast increase in rapidity of communication, has multiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting together the interests of nations to one another, till the whole now forms an articulated system not only of prodigious size and activity, but of excessive sensitiveness, unequalled in former ages.⁷

The “excessive sensitiveness” that Mahan had in mind derives from the fact that interdependence, and indeed dependency of any sort, inevitably produces targets for the malign to attack. But there is special point in his warnings now, partly because the extraordinary extent and depth of today’s version of globalization depends on a supply-chain philosophy of “just enough, just in time” that increases the system’s vulnerability to disruption. Moreover, there have emerged various groups and situations that could exploit or exacerbate that increased vulnerability. Such threats include, obviously, direct attack by groups or states hostile to the values and outcomes that the system encourages. Less obviously, international maritime crime in its manifold forms (piracy, drugs and people smuggling) and the unsustainable plundering of marine resources all threaten to undermine the good order on which the safe and timely passage of shipping depends. Conflict and instability ashore, moreover, can have disruptive effects in neighbouring seas, as was demonstrated all too clearly in the Tanker war of the 1980s or, more recently off Somalia, for example.⁸ In some cases these threats may be posed against sea-based trade itself; more commonly, the conditions, both ashore and at sea, that make such trade possible are at risk.

Moreover, some of these threats to the system are also globalizing. The menace of international terrorism is the most obvious example of this but various other forms of

⁷ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect* (p. 144), London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1902.

⁸ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century* (pp. 310–378), London: Frank Cass, 2004. In many ways, this article is a development of the last chapter of that book.

maritime crime also seem to be following this path. To take just one illustrative example, it was reported in February 2006 that the Russian mafia, using Norwegian trawlers under a Russian flag, was involved in large-scale poaching from cod reserves in the Barents Sea; the fish were sent to China for filleting and then returned to Grimsby and Hull for sale in the British market. The consortium responsible for this had Swedish, Russian, Norwegian and Hong Kong connections; the consequence was the depletion of cod reserves and considerable financial benefit to Russian mafia and other criminals, whose existence and success threatens good governance, domestic stability and the good order at sea upon which, it is worth repeating, the safe and timely passage of shipping depends.⁹

The Post-modern Naval Implications of Globalization

For all these reasons, sea power is at the heart of the globalization process in a way in which land and air power are not. Indeed as Daniel Coulter has observed:

Maintaining the security of globalization, therefore, is a role from which navies dare not shrink. It is the *raison d'être* for navies, and navies that understand that first, the ones that come up with the most coherent, credible and imaginative strategy for pursuing it, are the navies that will justify their existence and be firmly in tune with their master, the public.¹⁰

The protective function of naval activity will plainly be a significant part of any defensive response because so many of these threats to the system can, and do, take a maritime form or have important maritime consequences that require maritime responses. Indeed, the Tanker war mentioned earlier is a particularly clear example of the many ways in which navies “protect the system” both directly by what they do at sea and indirectly by what they do from it.

Identifying and prioritizing from amongst the range of possible naval responses and preparing the platforms, weaponry and skill sets that will realize those responses is the chief tasks of today’s naval planners. To repeat the point made earlier, many of these requirements are bound to pull sailors forwards, geographically. This should not be news to sailors since a

⁹ “Cod Sold in Hundreds of Chippies Linked to Russian Black Market”, *The Guardian*, 20 February 2006.

¹⁰ Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

forward-leaning policy was a characteristic of *Pax Britannica*—the last great age of globalization. Thus:

Britannia needs no bulwarks
No towers along the steep;
Her march is o'er the mountain waves,
Her home is on the deep.¹¹

The defence of the system also requires not just strategic reach but a range of naval tasks that covers much of the spectrum of conflict, a range that seems to be getting ever wider.

In order to cover this necessary spectrum of risk, threat and conflict, post-modern navies are developing forces and strategies in order to produce four sets of outcomes or deliverables. The first two of these are distinctively different interpretations of traditional maritime aspirations; the second two are, to all intents and purposes, new. The four aspirational deliverables are:

- Sea control
- Expeditionary operations
- Good order at sea
- The maintenance of a maritime consensus

This paper will review all four of these distinctive characteristics of the post-modern navy in turn.

Sea Control

To some extent at least, post-modern navies tend to re-formulate this traditional element of maritime strategy. In broad principle sea control remains what it has always been—the grand enabler that allows the sea to be used for whatever purpose that will serve the interests of the power that controls it. It therefore remains at the heart of maritime strategy, both modern and post-modern. For most post-modern navies, however, sea control is much less about open ocean operations against opposing fleets and are much more likely to be taking place in littoral regions where the threats are very different from, and at least as challenging as, those encountered on the open ocean. Moreover the likelihood that such campaigns take place in the course of wars of choice rather than of necessity makes the “force protection” variant of

¹¹ Thomas Campbell (1777–1844), “Ye Mariners of England”, in Peter Jay, *The Sea! The Sea!* (p. 45), London: Anvil Press Poetry, 2005.

sea control peculiarly apposite. There is ample evidence that contemporary domestic opinion, and, perhaps especially with an intrusive and unsympathetic media, will not wear the level of attrition common, for example, in Britain's system-defence wars in the third world of the nineteenth century.¹² Sustainable system-defence in the twenty-first century depends on the maintenance of high levels of security for the peacekeepers themselves. And this is as true for sailors operating off the coast as it is for soldiers in the streets of Basra or Baghdad. The perceived need is to shield forces operating in littoral waters from sea-denial capabilities such as coastal submarines, shore-based artillery and missiles and mines and a variety of novel threats such as "swarming" attacks from clouds of fast-attack craft and terrorists in small boats or on jet-skis. Accordingly, less emphasis is placed on high-intensity capabilities aimed at conventional naval forces in open water, and more on low-intensity threats closer to shore.

But there is a second significant post-modern angle on sea control as well. In a globalized world it is now less a question of "securing" the sea in the sense of appropriating it for one's own use, and more of "making it secure" for everyone but the enemies of the system to use. This is clearly aligned with the notion that "freedom of navigation" is a universal requirement, if not a universal right, and ideally should not be restricted to particular flags or cargoes. The language and the rhetoric of maritime strategy seems to be taking a step further away from older, more exclusive concepts of the "command" of the sea. In short, the second word in the concept of "sea control" is beginning to transmute into the French version of "*controle*", which means, in effect, "supervision" rather than command.

Expeditionary Operations

In the post Cold war period, there has developed a concept of liberal interventionism in defence of the system that is based on the notion that if we do not go to the crisis, then the crisis will come to us.¹³ Best of all, is to be there already, preventing the crisis from arising in the first place. "The emphasis on expeditionary operations," explains the British Ministry of Defence, "has enabled the U.K. to have a key role in shaping the international security environment."¹⁴ This kind of thinking has resulted in Europe and the United States, and in a

¹² The level of this attrition is often forgotten these days. But with the exception of such grand disasters as the early days of the Crimean war, the retreat from Kabul or the battle of Isandlwana, such casualties rarely attracted political controversy, even comment. It was accepted as an inevitable part of the burdens of empire.

¹³ *Strategic Defence Review* (Introduction, para. 6), London: The Stationery Office, 1998.

¹⁴ *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter* (Introduction), London: The Stationery Office, 2002.

perhaps surprising number of countries in South America and the Asia Pacific as well, a strong focus on Expeditionary Operations, the second of our four post-modern naval necessities.

To a large extent, this is a conceptual re-working of traditional concepts of maritime power projection. It continues to emphasize the overriding importance of events ashore, but is distinctive in that it emphasizes the need to conduct operations that are sea-based, distant, and limited in scope, aim, extent and duration. Examples include the British operation in and off Sierra Leone and the Australian led East Timor operation, both regarded as successful examples of liberal interventionism. Post-modern navies have accordingly switched their focus away, to some extent, from what they do *at* sea to what they can do *from* it. In the second of these they are implicitly acknowledging the fact that disorder at sea is most often the consequence of disorder on land, and that, in consequence, naval activity conducted purely at sea is usually dealing with the symptoms of the problem, rather than its causes. It is when they are having an impact on events ashore that post-modern navies are at their most significant, strategically.

Power projection in an expeditionary mode can therefore be seen as a defence of the trading system against the instabilities and conflicts ashore that might threaten it. These potential shore-based threats include rogue states, inter- or intra-state conflict and the malign effects of a host of newly-empowered non-state actors. In certain circumstances these can all be seen as threatening the health of the global sea-based system.

In earlier ages of course, defence of the trading system was based primarily on the *direct* defence of shipping at sea. Mahan indeed famously observed:

The necessity of a navy springs from the existence of peaceful shipping and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment.¹⁵

But nowadays the defence of the immediate political and strategic conditions that make beneficial trading possible has taken its place in naval priorities. There remain sea-based threats to the trading system of course, and these will still need to be dealt with, but in the post-modern world they no longer command the attention that they did in Mahan's day.

¹⁵ Capt. A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* (p. 23), London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1890.

Instead the system is largely defended by collective expeditionary action against threats ashore.

The current focus on the apparently unending land phase in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, poses a number of real challenges for the navies of the participants. In the short term, these conflicts absorb funds and resources that might otherwise go to navies.¹⁶ The tyranny of the immediate commitment is certainly a factor in the longer term budgetary embarrassments of the U.S., British and several other European navies.¹⁷

Politically, the costs and disappointments of both campaigns seem likely to make similar forays elsewhere less likely. On the face of it, this could undermine the case for developing expeditionary capabilities. Since expeditionary assumptions underlie, even justify, many of the major acquisitions of Western navies (in the shape of aircraft carriers, amphibious forces and so forth), this would seem to be serious news for post-modern sailors. On the other hand, the limited liability implied by purely sea-based responses to instabilities ashore may commend more “maritime” conceptions of intervention to politicians, who may be more anxious to avoid casualties and messy long-term commitments ashore.

This vision of a more sea-based conception of expeditionary operations, with much less emphasis given the commitment of land forces ashore, comes close to the notion of “good order *from* the sea”. Either way, the future shape of expeditionary operations, and a country’s prospective willingness to participate in them will clearly be another major determinant of naval policy in the United States and elsewhere.

The interest in the kind of sea-basing which underpins expeditionary operations that is so evident in the United States, Europe and parts of the Asia Pacific is an obvious manifestation of this impulse.¹⁸ Given the resource constraints common to navies in what used to be called “the West”, and the developing gap between these resources and the range of possible commitments they may be needed for, it also seems to make sense for such cooperative navies implicitly to accept a degree of specialization and a “contributory” ethos in the preparation for, and conduct of, expeditionary operations. They do not expect to cover all the colours of the naval rainbow, but, ideally, remain confident that someone else, equally

¹⁶ “Gates Plans to Use Air Force, Navy Funds to Cover Army Costs in Iraq, Afghanistan”, *National Journal Congress Daily AM*, 12 April 2007. George Friedman, “The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power”, *Stratfor*, 10 April 2007.

¹⁷ Paul Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of Navies”, *International Herald Tribune*, 5 April 2007.

¹⁸ Geoffrey Till, *Naval Transformation, Ground Forces and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate*, Carlisle, PA: SSI Letorte Papers, December 2006.

reliable, will. They may not welcome this development, or the degree of reliance on allies that it implies, but in the face of budgetary realities, they accept its inevitability. Accordingly, less stress is placed on the maintenance of a “balanced fleet” or, indeed, on an indigenous maritime industrial base. This pragmatic approach fits nicely into the conceptions of an interdependent, borderless world and an open economy—conceptions that lie at the very heart of globalization.

Good Order at Sea

Globalization prospers when trade is mutually beneficial and takes place in conditions of order, both on land and at sea. But as *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy* says, a variety of threats to Good Order at Sea imperils this:

Weak coastal states often are not able to regulate or provide protection for the legitimate movement and safety of vessels within their waters. They are frequently ill-prepared to safeguard their maritime commerce and energy infrastructure, or protect their marine resources from illegal exploitation and environmental damage. Combined, these vulnerabilities not only threaten their population, resources, and economic development, but can threaten the security of the maritime commons and even the continuity of global commerce.¹⁹

Such threats, the post-modern argument goes, need to be taken seriously and almost certainly need to be taken separately. It is probably a mistake to conflate maritime terrorism with piracy for example; the diseases are different and so are the cures. But one unifying requirement of them all is the need for maritime domain awareness (MDA) systems that provide the necessary information in a timely and useful manner to the people who need it. This in turn demands systems that are continuous in time, substance and space rather than sporadic, since the essential thing is to pick up what is normal, in order to identify the “abnormal”. MDA, in short, is a permanent requirement that, ideally, should monitor all civilian activity on the entire world ocean. An emerging issue is whether it will eventually monitor naval activity too.

Good order at sea will contribute to maritime security and the defence of the homeland, and globalization means that this is bound to have its “home” and “away”

¹⁹ *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship* (p. 51), Washington, DC, 2007.

dimensions. Forward operations conducted in defence of the global system can also be seen as a defence in depth of the homeland. In a borderless world, for example, container security begins, and may be at its most manageable, in foreign ports—another example of the way in which globalization requires maritime strategy to be “forward-leaning”. Here is *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy* again:

The U.S. maritime border, like the land and air borders, is integral to the global system of trade. Securing the maritime border is an *international activity* that requires pushing the nation’s layers of border security far away from its shores—through U.S. waters, onto a well-governed ocean commons, then seamlessly joining the secure maritime domain of foreign partners. It also requires *extensive partnerships* that integrate and build unity of effort among governments, agencies, and private-sector stakeholders around the world.²⁰

The maintenance of Good Order At Sea may be down the softer, more constabulary end of the spectrum of required maritime capability in defence of the system. For all that, it is increasingly seen as a crucial enabler in global peace and security, and therefore something that should command the attention of naval planners everywhere. It is recognized as the third of the four naval necessities of the post-modern age of maritime strategy. This concern for maritime security of this broader kind is not entirely new of course, but the emphasis it is currently being given even by navies such as those of the United States and the United Kingdom, where “modern” conceptions of maritime strategy run deep, is striking.

Where, on the other hand, navies *are* coastguards in all but name, this raises few issues; but it certainly does so for those planners of larger navies grappling with the allocation of resources between the hard and soft variants of maritime security. Here the essential question is the balance to be struck between coastguard functions and forces and conventional, naval ones. Should navies absorb these functions or hive them off to specialized forces specifically designed for the purpose? There are arguments either way, but little doubt that the function itself is important and becoming increasingly so. This is especially the case when dealing with threats that shade into the strategic area such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and environmental degradation. But since even piracy, fishing disputes and illegal immigration can feed, as well as reflect,

²⁰ Ibid, p. 35. Emphasis in original.

disorder ashore, there may well be strategic interests at stake here too, and hence an incentive for conventional naval involvement.

Post-modern navies with rapidly developing interests in this variant of maritime security, will tend to be especially interested in working with the other agencies of maritime law enforcements, with the instrumentalities of maritime domain awareness, the acquisition of numbers of offshore patrol craft and aircraft and especially when it comes to dealing with the “away” dimension of the contest (such as counter-narcotics patrols in the Caribbean by European naval forces) in cooperation with others. This brings us to the fourth postmodern naval necessity.

The Maintenance of a Maritime Consensus

Maritime cooperation is increasingly seen as so important to the successful defence of the sea-based trading system that it almost becomes an aim in its own right, and this is an aspiration that is quite novel in many, if not all, ways. While a great deal has been written about “commanding the global commons”, by which is usually meant the sea and the air and space above it,²¹ people are recognized as the biggest “commons” of all. To a post-modernist, securing their support is probably the most crucial single requirement for the defence of the system. Commanding the human commons provides such a level of military and political advantage that it is to be regarded as *the* “key enabler of the U.S. global power position”. Accordingly it is hard to exaggerate the importance of the consequent battle for world opinion, whether this finds expression in the parliaments of allies, the editorials of the *Washington Post* or the streets of the Middle East.

The perpetrators of 9/11 were not arguing for a bigger slice of the cake, they were trying to blow up the bakery because they thought globalization inherently inimical to their aspirations; but they are half-supported by huge numbers of people who *do* want a bigger slice of the cake, and who need to be persuaded away from that level of support by the assurance of a system that seems fairer to them. Hence the importance of the political, social and economic lines of development, in which naval forces are of particular utility because of their flexibility and ubiquity. A forward and sensitive maritime presence can help not only deter malefactors from malign actions or compel them into benign ones; it can also provide a

²¹ Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony”, *International Security* 28(1), Summer 2003, pp. 5–46, esp. pp. 8–13.

means of signalling interest in a region's affairs, monitoring events at sea and ashore and of contributing to the development of a sense of international community through a policy of active coalition-building. The guiding principle throughout is that while preserving national objectives, preventing war is always better than winning it.

This being so, the benign²² applications of seapower have particular salience in broader operations intended to defend the system through the winning of the hearts and minds of the populations on which it ultimately depends. The notion of the "global fleet station" and the conscious use of sustained cruises by hospital ships such as the USS *Mercy* and *Comfort*, and other such humanitarian relief operations are seen by post-modernists to fit the bill exactly.²³ In other circumstances, of course, coercive deployments of carrier battle groups off a potentially hostile coast may be more appropriate. Either way, naval diplomacy requires the closest coordination between navies and their foreign ministries.

Many of these post-modern ideas are subsumed within the concept of The Thousand Ship Navy. This is certainly a snappy and memorable title but it is unfortunate for its apparent exclusion of the coastguard forces that have a huge role to play in this concept. Moreover, folk memories of the "600-ship navy" aspirations of the Reagan era make some think of it this as simply just another U.S. Navy budgetary *demarche*. Finally, the term "Navy" immediately sets up connotations of hierarchy and leads to the question of "Who's in charge?" Concerns of this sort may make the idea harder to sell to other navies. On the other hand, the notion of an informal maritime coalition acting in concert against a host of common threats to common interests is an attractive and persuasive one that commands wide support.²⁴ Phrases such as "global maritime partnerships" may not have quite the zing of the Thousand Ship Navy but in the long run, post-modernists believe, they may sell better because they make it clearer that what is envisaged is maritime forces, effectively "policing" the system, with everyone contributing as they wish, and as and when they can. Encouraging the currently doubtful to participate, and facilitating this, where necessary with deliberate and sensitive campaigns of capability building, must be a high priority. What is called for, and

²² *British Maritime Doctrine* [BR 1806] 3rd edition (p. 58). London: The Stationery Office, 2004. Interestingly, earlier editions had rather more on this concept. Compare with pp. 33–36, p. 103 in the first edition of 1995.

²³ Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The US Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007, Newport Papers No. 28, pp. 101–106, 108–9 et seq.

²⁴ "The Commanders Respond" (pp. 14–31), in *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute* 2007; "Charting the Course: World Navy Chiefs Look to the Future", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 May 2007, pp. 23–50.

indeed appears to be happening, is a “conversation” conducted by the U.S. Navy with the rest of the world that does not necessarily have to end up with the U.S. Navy always acting as the sheriff in a host of maritime posses.

Indeed the tsunami relief operation of 2004 in many ways shows the Thousand Ship Navy concept in action, since this very necessary task was successfully performed by a loose coalition of the willing that got together, at very short notice, outside fixed agreements, with no one “in charge”. The international rescue effort from the Lebanon last year was much the same. Both were made possible by the participating navies’ developed habit of working together.

Interim Conclusions: The Post-modern Navy

To summarize at this point, globalization encourages developments within post-modern states that makes them outward-looking in economic, political and military terms. They are content to open their economies to others and to see the relocation elsewhere of their manufacturing industries, especially those of the general metal-bashing type. Their governments adopt classic *laissez-faire* attitudes to the defence of national economies, as much as they can, and do not put strong emphasis on the creation or maintenance of an independent defence industrial base. They do, however, pride themselves on developing open, accountable forms of government in which information is freely available as a basis for continuous innovation.

Post-modern states of this sort adopt defence policies that are likely to produce navies whose focus is on the maintenance of *international* rather than national security. They will embrace inclusive rather than exclusive attitudes towards sea control in which the priority given to peer competition with possible rivals security is typically much lower than it is in modern states. Reflecting a marked pre-disposition towards liberal interventionism, their shape, composition and activities reflect high priorities in the conduct of generally collaborative expeditionary operations. Acutely aware of the centrality of general maritime security to the efficient operation of a globalized sea-based trading system, emphasis is given to the maintenance of general maritime security through the protection of good order at sea. Finally, they put a premium on developing good, enduring and constructive maritime relationships with others. These collaborative assumptions often find expression in a “contributory” attitude towards the development of the naval capability to deal with

significant threats to the system. Such navies expect to participate in coalition operations rather than attempt to act on their own.

But will Globalization Survive?

As was the case a hundred years ago, many people now take an integrated world economy for granted, regard it as the natural state of things, and expect that it will last forever. Yet the bases on which global capitalism rests today are not very different from what they were in 1900, and the potential for their disruption is as present today as it was then ... The apparent stability of the early 1900s was followed by decades of conflicts and upheavals. Today's international economic order also seems secure, but in historical perspective it may be only a brief interlude.²⁵

This review of post-modern maritime defence pre-supposes a fundamental and permanent change in the nature of international politics. It assumes that we are indeed living "... on the cusp of a new era ... [one] plagued by uncertainty and change and unrestricted warfare, an era of shifting global threats and challenging new opportunities ... that calls for new skill sets, deeper partnerships, and mutual understanding".²⁶ It assumes that sea-based globalization will continue, and that its defence will indeed become and remain at the heart of naval policy around the world.

The threats that globalization faces are serious and may prove fatal, however. It is worth remembering that in many ways the world of the late nineteenth century was, in its own terms, as globalized as ours is today, but that the system collapsed in the face of commercial rivalry, the discontent of the disadvantaged and growing nationalism.²⁷ In some ways, indeed, these problems were actually a by-product of globalization, especially in regard to the kind of inequality of benefit that bred nationalism. The result of this was a World War which, as Niall Ferguson has observed:

... sank globalization—literally. Nearly thirteen million tons of shipping went to the bottom of the sea as a result of German naval action, most of it by U-boats. International trade, investment and emigration all collapsed. In the war's aftermath,

²⁵ Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (pp. xvi–xvii), New York: WW Norton, 2006.

²⁶ Admiral Mike Mullen, "CNO Guiding Principles", US Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Office of the CNO, *CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era* (p. 2), October 2006.

²⁷ Frieden, op. cit., p. 16.

revolutionary regimes arose that were fundamentally hostile to international economic integration. Plans replaced the market; autarky and protection took the place of free trade. Flows of goods diminished; flows of people and capital all but dried up.²⁸

This is indeed a chilling historical example of the way in which war can, to borrow Thomas Friedman's phrase, "unflatten" the world. If it is indeed true that "War and warfare will always be with us; war is a permanent feature of the human condition", then it is far from inconceivable that globalization might collapse again.²⁹

A Marxist might even argue that all of this is a result of the "inherent contradictions" of global capitalism and, accordingly, are historically inevitable.³⁰ Repeated shocks of the 9/11 sort, in conjunction with a sustained downturn in economic activity would certainly strain the sea-based trading system on which globalization depends. Shippers point out that we are now passing through the most sustained period of economic growth in history and wonder how long this can go on.

Accordingly, the prudent naval planner might well feel the need to bear this lesson of history in mind, especially given the fact that our kind of globalization faces an extra range of threats (most obviously international terrorism, resource depletion and environmental degradation) that theirs did not.³¹

The Survival / Renaissance of the Modern State

Should this analysis be right, and should globalization either collapse or enter a period of terminal decline, we would face a bleaker, harder, much less communal world of increased levels of competition in which coercive military force and power politics resume their dominance of the strategic horizon. We would indeed have a warlike future.

Current expectations seem to lie somewhere between these two future extremes of secure globalization on the one hand, and blood-chilling system collapse on the other, perhaps especially in the crucial Asia-Pacific "super-complex" area already alluded to.

²⁸ Ferguson, op. cit., p. 73.

²⁹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat; The Globalized World in the Twenty-first Century* (p. 458), London: Penguin, 2005; Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (p. 370), London: Phoenix, 2005.

³⁰ Timothy Garton Ash, "Global capitalism has no serious rivals. But it could destroy itself", *The Guardian*, 22 February 2007.

³¹ Some analysts, though, argue that today's globalization is deeper and so more resilient than in earlier periods because manufacturing is not merely relocated; it is *redistributed* among a number of countries in ways which increases mutual dependence. Using the computer industry as an example, Friedman calls this the "Dell Effect". Friedman, op. cit., pp. 529–536.

Although in many ways at the heart of the globalization process, this area has been authoritatively described as “an exemplar of traditional regional security dynamics found largely in the military-political mode ... Old-fashioned concerns about power still dominate the security agenda of most of the regional powers, and war remains a distinct, if constrained possibility.”³²

This seems to come out quite strongly in the Asia Pacific’s developing requirement for energy security. In the last great age of globalization, manufacturing industry’s reliance on raw materials that had to be extracted in other areas seemed to necessitate the control of territory that exacerbated the relations between states and led to conflict. These days, some analysts argue that our comforting optimism about the future of globalization depends on the assumption of sufficient resources. They go on to say that this is proving an illusion, most obviously in the availability of oil. A steep rise in oil demand especially from China, Japan and the rest of the Asia Pacific is coinciding with a terminal fall in the discovery of new reserves³³.

Anticipating that they shall soon have to start scraping the bottom of the barrel, states are already manoeuvring so they can cope with a less secure energy future and even now this is exacerbating relations between them. China and Japan, for example, are in dispute over islands that straddle potentially important marine oil fields. They are both competing for stocks in the volatile Middle East. The Chinese are heavily engaged in regimes which the United States regards as dangerous and disreputable (Sudan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Iran) and are moving into the Indian Ocean, watched warily by India. This suggests the possible emergence of a kind of globalization with a harder, more competitive, more mercantilist edge.

Moreover, many analysts would point out that beneath all the collaborative rhetoric, national behaviour still reflects the “modern” Westphalian state system with its assumptions of unending competition between states for power influence, land and resources, ideological supremacy and its preoccupations with military power.³⁴ Indeed defence and the concept of the nation state are completely bound up with one another. Defence is the ultimate “public

³² Buzan and Waever, op. cit., p. 93.

³³ Jeremy Leggett, “Dark Secret: What They Don’t Want You to Know About the Coming Oil Crisis”, *The Independent*, 20 January 2006.

³⁴ It is worth pointing out that with all our current focus on trans-national terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism and localized ethno-nationalist terrorism are still distressingly common.

good” since everyone in a country benefits from it (even if they do not contribute to it) and no private organization can supply it. Accordingly security is one of the main justifications for the nation state and a significant driver of the international system. Nor should we expect nationalism to wither as a result of globalization. “Nationalism,” says Fred Halliday, “is not an alternative to globalization, but an intrinsic part of it.”³⁵

As was remarked on earlier, the extent to which countries in the Asia Pacific or elsewhere are “modern” or “post-modern” and focused on globalization is a matter of degree. More traditionally-nationalist, modern, more self-contained countries might be somewhat less affected by the collapse or deterioration of globalization; post-modern countries on the other hand, would face a major upheaval. Either way, it would seem, everyone needs to guard against the consequences of the collapse of globalization.

Consequences for a Modern Navy

With this we come to the second, more traditional, “modern” paradigm of state and naval behaviour which clearly proceeds on the basis of a rather different set of assumptions about the roles and the necessary capabilities of navies in which national preoccupations prevail over the collaborative. They are, accordingly, in many ways rather different from, and sometimes the complete opposite of, the naval assumptions of the post-modernists.

The first obvious difference is the modernist’s tendency to focus on the defence of the country, rather than the system. This tends to result in different, more traditional conceptions of sea control. Naval preparations would then be framed by analysis of what other possibly competitive navies are doing, and there would be much greater emphasis on more “Mahanian” concepts of sea control, and all the naval disciplines that contribute to the independence of action that this implies. For the United States, China and its navy is the most discussed prospective peer competitor that might need treating in this way. Other countries in this region may see take a similar view, or focus on their immediate neighbours instead—or, indeed, as well. All this implies preparation for high intensity “fleet v fleet” engagements as Admiral Gorshkov used to call them. Relevant capacities are expensive and probably optimized for open ocean operations rather than land attack. Weaponry and sensor mixes emphasize ASW, anti-air, anti-ship missiles and so on. For the U.S. Navy this aspiration

³⁵ Fred Halliday, “Nationalism”, in John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (pp. 521–538, p. 536), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

would seem to suggest a need for strong fully networked naval forces, centred on carrier battle groups, permanently forward in the major area of concern, and would also seem to reinforce the inclination towards the high-intensity end of the spectrum, even if this does make cooperative action with allies more difficult. And, finally, such an approach also ultimately justifies the maintenance of nuclear deterrent forces at sea, and everything that goes with it.

Secondly, modern states tend to be much less affected by the impulse for liberal interventionism than post-modern states, and the consequent proclivity for expeditionary operations that it leads to. There is nothing new about this debate for an against-liberal interventionism. In the last great era of globalization, for example, the British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston thought that liberalism and the world's middle classes "far more likely than despotism to produce governments stable, pacific and friendly to England and English trade". Accordingly he advocated, and indeed implemented acts of liberal interventionism. These assumptions were challenged by the conservative balance-of-power school represented by Lord Melbourne who argued that on the contrary, such assisted powers "never take our advice ... treat us with the utmost contempt and take every measure hostile to our interests; they are anxious to prove that we have not the least influence on them".³⁶ Such interventions, in short, would do no good. Instead the focus should be on the defence of national tranquillity and on those who might threaten it directly. In a world much less determined by the exigencies of a mutually dependent community of production and consumption, the traditional, nationalist views of latter day Melbournes are likely to prevail. As already noted, expeditionary campaigns ashore may become more difficult politically, in any case.

This suggests much more of a stress on going forward, on preparing navies for action against other navies rather than largely on the prosecution of collective expeditionary campaigns ashore. It argues for the maintenance of the more traditional kinds of maritime power projection, including amphibious and maritime strike capabilities where the putative adversary demands sophisticated and high intensity weaponry, and where the aspiration is less for the defence of the international trading system against a variety of threats, than for strategic gain against conventional adversaries.

Good order at sea of course is as important to the modern state as it is to the post-modern one, but here it is much more focused on the exclusive defence of national interests

³⁶ David Cecil, *Lord M; Or the Later Life of Lord Melbourne* (p. 115), London: Constable, 1954.

and sovereignty in home waters. This approach is revealed by much greater sensitivity to cooperation with other states that is seen as potentially undermining political independence, maritime sovereignty or standard operating procedures. In the past, this kind of constraint has tended to complicate anti-piracy operations in sensitive areas such as the Straits of Malacca. Finally, modern states will tend to be more autarchic and economically self-contained, and so are much less preoccupied by the consequences of distant disorder. Their involvement in and consequent capability for the “away” aspect of maritime security, is accordingly much more limited.

For all these reasons, the “modern” navy will tend to be wary about the maritime consensus aspects of ideas such as the Thousand Ship Navy. Multilateral naval cooperation with other countries has a much lower priority and when it does take place is more constrained both politically, and in terms of the practical mechanics of interoperability. Modern navies exhibit, for example, a preference for bilateral arrangements on specific issues, as opposed to general-purpose, multilateral ones.

These differences in approach between the modern and the post-modern also extend into the development of the two major “enablers” that underpin all naval activity, namely the maintenance of a balanced fleet and an independent national maritime defence industrial base. Modernists exhibit a preference for the maintenance of the traditional naval fighting disciplines and a balanced but not a specialized “contributory” fleet of the post-modern sort. The desire to maintain a balanced fleet is reinforced by an acute sense that the future is essentially unpredictable, not least because economic rationality is far from being the only driver of human behaviour. “Realistic” assumptions may, accordingly also need to focus on the sheer unpredictability of future events. Who can really know what the future may bring? Should we not guard against the consequences of our inability to predict? Naval planners of this persuasion, aware of the possible consequence of a collapse in globalization or other unimagined threats to national interests, are persuaded by the argument that they should aim “to keep their power dry” by maintaining as wide a range of independent naval capabilities as their resources will permit.

This is closely associated with the last characteristic of the “modern” approach to maritime strategy—the determination to maintain a secure indigenous maritime base, if necessary at the price of industrial and commercial cooperation with allies. The greater the extent to which this is part of a larger national policy to close, and defend, the economy

against external pressure, the more it would be at variance with the free trade conceptions that underpin globalization. Most countries, even markedly post-modern ones, feel such pressures to some extent.³⁷

The following diagram summarizes the essential characteristics of the modern and post-modern paradigms of naval development.

COMPETING MODELS OF NAVAL DEVELOPMENT

Post-modern Modern

Non/Traditional Traditional

GLOBALIZATION ASSUMPTIONS

System centred Westphalian state-centred

Liberal Mercantilist

POLICY FOCUS

Regional/Global National

NAVAL ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

SEA CONTROL

Littoral for Exped Ops Aimed at other navies

Supervisory

EXPEDITIONARY

³⁷ Tom Bower, "The Sale of Liverpool Shows How Britain Lets Its Lifeblood Drain Away", *The Guardian*, 9 February 2007.

Major priority,
Land-centred, joint Low priority
 Amphibious war fighting

GOOD ORDER AT SEA

Inclusive/Away Exclusive/Home

DEVELOPING A MARITIME CONSENSUS

High Priority/General Moderate priority/specific
 bilateral

MEANS AND ENABLERS

FLEET SHAPE

Contributory/Niche Specialization Balanced, all-purpose,
 stand-alone

INTEROPERABILITY

High Priority Moderate/Low Priority

DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Open Protected/Closed

Modernism and Post-modernism in the Asia Pacific

Of course, these modernist and post-modernist paradigms of national state behaviour are very crudely drawn; the differences between them are fuzzy matters of degree and decidedly not pole opposites. Most states exhibit a blend of the two sets of behaviours and characteristics and their navies might therefore be expected to, and indeed do, illustrate the same thing. But where should the countries of the Asia Pacific be plotted on this spectrum of possibility, and to what extent does naval development in the region help illuminate an answer? It is to this set of questions that this paper should finally turn.

The increasing extent to which the burgeoning economies of the Asia Pacific seem likely to dominate the world economy of the twenty-first century suggest that the countries of the region certainly *ought* to be developing the trappings of globalization and post-modernism. Some countries clearly are, most obviously but in no particular order, Australia, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, China, India and New Zealand. Several of them, indeed have been utterly transformed by the process of globalization, especially Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. Given the development of ASEAN and other collective Asia-Pacific regional fora, and the manner in which long-standing issues such as the South China Sea dispute and concerns over the Straits of Malacca are being “de-territorialized” it is easy to see why some should conclude that in the Asia-Pacific area, “traditionalist and realist strategic cultures, with military power as their central focus and balance-of-power tactics as their main ‘game,’ are becoming less relevant”.³⁸

The Singapore case, however, shows that things are not quite so simple. It is true that in Singapore, there has been, in recent years, a marked acceleration in the achievement of S. Rajaratnam’s 1972 aspiration for Singapore to become a Global City embedded in an international trading system.³⁹ Singapore is one of the world’s most globalized cities and clearly intends to remain so. It is investing heavily in the infrastructure and the institutions needed to sustain an expanding global maritime role, and it also puts a high premium on the kind of multilateralism that it thinks will stabilize relationships in the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁰ Its military forces have operated in combination with others against common threats, such as international terrorism, including *Operation Enduring Freedom* and it is proud of its achievements in the East Timor crisis and the tsunami relief operation.

³⁸ C. L. Chiou, “Taiwan”, in Booth and Trood, op. cit., p. 66.

³⁹ Deck, op. cit., p. 258.

⁴⁰ Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore* (p. 33), London: Allen Unwin, 2000.

Nevertheless, initially, it “... traditionally viewed its neighbours with caution, even suspicion”. After the traumatic experience of being abandoned by the British, first in defeat in 1942, and then again in their precipitate scuttle from “East of Suez” announced in 1967, it has developed a strong preference for self-reliance and robust, if notably opaque, national defences.⁴¹ These “somewhat provocative military plans have indeed sometimes produced adverse reactions in the region”⁴² and are an expression of a determination to defend national interests as well as collective ones⁴³. Moreover, it is hard to imagine a mainstream European politician articulating, as did Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, the following:

I say to all Singaporeans: You have to feel passionately about Singapore. Being Singaporean should resonate in our hearts and minds. We built this country. We live, work and raise our children here. We will fight and, if we must, we will die to defend our way of life and our home.⁴⁴

This kind of thinking illustrates the point that globalization in certain circumstances is by no means antithetical to a strong sense of nationalism, and that in those circumstances what Europeans would regard as old-fashioned nationalism may still be a very significant policy determinant. The potential tensions between modern, post-modern and in some cases pre-modern tendencies are even more obvious elsewhere in the region.

Sometimes indeed, globalization has actually increased this. Its differential impact on communities within states has led to secessionist issues, and a consequent emphasis on national integrity at governmental level—as in the case of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Myanmar for example. The absence of collective cooperation in dealing with the currency crisis of 1997 illustrated the abiding strength of neo-mercantilist beggar-my-neighbour approaches in economic policy. Nor can there be much doubt from continuing issues over the ownership of the South China Sea, the safety and security of the Straits of Malacca, the future of Taiwan, and a host of other disputed jurisdictions over the region’s islands and land and sea borders and an abiding suspicion of “interference” by external powers, that most countries in the region continue to place a particularly high value of

⁴¹ Richard A. Deck, “Singapore: Comprehensive Security—Total Defence”, in Ken Booth and Russell Trood (Eds.), *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (p. 252), Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999.

⁴² Chandran Jeshurun, “Malaysia; The Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture”, in Booth and Trood, op. cit., p. 227.

⁴³ Huxley, op. cit., pp. 25, 45.

⁴⁴ Leo Suryadinata, *Nationalism and Globalization: East and West*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2000. See also David Brown, *Contemporary Nationalism in Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics* (p. 2000), London: Routledge, 2000.

sovereignty and national independence.⁴⁵ Malaysia's then Prime Minister Mahathir illustrated this well in a speech in July 1997:

We are told we must open up, that trade and commerce must be totally free. Free for whom? For rogue speculators. For anarchists wanting to destroy weak countries in their crusade for open societies, to force us to submit to the dictatorship of international manipulators.⁴⁶

Clearly, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, as elsewhere, exhibit a range of blends of the modern and the post-modern in their attitudes towards defence but, it seems fair to say, they are, overall, rather more tilted to the first approach than to the second. This being so, we might expect their navies to exhibit the same tendencies.

The Modern / Post-Modern Balance in the Asia Pacific

To explore the naval consequences and expressions of differentiated attitudes towards globalization, modernism and post-modernism we shall look at four illustrative examples. It seems to make sense to start with the biggest first, the U.S. Navy, not least because its characteristics so dominate the naval environment.

Case Study 1: The U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy, like the others listed in this brief survey, exhibits a blend of modern and post-modern naval assumptions about the balances to be struck in its current and future roles that are evident in the three areas of strategic thinking, programmes and operations.

U.S. Strategic Thinking

The differences and indeed the tensions between these two tendencies are interestingly revealed in the rather contrasting treatments given the challenges posed by "rising peer competitors" (a modernist preoccupation) on the one hand and "a variety of violent extremists, insurgents, pirates, criminals and paramilitary forces who seek to destabilize

⁴⁵ Booth and Trood, op. cit. offers a useful compendium of the array of attitudes in the Asia-to defence and globalization.

⁴⁶ Speech of 24 July 1997, cited in Frieden, op. cit., p. 392.

legitimate governments” (a post-modernist approach) on the other, as stated in the *Naval Operations Concept 2006* and the *Navy Strategic Plan* of May 2006.⁴⁷

“Despite the current focus on fighting the GWOT,⁴⁸ says the *Strategic Plan*, the United States still faces traditional threats from regional powers with robust conventional (and in some cases, nuclear) capabilities.⁴⁹ Modernists in the U.S. Navy are clearly substantially concerned about the development of the Chinese Navy and about the future situation in the east and South China seas.⁵⁰ “[The] Navy must possess the capabilities, and communicate to other nations that it possesses the will to employ those capabilities, to help the Joint Force deny, deter, dissuade and defeat a future competitor.”⁵¹

On the other hand, the same document exhibits a good deal of concern about current and future risks to good order at sea and the need to keep “the maritime domain free and open to the unimpeded flow of vital resources, goods and commodities ... Trans-national threats are becoming increasingly problematic because today, more than ever, promoting and maintaining the freedom of the seas is critical to any nation’s long-term economic well-being”. These comments are in the section of the paper that deals with what it calls “A Global Network of Maritime Nations / 1000 ship Navy”, a post-modernist concept being explored still further in the 2007 campaign to deliver a “new maritime strategy”.⁵² The semantics of the “Thousand Ship Navy / Global Maritime Network” concept are significant in themselves. The original phrase was the “Thousand Ship Navy” but this was replaced as it was thought to exhibit too many “modernist” assumptions of the sort we have already noted.⁵³

This Global Maritime Network concept is part of a determined effort to better coordinate a joint effort with the two other key members of the maritime team, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Marine Corps. It should also be seen as an important constituent of the United States’ new and thoroughly joined up Naval and Maritime Strategy Policy issued by

⁴⁷ As their titles suggest, these documents were issued in 2006 by the then CNO Admiral Mullen and General Hagee, Commandant of the USMC. They are both intended to guide the use of resources to achieve the aims of the US Navy’s “Vision” statement—*SeaPower 21*.

⁴⁸ The Global War on Terror.

⁴⁹ *Navy Strategic Plan*, p. 7.

⁵⁰ Larry Wortzel, “The Trouble With China’s Nuclear Doctrine”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 22 February 2006; see also *Navy Times*, 26 February 2007, for an interesting report of the range of views on appropriate responses to the rise of the Chinese navy.

⁵¹ *Navy Strategic Plan*, p. 15.

⁵² Christopher J. Castelli, “New Maritime Strategy Would emphasize Soft and Hard Power”, *Inside the Navy*, 18 June 2007.

⁵³ Vice-admiral John G. Morgan and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, “The 1,000-ship Navy Global Maritime Network”, *Proceedings* of the U.S. Naval Institute, November 2005.

the White House, which, at least in theory, clearly aims to cover the whole spectrum of threat rather than just to focus on the high-intensity end of the scale and so illustrates strong post-modernist tendencies.

U.S. Programmes

The traditional preoccupations of the modernists manifest themselves in the unilateral pursuit of U.S.-based technological excellence that may make it difficult for even their closest allies to keep up with them. This is reinforced by a natural focus on the higher, more intense end of the spectrum of conflict, simply because no one else can do it as well, or as much, as the U.S. Navy can. Hence the need for a continuing accent on *quality* in sea control operations and power projection, even if this does result in a drop in *quantity*, as measured by the number of platforms available. It is considered important for the U.S. Navy to stay ahead of the game in the manifold disciplines it lists under the headings of “sea strike” and “sea shield” in *Sea Power 21*. This should provide increased operational advantage over prospective adversaries, in the shape of greater effectiveness, accuracy and discrimination in the use of force and greater levels of force protection for all campaign participants. The result will be increased confidence amongst political decision-makers at times of strain, something that may well be even more important in the wake of the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. The thrust to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent at sea, and everything that goes with it, is clearly part of its determination “to deter and if necessary win the nation’s wars”.

This may well sustain, if not strengthen, a strategic culture of maintaining a resolute pre-eminence at all costs that was certainly appropriate in the twentieth century when peer competition with other major naval powers was the order of the day but which may be less appropriate in the globalizing world of the twenty-first century. Such aspirations for strategic dominance may not suit the U.S. Navy for significant contributions at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, whilst feeding the prejudices of those who complain of the malign affects of a U.S.-dominated unipolar world.

Finally in its procurements and programme acquisitions, the United States, despite its constant avowal of the benefits of free and open trade, is still concerned to maintain its own defence industrial base. It follows protectionist policies at variance with the values of

globalization, even at the price of annoying some of its closest allies, such as Japan over conditions for access to the F-22 or the United Kingdom over the JSF project.⁵⁴

Against this, to some extent at least, is the U.S. Navy's focus on expeditionary operations and the littoral, in which it has perforce to operate alongside its maritime partners as well, most obviously the U.S. Marine Corps. The investment in the currently troubled LCS programme, which is turning out to be a good deal more expensive than originally hoped for, illustrates the extent to which the U.S. Navy considers it necessary to "transform" itself in order to cope with a radically different strategic context.⁵⁵

The need to work alongside allies, and, indeed, the U.S. Coast Guard and Marine Corps is reinforced by the budgetary difficulties now faced by the U.S. Navy. As a result, it currently deploys only 276 platforms, the lowest total for nearly a century, and significantly below the 313 strong fleet the current CNO thinks it needs.

U.S. Operations

The U.S. Navy is perhaps at its most post-modernist in the focus of its current operations. It is putting a huge stress on a heavy programme of naval engagement with prospective maritime partners all around the world, but perhaps especially in and around the Gulf and the Asia Pacific.

In this, the U.S. Navy also recognizes that the range of requirements also calls for the strongest possible integration of the naval effort with other forces of maritime order, particularly the U.S. Coast Guard. Often, indeed, as both the Japanese and the Americans

doing so, it indirectly defends the system, whilst at the same time serving U.S. national interests and contributing to the United States' maritime outreach.

The Navy recognizes that the positive encouragement of allied participation in all manner of maritime operations calls for a focused, deliberate and intelligent maritime assault on all the things that make this difficult at the moment. Interoperability is key. This is partly a matter of shared technical proficiency, which is ultimately “fixable”, and also of protocols, and standard operating procedures.⁵⁷ The American tendency to over-classify everything does not help.⁵⁸ Policy divergences with coalition partners may be rather less tractable, especially if the United States is thought to be pursuing a unilateralist and nationalist agenda.

Nonetheless the U.S. Navy obviously still retains the potential for independent action of a more traditional kind, a potential perhaps exhibited by its campaign of pressure on Iran.⁵⁹

Case Study 2: The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF)

The Japanese in their slow march towards “reluctant realism” and their “steady progress toward becoming a ‘normal’ state” are producing naval forces capable of contributing to the maintenance of global security whilst defending national sovereignty and local interests in the Northeast Pacific.⁶⁰

On the face of it, the JMSDF would likewise seem of the archetypal post-modernist “collaborative” sort since the country it defends is ostentatiously global in its economic assumptions and needs, it is profoundly maritime and it is profoundly democratic. All the same, Japan also appears to be striking a balance between the modernist and post-modernist approaches to the maritime aspects of its security.

JMSDF Strategic Thinking

The country's National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) of December 2004 and its Defence White Paper of August 2005 identify two major strategic requirements for the country's armed forces. The first is “to prevent and repel any threat against Japan”—clearly a

⁵⁷ Paul T. Mitchell, *Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy*, London: IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 385, 2006.

⁵⁸ This was even a problem in the tsunami relief operation. Elleman, op. cit., p. 72.

⁵⁹ “US Considers naval build-up as warning to Iran”, *The Guardian*, 20 December 2006.

⁶⁰ Daniel Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the post 9/11 World* (pp. 7, 9, 85 and 126), Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006.

traditional modernist perspective. Since Japan comprises some 400 inhabited islands, has the world's sixth largest EEZ and is dependent on sea lines of communication by which come 95 per cent of its raw materials and nearly all its trade, a recognized need for significant forces to defend its maritime space and interests would seem unsurprising. And, indeed, incidents as varied as local piracy, intrusions into Japanese waters by North Korean spy-ships, Chinese hydrographic vessels, aircraft and a Han-class submarine appear to be attracting an increasingly robust response.⁶¹

In this regard, it has been interesting to note the slow parallel shift in attitude in recent years towards the JMSDF. The current programme to restore Admiral Togo's flagship, the *Mikasa* at Yokosuka and the recent spate of films on various aspects of the Pacific war at sea, most obviously Haruki Kadokawa's blockbuster, "Yamato: The Last Battle", suggest that a slow rehabilitation of the Imperial Japanese Navy is taking place and that this is connected with a growing public acceptance of an expanding naval role for Japan. As Haruki Kadokawa himself is quoted as saying, "I want people to start thinking again about how to live with self-awareness and pride as Japanese."⁶²

Unsurprisingly, this has reinforced perceptions in some quarters that Japan is indeed re-embarking on a more assertive course which could destabilize the security of Asia. Japan's attempts to reinterpret Article 9 of the constitution have therefore become controversial.

But against this, the other, markedly novel, focus of the NDPO is, in any case, that it is notably collectivist in approach:

Japan will engage in its own diplomatic activities to prevent the emergence of threat by improving the international security environment, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and Japan's alliance partner.⁶³

⁶¹ Denny Roy, "Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan's Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japanese Relations", APCSS Occasional Paper, September 2003; "Japanese Security Policy", lecture by His Excellency Mr. Shohei Naito, Ambassador to the Belgium, address at SHAPE, 17 March 2005; Martin Jacques, "Japan's Resurgent Nationalism has Global Ramifications", *The Guardian*, 27 September 2006; Simon Tisdall, "Japan Emerges as America's Deputy Sheriff in the Pacific", *The Guardian*, 19 April 2005. Fukushiro Nukaga, "Japan's Defence Policy: Basic Principles and New Initiatives", *Journal of the RUSI*, February 2006. See also Vice-Admiral Hideaki Kaneda, "Japan's National Maritime Doctrines and Capabilities", in Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman (Eds.), *The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific* (p. 123), Singapore: World Scientific and IDSS, 2006.

⁶² "Battleship Epic Reignites Anger over Japan's Wartime Excesses", *The Guardian*, 16 December 2005. The popularity of Clint Eastwood's film, "Letters From Iwo Jima", and, more controversially, the sanitization of reports of forced suicides in the defence of Okinawa lend weight to this argument. "Told to Commit Suicide, Survivors Now Face Elimination from History", *The Guardian*, 6 July 2007.

⁶³ Naito speech, op. cit., p. 7.

In its actions in the Indian Ocean and Iraq, Japan seems to be re-working its alliance with the United States, turning it into a global partnership rather than an exercise in regional defence.

JSMDF Programmes

Modernist thinking is reflected in a trend towards the development of an even more capable coastguard force and an increasing emphasis on building naval forces stronger in the disciplines of sea control, particularly in the areas of anti-submarine and anti missile defence, which take Chinese capabilities as a benchmark of what is required. The interest in the new large helicopter carrying destroyer, the 13,500 ton 16DDH and the prospect of its becoming a kind of tactical aircraft carrier seems to support the existence of such a trend. The possibility that this ship might be named *Akagi*, the flagship of the Pearl Harbour attack force, aroused further considerable controversy.⁶⁴

JSMDF Operations

Although it is still constrained by its current constitution, recent re-interpretations of that constitution have allowed the Japanese navy to take on an increasingly expeditionary character with its involvement in the multilateral Afghan and Iraq operations. The threats of international terrorism and piracy have also resulted in a considerable expansion in the range of naval and other military activity in recent years. These have included interest in maintaining and contributing to anti-piracy patrols off Southeast Asia, continuing logistical support for coalition forces engaged in *Operation Enduring Freedom* in the Indian Ocean, the tsunami relief operation, the shipping of humanitarian aid to the Turkish earthquake and so on.⁶⁵ Here expanding naval activity is seen as a natural Japanese contribution to the international community's response to threats to the international system. In parallel, such activity is also seen as a means of engaging with other maritime powers, particularly the United States, China and India.

This range of naval activities calls for the ability to operate at a distance for long periods of time, and for a focus on the interface between land and sea rather than on conventional conceptions of battle and sea control. Because the needs of the first and second approaches are not identical, choices may need to be made. Anti-submarine and anti-missile

⁶⁴ "New Japan Helicopter Carriers Equipped with Aegis Systems", East-Asia-Intl.com, 7 December 2005.

⁶⁵ "Groundbreaking relief effort in Aceh under way", *Japan Times*, 28 January 2005.

capabilities for example are expensive; investing heavily in these demanding capabilities may well reduce the number of vessels available for collective operations in the Indian Ocean.

Nonetheless, against this evidence of its becoming a “collaborative” navy, a high percentage of Japan’s maritime task revolves around the defence of its territory and waters against air and maritime incursions, against missile attack and even full-scale amphibious attack. Even in its whaling policy Japan is willing to take a very independent and national line.⁶⁶ Nonetheless the focus of the Japanese navy is on the perceived importance of the American connection, and now of a deepening relationship with the Australians in its traditional concerns about the growth of the Chinese navy on the one hand, and the possible intent of the North Koreans on the other.

In June 2006, the Aegis class destroyer *Kirishima* was pulled out of an important multinational exercise off Hawaii and brought home, apparently in response to concerns over developments in North Korea. This is a nice example of the primacy of traditional / modernist imperatives over post-modernist ones, at least in some circumstances.⁶⁷ Certainly, the Japanese navy seems intent on building up its missile defences and according to some reports is at least pursuing the idea of being able to defend itself proactively by developing the capacity to strike at the source of such threats.⁶⁸ Moreover, the intrusion of a Chinese submarine into Japanese waters in November 2004 highlighted the navy’s apparent need for an increased focus on advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities.⁶⁹

Case Study 3: The Chinese Navy

As for the Chinese themselves, they are modernizing and developing every aspect of their maritime industries and naval forces and are playing an increasingly important part in the global economy. On the other hand, they have a “democratic deficit”, an economy that is less than fully liberal and most of their military activity would seem to be focused on the immediate defence of their sovereignty and overseas interests. They too, then seem to fit the

⁶⁶ “A Firm Line on Whaling in Japan”, *International Herald Tribune*, 14 March 2007. Interestingly, the paper quotes Ayako Okubo of the Oceans Policy Research Foundation: “It’s not because Japanese want to eat whale meat. It’s because they don’t like being told not to eat it by foreigners.”

⁶⁷ “Japan Orders Destroyer Home Amid North Korean Concerns”, *International Herald Tribune*, 29 June 2006.

⁶⁸ “Japan Seeks Power to Strike Missile Bases”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 July 2006.

⁶⁹ “Submarine that Intruded into Japanese Waters Likely to be Chinese Vessel”, *Mainichi Shimbun*, 11 November 2004.

model of countries demonstrating both modern and post-modern tendencies. But, at least at first glance, their approach is predominantly modern despite their economic centrality in globalization. Indeed their global exposure in some ways is actually increasing the perceived need for more capable naval forces. Thus, as one Chinese analyst has observed:

Economic globalization entails globalization of the military means for self-defense ... With these complex and expanding interests, risks to China's well-being have not lessened, but have actually increased.⁷⁰

PLA[N] Strategic Thinking

Although there is evidence of aspirations to move out to the so-called "second island chain" and perhaps beyond, the immediate focus of the Chinese navy is on the direct defence of what they take to be their interests in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea.⁷¹

Their developing interests in national energy security, and the consequent "string of pearls" concept for an extension of their areas of concern around Southeast Asia and across the Indian Ocean to the Gulf and East Africa are equally modernist in conception.

It is then not surprising to find increasing stress on Mahanian thinking in their naval discourse. At a symposium conducted in Beijing in 2004, Chinese analysts pointed out the need for China to "build up a strong sea power guarding against the threats to our 'outward leaning economy' by some strong nations". Globalization did *not* mean the end of such traditional conceptions as the command of the sea, bearing in mind that "Mahan believed that whoever could control the sea is achieved through decisive naval battles on the sea; that the outcome of decisive battles is determined by the strength of fire power on each side of the engagement". This is scarcely the language of protracted defensive resistance that some Western scholars think is all that China aspires to.⁷²

More recently though, there have also been signs of China's developing the wider internationalist perspectives perhaps to be expected of one of the world's great trading countries. The Chinese have, for example been willing to begin participating in peace support

⁷⁰ Professor Zhang Wenmu of the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, cited in Gordon Fairclough, "As China Grows, So Does its Long-neglected Navy", *Wall Street Journal*, 16 July 2007.

⁷¹ You Ji, "China's Naval Strategy and Transformation", in Prabhakar et al, op. cit., p. 72.

⁷² James R. Homes and Toshi Yoshihara, "The Influence of Mahan upon China's Maritime Strategy", *Comparative Strategy*, January–March 2005, pp. 53–71, and their excellent *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan*, London: Routledge (forthcoming).

operations.⁷³ Moreover, the success of its “smiling diplomacy” in winning support in Southeast Asia, and apparent efforts to secure a more consensual solutions to the problem of managing the dispute in the South China Sea attest to a thoroughly “internationalist” conception of the value of soft power.

PLA[N] Programmes

The Chinese Navy’s focus on the procurement of submarines is entirely consistent with a strategy of sea denial intended not merely to defend the maritime approaches to China against intruding naval forces bent on attacking the mainland. It is also seen as evidence of a desire to deter external intervention in any future conflict with, and / or over, Taiwan. Some see the Chinese desire to achieve closure of the Taiwan problem, not simply as the final move of the drive towards national re-unification, but also as a strategic move designed to increase the country’s defensive perimeter and perhaps enable it to influence regional sea lines of communication.⁷⁴ Certainly, there is not much doubt of their desire to advance their active defence, anti-access and sea denial capabilities.⁷⁵

Plans for their surface fleet, however, might be thought to express a developing interest in forward operations and in maritime power projection. “China,” says the Pentagon’s recent report to Congress, “is investing in maritime surface and sub-surface weapons systems that could serve as the basis for a force capable of power projection to secure vital sea lines of communication and / or key geo-strategic terrain.”⁷⁶ The continuing absence of a carrier programme and the reliance on Russian equipment perhaps demonstrates the Chinese Navy’s current limits and the recent anti-satellite programme its long-term aspirations.

Accordingly there is great interest in their carrier programme. Recent developments have re-animated earlier debate about whether China was, or was not, according high priority to a potentially transformational carrier programme and the prospect of the Chinese forming ocean-going battle groups.⁷⁷

⁷³ “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”, a Report to Congress, 9 June 2006, p. 12.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 10, cites Chinese commentators to this effect.

⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 13, 25–26.

⁷⁶ Military Power, op. cit., p. 1.

⁷⁷ “Is China Building a Carrier?”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 17 August 2005; “First China Unveils this Fighter jet. Now, It Says It can Build an Aircraft Carrier”, *The Straits Times*, 10 January 2007. You Ji, op. cit., p. 86.

PLA[N] Operations

The 2001 incident of the air collision near Hainan island between a U.S. aircraft and a Chinese fighter, was a dramatic example of their “exclusive” approach to the maintenance of good order at sea in their own waters or as the Pentagon report put it: “China has an expansive view of its rights in the EEZ, treating the area as fully sovereign territory in a manner not consistent with international law.”⁷⁸ Their more recent and controversial anti-satellite test was also widely interpreted as an exercise in developing anti-access capability likewise at the expense of international agreement.⁷⁹

Moreover, the Chinese appear to be using naval forces to add emphasis to their views in a number of disputes with neighbours over maritime borders and claims.⁸⁰ On the other hand, the Chinese seem to be making increasing use of their naval forces to reach out to other countries and areas in a policy of constructive engagement.⁸¹ Thus in March 2006, Chinese frigates participated in a large-scale multinational exercise off Pakistan in “a display of international unity in the fight against terrorism and human, drugs and weapons trafficking”. All exercises were conducted in English, an important part of the drive to improve communications skills, procedures and international cooperation. China’s expanding diplomatic reach has caused some concern in the United States and indeed India, our fourth and final case study in this all too brief review.⁸²

Case Study 4: The Indian Navy (IN)

India operates a much more democratic and sometimes painfully transparent system that has many domestic preoccupations and immediate concerns with its territorial neighbours. Despite these problems, the country is rapidly becoming one of the most important players in the future world economy and is developing a navy of expanding reach and sophistication that again demonstrates an interesting blend of the modern / traditional and the post-modern. This reflects a determination to transform the navy in the light of “emerging geo-strategic and geo-economic imperatives [which] are continually shifting our national forces towards the

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 15.

⁷⁹ See reports in the *South China Morning Post* of 9 February 2007.

⁸⁰ “Taiwanese White Paper Records Chinese Incursions Reaching All-time High”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 6 September 2006.

⁸¹ “China Puts on a Friendly Face in PR drive”, *The Straits Times*, 17 May 2007.

⁸² *People’s Daily*, 10 March 2006; “US Uneasy as Beijing Develops a Strategic String of Pearls”, *The Guardian*, 10 November 2005.

sea. The Indian Navy is, therefore, destined to play a larger role in the future, both in our national security as well as in international affairs.”⁸³ Globalization is certainly an important aspect of this transforming international context, but so is energy security, and more traditional state-on-state concerns with Pakistan and China.

IN Strategic thinking

In its slow development of a concept of the role of maritime power which would guide its programme of acquisition and procurement, and perhaps protect the navy from the vicissitudes and sea-blindness so often lamented in the past, the Indian Navy has increased emphasis on sea-based deterrence, economic and energy security, forwards presence and naval diplomacy. In this, the publication in 2004 of Indian Maritime Doctrine has been an important development; although this is still largely operational in focus, it reflects an interesting blend of broader ideas.

Over the past few years, there has been a notable expansion of India’s internationalist concerns. This reflects its developing role in globalization, its concern for the Indian diaspora and its awareness of the impact on Indian interest of the expanding reach of other key players, such as the United States but most notably, China. China’s appearance in the Indian Ocean, however natural, is regarded with some concern.⁸⁴

India’s participation in collaborative exercises against international terrorism appears largely driven by their own sense of vulnerability to terrorist attacks launched from elsewhere in the Indian sub-continent; it seems, essentially to be response to domestic susceptibilities rather than to worries about the vulnerabilities of the globalization system as a whole.

Their current transformational emphasis is on developing their power projection and expeditionary capabilities, much of which could be deployed in the general defence of the system alongside their maritime partners. But the tone of much of their discourse seems still to illustrate continuing concerns about Pakistan, a very national, modernist preoccupation. Their Maritime Doctrine addresses the point directly:

⁸³ Adm Arun Prakash, *The Future Indian Navy: Strategic Guidance for Transformation*, 16 October 2006, pp. 17, 20.

⁸⁴ Vijay Sakhuja, “Indian Navy: Keeping Pace with Emerging Challenges”, in Prabhakar et al, op. cit., p. 191.

One school of thought avers that the fleet battles of the past are part of military history and that such exigencies will not occur again. It is only a rash security planner who will be so complacent ...⁸⁵

In this connection it is interesting to note the traditional emphasis given sea control. “Sea control,” says their doctrine, “is the central concept around which the Indian Navy is structured.”⁸⁶ Sea control is valued because it confers independence of action.

IN Programmes

India’s current naval programmes are generally aimed at all-round fleet modernization after decades of delay and disappointments, but two significant aspects might be picked out.

First, there is a definite focus on developing forward power projection capabilities in terms of two operational carrier battle groups, and so the modernization of the IN’s carrier programme is key.⁸⁷ The recent acquisition of the *USS Trenton* is a significant move in the campaign to beef up the amphibious capabilities that go with it. The clear aim is to develop “amphibious landing and exercise tactics aimed at influencing battles on land from force deployment at sea”.⁸⁸

Second, they have an ambitious submarine programme of modernizing existing forces, while developing new ones. These will serve standard sea denial / control purposes but are likely to be associated with an eventual move to take their independent nuclear deterrent to sea. When asked for details about this, IN officers are usually charmingly opaque however. Nonetheless their doctrinal statement makes a very modernist point:

India stands out alone as being devoid of a credible nuclear triad. It is one of the tenets of the post-Cold War era that the ability of a nation to adopt a truly independent foreign policy / posture is inexorably linked with such a strategic capability either directly or indirectly.⁸⁹

Both aspects of the general Indian programme, however, are aimed at producing a first class navy of expanding reach that reflects India’s increasing economic and strategic inter-

⁸⁵ *Indian Maritime Doctrine* (INBR 8), Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2004, p. 50.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁸⁷ *Times of India*, 27 January 2007.

⁸⁸ IRNA, 5 February 2007; NewKerala.com, 26 February 2007.

⁸⁹ *Indian Maritime Doctrine*, op. cit., *ibid.*, p. 54.

dependence with the rest of a globalizing world and could be used for a wide variety of modernist / post-modernist purposes.

Another aspect of this, though, is that the Indians exhibit much concern about their dependence on foreign arms manufacturers, which given recent experience of their dealings with both the Russians and the Americans at various stages is perhaps hardly surprising. Now they are stressing the indigenization of their Defence Industrial Base, which now provides about 80 per cent of their needs. Despite an extraordinarily ambitious fleet modernization programme, which is currently filling all its shipyards, there are those who wonder whether India will in fact be able to meet all its aspirations in the time frame envisaged.⁹⁰ Indigenization of the Indian Defence Industrial base would certainly reduce the country's level of dependence on others (which has sometimes caused difficulties in the past) but the process itself does present costs in time as well as money terms. It does, moreover, represent a step back from the reliance on a world market that is a characteristic of a thoroughly globalized power.

IN Operations

The operations and exercises of the Indian Navy are clearly in support of "... our core business of war-fighting"; given that the IN has engaged in three wars with its Pakistani counterpart, this traditional preoccupation is hardly surprising.⁹¹ The need to secure energy supply lines from the Gulf is regarded as "a primary national maritime interest" and defensive operations are regularly practised.⁹²

The IN puts a high premium on naval diplomacy and on collaborative maritime relationships with others, now especially the Chinese and the Americans; these are now cooperative but part conflictual too. China and India seem to be scrambling for influence around the rim of the Indian Ocean, while at the same time moderating their competition with fraternal rhetoric and the occasional bilateral exercise.⁹³ India is, moreover, broadly sympathetic to the notion of joining in the Thousand Ship Navy / Global Maritime Network concept.

⁹⁰ Rahul Bedi, "Lack of Strategic Will is Sapping India's Potential", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 August 2006.

⁹¹ Prakash, op. cit., Foreword.

⁹² Indian Maritime Doctrine, op. cit., p. 63.

⁹³ Anthony Paul, "Asian Giants' Game of Chess in Indian Ocean", *The Straits Times*, 16 May 2007.

Finally, the IN has maintained anti-piracy patrols in the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca and is particularly proud of its fast and extensive reaction to the tsunami operation of 2004. Twenty-two Indian naval vessels were en route, within hours of the disaster and were the first to arrive at some of the stricken locations. Likewise, the IN sent four ships to Beirut in 2006, joining in a loose and cooperative multilateral naval operation, took in relief supplies and took out 2,280 people. One of the evident aims of the navy is to enhance its capacity to join in such collaborative operations.⁹⁴

Conclusion

This review of four case studies of the navies of the Asia Pacific is clearly sketchy and the two modernist and post-modernist paradigms are crudely drawn. Much work clearly remains to be done, but already an emerging conclusion is that while around the world there is a marked shift from the traditional / national to the collective paradigm of naval power, this phenomenon is significantly slower and more complex in the Asia Pacific than it is in Europe. In Asia, despite the changes, the nation state and the traditional, modernist naval thinking that goes with it seems alive and well.

⁹⁴ “IN Fleet Leaves for Historic Exercise”, *Daily News and Analysis India*, 25 March 2007; James R. Homes and Andrew C. Winner, “A New Naval Diplomacy”, *Proceedings of the USNI*, July 2007, pp. 35–38.

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