<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th>Terrorist threat to Singapore's land transportation infrastructure: a preliminary enquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author(s)</strong></td>
<td>Dolnik, Adam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URL</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4409">http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4409</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rights</strong></td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 118

The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry

Adam Dolnik

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Singapore

30 November 2006

With Compliments

This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.
The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to:

- Conduct research on security, strategic and international issues.
- Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology.
- Promote joint and exchange programmes with similar regional and international institutions; and organise seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific.

Constituents of IDSS include the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) and the Asian Programme for Negotiation and Conflict Management (APNCM).

Research
Through its Working Paper Series, IDSS Commentaries and other publications, the Institute seeks to share its research findings with the strategic studies and defence policy communities. The Institute’s researchers are also encouraged to publish their writings in refereed journals. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The Institute has also established the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies (named after Singapore’s first Foreign Minister), to bring distinguished scholars to participate in the work of the Institute. Previous holders of the Chair include Professors Stephen Walt (Harvard University), Jack Snyder (Columbia University), Wang Jisi (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Alastair Iain Johnston (Harvard University) and John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago). A Visiting Research Fellow Programme also enables overseas scholars to carry out related research in the Institute.

Teaching
The Institute provides educational opportunities at an advanced level to professionals from both the private and public sectors in Singapore as well as overseas through graduate programmes, namely, the Master of Science in Strategic Studies, the Master of Science in International Relations and the Master of Science in International Political Economy. These programmes are conducted full-time and part-time by an international faculty. The Institute also has a Doctoral programme for research in these fields of study. In addition to these graduate programmes, the Institute also teaches various modules in courses conducted by the SAFTI Military Institute, SAF Warrant Officers’ School, Civil Defence Academy, and the Defence and Home Affairs Ministries. The Institute also runs a one-semester course on ‘The International Relations of the Asia Pacific’ for undergraduates in NTU.

Networking
The Institute convenes workshops, seminars and colloquia on aspects of international relations and security development that are of contemporary and historical significance. Highlights of the Institute’s activities include a regular Colloquium on Strategic Trends in the 21st Century, the annual Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO) and the biennial Asia Pacific Security Conference. IDSS staff participate in Track II security dialogues and scholarly conferences in the Asia-Pacific. IDSS has contacts and collaborations with many international think tanks and research institutes throughout Asia, Europe and the United States. The Institute has also participated in research projects funded by the Ford Foundation and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. It also serves as the Secretariat for the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Singapore. Through these activities, the Institute aims to develop and nurture a network of researchers whose collaborative efforts will yield new insights into security issues of interest to Singapore and the region.
ABSTRACT

The highly lethal attacks against land transportation targets in Madrid and London have sparked considerable amount of debate in Singapore about the terrorist threat to the local land transportation infrastructure. How real is this threat and what can be done to counter it? This is the central question addressed in this working paper.

While transportation targets in general have always been a terrorist favorite, in recent years there has been an increased emphasis on attacking soft transportation targets such as mass transit. There are several distinct reasons for this development, including the increasing difficulty of successfully striking other targets, the ease of producing large number of casualties, the panic-spreading universality of the city bus or metro car, economic impact on the afflicted state by crippling workforce mobility and deterring foreign investment and tourism, symbolic value, and an overall high probability of success and a low level of risk. Indeed, since 1991 more then 42 percent of terrorist strikes worldwide were directed specifically against land transportation, producing the highest casualty rates of any type of terrorist attack.

With regards to the threat to Singapore’s transit system, analysis of JI’s ideology and targeting patterns reveals an increasing preference for soft, Western, mass-casualty targets in Southeast Asia. But while Singapore’s commuter transportation system fully encompasses all of these adjectives, the recently weakened JI currently lacks to capability to strike this type of target. Still, other adjacent threats exist including a possible attack by a home-grown terror cell, attempted suicides by deranged individuals, or the disruption of service via a wave of hoaxes by pranksters or terror group sympathizers.

Despite the relatively low level of threat, Singapore has made many preparations and preventive measures that other countries that have experienced surface transportation terrorism have identified as pillars of effective public transportation security. These essentially include prevention, effective response and timely mitigation, and psychological defence measures.

***********

Dr. Adam Dolnik is currently Director of Research Development and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP) at the University of Wollongong in Australia. Formerly he has served as Chief Trainer at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, and as a researcher at the WMD Terrorism Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California and at the United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna, Austria.

Dolnik’s research has been published in over a dozen edited books and a variety of international journals, including Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, International Negotiation: Journal of Theory and Practice, Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs, Yaderny Kontrol. He is also the author of Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends (Routledge, forthcoming in 2007) and Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists (Praeger Security International, forthcoming in 2007).
The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry

Introduction

On 11 March, 2004, ten 5-10 kilogram bombs exploded on board four trains in three Madrid stations during the morning rush hour, killing 190 people and injuring over 1,400 more in what at the time was the ninth deadliest terrorist attack in world history. Then on 7 July 2005, three suicide bombers exploded their devices within 50 seconds of each other on three London Underground trains, with a fourth bomb exploding on a bus nearly an hour later. 52 people were killed and about 700 were injured in the most lethal terrorist attack in the history of the United Kingdom.¹

Both Madrid and London have sparked considerable amount of debate in Singapore about the terrorist threat to the local land transportation infrastructure. How real is this threat and what can be done to counter it? This is the central question that this working paper will seek to address. First, the global trends in land transportation terrorism will be discussed, along with an analysis of the scope of reasons behind land transportation becoming an increasingly attractive terrorist target. Secondly, the paper will focus on threat assessment with regard to the possibility of an attack on transportation infrastructure in Singapore, with a particular focus on the al Qaida-linked al Jemaah al Islamiya (JI) organization, a group that had plans to attack the country’s transportation infrastructure in the past. And finally, an overview of measures that could be implemented to mitigate the threat will be provided.

Trends in Transportation Terrorism

Transportation in general has been one of the most preferred terrorist targets, consisting of more then half of all terrorist attacks overall. This trend is highly disturbing, particularly in light of the fact that attacks against transportation targets have been extremely lethal when compared to other terrorist targets. Particularly in attacks against land transportation targets, terrorists have utilized the full terrorist arsenal: bombings, sabotage, arson, capture of hostages, dispersal of chemical and biological agents, roadside ambushes, and assaults with standoff weaponry.

¹ Excluding the 1988 bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland
The initial terrorist attacks against transportation in the late 1960s focused primarily on commercial airliners, which represented the highly visible symbols of nations, confined “containers” of hostages, as well as mobile platforms providing the terrorists a chance of escape. Since 1968 and the PFLP hijacking of an ElAl airliner from Rome to Algiers, the favorite mode of attacking aviation targets included the hijacking of aircraft, with the goal of taking hostages for the instrumental purpose of forcing governments into political concessions. Following increased security measures at airports consisting of a mandatory installation of metal detectors and other devices for boarding gate screening of passengers and luggage, along with increased international cooperation, successful hostage rescue raids of Entebbe and Mogadishu, and the increasingly tougher stance of many governments on the issue of granting concessions to hijackers, the hijacking of an airliner became an increasingly challenging task. This resulted in a change of modus operandi among many terrorist groups. While some organizations simply shifted their attention form aviation targets onto land based symbolic targets such as embassies, others responded by modifying their tactics thereby shifting the gravity of aviation terrorism to shooting attacks and bombings of airports and airliners in midcourse flight. Since 1980, 225 attacks on civilian aircraft or airports have occurred worldwide, with two-thirds (150) being attacks on civilian aircraft and one-third (75) being attacks on airports. Governments were once again forced to modify their security measures in order to counter this new threat. As a result the emphasis was now placed on the threat of bombing of airliners in midcourse flight, as opposed to hijackings. Especially the 1988 bombing of the Pan Am 103 flight over Lockerbie, solidified the perception that hijackings as a terrorist tactic had greatly diminished. These changes, while effective in some ways, again opened new opportunities for terrorists to exploit. For instance, prior to 9-11 it was perfectly feasible to overtly bring items such as knives and other bladed weapons on board domestic flights in the U.S., under the condition that the length of the blade did not exceed four inches. On September 11th 2001, 19 hijackers exploited our misjudged dismissal of the hijack threat, and by using a tactic that has already been

---

3 Jenkins, Brian Michael “Improving Public Surface Transportation Security: What Do We Do Now?” The Lexington Institute, July 2003
overlooked as nearly obsolete, they succeeded in perpetrating the most destructive terror attack in history. This example reminds us about the amorphous nature of the terrorist threat, which should force us to constantly challenge and reevaluate the basic assumptions upon which our security framework is based. Today, aviation security has been boosted not only by improved screening measures, but also by an increased resistance to hijacking attempts on behalf of the passengers, who no longer see their chances for survival as high. Nevertheless, we still have seen highly lethal attacks on civil aviation, such as the August 2004 twin suicide bombings of passenger airliners in Russia that killed 89 people. This incident reminds us that no security system is foolproof. Besides the threat of suicide bombings or hijackings, other current high-priority threats include the possible use of surface-to-air missiles against civil airliners, as well as the potential of crude dispersal of chemical or biological on board passenger aircraft.

With the declining prominence of aviation terrorism, the greatest current threat is constituted by attacks against surface transportation: trains, stations, depots and buses. A softer target than aviation, surface transportation offers terrorists easy access and little security to penetrate. In addition, the large crowds of strangers at surface transportation facilities guarantee anonymity for the attackers and facilitate their escape. Further, analysis of more than 22,000 terrorist incidents since 1968 indicates that attacks on land-based transportation targets have the highest casualty rates of any type of terrorist attack. On average, attacks against such systems created more than two-and-a-half times the casualties per incident as attacks on aviation targets. In terms of fatalities, attacks on surface transportation are among the deadliest, ranking behind attacks on aviation and nearly equaling fatality rates of attacks on religious and tourist targets.

Despite the heightened focus on ground transportation terrorism in the wake of London and Madrid, it must be emphasized that this threat is far from new. For instance, in May 1985, Sikh terrorists killed 84 people in a wave of attacks involving booby trapped transistor radios left on buses in New Delhi and three adjacent Indian states. Between 1991 and 1999 the IRA planted no less then 81 explosive devices on British underground and railway cars, terrorizing commuters in the whole country.

---

5 Jenkins, Brian Michael "Improving Public Surface Transportation Security: What Do We Do Now?" The Lexington Institute, July 2003
6 Jenkins, Brian Michael "Improving Public Surface Transportation Security: What Do We Do Now?" TheLexington Institute, July 2003
Then in 1995, Aum Shinkrikyo attempted to release sarin, hydrogen cyanide and botulinum toxin on subway trains or stations in Japanese cities on at least eight occasions, in one instance killing 12 and injuring 1,039. During the same year the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) spread terror in France with a wave of bombings in the Paris metro. And finally, in one of the most disturbing recent trends in global terrorism, suicide bombers have killed scores of passengers on Israeli buses and more recently the Russian metro. Overall, according to a study conducted in 1996 by the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI), almost a third of all terrorist activity worldwide since 1920 involves transportation targets. According to a more current study conducted by the Brookings Institution, between 1991 and 2001 a full 42 percent of terrorist strikes worldwide were directed against mass transit. With enhanced aviation security measures further decreasing chances of successful attack on aircraft and given the high public visibility of Madrid and London, terrorists are likely to rely even more on land transportation targets in the future.

**Why terrorists attack transportation targets**

There are several distinct reasons behind the continual increase in the proportion of attacks against land transportation over other targets. The first reason are the trends in global terrorism, which have witnessed the increasing lethality of individual attacks, along with the reduction in the volume of targets that are considered “taboo” by most terrorist groups. Because ground transportation provides a high concentration of people in a confined space, it creates an attractive mass-casualty environment; if a bomb is detonated in such a confined space, the blast wave has great potential for destruction. This is especially true in cases where the blast occurs on board trains passing underground or through tunnels, which create another obstruction for the blast to escape, resulting in even higher casualties. A clear example of this was the February 2004 attack on a train in Moscow, where the device carried by the suicide bomber was quite small but caused disproportionate damage, killing 42 and wounding 250, mainly because the blast had nowhere to escape in the

---

9 between 2.5 - 5 kg of TNT
tunnel. The mass casualty environment of public transportation is one of the key reasons why attacks against transportation targets have been nearly twice as lethal as terror attacks overall. Secondly, another key advantage is the panic-spreading universality of the city bus or metro car, which underscores the perception among the civil population that anyone who uses public transportation could become a victim of the next terror attack. Thirdly, a terror campaign targeting commuter transportation can deter people from everyday travel, having a profound economic impact on the afflicted state by crippling the mobility of its workforce along with scaring away potential investors and tourists. Fourthly, continuous attacks against such frequently used infrastructure such as buses or trains can severely undermine government authority, as with time the populace grows increasingly frustrated, eventually blaming the government for its inability to maintain order. Fifthly, terrorists prefer transportation targets because they are essentially a feature of large population centers, which in the terrorist’s mindset represent a strike against the heart of the enemy. And finally, unlike civil aviation which was the favorite terror target throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, ground transportation is essentially a soft target that provides the terrorists with almost an infinite number of options for operations with a high probability of success and a low level of risk. In short, commuter transportation is an attractive terror target, a reality that is unlikely to change any time soon. On the contrary, attacks against public transportation are becoming even more prominent than in the past, especially with the declining capability of terror organizations to successfully launch attacks against hard targets.

**Threat assessment**

In most basic terms, the threat assessment matrix consists of two critical factors: the intent of a potential perpetrator to attack a particular target, as well as the capability of that actor to carry out a successful attack against that target. In the absence of either component, an attack cannot take place. For the evaluation of intent one must understand the drivers in the given group’s decision-making, such as ideology, overall strategy, strength, leadership structure and demonstrated targeting patterns. Several key questions must be answered, i.e.: How would the given actor benefit from an attack against the target in question? Is the target seen as legitimate and justifiable by the group’s ideology? How does it fit into the overall strategy of
what the group is trying to achieve? Is the group operationally conservative or innovative? Does the given target fit the group’s established targeting pattern? If not, what are the prospects of a change occurring in the group’s targeting preferences? Are there any shortcomings or dangers involved in such a change? What is the authority of the leadership or autonomous cells to initiate such a change? All of these factors should be examined in the assessment of intent.

Similarly, in the assessment of capability, we need to look at a combination of several components. What types of weapons and tactics has the group used thus far? Are these usable in an assault on the target in question? How and with what prospects of success? Are there any indications of possible changes in the group’s established *modus operandi*? Does the group in question have the organizational practicality to infiltrate the environment in question in order to launch its attack? How does the given target compare to other targets in terms of difficulty and probability of success? All of these questions need to be taken into consideration in the analysis of a possible threat. The next section will explore the threat posed by the JI to land transportation in Singapore.

**Intent**

With regards to ideology, the religious nature of the organization seems to provide the group with an enhanced level of enemy dehumanization, which ultimately leads to an escalating spiral of violence and the associated inclination toward producing an increasingly large number of casualties. This trend seems to be confirmed by the operational progression JI has undergone over the past few years. Inspired by Darul Islam and founded with the intent of creating a regional Islamic government in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah originally focused its wrath against local targets such as the assassination attempt on the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia, who was injured in the explosion of a remotely detonated car bomb in August 2000. Three people were killed and 17 others were wounded in the attack. But the JI leadership’s willingness to become a public political organization had contributed to an ideological split within the group, which effectively triggered the escalation of JI tactics on behalf of the more radical faction under the operational command of Hambali. In December 2000, JI operatives conducted 38 bomb attacks throughout Indonesia targeting Christian churches, on the one hand maintaining the
group’s targeting logic but on the other introducing elements of synchronization and grandiosity on a scale previously unknown. The Christmas 2000 church bombings clearly aimed for a much higher level of fatalities than JI has ever produced in the past, and despite the fact that the coordinated attack resulted in the death of “only” 19 people and injuries to 120 others, the modus operandi that was used in the attacks represented a significant shift. Further, when during the operation one of the cells encountered a problem with their target -- the church they selected was not having a Christmas Eve service -- it had been advised by Jabir to select any location such as a discotheque or other establishment, as long as it was either kafir (infidel) or Chinese. This suggestion was a good indication of where the JI elements under Hambali were heading. Only six days later, JI launched its first successful attack against transportation infrastructure in the Philippines, killing 14 people on a light railway train and wounding some 70 others by a series of explosions in Metro Manila. This attack again was a sign of an increasingly daring attempt at mass casualties.

The Metro Manila bombings, however, were not the first instance where JI planned to attack transportation infrastructure. In 1999 two members of JI’s Singapore cell, Mohammad Khalim bin Jaffar and Hashim bin Abbas conceived a plan to bomb a shuttle bus service conveying US personnel between Sembawang Wharf and the Yishun MRT Station. Around this time, the two men filmed several videos of the Yishun MRT area, which were then edited into a single piece and sent to Mohammad Atef, al Qaeda’s operations chief to Afghanistan. Interestingly, in this case the targeting was hardly indiscriminate, as the attack was specifically aimed at U.S. military personnel. Similarly, there is no indication that public transportation as such was a prime target, Jaffar simply selected the Yishun MRT station because he lived in the area, and because this was the only place with visible American military presence that he was familiar with. As such the targeting for this attack was focused and discriminate, thus quite different from Madrid or London style attacks. Likewise, for Operation JIBRIL in which multiple suicide bombers were supposed to detonate truck bombs in Singapore, only Western or kafir targets such as embassies and government buildings were selected, targeting specifically what the terrorists called “white meat”, and not the average Singaporean. This is another indication that public

11 Jabir, whose real name is Enjang Bastaman, was the close friend of Hambali. Both were fellow Afghan veterans who had also been associates in Malaysia.
12 Ressa (2002) p. 155
transportation might not have been an ideal target for the Singapore cell at that particular time, as the overwhelming majority of passengers who use the system are average Singaporeans, which the group was perhaps willing to sacrifice as a part of collateral damage, but did not have the intent to specifically target. And while this may be a subtle distinction, it does provide a critical insight into JI’s target selection logic. At the same time, the avoidance of Singaporean casualties is likely associated with the fact that the perpetrators themselves were Singaporean, suggesting that another cell that would be sent from another country to carry out attacks in Singapore might not share such a sentiment. This again underscores the fluidity of internal logic within terrorist organizations, which forces us to approach the issue of threat assessment from a non-static frame of reference.

After the failure of Operation JIBRIL due to the swift arrests of the Singapore cell’s members in December 2001, yet another important shift in JI’s targeting preferences took place. Under pressure to deliver a strike that would finally succeed, at the next meeting held in January 2002 in Thailand Hambali called for a revision of targeting procedures to focus on “soft targets” associated with the West, such as night, clubs, bars and hotels. The shift from hard government targets to soft tourist targets represents a significant escalatory progression – due partly to the difficulty of successfully attacking heavily protected government targets, the terrorists now started considering innocent civilians to be a guilty party in the conflict, regressing their attribution of guilt to the lowest possible common denominator: anyone but themselves and their co-conspirators. Indeed, Hambali reportedly distributed bin Laden’s fatwa advocating precisely this targeting logic among the operatives of the Bali attack. In the bin Laden text, anyone who supports the infidel governments by paying taxes is declared guilty of the resulting oppression of Muslims, and therefore a legitimate target. At the same time, even in the upcoming attacks the target selection still focused primarily on attaining American casualties.

On October 12, 2002, a man detonated a suicide belt in the Patty’s Bar in Bali. As people fled out onto the street in panic, another suicide bomber detonated a van loaded with nearly 1000 kg of explosives in the middle of the quickly forming crowd. According to one of the terrorists, the bomb weighed 1000 kilograms as a symbolic

---

13 Ibid. p. 182
14 Associated Press: Bali bombing link to bin Laden claimed. April 3, 2004
15 Although the majority of victims in Bali were Australians, interrogation reports reveal that the group planned to target American sailors; their ship however left earlier then expected.
payback for the one-ton bombs America dropped on Muslims in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{16} The attack represented the first use of suicide bombers in Southeast Asia, and followed a signature al Qaida \textit{modus operandi} of a synchronized attack against multiple targets. Only nine months after the Bali attack, suicide terror would reach the Indonesian capitol, when on August 5th, 2003, a car bomb exploded outside the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12 people and wounding 150 others. The link between the two attacks was immediately obvious. As in the Bali bombing, the perpetrators in Jakarta used the same kind of explosives, as well as mobile phones for the purposes of remote detonation. Another thirteen months later, on September 9, 2004, a nearly identical suicide truck bombing took place at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 10 people and injuring more than 180 others. The attack was a clear demonstration of the fact that despite the apprehension of Hambali in February 2004, the pro- al Qaida wing in the JI was still a potent force. Just in case there was any doubt, on October 1, 2005, three suicide bombers detonated their belts at the seaside area of Jimbaran Bay and the bar and shopping hub of Kuta, killing 23 people and wounding 102 more.

The above chronology carries several important lessons and implications. The first implication stems from the JI ideology, which at least in the interpretation of the more radical wing provides an environment that favors operations that can maximize damage and casualties. In this light, the mass casualty favorable environment of transportation systems provides a logical target for the group to attack. Secondly, JI’s larger goal of establishing a Muslim state in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and southern Philippines nominates Singapore as a natural target, as demonstrated by the various disrupted plots targeting the city state. Thirdly, following the failure to launch attacks against hard targets in Singapore and the Philippines, JI’s targeting pattern has witnessed the shift toward soft targets such as hotels, bars and clubs frequented by western tourists. The Bali bombing was the evidence of first such attack, followed by the J.W. Marriott bombing. Having grown increasingly confident after these two operations, key operatives of the JI radical wing, Noodrin Mohammed Top and Dr Azhari decided to once again attempt striking a hard target, choosing the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. However, the attack could hardly be considered a success by any standard, as all of the 11 casualties were Indonesian Muslims,

\textsuperscript{16} Wayne Miller: Bali attack delayed a day, mastermind reveals, The Age, July 5 2003
sparking a wave of popular resentment against the perpetrators. As a result, the group switched back to attacking soft targets with the second Bali bombings. This suggests that land transportation targets, which are “soft” by definition, are well within JI targeting scope. And while JI has yet to perpetrate attacks that would be completely indiscriminate in the sense that they would also deliberately target Muslims, attacking land transportation in a setting where non-Muslims provide the majority of passengers would certainly be ideologically acceptable, if not desirable. Singapore, Philippines and Thailand provide such a setting. Not coincidentally, have all three countries been targets in transportation attacks in the past.

**Capability**

Terrorist organizations generate various fantastical ideas and attack plans. Their ability to translate those plans into action, however, is very much constrained by the operational capability of the given group. Having established the logic for JI’s selection of Singapore’s land transportation system as a target, let us now focus on JI capabilities and operational skills, in order to assess the likelihood of a successful attack being launched as well as the probable *modus operandi* that such an operation is likely to employ.

JI’s tactical repertoire is a relatively modest one, at least when comparing to other major contemporary terrorist organizations. Virtually all of the group’s operations have involved the use explosive devices, detonated either remotely or by suicide bombers. JI has never engaged in shooting attacks, barricade hostage or kidnapping incidents, sabotage, or more exotic means of attack such as the dispersal of chemical or biological agents. Even in the area of explosive devices JI has been rather conservative, settling for the design that has worked in the past accompanied by minor incremental improvements over time.¹⁷ These improvements were essentially the result of a “learning from failure” approach. For instance, during the 2000 Christmas church bombings the explosive devices were made out of carbon, potassium, sulfur and TNT,¹⁸ wrapped in gift paper and rigged to mobile phones for remote detonation. In this case however, a number of the bombs malfunctioned, either failing to detonate completely or detonating at the wrong time. This has resulted in the

¹⁸ Ressa (2002) p. 102
death of several JI operatives including Hambali’s close friend Jabir, who forgot to change his SIM card and died in an explosion triggered by an unexpected phone call. JI bomb makers reviewed their mistakes and during the next major attack in Bali, not only were the destructive effects of the large bomb enhanced by packing the delivery vehicle with a dozen plastic filing cabinets filled with a mix of explosive materials; the device was also rigged with four separate detonation mechanisms (remote, timing, manual and anti-handling mechanism) to ensure that it would detonate as planned.\(^{19}\) The 1000 kg bomb, although only 30 percent efficient,\(^{20}\) produced a large enough explosion and subsequent fire to kill an overall number 202 of people, marking the deadliest attack since 9-11 and the 8\(^{th}\) deadliest attack in the history of terrorism. According to interrogation reports, the Bali terrorists originally planned for an even greater carnage, by incorporating a third suicide bomber who was supposed to ride a motorcycle through the doors of the packed Sari Club and detonate himself. The plan was abandoned only after it was discovered the man chosen for the suicide task could not ride a motorcycle.\(^{21}\)

The explosive device used in the bombing of the J.W. Marriot in Jakarta was identical to the one used in Bali, and although it was considerably smaller consisting of six plastic boxes weighing 19 kilograms each,\(^{22}\) it was still clear the attack was aimed to create as many casualties as possible. In order to increase lethality, the terrorists attached dozens of bars of laundry soap to containers of inflammable liquid which were placed next to the bomb. The mixture of sodium and fatty acids in the soap helped create fireballs which engulfed some of the victims.\(^{23}\) According to investigators, the bomb was personally detonated via a mobile phone by Dr. Azahari bin Husin, JI’s top bomb maker who escaped from the scene on the back of a motorcycle. The explosion produced a two-meter wide crater, penetrating through 32-centimeter thick concrete into the basement, and the suicide bomber’s head was catapulted all the way to the hotel’s 5\(^{th}\) floor. As earlier in Bali, also in this attack the perpetrators tried to prevent easy identification by attempting to scrape off the identification numbers on the vehicles used so they would not be easily traceable to

\(^{19}\) Ibid 186-187\(^{20}\) Australian investigators calculated that only about 30 percent of the chemical mixture exploded, the rest simply burned\(^\)\(^{21}\) Cindy Wockner: Third suicide bomber planned, The Advertiser, 23. July 2003\(^{22}\) Damar Harsanto: Reenactment traces bomb assembly, The Jakarta Post, December 10, 2003\(^{23}\) Damar Harsanto and Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, The Jakarta Post, 12 August 2003
the original owner. However, in both of these cases as well as in the case of the Australian embassy bombing, the Indonesian authorities were still able to recover and reconstruct the registration number from the debris, leading to the arrest of many of the JI members involved in the bombings. This fact, along with the failure to achieve significant damage to the Australian Embassy due to anti-vehicle barriers installed in front of the building, apparently led to a change in JI’s bombing approach. Instead of using trucks packed with explosives which had trouble approaching their targets, the group adopted the use suicide backpacks, which would not only be more difficult to trace, but could also be more successful in reaching the desired target. Such devices were not only used in the second Bali bombing, but were also recovered from the hideouts of Dr. Azahri during his elimination in Malang in November 2005, and even more importantly, in the safe house of Noordin Mohammed Top during the unsuccessful apprehension attempt in Wonosobo in May 2006. Especially the Wonosobo discovery is significant, as it demonstrates JI’s ability to construct these explosive devices even after the demise Azhari, the group’s chief bomb maker.

With regards to other potential tactics that could be used by JI, we also need to mention chemical and biological agents, especially in the light of the Aum Shinrikyo experience in Japan and the October 2003 discovery of a chemical and biological weapons manual in the apartment of top JI operative Taufiq Rifqi in Cotabato City southern Mindanao. This manual provides useful insights into the CBW capability of the group. On the one hand, the document surveys several agents of disturbing potency and expresses considerable optimism and fascination with regard to how miniscule amounts of the respective agent are needed to kill a large number of people. On the other hand, the manual hints a complete lack of knowledge with regards to efficient delivery of the produced agents. The manual covers a number of chemical gases, pesticides and even narcotics, as well as biological toxins. All of the agents are discussed in a uniform structural manner, describing the materials and the procedures

---

24 CBS news: Jakarta Bomber: Qaeda Group Link. August 8, 2003
25 Baker in Jackson (2005) p. 84
26 Stratfor: “Indonesia: Missing a Chance at a 'Top' Militant.” Stratfor Daily Terrorism Brief 05.01.2006
needed for the production of the given agent, expected effects, dosage, experimental results, and in some cases, delivery methods. With regards to the scope of the chemical agents listed, it is noteworthy that with the exception of phosgene, one of the gases that were developed and used for assassination purposes by the Aum Shinrikyo, none of the listed substances can be accurately described as warfare agents. The chemical substances covered in the manual include hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide, phosgene, chlorine, and arsenic, which are described in some detail. The manual also discusses various less threatening or completely unusable agents such as potassium ferrocyanide, potassium permanganate, chloroform, aniline, as well as a number of narcotics including cocaine, heroin and morphine. These agents are discussed in less detail, skipping the information on composition, manufacture and weaponization. Hydrogen cyanide, the blood agent that was used in the Nazi gas chambers under the name Cyclone-B, is the one substance that is covered in most detail. The manual also spends a considerable amount of space on describing two “firing devices” for this agent, one of which utilizes a close up release consisting of a mechanical break of a glass plate separating the binary components, triggering their mixture and immediate release. The other firing device then relies on the use of a table tennis ball as a delay mechanism. In this scenario the ball injected with sulfuric acid is placed into an open container filled with potassium or sodium cyanide, relying on the acid to eat through the plastic in order to combine with the other ingredient. Having described the production and delivery, the manual moves on to prescribing ideal targets, focusing mainly on buildings that are air-conditioned in order to “achieve a more rapid spread of the gas”. Overall, the chemical weapons section of the manual discusses fairly accurately the production of several highly potent agents that theoretically could cause the death of a large number of people. At the same time, only agents the production of which is about as challenging as the mixing of a lime juice are considered in further detail – the manual completely omits the category of nerve agents, which are the most potent but also most difficult to produce.

In the category of biological agents, the JI manual focuses only on toxins (poisons produced by living organisms) such as botulinum toxin, nicotine, toxins from poisonous mushrooms and potato buds. In terms of agent selection, only substances that can be easily produced from conventional materials such as cigarettes, potatoes, castor beans, mushrooms, or meat are considered. The described production methods are fairly accurate, but the problem with JI’s biological weapons knowledge is the
complete lack of mass-casualty capable delivery systems. Noteworthy in this respect is the complete absence of contagious agents that could theoretically be delivered by a human carrier via secondary transmission. The non-inclusion of contagious agents is by no means a surprise – the lack of control over the outcome of the attack makes them highly unattractive for terrorist purposes, unless of course the perpetrators desire to kill everyone including themselves, their constituency and even their own family members.

With regards to the threat to land transportation terrorism, the manual is interesting in that it references Aum Shinrikyo’s tactics in targeting Tokyo trains. In the discussion about hydrogen cyanide, the manual states: “[the agent] was used in a Japanese railway several years ago killing a number of people”. This statement, however appears to be highly inaccurate, as it apparently refers to the Tokyo subway gassings, which employed the nerve agent sarin, and not hydrogen cyanide. Another possibility is that the citation refers to the 5 May 1995 incident in the bathroom of the Shinjuku subway station, where two plastic bags containing 1.5 liters of diluted sulfuric acid and 2 liters of powdered sodium cyanide, respectively, were found on fire. The objective of the attack that was ascribed to the Aum Shinrikyo, was the production of hydrogen cyanide with the hope that the air-conditioning system would suck in the gas, dispersing it over the platform. The attack however failed to impact anyone, as have the three duplicate attempts that took place later during the same year. As a result, the vague reference in the JI manual is ultimately incorrect, which is significant given the common tendency of analysts to assume that terrorist organizations routinely learn from each other. While there are historical instances where organizations have indeed studied the operations conducted by other groups in order to learn from them, the JI manual example clearly shows the inability or unwillingness of this group to do the same. This is evident not only in the area of chemical agents, but also in the earlier discussed example of JI’s explosive devices.

Analysis

JI has in recent years experienced an internal split. The principal organizers behind the main attacks in Indonesia have been two Malaysians, Dr. Azahari and

Noordin Mohammed Top, both members of the more radical pro-al Qaida faction within the JI, which according to a former key JI operative Nasir Abbas, who “[sees itself] as fighting a new world battle. ... They say, we can attack civilians anywhere, just as Americans attack Muslim civilians all over the world”.

This view is in sharp contrast with the JI core, whose actions and objectives are very much local in nature. It is this faction that has shown the desire to launch attacks consistent with al Qaida targeting guidelines and using the signature *modus operandi* of multiple synchronized suicide attacks against high profile targets. An attack against the transportation system in Singapore, especially following the precedents set by Madrid and London, would certainly be consistent with the group’s preferences. Further, this group has planned attacks in Singapore in the past, has a history of targeting commuter transportation, and appears to be further progressing to soft targets. As a result the motivation to attack public transportation in Singapore is not in question. At the same time, this appears be too ambitious of a plan for the group in its current state. Following the elimination of Dr. Azhari in November 2005, the immediate capability of the group has certainly decreased. Yes, it is true that given the codification of Azahari’s knowledge in JI bomb making manuals and the presence of Noordin Mohammed Top, another key operative who is still at large, JI’s ability to launch further suicide operations had not yet been eliminated completely. But while it may be safe to assume that we may see more suicide attacks in Indonesia, JI’s reach currently does not appear to go past the borders of that country, at least as far as operations are concerned. This is especially true if we consider Singapore as a target, as the city state has more stringent border controls in place then most other countries in the region and provides many other barriers and security measures that would make a possible attack highly challenging. For instance, even if JI operatives were to overcome the immigration obstacle and succeed in infiltrating Singapore, significant obstacles in obtaining the necessary precursor materials to build explosive devices for the attack would still exist. These problems alone are likely to convince JI to focus on other, more feasible targets.

Is this a reality that could suddenly change? History tells us that terrorist organizations rarely alter their established *modus operandi*, and when they do, these

---

31 Robin McDowell: Indonesians ask why fellow Muslims are turning to suicide bombings. Associated Press, December 4, 2005
changes are driven by very specific reasons. The first such reason comes in the event of an introduction of government countermeasures, such as target hardening efforts that serve as a direct obstruction to the tactics used by terrorists in the past. While most groups can be expected to yield to this pressure and substitute targets, an innovative organization will refuse go down this path of least resistance in order to increase its probability of success. Instead, such a group will work to overcome these countermeasures by means that have not been accounted for by the enemy, often placing an emphasis on projecting an image of invincibility as well as mocking the state for failing to stop the attack despite all of its resources. This is not a profile that would fit the JI in the current state. The group has responded to government countermeasures in the past precisely in a regressive fashion, by refocusing their target preferences to less challenging targets such as tourist spots, while making only minor incremental improvements along the way. This suggests that a shift toward hardened targets such as Singaporean MRT does not fit the group’s operational profile. To date, JI has been able to launch only one attack per year, and all of the attacks in recent years have targeted soft targets in Indonesia where the group finds it much easier to prepare and execute.

Another scenario in which a group can be expected to alter its operational methods in a novel direction comes in the presence of an inherent ideological predetermination toward using certain technologies or the need to innovate in order to obtain the capability to match the level of violence associated with the respective ideological and strategic preferences. This is not the case of JI at this moment; Azhari whose personal technological zeal was one of the major drivers of the incremental improvements in explosive devices is no longer available, and the group is dependent on the codification of his knowledge via various manuals and past training. For this reason, it is highly unlikely that JI’s modus operandi will change because of ideological or strategic reasons, especially given the limited resources and capability of the group.

The third relevant scenario of a trigger to terrorist adaptation of new operational methods is an incidental or unintended acquisition of a particular human or

---

33 MRT is by definition a soft target, but given its location in Singapore, it certainly represents a much harder target than a restaurant in Indonesia.
material resource. This is a real threat. If, for instance, a Singaporean JI cell offered to facilitate a *feasible* plot against the transportation system in Singapore, it is quite possible that JI may lend its expertise and resources toward this end. The current trends in terrorism suggest that the greatest threat is posed by homegrown groups which although inspired by al Qaida ideology, do not bear any visible links to the network. As we have seen in virtually all attacks attributed to the al Qaida after 9-11, they have been carried out by either ad-hoc groups, or operatives who were at home in the country where the attack took place. This has significant implications, as launching an operation from abroad requires much more resources, planning and expertise while also exposing the conspirators to great level of risk. JI presently does not have this capability. However, the facilitation of this process by a local cell, which is familiar with the targets and the system and does not need to worry when crossing borders, would make the execution of such an attack much more feasible. Although still quite low in probability due to extensive intelligence efforts within Singapore, this homegrown group scenario is by far the greatest terrorist threat facing the country’s public transportation system today.

While the terrorism threat has received the most attention, we should be aware that other scenarios exist as well, namely the possibility of an attack by individuals or small groups without a political agenda, such as financial gain or psychological idiosyncrasy. The most probable scenario in this regard is a deranged individual along the lines of Colin Ferguson, who in December 1993 began firing randomly at passengers traveling from New York on a crowded Long Island Rail Road train during rush hour. Ferguson, who was finally overpowered by passengers while reloading, killed six passengers and wounded 17 others. Other examples include Edward Leary, who in December 1994 detonated two gasoline bombs on subway trains injuring 48 people, or a Korean man who burned 192 persons to death during his February 2003

---

35 An exception to this are suicide bombings in active conflict zones such as Iraq, and the November 2005 bombing in Amman, which included an Iraqi husband and wife who infiltrated Jordan to blow themselves up in the Radisson Hotel.
suicide attempt on the Seoul subway. These incidents serve as a reminder that not always is the perpetrator’s intent a predictable variable.

In the case of criminal motivation, such attacks are unlikely in Singapore due to the overall very low level of criminality in the country, strong punishments for criminal offenses, small number of possible escape routes and the lack of precedents for successful negotiations on behalf of attackers when it comes to achieving concessions in hostage situations such as free passage. Robbing a train or holding hostages on a bus for ransom is simply not a good proposition for any criminal in Singapore. In contrast, a deranged or suicidal individual’s motivation and intent is much more difficult to predict. And while obtaining a firearm in Singapore is very difficult, we should not forget the above mentioned Seoul subway tragedy, in which easy to acquire technology requiring only about a $3 dollar investment was used to kill hundreds (a paper milk container filled with gasoline and a cigarette lighter). This example shows that an attack does not need to be particularly sophisticated to cause significant damage.

Another low-cost means to disrupt the transportation system are hoaxes, which can at a time of heightened threat level or in the aftermath of high profile attacks, cause a considerable headache. For instance, in Atlanta during the Olympic Games, the local MARTA transportation system experienced more then 140 suspicious packages in the wake of the Centennial Park incident. Similarly, in the U.K. between 1991 and 1997, there were 6,569 telephone bomb threats concerning transportation targets and 9,430 suspicious objects were reported and investigated. Hoaxes can be a considerable problem as they can cause the disruption of service, spread of fear and economic damage by the need to respond to them. However, they tend to work “best” in places where actual attacks have happened, and authorities thus cannot afford to ignore any type of threat. In the UK experience, no unattended bag was ever linked to an

---

explosive device, but due to the fact that real bombing happened frequently enough every unattended bag had to be checked.41

**Countermeasures**

Contrary to popular perception, when compared to other major cites in the world, the threat to Singapore’s transportation system is rather low. At the same time, the same could have also been said about the Tokyo metro system in March 1995, just before the sarin attacks. This fact underscores the dilemma faced by decision makers and security managers. If no real immediate threat exists, and yet nothing can ever be ruled out, how much security is enough? Is a specific real time terrorist threat the only way to gather together enough security, or should public agencies take action to prevent such a threat?42 Given the fact that there are never enough resources to address all possible threats, striking the right balance is always a difficult task. Singapore is no exception, although the city’s size, availability of resources and a generally high level of perceived threat have resulted in the implementation of more security measures then one might expect.

There are a number of reasons why terrorism has become such a high priority item on the government agenda in the last few years. Besides the now disrupted existence of JI cells with concrete attacks plans in the country, Singapore’s specific circumstances result in a perception of high vulnerability. The first reason is the small size of the country and herewith associated lack of “strategic depth”, as well as its economic dependence on the confidence of foreign investors, which might be disrupted in the event of a terror attack. Also important is the overall high level of security in the country, which besides its positive deterrent function also results in higher level of complacency among the general population, as well as a heightened psychological vulnerability toward the feeling of insecurity which is likely to occur in the aftermath of a possible attack. Similarly, the city-state’s highly multicultural population has a questionable resilience to a terrorist campaign, and should a terror attack be perpetrated by people form within Singapore’s minority communities, intercultural harmony in Singapore could be jeopardized. Combined with the perception of being a

41 Ibid.
“prize” target for terrorists in Southeast Asia due to its pro Western political position and economic success, the attention and resources devoted to defensive strategy against terrorism in Singapore is unusually high.

An essential part of this strategy is the protection of Singapore’s public transportation infrastructure, which includes primarily bus and rail systems. The bus service operated by two companies, SBS transit and SMRT corporation, provides a combined total of 3395 vehicles on 261 routes, totaling over 3 million passenger trips daily. The system also features 109 km of the so-called Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) with 3 lines and 67 stations, 1.3 million daily passenger trips. A new 34 km Circle Line is under construction and will be opened in phases as the various stations are ready. In addition to the MRT, the train system also features three lines of the Light Rapid Transit (LRT) system and 38.6 km of train tracks and one rail's terminal at Tanjong Pagar Railway Station which serves trains to Malaysia.  

Given the fact that Singapore is a small city state, it has one of the most dense ground transportation networks of all countries in the world.

In principle, land transportation security has two objectives: not only the prevention of casualties, but also the minimization of disruption of service. The elimination of casualties relies heavily on preventing an attack in the first place via deterrent and protective measures, but also on mitigation via swift and efficient medical response. The disruption of service and herewith associated economic costs relies on good inter-agency communication a well as planning or providing alternative means of transport for commuters, as well as contingency plans for restoration of regular service. An excellent analytical study by the Mineta Institute in California in 1997 has compared the lessons learned from attacks on public transportation systems in the U.K. France, Japan, and the United States, and identified the best practices in responding to the threat of public transportation terror. Many of these measures have been adopted in Singapore particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Madrid bombings.

---


As a part of this effort, many security measures have been implemented on trains and stations such as abundant presence of CCTV cameras at platforms. In addition a plan was announced to fit MRT trains with CCTV cameras, as well as the mounting of GPS systems on buses in order to achieve the ability to quickly pinpoint their exact location. Such measures are meant to not only serve as a tool for monitoring possible threats and incursions and to aid response teams by exactly identifying the current conditions inside impacted vehicles, but also as a deterrent function aiming to undermine the confidence of potential attackers that their attack plan will succeed. The British experience from the IRA camping in early 1990s provides a good example. In 1991, IRA terrorist attacks centered on stations in London. By 1992, following the adoption of highly visible CCTV cameras, intrusion alarms and other security measures, the attackers were pushed out to suburban stations, and by 1993, they were confined to home counties. The targets of the attackers also shifted from stations to switch boxes and rail lines away from stations.\(^5\)

Another measure that has been identified as highly productive was the adaptation of an environmental design of transportation stations that would eliminate potential hiding places for bombs. In Singapore, this step was represented by the removal of trash bins and mail boxes from platforms and concourse levels to the main station entrances.\(^6\) Given the fact that the platforms are well lit and monitored, this measure has virtually eliminated potential hiding places. Another step that has been used in countries experiencing terrorist campaigns has been the deployment of bomb resistant trash containers to eliminate fragmentation effects of a possible explosion, but such a measure would represent overkill in the Singapore context considering the comparatively low level of threat.

The next practice identified in the examined case studies as highly effective was the augmentation of visible security personnel in periods of immediate threat to deter potential attackers, or following major crises, in order to mitigate the psychological impact and restore a perception of security among commuters. This model was followed after Madrid by the deployment of private unarmed guards to


patrol the station platforms, with the authority to check the belongings of customers. In addition, following the London attacks, the Singapore police also deployed armed Police Tactical Unit officers to patrol within stations the day after the bombings occurred, while pre-existing security measures were placed on higher alert. These armed officers began visible patrols on the MRT and LRT systems, conducting random patrols in pairs in and around rail stations and within trains. Selected with their height and physique in mind to project a tougher presence, these officers are trained and authorized to utilize their firearms based on the officers' discretion, including "shoot to kill" if deemed necessary. This fact was, of course, widely publicized in order to achieve maximum deterrent effect.

The next area identified among the best practices for protecting commuter transportation is the involvement of the public, particularly in the area of boosting vigilance and encouraging the prompt reporting of unattended luggage and suspicious packages, in order to increase the likelihood that a potential explosive device left behind in a train or bus is discovered and disarmed before it can be detonated. This campaign has featured periodical public announcements on platforms and trains, as well as the distribution of ever-present posters encouraging passengers to report any suspicious activity or unattended luggage.

The one area identified as all important has been training, coordination and testing of response capability though simulated exercises. Such exercises are particularly useful in uncovering flaws in the system and advancing readiness, as well as serving to reassure the public that a response capability exists. In Singapore, exercises are also designed to serve a deterrent function by trying to demonstrate to potential perpetrators that a robust response capability is present to minimize the chances of success of any potential attack. This is one of the reasons why simulation exercises in Singapore tend to respond to highly fantastic and challenging threats, as in the case of the three hour Exercise NorthStar V, which took place on 8 January 2006. This exercise, the largest of its kind in the history of Singapore, simulated near simultaneous suicide bombings followed by a chemical attack on four MRT stations and one bus interchange. Northstar V involved a total 22 agencies and 2,000 emergency personnel. Services at 13 MRT stations were temporarily disrupted and roads within the vicinity were also closed to traffic, affecting about 3,400 commuters.

Shuttle buses were used to ferry commuters affected by the exercise. Thunderflashes, smoke generators, and fire simulators were used to simulate the explosion and 500 simulated casualties were deployed to test emergency rescuers at the scene. These mock casualties carried tags to provide paramedics information on the extent of their injuries and these includes injuries related to bomb blasts, such as open wounds and burns. There were also some with injuries related to sarin, and 28 casualties underwent decontamination before being treated. Besides clinical readiness, the drill also tested how hospital operations and information were coordinated and total of 1,280 hospital workers from seven hospitals and two polyclinics were involved in the drill. Further such exercises are planned for the near future.

Conclusion

Analysis of JI’s targeting pattern reveals an increasing preference for soft, Western, mass-casualty targets in Southeast Asia. Singapore’s commuter transportation system fully encompasses all of these adjectives, and is thus a natural target. But although a “soft” target by definition, the Singapore public transportation system appears to be too “hard” for the JI to attack at present, precisely because it is located in Singapore. So, while JI might very well be motivated to launch an attack against the system, it currently lacks the capability to do so. For the time being, the group’s operations are likely to take the form of synchronized suicide bombings against soft targets in Indonesia. If the land transportation system in Singapore is in fact to be attacked in the future, this will likely involve an explosive or arson attack by a homegrown cell that will conduct the attacks either independently by acquiring necessary know how and guidance via the internet, or with the help from an ideologically affiliated group with better resources and expertise. Other scenarios include attacks by deranged individuals along the lines of the Seoul suicide, or the disruption of service a wave of hoaxes by pranksters or sympathizers.

Despite the relatively low level of threat, Singapore has made many preparations and preventive measures that other countries that have experienced surface transportation terrorism have identified as pillars of effective public

---

48 Ng, Julia: Health Minister says Exercise NorthStar a good test of hospitals' readiness. Channel News Asia, 8 January 2006. Available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/187149/1/.html
transportation security. And yet, the system still has visible holes and weaknesses that could be exploited by potential attackers. This has, particularly in the wake of the Madrid bombings, led to many suggestions on how to strengthen the security system, essentially mimicking the measures that have gradually been implemented over the past 30 years in the effort to strengthen the security of civil aviation. These have consisted mainly of the installation of metal detectors, x-rays and vapor detectors, the securing of perimeter fences around airports, the deterrent presence of armed guards, sniffer dogs, etc. After London, the debate has gone as far as suggestions to introduce remote signal jammers in metro systems in order to eliminate the possibility of remote detonation of explosives on trains. Ironically, such measures could not have been effective in preventing even Madrid, where the alarm clock function that does not require a signal was used for detonations, nor London itself, where suicide bombers were present to detonate their devices manually.

It is clear that most of the proposed measures are not an option for securing ground transportation targets such as buses and MRT lines, for several reasons. Firstly, the sheer number of bus and train stops at which potential attackers could board is incomparably higher than the number of gates at airports, making the implementation of even relatively basic screening procedures for ground transportation an extremely expensive proposition. Secondly, while compulsory airport taxes paid by each passenger can aid in financing the security of civil aviation, the low cost of a bus or metro ride make the duplication of such efforts for ground transportation just about impossible. Thirdly, the idea of everyday commute being prolonged by up to an hour due to queues forming at screening stations would hardly be acceptable for the majority of the population. And finally, even if all of the above obstacles were somehow overcome, the ease of causing massive destruction with dual use items makes the prospects of successfully averting acts of terror uncertain. Clearly, no system is perfect and no matter what measures are eventually put into place, the public will inevitably have to accept a significant level of risk. The above mentioned experiences of countries that have been affected by deadly waves of ground transportation terror provide us with useful lessons we can build upon. In this sense, it has always been a combination of several measures that has helped the authorities to cope with the threat. On the prevention side, it has been the deterrent presence of armed guards and dogs at critical interchanges, the high level of awareness and bravery of surface transportation staff, and the heightened vigilance of
the public, that had succeeded in thwarting a large number of terrorist attacks. No less important has been the role of effective response and timely mitigation once attacks actually did occur. Fast and efficient medical response saves lives, effective forensics procedures can aid to timely identification and apprehension of the perpetrators, and returning the people’s lives back to normal as soon as possible helps in thwarting the effects of terror.

The one often neglected but in reality crucial aspect of effectively countering transportation terror is psychological defence. Terrorism is essentially a psychological mind game the objective of which is to create the universal perception of vulnerability that is largely disproportionate to the actual level of the threat. From a terrorist’s strategic perspective, the killings itself are secondary to the spread of panic. It is thus crucial to recognize that by living in fear and uncertainty we help satisfy the terrorists’ key objective. This is not to suggest that we should not take all reasonable preventive measures to improve our security, but it would be foolish to think that we can ever fully eliminate all of the weak spots of soft targets such as ground transportation. The population must understand that no system is perfect, and that no matter what steps are taken, public transportation will still remain a feasible target. Terrorists will always find ways to attack it. Reassuring the public that measures to combat the threat are in place, while also preparing it for the possibility that an attack might happen, provides the right combination of measures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDSS Working Paper Series</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vietnam-China Relations Since The End of The Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ang Cheng Guan (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desmond Ball (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reordering Asia: “Cooperative Security” or Concert of Powers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amitav Acharya (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The South China Sea Dispute re-visited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ang Cheng Guan (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Liow Chin Yong (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ as Justified, Executed and Mediated by NATO: Strategic Lessons for Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumar Ramakrishna (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Taiwan’s Future: Mongolia or Tibet?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Asia-Pacific Diplomacies: Reading Discontinuity in Late-Modern Diplomatic Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan See Seng (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Framing “South Asia”: Whose Imagined Region?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinderpal Singh (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Explaining Indonesia’s Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terence Lee Chek Liang (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan See Seng (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nguyen Phuong Binh (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Framework for Autonomy in Southeast Asia’s Plural Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam Coronel Ferrer (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ananda Rajah (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Natural Resources Management and Environmental Security in Southeast Asia: Case Study of Clean Water Supplies in Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kog Yue Choong (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Crisis and Transformation: ASEAN in the New Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etel Solingen (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Human Security: East Versus West?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amitav Acharya (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Asian Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Desker (2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. Multilateralism, Neo-liberalism and Security in Asia: The Role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum  
   Ian Taylor (2001)

20. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping as Issues for Asia-Pacific Security  
   Derek McDougall (2001)

21. Comprehensive Security: The South Asian Case  
   S.D. Muni (2002)

   You Ji (2002)

23. The Concept of Security Before and After September 11  
   a. The Contested Concept of Security  
      Steve Smith (2002)  
   b. Security and Security Studies After September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections  
      Amitav Acharya (2002)

24. Democratisation In South Korea And Taiwan: The Effect Of Social Division On Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations  

25. Understanding Financial Globalisation  
   Andrew Walter (2002)

26. 911, American Praetorian Unilateralism and the Impact on State-Society Relations in Southeast Asia  
   Kumar Ramakrishna (2002)

27. Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?  
   Tan See Seng (2002)

28. What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of “America”  
   Tan See Seng (2002)

29. International Responses to Terrorism: The Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control of Terrorism by Regional Arrangement with Particular Reference to ASEAN  
   Ong Yen Nee (2002)

30. Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization  
    Nan Li (2002)

    Helen E S Nesadurai (2002)

32. 11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges, and Warfighting  
    Nan Li (2002)

33. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11  
    Barry Desker (2002)

34. Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of September 11 For American Power  
    Evelyn Goh (2002)

35. Not Yet All Aboard…But Already All At Sea Over Container Security Initiative  
    Irvin Lim (2002)
36. Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulation in East Asia: Still Perverse?  
   *Andrew Walter* (2002)

37. Indonesia and The Washington Consensus  
   *Premjith Sadasivan* (2002)

38. The Political Economy of FDI Location: Why Don’t Political Checks and Balances and Treaty Constraints Matter?  
   *Andrew Walter* (2002)

39. The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN  

40. Liquidity Support and The Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience  

41. A UK Perspective on Defence Equipment Acquisition  

42. Regionalisation of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership  

43. The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round  

44. Seeking Security In The Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia In The Emerging Asian Order  

45. Deconstructing Political Islam In Malaysia: UMNO’S Response To PAS’ Religio-Political Dialectic  

46. The War On Terror And The Future of Indonesian Democracy  

47. Examining The Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case  

48. Sovereignty and The Politics of Identity in International Relations  
   *Adrian Kuah* (2003)

49. Deconstructing Jihad; Southeast Asia Contexts  
   *Patricia Martinez* (2003)

50. The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion  

51. In Search of Suitable Positions’ in the Asia Pacific: Negotiating the US-China Relationship and Regional Security  

52. American Unilaterism, Foreign Economic Policy and the ‘Securitisation’ of Globalisation  
53. Fireball on the Water: Naval Force Protection-Projection, Coast Guarding, Customs Border Security & Multilateral Cooperation in Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror from the Sea
Irvin Lim (2003)

54. Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy
Chong Ja Ian (2003)

55. Pre-emption and Prevention: An Ethical and Legal Critique of the Bush Doctrine and Anticipatory Use of Force In Defence of the State

56. The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Implications for Regional Economic Integration
Helen E S Nesadurai (2003)

57. The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operation
Joshua Ho (2003)

Irvin Lim (2004)

59. Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia
Andrew Tan (2004)

60. Testing Alternative Responses to Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding and Beleaguering in the Real World
Chong Ja Ian (2004)

61. Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004

62. Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Issues: A Study of Human and Drug Trafficking in East Asia

63. Outlook for Malaysia’s 11th General Election

64. Not Many Jobs Take a Whole Army: Special Operations Forces and The Revolution in Military Affairs.

65. Technological Globalisation and Regional Security in East Asia
J.D. Kenneth Boutin (2004)

66. UAVs/UCAVs – Missions, Challenges, and Strategic Implications for Small and Medium Powers

67. Singapore’s Reaction to Rising China: Deep Engagement and Strategic Adjustment

68. The Shifting Of Maritime Power And The Implications For Maritime Security In East Asia
Joshua Ho (2004)

70. Examining the Defence Industrialization-Economic Growth Relationship: The Case of Singapore  
   Adrian Kuah and Bernard Loo (2004)

71. “Constructing” The Jamaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry  
   Kumar Ramakrishna (2004)

72. Malaysia and The United States: Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement  
   Helen E S Nesadurai (2004)

73. The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform  
   John Bradford (2005)

74. Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment  
   Catherine Zara Raymond (2005)

75. Southeast Asian Maritime Security In The Age Of Terror: Threats, Opportunity, And Charting The Course Forward  
   John Bradford (2005)

76. Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives  
   Manjeet Singh Pardesi (2005)

77. Towards Better Peace Processes: A Comparative Study of Attempts to Broker Peace with MNLF and GAM  
   S P Harish (2005)

78. Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics  
   Amitav Acharya (2005)

79. The State and Religious Institutions in Muslim Societies  
   Riaz Hassan (2005)

80. On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies  
   Riaz Hassan (2005)

81. The Security of Regional Sea Lanes  
   Joshua Ho (2005)

82. Civil-Military Relationship and Reform in the Defence Industry  
   Arthur S Ding (2005)

83. How Bargaining Alters Outcomes: Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Bargaining Strategies  
   Deborah Elms (2005)

84. Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order  
   Evelyn Goh (2005)

85. Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan  
   Ali Riaz (2005)

86. Autobiography, Politics and Ideology in Sayyid Qutb’s Reading of the Qur’an  
   Umej Bhatia (2005)

87. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo  
   Ralf Emmers (2005)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>China’s Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends &amp; Dynamics</td>
<td>Srikanth Kondapalli</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses</td>
<td>Catherine Zara Raymond</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the Bush Doctrine</td>
<td>Simon Dalby</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of the Riau Archipelago</td>
<td>Nankyung Choi</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>The Impact of RMA on Conventional Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis</td>
<td>Manjeet Singh Pardesi</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Africa and the Challenge of Globalisation</td>
<td>Jeffrey Herbst</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>The East Asian Experience: The Poverty of ‘Picking Winners’</td>
<td>Barry Desker and Deborah Elms</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Bandung And The Political Economy Of North-South Relations: Sowing The Seeds For Revisioning International Society</td>
<td>Helen E S Nesadurai</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Re-conceptualising the Military-Industrial Complex: A General Systems Theory Approach</td>
<td>Adrian Kuah</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Food Security and the Threat From Within: Rice Policy Reforms in the Philippines</td>
<td>Bruce Tolentino</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Securitizing/Desecuritizing the Filipinos’ ‘Outward Migration Issue’ in the Philippines’ Relations with Other Asian Governments</td>
<td>José N. Franco, Jr.</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Securitization Of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis To India</td>
<td>Josy Joseph</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Securitizing border-crossing: The case of marginalized stateless minorities in the Thai-Burma Borderlands</td>
<td>Mika Toyota</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>The LTTE’s Online Network and its Implications for Regional Security</td>
<td>Shyam Tekwani</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>International Regime Building in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Cooperation against the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Changing Conflict Identities: The case of the Southern Thailand Discord</td>
<td>S P Harish</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>TEMPORAL DOMINANCE</td>
<td>Edwin Seah</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Globalization and Military-Industrial Transformation in South Asia: An Historical Perspective</td>
<td>Emrys Chew</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime</td>
<td>Sam Bateman</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Freedom and Control Networks in Military Environments</td>
<td>Paul T Mitchell</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Rewriting Indonesian History The Future in Indonesia’s Past</td>
<td>Kwa Chong Guan</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Twelver Shi’ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects</td>
<td>Christoph Marcinkowski</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Islam, State and Modernity : Muslim Political Discourse in Late 19th and Early 20th century India</td>
<td>Iqbal Singh Sevea</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>“From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI”</td>
<td>Elena Pavlova</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry</td>
<td>Adam Dolnik</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>