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<td>Author(s)</td>
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No. 60

Testing Alternative Responses To Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding And Beleaguering in the Real World

Chong Ja Ian

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore

JANUARY 2004

With Compliment

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ABSTRACT

In an earlier piece entitled, “Revisiting Responses to Power Preponderance: Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning”, the author developed four alternative responses to power preponderance that fell outside the traditional international relations framework of balancing and bandwagoning. The four responses are namely binding, buffering, bonding and beleaguering. The previous work argued that states might broadly adopt these four responses to preponderant power depending on their relative power next to the leading state and the level of integration with the world system.

In this follow-on work, the author tries to test the above conceptual argument against empirical evidence. To do so, this paper looks at five case studies, China, Taiwan, Singapore, North Korea and Australia during the past decade-and-a-half of American unipolarity. This choice of the four East Asian cases aims to vary power and integration while holding potential intervening variables such as culture, geography, and history constant. Australia is a control case as it differs from the four East Asian cases in geography, history, and culture.

This paper finds that non-leading states respond to power preponderance along the intervals of power and integration as predicted by the argument. However, this study also finds that state responses to power preponderance do not fit perfectly within the categories laid out by the argument. States often display some mixture of strategic responses even if they are inclined towards one approach. Nonetheless, such variation in response appears to be unsystematic and fluctuates according to the specific historical contingencies of each case.

Although the paper argues that relative power and integration play an important role in shaping responses to power preponderance, it leaves open the possibility that prior state choices, particularly on normative issues, can affect power and integration. The paper concludes by suggesting that the collective and cumulative effects of alternative responses to power preponderance may affect the persistence of unipolarity. As such, the paper also calls for further study into the reactions of lesser powers to preponderant power.

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Testing Alternative Responses to Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding, and Beleaguering in the Real World

In my previous paper, I argued that bandwagoning and balancing were inadequate responses to power preponderance, especially under the unique conditions of unipolarity. In their stead, I offered binding, bonding, buffering, and beleaguering as alternative approaches that non-leading states may take to preserve and forward their interest in a unipolar world. In short:

- **Binding** is the entering of institutional arrangements with a stronger state by a weaker state to secure a mechanism for restraining the stronger state in exchange for recognising leadership.
- **Bonding** is the creation of functional value by a weaker state to give others a stake in its interests.
- **Buffering** is the establishment of a set of institutional and other arrangements weaker states undertake with each other to reduce the influence and impact of the stronger state.
- **Beleaguering** is disruptive action taken by a weaker state in order to receive payoffs from stronger states to desist or not repeat such behaviour. I also contended that states will choose among the four responses to power preponderance (mentioned above) depending on their power relative to the preponderant state and level of integration in the world system.

This paper essentially attempts to test this argument against the almost decade-and-a-half of American unipolarity with the following hypotheses:

**H₁**: Balancing and bandwagoning cannot explain significant variation in state responses to preponderant power.

**H₂**: Relative differences in power and the level of integration help influence responses power preponderance such that:

a. Weaker tend to bond or bind; stronger states tend beleaguer or buffer.

b. More integrated states tend to buffer or bind; less integrated states tend to bond or beleaguer.

In doing so, this paper will attempt to disprove the null hypothesis:

**H₀**: Balancing and bandwagoning explain systematic variation in state responses to preponderant power.

If, taking account of non-systematic error, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis in support of the two alternative hypotheses then it may be possible to claim that the four approaches in
the paper can help in the understanding of responses to power preponderance.

To test for the likelihood that second-tier states in the current unipolar system adopt buffering, binding, bonding and beleaguering according relative power and integration in the world system, I will attempt to look at cases that vary on the two central independent variables. To do so, I focus on security issues. Owing to the scarcity of security and abundance of threats under anarchy, this is an area where balancing and bandwagoning explanations are most prevalent. Hence, situations that involve security issues are likely to present harder cases for state strategies that go beyond balancing and bandwagoning.

**Examining Responses to Unipolarity**

To test for binding, bonding, buffering and beleaguering, this paper will use China, Taiwan, Singapore, North Korea and Australia from the late 1980s to the present as test cases. These five cases allow me to vary relative power vis-à-vis the pre-eminent state as well as the level of integration in the world system. The four cases from East Asia were chosen because substantial security concerns remain for states in that region, therefore making bandwagoning and balancing likely explanations for behaviour. Looking at cases from one region with broadly similar backgrounds also allows for constancy and control over factors like regional influences, culture, history and geographical distance from the United States. Australia provides a control case that is not strictly within the East Asian security, cultural and historical frameworks. The relative wealth of information surrounding these cases and lack of prior testing in Asia provide further rationale for my approach.

To help measure for power and integration in the case studies, I take the leading state, the United States, as the benchmark on both indicators. To measure power, I take the relative power of the second-tier states to include mean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1988 to 2002 and mean military expenditure from 1988 to 2002, expressed as percentages of U.S. figures. As another indicator of power, I include possession of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. I also include least-, middle-, and high-income state information from the World Bank in the table for comparison. Table One below summarises the power position of the case study states in relation to the United States:
For integration, I look at a composite of the mean number of international organisations a state belongs to and mean number of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) operating in a country. I also consider the mean value of international trade as a percentage of GDP, the mean value of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP for each country, outgoing international telecom traffic and the level of international tourism. These figures are also averages from the period 1988 to 2002 and given in percentages of U.S. levels. Table Two below summarises the level of integration for each case.

Table One: Indicators of Power Relative to the Leading State

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Moderately High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>4.69 est.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0.2 est.</td>
<td>0.7 est.</td>
<td>V. Probable/Yes</td>
<td>Greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lesser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lesser</td>
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Least Income States Mean\(^1\) 0.04 & 0.03 & - & Very Low
Mid-Income States Mean\(^2\) 0.65 & 0.44 & - & Moderate
High Income States Mean\(^3\) 6.2 & 4.11 & - & High

\(^1\) As listed by the United Nations and World Bank in *World Development Indicators 2003*.

Table Two: Indicators of Integration in the World System as Percentage of Leading State Levels

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Participation in IOs, INGOs, &amp; other exchanges 1988-2001(^7)</th>
<th>Mean International Trade as % of GDP 1988-2001(^4)</th>
<th>Mean FDI as % of GDP 1988-2001(^5)</th>
<th>International Tourism (Arrivals and Departures)</th>
<th>International Telecom, Outgoing Traffic</th>
<th>Level of Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>118.76</td>
<td>Greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>22.97</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Lesser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>136*</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>595.6</td>
<td>Greater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan(^6)</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
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\(^*\) Only includes non-oil exports
\(^#\) Data only available for the period 1993-2002
\(^1\) International Organisations (IOs), International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs)
\(^2\) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Table Two: Indicators of Integration in the World System as Percentage of Leading State Levels


Given their levels of power and integration into the world system, Diagram One indicates my expectations for responses to unipolarity by each of the case study states.

Relative Power under Unipolarity

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<th>GREATER</th>
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<td>BONDING</td>
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- Taiwan
- N. Korea
- China
- Australia
- Singapore

Diagram 1: Expected Strategies of Case Study States in the Unipolar System

With this set of expectations, I now turn to looking at how the empirical record for each of the case study states match up.

China—The Elusiveness of Balancing

China is a state many claim as the most likely “peer competitor” to the United States in the near future. With an economy growing at an average rate of between 5 to 10 percent over the past decade and a military budget that is expanding at least as quickly, some see China catching up with, if not surpassing the United States economically sometime between 2030 and 2050. In fact, some analysts think that Beijing may already be undertaking steps to balance against U.S. power.³

The reasoning above is, however, problematic on at least two fronts. Firstly, Chinese economic, military, and political developments may not necessarily determine a destiny to

become a peer competitor of the United States, even within a forty or fifty-year period.\(^4\) Predictions of some sort of new bipolar world split between China and the United States, or a multipolar world with a resurgent Russia and even a Europe independent of U.S. influence, often rely on very rosy projections of Chinese political, economic and military growth and pessimistic forecasts for the American side.\(^5\) As such, China’s status relative to the United States in the future is still highly uncertain.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, China is a military, political and economic Great Power in Asia, even if it cannot directly balance the United States. In terms of military strength, its military budget is 4.69 percent of that of the United States from 1988 to 2001. In additional, the People’s Liberation Army is still comparatively backward, which greatly limits its operational effectiveness. This is despite the fact that the Chinese military is far larger than that of the United States in terms of sheer physical size. Over the past decade-and-a-half, China’s GDP has averaged 9.22 percent to that of the United States. As such, China appears to rank much higher than most other states of the world in relative power to the United States, save India, Japan, Russia, and Europe as a whole, but remains significantly behind the United States on all the indicators of power here.

Notably, many positing that China will emerge as a balancer of the United States also foresee “peer” balancing as a future event, rather than an ongoing phenomenon.\(^7\) Given the enormity of internal and, to a lesser degree external, economic, political and social challenges facing the Chinese state, when and if such a future of counter-balancing the United States will emerge is also quite far from certain.\(^8\) Additionally, many advocates of this China-as-a-future-counterweight argument also concede that even if the Chinese economy surpasses the United States in absolute terms, it will still likely lag behind in per capita terms for a long time. These approaches also say little about China’s current strategy towards the United States, if it is not yet a peer competitor.

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The empirical record of Chinese balancing behaviour vis-à-vis the United States over the past decade-and-a-half is also somewhat questionable. Proponents of this position point to Beijing’s initiation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and participation in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)-based groupings as precursors to attempts at balancing U.S. power and influence. Other seeming indicators of Chinese balancing behaviour are Beijing’s sabre-rattling behaviour towards Taiwan, ongoing nuclear weapons development, nuclear and missile technology proliferation and diplomatic disputes with the United States.

Using such evidence to argue for a strategy of balancing against the United States on the part of Beijing, however, is problematic. After all, Russia and the Central Asian members of the SCO each independently decide to offer support to the United States and its interventionist approach towards fighting terrorism. This is in spite of painstaking Chinese efforts to establish cohesion within the SCO. Such factors strongly undermine the argument that China is presently able and willing to balance Washington.

Russia, the Central Asian SCO partners and even China also depend substantially on access to U.S. markets and investments.9 As such, leaders in Beijing constantly stress the importance of smooth relations with Washington despite recurring tensions.10 China was also remarkably muted in its opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; it took a backseat to France, Germany and even Russia. Additionally, the limited power and domestic problems facing these states are likely to present substantial obstacles to effective balancing against the United States in the near future despite possession of nuclear weapons by Russia and China.

Furthermore, the other supposed leg of China’s external balancing strategy, ASEAN plus Three and ASEAN plus One, include four longstanding U.S. allies, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. The United States is also the leading trading partner and investor to almost all members of the ASEAN-centred frameworks. Notably, the SCO and the ASEAN-based groupings lack a formal military component that is historically characteristic of balancing groupings and alliances. Finally, China also looks to the U.S. security guarantee to hold down potential Japanese re-militarisation, which it fears may be a greater threat to its

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9 Liu Xuecheng and Li Jidong, Zhongguo he Meiguo—Duishou Haishi Huoban? (Beijing, China: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 2000), 109-116; and, Interview with Wang Xuejun, Deputy Secretary-General, China Reform Forum, Chinese Communist Party Central Party School.
10 Steven I. Levine, “Sino-American Relations: Testing the Limits of Discord”, in Kim, China and the World, 82-83; Interview with Professor Jia Qingguo, School of International Studies, Peking University; Interview with Wang Xuejun; and, Interview with Da Wei.
immediate security.\textsuperscript{11}

Nonetheless, despite the absence of balancing against the pre- eminent state in the current unipolar system, China is by no means bandwagoning with the United States. Some cooperation over counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing notwithstanding, Beijing shows a remarkable independence of action from Washington. From its sometimes open belligerence towards Taiwan, for instance, it seems apparent that China is not ready to acquiesce to Washington’s will and is even willing to risk confrontation on some matters of importance to the United States. The United States in turn finds Beijing’s past record of proliferating nuclear and ballistic missile related technology highly objectionable. In addition, evidence suggests that Beijing’s collaboration with Washington on anti-terrorism is an effort to win a freer hand to crackdown on internal dissent, especially in Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{12}

If Beijing is currently neither balancing against nor bandwagoning with the United States, then how exactly it is responding to the current unipolar world demands further elaboration. Consider first the relatively high level of integration China is experiencing. In terms of participation in International Organisations, having INGOs and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) working within its borders, and communication links with the rest of the world, China stands at 45 percent of average U.S. levels from 1988 to 2001. Likewise, average trade and foreign direct investment, as proportions of GDP stand at 189 and 276 percent of mean U.S. levels respectively during this time. Level of tourism and international telecommunication traffic are also relatively high, at 22.97 and 37.75 percent of the United States, respectively. These figures are substantial in comparison with the United States, and far exceed North Korea, the least integrated state in this study.

Given its relatively high level of integration in the contemporary world system, therefore, I argue that Beijing is in fact demonstrating buffering behaviour vis-à-vis the leading state. At least in its current guise, the SCO does not appear to have the ability to balance against the United States. In fact, the economic importance of the United States to the SCO members is likely to present a strong countervailing rationale against balancing. Likewise, the majority of members in ASEAN-linked frameworks openly acknowledge their desire for the United States to maintain a strong presence in Asia.\textsuperscript{13} Even China admits the utility of having a U.S.

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presence in the region to constrain Japan as well as to maintain the regional stability critical to economic development.\textsuperscript{14}

Instead of balancing, the common aim that members of the SCO and ASEAN plus Three explicitly spell out, for example, appears to point to securing a certain level autonomy in light of preponderant U.S. power. The SCO and ASEAN-linked groupings aim to provide a forum through which members can coordinate action and responses on immediate regional matters of common concern without extra-regional interference.\textsuperscript{15} By being able to solve regional problems without relying on Washington, these states are able to pre-empt potential U.S. intervention, at once limiting active U.S. influence and ensuring some independence of action.\textsuperscript{16} Some even argue that Chinese attempts to develop its military forces and acquire a limited force projection capability aim less at balancing the United States than to guarantee autonomy of action.\textsuperscript{17}

Together with its aspiration to assert independence of action from Washington and its non-balancing behaviour, it seems that buffering is at the core of Beijing’s response to preponderant U.S. power. In attempting to establish functional groupings that allow for the resolution of issues without Washington, China appears to be trying to create political space around its periphery to reduce active U.S. involvement. The lack of evidence for a military component to these arrangements, however, suggests that sometimes-fiery rhetoric aside, Beijing is currently not seeking a change to the status quo distribution of power. After all, the China and its associates in various regional groupings all depend on stable and positive relations with the United States for crucial markets, investment and even security guarantees.

Attempts to reduce active U.S. influence and preserve autonomy of action, however, do not contradict the desire to have a strong U.S. presence to serve as a possible final guarantor of regional stability. In view of China’s active support for and participation in the SCO and ASEAN plus Three, as well as its power relative the United States and its level integration in the world system, it thus appears that the Chinese strategic response to U.S. preponderance conforms nicely to the expectation that it will buffer rather than balance or bandwagon.

\begin{flushleft}
Interview with Da Wei.
\end{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{14} Nathan and Ross, \textit{The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress}, 78-81; Ross, “China and the Stability of East Asia”, in Ross, \textit{East Asia in Transition}, 95-98; Liu and Li, \textit{Zhongguo he Meiguo}, 21-23, 37-41; and, Interview with Da Wei.
Additionally, China is signing onto a world economic system that is currently dominated by the United States. It does not intent to establish an alternative economic bloc, as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. In becoming part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and World Trade Organisation (WTO), China is opening its economy to direct U.S. influence as well as the regulations of international economic institutions shaped by American economic and political might. In joining this U.S.-dominated world system, China is acutely aware of the potential domestic shocks that such an action may provoke. These ‘shocks’ can range from potential banking crises to massive unemployment and possible further erosion of Communist Party power. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership openly claim that becoming part of this system is “essential to China’s future”.18

Interestingly, Chinese participation in the U.S.-dominated economic and political system does hint at some binding. Integration in the current international economic system and membership in organisations like APEC and the WTO appear to be an acceptation of the efficacy of using U.S.-influenced international organisations to restrain American freedom to exercise power at least in the economic arena.19 The same may be true of its current attitude towards participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).20 Perhaps such behaviour on the part of Beijing is understandable based on the fact that it lags enough behind the United States in power terms to not adopt a fully-fledged buffering strategy.

**Taiwan—Bond Seeking Behaviour**

Facing an unfriendly giant neighbour across a mere two hundred kilometres of water, conventional wisdom expects Taiwan to bandwagon with the United States without reserve. In the years following the end of the Cold War, however, Taiwan displays both a tendency to seek autonomy from U.S. influence as well as to present itself as an independent actor of value to both Washington and the world at large. In other words, Taiwan’s main strategy appears most like bonding.

On one hand, Taiwan displays a remarkable ability to manoeuvre against American wishes over the past decade. Most notably, the island’s attempts to gain greater international recognition and distinction from Mainland China have at times worked against the U.S. desire to maintain regional stability and amiable relations with Beijing. The engineering of then-Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States in 1995 and suggestions of moving

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19 Interview with Jia Qingguo.
20 Interview with Jia Qingguo.
the island toward formal independence, for instance, sparked the diplomatic impasse with Beijing that led to China’s destabilising military exercises and missile tests across the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. This was in spite of Washington’s engagement policy toward Beijing at the time.

Despite U.S. warnings not to provoke China again, President Lee’s 1999 declaration that Taiwan and China have a “Special State-to-State” relationship led to another potentially destabilising round of stand-offs with China. Again, in 2002 President Chen Shui-bian made an open display of support for Taiwan independence at a public forum and announced that Taiwan and China constitute “one country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait. This was with full knowledge that such action would provoke serious consternation in Beijing and upset Washington’s policy of maintaining smooth relations with China. In 2003, Taipei even began mooting the idea of implementing referenda on various domestic and “defensive” issues. Such a step causes Washington great displeasure because it may be regarded as a precursor move toward formal independence and one that is sure to provoke Beijing. In the above instances, Taiwanese attempts to establish itself as separate from China clearly went against implicit and explicit U.S. wishes and warnings.

On the other hand, Taiwan consciously strives to cultivate its importance to the world and the United States. Economically, it maintains the position among the most important manufacturers and suppliers of high-end silicon wafers, semiconductors and other crucial computer components. Taipei also tries to provide significant development and relief aid around the world, especially to Africa and Latin America, albeit as part of efforts to maintain diplomatic recognition. Diplomatically, Taiwan is seeking membership in international organisations, ranging from the WTO to the World Health Organisation and the United Nations. Justifications for membership are couched in terms of the economic and other practical services Taiwan can render to international society. Politically, Taiwan also tries to present itself as a model for democratic development in the hope of gaining wider

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24 Clough, Conflict or Cooperation in the Taiwan Strait, 70-75.
international support and leverage with the United States.\textsuperscript{26}

Such bonding behaviour matches Taiwan’s power position and level of integration in the world. In many respects, Taiwan ranks as a middle power despite the fact it often appears like a dwarf next to its Mainland neighbour. As the fourteenth largest trading state in the world, Taiwan’s economy is 3.14 percent that of the United States in terms of GDP while military spending stands at 3.21 percent of mean U.S. levels from 1988 to 2001. On a per capita basis, it even ranks higher than China on indicators of economic power in this study.

Despite significant connections with the international economic system, Taiwan’s level of integration in the world system are only moderate. This is largely due to Chinese pressure. Taiwan ranks high on economic integration since foreign trade as a proportion of GDP is a whopping 288 percent that of the United States and foreign direct investment 99.5 percent. Nonetheless, the number of IOs and INGOs that maintains relationships with Taiwan only stands at 48 percent of U.S. levels from 1988 to 2001, despite a relatively large number of MNCs on the island and unrelenting attempts by Taipei to change the situation.

At the same time, Taiwan’s average annual tourist exchanges are 10.84 percent of U.S. levels, while its average annual outgoing telecommunications traffic is 84.5 percent that of the United States. The tourism and telecommunication figures for Taiwan are particularly telling in comparison to Singapore. For a country with almost six times the population of Singapore, Taiwan’s average annual tourist exchanges only exceed those of Singapore by about 1.83 percent when compared to U.S. levels, while its mean annual outgoing telecommunications traffic lags behind Singapore by 511.1 percent.

Taiwan’s strategy, however, does not fit perfectly with bonding. Taipei also displays some binding towards the United States. Militarily and politically, the period after the Cold War witnessed repeated attempts by Taipei to establish influence on U.S. policy through more or less formal institutional means. This included measures such as pushing for the passage of a Taiwan Security Enhancement Act through to the U.S. Congress to supplement existing U.S. support for Taiwan’s security as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act.\textsuperscript{27} Other acts range from attempts to engage Washington in formal joint defence planning together with Japan, a major U.S. ally in the region, intelligence operations, and gaining influence over U.S.


policymaking through congressional pressure. Taipei is also seeking to conclude a free trade agreement with the United States which will link the two states economically.

It is also possible to make a case for some beleaguering behaviour on the part of Taipei. Long time observers of cross-Strait relations like Nancy Tucker, for example, point to Lee Teng-hui’s aforementioned “Two State Theory” statement as an attempt to prevent too close an alignment between Washington and Beijing. The argument is that Taipei intentionally attempted to disrupt the Clinton administration’s policy of engaging Beijing in some sort of “strategic partnership” in order to avoid sacrificing of Taiwanese interests. Such an understanding of the Taiwanese strategy is particularly understandable in the light of Bill Clinton’s “Three No’s” towards Taiwan in 1998, when the U.S. president indicated a limit on American support for Taiwanese attempts to expand its “international space”.

A possible explanation for Taiwan’s slight departure from its expected strategy may come from the fact that it is both more powerful and enjoys greater integration than my initial expectations. More refinement to indicators for power and integration may reduce this variance. Perhaps indicators that weigh for the various indicators of power and integration may give better estimates of Taiwan’s strategy towards power preponderance.

Additionally, the effect of path dependence is a from Taiwan’s history of close relations with the United States and past attempts to manipulate U.S. policy going back to former president, Chiang Kai-shek, may also help account for some of Taipei’s binding and beleaguering tendencies. Prevented from greater integration through participation in most international organisations, Taiwan’s isolated international political status may likewise preclude increases to the level of integration and the accompanying binding options. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s behaviour towards the leading state largely falls within the expectations from a conceptual framework looking at buffering, binding, bonding and beleaguering rather that just balancing and bandwagoning.

Singapore—Ties that Bind

By most accounts, Singapore is a small power. Its GDP is only 1.07 percent of that of

29 Tucker, Security Challenges for the United States, China, and Taiwan at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 7-8. Also, see Sheng, China’s Dilemma, 210-217.
30 Tucker, Security Challenges for the United States, China, and Taiwan at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 6-9.
31 Sheng, China’s Dilemma, 216-217 and Tucker, Security Challenges for the United States, China, and Taiwan at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 7-9.
the United States between 1988 and 2002, and its defence budget 1.27 percent. In fact, total U.S. spending on the military in the period under consideration is almost a hundred times larger than Singapore’s total GDP during this time. With a total land area roughly the size of New York City and a population of a little over 4 million, Singapore’s small physical size next to the United States is even more apparent than the difference in economic and military factors.

Despite its modern military and past record of economic success, looking at Singapore through the lenses of the balancing-bandwagoning paradigm should suggest that the island bandwagon with the United States. The fact that Singapore’s neighbourhood consists of large, potentially unfriendly states, the city-state should have even more reason to bandwagon on the side of Washington. Such bandwagoning with Washington would allow for balancing against hostile neighbours should the need arise.

Supporters of the bandwagoning position are likely to point to the island’s support for the recent U.S.-led war in Iraq, participation in U.S. post-September 11 anti-terror efforts and defence cooperation with the United States as evidence. Singapore’s hosting of U.S. forces transiting between the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as the opening of a new naval facility to berth transiting U.S. aircraft carriers further suggest that the small island-state is trying to establish itself within the American camp.32 In contemporary “Pentagon-ese”, Singapore is a quintessential example of “a place, not a base” from where the United States can project military force around the world.

Nevertheless, Singapore simultaneously displays a tendency for autonomy from Washington that is uncharacteristic of bandwagoning. For all its close defence and military relations with the United States, Singapore is not a U.S. ally. It also maintains significant defence relationships with the United Kingdom, Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Sweden, France and even Taiwan. Furthermore, Singapore is a major supporter of engaging China, India, South Korea, Japan and even Europe on security and economic matters in Southeast Asia in the years following the end of the Cold War, perhaps even at the expense of U.S. influence.33 Finally, Singapore in the 1990s was also a strong advocate of a greater role for ASEAN in regional affairs, despite the problems dogging the organisation.

Singapore was one of the main voices pushing for greater Chinese and Indian participation in the Asia-Pacific, beginning with the incorporation of these two actors into the ARF. In fact, Singapore even sponsored Delhi’s entrance into the grouping. From the early 1990s, Singapore was also one of the main advocates behind incorporating Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian and Burmese participation in regional affairs, which caused some friction with Washington.  

Singapore is also a regular supporter of all seventeen key pro-Palestinian resolutions in the United Nations over the years, a move that is contrary to longstanding American interests in the Middle East. In the early and mid-1990s, Singapore’s public stance supporting “Asian Values” also brought it in conflict with American attempts to promote democracy and human rights in Asia. This included a public row between Washington and Singapore over the caning of American teenager Michael Fay.

Overall, however, Singapore’s strategy towards the preponderant power of the United States seems to be one of binding. In building substantial defence ties with the United States, especially in aftermath of U.S. base closures in the Philippines, Singapore aims to maintain effective American involvement and participation in the management of regional security affairs. In engaging the United States and other powers simultaneously, Singapore hopes at the same time to enmesh the United States in multilateral regional frameworks to prevent excessive unilateralism or “drifting away” on Washington’s part. In fact, many observers in Singaporean defence circles claim that having a strong American military and civilian presence on the island allows it to draw on Washington’s support in the event of security contingencies.

Such moves potentially prevent a situation where a powerful United States becomes detached from regular management of regional security and only reacts with overwhelming force to full-blown crises. Even if the United States successfully intervenes under these circumstances, the fact that crises actually develop may be to the detriment of states within the region. Moreover, by serving as a conduit for U.S. regional involvement, Singapore may gain broader influence over Washington’s decision-making regarding the region as well as other

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benefits.\textsuperscript{40} Examples of such paybacks are U.S. concessions over capital controls and other trade-related issues in the recently concluded U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and the opportunity to join in the rebuilding of Iraq.\textsuperscript{41}

Perhaps a consideration of Singapore’s level of integration in the world system may provide insights as to why it engages in binding over bandwagoning. Although it is a small power, Singapore enjoys a high degree of integration with the rest of the world across all indicators. Trade and foreign direct investment in Singapore as a proportion of its mean GDP from 1988 to 2002 stand at 136 percent and 787 percent of average U.S. levels, respectively. Singaporean participation in International Organisations as well as the number of INGOs and MNCs within its borders is at 87 percent of mean U.S. levels. Furthermore, Singapore’s average annual outgoing telecommunications traffic is a massive 595.6 percent of average U.S. levels, which is surprising for such a small state. At the same time, its mean annual tourist exchanges are 9.01 percent of average U.S. levels for the period 1988 to 2002, very respectable for a country of its size.

Singapore’s high level of integration within the world system enables it to position itself in institutional relationships that permit some formal influence over decision-making in Washington. Participation in U.S.-initiated and -influenced organisations such as the WTO, IMF, World Bank, United Nations and APEC gives Singapore the experience of interacting with and informing U.S. decision-making through both the executive branch and Congress.\textsuperscript{42} Successful cooperation with Washington through these institutions also provides Singapore with considerable leverage in the conducting of its relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{43}

These factors give Singapore an incentive to establish further institutional linkages with the United States, which it knows will accord it some level of influence in Washington that is incommensurate with the small island state’s relative power. Binding with America, therefore, allows Singapore to “punch above its weight” in relations with the pre-eminent state in the system. This rationale likely accounts for Singapore’s tendency to engage this strategy as a


response to power preponderance.

To a lesser degree, Singapore also displays some behaviour akin to bonding alongside its predominantly binding behaviour. Using its strategic location at the confluence of vital Sea Lanes of Communication, namely the Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits and South China Sea, Singapore takes pains to establish itself as a critical node in maritime trade between Europe, the Middle East and with the Indian subcontinent to the west and the Asia-Pacific to the east. As such, Singapore serves as a critical refining and trans-shipment centre for energy resources bound for the Asia-Pacific from the Middle East as well. This role is particularly important for states like China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, which depend on Middle Eastern resources for between 70 to 90 percent of their energy needs. Even oil bound for the West Coast United States from the Middle East pass through the waters surrounding Singapore.

At the same time, Singapore consciously tries to cultivate itself as a responsible “global citizen”. It regularly provides peacekeeping troops and aid resources both in the region and around the world. This includes aid to Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, and Cambodia, substantial peacekeeping roles in Namibia, Cambodia, East Timor, and Kuwait, as well as a leading role in the activities of ASEAN. The island-state even played a good-offices role in attempting to facilitate dialogue between Taiwan and China in the early 1990s. Singapore’s recent participation on the United Nations Security Council as well as its efforts to promote international cooperation and coordination over the recent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARs) epidemic also forms part of this larger attempt to increase its functional value to the world.

Singapore’s bonding behaviour may be due in large part to path dependence. Although it is currently enjoys high degrees of integration in the world system, Singapore is a relatively new state, having only gained independence in 1965. Between independence and the end of the Cold War, one of the facets of Singapore’s efforts to establish international legitimacy and


46 Roy, China’s Foreign Relations, 98; Sheng, China’s Dilemma, 20; and, Garver, Face Off, 144-145.

increase integration with the world is by providing service to others. This partially explains its role in co-establishing ASEAN to promote regional stability in 1967 and its opposition to Vietnam’s invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia from 1979 to 1989. As such, Singapore’s current bonding efforts may indicate the inertia of past preferences.

North Korea—From Beleaguered to Beleaguering

If there is any contemporary state that is not experiencing integration in the world system, it is North Korea. Although North Korea has formal membership in a number of inter-governmental organisations between 1988 and 2002, it does not participate actively in many of them save perhaps the United Nations, which it uses as its main channel of contact with the outside world, and the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organisation. The number of INGOs and MNCs within its borders is virtually negligible. Pyongyang also does not provide consistent statements about trade and foreign direct investment. North Korea’s levels of tourist exchanges and outgoing telecommunications traffic are also a mere 0.03 percent and 0.23 percent of average annual U.S. levels from 1988 to 2002, respectively. This is remarkably small considering that North Korea has roughly the same population as Taiwan and Australia.

Despite its notoriously dire economic circumstances, Pyongyang is not the weakest state actor in this study. Although mean GDP over the past fourteen years is only an estimated 0.2 percent that of the United States, while estimates also gauge its military expenditure to be 0.7 percent of U.S. levels, it possesses or is very close to possessing nuclear weapons. Additionally, North Korea allegedly has mature biological and chemical weapons capabilities as well as the ability to deliver these weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to surrounding areas as well as parts of the United States using its competent cruise and ballistic missile technology. These factors make it a moderately powerful middle power at the minimum, as it can at times force its will on others. Given its relative power and level of integration, North Korea is the most likely candidate to engage in beleaguering vis-à-vis the United States.

Indeed, the description of beleaguering seems to fit Pyongyang’s relations with Washington. North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship in 1994 and 2003, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its missile test over Japan in 1998 are largely attempts to gain economic concessions and security guarantees from Washington and its two allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea. Given its knowledge of the U.S. commitment to stability in

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49 Bracken, Fire in the East, 2, 10, 47, 53-54, 62, 91-97, 114-119, 133-137; Alagappa, “Constructing Security in
Asia and the security of its allies, Pyongyang consciously threatened regional security and stability in the three instances above. In doing so, North Korea successfully won support for its ailing economy from the United States, Japan and South Korea as well as assistance for its supposedly civilian nuclear programme in 1994 and 1999 through the so-called “Agreed Framework”.

Most observers recognise that it is highly unlikely that Pyongyang is trying to balance the United States. Due to its limited economic and other resources, and despite the potential of North Korea’s alleged nuclear capability to turn the Sea of Japan and South Korea into a “sea of fire”, North Korea lacks the capacity to significantly threaten the United States’ predominant position in the world. Furthermore, Pyongyang’s estrangement from its two closest erstwhile friends, Russia and China make it unlikely that it will or can join in an arrangement with these two Great Powers to challenge the United States. Additionally, many observers acknowledge growing Chinese displeasure over North Korea’s unwillingness to compromise over the nuclear issue in trilateral talks with the United States brokered by Beijing.\(^50\)

Overall, North Korea’s consistent attempts to disrupt the U.S. policy of maintaining peace, stability and security in Northeast Asia appears to resemble beleaguer ing more than anything else. In view of the Pyongyang regime’s nuclear- and weapons of mass destruction-based capabilities as well as its lack of integration in the world system, North Korea’s responses to U.S. power preponderance conforms well to the expectations of a state with its power and integration attributes.

**Australia—A Mixed Case Down Under**

As a middle power that enjoys a high level of integration with the world, I expect Australia’s response to preponderant U.S. power to fall somewhere between binding and buffering. Australia’s average GDP from 1988 to 2002 is 5.04 percent that of the United States, while its military spending is 2.58 percent of average U.S. levels in the same period. This places Australia ahead of Taiwan, Singapore and North Korea in terms of economic and conventional military power. Australia, however, does not possess North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

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Australia also ranks high in terms of integration in the world system on the indicators in this study. Trade and foreign direct investment as proportions of average GDP in the period from 1988 to 2002 are at 171 percent and 151 percent of average U.S. levels, respectively. International organisations participation and domestic activity by INGOs and MNCs, on the other hand, stand at 73 percent of U.S. levels from 1988 to 2001. Additionally, Australia’s tourist exchanges stand at 6.55 percent of average U.S. levels from 1988 to 2002 and its outgoing international telecommunications traffic are 118.76 percent of mean U.S. levels for the same period. The extent of Australia’s telecommunications links with the rest of the world, are particularly significant given that its economy and population are substantially smaller than the United States.

Canberra, however, displays a propensity for binding. Not only does Australia remain a formal treaty ally of the United States through the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) pact, it is also one of the most active supporters of the United States internationally. It was one of the few states that fought alongside the United States in most of the latter’s major military engagements since the end of the Cold War. Australian troops were active in the first and second Persian Gulf Wars, as well as operations in Afghanistan in late 2001 and the various U.S.-led interventions in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Canberra also invoked the mutual defence clause of Australia New Zealand US Treaty (ANZUS) in support of the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on Washington, DC and New York City of September 11, 2001.

Nonetheless, Australian support for America does not equate to bandwagoning. Canberra in fact shows significant autonomy from Washington on many issues of import. It led intervention in East Timor from 1998 to 2000 whilst the U.S. was unwilling to do so, and maintained significant ties with a crumbling and politically isolated Indonesian government when the U.S. dramatically reduced contact in light of widespread human rights abuses by Jakarta. Despite American long-term suspicions of China, Canberra moved to develop a major multi-billion dollar, twenty-five year oil and natural gas export arrangement with China—Australia’s biggest ever foreign trade deal—as well as a series of other economic ties. Clearly then, Canberra does not simply bend in the direction where the prevailing

American wind happens to be blowing, as some observers and supporters of the bandwagoning view may charge.

Australia’s siding with the United States on many issues also seems to be efforts to sustain and enhance institutional influence over the pre-eminent state. By being a reliable ally to Washington, Canberra hopes to establish a role as a partner that the U.S. consults on matters pertaining to Asia, the Pacific and elsewhere. The success of Canberra’s may be evident in U.S. respect for, and even deference to Canberra’s opinions on Indonesia and East Timor following the political turmoil in these areas after the Asian Financial Crisis.

In event of tensions between Washington and Beijing, Canberra also hopes to use its unique access to Washington to help mould American behaviour. This allows Australia to pursue its interests in the region relatively free of constraints from Washington. At the same time, Australia aims to maximise the gains and freedom of action it can accrue under a U.S.-dominated system by demonstrating its loyalty as an alliance partner. This is evident in ongoing Australian efforts to secure American support for its economic and other activities in re-building efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Timor.

Like Singapore, Australia also tries actively to tie Washington’s actions to multilateral frameworks. These includes not only regional groupings like APEC, the ARF and Five Power Defence Arrangement, but broader arrangements like the Kyoto Environmental Treaty, International Criminal Court, WTO and several non-proliferation groups as well. True to a state that engages in binding the leading preponderant power, the belief in Canberra is that encouragement of U.S. engagement in multilateral institutions helps support both continuing U.S. international involvement as well as formal checks on the exercise of preponderant power. By securing a say in institutions involving the United States and deepening relations with Washington, therefore, Australia can exert influence on the shaping and restraining America.

Given its tendency for binding, Australia’s strategy towards unipolarity displays the greatest deviance from expectations among all the cases in this study. I suspect that this is the

56 Presentation by Carlyle A. Thayer.
result of path dependence on decisions following the end of the Second World War. During World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, Australia, like Japan and most of Western Europe, joined institutions and frameworks that Washington established to preserve the American position as the leading state in the Western bloc. These arrangements largely provided a structure for binding, where Washington allowed its allies to restrain and influence its actions in exchange for recognition of its leadership. Australia’s binding behaviour towards the United States in the almost decade-and-a-half since the end of the Cold War is likely to be indicative of the momentum emanating from World War II and Cold War decisions to join the liberal U.S.-led institutional order.

**Conclusion**

From the case studies, it seems clear that balancing and bandwagoning do not accurately describe responses to preponderant power in the contemporary world. Instead, an analytical framework that considers binding, bonding, buffering and beleaguering in light of differences in power and integration appears to offer better approximations and explanations of reactions to preponderant power under unipolarity. Evidence suggests that strategies towards the pre-eminent state do fall close to the expectations of a theory considering bonding, binding, buffering, and beleaguering as alternatives to bandwagoning and balancing. This suggests that it is possible to reject the Null Hypothesis, but not Hypotheses One and Two.

The variation between observed and expected state strategies in the cases under consideration are likely to be largely due to the roughness of measures of power and integration in this study. As such, the variance in the results of this study does not contradict the expectations I offer at the outset. Given measures of power and integration that can provide more precision, therefore, I should be able to reasonably expect better confluence of the data with my theoretical expectations.

What is also notable is the apparent, but non-systematic effect of historical path dependence. This is most evident in the Australian and Singaporean cases, and to a lesser extent, the Taiwan case. Notably, these are states with strong and clearly established pre-existing policies. In the Australian case, Canberra shares a longstanding institutional relationship with Washington since World War II. This leads to a preference for binding over buffering when its power and level of integration suggests some sort of mixture between the two. Singapore, on the other hand, shows residual bonding behaviour resulting from the historical inertia of past attempts to establish legitimacy and viability as an independent nation-state, just as Taiwan’s history of relations with the United States results in some residual binding and beleaguering. Some effects of path dependence may, however, diminish
over time if they are not reinforced.

Although I focus largely on material and institutional factors in this paper, explanations of state responses to preponderant power incorporating binding, buffering, bonding and beleaguering behaviour are not necessarily inimical to norms and ideational factors. Beliefs about economic systems or WMDs, for example, may play a major role in determining state power and integration. North Korea is a case in point. If Pyongyang did not adopt a policy of autarchic self-reliance or *Juche*, how it reacts to a unipolar system may be significantly different from what is currently occurring. Ideational factors such as beliefs, socialisation and norms may also help explain how and why path dependence influences responses to power preponderance as well as the specific content of bonding, binding, buffering and beleaguering behaviour.

In looking at responses to power preponderance outside of balancing and bandwagoning, normative and ideational factors may also be appropriate to understanding how a state achieves a particular level of power and integration. This study looks at state strategies taking power and integration as given. Hence, normative and ideational factors are not directly relevant in this case, despite their importance in an ontologically prior sense. Nonetheless, power and integration are not pre-destined and can change over time. This means that a state’s reaction to power preponderance may evolve as they traverse along the power and integration spectra. As such, the case studies in this paper only provide a cross-sectional understanding of state strategies in the period from the end of the Cold War until the present.

Most previous works on unipolarity or hegemony largely discuss the conditions under which the system may change. Such theories however, do not adequately address *how* states may attempt to secure or even advance their interests under a status quo that a pre-eminent state imposes on them. This paper is an attempt to better grasp how states in secondary positions of a stable system with a pre-eminent leading state may react and seek self-help. Under unipolarity especially, it seems that the various forms of balancing and bandwagoning do not appear to capture much of the behaviour of second-tier states.

Much scholarship in world politics also tends to ignore the fact that even individual actions by lesser, second-tier actors may have cumulative or collective effects. As such, the strategies that states choose may affect the persistence of a unipolar system over time and perhaps even allow for an opening of the political space needed for systemic change. If a significant number of states buffer, for instance, this may reduce the ability of the pre-eminent state to exercise its power and allow the rise of potential challengers. On the other hand, if
many states choose to bind, locking in institutions and processes that concede a restrained leadership position to the leading power, then the unipolar system may experience significant stability and longevity. Currently, it seems that most states in the contemporary world are choosing to bind, bond and buffer, which suggests that the present unipolar order may be stable. Nonetheless, as a response to increasingly U.S. unilateralism, more states may choose to buffer which may then lead to some erosion of American pre-eminence.

The collective importance of second-tier states demands more rigorous attempts to understand reactions to power preponderance by second-tier states. To assume that “self-help” merely means balancing or bandwagoning may be a too narrow conception of how states seek to pursue self-interest under anarchy. Here, it seems that the special conditions of power asymmetry under unipolarity present a situation where such variance in self-help behaviour can become more apparent. Therefore in looking specifically at strategies that move beyond the standard balancing-bandwagoning paradigm, this study is an effort to explore alternative responses to power preponderance and raise sensitivity about the unique dynamics and problems that may surround unipolarity.
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