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- Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology.
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ABSTRACT

In this essay, I examine the dynamics and outcomes of Indonesia’s first-ever direct local executive elections in a case study of the gubernatorial election in the Riau Archipelago. Specifically, I examine the election processes, identify the major issues before, during, and after the elections, and assess voters’ participation. I then examine the ways direct local executive elections have affected the dynamics of local politics in the country. Overall, this essay aims to further develop our understanding of political dynamics in the Riau Archipelago and grasp the practical significance of local political change in Indonesia more broadly.

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Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of the Riau Archipelago

Introduction

More than seven years have passed since Soeharto’s fall unleashed historic political and social transformations in Indonesia. It has been more than four years since the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid began implementing sweeping decentralization measures that devolved a wide range of administrative and fiscal responsibilities to the country’s district-level governments and assemblies. Within this short period, Indonesians have participated in three national elections – two parliamentary elections, in June 1999 and April 2004; and the country’s first-ever direct presidential elections, held in two rounds in July and September of 2004. Currently, Indonesia is taking yet another important step in its process of political and administrative decentralization: direct elections of local government heads (i.e., provincial governors, municipal mayors, and district regents).

Since 1 June 2005, eight provinces and over 170 municipalities and districts have held their first-ever direct executive elections. Over the next few years, similar elections will take place in all remaining provinces and municipalities/districts. Given the increased power of local government in Indonesia, the country’s local politics are of great practical significance. Yet our understanding of how direct local elections have and will continue to affect the dynamics of the country’s politics and governance remains woefully inadequate.

International press coverage of Indonesia’s recent local elections has generally been quite favorable. My research shows a more complex picture. Direct local executive elections have gone smoothly in some areas, but generated considerable controversy in many others. In some instances, election controversies have even spurred large-scale public protest. Of course it is too early to assess the impact of these elections on local governance. Yet understanding the dynamics, including the strengths and shortcomings, of recent direct local elections in
Indonesia is important on at least two different levels. Viewed narrowly, an appreciation of the dynamics of local electoral politics in the country can contribute to efforts to improve the fairness and quality of future elections. More broadly, given that many local elections in Indonesia have been tarnished by such undemocratic practices as ‘money politics’ and political intimidation, it is pertinent to question whether and how direct elections of local government heads will affect the attitudes and practices of local politicians and voters and state-society relations more generally. At stake is the very legitimacy of locally-elected government.

The premise of this essay is that there is no inherent relation between political decentralization and democracy. Although political and administrative decentralization can enhance the responsiveness, accountability, and transparency of local government, both international experience and Indonesia’s own recent experience warn us against unqualified optimism. Assessing the actual effects of direct local elections requires evidence and explanation going beyond simplistic assumptions about the positive impact of formally democratic institutions and processes. Whether, how, and with what consequences direct local executive elections affect local political institutions and governance in Indonesia is an open question and can only be answered by empirical analysis.

In this essay, I examine the dynamics and outcomes of direct local executive elections in Indonesia, using the Riau Archipelago’s recent gubernatorial election as a case study. I examine the conduct of these elections, identify the major issues before, during, and after the elections, and assess voters’ participation in their first-ever direct local elections. To gain a broader perspective on Indonesia’s local electoral and party politics, I make extensive references to elections in other regions. This essay aims to develop an understanding of the political dynamics of recent elections in the Riau Archipelago and grasp the practical significance of local political changes in Indonesia more broadly.
My analysis is organized in three sections. In the first section I discuss elections and political parties in contemporary Indonesia and clarify the significance of the country’s first experiment with direct local executive elections. In this section I also examine the process by which direct elections for local government heads were adopted and the important controversies and ambiguities that preceded even the implementation of the first-round of elections. In the second section I investigate the processes and results of the 2005 gubernatorial election of the Riau Archipelago. In the third section, on the basis of my observations of elections in the Riau Archipelago and other regions, I discuss some of the ways direct local elections have affected the dynamics of local politics in the country. Of course, given that direct local elections have just begun, such general assessments are necessarily preliminary. Overall, I argue that while direct local executive elections have indeed transformed the dynamics of Indonesia’s local politics – in the Riau Archipelago and elsewhere, it is unclear whether the local democratization that advocates of direct local elections had hoped for has truly materialized.

The Significance of Local Elections and Local Party Politics in Indonesia

Since the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia has seen two multi-party general elections, in 1999 and 2004, and its first-ever direct presidential elections, also in 2004. These elections attracted worldwide interest and support. Prominent international organizations and political leaders greeted Indonesia’s elections with enthusiasm and emphasized their importance to the consolidation of democracy in the country. However, while there has been enormous

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1 In contrast to the old system, under which the president and vice-president were elected in separate votes by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat: MPR), from 2004 the president and vice-president were directly elected as a single team in a nation-wide presidential election. To be elected, a team of candidates had to win an absolute majority of the votes at the national level (50 per cent plus one) and 20 per cent or more in at least half the provinces. None of five teams met the criteria in the first round of popular balloting in July so that the top two pairs of candidates advanced to a second round of voting in September. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Yusuf Kalla won the election against Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi with almost two thirds of the vote.
attention to Indonesia’s revitalized electoral and party politics, most discussions have centered on the *national* electoral and party systems and *national* election results. As I explain, the dynamics of local electoral and party politics have received comparatively little attention. This is unfortunate, for in practice, and especially given Indonesia’s decentralized political landscape, it is local electoral and party politics that give us the most accurate understanding of the state of democracy in contemporary Indonesia. In what follows, I show that our understanding of Indonesia’s political change has been incomplete. I then discuss the background and significance of Indonesia’s first experiment with direct local elections in the context of the country’s ongoing process of political decentralization.

**National Obsession: Our Incomplete Understanding of Indonesia’s Local Politics**

Our understanding of the institutional and practical features of local politics in Indonesia remains limited. In large part, this is a result of observers’ consistent focus on national politics, at the expense of the local processes underlying them. International observers widely acknowledge the importance of political decentralization in Indonesia, but their analyses remain firmly pitched at the national level. Scholars of Indonesian politics have examined issues pertaining to decentralization, but relatively few have focused on the political dynamics of decentralization on the ground. Consequently, most predictions about the effects of Indonesia’s political decentralization have rested on familiar but quite unfounded assumptions about the relation between decentralization and the quality of

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2 See, for example, the Carter Center’s election reports on its website: [http://www.cartercenter.org/activities/showdoc.asp?countryID:40&submenu=activities](http://www.cartercenter.org/activities/showdoc.asp?countryID:40&submenu=activities).

3 For example, Agung Laksono, the chairman of the People’s Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: DPR) of the period 2004-2009, points out that “the emergence of multi-party system has dramatically changed the way of doing Indonesian politics” (from his talk at IDSS Indonesia Update Seminar, 23 March 2005).

4 In an appendix, I briefly elaborate an analytic perspective for studying local electoral and party politics in a post-authoritarian context. For a more detailed discussion, see also Choi (2003).
For in practice, and particularly in Indonesia, there is little evidence that democratization combined with decentralization systematically encourages local politicians to be more responsive and accountable.\(^5\)

A small number of locally-grounded case studies of politics in Indonesia suggest quite the opposite. Namely, that in Indonesia we have observed a large and apparently growing gap between the formal institutions of democratic decentralization and actual practices and experiences on the ground (Aspinall & Fealy 2003; Choi 2003 & 2004; Shiller 2004; Hadiz 2004; and Lucas 2004). More specifically, both within and outside the shell of formally democratic political institutions, we have observed the emergence of a decentralized ‘money politics’ (as opposed to the highly centralized corruption during the New Order period) and the penetration of local (and nominally democratic) political institutions by political gangsterism (premanisme\(^7\)). Much more numerous than the scholarly accounts are the press reports about regents and mayors behaving like “little kings,” local assembly members awarding themselves various perks and allowances amounting to millions of rupiah per person per year, and widespread allegations of corruption against local government heads and assembly members.\(^8\)

\(^5\) Of course, assessing the “quality” of democracy is a notoriously difficult proposition. On this point, see the recent issue of *Journal of Democracy* (October 2004).

\(^6\) The experiences of other countries that simultaneously underwent democratization and decentralization tell us that the positive impact of devolving power to local authorities in the process of democratization will only be felt if the decentralized power is exercised democratically (Crook & Manor 1995; Kerkvliet & Mojares 1991; Trocki 1998; Arghiros 2001; and, Swianiewicz 2001). For instance, reforms in Thailand and the Philippines have revealed that competitive elections for local officials do not, in themselves, ensure that the devolved authority would be operated democratically (Kerkvliet 1996; Sidel 1999; and, McVey 2000).

\(^7\) The term *preman* used to refer to a policeman or a soldier who was not on duty or wearing civilian clothes during the New Order period, but the term now refers to hoodlums or criminals, replacing the traditionally used *jago* or *gali*, professional criminals or charismatic toughs. For further discussion on the historic background, see Cribb (1991) and Robinson (1995), and for the recent developments of ‘premanisme’ in Indonesia’s local politics, see Rytter (1998; 2001), Barker (1998; 1999), Lindsey (2001), Collins (2002), and Choi (2003). See, for example, the special section that recently appeared in the *Economist*, “Time to deliver: A survey of Indonesia” (December 11\(^{\text{th}}\) 2004). Since the Susil Bambang Yudhoyono-Yusuf Kalla government took power in October 2004, some of those alleged have been actually brought to the court and sentenced to jail terms. For example, 27 Padang municipal assembly members for the period 1999-2004 were recently sentenced to 4 years in jail and fined 200 million rupiah per person for graft (*Riau Pos*, 28 July 2005; *The Jakarta Post*, 29 July 2005).
Overall, existing evidence of local politics in contemporary Indonesia stands in stark contrast with the rosy accounts of most international observers. Substantively, both the locally-grounded scholarly accounts and the press reports remind us that formal institutional arrangements do not, in and of themselves, consolidate democratic values, attitudes, and behaviors at the grassroots. The mere existence of formally democratic institutions and decentralization programs by no means guarantees the development of institutionalized democratic practices. On the contrary, analyses of political change in Indonesia and other settings suggest that people interpret, experience, and apply the formal rules of democracy in profoundly different, frequently unintended, and often contradictory and undemocratic ways.

Direct Local Executive Elections: From Adoption to Implementation

Given the potential impact of direct executive elections on local governance, a careful empirical analysis of local elections in Indonesia would represent a useful contribution to our understanding of political change in the country. Doing so requires some basic familiarity with the formal institutions governing the elections, which is the aim of this subsection. In what follows, I briefly explain Indonesia’s transition from indirect to direct elections of local government heads. I then examine the controversies that surrounded (and continue to surround) the governing system of direct local elections. This sets the stage for the case study of the Riau Archipelago’s gubernatorial election.

After Soeharto’s fall, one of the most vibrant debates on Indonesia’s electoral reform concerned the selection and representativeness of executive heads of the provincial and district governments. Under the New Order regime, local government heads were in effect

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9 With regard to the significance of local political dynamics, Hans Antlöv emphasizes that “[p]olitics are more than elite maneuvering and the development of political institutions. It is also a question of how people perceive their leaders and how they express their feelings through a variety of low-key and everyday means. Crucial to our view is the interaction between politics, identity and local issues” (Antlöv 2004, 3).
appointed by the central government, despite going through a formal electoral process in the local assemblies (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*: DPRD). In September 1999, local assembly members gained real (i.e., substantive) responsibility for electing and dismissing local government heads. While this change made political decisions more decentralized, it also created some problems of its own. From the outset, local assemblies’ choices were accompanied by allegations that local government leaders could win elections by buying votes from local assembly members and that many local government heads, no matter how they were elected, could secure their positions by bribing local assembly members (Rasyid 2003, 66). In response to such allegations, and to increasingly blatant practices of ‘money politics’ in local politics, international organizations and Indonesian civil society activists called for a direct election system. Such a system, they believed, would make those directly elected officials more responsive to the local public’s interests (Koalisi ORNOP 2001; Asia Foundation 2002; and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung & ADEKSI 2003). It is useful to examine the process by which direct elections for local government heads were adopted and the important controversies and ambiguities that preceded even the implementation of the first-round of elections.

In late 2002, the People’s Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*: DPR) adopted a direct election system for the government heads at all levels of governance, from President to mayors and regents. The adoption of the proposal for direct elections was something of a surprise, as leaders of major parties initially appeared intent on maintaining the indirect electoral system, which allowed only party representatives in local assemblies to

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10 Under the New Order regime, local assemblies usually proposed three candidates for the position of head of local government, with the final decision among those three lying in the hands of the central government. The president decided who were to become governors, while the Minister of Home Affairs chose the regents (*bupati*) and mayors (*walikota*). Neither the president nor the minister were bound to select the candidates who had gained the most votes in the local assemblies, and in some cases, the successful candidates were in fact those with the lowest level of support at the local levels (Rasyid 2003, 64-65).

11 This NGO coalition initiated an embryonic movement for the overhaul of the 1945 Constitution since the time of the Habibie’s interregnum government, inspired by the successful movements in Thailand and the
vote. It took almost two years for the DPR members to revise the existing laws and bring into being a new law on regional administration. In September 2004, with direct local elections scheduled to begin in less than a year (June 2005), the DPR moved to revise the two previous laws on regional autonomy (Laws No. 22 & 25 of 1999) and legislated Law No. 32 of 2004 on regional administration. The new law came into effect in October 2004. Its many confusing stipulations invited a great deal of controversy even before the first direct elections were held.

One of the controversial issues was about which institution should be responsible for organizing and staging direct local executive elections. A number of civil society organizations and experts challenged the law, arguing that the law contravenes the amended 1945 Constitution because it allows the government to intervene in the electoral process. In addition, there were also concerns about the fairness and impartiality of the elections, because it is each local branch of the Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah: KPUD) that is designated to organize elections without any centrally-coordinated assistance and monitoring from its parent organization, the Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum: KPU). The law also stipulates that each KPUD has to be accountable to its respective local assembly, while only political parties or party coalitions seizing at least 15 percent of seats in local assemblies are eligible to nominate candidates for governors or mayors/regents.

A number of civil society organizations, local branches of the Election Commission (KPUD), which were also initiated by civil society organizations. Eleven NGOs comprised it: CETRO, GPSP, ICW, INSE, KIPP Indonesia, PBHI, PSHK, Solidaritas Perempuan, WALHI, YAPPIKA, and YLBHI.

12 The impetus for the passage of electoral reform seemed mainly to achieve consistency with the four amendment packages of the 1945 Constitution made during the period 1999-2002.

13 The new law has been criticized for its nuance of re-centralization. Critics argue that it regulates power-sharing between Jakarta and the regions rather than regional autonomy per se, pointing out that it allows the central government to control some strategically important sectors, including development, of local level of governance: See Ridwan Max Sijabat, “Review 2004 – National: Regional Autonomy Makes Little Headway” (The Jakarta Post, 17 August 2005); See also CETRO (2004) and LIPI (17 June 2005).

14 For instance, Article 65 verse 4 stipulates that detailed guide for the preparation and implementation of elections will be provided to local election commissions through a Governmental Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah: PP). Responding to this stipulation, Ryaas Rasyid, a former director general of regional autonomy
and leaders of small parties brought the law to the Constitutional Court for a judicial review. In early 2005, however, while the court was still holding hearings, the new government led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced Governmental Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah: PP) No. 6 of 2005 on the election, validation and dismissal of local government heads.

On 22 March 2005, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling (Perma No. 2 of 2005), bringing about changes to some controversial stipulations. With the ruling, parties that do not even have any representatives at local assemblies still can nominate candidates for governors, mayors and regents by forming a coalition with other parties in such a way that they garner 15 percent of support in the local assembly. The court also ruled that provincial KPUD should report to the national Election Commission (KPU), as they did in the 2004 elections, rather than to local assemblies. In case of conflict over the election results, which was not clearly stated in the law, the court ruled that the case should be brought to the regional High Court first and then advanced to the Supreme Court. In response to the ruling, the central government issued a new Governmental Regulation (PP No. 17 of 2005) in April 2005. Nonetheless, controversies over systemic issues and the overall uncertainty threatened to smear the smooth conduct of elections. Table 1 (below) summarizes major points specified in Law No. 32 of 2004 and Governmental Regulations No. 6 & 17 of 2005.

at the Ministry of Home Affairs, argued that the government should not get involved in the electoral processes (The Jakarta Post, 17 February 2005); See also CETRO (2004).
Table 1. Electoral System of Indonesia’s Direct Local Executive Elections

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<th>Phase of Election</th>
<th>Major Points</th>
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| Nomination of Candidates                               | • Parties or party coalitions that seize at least 15 percent of seats in local assemblies are eligible to nominate candidates.  
• Minority parties that do not have any representatives in assemblies also can nominate candidates by forming a coalition with other parties. |
| Registration and Validation of Candidates, Campaigns, Voting, and Counting of the Vote | • Basically, provincial and district branches of the Election Commission (KPUD) are responsible for the entire electoral process, without any centrally-coordinated assistance and monitoring.  
• Provincial KPUD have to report to the national Election Commission (KPU), rather than to local assemblies.  
• KPUD still have to be accountable to local assemblies for the use of the budgets for elections, which are decided and monitored by local assemblies. |
| Validation of the Election Results                      | • To win elections, a pair of candidates has to win the majority (more than 25 percent) of the vote.  
• They are to be inaugurated by the Minister of Home Affairs on the basis of President’s agreement. |
| Supervision and Conflict Management                    | • Local branches of the Election Supervisory Committee (Panitia Pengawas: Panwas) are to supervise the entire electoral process.  
• In case of violation, Panwas has to report to the regional High Court within seven days after the voting.  
• In case of conflict over the election results, the case should be brought to the regional High Court first and then advanced to the Supreme Court. |

**The 2005 Gubernatorial Election of the Riau Archipelago**

On June 30, I found myself in Batam, witnessing the latest twist in Indonesia's remarkable political transformation. For the first time since independence, Indonesians were participating in direct elections of their local government heads. While Indonesia's vast size and social complexity work against generalizations, a close look at the recent gubernatorial election in the Riau Archipelago (including Batam and Bintan) offers some notable findings. (It bears
emphasis that this case study is the first step in a larger project that seeks a more comprehensive and comparative assessment of local politics in Indonesia.) I begin by providing some context on the Riau Archipelago’s noteworthy social, political, and economic attributes. This includes discussion of the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), a national-level agency whose operations overshadowed the archipelago’s local political institutions until at least 2001. I then proceed to an analysis of the archipelago’s gubernatorial election held on 30 June 2005. This includes analysis of the nomination of candidates by party coalitions, the qualitative features of the electoral campaigns, voting patterns, and the validation of election results. Primary data for this analysis was collected during three field visits in June, July, and August of 2005. Given the timing of the elections, the data are still incomplete and my conclusions are necessarily preliminary. In essence, I show that the devolution of a wide range of authorities to the Riau Archipelago’s municipal governments since 2001 has engendered increased tensions between BIDA and local authorities, with local residents and foreign investors caught in between. In the end, Ismuth Abdullah – a BIDA-affiliated elite – managed to win the election handily. But the conduct of the elections, their dynamics, and the controversies they generated are all suggestive of the fragile state of Indonesian democracy.

**Background on the Riau Archipelago**

The Riau Archipelago, or *Kepulauan Riau* (Kepri), is Indonesia’s youngest province, having just separated from Riau Province in 2004. Economically, the archipelago is distinctive. Thanks to its close proximity to Singapore and the Indonesian government’s efforts to exploit this advantage, Kepri has become a significant destination for international investment and tourism, particularly from Singapore. Batam and Bintan are the archipelago’s
two most important islands. Batam is the island closest to Singapore and, in the past three decades, it has been transformed from a lightly-populated backwater to a bustling regional center of industry, shipping, communications, and tourism. Bintan is the archipelago’s largest island and also a focus of large-scale foreign investments, including investments in industrial parks and mega resorts. These islands attract foreign investors with their cheap land and labor, and their strategic locations. According to Singapore’s Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs, to date, combined foreign investments in Batam and Bintan have exceeded US$ 9 billion, have generated an export value of US$ 4.1 billion, and have created jobs for more than 220,000 workers. In 2004 alone, 41 new foreign companies established operations in Batam, with new investments totaling more than US$ 160 million.16

Batam, only 20 km from Singapore, is the motor of the archipelago’s economic growth. It thus warrants special attention. In the 1960s, the island was nearly all pristine rainforest, with only 2,000 residents inhabiting a few tiny villages. In 1971, the Indonesian government launched an ambitious project to transform the island into a major industrial zone and to this end established the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA). The island was placed under the custodianship of the BIDA, which gained control of land through presidential decree and has remained outside the power of local political institutions. Until 1998, President Soeharto held a tight grip on Batam’s development principally by assigning his cronies to oversee the island’s transformation. Ibnu Sutowo, the President-Director of Pertamina, the state-owned oil company, chaired BIDA from 1971 to 1976, until he was fired from his position in the wake of Pertamina’s bankruptcy.17 In 1978, Soeharto installed B.J.

15 Law No. 25 of 2002, legislated in September 2002, allowed the Riau Archipelago to be separated from Riau Province but did not take effect until 1 July 2004.
17 Ibnu Sutowo, who initially promoted and launched the Batam development project, was known as one of main suppliers of funds to Soeharto’s patronage system. For further discussion, see Mackie (1970), Robison (1986), Winters (1996), and Liang (2001).
Habibie, his most trusted and longstanding favorite, to head BIDA.\(^\text{18}\) For the next twenty years, B.J. Habibie used the land and capital at BIDA’s disposal to serve the interest of Soeharto and his patronage system.\(^\text{19}\) At the same time, Habibie secured lucrative business opportunities for members of his own family.\(^\text{20}\) BIDA continued to control all development projects on Batam until the implementation of regional autonomy scheme in 2001.\(^\text{21}\)

Since 2001, the devolution of a wide range of authorities to the Batam municipal government has brought tension and sometimes conflict of interests between BIDA and local authorities. While the island still receives significant transfers from the national budget, the municipal government has also introduced new taxes in order to boost its budget revenues. Investors on the island have grown wary of inconsistencies and contradictions in the policies pursued by the island’s competing political authorities.\(^\text{22}\)

In June 2005, in an effort to allay investors’ concerns, the Indonesian government announced its plan to upgrade Batam to a “bonded zone plus” in which businesses would be

\(^{18}\) B.J. Habibie also served as the Minister of Research and Technology until the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected Soeharto and him as President and Vice President in early 1998. Later, he led an interim government as an acting President from May 1998 to September 1999.

\(^{19}\) For example, in many cases, the counterpart of the Singaporean investors was the Salim Group, owned by Soeharto’s another long-time crony Liem Sioe Liong (Colombijn 2003).


\(^{21}\) Initially, the development of Batam was limited to logistic and operational businesses related to oil and gas exploration of Pertamina. The focus of development started being expanded in the mid 1970s, and the islands’ development potential started to be fully realized when the island was integrated into Singapore-led growth triangle linking Batam, Singapore, and Maylayasia’s Johor state in 1986.

\(^{22}\) It is recently reported that Batam has lost its allure for foreign companies. According to local think-tank Prodata Batam, at least 95 foreign companies have left the island for countries such as China and Vietnam since 2001, the first year of the implementation of a wide range of decentralization measures, and 35 others have downsized operations or are considering pulling out. Among the things that investors are wary of, tax issue has plagued many foreign investors since 2004 when the central government lifted the island’s tax-exemption status on immaterial products and services such as consultancies. Industries now have to pay an unrealistically high 10 years’ worth of tax arrears. The government has also lifted exemption on value-added and luxury-goods taxes, forcing companies to pay high taxes when they import products such as electronics parts (The Straits Times, 18 March 2005).
able to import goods duty-free into specified bonded zones. Such a plan, if realized, would indeed give Singaporean and other foreign investors increased incentives for further investment. Yet even if the special status is eventually granted, the local regulatory environment will increasingly hinge on local, rather than national, political processes. With administrative and political decentralization and direct local elections, foreign investors will need to become increasingly involved in the local society and their need to cultivate local relationships will become more important. From this point of view, the region’s first direct gubernatorial election should be of great interest to political and economic decision-makers in Singapore and beyond.

In what follows, I analyze four major processes of the 2005 gubernatorial election of the Riau Archipelago: the nomination of candidates, campaigns, voting, and the validation of election results. I analyze data obtained from media coverage of the election as well as my own interviews with diverse social groups, including voters, campaigners, and journalists. To assess continuity and change in voters’ party identity and bases of voting decisions, I compare the 2005 direct election results with the 2004 parliamentary election results (provincial-level).

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23 On 24 January 2005, Coordinating Minister for the Economy Aburizal Bakrie announced that the government decided against a proposal to turn the entire Batam islands area (including 41 neighboring islands) into a single Free Trade Zone. According to a news analysis of the US Embassy-Jakarta, while BIDA argued the bonded zone scheme decided by the central government would confuse investors and lead to local government graft, local authorities claimed that bonded zones would enable them to better govern Batam as mandated under the regional autonomy laws (US Embassy Jakarta, “Indonesia: Trade and Investment Highlights, January/February 2005”: http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/econ/trade%20highlights-jan-feb-05.pdf, accessed 27 September 2005).

24 In a seminar held in August 2003, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Jakarta-based think-tank, recommended “clear and complementary authorization between local government and BIDA” as an important precondition of formulating Batam as a Free Trade Zone. For further discussion, see CSIS, “Batam Free Trade Zone: A Blueprint for National Economic Recovery” (http://www.csis.or.id/tool_print.asp?type=events&mode=past&id=9, accessed 3 August 2005).

25 For a case study of the indirect election system applied during the period 1999-2005, see Choi (2004).
Nomination of Candidates and Party Coalitions

Three party coalitions nominated three pairs of candidates for the Riau Archipelago’s gubernatorial election (see Table 2 and 3 below). Notably, all the six candidates were well-established local officials and bureaucrats. The first pair was Rizal Zen, former police officer, and Firman Bisowarno, secretary-general of the agency that set up the new province (Badan Pelaksana Pembentukan Provinsi Kepulauan Riau). The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa: PKB) nominated the Rizal-Firman pair and 12 other small parties joined the coalition.\(^{26}\) Golkar and the Prosperity and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera: PKS) nominated Ismeth Abdullah and Muhammad Sani, and several small parties, including the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: PPP) and the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat: PD) joined the coalition. Finally, the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional: PAN) and the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan: PDI-P) nominated Nyat Kadir and Soerya Respationo, drawing support from a few small parties.\(^{27}\) Of the three tickets, Rizal Zen and Firman Bisowarno were the least well-known among the local population. By contrast, the other two tickets had been nominated by major parties and were in tight competition from the outset.

\(^{26}\) Some of these small parties have no representatives in the provincial assembly of the Riau Archipelago. As explained earlier, the requirement for candidates for local government heads to meet a threshold of 15 percent support in local assemblies puts small parties at a decided disadvantage, but with the Constitutional Court’s ruling of March 2005, even small parties with no representatives in local assemblies can nominate candidates by forming coalitions with other parties.

\(^{27}\) Both the PAN and the PDI-P are the second biggest parties in the provincial assembly with 7 seats, respectively. In the meantime, the PAN is the majority party in the Batam municipal assembly, while the PDI-P is the majority party in the Tanjung Pinang district assembly.
Table 2. Composition of Parties at the Riau Archipelago Provincial Assembly (2004-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>The number of seats in the provincial assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-Perjuangan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other small parties</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Candidates and Party Coalitions in the 2005 Riau Archipelago’s Gubernatorial Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Candidates</th>
<th>Party Coalitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rizal Zen</td>
<td>PKB (2 seats) and 12 small parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firman Bisowarno</td>
<td>Golkar (9), PKS (5), PPP (3), PD (3), and small parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismeth Abdullah</td>
<td>PAN (7), PDI-P (7), and small parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Sani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyat Kadir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soerya Respationo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By any count, Ismeth Abdullah is one of the wealthiest and best-connected political and economic elite in the archipelago. Originally from Cirebon of West Java, he served as chairman of BIDA from 1998 to 2005 and was also a former acting governor of the Riau Archipelago from 2004 to 2005.\(^{28}\) Given Ismeth Abdullah’s background and experience, it was not surprising that Golkar, the biggest party in the archipelago’s provincial assembly (with 9 out of 45 seats), swiftly nominated him to be the party’s gubernatorial candidate. Ismeth Abdullah was also believed as the favorite among the business community in the

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\(^{28}\) His wife, who is also the daughter of a former governor of Riau Province in the late 1950s, is currently serving as a member of the national level Regional Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah: DPD*) representing the archipelago.
Ismeth Abdullah picked Muhammad Sani, a former regent (*bupati*) of the Karimun district, as his running mate. Muhammad Sani was supported by the PKS, the fourth biggest party in the Kepri assembly (with 5 seats). Muhammad Sani was also believed to have strong base in Karimun, where Ismeth Abdullah seemed to have relatively weak support base. Aside from the fact that they were supported by the strong Golkar-PKS coalition, Ismeth Abdullah and Muhammad Sani seemed to benefit from their long-established careers and reputations. Some predicted the pair’s victory even before the campaigns.

Nonetheless, Nyat Kadir and Soerya Respationo were competitive enough to make predicting the results difficult. Nyat Kadir was mayor of Batam from 2001 to 2005, while Soerya Respationo is currently chairman of the Batam municipal assembly. Compared to Ismeth Abdullah and Muhammad Sani, Nyat Kadir and Soerya Respationo appeared somewhat closer to the local people. Originally from the region, Nyat Kadir was regarded as “local boy,” or *putra daerah*, and Soerya Respationo, originally from Yogyakarta of Central Java, had earned a good reputation through his social networks and activities with Batam’s lower-class workers and their families. What we had was a campaign between a BIDA heavyweight and local underdogs.

**Campaigns: Sosok, Migrants, and Media**

Compared to the nomination of candidates, parties played an insignificant role in other electoral processes. In waging their campaigns, which lasted from June 13 to 26, candidates funded their own campaigns and received very limited support from the political

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29 For example, Rostiati Sulaiman, head of the Coalition of Women Voters in the Riau Archipelago, expressed her concern about the economic prospect of the directly-elected provincial government and said that “(w)e are confident he (Ismeth Abdullah) can help boost the economy and free Batam of the cumbersome rules that impede business” (*The Straits Times*, 4 July 2005).
The campaigns were also more focused on personalities, or *sosok*, rather than platforms. By law, candidates were required to lay out their “mission, vision, and program” but their ideas were more or less uniform. Instead, *sosok*, which can be referred to a person’s physical appearance or charismatic character, played an important part in the campaigning, given that there was very little information available for voters to assess candidates. It is disputable whether Indonesian voters are irrational and emotional because they tend to rely on candidates’ *sosok* in choosing their political leaders. However, given the lack of policy debate during the campaigns, candidates’ personalities and socio-economic backgrounds certainly provided Indonesian voters with some way of assessing candidates.

Second, given that a large share of the archipelago’s population are migrants, or *pendatang*, such regional organizations as the Community of North Sumatranese (*Ikatan Keluarga Besar Sumatar Utara*) took on an especially important role, in some senses taking the role usually provided by village leaders. Although it is said that there are more than 100 such organizations in the archipelago, just a handful of them can boast of close relationships between the leadership and the grassroots members. Notably, regional organizations are themselves not political. However, during the election campaigns, such organizations’

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30 According to the survey conducted by the Jakarta-based Center for Political Study-Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate (CPS-SSS) in 4 provinces and 86 districts/municipalities, the elected provincial government heads generally spent their ‘campaign’ funds averaging Rp 100 billion (US$ 10 million), while elected district/municipal government heads generally spent between Rp 1.8 and 16 billion (US$ 180,000-1.6 million) (Rinakit 2005).

31 An exceptional case was the PKS. In Batam, the PKS held a rally of thousands of cadres and supporters at a sports stadium, in which the party’s chairman, Tifatul Sembiring, and other executive committee members attended. The party is reported to have held similar events in other regions and obligated its cadres and supporters to vote for its own candidates. The PAN-PDI-P coalition also held a rally for the Nyat-Soerya pair but the rally was much smaller compared to the PKS’s, despite the attendance of such national political figures as Megawati Soekarnoputri and Amien Rais, the chairwoman and chairman of the PDI-P and the PAN, respectively. In the place of effectively functioning political machines, three elements of the campaigns took on additional importance.

32 For example, Prijanto Ar-Rabbani, executive director of the Center for Madani Studies, points out that Indonesian voters are emotional and personal in casting their votes because they tend to see candidates’ familial and socio-economical backgrounds as well as their affiliations with religious organizations (“Pilkada dan Masa Depan Kepri (1),” *Media Kepri*, 2 June 2005).

33 It is roughly estimated that migrants consist of more than 50 % of the whole population of the Riau Archipelago.

34 This is particularly the case in Batam, whose population makes up more than half the whole population of the province.
chairmen often decide to support certain parties or candidates in the name of their organizations, but usually without consulting their grassroots members. In the 2005 gubernatorial election, leaders of regional organizations appeared keener to make use of the election in seeking financial contributions (sumbangan) as rewards of their political support.\(^{35}\)

The third important factor that influenced the campaigns was the local mass media. Theoretically, the local mass media can help the local public form opinions on the basis of the locally-defined interests. However, in practice, many of Kepri’s dailies and weeklies appeared highly partisan and drew criticism as having become instruments of power struggles (Rumbadi Dalle, *Batum Pos*, 29 June 2005). Some reporters unofficially joined campaign teams and supported their candidates by providing them with inputs or organizing questions before press conferences. Journalists supporting the Nyat-Soerya team seemed to be particularly blatant given that Ismeth Abdullah, the former governor of the Riau Archipelago, boasted a vast network and resources, including close relationships with local media companies (*The Jakarta Post*, 15 June 2005). The lack of professional journalism, reporters’ poor pay, and the significance of receiving advertisements from local political institutions can be attributed to unbalanced coverage by the local mass media in the Riau Archipelago and other regions more generally.\(^ {36}\)

**Voting**

On 30 June 2005, a little more than half of the registered voters (56.16%) turned out across the archipelago.\(^ {37}\) Internationally, local elections consistently draw lower turnouts than

\(^{35}\) Interviews with M. Ridwan Lubis, political observer and also originally from North Sumatra, and Putut Ariyo Tejo, reporter of *Batum Pos*, 2 June 2005, Batam.


\(^{37}\) Note that there were many eligible but unregistered voters. As in many other regions, the provincial branch of the Election Commission used demographic data from the local branch of the Population Office, in which many of those who had voted in the 2004 elections were not registered.
national elections. Therefore, the lower turnouts in the Riau Archipelago compared to the previous year’s national-level elections are not surprising. However, the estimated 50 to 60 percent turnouts for the country’s first-ever direct local elections are neither suggestive of a vibrant democracy. Here, two findings need to be considered.

First, since the late 1990s, I have observed Indonesian voters have changed their attitudes towards parties and elections. 38 Despite the country’s continuous experiment with democratic reforms and decentralization, the forgotten promises made during the elections and the abuse of the expanded authority by local politicians have vastly dampened expectations of ordinary Indonesians about a more democratic and locally-grounded political life. 39 The low turnout in the region’s first direct election might even reflect a growing public disillusionment with formally democratic, but substantively doubtful, political change. In Batam, the turnouts were lower than the provincial average, with 52 percent. And, as my interview with members of Batam’s municipal branch of the Election Commission revealed, the turnouts in industrial areas within Batam were much lower with around 28 percent in Muka Kuning, the area where Batamindo, Batam’s first industrial park, is located. 40

38 Public opinion, as expressed by civil society organizations and mass media, increasingly believes that most political parties have been indifferent to the societal interests of their constituents. For instance, the polling conducted by Center for the Study of Development and Democracy (CESDA) and the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES) in early 2002 shows that many party supporters have been disappointed by the parties that they supported in the 1999 general elections. Around two thirds of Golkar supporters (62%) believed that there was no party “fighting on behalf of the people” (memperjuangkan kepentingan rakyat), and similar proportions of the PPP (67%) and the PAN (57%) supporters expressed the same opinion (Media Indonesia, 21 February 2002). Another polling conducted by LP3ES in February 2002 shows that slightly more than half the respondents (51%) saw no political party “attending to the people” (memperhatikan rakyat) (Kompas, 20 February 2002). The public disillusionment about political parties seems to have continuously furthered, which is demonstrated by another CESDA-LP3ES survey conducted in May 2003. The polling results show that around two-thirds (64%) do not regard political parties as a media for people’s aspirations and almost half the respondents (49%) do not trust political parties (Kompas, 13 June 2003). Despite the high turnouts in the 2004 general and first direct presidential elections, the Indonesian public’s disappointment with political parties seems to have not changed. In a survey recently conducted by Kompas, two thirds of the respondents (65%) expressed their dissatisfaction with the parties’ performance in aggregating aspirations on the grassroots (Kompas, 26 September 2005).

39 Ironically enough, as Ryaas Rasyid observes, “public trust in regional governments and legislatures has declined since the implementation of the regional autonomy laws” (Rasyid 2003, 66).

40 The next day of the voting, one local dailies reported that only 11 out of 525 voters registered at a polling station in the Batamindo industrial area turned out to vote (Tribun Batam, 1 July 2005).
Second, elections in many localities, including the Riau Archipelago, revealed the shortcomings in the legal framework and governance of the elections. According to Law 32 of 2004, local branches of the Election Commission (KPUD) are responsible for staging the elections by themselves without any centrally-coordinated assistance and monitoring. Almost every locality had difficulty in updating voter registration and socializing the elections, which were undertaken by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Angry unregistered voters staged demonstrations in the Riau Archipelago and many other places, asking for delay of the voting. The legal disputes over voter registration and which institution has the final responsibility for governing elections continued even after the elections in many places, including the Riau Archipelago.

Anecdotal evidence is further suggestive of the change of Indonesian voters’ attitudes towards elections and political parties. Many of those who I met in Batam just before the voting seemed uninterested in, even unaware of, their first direct local executive elections. A few showed their enthusiasm for the election. For example, Muhammad Zaenal Arifin, a motorbike taxi driver (tukang ojek), was not shy to show his enthusiasm for the election. Originally from Klaten, Central Java, Zaenal showed strong support for Soerya Respationo, the deputy gubernatorial candidate. Zaenal explained that Soerya founded a social organization named Jogoboyo (literally meaning ‘guards of danger’) for mutual help among the members, mostly from lower class. According to Zaenal and other sources, migrant

41 In fact, even before the elections were held, some observers, including Moh. Samsul Arifin, predicted low turnouts by pointing out two factors: the lack of socialization of the elections by respective KPUD and the lack of parties’ involvement in the campaigning (Pikiran Rakyat, 16 May 2005: http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/2005/0505/16/teropong/utama1.htm, accessed 3 August 2005)
42 In Tanjungpinang District, for example, the KPUD received 112,779 voters’ registration cards just two nights before the voting and had to sort out and distribute the cards only for one day. The voters were allowed to cast their votes by showing their identity cards as long as they were registered at the polling stations. In addition, some people, including some members of the local assemblies, found that they were not even registered at all (Batam Pos, 30 June 2005). As a result, there were several demonstrations in front of the provincial assembly as well as the provincial KPUD after the voting, asking for chances to vote to those who couldn’t vote on June 30 (Batam Pos, 4 July 2005). As a response to those mass demonstrations, political parties, in the name of Political Parties Supporting Local Executive Election (Gabungan Parpol Pendukung Pilkada), expressed their support to the provincial KPUD’s decision not to repeat the voting (Batam Pos, 5 July 2005).
workers from Java, usually with no stable jobs, support Soerya, who is also from Central Java, because of his track record as a ‘big man’ for the poor and the needy. Jogoboyo is said to have around 6,000 members in the Riau Archipelago.

Overall, however, many people appeared to be uninterested in, and even cynical about, the election. For example, Anton, originally from the region (Karimun), argued that local elections matter only to politicians. He said, “We, little people, are bored with promises made during the campaigns” (Media Kepri, 30 June 2005). Others expressed their distrust in the political parties, accusing party politicians of taking care of the interests of their parties and themselves (Yudi Saputra, Batam Pos, 30 June 2005). Intellectuals, activists, and journalists appeared even more pessimistic. Although they are engaged in the issues, directly or indirectly, they show strong disbelief in, and cynical attitudes towards, democratic processes. For example, a reporter working for Media Indonesia, one of national dailies, told me, “Indonesian democracy is crippled.” Their cynicism, in turn, was used to justify their distance from democratic political processes. I also met some people who were totally uninformed about the election. Several female clerks at Lucky Plaza, a busy electronics shopping mall, did not even know about the election. Originally from Palembang, South Sumatra, a Chinese woman working at a mobile phone shop was actually surprised by my question about the election. On another occasion, when I tried to talk about the election at a restaurant, one Chinese man immediately said to me “I do not know (enggak tahu),” while two of his companions left the table.

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43 Interview with Muhammad Zaenal Arifin, 29 June 2005, Batam.
44 Interview with Henri Kremer, reporter of Media Indonesia, 29 June 2005, Batam.
45 The election results indicate that Ismeth Abdullah and Muhammad Sani were the favorite candidates of the Chinese Indonesians living in Kepri, receiving the confident majority of the vote in areas where most Chinese Indonesians inhabit (Batam Pos, 1 July 2005).
Validation of the Election Results

On 7 July 2005, the Riau Archipelago’s provincial branch of the Election Commission (KPUD) announced the election results and declared Ismeth Abdullah and Muhammad Sani the winners. They won the election convincingly, with 60 percent of the vote (see Table 4). Interestingly, they lost against Nyat Kadir and Soerya Respatino in Karimun, where Muhammad Sani was believed to have a strong base. The Nyat-Soerya pair also won in the Natuna district.

Table 4. Results of the Riau Archipelago’s 2005 Gubernatorial Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Rizal-Firman</th>
<th>Ismeth-Sani</th>
<th>Nyat-Soerya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batam*</td>
<td>7,042</td>
<td>174,437</td>
<td>65,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanjung Pinang</td>
<td>3,764</td>
<td>30,568</td>
<td>16,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karimun</td>
<td>4,345</td>
<td>35,608</td>
<td>39,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepri</td>
<td>3,837</td>
<td>31,746</td>
<td>17,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lingga</td>
<td>3,775</td>
<td>20,541</td>
<td>17,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natuna</td>
<td>4,759</td>
<td>16,219</td>
<td>17,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,522</strong></td>
<td><strong>309,119</strong></td>
<td><strong>172,923</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Municipality
Source: The Riau Archipelago’s provincial branch of the Election Commission

If the elections results are compared to the provincial-level results of the 2004 parliamentary election, the linkage between party affiliations and voting behaviors is unclear (see Table 5). More than 20 percent of additional votes cast for the Ismeth-Sani pair is hard to explain only with party affiliations of the voters. Other factors, such as religion, ethnicity, and social class, need to be considered, which is beyond the purpose of this essay. One thing worth mentioning is that those who I talked to during and after the election tended to disregard the significance of party affiliations of both candidates and voters, pointing out that a candidate’s sosok matters more than anything else.
Table 5. The 2005 Gubernatorial Election Results Compared with the 2004 Parliamentary Election Results (Provincial Level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The 2004 General Election Results (percentage)</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>The 2005 Gubernatorial Election Results (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90,034 (16)</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>The Ismeth-Sani Pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61,565 (11)</td>
<td>PKS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34,092 (5)</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36,802 (5)</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222,493 (37) + small parties</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>309,119 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81,447 (14)</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>The Nyat-Soerya Pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64,941 (10)</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146,388 (24) + small parties</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>172,923 (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,777 (4)</td>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>The Rizal-Firman Pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>566,126</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>509,564</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ananta, Arifin, & Suryadinata (2005, 151) for the provincial level results of the 2004 general elections and the provincial branch of the Election Commission (KPUD Kepri) for the 2005 gubernatorial election results.

Like in many other regions across the country, unresolved controversies over voter registration and the roles played by the KPUD turned into legal disputes over Kepri’s election results. The losing candidates Nyat Kadir and Soerya Respatino contested the election results in the Supreme Court, accusing the KPUD of disenfranchising 278,299 eligible voters, especially among their support base, by preventing their registration before the voting. The case was dropped.46 On August 19, Ismeth Abdullah and Muhammad Sani were inaugurated as the first directly elected Governor and Deputy Governor of the Riau Archipelago.

The victory of the Ismeth-Sani pair was not surprising. Some analysts had already predicted that direct executive elections would result in the emergence of ‘big kings’ (raja-46 In contrast to the case of the Riau Archipelago, the losing candidate won in the case of Depok mayoral election by contesting the election results in West Java High Court. Golkar’s losing candidate accused the Depok KPUD of the same type of vote-rigging and claimed that thousands of the party’s supporters were unable to cast their votes because they were not registered. In other localities, such as Banyuwangi of East Java, Tana Toraja of South Sulawesi, and Padang Pariaman of West Sumatra, the local assemblies rejected the election results. Although, legal experts point out that the local assembly has no such a right (Kompas, 20 July 2005), those cases are in stalemate with the ambiguity of the related law and governmental regulations. In a mean while, a small number of localities, including Bandar Lampung municipality in Sumatra, held the second-round of voting with no candidates having received more than 25 percent of the vote.
raja besar) with strong legitimacy in the regions.\textsuperscript{47} Taken as a whole, the new provincial government led by well-resourced and experienced Ismeth Abdullah and religiously devout and skillful Muhammad Sani indicates that Kepri will see political and bureaucratic stability, and the continuance of development policies geared towards the domestic elite and the international business community.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{The Dynamics of Local Politics: Local Democratization?}
An analysis of direct executive elections in the Riau Archipelago and other regions reveals a number of important developments in Indonesia’s multi-party politics that, together or separately, have the potential to powerfully impact the dynamics of local politics in the country. In particular, my analysis suggests that, thus far, there is overriding inconsistency in patterns of inter-party coalition-building across the country, that parties are locally seeking ad hoc coalitions with powerful local elites, that there is growing intra-party tension, and that the magnitude of ‘money politics’ in local electoral and party politics is not declining, but changing character.

A first notable feature of the recent round of direct local elections was the profoundly inconsistent patterns of party coalitions across the country. This may indicate that Indonesian political parties are becoming more concerned about nominating candidates who are popular among the local populations rather than centrally coordinating party coalitions.\textsuperscript{49} As Muhammad Qodari, the deputy executive director of Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran

\textsuperscript{47} One of those analysts is Syamsuddin Haris of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) (Kompas, 26 March 2005: kompas-cetak/0503121/pilkada/1631534.htm).

\textsuperscript{48} One example can be taken from the address by Singapore’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs at the Singapore National Day Reception held in Batam on August 2005, right after new governor and deputy governor were sworn. The Minister Encik Zainul Abidin Rasheed said, “the successful conclusion of the first direct governor elections for Kepri province, in which Bapak Ismeth Abdullah won with a convincing mandate, has put to rest any uncertainty in the local political situation” (Riau Pos, 27 August 2005; http://app.mfa.gov.sg/internet/press/view_press_print.asp?post_id=1424, accessed 31 August 2005).

\textsuperscript{49} The components of winning party coalitions varied region by region, reflecting different power configurations of each locality as well as no existence of centrally coordinated coalition-building effort. Among the seven gubernatorial elections held in June 2005, for example, three different party coalitions won in four regions
Survei Indonesia: LSI), pointed out, it could also signal that ideology or substantive policy debates have a negligible role in party politics, especially at the local level; Rather, it is parties’ local political and economic interests that determine their attitudes and behaviors (Kompas, 30 June 2005).

A second notable feature of the recent direct local elections was the participation of entrenched political and economic elites. As the Center for Political Study-Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate (CPS-SSS) survey shows, and as the case of the Riau Archipelago’s gubernatorial election demonstrates, many of the elected local government heads turned out to be the long-established and well-resourced incumbents. Could it be that only well-established elites can meet the perceived costs of effective electoral campaigns? If this is the case, how might it affect the course of local politics in Indonesia? On the other hand, direct local elections have greatly strengthened the position of locally-embedded, as opposed to nationally-vetted, leaders. In the absence of strong party identification, local leaders with sufficient means seemed to be able to secure their control over local political institutions, and may enjoy the support of local party politicians.

Third, most major parties seem to have experienced some degree of tension between the central (i.e. Jakarta-based) leadership and local cadres. Examples of major tensions can be found within all major parties, with the possible exception of the PKS. However, two cases from the PDI-P, which has the second-most seats in the national assembly, are particularly illustrative. In one instance, the central board of the PDI-P is reported to have discharged both the chairman and secretary of the party’s district board in Sintang, West Kalimantan, when the district board failed to follow the central board’s recommendations and nominated their own candidates (Kompas, 29 April 2005). In the regent election in Banyuwangi, the

(PAN-Golkar-PKS-PBB coalition in Jambi, PDI-P-PBB in West Sumatra, PKB-PPP in South Kalimantan, and Golkar-PKS in the Riau Archipelago), while the candidates of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) won in North Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan.
PDI-P’s central board supported chairman of the party’s district board, while the majority of the party’s sub-district boards (in Banyuwangi) supported the district board’s former chairman. It appears that tensions and contradictions have accumulated between the process of administrative and political decentralization on the one hand, and the highly centralized pretension of parties’ central boards in Jakarta. In some respects, direct local executive elections appear to have exacerbated internal conflicts between the central leadership and local branches of parties.

Finally, direct local elections do not appear to have reduced the significance of ‘money politics’ but may well have altered their character. In fact, ‘money politics’ was already embedded in local elections even under the indirect electoral system. What makes the new electoral system distinct is that now political parties, not individual party representatives in local assemblies, are the ones receiving money from potential candidates. This is the supreme irony. Many ordinary Indonesians, NGO activists, and academics enthusiastically supported direct elections for local government heads with the expectation that such elections would prevent the local elite from playing ‘money politics’ and enhance democracy at the local levels (see, for example, ADEKSI & Konrad-Adenauer-Stifung 2003, 9; 13; and, 17).

50 The CPS-SSS survey finds that the incumbents and local bureaucrats, generally paired with businessmen, managed to win most elections (around 87 %) (Rinakit 2005).

51 Ratna Ani Lestari, the candidate supported by local cadres, sought support from a coalition of 18 small parties and won the election. Given that only parties or party coalitions seizing at least 15 percent of seats in local assemblies are eligible to nominate candidates, the reason why the district branch of Election Commission validated the pair’s candidacy is unclear. In any case, the Banyuwangi district assembly, the chairman of which was one of the regent candidates, rejected to approve the election results, arguing that the election was legally problematic. The district assembly also recommended the district branch of Election Commission to withdraw its decision on the election. The dispute is still underway and as a result, the elected pair has not been officially inaugurated.

52 At the same time, the revised party law (Law No. 31 of 2002) has tightened parties’ central boards’ control over the elected assembly members. For instance, Article 12 stipulates that elected members of the DPR and DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Local People’s Representative Assembly) can be replaced midterm on the grounds of withdrawal of party membership by the party, or breach of the law causing removal from office (NDI 2003; Kompas, 10 July 2003). This ‘recall’ system, which was the norm under the New Order, was not allowed under the former Law No. 4 of 1999 on the structure and composition of the national and local assemblies, so that the parties’ central boards were not able to recall those members who had switched to other parties. The ‘recall’ system has been revived in the new Law No. 12 of 2003 on the structure and composition of the national and local assemblies.

53 Note that a few activists and academics expressed different, somewhat pessimistic, viewpoints. While Kastorius Sinaga argued that it was too naive to assume that the implementation of direct elections for local
Long before the elections were held, however, the importance of ‘money politics’ was already clear, given the major parties’ effective control over nomination of candidates.\(^{54}\)

**Conclusion**

Under former president Soeharto’s New Order regime, local government heads in Indonesia were effectively appointed by the central government. This changed after Soeharto’s fall, when local assembly members gained substantive control over the election and dismissal of provincial and district government heads. From the outset, however, indirect election of local executive heads were accompanied by allegations that local government heads could win elections by buying votes from local assembly members. Appeals for electoral reform by international and domestic organizations finally paid off in late 2002, when the national assembly agreed to adopt direct elections for government heads at all levels of governance, from the President to mayors and regents. After years of tweaking, direct elections began in June of this year.

What has been the impact of these local elections on Indonesia’s local politics and democracy? While Indonesia’s vast size and social complexity work against attempts to generalize, my research on recent elections in the Riau Archipelago and my tracking of elections in a handful of other localities suggest three noteworthy findings.

First, as I have shown, national parties play a powerful role in deciding who is allowed to compete in elections for local office. Under a law championed by a handful of Indonesia’s most established and entrenched political parties, all candidates for local office officials would eliminate ‘money politics’ from Indonesia’s electoral and party politics, T.A. Legowo emphasized the significance of institutionalization of democratic practices at the local level rather than the implementation of direct local elections per se (ADEKSI & Konrad-Adenauer-Stifung 2003, 48-63). \(^{54}\) For example, I Gede Widiatmika, independent candidate in the mayoral election of Denpasar in Bali, gave up running for the office after learning from a broker (calo) that he had to pay hundreds of millions of rupiah to a party in order to get the party’s official candidacy (*Kompas*, 20 April 2005). In interviews with a Singapore-based daily, some election watchers confirmed that due to the party-ticket requirement, “some candidates have had to pay local party chapters to endorse their candidacies” (*The Straits Times*, 4 July 2005).
must meet the threshold of 15 percent support from their respective local assemblies, which are at present dominated by these national parties. This has placed small parties at a decided disadvantage.

Second, despite their important role in nominating candidates, national parties have lost out to the local imperatives of coalition building and electoral victory. Elections to date display a high degree of variation in the composition of winning party coalitions across regions, reflecting different configurations of power and interests across localities.

Finally, political parties played an insignificant role in the conduct of the electoral campaigns, partly because they had no consistent national platforms. According to some media accounts, some candidates were requested to pay for their party nominations. Whatever the case, the parties have shown a preference for well-established local elites, who were deemed capable of self-financing their campaigns. In this respect, it is apparent that direct local elections have not reduced the significance of ‘money politics’ but instead have altered their character. The campaigns themselves were more focused on personalities than programs or substantive political issues.

A preliminary analysis of direct elections results can improve our understanding of the dynamics of local politics in Indonesia, but is not sufficient for grasping the impact of elections on local political institutions and governance. We can expect elections will significantly affect such vital functions as the drafting of local budgets, the legislation of regional regulations, and the direction and governance of the regions’ development policies, to name a few. Therefore, it is required to examine how elections will change the behaviors of local governments, the character of local executive-legislative relationships, and relations between the central government and local governments, as well as between local politicians and the grassroots.
As numerous regions have yet to hold elections, it is premature to draw final conclusions. These elections do indeed mark a turning point in Indonesia’s local politics and might enhance the quality of the country’s local democracy. However, as Indonesia’s initial experiments with direct local executive elections have shown, the practical effects of political change depend not on formal policies but how local actors interpret and respond to these policies on the ground. Overall, although change in Indonesian local politics has been dramatic, it remains unclear whether local democratization that advocates of direct local elections had hoped for has truly materialized.
Appendix
An Analytic Perspective: Political Change in a Post-Authoritarian Context

The analytic perspective that I employ rests on a basic conceptual distinction and a theoretically-grounded empirical focus. Specifically, in assessing the effects of political reforms and decentralization in post-Soeharto Indonesia, I (1) distinguish substantive democratization from formal democracy and (2) pursue a deliberate focus on elections and, in particular, the organization and operation of political parties at the local level. I will briefly explain the significance of the distinction between formal and substantive democracy and how this distinction might be operationalized for analytic purposes. Then, at somewhat greater length, I specify the theoretical and practical significance of political parties in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian political processes and explain how a focus on parties can help understand local politics.

First, it is necessary to distinguish ‘substantive’ democratization from ‘formal’ democracy in understanding the post-authoritarian political process. Whereas ‘formal’ democracy refers to the institutional aspect of the political system, ‘substantive’ democratization emphasizes the institutionalization of democratic practices in the day-to-day political behavior of politicians. By drawing a distinction between the ‘substantive’ nature of democratization, on the one hand, and the introduction of ‘formal’ rules and institutions of democracy, on the other, I seek to avoid the tendency found in much of the literature on the “transition to democracy” to focus heavily on the procedures and longevity of emerging democratic governments. The weakness of the substantive aspects of democratization may be unnoticed in formally democratic settings, but when informal political processes emerge as a defining feature of the post-authoritarian polity, it will become clear that “formal democracy may remain formal” (Huber, Rueschemeyer & Stephens 1997, 324). Of course, other new democracies also have similar informal political practices that threaten their democratic character. What is especially problematic in the post-authoritarian context is that such informal and often undemocratic political practices become deeply entrenched and circumscribe the nature and working mechanisms of democratic political institutions. I now clarify the reason for my focus on parties.

Elections and political parties have always been at the core of understanding how democracy works. Elections confer political legitimacy and encourage politicians to be responsive and accountable to their constituents. Political parties play a crucial role in elections. They influence the agenda of public discourse by organizing, articulating, and aggregating demands and interests. They also function as a training ground for political elites who aim to assume direct governing roles. In theoretical treatments of democracy, scholars have been particularly attentive to how political parties mediate the development and character of democratic institutions (Huntington 1968; Dahl 1971; Sartori 1976; Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela 1992; Hagopian 1993; Linz 1994; Morlino 1995; Ware 1996; Sachsenroder 1998; Diamond 1999; Mainwaring 1999; Kitschelt et. al. 1999; Teorell 1999; Sejong Institute & NED 2000; Randall & Svasand 2001; Carothers 2002; and Wollack 2002). For all of the above reasons, political parties play a critical role in determining the qualities of post-authoritarian polities.

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55 The idea of ‘social democracy’ suggested by Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John Stephens is more concerned with social dimensions such as “high levels of participation” and “increasing equality in social and economic outcomes,” while the ‘substantive’ democratization in this study is more directed to the practical effects of the introduction of formally democratic settings on the daily practices and performances within political institutions: See Huber, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens (1997), pp. 323-5.
However, studying political parties at the local level poses major analytic challenges, particularly in “analytically slippery and volatile” developing polities, such as those in Southeast Asia (MacIntyre 2003). For this reason, some scholars argue that analysis of party politics in post-authoritarian countries requires distinctive perspectives and approaches. Robert W. Compton, for example, suggests that examining party systems as part of political development requires an historical perspective on the cultural construction of politics (Compton 2000, 17). Drawing on case studies of several democratizing Asian countries, Compton argues that democratic transitions and patterns of consolidation in Asia have generally involved weak party systems and low levels of responsiveness. He thus suggests that analysis of post-autoritarian party development needs to be grounded in an understanding of a particular society’s historical experiences and their remaining effects on people’s political attitudes and behaviors. In practice, authoritarian legacies of former regimes often survive the transition to post-authoritarian politics.

In addition to the social context in which parties develop and operate, the internal operations of political parties also profoundly affect the character of political change. One of the most significant issues in this respect is how parties’ internal dynamics affect their representativeness and accountability. In his classic participant observation study of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany in the early 20th century, Robert Michels (1962) found that the oligarchic tendencies of political parties are a “disease” inherent to democracy. Similarly, Giovanni Sartori noted a tendency toward “a party tyranny, in which the actual locus of power is shifted and concentrated from government and parliament to party directorates” (Sartori 1987, 148). However, drawing on a competitive-elective polarchy model from J. A. Schumpeter’s and Robert A. Dahl’s theories of democracy, Sartori criticizes Michels for dismissing the existence and breadth of competition among organizations – and among elites who represent those organizations. More recently, S. N. Eisenstadt has noted that “the suspicion that the existing representative institutions serve only to uphold various concrete, diverse interests, and not some vision of common good” continues to arise even in contemporary democratic regimes (Eisenstadt 1999, 90-1). While Eisenstadt’s argument regarding the ‘deconsolidation’ of the institutional bases of democratic regimes mainly applies to consolidated democracies, I argue that in the post-authoritarian societies, it is the lack of consolidation of democratic values and practices that is a significant factor in supporting the oligarchic tendency in new democracies.

This realist understanding of democracy and political parties may assist our understanding of Indonesia’s post-authoritarian political developments, especially at the local levels. Although changes of the past seven years in the country’s political system have generally revitalized the democratic principle of ‘exchange of leadership for support’ in the country’s electoral and party politics, it is still premature to conclude that local politicians are now more representative and accountable. The problem is that the formal democratic rules and procedures can be often disregarded as a result of politicians’ weak linkages of responsiveness and accountability to the people. From this viewpoint, it is essential to estimate the effect of political and administrative reforms, such as the introduction of direct

56 This “realist” model of democracy suggested by Sartori has in fact been pursued by other political scientists, including Talcott Parsons (1959) and Seymour M. Lipset (1962), who emphasize the competitive struggle among political elites as a way of understanding how democracy operates in the real world. Consequently, although it emphasizes the effects of competition among the elite in promoting responsiveness, the competitive-elective polarchy model also preserves an inherently elitist – or oligarchic – tendency of democracy.
local executive elections, on the way political institutions operate on the ground and party politicians or power seekers create linkages to the people.
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