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Islamizing Formal Education: Integrated Islamic School and a New Trend in Formal Education Institution in Indonesia

Noorhaidi Hasan

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore

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With Compliments

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the Islamization of formal education at the pre-university levels with a focus on integrated Islamic schools that have proliferated in the context of increasingly Islamized Indonesian public sphere and the rising tide of Islamic militancy after Suharto. While a vast literature exists on Islamic militancy and the general process of the Islamization of the Indonesian society, education has been largely neglected or misunderstood in the debates. By highlighting the interplay between the state, non-state actors, and the discursive strategies of the Islamists, this study analyses the role of formal education in wider social transformations relating to Islamization, the spread of Islamic militancy and the cultural politics of contemporary Indonesian Muslim society. Furthermore, through ethnographic inquiries into the integrated Islamic school, this study seeks to illustrate the new and diverse ways Islamist messages are adapted to changing circumstances and shifting contexts.

Based on a study of relevant literature and in-depth interviews, this study shows that the integrated Islamic school basically adopts the national curriculum, which is enriched with a few additional religious subjects and Islamic moral education through a systematic insertion of Islamic values and codes of conduct both among general and religious subjects and through extracurricular activities. The school has thus a pragmatic approach regarding the secular system and does what it could for the Islamic cause within the given social and political framework. It can be portrayed as a viable alternative to the existing educational institutions in the sense that it provides a formal education for the benefits of knowledge economy and, at the same time, an arena of instruction and mental training for students and the younger generation of Muslims to live in accordance with Islamic principles and values.

This study also demonstrates that the efflorescence of the integrated Islamic schools cannot be dissociated with the growing influence of Islamism, or, more specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas on the need to instil Islamist framework into students’ young minds and nurture their commitment to Islam as a preparation in the long-term process to implement the shari’a (Islamic law). The school appears to be a pilot project to implement the particular concept of education developed by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The backbone of its establishment was, in fact, activists of the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired tarbiyya movement whose main wing has transformed into the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). They believe that education serves as an effective means to recruit young Islamist cadres who will become the cornerstone of the struggle for the comprehensive application of the shari’a. This is especially true when the political
opportunity structure does not allow them to impose the *shari’a* from above through the transformation of the state system. By establishing the integrated Islamic schools, the PKS attempts to expand its membership and constituent and recruit new cadres prepared to bring victory to the party. The integrated Islamic schools also serve as the means through which the formal education in Indonesia becomes gradually Islamized.

Noorhaidi Hasan is an associate professor at the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. His research interests include various manifestations of political Islam in Indonesia and other Muslim populated countries in Southeast Asia. He received his PhD from Utrecht University, the Netherlands (2005). Among his publications is *Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: SEAP Cornell University, 2006). He is currently a visiting research fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University of Singapore.
Islamizing Formal Education:  
Integrated Islamic School and New Trend in Formal Education Institution in Indonesia

Introduction

Over the last few decades, Islam has demonstrated its vitality as a system of symbolic and collective identity that forms the social and political dynamics of Indonesian society, more than 80 per cent of whom are adherents of Islam. Keeping pace with the erosion of traditional values and institutions, the religious consciousness of Indonesian Muslims to live in accordance with Islamic norms and values has been on the rise. Islam is no longer at the margins but has become part of their political expressions, legal transactions, economic activities, as well as social and cultural practices. It has even emerged as a rallying cry behind the major social and political changes in the aftermath of the collapse of the Suharto-led New Order regime in May 1998, marked by mounting demands for the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a and calls for armed jihad.

Signs of the reassertion of political Islam might be seen in the accentuation of religious symbols in the Indonesian public sphere. Splendid mosques with new style of architecture (usually derived from the Middle East) have been constructed and they are full of congregations attending collective daily and Friday prayers as well as Qur’anic reading sessions (pengajian). Typical Muslim fashions, such as jilbab (headscarf) for women and baju koko (Muslim shirts) for men with their trendy and colourful styles, have sprung up and begun to dominate the cultural landscape of every corner of the country. In tandem with the accentuation of religious symbols, new kind of Islamic institutions have flourished across the country. There emerged institutions for collecting an increasingly large sum of religious alms and donations and Islamic financial institutions that include Islamic banks (also known as shari’a banks), Islamic insurance (takaful), Islamic people’s credit unions (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syari’ah) and Islamic houses of treasury (Bait al-Mal wa al-Tamwil). More phenomenally perhaps, the so-called integrated Islamic school (sekolah Islam terpadu) has expanded immensely with full-day and boarding school system.

The integrated Islamic school constitutes a formal education institution at the pre-university levels that has thrived among modern-style general schools, sekolah, and Islamic educational institutions, which include pesantren and madrasah. Today, there are some 47,000 pesantrens and madrasahs scattered all over Indonesia. While all pesantrens belong to private Islamic organizations, a significant number of madrasahs are under the control of the government, specifically the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Azra et al., 2007). Unlike the
madrasah, which adopts a system of modern education and national curriculum, the pesantren is overwhelmingly identified with the traditional Islamic education system devoted to the study of Islamic traditions of knowledge. A handful among the pesantren, especially those associated with the Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki, in Solo, Central Java, was discovered to have had ties to militants responsible for the October 2002 bombing in Bali (ICG, 2002; Rabasa, 2006). The pesantren was even considered the hub of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organization in Southeast Asia. Amid the mounting suspicions against the pesantren, which have increasingly been perceived as major training grounds for terrorists, the integrated Islamic school has interestingly flourished. Although there is no exact data, the schools’ expansion is visible and assertive across the country. In Jakarta and its surrounding only, there are several dozens integrated Islamic schools. Likewise in Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Surabaya and Malang, as well as Padang, Palembang and Makassar in outer islands of Indonesia, hundreds of such schools have recently been constructed to complement and facilitate the proliferation of the existing schools.1

While education is a highly contested arena between the state and non-state actors, especially Islamists, formal schooling is absent in the considerable scholarly literature on the growth of Islamic militancy in contemporary Indonesia and other Muslim-populated countries in Southeast Asia. Only recently have prominent research centres such as PPIM of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University of Jakarta paid considerable attention to the issue by conducting survey involving 500 teachers in public and private schools throughout Java. The survey found that most of the respondents oppose pluralism, tending toward radicalism and conservatism; 68.6 per cent of them are opposed to non-Muslims becoming their school principle and 33.8 per cent are opposed to having non-Muslim teachers at their schools. Some 73.1 per cent of the respondents do not want followers of other religions to build their houses of worship in their neighbourhoods. Some 85.6 per cent prohibit their students from celebrating big events perceived as Western traditions, while 87 per cent tell their students not to learn about other religions. Some 48 per cent would prefer for female and male students to be separated into different classrooms. The survey also shows 75.4 per cent of the respondents ask their students to call on non-Muslim teachers to convert to Islam, while 61.1 per cent reject a new Islamic sect. In line with their strict beliefs, 67.4 per cent

1 According to the data collected by JSIT (the Network of Integrated Islamic School) in 2007, there are 265 integrated Islamic schools at the primary level, 70 at the junior secondary level and 12 at the senior secondary level. The number becomes doubled if Islamic integrated kindergartens are included. Interview with Fahmi Zulkarnain, Secretary General JSIT, Jakarta, was conducted in December 2008.
said they felt more Muslim than Indonesian and the majority of the respondents also support the adoption of shari’a law in the country to help fight crime (PPIM, 2008).

The result of this survey signalled the growing influence of Islamism and religious intolerance among practitioners of the formal education and, thus, needs to be taken into account. However, it deals primarily with the phenomenon at the surface. The root causes and dynamics behind this phenomenon have not sufficiently been treated; how the anti-pluralist and religious intolerant attitudes have developed among school teachers and to what extent such attitudes correlated not only with the increasing ability and creativity of Islamist actors to disseminate Islamist messages but also with the emergence of new educational institutions operating under the auspices of the formal schooling. It is likely that formal schooling as a field of inquiry is often neglected because of the assumption that schools under centralized and heavily bureaucratized management structures are implausible sites of non-state initiated change. Indeed, the bulk of literature that specifically deals with formal education in Indonesia adds little to advancing notions about the complex dynamics between socio-educational change and Islamist challenge.

In a recent book, *Putting Islam to work: Education, politics and religious transformation in Egypt*, Gregory Starrett (1998) calls attention to the inadequacy of modernization approaches for understanding educational and social change in Egypt. He demonstrates, with theoretical nuance, that state policy is not passively accepted by its recipients but is mediated, contested, and can result in unintended consequences. Starrett’s work sheds some lights on the way certain values and practices are transmitted to children, especially through state school textbooks. Putting his emphasis on top-heavy state policies and curriculum, however, Starrett neglects the role played by human agencies located in schools and elsewhere in determining and controlling multiple aspects of the educational process. As Herrera (2002) clearly puts it, the organization and practice of schooling cannot be reduced to issues of state policy alone. By analysing the integrated Islamic school and looking at local actors situated in the school, this paper seeks to discover how Islamic schooling represents a creative effort by Islamist actors to enhance discursive strategies so as to deal with political changes and constraints and eventually achieve their common goal.

This paper first analyses the historical trajectory of the integrated Islamic school by providing an account for the socio-political context of its efflorescence and the Islamization of the Indonesian education system as a whole. Next, it discusses the network of the school and its linkages with the *tarbiyya* movement and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Furthermore, this paper examines the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology on the
philosophical underpinning and practice of the school. Within this context, the school’s curriculum and system are given special attention. Finally, the paper analyses the school’s impact on wider social transformations relating to Islamization and the mounting influence of Islamism in the Indonesian public sphere.

**Historical Trajectory**

The expansion of the integrated Islamic school has introduced a new trend in the formal education institution in Indonesia. As indicated before, the school can be distinguished with both the public school and the Islamic educational institutions whose roots lie in the *pesantren* tradition. The *pesantren* constitutes a typical Islamic boarding school run and often owned by an individual religious teacher (*kyai*). It teaches 100 per cent Islamic subjects using the *kitab kuning* (yellow books, referring to classical Arabic texts) and aims to produce religious scholars (Bruinessen, 1990; Dhofier, 1999). Slightly different from the *pesantren* is the *madrasa*, which teaches only 30 per cent Islamic subjects alongside general subjects. Over the last 20 years, many *pesantrens* have adopted the *madrasa* system and included instruction in secular subjects in their curriculum. The *madrasa* system was initially introduced to bridge the gap between the *pesantren* and *sekolah*, which resulted in dualism in the educational system in Indonesia. Given its emphasis on the mastery of religious instructions, the *pesantren* has frequently been considered inadequate to deal with modern challenges and current needs.²

The initiatives to modernize the Islamic educational institutions in Indonesia began in the 1970s when the then Minister of Religious Affairs, Abdul Mukti Ali, introduced the standardized *madrasa* education system through a joint ministerial decree between the Ministers of Religious Affairs, Education and Culture, as well as Interior Affairs (No. 6/1975). Later, the modernization of the *madrasa* education was reinforced by the issuing of the Law of National Education System (UUSPN) No. 2/1989, which acknowledges the *madrasa* as part and parcel of the national education system. The government has further strengthened the *madrasa* by ratifying the Law on the National Education System (UU Sisdiknas) No. 20/2003 which guaranteed the equal status of the *madrasa* with the general school, the only exception being the religious purpose to teach Islam through the reading and

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² In response to the criticism over the *pesantren* system, many *pesantrens* have recently offered extra courses—such as English and computer science—as well as vocational training skills, including driving, automobile repair, sewing and small business management (Abasa 2005; van Bruinessen 2008).
rote memorization of the Qur’an (Azra and Jamhari, 2006; Zuhdi, 2006). Despite these efforts, the *madrasa* remained marginal and was considered as providing second-class education.

The growing participation in higher education of Muslims from the *santri* (pious Muslim) background has facilitated the vertical and horizontal mobility of the *santris* and, thus, the rise of a new Islamic-oriented middle class. The hallmark of this phenomenon has been the spread of *santris* into the various sectors of activities and governmental services, as well as modern business structures. Being involved in the grand narrative of development, the emerging Muslim middle class no longer questioned the compatibility between Islam and the state. Instead, they accepted the *Pancasila* as the state ideology that unifies the whole nation and engaged in the government’s effort to accelerate the process of development (Mahasin, 1990; Hefner, 2000; Prasetyo et al., 2002). This phenomenon occurred in tandem with the shift of the state’s policy towards Islam by the end of the 1980s, marked by the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia) in which Suharto served as its patronage. Part of their efforts to introduce more Islamic symbols and institutions into the Indonesian public sphere, the urban Muslim middle class conducted various experiments to Islamize formal education. Not only did they propose the lifting of the ban on wearing headscarves for students, they also set up a number of quality Islamic schools that combine secular elite education with Islamic morals. Examples of this kind of schools include al-Azhar, al-Izhar, Muthahhari, Insan Cendekia, Madania, Bina Insani, Dwiwarna, Lazuardi, Fajar Hidayah, Nurul Fikri and Salman al-Farisi.

Unlike the *madrasas* which generally acquired limited facilities and recruited students from the poor and lower middle classes, the quality Islamic schools have appeared to be elitist as they selected the best students from upper middle class and are equipped with excellent and expensive facilities, such as air-conditioned rooms, digital libraries and laboratories. Some of them adopt the boarding school system, which is oriented toward instilling discipline and piety among students. Basically, they are modelled on the general school system and administratively under the auspices of the Ministry of National Education, which determines the curriculum, system of examination and overall organization of schooling. But, their Islamic characteristic is visible in the way the schools give a certain emphasis on Islamic moral education (Ropi, 2006). The growth of such Islamic quality schools has no doubt inspired the Islamization of formal education and the efflorescence of the integrated Islamic school.
The integrated Islamic school basically adopts the national curriculum, which is enriched with a few additional religious subjects and Islamic moral education through a systematic insertion of Islamic values and codes of conduct both among the general and religious subjects and through extracurricular activities. The school has thus a pragmatic approach regarding the secular system and does what it could for the Islamic cause within the given social and political framework. It can be portrayed as a viable alternative to the existing educational institutions in the sense that it provides a formal education for the benefits of knowledge economy and, at the same time, an arena of instruction and mental training for students and the younger generation of Muslims to live in accordance with Islamic principles and values. To some extents, it resembles the pesantren, especially in terms of its tendency to emphasize the need to disseminate moral education and impart religious knowledge.

It is intriguing to note that the integrated Islamic school thrived as a response to the growing discontent with the national education system, long considered to be inadequate to meet current needs, specifically in relation to the advancement of sciences and technology. The system is also deemed to have failed to shape students’ morality and thus protect them from drugs abuse, free sex and violence (Tim JSIT, 2006). This sort of moral panic has primarily afflicted urban people who directly saw the impact of modernization and globalization. It is against this background that the discourse on the need to combine science with an Islamic approach began to take shape. If used in the zeal to rationally comprehend God, science is believed to be able to form the basis of economic prosperity and social harmony of Muslims.3

The discourse of combining science with an Islamic approach has increasingly been articulated in tandem with the efflorescence of Islamist ideology that is highly assertive in its attempt to call for the implementation of various “Islamic visions” in educational, social, economic and political arenas. It is not surprising that the founders of the integrated Islamic school are generally obsessed with a strong desire to imitate and revive the “Golden Age of Islam” which is perceived to be the pure, ideal Islam upon which contemporary life should be based. It is believed that this commitment is badly needed in a situation when Islam is under attack by what Islamists describe as the “U.S.-led Zionist-Christian imperialist plot”. In their eyes, the best way to achieve this end is by developing an integrated system of education whereby the way of life and moral integrity of students can be systematically shaped in an Islamic sense, in accordance with the exemplary of the Prophet Muhammad and the first

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3 As for the debates on the Islamization of Islamic knowledge and their impact on Indonesia, see Baqir (2002).
generation of Muslims (*Salaf al-Salih*). In this system, students are simultaneously trained to accept Islam as a complete system governing all religious, social, political, cultural and economic orders and encompassing all things material, spiritual, societal, individual and personal (Tim JSIT, 2006).

The prototype of the integrated Islamic school was initially developed by the campus *da’wa* activists of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). They were the pioneers in the campus Islamic activism whose influence began to gain ground in the 1970s and who played an important role in disseminating Islamist ideology among university students. Youth have been the main target of their expansionist activism as they believe that youth would become pivotal social agents obsessed with the basic agenda to Islamize the whole Indonesian society. The task to prepare a younger generation of Muslims committed to *da’wa* is believed to be more efficient if sought through education. Within this context, they set up Lukmanul Hakim Integrated Islamic Primary School (SDIT) that inspired the establishment of similar schools by various *da’wa* activists from diverse Islamic organizations and private foundations, including al-Furqon, al-Taqwa, al-Ikhlas, Izzuddin, Al-Itqon, Auliya and Nur Hidayah. Recently, conservative Salafi foundations also have developed a model of integrated Islamic schools, replacing their exclusive teaching centres that reject anything regarded as the corrupting influence of Western culture (Hasan, 2008).

**Muslim Brotherhood Influence**

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology on the establishment of the integrated Islamic school is visible in the way the school emphasizes the need to instil Islamist framework into the students’ young minds and nurture their commitment to Islam as a preparation in the long-term process to implement the *shari’a*. As seen before, this emphasis gains ground in tandem with the public’s impatience and disillusionment with the existing education system, which is believed to have suffered a huge crisis in terms of paradigm, vision and mission, development, management, communication and learning process and approach.

What becomes a pride of the existing schools? The moral quality of their students is certainly not, nor their knowledge and insights in the field. That is why Muslims are easily defeated by the imperialist West. In a competitive world, it is a pity that we don’t dare to show our identity. As a result, the existing schools simply produce a
Westernized young generation whose religious identity and insights are insufficient. So does their moral identity. This is somehow a troublesome phenomenon. We don’t talk about politics. Our ultimate concern is to boost Islamic echo (syiar Islam) for the glory of the Muslim umma.4

This problem is claimed to have been inseparable with the application of the secular system that resulted in the failure of the ruling regimes in the Muslim world to fulfil the promises of accountability, transparency and development. In fact, more and more people are expressing their protest against the system, which is perceived to be an imposition of the West and have generated a society that is brutal, sadistic and licentious. To them, the way to escape this disaster is the shari’a and nothing but the shari’a, whose implementation will bring stability, morality and prosperity. The shari’a is thus seen as an alternative and a solution to the crisis and is trusted as a blueprint for creating a fair and prosperous society.

Borrowing the concept introduced by Egyptian schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the integrated Islamic school’s vision is thus to transform the Indonesian Muslim youths into a “rabbani” generation, which is defined as those knowing their very existence as creatures of the only Creator and thus comprehending their responsibility for all other creatures (Tim JSIT, 2006). This generation is believed to have strong ties with God and take God’s rules as the only source of reference and paradigm to steer every Muslim’s mind and action. From their perspective, there is no mind and action but to dedicate toward remembrance of God (dhikr) that create all creatures, give livelihood and govern the universe.5

The significance of education as a means to set the foundation of thorough-going Islamic reform in six main fields of life, including knowledge, politics, economic, social, culture and international relations, has been highlighted by al-Banna. In his view, the key to achieving this radical reform and establishing Islam as a “comprehensive order” (nizam shamil) lay in fact in education. His argument is that any attempt to transform the society today would hardly be successful without relentless support of dedicated cadres prepared to implement the movement’s revolutionary agenda. Creating this new society therefore required a strategy of formal and informal education (tarbiya) to nurture a new generation of Muslims committed to reviving and implementing Islam in all realms of human activity

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(Rosen, 2008). By developing a system for cultivating new Muslims for a new society, al-Banna believed that Muslim society at large could be transformed, and that the Muslim nation (*umma*) as a whole would eventually be restored to its lost power and glory.

Al-Banna’s concept of education inspired the activism model developed by the *tarbiyya* movement that formed the backbone for the establishment of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Education is deemed crucial to serve as the basis for Muslim’s relentless campaign to impose the need for revitalizing Islam in all walks of Muslim life. The integrated Islamic school is expected to be at the forefront in a time when Muslims are defeated by temptations of the globalizing world. As one of the most important personalities among the PKS membership and also the spokesperson of the Indonesian Consultative Assembly Hidayat Nur Wahid puts it, the integrated Islamic school was set up to revive the lost glory of the Islamic education institution in the Golden Age. It serves as the bridge to dissolve the dichotomy between the sacred and secular knowledge and this dichotomy is claimed to have caused the collapse of the Islamic education institution. To this end, the integrated Islamic school does not treat Islam solely as an object of study, but also as a way of life (*minhaj al-haya*), based on which students will survive all current challenges and difficulties.6

Within this context, the integrated Islamic school puts a particular emphasis on the imparting of fundamental religious subjects, such as theology (*‘aqida*), morality (*akhlAQ*) and devotional practice (*‘ibada*).7 In accordance with al-Banna’s educational theory, its aim is to build students’ character and morality in an Islamic sense (*shakhsiya Islamiya mutakamila*) as reflected in their way of thinking, attitude and everyday practices. The purpose of education, as al-Banna saw it, is not simply to impart knowledge, whether religious or secular. Rather, he sought in education the achievement of a comprehensive moral edification (*tahdhib*) and the shaping of fully Islamic personalities whose manners, way of thinking and sense of moral duty were defined entirely in accordance with the Brotherhood’s religious and political *da’wa*. Al-Banna contrasted this ideal of a fully formed Muslim personality who possessed a “sincere faith” with the light-hearted or weak belief that he perceived in his contemporaries and which he tirelessly professed to despise (Rosen, 2008).

Al-Banna’s concept of education provided an outline of the integrated Islamic school’s system which is claimed to have been implemented for the fulfilment of a clear mission, i.e. to develop a typical Islamic education institution that aims to produce pious

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6 This statement appears in Hidayat Nur Wahid’s preface for Tim JSIT Indonesia, *Sekolah Islam Terpadu, Konsep dan Aplikasinya* (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2006).

7 Interview with Fahmi Zulkarnain, Jakarta, conducted in December 2008.
graduates who are diligent and independent and, at the same time, capable of providing correct guidance to the world in accordance with the true religion. The school system is conceptually developed to support the application of the mission as a residential community whereby students are taught a solid curriculum of both general and Islamic subjects plus a particular type of moral education. It applies a modern management and approach oriented to meet current needs. Instructional activities are managed to optimize the students’ intelligence, in accordance with the criteria proposed by the Connecticut School of Effectiveness Project. It is believed that only by adopting the modern system of education can the schools produce pious graduates capable in science and technology, while committed to following the example of Prophet Muhammad and the first generation Muslims. In addition to that, the schools are concerned with teaching practical knowledge and vocational skills useful for those graduates that could not continue their studies to a higher level of education (Tim JSIT, 2006).

**JSIT Network**

The most remarkable among all the integrated Islamic schools is certainly the schools affiliated to the *tarbiyya* movement represented mainly by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The umbrella organization of the schools is JSIT, the Network of Integrated Islamic School (Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu), which was established in 2003 with the aim of coordinating and facilitating the establishment and operation of the schools. JSIT is also claimed to be part of the broader concerns among the *da’wa* activists of the *tarbiyya* movement to unite the *umma*. This is particularly true when they saw that fragmentation has been rife among Muslims as a result of recent stiff political competitions in the democratic system. The main concern of JSIT is thus to bring the various integrated Islamic schools together under the same umbrella organization with the spirit of solidarity and Salafism and back to the exemplary of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generation Muslims (*Salaf al-Salih*). There are various schools under the auspices of JSIT but operating under different private foundations, including al-Mu’adz, Insan Mulia, Insani, Al Farabi, Ibnu Abbas, Salman al-Farisi, al-Khairaat and al-Madinah.

JSIT has played a pivotal role in assisting *da’wa* activists and aspirant Islamists across Indonesia to develop their own schools through networking and information exchange.

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8 Interview with Joko Prayitno, Nurul Fikri Integrated Islamic School, Jakarta, conducted in December 2008.

9 Interview with Mujidin, Public Relation of JSIT, Yogyakarta, conducted on 16 February 2007.
In this context, JSIT emerged as a sort of franchise that offers anybody a licence to set up his own school. It simply provides a blueprint and guideline on how to establish the school. By joining JSIT, a school is administered under the auspice of the Ministry of National Education and allowed to utilize a solid curriculum constructed by JSIT. JSIT normally has no right to interfere in internal affairs of each school, especially in relation to financial matters. JSIT has regional and district branches across Indonesia. There are seven regional branches which cover (i) the northern part of Sumatra; (ii) the southern part of the island; (iii) Banten, Jakarta and West Java; (iv) Central Java and Yogyakarta; (v) Kalimantan; (vi) East Java, Bali, West and East Nusa Tenggara; and (vii) Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua. Every regional branch has one coordinator supervising district branch coordinators. The coordinators are mostly the \textit{da'wa} activists affiliated to PKS. One of the main actors behind the establishment of JSIT is Fahmi Alaydroes, who also serves as the chairman of PKS-linked education foundation, Nurul Fikri.\footnote{Nurul Fikri was initially set up in the 1970s by Yusuf Asmara Nurasa, a \textit{tarbiyya} activist of Arief Rahman Mosque at the University of Indonesia, as a profit-oriented study club for senior high school students wanting to pursue a higher education in prestigious universities in Indonesia. This institution appears to be one of recruitment pools for \textit{da'wa} activists concerned with the expansion of the \textit{tarbiyya} movement on university campuses. Interview with Yusuf Ghazali, Nurul Fikri Islamic Boarding School Foundation, Jakarta, conducted in December 2008; see also Damanik (2002: 52–57).}

JSIT has been active in encouraging the growth of the integrated Islamic schools. With simple requirements, it invites any individual to set up schools and send application to JSIT via district and regional branches. Approved application will receive a registration number. With this sort of open system, JSIT claims to have incorporated several hundreds of the integrated Islamic schools across Indonesia into its network.\footnote{Interview with Fahmi Zulkarnain, Jakarta, conducted in December 2008.} A number of JSIT competitors have observed some weaknesses in the system as it does not guarantee that registered schools operate in accordance with the ideal concept developed by JSIT.\footnote{Interview with Nasruddin Ahmad, a Muhammadiyah school’s teacher, Yogyakarta, conducted in February 2007.} In fact, JSIT cannot verify the exact number of schools operating under its umbrella. One registered school may change its name or move to another location without reporting to the central organization of JSIT.\footnote{Interview with Muhammad Harman Abdullah, the Regional Coordinator of JSIT, Yogyakarta, conducted on 14 February 2007.}

The JSIT-affiliated schools generally look more prosperous than those under the auspices of other organizations and private foundations. Lukmanul Hakim School at Jl, Timoho, Yogyakarta, for instance, has several units of remarkable buildings near elite
housing complexes in the town. This school has been developed by activists of the tarbiyya movement, some of whom have been involved actively in politics by joining PKS. Important personalities among them are in fact local parliamentarians in Yogyakarta representing PKS. Indeed, the dissemination of the integrated Islamic schools has become the interests of the da’wa activists and PKS as a political party.

PKS’s concern to support the establishment of the integrated Islamic school has to do with the party’s ambition to expand its core membership and constituent, primarily among the younger generation of Muslims. By developing the schools, PKS has been recruiting the future cadres of the party. At the same time, the party could expand its mass sympathizers through the establishment of the schools. More and more people from the upper middle class are interested in sending their children to the schools and in turn, learn how to become pious Muslims. The network of the integrated Islamic schools thus has the potential to be the conduit in the spread of the party’s messages and also the mobilization machine by playing a pivotal role in the victory of PKS cadres both in the direct election of regional administrators (pilkada) and in the general legislative elections. This strategy corresponds with the PKS effort to support the development of Iqra Club, which is active in organizing Islamic programmes among students of senior high schools. Hand in hand with the Kerohanian Islam (Rohis), a student unit of Islamic activism which appears to be a venue where the students’ interest in Islam has developed, the Iqra Club actively promulgated ideas by Islamist ideologues and their hybrid versions packages friendly and popularly.

Though from the same root, a number of integrated Islamic schools are operating outside the JSIT network. For example, the Bina Anak Shalih school in Yogyakarta, which is under the auspices of the Bina Anak Shalih foundation, claims to have been established earlier than the Lukmanul Hakim school. The Bina Anak Shalih foundation was set up in the early 1990s by a few activists of the Shalahuddin community (Jamaah Shalahuddin) at Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta who were concerned with the integration between the secular and religious knowledge. Recently, they also set up integrated Islamic schools at the primary and secondary levels in various cities in Indonesia. The foundation has published a popular periodical, Bina Anak Shalih, which has served as one of the most popular reading materials for Indonesian children.

Some important personalities known for their affiliation with the mainstream Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, such as Amien Rais, also sponsored the establishment of the integrated Islamic school under the auspices of his own foundation. He closely cooperated with the Shalahuddin alumni to develop the Budi Mulia Dua schools. The mounting
popularity of the integrated Islamic school has even inspired the established Muslim organizations to set up their own schools. Muhammadiyah established Ahmad Dahlan school and the Nahdlatul Ulama set up the al-Madinah. A number of foundations linked to particular mosques are also keen to develop integrated Islamic schools. One such example is the Syuhada school in Yogyakarta which operates under the auspices of the Syuhada Mosque.14

Another important organization concerned with the efflorescence of the integrated Islamic schools is the Hidayatullah foundation. The umbrella organization of the Pesantren Hidayatullah which publishes the monthly Hidayatullah known for its fiercely anti-Jewish and Anti-Christian standpoints, the Hidayatullah foundation has set up several dozens integrated Islamic schools in various provinces in Indonesia: al-Iman, al-Madinah and Hidayatullah. The foundation is keen to apply the concept of shahada, which is insisted as a primary guide to revive a “blessed community” based on the Islamic way of life. Its institutional profile defines that the organization’s sovereignty belongs solely to God and is carried out by the main leader through the mechanism of consultation (shura). The aim of the organization is to realize the enforcement of the principle of the Oneness of God (tawhid) as the foundation towards the comprehensive application of the shari’a and the victory of Islam. No doubt, this concept has some profound impact on the establishment of the Pesantren Hidayatullah, which appeared to be a typical Islamic boarding school that develops an independent modern religious institution and reformist ideology close to Salafism. It aimed at producing da’wa cadres committed to the principle of al-amr bi’l-ma’ruf wa nahy ’an-munkar (enjoining good and opposing vice).15

Islamist nuances are clearly visible in the vision developed by the Hidayatullah, especially in reference to Mawdudi’s notion of the sovereignty of God.16 The founder of the pesantren was Abdullah Said who was born in Makassar and was believed to have links with the Darul Islam movement leader in South Sulawesi, Kahar Muzakar.17 The pesantren has even been implicated in several reports as having links to the Jama’ah Islamiyah (ICG, 2003). Yet, the Hidayatullah has been known for its excellent relations with the government. Since its establishment, the pesantren has frequently received visits from high-ranking officials, including former President Suharto (Bruinessen, 2008).

14 Interview with Mujidin, Public Relation of JSIT, Yogyakarta, conducted on 16 February 2007.
15 On the profile of the pesantren, see Abas (1998); see also Subhan (2006).
16 On Mawdudi’s concept of hakimiyya (sovereignty), see Nasr (1994).
17 Concerning Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar and the DI/TII movement in South Sulawesi, see Gonggong (1992).
A number of integrated Islamic schools developed linkages with established da’wa organizations from the modernist end of spectrum. Abu Bakar school in Yogyakarta, for instance, was set up on a piece of land donated by the Indonesian Council of Islamic Missionary (DDII) branch office of Yogyakarta. It is a da’wa organization established in 1967 by former Masyumi leaders, the first and largest Islamic party in Indonesia before it was banned by Sukarno in 1960. A staunch ally of Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami in disseminating the Wahhabi da’wa and Islamist ideology, the DDII distributed funding from the Middle East for the construction of mosques, Islamic schools and hospitals. When the bloody conflict erupted in Maluku, the DDII set up the Committee of Overcoming Crisis (Kompak) under which the paramilitary group Mujahidin Kompak operated in Maluku and Central Sulawesi and was even involved in perpetrating terrors in those trouble spots (ICG, 2004; Hasan, 2006).

**Curriculum**

The integrated Islamic school’s adoption of the national curriculum reflects its interest to exist as part of the national education system. The importance of mathematics, natural sciences, humanities, languages, vocational skills and arts, which constitute the basic format of the national curriculum, is not denied. The school considers the imparting of secular subjects as necessary to serve as a means to prepare school leavers and aid in the development of their professional future careers as engineers, doctors, economists, physicians and social scientists. Modern pedagogical approach is used to support the application of the curriculum and this distinguishes itself from the pesantren education. Offering a religious-based curriculum, focusing on the Qur’an and Islamic texts, the latter has long been criticized as static and blamed for producing individuals who are neither skilled nor prepared for the modern workforce.

The national curriculum is secular and nationalistic in character. It was designed to fulfill the aim of national education, which is articulated in Article 4 National Education Law No. 2 of 1989, i.e. to elevate the intellectual life of the nation and to develop the complete Indonesian man, i.e. one who is devout and God-fearing, physically and mentally healthy, of stable personality, independent, has a deep sense of responsibility towards the society and the nation and possesses knowledge, skill and high morality. In tandem with the current needs for a skilled workforce confident in its ability to compete in future global markets, the curriculum has also accommodated reform demands. Providing a foundation for lifelong
learning, character-building, problem-solving and critical thinking, and developing the flexibility to manage change are key factors for the curriculum reform (Yulaelawati, 2001).

Every school that adopts the national curriculum is required to use standardized government textbooks and apply the correct procedures and practices. There are some limitations for the school to commence classes and offer both intra- and extracurricular activities. But this mechanism does not prevent the integrated Islamic school from modifying its curriculum in order to include religious subjects and inculcate Islamic moral values. The school’s curriculum includes time for religious instruction that is allocated only two lesson hours a week—one lesson hour being 40 minutes. Religious instruction is allocated for four lesson hours a week at the primary level and five lesson hours at the junior secondary level. Interestingly, no extra time is allocated for religious instruction for students at the senior secondary level. Despite the limited time allocated for religious instruction, the imparting of religious knowledge can be maximized by including a variety of medieval Islamic sciences, such as theology ('aqida), devotional practices ('ibada), morality (akhlaq), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and history and civilization (tarikh and sira) (Hermawan et al., 2006).

Moreover, the integrated Islamic school’s curriculum incorporates into its structure Arabic Language and Qur’anic studies, which are normally associated with the madrasa curriculum. Both are deemed instrumental to underpin students’ understanding of religious subjects and nurture their correct belief. A student is expected not simply to memorize the Qur’an, but taught to internalize its lessons and principles. The emphasis on the study of the Qur’an reminds us of al-Banna’s concept of education that maintains the Qur’an and the Sunna as the curricular basis of religious instruction (Rosen, 2008). The Qur’an is believed to have provided detailed practical commandments and regulations concerning each and every aspect of daily life, including the proper relationships that people should have with others in their home and community. As such, by working to implement the shari’a in all aspects of his life, the sincere believer transforms the community around him; in time, a collective of believers transforms the Muslim nation as a whole.

In fact, the integrated Islamic school develops its own curriculum, which is designed to meet the main purpose of the establishment of the school, inter alia, “to educate students to become smart faithful Muslims who have good morality and skills for the benefit and interest of human beings”. All subjects in the curriculum integrate Islamic values of the Qur’an and Sunna with those of modern, practical knowledge. For the proponents of the school, this is

the most important means to balance the students’ achievement in the basic knowledge competence and in the consciousness to devote the whole thinking and activity in their lives solely to God (Alaydroes, 2006). There are five principles that characterize the integrated Islamic school curriculum: (i) Islam-based education and learning in all aspects of school activities; (ii) competence-based instructional enrichment; (iii) Qur’anic recitation and memorizing ability; (iv) Arabic and English mastering as a condition to compete in global world; and (v) actualization of students’ talents and vocational skills.

On the basis of these principles, the integrated Islamic school offers additional religious and moral education aimed at instilling religious values into the students’ young minds, especially after the regular school times from 7.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. Tawhid (oneness of God) is the focus of the students’ mental training and is considered the foundation to develop their consciousness to apply Islam in all walks of their life. A number of Salafi-Wahhabi type books are used for this purpose, including Kitab al-Tawhid by the Wahhabi founder Muhammad ’ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) or its annotated commentary, al-Qawl al-Shadid 'Ala Kitab al-Tawhid by ’Abd al-Rahman al-Su’udi. In this regard, students are required to reach the mashohah level even from the elementary level. It is a basic competence expected to provide the foundation for the students to become the total (kaaffah) Muslims that survive the challenges of the globalizing world on the basis of their commitment to the shari’a. The main emphasis of the school curriculum is in fact on the construction of students’ morality and the internalization of religious values based on the concept of “tarbiyatul awlad fil Islam” (educating children according to Islam) (Tim JSIT, 2006).

The imparting of religious values and moral education is carried out not only through the teaching of Islamic subjects and extracurricular activities but also through general subjects, for example, when a teacher discusses three-dimension models in mathematics class. From the perspective of geometry, a three-dimension model is the mathematical representation of any three-dimensional object. The teacher is encouraged to relate this mathematic concept to that of Islamic belief, using a cube as an example. The distinctiveness of a cube as an object that has three dimensions is then explained; it appears to be the same construction if seen from different perspectives. This feature is then interlocked with that of the Muslim belief on the basis of the Qur’an. Students will understand that every knowledge and science is above all the evidence of God’s magnificence and omnipotence. In this way,
students become indoctrinated and aware of the need to uphold God’s sovereignty upon all creatures.\textsuperscript{19}

Some indicators are used to measure the extent to which this purpose can be achieved and this indicates how the curriculum is concerned not simply with the development of students’ core competency and skills, but also with nurturing their religious awareness and commitment. The most important of the indicators are that students should have sincere belief (\textit{salimul aqidah}) and piety (\textit{shahihul ibadah}). This is emphasized as the foundation before the students can develop their maturity (\textit{matinul khulq}); independency (\textit{qadirun ala-l-kash}); intelligence and knowledgeable (\textit{muthaqqaful fikr}); good health (\textit{qawiyul jism}); seriousness and discipline (\textit{mujahidun li-nafsih}); correctness and accuracy (\textit{munazhzhom fi syu’unih}); efficiency (\textit{harisun ‘ala waqti}); and helpfulness (\textit{nafi’un li-ghairih}). In other words, the integrated Islamic school’s curriculum aims not only to develop students’ curiosity and knowledge and equip them with vocational skills, but also to train their morality and elevate them to be faithful Muslims committed to \textit{da’wa}. This is claimed as a manifestation of the term “integrated” in the school system, believed to be the foundation to shape Muslim leadership.

In an attempt to mould the Islamist character of the young generation of Muslims, the integrated Islamic school requires the students to declare the students’ oath every Monday morning. It comprises of six statements which constitute the students’ determination to be (i) obedient to God and His Messenger; (ii) devoted to parents and teachers; (iii) respectful of fellow Muslims; (iv) committed to hard study and knowledge-seeking; (v) loyal to the rules applicable in the school, dormitory and society; and (vi) independent, well behaved and of good character. Though not identical, this oath of loyalty resembles \textit{bay’a} in the Islamist terms. It is a doctrine of allegiance that requires all members of an Islamist movement to vow loyalty to their leaders (\textit{’amir} or \textit{imam}). This doctrine has been applied by most radical Islamist movements to ensure the loyalty of their followers and thus subjected to criticism even by Islamists themselves. Those from the moderate wings of the Islamist movements argue that \textit{bay’a} might entail a serious deviation from the principle of \textit{al-wala wa’l-barra} (alliance and dissociation) as it is believed to have necessitated a declaration of unconditional loyalty to a \textit{jama’}a leader under all circumstances, even if the leader commits sinful acts.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Mujidin, Public Relation of JSIT, Yogyakarta, conducted on 16 February 2007.

\textsuperscript{20} On the doctrines of \textit{bay’a} and \textit{al-wala al-barra} as propagated by Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood in general, see Mousalli (1992).
The integrated Islamic school curriculum applies the principle of Islamization in the learning process and aims to mould the consciousness and logical pattern of thinking integral to the perspective of Islam. Students are encouraged to think and understand that all phenomena in the universe cannot be dissociated from the role of God. In their own words, all learning processes rely on the rabhaniya (lordship) values and aim to bring students closer to God. With the application of the rabban paradigm in learning process, emotional relation between students, teachers and the subjects under discussion is constructed (Tim JSIT, 2006). This paradigm resembles the concept of Islamization of knowledge introduced by Ismail Raji al-Faruqi. Al-Faruqi defines this concept as an attempt to rebuild disciplines of modern sciences on the basis of Islam. In his opinion, modern social and natural sciences should be conceptualized, reconstructed and given a new foundation of Islam so that Islamic principles and values are embodied not only in the methodology and strategy of schooling, but also in the data, problems, purposes and aspirations of the sciences. Al-Faruqi goes on to suggest that every discipline should be reconstructed for the sake of integrating Islamic relevance in accordance with tawhid mission, which includes the unity of knowledge, life and history. There is no division between the secular and sacred subjects. Islamic values automatically replace Western norms as a source of inspiration for the working of the scientific disciplines. Through this project, al-Faruqi, therefore, sought to bring secular subjects under the grasp of Islamic subjects (Al-Faruqi, 1982).

What is of interest to note is that the integrated Islamic school curriculum pays specific attention to the activity of scouting. Every student is required to attend scouting, aimed to educate, train and steer his tendency to have Islamic morality and integrity as well as leadership, discipline, intelligence, responsibility, skill and care for all human beings. The scouting curriculum includes various training in spirituality (kerohanian), physics (fisik), vocational skill (fanniya), historical insight (thaqafiya), leadership and military (qiyada wa-l jundiya), as well as Islamic solidarity (ukhuwwa). This curriculum seems inseparable from the PKS’s concern to develop scouting under the banner of the justice scout. There are today several thousands PKS’s scout membership across Indonesia, believed to be the front line of the party prepared for mobilization, including the purpose of conducting humanitarian missions.

The emphasis on scouting as part of the integrated Islamic school curriculum is a reminiscence of al-Banna’s message for the activists of Islamist movements to unify themselves under the banner of Islamic leadership. Within this context, al-Banna stressed the importance of teaching patriotism and love for one’s homeland and the Muslim nation. This
meant instilling in youth a sense of civic responsibility, a desire to combat the ills of poverty, illiteracy, disease and crime and to build in modern society’s place a new exemplary society based on Islamic social justice and fraternity. From al-Banna’s point of view, to accomplish this mission, education needs to inculcate in each Muslim a sense of obligation toward other Muslims before all others, and to teach him how to cooperate with another for the achievement of larger purposes. Physical education also figures prominently in al-Banna’s educational method as he believed that physical training is a vital component in preparing young souls for jihad in the way of Islam (Rosen, 2008). This message has been interpreted by radical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and its derivates to set up secret groups prepared to fight against Islam’s enemies.

**Teachers as Murabbi**

The role of teachers in translating the visions developed by the integrated Islamic school is paramount. The most responsible for imparting secular and religious knowledge, teachers are considered the key for the success of learning and the teaching process in the integrated Islamic school. To accomplish this duty, they are required to have teaching competence and professionalism. Indicative of the teacher’s competence is his ability to transfer knowledge to students and guide them to achieve certain level of moral integrity. JSIT, as the umbrella organization of the integrated Islamic schools, has developed surveys to measure the teacher’s competence through, among other instruments, regular assessment tests for teachers. The attempt to guarantee the teacher’s competence and professionalism is not necessarily easy as this also depends on the whole process of recruitment. To meet all these requirements, the integrated Islamic school has implemented a certain system of recruitment. Teachers are selected among candidates from various institutions of high learning, including state teachers’ training colleges, faculties of education at state Islamic universities and secular universities and non-education faculties of those universities.21

More than simply to impart both secular and religious knowledge, teachers are required to act as educator and moral guide (murabbi) charged with the task to instil religious moral values into the students’ young minds. Accordingly, they have to treat students not simply as pupils, but also as partners in developing knowledge and disseminating da’wa messages. It is claimed that in this way, the students’ intellectual capacity and moral integrity can be attested properly. As indicated by one teacher in al-Khairaat school in Yogyakarta, the

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21 Interview with Fahmi Zulkarnain, Jakarta, conducted on December 2008.
distinctiveness of the integrated Islamic school does not lie primarily in its curriculum but rather on the ability of its teachers to instil Islamic values and moral education in students by demonstrating real examples; how the teachers speak in the language of the Qur’an and Sunna and behave in accordance with the Islamic moral principles like what al-Salaf al-Salih did in the past.  

There is a slogan recited widely by those active in the integrated Islamic school: “al-tariqatu ahammu min al-maddah, wa’l asatidh ahammu min l’tariqah, wa ruh ‘l Islam ahammu min kull shay’i” (method is more important than teaching materials, teachers are even more important than the method, and the spirit of Islam is the most important than any other things). It is believed that owing to the teachers’ knowledge and insights in Islam, the students will know the correct belief in accordance with the method of pious forefathers (manhaj Salah al-Salih), and thus be free from heretical innovations (bid’a), polytheism (shirk), as well as pluralism and liberalism. Nevertheless, this kind of moral instruction is taught through a persuasive method, whereby the teachers seek to develop the students’ consciousness as faithful Muslims committed to Islam. Teachers serve primarily as motivators of students, rather than their instructors.

Within this context, the Islamist consciousness of the candidates to be recruited as the integrated Islamic schools’ teachers is considered seriously. The candidates’ concern with Islam is indeed one of the most important criteria for teacher recruitment. They are required to follow measurement tests of the mastery of Islamic knowledge and the Qur’an. As a matter of fact, most selected candidates have had acquaintanceship with conservative Salafi-type Islamist movements that flourished on university campuses. Their tendency towards such a conservative branch of Islam is reflected in their appearance: long beards, trousers rights to their ankles and al-Banna-style hat for men teachers, or long veil for women. Generally, they have certain ambitions to see the shari’a implemented comprehensively in Indonesia, though they do not agree with revolutionary Islamist movements legitimizing the use of violence to topple existing regimes. In their eyes, the struggle to implement the shari’a should be sought through peaceful education and da’wa.

To ensure the teachers’ commitment to Islam, selected candidates are required to attend the training programmes by JSIT, in collaboration with private foundations and relevant organizations. It is claimed that by attending this programme, they would understand

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22 Interview with Siti Nurlela, an Al-Khairaat School’s teacher, Yogyakarta, conducted on 17 February 2007.
23 Interviews with Abdullah Munir and Ahmad Yunus, Al-Madinah school’s teachers, Kebumen, conducted in October 2007.
their main task as teachers of the integrated Islamic school—to save the future generations of Muslims.24 The programme of internalizing the teacher’s faith and commitment to Islam is continuously conducted through da’wa which is integral to the school’s daily activities. They must understand that Islamic schooling is a process to reinforce Muslim faith using the Prophet Muhammad’s model to spread Islam among Arab pagans. Recently, JSIT set up the teachers’ training college for integrated Islamic schools (Pendidikan Guru Sekolah Islam Terpadu, PGSIT) in Yogyakarta in an effort to recruit more potential candidates to strengthen the expansion of the schools.

The emphasis on the training programme for teachers must be understood within the context of assuring the qualities that make good teachers with the desirable character traits. As al-Banna and other Muslim Brother thinkers such as Said Hawwa put it, since they are the cornerstone of any programme of education and have the special responsibility of nurturing the new generation, teachers should be held to the highest of moral and intellectual standards and be content with little material wealth and comfort and never be jealous of others. They also should see their duties to God and to the Muslim nation as paramount, and also that these obligations are best fulfilled through selfless work on behalf of the Islamic revival movement. They should even be compassionate and tolerant towards students, be interested in educating children and youth and able to gain the students’ trust (Rosen, 2008).

Indeed, the integrated Islamic school’s teachers are recruited to spearhead the task to teach correct faith to students and practise it. Their understanding of the meaning of tolerance should exclude that in theological terms, as Islam does not compromise in terms of faith. They believe this is the meaning of the Qur’anic message—Lakum dinukum waliya din (for you your belief and so does for me). Nevertheless, teachers are required to give some insights into the theology of other religions as anticipation when needed to deal with non-Muslims. The principle of tolerance to non-Muslims is also taught as it is believed to be the basic character of Muhammad. Tolerance is recommended to any one who does not treat Muslims as enemies. Yet, this is confined to the matters of social relationship, not of the belief. The integrated Islamic school’s teachers have thus the twin tasks of teaching students the required subjects and the basic tenets of Islam and of instilling into them Islamic values and morality (adab) through everyday practices.

It is worth noting that although lessons in adab only take up a relatively small portion of the schedule, observations confirm that adab permeates the everyday affairs and overall

24 Interview with Fahmi Zulkarnain, Jakarta, conducted in December 2008.
atmosphere of the integrated Islamic schools. Some teachers in al-Khairaat school in Yogyakarta claim that their school could attract more and more students every year not because of its academic achievement but rather its popularity as the school that produces graduates concerned with the Islamic principle of morality and code of conduct. They are really proud of the fact that students of the school, including those at the senior secondary level, fully respect their teachers, founders and other collaborators behind the school, more than they do their parents. When the students meet their teachers, even outside the school compound, they do not hesitate to kiss their teachers’ hand. This kind of *adab* education is developed as part of the efforts to encourage the students to find in their own lives application of the examples highlighted in the religious curriculum, which includes social etiquette based on the stories about the lives of the Prophet Muhammad, his Companions and the *Salaf al-Salih* in general.

**The Schooling System**

Another attraction of the integrated Islamic school lies in its the full-day school system, which requires students to attend learning activities for the better part of the day, from 7.00 a.m. till 3.00 p.m. This longer learning time enables the integrated Islamic school to teach all materials required in its curriculum, including the additional religious curriculum, Arabic and the Qur’an. In addition to that, students will also obtain the instruction to practise what they have learnt, especially those related to the materials in the religious curriculum. Through the programme of collective prayer and short religious lesson (*kultum*), for instance, the school is able to further instil religious values and awareness that will serve as the foundation of the students’ moral standing and integrity in their young minds. At the same time, they can interact intensively with teachers who act as their close observers and also as their mentors, providing them with direct guidance on how to behave as a good Muslim. More importantly perhaps, the full-day school system is believed to be capable of nurturing the students’ creativity and knowledge optimally. Due to the system, the students can attend a variety of enriching programmes in accordance with their interests and talents.

The task of imparting religious knowledge and nurture piety and morality can be conducted more systematically and intensively in the schools that apply the boarding school system. Since students stay in the dormitory located in the school compound, they have more time to interact with teachers and tutors and thus learn how to practise what they have studied in the classrooms. This system is somehow similar to the *pesantren*, with one exception being...
there is no central authority such as kyai who becomes the main reference among students especially when reading the *kitab kuning*, classical *fiqh* texts. The integrated Islamic school’s students are not demanded to master the *kitab kuning*, which is the main requirement for pesantren students.

Keeping pace with the school founders’ concern about the danger of young Muslims intermingling with members of the other sex (ikhtilat), the integrated Islamic school rejects coeducation, especially for students at the secondary level. Male students have to be separated from the female students. Coeducation has, in fact, been considered as the reason for the moral crisis among Muslims. For *da’wa* activists of the *tarbiyya* movement, *ikhtilat* should thus be avoided to protect the younger generation of Muslims from becoming slaves of hedonism and the materialistic culture. Nevertheless, the integrated Islamic school still allows the system to be implemented in the pre-school and elementary schools. Students at these levels are regarded as still too young to know about sex.

The full-day and boarding school systems benefit urban middle class and working parents. By sending their students to the integrated Islamic school, they do not need to spend extra money to take care of their children. They do not even need to worry about the activities their children will possibly engage in after school. This is particularly helpful at a time when parents are afflicted by a sort of moral panic from watching television airing drug victims and promiscuous attitudes among youths towards sex. They only need to pay some extra money to cover all things but no more than Rp 600,000 per month. This slightly more expensive school fee is a consequence of the application of such a system. The school is required to provide lunch for and other facilities to the students, including monitoring them the whole day.\(^\text{25}\)

Among the urban middle class, civil servants are most likely to send their children to the integrated Islamic school. In tandem with the adjustment of the office hours in Indonesia from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m (six working days) or from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (five working days), they have less time to take care of their children if they attend regular school. The full-day school system is believed to be a practical solution for them. This sort of benefit accounts for the motivation of the middle-class parents in sending their children to the integrated Islamic school and contributes to the success of some schools in enhancing their status as established, if not elitist, schools. This is especially true in Salman al-Farisi school in Yogyakarta, whose most students are from the upper middle class. According to the school’s

\(^{25}\) Interview with Mujidin, Public Relation of JSIT, Yogyakarta, conducted on 16 February 2007.
headmaster, the majority of his students are indeed from the upper middle class, a group that places emphasis on Islamic education and understands the need for a solid moral education in anticipation of future challenges.\(^{26}\)

Nevertheless, generalization is easy to make and should be treated with some caution. There are also schools that only attract students from the lower middle class and thus look poor and unadorned. For example, as shown in one of the al-Khairaat schools in Yogyakarta, most of the parents of students from schools under the auspices of al-Khairaat foundation work as petty traders, labourers or, at best, low-ranking civil servants. Although the schools do not receive significant amount of money from the students’ tuition fees, they still can operate with financial aids by donors. According to one teacher in the school, donors’ concern with the progress of Islamic education institutions appears to be the key reason for his school’s sustenance. In fact, this school subsidies those unable to afford the tuition and catering fees. To support the operation of the integrated Islamic schools, some foundations creatively develop various economic activities and entrepreneurship. These activities of alms collection, donations and charities are coordinated with institutions which are also operating under the same foundation. In this context, philanthropy has been underlined as potential mechanism to back up the establishment of the integrated Islamic schools. More and more philanthropy institutions are willing to cooperate with the school foundations as part of their ambition to “empower” the umma. Financing the schools is considered more appropriate than simply distributing money for the poor.

The interest of donors and philanthropy agents in supporting the operation of the integrated Islamic schools has apparently also been driven by the success of the schools in fostering an increasingly positive image of their students’ ability when compared with the other existing schools, including the private schools that belong to the Catholic and Protestant foundations. In the 2007 junior secondary school national examination, the students of the integrated Islamic schools have succeeded in dominating the best 10 ranking, surpassing the achievements of well-known schools, such as SMP 5 of Yogyakarta or Stella Duce School of the Catholic foundation. Moreover, many graduates of the integrated Islamic schools at the senior secondary level usually succeed in going on to prestigious universities in Indonesia.\(^{27}\)

\(^{26}\) Interview with Nuzil, a Salman al-Farisi School’s teacher, Yogyakarta, conducted on 20 February 2007.

\(^{27}\) Interview with Muhammad Harman Abdullah, Yogyakarta, conducted on 14 February 2007.
The most innovative aspect of the integrated Islamic school is its adoption of the moving class system involving an active learning method called *sentra*. *Sentra* means the way to organize a class so that students are encouraged to study actively and independently. They are given a great deal of freedom to develop interests and the choice to conduct their own experiments. In Salman al-Farisi, for example, there are two *sentras* that become the focus of the development of students’ talents and interests—construction and arts. In the *sentra* of construction, their interests and talents in construction technology are disseminated through various models. Those interested in arts are encouraged to join the *sentra* of arts, which comprises different forms of arts. In al-Madinah, Kebumen, which claims to offer a modern, fun and popular education concept, there are seven *sentras*: exploration, imagination, vocational activity, construction, creative arts, mathematic and language. Each *sentra* has a small laboratory for the students’ practices.

Another school, the al-Khairaat, develops the moving class system with two *sentras* which also functions as the laboratory for the development of students’ interests and talents: *sentra* of language and construction. In the *sentra* of language, students are trained to correctly communicate in Bahasa Indonesia and master foreign languages, especially the English language and Arabic. The mastery of the former is given more emphasis as it is considered as the most important international language and key for the students’ development and their career. Arabic is also taught intensively as it is regarded as the language of the Qur’an, which is at the same time used by one-fifth of the world’s population. A number of integrated Islamic schools with excellent foreign language courses have attracted more and more students. This is precisely the reason for popularity of foreign language courses in the integrated Islamic school.

**Conclusion**

The number of the integrated Islamic schools has increased from year to year. New schools have been established under the auspices of various foundations. Today, there are more than 1,000 integrated Islamic schools across Indonesia. It is predicted that this number will continue to increase in tandem with the growing interest of Islamic-oriented Muslim middle class in looking for a viable alternative to the existing education institution that can protect their children from various temptations of the globalizing world, including drug abuses and free sex. The existing schools are considered no longer sufficient as they simply provide a
formal education without “educating” students and equipping them with Islamic values largely perceived as the moral foundation for them to cope with current needs and challenges.

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology on the establishment of the integrated Islamic school is visible in the way the school emphasizes the need to instil Islamist framework into students’ young minds and nurture their commitment to Islam as a preparation in the long-term process to implement the shari’a. Borrowing al-Banna’s concept on education, the integrated Islamic school’s vision is thus to transform the Indonesian Muslim youths into a “rabbani” generation, which is defined as those knowing their very existence as creatures of the only Creator and thus comprehending their responsibility for all other creatures. Education is regarded as the key to the foundation of thorough-going Islamic reform in six main fields of life, including knowledge, politics, economic, social, culture and international relations, and thus establishing Islam as a “comprehensive order” (nizam shamil). By developing a system for cultivating new Muslims for a new society, al-Banna believed that Muslim society at large could be transformed and that the Muslim nation (umma) as a whole would eventually be restored to its former power and glory.

The field of education has appeared to be one tactical choice for the Islamists when recent years have witnessed the diminution, demobilization, and domestification of Islamist forces in Indonesia. Keeping pace with the government’s campaign against terrors, the room for the militant Islamist groups to manoeuvre has narrowed. Secret cells, which are believed to have links with JI and continue to perpetrate terrors and are scattered across Indonesian provinces, have been discovered one by one. In response to this situation, the Islamist groups changed their strategy of activism toward Islamization from below, emphasizing the need for da’wa and education as the first step towards the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a. By educating talented students in the integrated Islamic schools, they prepare a younger generation of Muslim that will be the key for the continuing process of Islamization.

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