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Japan’s New Security Imperative: The Function of Globalization

Bhubhindar Singh and Philip Shetler-Jones

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
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ABSTRACT

Japan has steadily extended its military reach from a domestic zone of defence against territorial invasion in the late 1950s, through a regional security policy in the late 1970s, to what has now become a globally scaled military role. This re-expansion is perceived by some as evidence of revived militaristic ambitions and by others as subservience to the U.S. global strategy. However, taking the cue from Japan’s 2004 National Defence Programme Guideline (New Taikō), this paper assesses the role globalization has played in this territorial expansion. The impact of globalization is evident in the double expansion of Japan’s national security conception in geographical terms and SDF roles in global security. These “expansions” are studied through two key elements of globalization—the deterritorialization of complex relations of interdependence between states (security globality) and the inter-penetrating nature of these relations blur the boundary between foreign and domestic spaces (intermestic space).

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Japan’s New Security Imperative: The Function of Globalization

Introduction

It is widely recognized that the role Japan’s Self Defence Forces (SDF) has come to play in Japan’s national security policy since the end of the Cold War has expanded in terms of mission tasks, geographical reach and its importance relative to other parts of Japan’s national security apparatus (Hughes, 2004; Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007; Hughes and Krauss, 2007). This expansion has been crowned with an overt change of emphasis represented by the abandonment of the minimum territorial defence concept in favour of a concept of global security expressed in the 2004 National Defence Programme Guideline (NDPG or Bōei Keikaku Taikō, hereafter Taikō).

Since the same post-Cold War period saw a quickening in the pace of globalization, it would seem that the de-territorialization of Japan’s national security concept just happened to coincide with this latest surge of globalization. But this is not so if you track the logic presented in the 2004 Taikō, which references globalization and deepening interdependence as the background against which “new threats and diverse situations” are emerging to menace Japan. In the narrative of the 2004 Taikō as well as its pre-cursor “Araki Commission report”,¹ the 9/11 attacks are cast as symbolizing the way globalization enables threats emerging far away to speedily cross distances and borders and arrive in Japan. It includes a reminder of Japan’s reliance on far-flung supply lines for foodstuffs, energy and foreign markets, underlining globalization’s role in shaping the security environment. These ideas continue to be used (and not only in Japan) to argue that old territorially-bounded concepts of national defence should give way to a more ambitious, proactive (even preventive) global security concept. The choice of 9/11 and “global terror” as a symbol of change in the overall security environment also opens opportunities for the military to claim a larger role in national security policy.

Academic accounts of this re-inflation of Japan’s security concept and military capacity overwhelmingly fall back on the three narratives that dominated explanations of Japan’s international relations and defence policies over the post-war period. The

¹The 18 October 2004 report of the Council on Security and Defence Capabilities entitled “Japan’s visions for Future Security and Defence Capabilities” (also known after its chairman as the Araki report).
first is external pressure or *gaiatsu*, specifically encouragement from the United States to be a more active ally in regional and international security affairs (Inoguchi and Jain, 2000). The second is pressure from a domestic lobby of what has been termed “normal nationalists” who have sought to overturn restrictions on Japan’s military-strategic freedom of movement, which they see as the legacy of defeat and occupation (Samuels, 2007). The third variable is the changing East-Asian security environment since the mid-1990s—specifically a series of belligerent gestures by North Korea and rising Chinese military capability (Pyle, 2007; Green, 2003). What is neglected by these conventional narratives is the possibility that an over-arching structural factor, represented by the rise of interdependence from the 1970s and the post-Cold War surge of globalization, also influenced the shift to a new national security concept. This factor is not only because it is mentioned in the 2004 *Taikō*, but has also entered the security discourse all over the world.

This paper explores theoretical and empirical connections between the globalization surge and the geographical and military expansion in Japan’s national security concept. This is approached in three stages: first, a general investigation of the relationship of globalization and national security from a theoretical perspective. The second section describes how Japan contained the role of its military with a narrow conception of national security focused on territorial defence, and how this concept started to dilate, both qualitatively and geographically in the late Cold War period. The third section looks at how the double expansion took place, and evaluates the extent of globalization’s role. This section concentrates on two aspects of globalization’s effect: the emergence of a globalized concept of national security in Japanese national security discourse, and Japan’s adaptation to “intermestic” security challenges.

**Globalization and National Security**

For the purposes of this paper, globalization is defined as the increasingly free flow of materials, images, ideas, people and human interactions on a planetary scale enabled by the gradual elimination of obstacles (distance, borders), through technology in the service of economic or political interests. Movement towards these conditions is neither new nor complete, but the present rate and stage of progress has made relations of interdependence more widespread as well as deeper, and fostered the
growth of a complex system of contingencies (Dillon, 2005). The effects of globalization were already studied within the study of International Relations from the 1970s focusing on the theme of interdependence (Nye and Keohane, 1977), and were realized in the oil shocks and currency crises of that decade. The elimination of East-West divisions with the end of the Cold War made the economic interdependence of the late 1970s and 1980s a near universal condition—catalyzing the process that came to be called globalization. The process accelerated with the end of the Cold War causing confusion between these two processes (Cha, 2000; Bilgin and Morton, 2007: 13).

However, this changed towards the end of the 1990s. The influence of globalization was increasingly seen as distinct from that of the “post-Cold War”. As a result, a number of phenomena initially attributed to the end of the Cold War such as fourth-generation war, the transformation of war (Lind et al., 1989; Van Creveld, 1991), the rise of non-state actors and “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999), were being identified and evaluated in the context of globalization (Guéhenno, 1999; Cha, 2000).2 A clear turning point arrived when the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack was interpreted mainly in the context of globalization (Rasmussen, 2002). The subsequent upholding of 9/11 as the dominant icon of globalization’s effects on security demonstrated that the latter had achieved ascendancy over the “post-Cold War” security paradigm (Campbell, 2002; Keohane, 2002; Rasmussen, 2002: 331; Devetak and Hughes, 2008). Japan’s 2004 revision of its Taikō reflects the same shift from post-Cold War reference points to those of “global terror”, as will be discussed below.

According to the present body of literature, globalization has affected security in the following areas: concepts, system, actors, practice and procurement.

**Concepts:** Globalization has affected the realist and constructivist schools that dominate IR and security studies. Globalization poses a challenge to “realist caution” by making the concepts of barriers and distance obsolete in the calculation of the national interest and security (Keohane, 2002: 32–33). Globalization’s effects on cultural flows and migration create social effects in the constitution of identity—a core constructivist concern. The effects of globalization have also contributed to the

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2 This development was evident in Japanese security debates as well. See the “Challenge 2001” and Commission on Security and Defence Capabilities, 1994 (also known as the Higuchi Report) reports.
broadening of the concept of security since the 1980s as globalization has facilitated the spread of international terrorism, transnational crime, WMD proliferation, illegal immigration, pandemics and pollution, strengthening the argument that non-state transnational threats deserve as much, if not more, attention than conventional inter-state military threats.

System: Globalization has altered the international system within which states pursue national security. The belief that the largest national economies are more interdependent through a network of trade, commerce, finance and global supply chaining is not limited to a few “hyper globalizers” (Friedman, 2006; Wolf, 2004). The implication of this (conflict threatening this network itself threatens fundamental national interests) can be seen as a variant of the democratic peace theory—the idea that economies are so interdependent that they cannot afford to go to war with one another. But while this interdependent system may represent a plus for a peaceful inter-state security (Waltz, 1979: 143), it also offers non-state actors (“asymetrically” unencumbered by such a vulnerable flank) a clear advantage (see Robb, 2007).

Actors: Globalization’s effects on actors can be seen in two related areas: the weakening of the state’s capacity to exercise sovereignty, and the proliferation and empowerment of trans- or inter-national non-state actors, the range of which is spread along the axes of governmental/non-governmental, licit/illicit, politically/economically motivated. Al-Qaeda has become the iconic non-state actor empowered by the benefits globalization offers for communications, recruitment and camouflage. Trans-border nationalist movements can also realize logistical and operational benefits from money transfer networks and porous borders. Japan’s attempts to control remittances and other links between its Korean population and the Pyongyang regime shows how even in relatively isolated countries, the infrastructures of globalization enable diasporas to become more involved in international disputes (Lind, 1997). Guéhennno pointed out that while a positive view of the nation-state drove the earlier phase of global integration and disintegration (before 1914), the inter-penetration that characterizes contemporary globalization makes it more difficult for the state to consolidate power and exposes its weaknesses (Guéhennno, 1999: 6–7). The capacity of globalization to challenge the state was also the central focus for Hughes’ studies of what he termed the “globalization-security nexus”
(2001)—specifically its ability to exploit potential divisibility between the security interests of sovereign states and their citizens. The weakening of borders (Rosenau, 2003: 251–252; Cha, 2000: 392) and the shifting of power “up” to inter-state institutions and “sideways” to NGOs also features in this category of “state weakening” that have led some to predict the end of the nation state (Guéhenno, 1995; Ohmae, 1996).

**Practice**: The transnational nature of newly perceived threats (such as organized crime, proliferation and terrorism) raises the demand for collective security operations, as seen in the extent to which United Nations (UN) peacekeeping as well as multi-national coalition operations account for the greater proportion of military operations (Smith, 2006). Threats especially from transnational actors raise the requirement for more coordination between security actors hitherto constituted according to categories of “domestic” (police) and “international” (military). They may also in part account for increased reliance on paramilitary or Special Forces (SF) whose training, equipment and legal framework (such as disguise by “unmarked” vehicles or civilian clothing for clandestine or covert operations) make them more effective at engaging threats in intermestic space.

**Procurement**: This is in reference to the procurement of material and human resources for security—one of the most critical components of strategy. National champions in defence production are largely a thing of the past. Big defence companies have not only dispersed in terms of ownership through privatization, their production facilities have also been *physically* relocated, making the nationalizations seen in the 1930s impossible. Even the largest corporations rely, to a significant extent, on a de-territorialized supply chain, cross-licensing and R&D partnerships to maintain their position at the cutting edge of new weapons development (Brooks, 2005). The pressures of competing in this environment have been keenly felt in Japan, where national participation in joint R&D and international marketing is restricted by principles on arms exports (Kimura and Matsuoka, 1999).

Not all of the ideas listed above bear on the military and geographical expansion of the security concept. This section concludes by investigating the implications of the two main concepts that do—the effects on security arising from de-territorialization and complex relations of transnational interdependence (security
globality), and second, challenges from the blurring of foreign and domestic spaces (intermestic space).

**Security Globality**

The globality in “security globality” is borrowed from Ulrich Beck’s definition of the global social structure. It is distinct from globalization, which Beck defined as the process that transcends previous—national—structures in favour of new global structures (Rasmussen’s summary of Beck, 2002: 233). The idea of security globality goes beyond the notion that our national security is merely more interdependent, even beyond the idea that globalization means borders and distance have diminished significance as a check on the movement of threats; it is an assertion that our national security has been rendered by globalization into a globally scaled *indivisible* whole. This is not a new idea as Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” presents a version of it as far back as 1795 (section I, para. 5). However, it has become a recurring theme in the rhetoric of political leaders, not to mention many journalistic and some scholarly works.

This contemporary view of security globality has evolved through three stages. The oil shocks of the 1970s reminded economies closely tied to world trade of the fragility of their economic interdependence. Then, after the Cold War, the “West” understood its “victory” over the Soviet bloc in terms of the realization of an ideological globality of values, marking “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). UN-mandated operations boomed and Japan joined in, sending the SDF overseas for the first time. The famines, slaughter and despotism that cast doubt on the new world order were met with “humanitarian interventions”. The projects of the new global morality strained the old standards for disregarding sovereign independence, and it was sometimes a stretch to pass off localized misery as a “threat to international peace and security”. Sceptical members of the Security Council might indulgently (and selectively) look the other way, but would not amend the letter of this law. The progress of this moral globality took institutional forms such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the “responsibility to protect” (R2P).

Towards the end of the 1990s, the side effects of “failed states”—organized crime, refugees, drugs—were presented as a pragmatic supplement to the moral
imperative (Kaldor, 1999). The logic ran that “We have to help these poor people or something nasty will seep out”. Before taking the helm at Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN, Guéhenno described these situations as “black holes” (1999: 10). This pre-figured the present stage, which is characterized by the framing of 9/11 as a symbol of globalization’s “dark side”.

In the third phase after 9/11, state failure, weak governance and “ungoverned spaces” were implicated in the generation of a different problem: underdevelopment, backwardness and frustration were the “recruiting sergeant” of the terrorist. “Ungoverned space” provided “safe havens” for their training and organization or a base from which to launch attacks on the network of the world economy. The architectures of globalization provided the medium by which these threats would be transmitted across borders and distances from the black holes to our streets. By hosting Osama Bin Laden, Afghanistan’s Taliban became the model for universal application. What was first (in the 1970s) an economic interdependence became (in the West’s misplaced post-Cold War triumphalism) a moral globality, and finally (after the affront of 9/11) was “securitized” to create the “security globality”.

Despite its many subscribers, this view of the security globality is a gross exaggeration, if not an outright myth, but one with certain advantages. First, it allows states to present their security policy outside of the political context that, since it is often of a murkier ethical colouring, could distract the audience’s eye from the clear lines of the moral mission. Transnational terrorist groups do not strike out in every direction at random. Most of the countries Al-Qaeda has not attacked to date are unlikely to suffer their own 9/11 for the simple reason that they have little or no political interest in or influence over the things that Bin Laden and his affiliates care about. But rather than addressing the specific grievances that mobilize and draw support to Al-Qaeda, governments can target rhetorical abstractions (“the war on

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3 It is an exaggeration to say that “chaos” or misery anywhere automatically affects our security everywhere. It may be better for the long suffering people of Darfur if it were not so, but theirs is an example of the many sad cases that have practically no adverse effect on societies far away. For every Somalia, where pirates menace world trade, there are several Darfurs or DRCs, where human misery and anarchy drag on, inflicting no more than a moral damage to the notion of international community. In fact, cases like the Congo suggest that far from catalyzing their conclusion, connections to the outside world can make it more likely that they receive the kind of interest and resources that sustain them.
terror”), and entrepreneurial pundits can project the notion that war will be fought against politically neutral enemies like “disconnectedness” (Barnett, 2004: 94).

Second, the notion of a “security globality” camouflages efforts to extend power and values. Before 9/11, Duffield pointed out how the “merging of development and security” was taking place on the logic that “the modalities of under-development have become dangerous and destabilizing” (Duffield, 2001: 16). Later, he suggested that the idea of human security has functioned as “a moral technology through which effective states are able to project and strategize power” (2005: 4). Former U.K. Prime Minister Blair expressed the global logic linking morality and security thus: “Globalization begets interdependence. Interdependence begets the necessity of a common value system to make it work. Idealism becomes realpolitik” (Blair, 2006: 34). Just as fears of territorial incontinence (WMD proliferation) were used to link 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq, thus the bogey man of “global terror” moved ideas about transnational insecurity and international intervention from the optional realm of humanitarian obligation (expressed in the “responsibility to protect”), to the realist realm of necessity and even self-defence. At its furthest extent, the logic of the security globality ends in what Blair called “progressive pre-emption”:

“A few decades ago, we could act when we knew. Now, we have to act on the basis of precaution. We have to act, not react. We have to do so on the basis of prediction, not certainty. Circumstances will often require intervention, usually far beyond our own borders … We must be prepared to think sooner and act quicker in defence of our values” (Blair, 2006: 31, 34).

If the security globality unbinds “defence” from the restrictions of space, this notion of “progressive pre-emption” removes even the restraint of sequence and time.

**Intermestic Space**

Globalization is as much about *inter-penetration* blurring the boundary between foreign and domestic spaces as it is the extension of links between states or nations (Guéhenno, 1999: 7–8; Cha, 2000: 392). Since the 1980s, many governments liberalized economic policies, opening up their markets and societies to the world. This opened their markets and societies to global economic and social forces, the
impact of which was felt more directly by groups and individuals within nations—a process Guéhenno (1999) calls “dis-intermediation”. In the same period, transnational migration has increased due to economic demand, political liberalization and cheaper transport and communications allowing the growth of ethnic diaspora as people move but maintain economic and identity connections to their places of origin.

Globalization has stimulated the growth of transnational networks through technology and migration, but also because dis-intermediation increases demand for material and cultural insulation to cushion the impact of global market forces and cosmopolitan culture. As the post-modern liberal market state system cut back its activity in these areas (patriotic education, social insurance), reliance on “transnational solidarities” (Guéhenno, 1999: 7–8) grew, and individual loyalties realigned. By the mid-1990s, where state capacity compared poorly with that of enterprising (and often formerly state-employed) individuals, the latter took steps to meet people’s needs—legal or otherwise. Transnational organized crime boomed on the basis of its ability to get drugs, people and weapons *inter alia* to market across borders (Glenny, 2008). While Mary Kaldor (1999) revealed the symbiotic relation between such activities and war, globalization gave organized crime not only the opportunity, but also the profit incentive to connect areas of war and peace (Naim, 2005; Saviano, 2007).

State security institutions that are constituted, trained, equipped and legally empowered according to territorial divisions between “foreign” and “domestic” (such as police/army, internal/external intelligence agencies), found themselves wrong-footed by these groups. This started to change with more police in peacekeeping, and more paramilitary tactics and equipment in the police, as well as efforts to integrate intelligence in cross-border security functions. Intermestic space is also the home of other, non-human threats like transnational pollution and epidemics. The difficulty of adapting state institutions to manage these inside-out menaces has led some to signal “the end of foreign policy” (Hain, 2001).

**Territorial Conception of Japan’s National Security**

The rest of the paper examines the impact of globalization on Japan’s changing national security concept. It begins with an account of Japan’s territorial conception
of security in the Cold War period. As this section will show, the narrow conception prevailed in the face of repeated challenges.

Establishment

Japan’s Cold War security policy was based on Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s vision of Japan as a merchant nation (shōnin kokka), that concentrated all efforts on economic resuscitation and development, and kept a low politico-security profile. To revive its economy from the devastation of war, Japan expanded its economic interests globally to access resources and markets. While Japan became increasingly interdependent with the international environment in economic and financial matters (Edström, 1999: 162), a similar pattern in Japan’s security policy did not follow. Japan pursued a minimalist security policy that was based on a narrow conception of national security.

The security policymaking elite separated Japan’s national security (in military terms) from the larger regional and international security environment. This detachment could be explained by the way Japan’s leadership perceived the international environment outside Japan’s national borders. Yoshida was of the view that the international security environment was a “given”, which Japan could not affect (Edström, 1999: 11). Japan’s interaction with the international environment occurred mainly through economic means pursuing a strategy that, according to Hellman (1977), did not form a linkage between its economic interests and national military capabilities (p. 326). Their focus was on mitigating the impact of the “threat-based” international environment at the national level, namely through strengthening its national defence capabilities and relying on the United States for a security guarantee against external threats (Hellmann, 1977: 329). Whilst the “maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” was stated in the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed in 1960, this responsibility was excluded in the way Japan’s security policy was exercised, including the SDF’s mandate.

This territorial conception of national security was institutionalized in the official documents that outlined Japan’s postwar defence policy. The 1957 “Basic Policy on National Defence” was Japan’s first clear post-war statement of a military
role in a national security and defence policy. Based on a territorially circumscribed notion of home defence, the objective of Japan’s defence policy was to resist an invasion pending the arrival of assistance of the United States and/or UN forces. Such an approach was further reinforced in the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) or Taikō, issued on 29 October 1976. This was the first policy document to describe Japan’s defence doctrine in detail and to present it as the basis for the determination of the SDF force structure. The 1976 Taikō argued for a focus on self-defence, hence the narrow definition of national security, and a continued reliance on the United States for wider security guarantees (Nishihara, 1983/84: 180–181; Kawasaki, 2001: 72–73).

This narrow conception of national security was also embedded in legislation that created the SDF in 1954. Both the pacifists and conservatives politicians interpreted Article 9 in such a way that the SDF was permitted to use the minimum level of force necessary for individual self-defence, but no more. This interpretation determined that collective self-defence efforts and overseas troop deployment would be forbidden on the ground that they exceeded this minimum (Oros, 2008: 46; Samuels, 2007: 45–49). This interpretation overshadowed the legal provisions accrued to Japan’s membership in the UN Charter, namely Article 51 that permits all member states to carry out both individual and collective self-defence activities.

The Japanese government defined that the purpose of the SDF is to repel a “limited and small-scale aggression” against Japan’s national territorial integrity. The

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4 The BPND states that the Japanese government will (i) support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation; (ii) promote the public welfare and foster the people’s love for their country; (iii) develop an effective defence capability with due regard for the nation’s resources and the prevailing domestic situation; and (iv) emphasize Japan’s security arrangements with the United States pending more effective functioning of the United Nations (Maeda, 2004: 113–114). The BPND is available at http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp02.html, accessed 13 November 2007.

5 Also see the first four defence build-up plans during the period of 1957–1976 divided into the following four five-year defence plans: (i) 1958–1960; (ii) 1962–1966; (iii) 1967–1971; and (iv) 1972–1976.

6 For the different interpretations of the Article 9 and its related concepts such as war potential, self-defence, legality of the SDF, collective self-defence, and collective security, see Samuels (2007: 45–49).

7 Japan became a member of the United Nations in 1956. As a member, it was obligated by the UN Charter to exercise the use-of-force option against potential aggressors. However, the separation of politics and economics and its aversion to traditional military roles denied Japan this obligation. When Japan declared that it would comply with all obligations of the United Nations, it emphasized “by all means at its disposal” clearly making it clear that it would not fulfil all the obligatory demands that went beyond its constitutional revision. Japan passed a Diet resolution that banned overseas deployment of the SDF (See Pan, 2005).
Upper House passed a resolution banning overseas despatch of Japanese troops and participation in collective security initiatives. As a result, the Japanese military focused on the limited function of defending Japan’s borders, relying on the U.S. military to safeguard Japan’s overseas interests. One consequence of these restrictions was that the ASDF could possess fighter planes but not bombers or mid-air refuelling capabilities. This prevented the fighter plans from extending their military reach outside of Japan and perhaps attacking a potential enemy’s land (Cooney, 2007: 24–25).

Hence, Japan’s post-war security policy determined the scope of the SDF’s role according to the territorial principle, as well as using this same spatial principle for delineating the SDF role from that of its U.S. ally, with the latter taking responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability of the regional and international security environment. This strategy came to be known critically as “one-country pacifism”, which placed constraints on the use of the military as a legitimate instrument of state policy (Hook, 1996). This relationship of Japan with the international environment promoted by Yoshida’s strategy became entrenched in Japanese security policy discourse during the course of the Cold War (Edström, 1999: 19).

Challenges

This strategy of a narrow security conception and Japan’s aversion to taking part ownership of the military affairs in the regional and international security environment faced successive waves of challenges over the course of the Cold War period starting from the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969.8 One of

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8 There were similar examples prior to this period and two of them deserve mention here. The first was America’s proposal for a regional defence in Asia similar to NATO in Europe. When the Cold War emerged in 1950, the United States considered building a regional defence alliance comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and perhaps even Indonesia. Japan’s participation would have involved rearmament efforts and joint responsibility to protect the interests of the regional defence alliance, namely to stop the spread of communism, based on the concept of collective security. Yoshida rejected this proposal and the American demands of rearmament. He pursued to define Japan’s national purpose in narrow terms based on the narrow definition of national security (Pyle, 2004: 40). The second example was the Mitsuya Kenkyu, which brought together defence planners from Japan and the United States to discuss scenarios related to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. It involved a simulation including a procedure for a wartime emergency legislation. However, this study was suspended when it was leaked to the public leading to the cessation of such debates (Green and Murata, 1998: 5; Kurashina, 2005: 141–142).
the main features of this Doctrine was that it urged America’s allies to expand their responsibility in the contribution to defend the “free world” against communism. This, along with enhanced trade frictions with the United States (originating in the 1950s) triggered relentless American pressure on Japan to balance its one-sided economic policy by strengthening its national defence and expanding its responsibility in terms of regional security (Hellman, 1977: 327). It was in this context that the Nixon-Sato communiqué was signed in November 1969. This extended Japan’s narrow security definition as the communiqué incorporated South Korea and Taiwan as essential factors to Japan’s security. Togo (2005) wrote that this represented “a clear convergence of views [between Japan and the United States] … needed … so that any possible mobilization of forces from Okinawa would be conducted based on common recognition of the developing situation” (p. 67. Parenthesis added).9

The foundation of Japan’s security policy was also challenged by the 1973 oil crisis that quadrupled world oil prices. For the first time, Japan had to incorporate the political dimension into its economic policies towards the oil-producing states (Hellmann, 1977: 327). Both pressures from the United States and events in the international environment, such as the oil crisis, resulted in a debate within Japan to re-orient its security policy. The resultant effect was that the Japanese leadership began to appreciate how security issues, such as events in the Middle East, have a direct impact on Japan’s national security vulnerability. In terms of security policy, the debate led to the introduction of the comprehensive security concept as a core feature of Japan’s external security policy (Chapman, Drifte and Gow, 1983), a marked increase in Japan’s defence expenditures, the use of an economics-based foreign policy defined by aid diplomacy, and the strengthening of an UN-centred diplomacy.

The security debate within Japan also led to attempts that hinted at SDF’s integration into the U.S. East Asian strategy from the late 1970s onwards. The main development was the signing and adoption between Japan and the United States of the Guidelines for Defence Cooperation in November 1978. The declared purpose of

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9 As part of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States re-introduced the collective security mechanism to defend Asia against communism (Pyle, 2004: 49). Despite U.S. pressure, Japan refused participation—reinforcing the narrow national security definition.
this document was to expand Japan’s military participation in the alliance from operations confined to the home islands to operations designed for the provision of “peace and stability throughout East Asia”. It laid the foundation for greater cooperation between the United States and Japanese militaries in the form of joint studies on sea-lines of communication, joint operations, and inculcating greater interoperability between the two militaries. This set the stage for more far-reaching commitments from Japan, such as Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō’s announcement in 1981 that Japan would accept responsibility for patrolling sea-lines of communication up to 1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese coasts (Lind, 2004: 113–114).

Of all the Japanese prime ministers in the Cold War period, Nakasone probably made the boldest attempts to widen Japan’s concept of national security and implement a more active security policy. He was of the view that Japan’s “security was indivisible” from the regional and international security environment (Pyle, 2007: 273). In the preparation of the Fourth Defence Buildup Plan (for fiscal 1972–1976) during his time as chief of the JDA, Nakasone attempted to fundamentally review Japan’s BPND. Not only did he intend to make Japan more self-reliant in deterring a foreign invasion alongside the United States, Nakasone proposed that Japan take control of the air and sea command in an event of an invasion to exercise the right of self-defence and engage the enemy in international air space and on the high seas (Murakami, 2004: 97). Due to the immense opposition, both from within and outside of Japan, and the changing strategic situation around Japan, this policy proposal was abandoned (see ibid., pp. 97–98). However, this point serves as an initial sign of the expansion of Japan’s national security concept beyond its national borders.

Nakasone resurrected his proposal to expand Japan’s national security during his time as Japan’s prime minister in the 1980s (Maeda, 2004: 114–115). This time he was successful in incorporating his proposals in the fifth five-year defence plan that was approved by the National Defence Council and the cabinet (also known as the Mid-Term Defence Programme Estimate for 1986–1990). According to Maeda (2004), “The plan represents the first official document sanctioning a shift from a policy oriented to defence of the Japanese archipelago to an outward-looking policy
oriented to deterrence of the Soviet threat” (Maeda, 2004: 113). Working on the principle that Japan’s “security was indivisible” from the United States, Nakasone constructed not only a closer but a more global bilateral relationship between the two countries (Nishihara, 1983/84: 184; Togo, 2005: 75). Based on this concept, he declared support for the United States’ efforts (under the Reagan administration) to confront the Soviets head-on (Togo, 2005: 74). During a G-7 meeting in Williamsburg in May 1983, Nakasone announced that the Soviet installation of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) SS-20 in Europe and Asia posed a serious threat and declared support for U.S. action for their removal. This declaration had three implications: it resulted in Japan’s clear alignment with the West (Pyle, 2007: 273); it was an indication of where Japan stood in relation to a security issue of global magnitude (Togo, 2005: 75); and raised the possibility that Japan could take part in future collective arrangements (Nishihara, 1983/84: 184).

Resistance

Nevertheless, these attempts that hinted at the functional and geographical expansion of Japan’s security role only led to cosmetic changes to Japanese security policy. These attempts had little military impact on Japan’s narrow conception of national security and taking active responsibility of the regional and international security affairs. The developments in Japanese security policy, described above, did not lead to a revision of Japan’s security policy principles. Japan’s main contribution to international affairs remained centred on economics, and not in the area of military-strategic affairs, and the SDF continued to play a subsidiary role to the U.S. military. This security policy stance remained unchanged even when Japanese prime ministers, especially from Ikeda onwards, repeatedly voiced in public and policy statements that Japan had to adapt to the international security environment and promote a strategy that would affect the international environment (Edström, 1999: 49–50). The “convergence of views” as represented by the Nixon-Sato communiqué, described in the previous section, did not expand Japan’s national security conception. According to Hellman (1977), the strategic attachment of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan to Japan’s national security was not a carefully calculated strategic policy, and instead,

10 Maeda (2004) makes the argument that while the first four plans referred to the BPND, the fifth one did not—suggesting a clear “revamping” in Japanese defence policy (pp. 114–115). The main feature of the fifth plan was the clear pronouncement of the Soviet threat in the Pacific, suggesting that Japan’s military power should extend over the northwest Pacific region (ibid., 116).
was in response to U.S. pressure and in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty (fn, 16: 329).

Article 6 of the 1978 Japan-U.S. defence guidelines and Prime Minister Suzuki’s proposal, as discussed above, did not expand either the role of Japan’s military or its concept of national security. According to Berger (1996), the signing of the 1978 guidelines came during the period of détente in the Cold War. This reflected the softening of the bipolar rivalry that was triggered by the declaration of intent of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam in May 1969, the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreements on SALT 1 and ABM Treaty in May 1972, the establishment of diplomatic relations by the United States (and Japan) with China in 1972; and the improvement of Japan-Soviet relations, which led to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Moscow in October 1973. As détente reduced Japanese fears of entanglement in the U.S. Cold War struggle, Japan officially supported the new security roles within the U.S.-Japan security relationship but not in terms of actual policy (Berger, 1996: 339).11

The signing of the 1978 defence guidelines was also promoted by Japan’s domestic considerations. According to Green and Murata (1998), the bilateral defence guidelines were passed to preclude a breakdown of the consensus within the LDP on defence issues, which was threatened by the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 and keeping a credible U.S. defence commitment to Japan (p. 2). The Article 6 contingencies were included in the 1978 defence guidelines as a consequence of U.S. pressure; namely the United States pushing Japan on two points (related to Article 6 contingencies) that would have expanded Japan’s national security. The first was that the United States wanted Japan to adopt a larger operational role to assist the United States outside of the main purpose to defend Japan, and the second point was to include a reference to the Korean Peninsula, a precedent set by the Nixon-Sato communiqué signed in 1969. Japan resisted on both points (Green and Murata, 1998:

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11 Togo (2005), however, contends that détente ended in 1976 when socialist regimes emerged in Indochina (after the fall of Saigon) and the Soviet Union expanded its activities in Indochina and Africa. This coincided with the cooling off of Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union following the conclusion of Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978 (p. 71). Whether it was détente that best described the international environment or not, in reality, Japan’s military-strategic role did not expand as stipulated in the 1978 defence guidelines.
4) suggesting the continued application of the narrow conception of national security and aversion to assuming a larger security role in regional and international security.12

Similarly, Japan’s definition of national security did not expand with Prime Minister Suzuki’s proposal to accept responsibility for patrolling sea-lines of communication up to 1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese coasts. Berger (1996) argued that Japan’s SDF had long planned to patrol Japan’s sea-lines of communication in order to assure the continued flow of oil and other vital raw materials and his announcement was more related to domestic political intrigues than to geo-strategic exigencies (pp. 350–351). As Arase (2007) further pointed out, Prime Minister Suzuki failed to provide a clear commitment “to assist U.S. forces in anything but the defence of Japan” (p. 565). Bold though they might have been, Nakasone’s attempts in the 1980s were futile in the sense that they remained at the rhetorical level without altering the course of Japanese security policy. He faced adverse pressure from the Yoshida followers and the bureaucracy—advocates of the narrow conception of national security for Japan.

The implication of Japan’s Cold War strategy, discussed above, was the adverse imbalance in its involvement in the economic versus military-strategic spheres in the international environment during the post-war years. All governments in the Cold War period defined Japan’s security policy based on this narrow conception of national security and shunned military-strategic responsibilities that came with being an economic power. Japan did expand its concept of national security, but only in economic terms through its contribution of non-military international public goods like aid and debt relief in the Cold War struggle (Pharr, 1993). The various efforts to expand the operational range of the SDF were resisted by budgetary and politically principled objections. In spite of rising expenditure and capacity through the 1970s and 1980s, the mission of Japan’s military was held behind the line that divided “defence” from “security” according to a spatial and territorial logic that was to prove surprisingly durable.

12 Following the adoption of the defence guidelines, the United States wanted Japan to undertake studies for both the defence of Japan against contingencies (Article 5) and contingencies in the Far East (Article 6). However, Japan was interested exclusively in the former rather than the latter. While the study on Article 6 contingencies was officially initiated in January 1982, the progress was limited on the Japanese side for legal restrictions (Green and Murata, 1998: 5–6).
Globalization of Japan’s National Security

Japan’s security policy was transformed in the post-Cold War period by two expansionary trends—first, the SDF mission was expanded from territorial defence to a wider role within a new concept of national security; second, that new concept of security itself represented an expansion in spatial and functional terms. The rest of the section examines this transformation in terms of the aspects of globalization’s effect on security described above: the advent of the security globality and the imperative of securing intermestic space.

Security Globality

The manifestation of the security globality in Japan’s security policy is described in the following sequence: (i) Emergence: from Japan’s adjustment to economic interdependence in the late 1970s until the flowering of the “international contribution” era around 1994; (ii) Exchange: from the mid-1990s until around 2004, when Japan expanded its support to the U.S. global strategic project in exchange for contributions to overcoming local security problems; (iii) Institutionalization: after 2001 the indivisibility of national and international security is embedded as a fundamental principle of Japan’s security policy.

Emergence:

Japan shared in the revival of interest in themes of common security and “interdependence” that surfaced in the wake of American decline in the late 1970s. Even before Europe produced the Brandt, Palme and Brundtland reports, 13 Japan’s Prime Minister Óhira unveiled the concept of “comprehensive security” in 1979. Then in the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone began to question the line dividing Japan’s national security from wider issues in the realm of “international security”. Some Japanese officials and scholars now insist that Japan’s defence build-up in the 1980s was only presented as a territorial defence effort in order to disguise its key role in the

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13 The Brandt (1980), Palme (1982) and Brundtland (1987) report that “all call for a re-conceptualization of security in the light of inter-dependence between states in the international system and between the rich North and the developing countries”. Brandt looked at North/South wealth disparity and impact of world economic system on this inequality; Palme nuclear arms race and its ramifications on the poor South; and Brundtland focused on the environmental and development sustainability models (McSweeney, 1999: 51).
(global) strategy of containing Communism. The geographical accident that placed Japan in an ideal position to block the USSR’s far eastern “Bastion” strategy allowed it to present such operations (to anti-militarist audiences) as defence against the threat of Soviet invasion. This points to two conclusions: first, that Japan’s global security role pre-dated the end of the Cold War; and second, that the distinction between simple territorial defence and a global security role remained a meaningful one in the context of Japanese politics. However, in the early 1990s several events started the process that was first to blur this distinction.

The first of these events was the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis. Rare is the account of Japan’s recent diplomatic history that does not mention the “shock”, “trauma” or “humiliation” felt in Japan when Kuwait and the world failed to register much appreciation for Japan’s cash contribution to the 1991 Gulf War. This shock prompted the Japanese security policymaking elite to think beyond the defence of its own territory (Mochizuki, 1997: 57), and provided momentum for the 1992 “International Peace Cooperation Law” (IPCL) that gave the SDF its first international mission—participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). It is notable that, with the possible exception of the Golan Heights operation, none of the PKOs in which the SDF took part could be seen as addressing a threat to Japan’s security. A more important feature of PKO was its effect on Japan’s security culture in that it overturned the post-war assumption that overseas military despatch necessarily implies aggression and/or threat to “civilian control”. Looking back over opinion polls in the 1990s, the expectation that PKO participation would improve the standing of the SDF in the eyes of public opinion seems to have been broadly satisfied.

Japan’s PKO participation reflected a wider renewal of optimism in the early 1990s regarding the effectiveness of international organizations within the “new world order” that would replace the collapsing Cold War framework, represented by Boutros Ghali’s 1992 “Agenda for Peace” and the boom in UNPKO. The “Higuchi

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14 Interviews with GRIPS Professor Michishita Narushige and retired GSDF Major General (anonymous) April 2009.
15 In the sense that Arab-Israeli peace meets Japan’s interest of a reliable flow of Middle East oil.
16 Two government (Prime Minister’s Office) surveys conducted in 1991 and 1994 show the increase in public’s support for SDF’s participation in UNPKOs. Between 1991 and 1994, the percentage for those who supported SDF’s participation in UNPKOs increased from 46 per cent to 48.8 per cent, while the figure for opposition decreased from 37.9 per cent to 30.9 per cent (Washio, 1994-95).
report”, commissioned in 1994 by Prime Minister Hosokawa “with a view to reviewing the National Defense Programme Outline” reflected this same spirit. It included failed states and arms proliferation as dangers likely to appear in the new security environment:

“… with nations of the world becoming increasingly interdependent because of the economic and technological conditions of the modern society, even localized conflicts are likely to affect the entire international community. In particular, the Japanese economy is built on close relations with various parts of the world, including heavy dependence on Middle East oil. Therefore, the nation’s security concerns are truly worldwide …” (Higuchi Report, 1994).

The Higuchi report even listed “promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale” first in the list of three elements of a “comprehensive and coherent security policy”, before “enhancement of the functions of the Japan-U.S. security relationship” and (third) “possession of a highly reliable and efficient defence capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability”. In retrospect, this looks like the highpoint of Japan’s enthusiasm for PKO and other forms of “international contribution”. It was not to last. The perceived “drift” in the U.S.-Japan security relationship was soon to be arrested in light of events closer to home.

In summary, while the notion of the “security globality” was instrumental in dispensing with the SDF’s territorial restriction, Japan’s contribution to “international peace and security” was presented less in the context of national security than in terms of its value for Japan’s reputation.

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17 The “Advisory group on Defence issues” prepared a report entitled “The modality of the security and defence capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century”, which was known after the name of its chair, Higuchi Hirotaro.
18 The report stated “… there are emerging signs that a collective capacity to deal with conflicts will be developed through the cooperation of the United States and other major nations under the United Nations and other international regimes. These signs indicate a new direction” and later “There is no doubt that the United Nations is beginning to move in the direction of a United Nations as it should be”.
19 In February 1995, the U.S. Department of Defence published “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region”, sometimes referred to as the Nye Report.
20 The Higuchi report speculated that “giving the SDF opportunities to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and other international activities will greatly help, internationally, to broaden the international perspective of the SDF and defence authorities and enhance the public understanding of
Exchange:

For the decade between the North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1993/4 up to the 2004 Taikō, the globalization of Japan’s security policy can be understood in the form of an exchange. Japan determined deeper alliance cooperation as the best way to face the resurgence of local threats to the extent that it was prepared to pay the price of contributing more substantial support to U.S. global strategic projects. What began with series of crises in Northeast Asia would end (post-9/11) with the SDF in the Indian Ocean and Iraq.

The 1993/4 North Korean Nuclear Crisis drew attention away from Higuchi’s international contributions towards more proximate and directly threatening features of the post-Cold War security landscape. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, Japan was reminded of the continued value of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Thus, North Korea’s behaviour, particularly during the Taepodong Missile Crisis, forced the Japanese security policymaking elite to incorporate a concept of expanded national defence into Japan’s national security policy. It convinced the Japanese leadership that it would have to perform national defence duties away from its national borders, either individually or in cooperation with the United States, based on an expanded understanding of national security to include the regional and international security environment. 21

Another military crisis that raised the threat level for Japan during this period was the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Although Japan’s response was limited to monitoring the exercises and voicing protests through diplomatic channels, it highlighted the impact that a regional security crisis could have on its national security, and Japan’s inability to act on its own to mitigate it (Singh, 2006: 194–195; Funabashi, 1999: 422–423). This crisis made Taiwan a core feature in Japanese

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21 To strengthen national defence, the Japanese government implemented the following measures: the re-introduction of the pre-emptive strikes option against potential foreign enemy targets as a form of deterrence; Japan’s declaration to commit itself to the U.S.-led Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) project to install a defence shield in East Asia against ballistic missiles from enemy states; and the strengthening of Japan’s air defence capabilities, providing the ASDF with the capability to target perceived threats before they reach Japan’s mainland (Singh, 2006: chapter 7).
security debates and continues to present itself as a major destabilizing factor for Japan today. In a joint security declaration signed in February 2005, the foreign and defence ministers of Japan and the United States declared the peaceful resolution of Taiwan as a shared strategic objective. Related to the Taiwan issue is Japan’s concerns related to China’s economic and military rise during this period. The Sino-Japanese relationship is plagued by the territorial disputes in the East China Sea and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands (Samuels, 2007: 138), maritime incursions (such as the 2004 passage of a Chinese submarine through Japan’s waters) and rising nationalism in both countries. China’s economic rise presents a new factor in calculations of intent and capability, and its double-digit growth in military budgets has funded military modernization that compounds fears regarding its possible power-projection intentions.

Japan’s response to rising perceptions of regional threats can be read in its 1995 revision of the 1976 Taikō. It discussed the role of Japan’s defence capabilities in three areas: national defence, response to large-scale disasters (and various other situations), and in situations in areas surrounding Japan “which have an important influence on national peace and stability” (cited in Soeya, 1998: 212). Contrary to Higuchi’s prioritization of international cooperation over the alliance, the 1995 Taikō identified the latter as the core of Japan’s security strategy and signalled Japan’s willingness to respond to regional situations that have serious implications for Japan’s national security (Ueda, Washio and Koseki, 18 April 1996).

This re-evaluation of the alliance took shape in a joint declaration during the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto summit, which started the process for revising the 1978 defence guidelines for close defence cooperation between the United States and Japanese militaries in 1997. These vivified the SDF’s long-standing but operationally dormant mandate to provide military assistance to the U.S. military, and expanded the scope of such cooperation from the “Far East” to the “Asia-Pacific”. Both parties pledged to undertake studies to study bilateral cooperation in dealing with “situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and stability of Japan” (Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, 1996).
This expansion of Japan’s national security concept took legal form in the May 1999 “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan”. The term “surrounding situations” (shuuten jitai) raised controversy, namely from China, related to how far the geographical coverage extended. Japan and the United States responded to calls for clarification of this phrase by stating that the law had a situational rather than a geographical interpretation. The controversy over “surrounding situations” suggested the continued salience of geographical scope of SDF mission areas. The Japanese policymakers understood that it “strictly limited the area to Japan’s territory and the high seas (and its airspace) surrounding Japan” (Shinoda, 2002) and not envisaging the Indian Ocean to be part of the revised guidelines (Hughes, 2004: 127). However, this issue of “surrounding areas” would arise again in the context of support to the U.S.-led global war on terror.

Long after Japan’s enthusiasm for “international contributions” was diverted towards “situations in areas surrounding Japan”, the notion of the “security globality” would resurface in the wake of 9/11. As “global terror” became the symbol for a new era of security, the idea that globalization permitted threats to cross borders and distance to arrive in Japan was used to mobilize support for SDF’s despatch to aid U.S.-led global counter terrorist operations in 2002.

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22 China was concerned whether the geographical reference of “areas surrounding Japan” could also be applied in the Taiwan Strait issue, which is viewed by China as a domestic issue.

23 There were mixed signals coming from Japan about the inclusion of Taiwan in the geographical scope of the new guidelines. During the on-going review of the 1978 defence arrangements, former LDP Secretary-General Katō Kōichi declared that the defence guidelines focused on emergencies on the Korean Peninsula and excluded the area around Taiwan. However, he was rebuked by both Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku and MOFA. On 17 August 1997, Kajiyama said that the new guidelines would “naturally cover” a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The Japanese government then reiterated that the 1978 defence arrangements with the United States would include handling emergencies in the Taiwan Straits. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yosano Kaoru restated that Japan’s view that new guidelines for U.S.-Japan defence cooperation should not define those areas surrounding Japan, which will be given a response in the event of a crisis. He said, “Emergencies in surrounding areas, under the guidelines, are defined in accordance with the nature of the occurrences, not geographical concepts.” Yosano added, “The definition of the Far East under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will not be changed”, suggesting that the geographical coverage included Taiwan (The Japanese government had always defined the Far East as being north of the Philippines, including Japan and surrounding areas and the Taiwan region). In May 1998, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau at MOFA, Takano Toshiyuki, admitted that the agreement would cover Taiwan. Even former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro said, “It would be wrong to say that Taiwan is not included in the interpretation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty” (Nikkei Weekly, 11 August 1997; Mainichi Daily News, 21 August 1997; Hickey, 2001: 45–46; Funabashi, 1999: 399).
In fact, several aspects of the “security globality” were used to justify SDF deployments to Iraq and the Indian Ocean. First, in distinction to the 1991 Gulf Crisis, the 9/11 attacks were presented as a direct hit on Japan’s national security in terms of the human\(^{24}\) and material damage on Japanese banks, life insurance companies and brokerages that had offices in the twin towers.\(^{25}\) During a ceremony dedicated to all victims of terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Koizumi said, “Many people fell victim to these attacks. The damage was inflicted, of course, on Americans, but also on people throughout the world, including Japanese” (MOFA, 2001. Italics added). In this way, the Japanese government framed the attacks against the United States as attacks on Japan’s national security, and the fight against terrorism as Japan’s own challenge. This represented an “imagined” direct connection between U.S. national security and Japan’s own national security. During the Prime Minister’s New Year Reflections speech in January 2002, he raised 9/11 as one of the two core issues that had major implications for Japan’s national security.\(^{26}\) The link was articulated in the following abstract terms in the 2003 Diplomatic Bluebook: “Japan considers terrorism as a threat to its own national security” (MOFA, 2003).

Second, the government stressed the vulnerability of Japan to similar terrorist attacks. At a press conference, the JDA chief announced that terrorist incidents could also occur in Japan (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 12 September 2001). The National Police Agency (NPA) Security Bureau chief, Uruma Iwao, repeated this concern when he revealed information from foreign intelligence sources that members of a radical fundamentalist Islamic group had entered Japan before the terrorist attacks in the United States. Although the possibility of Japan being a terrorist hideout remained low, Uruma told the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee that a launch of a terror campaign in Japan could not be dismissed: “If members of such groups are already in Japan, it is possible that they will carry out terrorist attacks here” (Mainichi Daily News, 18 September 2001). NPA’s white paper released in September 2001 repeated similar vulnerabilities of the Japanese state, warning that Japan’s status as an economic power had attracted terrorist organizations to use Japan

\(^{24}\) More than 20 Japanese were killed in the attacks.

\(^{25}\) JDA’s Director-General, Nakatani Gen, said, “Many Japanese victims were involved in the attacks, so we can hardly look on unconcernedly like last time [referring to Japan’s contribution to the 1991 Persian Gulf War]. We are under threat” (Nikkei Weekly, 24 September 2001. Parenthesis added).

\(^{26}\) The other issue was the intrusion of the unidentified vessels in Japanese waters in December 2001 (MOFA, 2002).
as a financial base to support their operations. The rise of terrorist bombings in Asia prompted the then Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko to warn that:

“Recent bombings on Bali in Indonesia and in the Philippines show that the terrorists are stepping up their activities in Southeast Asia, and we cannot discount the possibility that the wave of violence will come to Japan, which has deep human and economic ties with the region” (Kawaguchi, 2003: 27).

Based on the widened concept of national security, the Japanese security policymaking elite joined the international community in condemning the 9/11 attacks, and announced measures that laid the foundation of major changes in Japanese security policy. Japan passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), which extended the geographical limit of U.S.-Japan defence cooperation. The Basic Plan (the document that outlines the measures and the geographical scope of SDF’s activities during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)) disclosed a greater sense of flexibility in SDF’s activities in a wider geographical area and not only in areas around Afghanistan, which was the U.S. military’s operational area (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 6 October 2001). It stated that Japan’s SDF was legitimized to undertake supply and transportation activities at the following areas: the territory of Japan and the Indian Ocean, which includes Diego Garcia, Australia and the territories of countries located on the coast of the Indian Ocean as well as the territories of countries along the routes from the territory of Japan to the coast of the Indian Ocean which contain points of passage or points where fuel and others will be loaded and/or unloaded (MOFA, 2001). Nevertheless, to show the relationship between the Middle East and Japan’s national security, Admiral Kōjō Kōichi told his commanders, “This mission [OEF] doesn’t mean just the support for U.S.-U.K. military action. What you have done is for Japan. I want you to keep telling the crew this” (Parenthesis added). According to an Asahi Shimbun report, this statement was

27 The White Paper reported that six Sri Lankan nationals were arrested in Ichikawa and Funabashi in Chiba Prefecture in June 2000 on suspicion of illegally staying in Japan. The police confiscated 11 videotapes and documents describing terrorist acts by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization in Sri Lanka. Investigators discovered that a total of 45 million yen was transferred to the group in Sri Lanka over the past decade and the six arrested in Chiba admitted that it was for the purpose of supporting the LTTE. The LTTE is believed to be supplied with weapons by the Taliban, the Islamic fundamentalist regime of Afghanistan that is said to be protecting Osama bin Laden, the main suspect in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington (Daily Yomiuri, 22 September 2001).
in recognition of the fact that the sea-lanes the MSDF fleet uses between Japan and the Indian Ocean are the same as that used by oil tankers linking Japan with the Middle East (Asahi Shimbun, 2005). The continuous flow of oil tankers to Japan was vital to Japan’s national security. In as far as the ATSML legitimized the SDF to actively support the United States and other militaries outside the “areas surrounding Japan”, it contributed to the globalization of Japan’s national security concept.

A similar widening of Japan’s national security occurred during debates that led to SDF’s deployment to Iraq. Japan’s participation was based on its responsible fulfilment of an international role, but the security policymaking elite also discussed the impact of the Iraq issue on Japan’s national security. The Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 stated, “Japan is vigorously tackling the Iraq issue, understanding that it is a critical issue directly related to Japan’s national interests” (MOFA, 2004). The impact on Japan’s national security was framed with regard to the threat of WMD falling into the hands of international terrorists.28 Further, the Japanese government stressed that instability in Iraq will have a direct impact on Japan due to its extensive reliance on the Middle East for 90 per cent of its crude oil and energy. The Diplomatic Bluebook recognized this relationship when it wrote, “Based on such recognition, Japan has been actively making efforts towards ensuring the peace and stability of this region [Middle East]” (MOFA, 2004. Parenthesis added).

This geographical expansion of Japan’s concept of national security was also reinforced by the restructuring of the U.S. military presence in Japan designed to enhance the inter-operability of the two militaries in the context of the U.S.-led war on terror. On 29 October 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) published its report: “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future”, the product of a review launched in December 2002. This report reiterated the theme of “regional and global common strategic objectives”, identified in their 19 February 2005 Joint Statement. In a joint statement in 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi and U.S. President George Bush “heralded a new U.S.-Japan Alliance of Global Cooperation for the 21st Century” (Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, 26 June 2006).

28 Prime Minister Koizumi linked WMD, international terrorism and Japan’s national security as follows: “What would be the consequences were dangerous weapons of mass destruction to fall into the hands of a dangerous dictator? Any consequences would certainly not be limited to the people of the United States. This is not a matter without implications for Japan” (MOFA, 2003).
2006). In May 2006, Japan and the United States agreed to undertake a Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to institutionalize bilateral inter-operability (including command and control functions) to address both regional and global military contingencies (Hughes and Krauss, 2007: 158). As Hughes (2007) identified, this realignment meant that “Japan would serve as a frontline command post for U.S. global power projection to as far away as the Middle East” (p. 331). This was in the context of the joint statement by Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush, on 29 June 2006 entitled “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century”, which highlighted “universal values” as the basis for the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

However, the view that these policies implemented by the Japanese leadership during both the OEF and OIF missions reflected a global security policy does not stand up to closer examination. Despite the agreement on common and universal values, the decision to support the U.S.-led war on terror was based on the desire to maintain the integrity of the alliance, but more for locally than globally conceived security aims. Koizumi mobilized support for his Iraq policy on the basis that Japan could not refuse to assist America’s war on terror efforts if it expected to continue to receive U.S. help to deal with the threat from North Korea (Shinoda, 2006: 77). This suggests his agreement on a global alliance was based less on recognition that Japan’s security had become global, and more on acceptance of the price to be paid for help in the immediate neighbourhood.

In summary, the period between 1994 and 2004 saw how threats from North Korea and China stimulated Japan to dilate the mission of the SDF and the geographical dimension of its national security concept through expanded participation in the U.S.-Japan security agreement. Although the effects of globalization are more apparent as a justification than as a cause or outcome of these changes, they did lay the groundwork for later developments by shifting the basis for

29 As the GSDF rapid-reaction force is stationed alongside the U.S. I Army Corps at Camp Zama, it will operationally tie it to the global deployments of the U.S. military (Hughes, 2007: 335).
30 The report stated, “The United States and Japan stand together not only against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, market economy and rule of law. These values are deeply rooted in the long historic traditions of both countries …. Asia’s historic transformation is underway, creating a region that increasingly embraces the universal values of democracy, freedom, human rights, market economy and rule of law” (Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, 29 June 2006).
the SDF’s international role from improving Japan’s image by keeping peace to facing direct or indirect “threats”, and moving Japan’s alliance from a local to a “global” scale.

**Institutionalization:**

The notion of the security globality that emerged in the 1980s and was applied after 9/11 has been institutionalized in Japan’s security policy in two forms: the inseparability of Japan’s national security from international security and the end to geographical limits on the deployment of the SDF.

Following the ground-breaking SDF deployments to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, work began on revising the 1996 Taikō to bring security policy up to date with these developments and prepare the ground for the next phase of the legislative programme. The foreword to the 2004 Araki Report\(^\text{31}\) began with the following assessment:

> “We are living in an era of great transition … In the era of globalization, dangers and threats can easily travel across borders and arrive in our land without any warning. Under such context, the Cold War, in hindsight, seems to have been an era of relative stability.”

This was the logical basis for Araki’s recommendation that “international peace cooperation activities” (including UNPKO, but also support to the GWOT), be promoted to the SDF’s “primary mission” (alongside national defence). Previously, such secondary missions could only be undertaken so long as they did not impair the ability of the SDF to exercise its “primary mission” of national defence. This change implies that international duties should be evaluated in roughly equal importance with territorial defence.

The third Taikō published in 2004 followed faithfully this security globality logic, noting for the first time the impact of globalization on security, casting it alongside “interdependence” as the background against which “new threats and diverse situations” are emerging to menace Japan. Giving primacy to the threats of

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“international terrorist organizations”, and proliferation of WMD, the 2004 *Taikō* extrapolates from these themes a logic for questioning conventional forms of defence and deterrence. Global problems, it implies, call for global solutions. This logic makes sense of the need to deploy the SDF not only in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but to wherever failed states might nurture potential transnational threats. The new *Taikō*’s shift in moral tone is striking—where in 1996 contributions to PKO were an expression of Japan’s “international contribution”—a kind of *noblesse oblige* owed by big economies—the impact of globalization and interdependence on security casts participation in counter-terrorist operations as a security *necessity*.

The 2004 *Taikō* prepared the ground for a set of legislative amendments consolidating the post-9/11 initiatives, including the 2006 amendment of the SDF law adding “activities for the preservation of the peace and security of the international community, including Japan” to its primary duties, framing into law the notion that Japan’s security was indivisible from that of the international community.32 The significance of this change lies in its utility for overcoming restrictions on SDF deployments, which reflect a lingering trace of civilian control concerns. Even after a decade of PKO participation, a sunset clause was placed in the legislation on SDF despatch to Afghanistan and Iraq, meaning continued operations were subject to their periodical review and potentially veto. The LDP aimed to bypass the difficulties of gaining support for renewal of the legislation for Indian Ocean operations with the argument that since various forms of overseas despatch (including disaster relief, PKO, humanitarian and anti-terrorism operations), had become a routine part of the SDF’s mission, it would be more practical to draft a permanent law covering all such operations.33

One of the most far-reaching applications of the “security globality” to Japan’s security concept is the basis for an extension of defence *in time* via a notion of

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32 The phrase increasingly taken up in debates (see especially Diet discussions on counter-piracy operations in 2009), is “nihon wo fukumu kokusai shakai”, or “international society, which includes Japan”.

preventive or pre-emptive security action. Just as former U.K. Prime Minister Blair used the logic of the “security globality” to justify what he called “progressive pre-emption”, the idea that globalization permits threats to travel rapidly across borders from far away combined with the theory that non-state actors are not susceptible to deterrence, was the basis for the Japanese version of a pre-emptive doctrine. Where the Bush doctrine described the intention of the United States to act, using force where necessary, to prevent states obtaining WMD and possibly passing them on to terrorist organizations (National Security Strategy of the United States 2002, chapter V), the 2004 Taikō described Japan’s pre-emptive doctrine in terms of the second objective of Japan’s security policy, which is “to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place” (2004 Taikō, III: 1). This has acted to expand the legal scope governing Japan’s use of the SDF.

There are two other cases where Japan’s security policy reform has followed the logic of de-territorialized space. Outer space can be seen as another non-territorial dimension, and here too Japan has relaxed restrictions on the role of its military (Oros, 2008: 79, 129). Though there have been calls to relax the restrictions on arms exports (LDP Defence Policy Studies Subcommittee Report, 2004: 15–16), this territorial limitation is still largely in place. The exception made for the BMD programme has been widely noted. However, a more significant example from the perspective of this paper is the exception granted for the use of ODA to supply arms (armoured patrol boats) to Indonesia. The logic for this was that Japan’s reliance on clear SLOCs would be ensured in part by boosting the military capacity of friendly countries in critical points such as the straits of Malacca. This signifies a new area of de-territorialized security policy for Japan, as pre-figured in the 2004 Taikō.

Intermestic space

This section looks at how Japan’s security policy and capacity is adapting to improve its ability to meet the challenges of securing intermestic space. We specifically focus on reforms in crisis response and intelligence.

34 “A few decades ago, we could act when we knew. Now, we have to act on the basis of precaution. We have to act, not react. We have to do so on the basis of prediction, not certainty. Circumstances will often require intervention, usually far beyond our own borders ... We must be prepared to think sooner and act quicker in defence of our values” (Blair, 2006: 31, 34).
Crisis response:

If the history of the Imperial Japanese Army’s unchecked aggression and loss of civilian control explained the taboo on overseas despatch of the SDF, lessons learnt from the same period also restricted the scope of SDF operational powers at home. From the mid-1990s however, local crises involving North Korea (kidnappings, “spy ships”), inspired a set of security policy changes that eroded this restriction and saw the SDF engage in a range of new security tasks across intermestic space.

The “Crisis laws” (Yūji hōsei) that were passed in the early years of the present decade have been defined as: “The set of laws that determine what action will be taken as a nation in the event of an armed attack on Japan—"teamwork rules” set in advance to determine how national, local government, individuals, as well as the police, fire service, coastguard and SDF will work together in peace-time, war-time and large scale terrorism events, etc” (Tamura and Suginō, 2004: 160). By adding a series of special provisions on relevant laws such as Road Traffic Law, Medical Service Law, Building Standards Law, and others, these laws provide the basis for the SDF to function in the same space as the police and local government, and to requisition the use of civilian infrastructure such as air and sea ports, roads and radio frequencies.35 One of the measures that attracted criticism was the role of the SDF in coordinating voluntary neighbourhood groups to organize the civil response to crises (Yamauchi, 2002: 108).

The 2004 Taikō foregrounded intermestic threats such as clandestine operations, guerrilla and Special forces (SF) activities by a hostile power/organization (section IV, 1 (1)b).36 The response to this can be seen in the transformation of structures and rules affecting the SDF’s ability to respond and cooperate with other

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36 This theme was also elaborated in a report published by the Tokyo Foundation in 2008. The report stated,

“There is also the possibility that a group of terrorists who have received systematic military training creep into Japan to carry out subversive activities … Recognizing that not merely a few terrorist attack scenarios would require collaboration between the SDF and other related organizations, we need to establish a system of initial response and crisis management (p. 15).”

Two leading University of Tokyo Professors, Tanaka Akihiko and Kitaoka Shinichi, oversaw the production of this report. They are also leading figures in the panels appointed by the Prime Minister to make recommendations for Taikō review processes in 2004 and 2009.
domestic actors. The Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the (then) JDA and National Public Safety Commission, to provide cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised in 2000 to enable its application to illegal activities by armed agents. Local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces. The government still feels that “[f]or the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency” (MOD, 2008: 178).

Also notable among such reforms is the 2007 creation of the Central Readiness Force (CRF), which houses the GSDF’s SF capability within a structure tasked with preparing and directing the GSDF’s response to domestic and overseas crises. The intermestic range of the CRF mission is illustrated by its organizational structure, which consists of two deputies under the commander—one for overseas and another for domestic operations. In the former case, the CRF assumes the function of advance party and commands the forces sent overseas. In the case of the latter, the CRF acts as “force provider” to the regional armies.37 The CRF conducts an annual exercise with the police force38 and members of its SF units take steps to preserve their anonymity, presumably to enable them to pass among the civilian population in covert operations either at home or overseas.39

In summary, the institutionalization of the SDF’s intermestic role is reflected all the way down the line from doctrine (2004 Taikō), through law (Yūjī hōsei) and procedures (basic agreement, etc.) to capacity and practice (CRF, joint exercises).

Intelligence:

One of the implications of globalization for security policy noted in the first section of this paper is the increased importance of intelligence for coping with complex contingencies and problems approaching Japan from afar, at speed and without

38 Although it is outside the scope of this paper, it is noteworthy that Japan’s Police have extended its operational reach across intermestic space, too. “Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) has begun systematic cultivation of contacts with law enforcement agencies in other Asia-Pacific countries in an effort to increase trust among police professionals throughout the region. In so doing, the NPA hopes to create a climate in which Japan’s police will be able to cooperate more easily with foreign police forces on an ad hoc basis” (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2001: 160).
warning. However, there is also evidence that post-Cold War changes increasing Japan’s intelligence capacity could be seen as a response to some of the “intermestic” consequences of globalization on security.

The expansion and re-orientation of Japan’s intelligence capacity can be traced back to the early post-Cold War period. The 1994 Higuchi Commission report detailed the third element of a “comprehensive and coherent Security Policy” as “possession of a highly reliable and efficient defence capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability”. 1996 Taikō followed through on the Higuchi recommendations, expressing the need for stronger intelligence capability. Since then, substantial material and political resources have been invested to re-orientate, re-organize and expand Japan’s intelligence capacity.

Two cases show how Japan’s new intelligence capacity reflects an adaptation to the challenges of securing intermestic space. First, in May 1996 the traditional orientation of the Public Security Intelligence Agency (or PSIA, which had a task similar to that of the U.K.’s MI5 or the American FBI) to monitoring left-wing subversives was re-directed towards the Korean community resident in Japan (Oros, 2002: 8; Sung-jae, 2004: 376). Following the 1998 Taepodong-1 shock and Pyongyang’s 2001 admissions of kidnapping, the PSIA and the Japanese police attention on Korean organizations in Japan intensified. This began with raids in November 2001 on the Chongryon organization and Chongryon-affiliated financial enterprises suspected to be responsible for funding the North. Similar actions were conducted in 2003 against the ship Mangyongbong-92, which was suspected of being used to transfer materials and currency (Sung-jae, 2004: 380–381).

Second, when the Japanese government established the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) in 1996, and attached it to the Joint Staff Office (JSO) in 1997, this raised the capacity of military intelligence and streamlined its function in supporting executive crisis management. The DIH website describes the reasons for bringing defence intelligence under direct control (chokkatsuka) as follows:

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40 http://www.mod.go.jp/dih/gaiyou.html#gaiyo3
“In order for defence capability to function properly in its various phases and situations in a more unpredictable, complex and varied security environment, it is essential to attain and make adequate use of high level information capacity. Furthermore, in the intelligence department of the JDA (now MoD), in order to collect and deal with information from a wider field from all points of view and respond to the needs of a wider range of government agencies and the cabinet, it is necessary to have the capability to provide directly to the Minister of Defence more rapidly a higher level of analysis and more precise information.” (Author’s translation, italics added)

In summary, Japan’s intelligence capacity has been re-directed at a transnational threat and embedded in a system of crisis management designed around the theme of integrating the functions of government. Both moves reflect the need to manage fast-developing threats in a way that is not impeded by institutional or conceptual barriers between “foreign” and “domestic” portfolios.

Conclusion

This paper aims to develop our understanding of the ways globalization has affected security, taking as its case study the military element of Japan’s security policy, which has moved from a territorial to a global scale. Two aspects of globalization’s effect on security—the “security globality” and “intermestic space”—are identified to study the role they played in breaking through historically robust resistance against a globally scaled post-war security role for Japan’s military.

Although ideas such as “interdependence” had appeared in Japan’s security discourse much earlier, and Japan began “overseas dispatch” of the SDF in the early 1990s, the events of 9/11 provided the spur to finally lift Japan’s policy over the obstacles to reform. While the U.S.-Japan alliance facilitated this change by providing a series of intermediate stepping stones, the logic of the “security globality” has enabled a global military role to be locked into place in the form of legislation, policy, doctrine and procurements. Also, crises in the region (Taiwan and North Korea) provided the impetus for reforms that make Japan more able to cope with the challenges of securing intermestic space. In the first decade of this century, both ideas have been firmly embedded in Japan’s new global security policy.
This paper makes an argument for looking outside the areas usually cited as drivers of security policy change (U.S. gaiatsu, changes in the East Asian balance of power unfavourable to Japanese interests, and changes within the Japanese political system, namely the shift of power in favour of the conservative politicians), to consider broader and more long-term trends affecting the security field beyond Japan. This paper presents evidence to suggest that the shift to a global security policy has been determined not by the ideological positions of those in power in Japan, but as an evolutionary response to adapt to broader change (rooted in technological and ideological developments) affecting the global security climate.

Recent changes in Japanese domestic politics offer a chance to test the validity of this argument. In the 2009 Katsumata Report, prepared for the next Taikō, the logic of the “security globality” was expressed once again in the following statement: “Since it is not possible to build walls between people, making the whole world peaceful is essential for the security of one country” (Katsumata Report, 2009: 6). Japan’s August 2009 election replacing the LDP-led government with a DPJ-led government might be expected to disrupt this steady evolution of Japanese security policy. However, despite the decisions of the DPJ government to allow the SDF mission in the Indian Ocean to lapse and to discard the Katsumata report, there are also reasons to expect continuity in certain aspects of Japan’s globalized security policy. The DPJ is strongly committed to military participation in global collective security action, as seen by its launch of a review of PKO policy, intended to boost Japan’s contributions. Thus, it would not be a surprise if globalization were to feature in the analytical and policy justification sections of DPJ’s first Taikō.
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