<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th>Evolving global economic architecture: will we have a new Bretton Woods?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author(s)</strong></td>
<td>Pradumna B. Rana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URL</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10220/6509">http://hdl.handle.net/10220/6509</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rights</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The RSIS Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. If you have any comments, please send them to the following email address: isjiwin@ntu.edu.sg.

Unsubscribing

If you no longer want to receive RSIS Working Papers, please click on “Unsubscribe.” to be removed from the list.

No. 215

Evolving Global Economic Architecture:
Will We have a New Bretton Woods?

Pradumna B. Rana

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore

19 November 2010
About RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS’ mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia-Pacific. To accomplish this mission, RSIS will:

• Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
• Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations
• Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

Graduate Training in International Affairs

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy and Asian Studies as well as The Nanyang MBA (International Studies) offered jointly with the Nanyang Business School. The graduate teaching is distinguished by their focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the professional practice of international affairs and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 150 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

Research

Research at RSIS is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, and the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade and Negotiations (TFCTN). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations.

International Collaboration

Collaboration with other Professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.
ABSTRACT

The Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997–1998 had led to calls for a “New International Financial Architecture” (NIFA) and discussions had focused on crisis prevention, management and resolution efforts. Similarly, the global economic crisis (GEC) of 2008–2009, which was expected to be the worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, also led to calls for a “New Bretton Woods” (NBW) system—a wider and a much more comprehensive set of reforms concerning the global governance system and international economic institutions (IEIs), similar to the remarkable 1944 Bretton Woods conference where the World Bank, the IMF and the GATT (the predecessor of the WTO) were established.

Various academics and politicians have joined hands in making the call for an NBW. A large number of proposals to reform the global economic architecture (GEA)—configuration of institutions of global economic governance—were discussed and the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors group was upgraded to the G20 Summit of leaders and the Financial Stability Forum upgraded to the Financial Stability Board by expanding its membership. But could post-GEC reforms of the GEA disappoint, like those discussed under the NIFA? If so, cycles of crises, talk of architecture reform and complacency in reforms could continue without significantly enhancing the resilience of the GEA. How would the future architecture look?

This paper argues that it may be too optimistic to expect an NBW in the future. With faster than expected recovery from the GEC, memories of the crisis have begun to fade and complacency has started to set in the reform agenda. Also as predicted by the Theory of Clubs (see, among others, Kawai, Petri and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2009), IEIs have been inflexible and reform of “Chairs and Shares” of the IEIs to give a greater voice to emerging markets have been slow. The likely scenario is a more benign one: a move to a more decentralised GEA where regional institutions are linked together—and to a “senior” global organisation—by rules and regulation. Such a system would be more flexible in terms of membership, governance, representation and agenda. Large regional countries may also be willing to take a lead role in regional bodies before global bodies. Asia can contribute to the evolving GEA by establishing institutions to enhance regional economic integration and by making sure that regional institutions are complementary to global ones.
With the faster than expected recovery, although industrial countries are still struggling to emerge from the crisis, issues of inclusiveness and legitimacy of the G20 Summit has resurfaced. This paper argues that the adoption of ideas proposed by the Singapore-led Global Governance Group (3G) could help position the G20 as the universal and unquestioned “premier fora for international economic cooperation”. Asian countries could help by being members of the 3G and participating in the discussions.

Dr. Pradumna B. Rana is Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of Nanyang Technological University (NTU). He was the Senior Director of the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Office of Regional Economic Integration, which spearheaded the ADB’s support for Asian economic integration. Prior to that, he had held various senior positions at the ADB for many years. He has teaching and research experience at the NTU, NUS and the Tribhuvan University (Nepal). He obtained his Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University, where he was a Fulbright Scholar and has a Master’s in Economics from Michigan State University and Tribhuvan University, where he was a gold medalist. He has published widely in the areas of Asian economic development and integration, financial crises, and economic policy reforms in transition economies. These include 15 authored or edited books, over 25 chapters in books, and over 40 articles in international scholarly journals, including Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of International Economics, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Asian Economics, World Development, Developing Economies, and Singapore Economic Review. Recently, he co-authored books on Asia and the Global Economic Crisis: Challenges in a Financially Integrated World (Palgrave Macmillan) and South Asia: Rising to the Challenge of Globalization (World Scientific Publishers), and co-edited books on Pan-Asian Integration: Linking East and South Asia (Palgrave Macmillan) and National Strategies for Regional Integration: South and East Asian Case Studies (Anthem Press, UK).
Evolving Global Economic Architecture: Will We have a New Bretton Woods?

Introduction

The Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997–1998 had led to calls for a “New International Financial Architecture” (NIFA) and discussions had focused on crisis prevention, crisis management and crisis resolution efforts (see Kawai and Rana, (2009) for a discussion and evaluation of these efforts). Similarly, the global economic crisis (GEC) of 2008–2009, which was expected to be the worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s,¹ had also led to calls for a “new Bretton Woods” (NBW) system—a wider and a much more comprehensive set of reforms concerning the global governance system and international economic institutions (IEIs), similar to the remarkable 1944 Bretton Woods conference where the World Bank (WB), the IMF and the GATT the predecessor of the WTO were established.

Academics (e.g., Stiglitz cited in Daniel Bases, 2008) and politicians (e.g., Nicolas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown cited in Kirkup and Waterfield, 2008) joined hands in making the call for a NBW system. So far, a large number of proposals to reform the global economic architecture (GEA)—the configuration of institutions of global economic governance—have been discussed and a number of them implemented including the upgrading of the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors group to the G20 Summit of leaders and designating it as the “premier forum for our economic cooperation” and the upgrading of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) into the Financial Stability Board (FSB) by expanding membership. But could post-GEC reforms of the GEA disappoint like those discussed under the NIFA? If so, cycles of crises, talk of architecture reform and complacency in reforms could continue without significantly enhancing the resilience of the GEA. How would the future architecture look?

Section II of this paper reviews the pre-GEC G7-led GEA and identifies some of its shortcomings. Section III analyses how some of these shortcomings were addressed in the post-GEC G20-led GEA. It also discusses the weaknesses of the G20 process and presents some thoughts on how the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the G20 can be enhanced. It argues that the G20 has adopted an incremental informal

¹ According to NBER (2010), this was indeed the case in the United States, where the present recession lasted 18 months (from December 2007 to June 2009), compared to 16 months in 1973–1975 and 1981–1982.
network-based approach to governance and not a radical rules-based one as was the case in 1944 in Bretton Woods and as called for by the proponents of the NBW system.

Section IV concludes that, for various reasons, including the firm lack of political will to enhance global policy coordination, it may be too optimistic to expect a NBW system in the future. The likely scenario is a more benign one—a move to a more decentralised GEA where regional institutions are linked together—and to a “senior” global organisation—by rules and regulation. Such a system would be more flexible in terms of membership, governance, representation and agenda. Large regional countries may also be willing to take a lead role in regional bodies before global bodies. We already have such a system in development finance where the four regional developments (in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe) are linked to the WB in Washington, D.C. As discussed in the paper, signs of a decentralised architecture are also starting to emerge in the areas of macroeconomic stability, financial stability and the world trading system.

As the Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2010) of the IMF remarked recently, “Asia’s time has come to play a leading role in the global economy”. Section V argues that Asia can contribute to the evolving GEA by establishing institutions to enhance regional economic integration and by making sure that regional institutions are complementary to global ones. It also argues that Asian countries can assist in enhancing the inclusiveness of the G20 Summit by being members of the group and participating in its discussions.

**Pre-Global Economic Crisis G7-led Global Economic Architecture**

A simplified picture of the Pre-GEC architecture is presented in Table 1. This economic architecture is very similar to the one created in Bretton Woods, under which the IMF was to promote macroeconomic stability, the GATT was to ensure an open trading environment globally, and the World Bank and later the regional development banks (e.g. ADB) were to provide development finance for poverty reduction. The G7 was created in the mid-1970s from the G5 to oversee the process of provision of international public goods by various IEIs. Russia joined the group in 1997 to form the G8. In response to the Asian financial crisis, the FSF was established in 1999 with a small staff to help coordinate the development of standards and codes and best practices for policy and transparency, financial sector regulation and
supervision, and market integrity. Another institution established in that same year was the G20 finance ministers and central bankers group, but this body had existed in the shadow of the G7 since its creation. In 1995, the GATT was folded into the WTO with a proper organisational and staffing arrangement.

### Table 1: Pre-GEC G7-led Architecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microeconomic stability</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development finance and poverty reduction</td>
<td>WB and ADB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open trading system</td>
<td>WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial stability</td>
<td>FSF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pre-GEC G7-led GEA had a number of shortcomings. First, its governance system reflected the dominance of the United States and did not reflect the economic rise and political power of emerging markets, particularly those in Asia (China and India) and, therefore, the architecture lacked legitimacy. Emerging markets had no representation at the G7 and also their voice in the IEIs was limited. According to the long-term projections made by Goldman Sachs, emerging markets will continue to grow rapidly over the next 40 years. In 2003, Goldman Sachs (2003) projected that the three largest economies in the world by 2050 would be China, the United States and India. In 2007, Goldman Sachs revised this ranking to China, India and the United States. More recently, the ADB (2009) has projected that the above ranking could be obtained even earlier, within the next 30 years. Despite their economic dynamism, China and India will be very much behind the United States in terms of per capita incomes, poverty and military might.

Kawai, Petri and Sisli-Ciamarra (2009) have examined the evolution of the shares of developing and emerging markets in IMF quotas, and in global trade and GDP (in terms of purchasing power), two rough indicators of their importance in the world economy. They have found that the trade shares of developing and emerging economies have risen more rapidly than their share in IMF quotas. This contrast was even clearer for their share of world GDP. Quotas which also determine voting power at the IMF are especially low for the rapidly growing emerging markets countries, such as Brazil, China and India. Kelkar et al (2005) found that these three countries had 19 per cent fewer votes than Belgium, Italy and Netherlands collectively,
although they had 21 per cent more nominal GDP, 400 per cent more purchasing power GDP, and 2,800 per cent more population in the second group. On the other hand, Europe controls directly or indirectly 10 chairs out of 24 at the IMF Board even though it has common monetary policy and it has 30 per cent of quota and voting rights.

Second, charters, quotas and voting rights of IEIs were designed in the interest of like-minded original core members in 1944 and had placed strict limits on change as membership expanded. In comparison with the 44 countries that participated at the Bretton Woods conference, the membership of the IMF and World Bank now stands at 186. The membership of the WTO is 150 but an additional 30 countries have applied or are in accession negotiation. Kawai, Petri and Sisli-Ciamarra (2009) write: “IEIs are clubs in the sense that they produce goods that are at least partially non-rivalrous (more than one user can consume) and at least partially excludable (users can be denied access to them). Their most important services include order and predictability in international trade and finance. Although these services are generally enjoyed by countries without diminishing their value to others, IEIs also offer services specifically to members that generate demand for membership.” A literature survey by these authors on the application of club theory to IEIs leads to three insights. First, the provision of club goods fills an important gap. Clubs can lead to Pareto-optimal results by supplying public goods under optimising conditions that are similar to those in market production. Second, the expansion of club membership tends to make clubs less effective. Decisions are harder to align as the preferences of members diverge. Third, clubs tend to be relatively inflexible institutions. Club charters are usually designed to maintain firm control in the hands of founding members and those who share their preferences. Expansion of membership and the need to serve the interests of many new members have also led the IEIs to undertake many new activities and to “mission creep”.

Third, the environment in which the IEIs operated has also changed dramatically. While policymakers had been wary of uncontrolled financial flows during the Bretton Woods era and in fact permitted capital controls, in the 1980s and the 1990s under the Washington Consensus they embraced financial liberalisation and deregulation, thereby ushering in an age of highly integrated financial markets and capital flows which have dwarfed the operations of IEIs. As early as the 1960s, the British had been promoting financial globalisation through their support of
deregulated Euromarkets for London. But the momentum accelerated when Thatcher in 1979 and Reagan in 1980 took political office. IMF management even launched an initiative in 1995 to overturn the commitment to capital controls by amending their articles of agreement in order to gain liberalisation mandate with respect to capital movement. It was only recently that this initiative was withdrawn.

Fourth, as argued again by Kawai, Petri and Sisli-Ciamara (2009), IEIs face a “governance trilemma”. There is a broad agreement that IEIs need to become (i) more democratic (ii) more effective in delivering public goods and (iii) universal by accepting all countries that apply for membership. Unfortunately, these requirements add up to a trilemma. Achieving any two makes achieving the other more difficult. For example, the United Nations is democratic and universal, but suffers on effectiveness. Similarly, the IMF and WB are universal and effective but not democratic.

**Post-Global Economic Crisis G20-led Global Economic Architecture**

The GEC generated a legitimacy crisis for the neo-liberal globalised financial regime that had emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (Heillener, 2010). Actually, questions had been raised against free market finance at the time of the AFC. But at that time “many G7 policymakers, IMF officials and private international financiers blamed the instability not on global financial markets but on policy mistakes within developing countries, where the crisis originated” (p. 628). Accordingly, Asian countries were asked to correct these policy failures by adopting various international standards and codes ranging from transparency to corporate governance based on the Anglo-American model. Asian countries, however, did not share this view and blamed instead speculative financial flows and took actions to unilaterally accumulate reserves and to establish regional self-help mechanisms (such as the CMI). Now the GEC which emanated from the Western world has firmly eroded the legitimacy and relevance of the Anglo-Saxon Washington Consensus and many have questioned the benefits of financial globalisation. Eichengreen (2009) commented recently that “a process of financial deglobalisation has already begun”.

It is not just the legitimacy of the neo-liberal thinking that has been undermined by the GEC but also the legitimacy of U.S. and British leadership. Helleiner (2010) quotes one Chinese official as saying, “We used the United States as our teacher but now we realise that our teacher keeps making mistakes and we’ve
decided to quit the class.” As the crisis unfolded, cash-strapped U.S. institutions sought help from a number of emerging markets (see footnote 2).

After the GEC, dominant powers moved quickly and created the G20 Summit by upgrading the G20 finance and central bank officials’ forum which started since 1999 but was kept under the shadow of the G7. The leaders self-appointed the forum as the “premier forum for our international economic cooperation” and in September 2009 President Obama categorically announced that G20 would replace the G7. They also upgraded the FSF into the FSB with wider membership. The post-GEC G20-led GEA is depicted in Table 2.

Table 2: Post-GEC G20-led Architecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G20: “Premier forum for our international economic cooperation”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microeconomic stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development finance and poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open trading system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Raising the profile of the G20 to a leaders’ level forum was no doubt enormously significant in signalling the incorporation of systemically important emerging markets into the core of global economic governance. It was a historic event which partially addressed the inclusiveness and legitimacy problem of the Pre-GEC G7-led GEA (Rana, 2010 a and Rana, 2010 b). However, in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, these issues resurfaced once again. The G20 represents 4.2 billion people of the world but not the other 2.6 billion people. How can their views be incorporated and the legitimacy of the G20 enhanced? It is also a self-selected group and so it lacks legitimacy.

The Stiglitz Commission has recommended the involvement of the United Nations. The Commission argues that decisions concerning necessary reforms in global institutional arrangements must be made not by a self-selected group but by all countries in the world or the G192, working in concert. Better representation and democratic legitimacy will not require the presence of all countries in all deliberations. Working committees chosen by a democratic process can be limited to

---

2 The G7 continues to meet, albeit with much less fanfare.
a size that ensures effective decision-making. This proposal certainly merits further consideration but the common view is that the United Nations lacks effectiveness and has a few accomplishments to show on the global economic and financial scene.

A more practical and implementable view is that of the 3G which believes that the G20 and the United Nations can co-exist amicably. The group would like the G20 to be consultative, inclusive and transparent so that its outcomes can be effectively implemented globally. For this to happen, there has to be greater engagement between the G20 and the United Nations, the only global body with universal participation and unquestioned legitimacy. The 3G has been convened by Singapore under the auspices of the United Nations since July 2009 and presently comprises 28 small and medium states (of which 6 are from Asia (Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam)).

The 3G has put forward several ideas on how the accountability of the G20 to the general membership of the United Nations could be enhanced (Menon, 2010). First, the G20 should undertake consultations as widely as possible with the non-G20 members before the G20 Summits. The hosts of the G20 summits should also provide the rest of the UN membership with an update after the meeting. Second, the participation of the UN Secretary General and his Sherpa at the G20 Summits and preparatory meetings should be formalised.

Third, participation of Chairs of various regional organisations in G20 Summits should be regularised. In accordance with the G20 practice, this year the Korean Chair has invited the Chairs of the African Union, New partnership of African Development, ASEAN and 3G. Chairs of additional regional groups could be brought in as appropriate. Fourth, in some cases, regional groupings alone will not adequately represent the national interests of small and medium-sized states. In such a case, the G20 decision-making process should take on a “variable geometry” configuration to allow non-G20 states to participate in Ministerial and other gatherings and other working groups involving senior officials/experts on specialised issues. This will ensure that deliberations on key issues of global concern engage all relevant parties.

For the first time this year, the Korean Government has invited Singapore, the Chair of the Global Governance Group or the 3G, to participate in the G20 Summit to

---

3 Heads of 7 IEIs—IMF, World Bank, UN, WTO, FSB, OECD and ILO—have also been invited by Korea.
be held in Seoul on 11–12 November. This is an important recognition by the Korean Chair of this year’s Summit that the 3G can contribute to the G20 process. Asian leadership, together with leaders from other regions, should agree to implement these ideas as it would help position the G20 Summit as the universal and unquestioned “premier fora for international economic cooperation” overseeing global economic governance.

However, enhancing the inclusiveness of the G20 is only a first step. Individual countries can collectively decide on the needed global policy changes but these changes have to be implemented by the relevant IEIs. Thus, an effective global governance system requires additional governance reforms in the IEIs implementing the reforms. This is an area where progress has been slow.

At the 2006 annual meeting of the IMF and WB in Singapore, an agreement was reached to increase the quotas of China, Mexico, Korea and Turkey on an ad hoc basis by small amounts. At that time several other reforms were also proposed (including a new quota formula and the second round of quotas increases) and eventually endorsed in March 2008. Based on these two actions, in April 2008, the IMF’s Board of Governors announced a package as a set of what it called “far-reaching reforms” of the institution aimed at rebuilding its “credibility and legitimacy”. But as Woods (2010) notes, taken together these two packages will affect an overall shift of only 5.4 per cent of voting power in the IMF and they are still in the process of implementation as they require an amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. At the Pittsburgh Summit, the leaders pledged to shift another five percentage points of voting power to emerging markets by January 2011 using the 2008 quota formula. But as Truman (2010) argues, the quota formula is flawed and its implementation would lead to a shift of only 2.1 percentage shift from advanced countries to emerging markets. He argues for a more transparent approach.

Even less progress has been made in reforming other aspects of IMF governance. Most observers agree that representation at the IMF is skewed

---

4 Acceptance by three-fifths (112) of the members with 85 per cent of weighted votes is required. More than two years later, as of mid-September 2010, only about three-quarters (85 members) with 78 per cent voting power had accepted the amendment. Interestingly, only 61 per cent of the countries that would receive increased IMF quotas have not taken the necessary action including those in Asia (Truman, 2010).

5 The World Bank has been more successful in reallocating 3 percentage points of its quota to developing countries because it uses the old formula.
excessively towards Europe which potentially occupies 10 out of 24 seats\(^6\) at the IMF Board. Given that Europe has a monetary union, it should have two, at most three, seats (Truman, 2010). But this is a very sensitive issue. The Financial Times reported recently (15 September 2010) that the EU was willing to give up seats at the IMF Executive Board only if the United States gave up its veto power. It is understood that an agreement, in principle, has been reached that the selection of the heads at the IMF and World Bank should be merit-based. We have to wait and see if this happens.

Another weakness of the G20-led reforms has been that it is incremental rather than radical. Two key innovations, the FSB and the G20 Summits, have grown out of pre-existing organisations. In addition, neither of the two bodies even comes close to resembling an ambitious inter-governmental institution created at Bretton Woods. They are informal networks facilitating informal cooperation, information-sharing and the development of international “soft law” whose implementation is left to the discretion of national authorities.

Finally, the G20’s mandate is to be a “premier forum for international economic cooperation”. Thus, its potential agenda is huge. Selectivity and prioritisation are required. So far, the focus has been on the stimulus packages which have brought about faster than expected global recovery, coordination of exit strategies and designing a new international financial regulatory framework. Successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round has been mentioned, but no action was taken yet. The Stiglitz Commission and others have urged a wider agenda such as addressing growing inequality within and between countries, global macroeconomic imbalances, the need to transform models of growth in a more environmentally friendly direction, new global reserve currency, an international debt restructuring court, and new international financing mechanism, reform of the United Nations and actions on climate change.

**Future Global Economic Architecture: Likely Scenario**

After a detailed analysis of the Bretton Woods system and its successor, Helleiner (2010) concludes that the creation of a new GEA is not an outcome of a single event or meeting but a long-drawn-out process involving a legitimacy phase (thinking that old regime needs to be replaced), interregnum phase (the experimental and discussion

---

\(^6\) EU countries control six seats directly and are significant or dominant members in four other seats.
phase) and a constitutive phase (formal negotiation phase). In terms of this typology, as discussed in the previous section, it is safe to conclude that the GEC has led to a thinking that the previous G7 architecture needed to be changed and that G20 has successfully implemented some of the changes. We are therefore in the interregnum phase of a new architecture where various ideas for reforms are being discussed. The question is whether we will ever go to the constitutive phase and have a NBW. The answer is, probably not. With faster than expected recovery from the GEC, memories of the crisis have begun to fade and complacency has started to set in the reform agenda. For example, representatives of the finance industry have successfully resisted and diluted the reform agenda (e.g. Basel III). Moreover, questions continue to be raised against the G20 process including its inclusiveness, legitimacy, informal network-based approach and agenda. As predicted by the Theory of Clubs (Section II), IEIs have been inflexible and progress in governance reforms of IEIs to give a greater voice to emerging market has also been slow.7

In this context, how could the post-GEC GEA evolve? A likely scenario is a move to a more decentralised GEA where national, bilateral, and regional initiatives work closely with a “senior” global institution. This would mean complementing monolithic IEIs with a multi-layered decision-making structure along the lines of “functional federalism” advocated at the national level. It also means the application of the principle of subsidiarity which means that decisions should be made at the lowest possible administrative level (Kawai, Petri, and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2010). Decentralisation would make international decisions more flexible and accountable, making them more like decisions within countries, which typically involve several layers of government. The value of decentralisation lies in its ability to produce public goods that are important to some, but not for all countries. Regionally decentralised decision-making also has the advantage of inducing large emerging economies to take leadership in providing regional public goods, even before they take leadership of global bodies.

To be sure, decentralised decisions create new challenges. Regional decisions need to be made globally coherent in order to act as “building blocks” of a global

7 In the age of the Internet, civil society and media could sensitise issues related to the governance of IEIs and prod governments to take action (Andrew Sheng and Paul Collier at the Singapore Global Dialogue, 2010).
system. This requires paying close attention to connections within a decentralised system to make sure that they complement one another and the global system.

Such a decentralised architecture is not hypothetical. It already exists in some areas and its importance has been growing in the past decade and a half. The World Bank is complemented by four regional development banks and the WTO is paralleled by several regional and bilateral trade agreements. In the area of macroeconomic surveillance there is the Arab Monetary Fund and the Latin American Reserve Fund. Recently, there was also some discussion on establishment of a European Monetary Fund. In the area of financial regulation, the European Systemic Risk Board and three European bodies for banking, insurance and securities market are to be established soon.

At the present level of political will, an incremental and a more decentralised process is what we can envisage in terms of GEA reform. If in the future, however, the incidence of financial crises were to increase and political will among countries strengthened and cooperation strengthened, one could then perhaps see a move towards a more rules-based system. In such a context, as discussed below it is possible that the G20 could be replaced by the Global Economic Coordination Council (GECC) and the FSB by a World Finance Organisation (WFO).

Despite the plethora of IEIs, the Stiglitz Commission (UN, 2009) has recommended the establishment of a globally representative fora to be called the GECC at a level equivalent with the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. The GECC could meet annually at the Heads of State and Government level to assess developments and provide leadership in economic, social and ecologic issues. It would promote development, secure consistency and coherence in the policy goals of the major international organisations and support consensus building among governments on efficient and effective solutions for issues of global economic governance. Such a Council could also promote accountability of all IEIs, identify gaps that need to be filled to ensure the efficient operation of the global economic and financial system and help set the agenda for global economic and financial reforms. Eichengren (2009) has made the case for establishing a World Financial Organisation (WFO) analogous to the already-existing World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the same way that the WTO establishes principles for trade policy without specifying outcomes, the WFO would establish principles for prudential supervision (capital and liquidity requirements, limits on portfolio concentrations and connected lending,
adequacy of risk measurement systems and internal controls) without attempting to prescribe the structure of regulation in detail. The WFO would define obligations for its members. The latter would be obliged to meet international standards for supervision and regulation for their financial markets. Membership would be mandatory for all countries seeking access to foreign markets. The WFO would appoint an independent panel of experts to determine whether countries were in compliance of those obligations failing which the authorities would be able to impose sanctions against countries that fail to comply. Eichengreen reiterated that the WFO would not dictate regulatory conditions on countries.

**Future Global Economic Architecture from an Asian Perspective**

From an Asian perspective, the future GEA could evolve as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3: Decentralised GEA from an Asian Perspective**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>G20 (or Global Economic Coordination Council proposed by the Stiglitz Commission)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic stability</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CMIM ($120 billion crisis fund) to Asian Monetary Fund (under implementation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development finance and</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poverty reduction</td>
<td>ADB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open trading system</td>
<td>WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia-wide FTA (under implementation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Stability</td>
<td>FSB (or World Finance Organisation proposed by Eichengreen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian Financial Stability Board (under discussion)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asia is very much behind Europe in terms of building supra-national institutions. What are the institutions that Asia needs to develop to support such a decentralised architecture? In the area of macroeconomic stability, after the AFC, ASEAN+3 countries had started to develop the CMI as a regional self-help mechanism. Subsequently, the bilateral swaps under the CMI were multilateralised to form the CMI Multilateralisation (CMIM) which became operational in December 2009 and comprised the $120 billion crisis fund. However, funds available from this regional facility are limited as only 20 per cent is readily available. The rest is linked to an
IMF program being in place. Therefore, in late 2008 when the region was adversely affected by the GEC, countries had to rely on either national reserves or enter into new bilateral swap arrangements with non-regional and regional countries outside of the CMIM. For example, Korea arranged a one-year US$30 billion swap with the United States in October 2008, and followed up with a three-year currency swap of RMB180 billion (US$26.3 billion) with China and a two-year US$20 billion swap with Japan. Singapore signed a US$30 billion currency swap with the United States in October 2008 and followed up with another swap with Japan. Efforts are, however, ongoing to strengthen the CMIM. The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) is to be established in Singapore by early next year to serve as an independent regional surveillance unit. Once the AMRO is established and is strengthened in terms of its staffing and competencies, the CMIM’s link to the IMF could be gradually loosened and the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), an independent regional financing facility, established.

In the area of development finance, with the recent capital increase, the ADB is an important player. The ADB is regarded as one of the most efficient IEI and its coordination with the World Bank and other regional development banks is very good. The ADB recently introduced a new counter-cyclical instrument—the Counter-Cyclical Support Facility—to provide a budget support of up to $3 billion to crisis-affected countries in Asia comprising, among others, financing for fiscal expansion, support to social safety nets, trade financing and investment spending.

In the area of international trade, early steps are being taken in establishing an Asia-wide FTA. Two proposals are being discussed including an East Asia Free Trade Area (or EAFTA) among the ASEAN+3 countries and a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (or CEPEA) among the 16 members of the East Asia Summit. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (or ERIA) has been established to support the latter effort. With the implementation of the “ASEAN plus one” FTAs between ASEAN and China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, the concept of an Asia-wide FTA is starting to evolve.

---

8 AMRO will be tasked to (i) monitor, assess and report on the macroeconomic situation and financial soundness of the ASEAN+3 countries, (ii) assess macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities in any of the ASEAN+3 countries and provide assistance in timely formulation of policy recommendations to mitigate such risks, and (iii) ensure compliance of swap requesting parties with the lending covenants under the CMIM agreement (ASEAN Secretariat website).
In the area of financial stability, less progress has been made. But since the newly established FSB does not include all Asian countries, like in Europe, Asia could consider establishing the proposed AFSD by involving the region’s regulators and supervisors. The AFSD would, among others, promote capital market rules and regulations (micro-prudential monitoring) and the stability of the financial system throughout the region through early warning systems (macro-prudential monitoring).

In addition to establishing the institutions above, in an environment of decentralised architecture, Asian countries should make national and regional decisions coherent globally in order to prevent “races to the bottom” and more generally to make national and regional institutions and agreements the building blocks of an efficient global system. Regional institutions should focus on regional public goods and global institutions on truly global public goods. The Seoul Summit is to endorse a global financial safety net comprising (i) a further relaxation of the amounts and terms of Flexible Credit Line (FCL) for countries with very strong fundamentals, (ii) establish Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) for countries with generally sound policies but do not qualify for FCL and (iii) a multilateral lending facility, or global stabilisation mechanism, through which the IMF can lend to a group of countries. These credit lines should complement the CMIM.

Asian countries can also assist in making the G20 more inclusive and legitimate. In order to do this they need to become members of and participate in the discussions of the ideas of the Singapore-led 3G outlined in Section III.

Conclusions
The question that this paper sought to answer was: Will we have a New Bretton Woods system as called for by academics and politicians alike in the post-GEC period? The paper finds that while the establishment of the G20 Summits is encouraging since for the first time systemically important emerging markets have been given a voice in international economic issues, those hoping for a NBW, like those hoping for a NIFA in the post-AFC period will probably be disappointed. We are at an interregnum phase of the NBW system but the constitutive phase could fizzle out. This is for two reasons. First, the recovery from the AFC as well as the recovery from the GEC turned out to be faster-than-expected. Faster-than-expected recovery, in turn, led to complacency in implementing reforms and in some cases dilution of the reform agenda. Second, as predicted by the Theory of Clubs (discussed in Section II),
policies of IEIs have been relatively inflexible. In particular, the slow progress in governance reforms of the IEAs or the so-called “Chairs and Shares” (voting rights, management and Board representation) reform to give greater voice to emerging markets particularly those in Asia, China and India, commensurate with their growing economic and political power has led to questions regarding their legitimacy. Initial enthusiasm of emerging markets on the G20 has also dissipated somewhat as questions regarding its inclusiveness, legitimacy and agenda continue to be raised.9

It is, therefore, likely that in the future we will not have a NBW system but an architecture that will move incrementally towards a more decentralised system where national, bilateral and regional initiatives will work closely with the existing global IEIs. In this context, Asia has an important role to play by building institutions for regional integration (such as the AMRO, Asia-wide FTA and AFSD). Furthermore, Asia has to make sure that national and regional initiatives complement global ones and that there is no duplication. Asia can also take various actions to enhance the legitimacy of the G20 process.

---

9 Initially, the BRICs refused to join G20’s efforts to extend lines of credit to the IMF until more substantive reforms were undertaken in IMF’s governance. Subsequently, a second phase of quota reforms were agreed at the Pittsburgh G20 Summit (Woods, 2010: 56).
References


Rana, P. 2010 a. “G-20 Summits: How can Asia Collectively Strengthen its Voice?” in Dirk Willem te Velde (Ed.), The G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and
**Balanced Growth: What Role for Low-income, Small, and Vulnerable Countries?**
London: Overseas Development Institute.

Strauss-Khan, D. Statement at the Conclusion of the 21 High-Level Conference in Daejon, Republic of Korea (13 July 2010). Available at www.imf.org


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Vietnam-China Relations Since The End of The Cold War</td>
<td>Ang Cheng Guan</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The South China Sea Dispute re-visited</td>
<td>Ang Cheng Guan</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>‘Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ as Justified, Executed and Mediated by NATO: Strategic Lessons for Singapore</td>
<td>Kumar Ramakrishna</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Taiwan’s Future: Mongolia or Tibet?</td>
<td>Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Diplomacies: Reading Discontinuity in Late-Modern Diplomatic Practice</td>
<td>Tan See Seng</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Explaining Indonesia's Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Terence Lee Chek Liang</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Asian Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations</td>
<td>Barry Desker</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. Multilateralism, Neo-liberalism and Security in Asia: The Role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum  
   **Ian Taylor** (2001)

20. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping as Issues for Asia-Pacific Security  
   **Derek McDougall** (2001)

21. Comprehensive Security: The South Asian Case  
   **S.D. Muni** (2002)

   **You Ji** (2002)

23. The Concept of Security Before and After September 11  
   a. The Contested Concept of Security  
      **Steve Smith** (2002)  
   b. Security and Security Studies After September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections  
      **Amitav Acharya** (2002)

24. Democratisation In South Korea And Taiwan: The Effect Of Social Division On Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations  
   **Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung** (2002)

25. Understanding Financial Globalisation  
   **Andrew Walter** (2002)

26. 911, American Praetorian Unilateralism and the Impact on State-Society Relations in Southeast Asia  
   **Kumar Ramakrishna** (2002)

27. Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?  
   **Tan See Seng** (2002)

28. What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of “America”  
   **Tan See Seng** (2002)

29. International Responses to Terrorism: The Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control of Terrorism by Regional Arrangement with Particular Reference to ASEAN  
   **Ong Yen Nee** (2002)

30. Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization  
   **Nan Li** (2002)

   **Helen E S Nesadurai** (2002)

32. 11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges, and Warfighting  
   **Nan Li** (2002)

33. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11  
   **Barry Desker** (2002)

34. Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of September 11 For American Power  
   **Evelyn Goh** (2002)

35. Not Yet All Aboard…but Already All At Sea Over Container Security Initiative  
   **Irvin Lim** (2002)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulation in East Asia: Still Perverse?</td>
<td>Andrew Walter</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Indonesia and The Washington Consensus</td>
<td>Premjith Sadasivan</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Liquidity Support and The Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience</td>
<td>J Soedradjad Djiwandono</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>A UK Perspective on Defence Equipment Acquisition</td>
<td>David Kirkpatrick</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Regionalisation of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership</td>
<td>Mely C. Anthony</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round</td>
<td>Razeen Sally</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Seeking Security In The Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia In The Emerging Asian Order</td>
<td>Amitav Acharya</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Deconstructing Political Islam In Malaysia: UMNO’S Response To PAS’ Religio-Political Dialectic</td>
<td>Joseph Liow</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>The War On Terror And The Future of Indonesian Democracy</td>
<td>Tatik S. Hafidz</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Examining The Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case</td>
<td>Eduardo Lachica</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Sovereignty and The Politics of Identity in International Relations</td>
<td>Adrian Kuah</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>Deconstructing Jihad; Southeast Asia Context</td>
<td>Patricia Martinez</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion</td>
<td>Alastair Iain Johnston</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>In Search of Suitable Positions’ in the Asia Pacific: Negotiating the US-China Relationship and Regional Security</td>
<td>Evelyn Goh</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Irvin Lim</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Chong Ja Ian</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Malcolm Brailey</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Implications for Regional Economic Integration</td>
<td>(2003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Helen E S Nesadurai</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Joshua Ho</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Irvin Lim</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Andrew Tan</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Chong Ja Ian</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Irman G. Lanti</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ralf Emmers</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Joseph Liow</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Malcolm Brailey</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>J.D. Kenneth Boutin</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Manjeet Singh Pardesi</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Evelyn Goh</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>The Shifting Of Maritime Power And The Implications For Maritime Security In East Asia</td>
<td>(2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Joshua Ho</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70. Examining the Defence Industrialization-Economic Growth Relationship: The Case of Singapore
   Adrian Kuah and Bernard Loo (2004)

71. “Constructing” The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry
   Kumar Ramakrishna (2004)

72. Malaysia and The United States: Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement
   Helen E S Nesadurai (2004)

73. The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform
   John Bradford (2005)

74. Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment
   Catherine Zara Raymond (2005)

75. Southeast Asian Maritime Security In The Age Of Terror: Threats, Opportunity, And Charting The Course Forward
   John Bradford (2005)

76. Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives
   Manjeet Singh Pardesi (2005)

77. Towards Better Peace Processes: A Comparative Study of Attempts to Broker Peace with MNLF and GAM
   S P Harish (2005)

78. Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics
   Amitav Acharya (2005)

79. The State and Religious Institutions in Muslim Societies
   Riaz Hassan (2005)

80. On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies
   Riaz Hassan (2005)

81. The Security of Regional Sea Lanes
   Joshua Ho (2005)

82. Civil-Military Relationship and Reform in the Defence Industry
   Arthur S Ding (2005)

83. How Bargaining Alters Outcomes: Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Bargaining Strategies
   Deborah Elms (2005)

84. Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order
   Evelyn Goh (2005)

85. Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan
   Ali Riaz (2005)

86. Autobiography, Politics and Ideology in Sayyid Qutb’s Reading of the Qur’an
   Umej Bhatia (2005)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>China’s Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends &amp; Dynamics</td>
<td>Srikanth Kondapalli</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses</td>
<td>Catherine Zara Raymond</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the Bush Doctrine</td>
<td>Simon Dalby</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of the Riau Archipelago</td>
<td>Nankyung Choi</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>The Impact of RMA on Conventional Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis</td>
<td>Manjeet Singh Pardesi</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Africa and the Challenge of Globalisation</td>
<td>Jeffrey Herbst</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>The East Asian Experience: The Poverty of ’Picking Winners</td>
<td>Barry Desker and Deborah Elms</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Bandung And The Political Economy Of North-South Relations: Sowing The Seeds For Revisioning International Society</td>
<td>Helen E S Nesadurai</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Re-conceptualising the Military-Industrial Complex: A General Systems Theory Approach</td>
<td>Adrian Kuah</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Food Security and the Threat From Within: Rice Policy Reforms in the Philippines</td>
<td>Bruce Tolentino</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Securitizing/Desecuritizing the Filipinos’ ‘Outward Migration Issue’in the Philippines’ Relations with Other Asian Governments</td>
<td>José N. Franco, Jr.</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Securitization Of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis To India</td>
<td>Josy Joseph</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Securitizing border-crossing: The case of marginalized stateless minorities in the Thai-Burma Borderlands</td>
<td>Mika Toyota</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>The LTTE’s Online Network and its Implications for Regional Security</td>
<td>Shyam Tekwani</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
105. The Korean War June-October 1950: Inchon and Stalin In The “Trigger Vs Justification” Debate  
Tan Kwoh Jack (2006)

106. International Regime Building in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Cooperation against the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs  
Ralf Emmers (2006)

107. Changing Conflict Identities: The case of the Southern Thailand Discord  
SP Harish (2006)

108. Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities?  
Christopher B Roberts (2006)

109. TEMPORAL DOMINANCE  
Military Transformation and the Time Dimension of Strategy  
Edwin Seah (2006)

110. Globalization and Military-Industrial Transformation in South Asia: An Historical Perspective  
Emrys Chew (2006)

111. UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime  
Sam Bateman (2006)

112. Freedom and Control Networks in Military Environments  
Paul T Mitchell (2006)

113. Rewriting Indonesian History The Future in Indonesia’s Past  
Kwa Chong Guan (2006)

114. Twelver Shi’ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects  
Christoph Marcinkowski (2006)

115. Islam, State and Modernity: Muslim Political Discourse in Late 19th and Early 20th century India  
Iqbal Singh Sevea (2006)

Ong Wei Chong (2006)

117. “From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI”  
Elena Pavlova (2006)

118. The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry  
Adam Dolnik (2006)

119. The Many Faces of Political Islam  
Mohammed Ayoob (2006)

120. Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (I): Thailand and Indonesia  
Christoph Marcinkowski (2006)

121. Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (II): Malaysia and Singapore  
Christoph Marcinkowski (2006)
122. Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama
   Mohamed Nawab (2007)

123. Islam and Violence in Malaysia
   Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid (2007)

124. Between Greater Iran and Shi’ite Crescent: Some Thoughts on the Nature of Iran’s
     Ambitions in the Middle East
   Christoph Marcinkowski (2007)

125. Thinking Ahead: Shi’ite Islam in Iraq and its Seminaries (hawzah ‘ilmiyah)
     Christoph Marcinkowski (2007)

126. The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia
     Richard A. Bitzinger (2007)

127. Contested Capitalism: Financial Politics and Implications for China
     Richard Carney (2007)

128. Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army
     Samuel Chan (2007)

129. The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations
     Ralf Emmers (2007)

130. War, Peace or Neutrality: An Overview of Islamic Polity’s Basis of Inter-State Relations
     Muhammad Haniff Hassan (2007)

131. Mission Not So Impossible: The AMM and the Transition from Conflict to Peace in Aceh,
     2005–2006
     Kirsten E. Schulze (2007)

132. Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Approach to
     Terrorism and Sea Piracy
     Ralf Emmers (2007)

133. The Ulama in Pakistani Politics
     Mohamed Nawab (2007)

134. China’s Proactive Engagement in Asia: Economics, Politics and Interactions
     Li Mingjiang (2007)

135. The PLA’s Role in China’s Regional Security Strategy
     Qi Dapeng (2007)

136. War As They Knew It: Revolutionary War and Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia
     Ong Wei Chong (2007)

137. Indonesia’s Direct Local Elections: Background and Institutional Framework
     Nankyung Choi (2007)

138. Contextualizing Political Islam for Minority Muslims
     Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan (2007)

139. Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of
     Ngruki, Surakarta
     Farish A. Noor (2007)

140. Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern / Post-modern Navies of the Asia Pacific
     Geoffrey Till (2007)
141. Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?  
Irvin Lim Fang Jau  
(2007)

142. Sulawesi: Aspirations of Local Muslims  
Rohiza Ahmad Asi  
(2007)

143. Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Suharto Indonesia  
Noorhaidi Hasan  
(2007)

144. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and The Maritime Balance of Power in Historical Perspective  
Emrys Chew  
(2007)

145. New Security Dimensions in the Asia Pacific  
Barry Desker  
(2007)

146. Japan’s Economic Diplomacy towards East Asia: Fragmented Realism and Naïve Liberalism  
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu  
(2007)

147. U.S. Primacy, Eurasia’s New Strategic Landscape, and the Emerging Asian Order  
Alexander L. Vuving  
(2007)

148. The Asian Financial Crisis and ASEAN’s Concept of Security  
Yongwook Ryu  
(2008)

149. Security in the South China Sea: China’s Balancing Act and New Regional Dynamics  
Li Mingjiang  
(2008)

150. The Defence Industry in the Post-Transformational World: Implications for the United States and Singapore  
Richard A Bitzinger  
(2008)

151. The Islamic Opposition in Malaysia: New Trajectories and Directions  
Mohamed Fauz Abdul Hamid  
(2008)

152. Thinking the Unthinkable: The Modernization and Reform of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia  
Farish A Noor  
(2008)

153. Outlook for Malaysia’s 12th General Elections  
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Shahirah Mahmood and Joseph Chinyong Liow  
(2008)

154. The use of SOLAS Ship Security Alert Systems  
Thomas Timlen  
(2008)

155. Thai-Chinese Relations: Security and Strategic Partnership  
Chulacheeb Chinnanno  
(2008)

156. Sovereignty In ASEAN and The Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea  
JN Mak  
(2008)

157. Sino-U.S. Competition in Strategic Arms  
Arthur S. Ding  
(2008)

158. Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism  
Karim Douglas Crow  
(2008)

159. Interpreting Islam On Plural Society  
Muhammad Haniff Hassan  
(2008)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>Towards a Middle Way Islam in Southeast Asia: Contributions of the Gülen Movement</td>
<td>Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia</td>
<td>Evan A. Laksmana</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>The Securitization of Human Trafficking in Indonesia</td>
<td>Rizal Sukma</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>A Merlion at the Edge of an Afrasian Sea: Singapore’s Strategic Involvement in the Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Emrys Chew</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Political Risk of Overseas Investments</td>
<td>Friedrich Wu</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>The Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites</td>
<td>Jennifer Yang Hui</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>Beibu Gulf: Emerging Sub-regional Integration between China and ASEAN</td>
<td>Gu Xiaosong and Li Mingjiang</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>Islamic Law In Contemporary Malaysia: Prospects and Problems</td>
<td>Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>“Indonesia’s Salafist Sufis”</td>
<td>Julia Day Howell</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia</td>
<td>Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>Islamizing Formal Education: Integrated Islamic School and a New Trend in Formal Education Institution in Indonesia</td>
<td>Noorhaidi Hasan</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>The Implementation of Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty: Bilateral and Regional Implications</td>
<td>Do Thi Thuy</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>The Tablighi Jama’at Movement in the Southern Provinces of Thailand Today: Networks and Modalities</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>The Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at Across Western, Central and Eastern Java and the role of the Indian Muslim Diaspora</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>Significance of Abu Dujana and Zarkash’s Verdict</td>
<td>Nurfarahislnida Binte Mohamed Ismail, V. Arianti and Jennifer Yang Hui</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
177. The Perils of Consensus: How ASEAN’s Meta-Regime Undermines Economic and Environmental Cooperation
   Vinod K. Aggarwal and Jonathan T. Chow (2009)

178. The Capacities of Coast Guards to deal with Maritime Challenges in Southeast Asia
   Prabhakaran Paleri (2009)

179. China and Asian Regionalism: Pragmatism Hinders Leadership
   Li Mingjiang (2009)

180. Livelihood Strategies Amongst Indigenous Peoples in the Central Cardamom Protected Forest, Cambodia
   Long Sarou (2009)

181. Human Trafficking in Cambodia: Reintegration of the Cambodian illegal migrants from Vietnam and Thailand
   Neth Naro (2009)

182. The Philippines as an Archipelagic and Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges, and Perspectives
   Mary Ann Palma (2009)

183. The Changing Power Distribution in the South China Sea: Implications for Conflict Management and Avoidance
   Ralf Emmers (2009)

184. Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia
   Noorhaidi Hasan (2009)

185. U.S. Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia: From Manifest Destiny to Shared Destiny
   Emrys Chew (2009)

186. Different Lenses on the Future: U.S. and Singaporean Approaches to Strategic Planning
   Justin Zorn (2009)

187. Converging Peril: Climate Change and Conflict in the Southern Philippines
   J. Jackson Ewing (2009)

188. Informal Caucuses within the WTO: Singapore in the “Invisibles Group”
   Barry Desker (2009)

189. The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: A Failure in Practice
   Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan (2009)

190. How Geography Makes Democracy Work
   Richard W. Carney (2009)

191. The Arrival and Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at In West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia
   Farish A. Noor (2010)

192. The Korean Peninsula in China’s Grand Strategy: China’s Role in dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Quandary
   Chung Chong Wook (2010)

   Donald K. Emmerson (2010)

194. Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind
   Sulastri Osman (2010)
195. The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture
   *Ralf Emmers*
   (2010)

196. The Domestic Political Origins of Global Financial Standards: Agrarian Influence and the Creation of U.S. Securities Regulations
   *Richard W. Carney*
   (2010)

197. Indian Naval Effectiveness for National Growth
   *Ashok Sawhney*
   (2010)

198. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime in East Asian waters: Military and intelligence-gathering activities, Marine Scientific Research (MSR) and hydrographic surveys in an EEZ
   *Yang Fang*
   (2010)

199. Do Stated Goals Matter? Regional Institutions in East Asia and the Dynamic of Unstated Goals
   *Deepak Nair*
   (2010)

200. China’s Soft Power in South Asia
    *Parama Sinha Palit*
    (2010)

201. Reform of the International Financial Architecture: How can Asia have a greater impact in the G20?
    *Pradumna B. Rana*
    (2010)

    *Kumar Ramakrishna*
    (2010)

203. Future of U.S. Power: Is China Going to Eclipse the United States? Two Possible Scenarios to 2040
    *Tuomo Kuosa*
    (2010)

204. Swords to Ploughshares: China’s Defence-Conversion Policy
    *Lee Dongmin*
    (2010)

205. Asia Rising and the Maritime Decline of the West: A Review of the Issues
    *Geoffrey Till*
    (2010)

206. From Empire to the War on Terror: The 1915 Indian Sepoy Mutiny in Singapore as a case study of the impact of profiling of religious and ethnic minorities.
    *Farish A. Noor*
    (2010)

207. Enabling Security for the 21st Century: Intelligence & Strategic Foresight and Warning
    *Helene Lavoix*
    (2010)

208. The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian Regionalism
    *Ralf Emmers and John Ravenhill*
    (2010)

    *Bhubhindar Singh and Philip Shetler-Jones*
    (2010)

210. India’s Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities
    *Colonel Harinder Singh*
    (2010)

211. A Response to Fourth Generation Warfare
    *Amos Khan*
    (2010)
212. Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute: The Interplay of Nationalism and Natural Resources
   Ralf Emmers (2010)

213. Mapping the Religious and Secular Parties in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi, Indonesia
   Farish A. Noor (2010)

214. The Aceh-based Militant Network: A Trigger for a View into the Insightful Complex of Conceptual and Historical Links
   Giora Eliraz (2010)

215. Evolving Global Economic Architecture: Will We have a New Bretton Woods?
   Pradumna B. Rana (2010)