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A Response to Fourth Generation Warfare

Amos Khan

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ABSTRACT

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) claims that non-state insurgencies are the wave of the future. Furthermore, 4GW is presented as a radically new form of warfare and defeating it thus requires equally radical changes in military organization and thought. This theory is seriously flawed because it says nothing new, exaggerates the characteristics of insurgency and suffers from bad history. Proponents of 4GW such as Martin van Creveld and Thomas X. Hammes inaccurately distinguish insurgency as “political” and “non-Trinitarian”, when in fact both political will and Clausewitz’s Trinity are an integral part of all wars. Insurgency is claimed to be the latest “generation” of warfare. However, a survey of military history shows that warfare did not develop in four clear “generations”. Furthermore, insurgency is as old as warfare itself and its principles have been understood since antiquity. 4GW is thus both inaccurate and unnecessary. We would do well to simply abandon the theory as it is not the solution to dealing with insurgencies. Military thinkers should instead study insurgency within the larger context of history if they wish to understand it.

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A Response to 4GW

Introduction

The theory of 4GW has enjoyed considerable popularity since the September 11 attacks. Proponents of 4GW claim that non-state insurgencies will replace inter-state conventional warfare as the dominant form of conflict for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, they claim that 4GW is a radically new form of warfare and defeating it requires equally radical changes in military organization and thought. This paper will argue that the concept of 4GW is theoretically unsound. This is not to deny that governments are challenged by insurgencies or that insurgents are capable of significant military action. However, the use of 4GW as a means of explaining this phenomenon is unnecessary and inaccurate. Chapter One will examine the arguments of two notable proponents of 4GW, Martin van Creveld and Thomas X. Hammes. Chapter Two will argue that the theory is flawed because both writers draw false distinctions between insurgency and other forms of warfare. It will do so by correcting several of their misconceptions about political will, Clausewitz and the Trinity, the Treaty of Westphalia and the nation-state. Chapter Three will argue that 4GW is not only flawed but suffers from bad history by measuring it against the history of warfare in general and insurgency in particular. It will show that both the concept of “generations” of war and the assertion that insurgency is a new form of war are not supported by history. The conclusion drawn is that 4GW theory is not the solution to the problem of insurgency and should be discarded. Military thinkers should instead study insurgency within the larger context of history if they wish to understand it.

Fourth Generation Warfare

The theory of 4GW owes much of its underlying principles to the writing of Martin van Creveld, whose work The Transformation of War announced that the nature of warfare has fundamentally changed since the end of the Second World War.1 With this change, the dominant form of warfare for the past three centuries, conventional

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war, has been completely superseded by insurgency. This concept of a paradigm shift in the nature of warfare was then taken up by Thomas X. Hammes in The Sling and the Stone, arguing that insurgency was the latest generation of warfare. Both authors insist that, as a completely different form of warfare, insurgencies require a corresponding paradigm shift in military thinking if they are to be successfully dealt with.

**The Transformation of War**

In The Transformation of War, Martin van Creveld sums up the last three centuries as the development of the nation-state’s ability to wage war. Since the Peace of Westphalia, states have not only enjoyed vast increases in their capacity to wage war, but have enjoyed a monopoly on the use of military force. Van Creveld considers this form of warfare “Trinitarian”, based on the writings of Clausewitz. They were waged by states against other states, based on a threefold division of labour between the direction of the government of the state, the sacrifice of the uniformed armed forces, and the support of the people. Since the latter half of the seventeenth century, social, political, economic and technological change combined to create ever stronger states and more powerful militaries.

The end to this dominance of state-led, conventional war came with the invention of nuclear weapons. Being the culmination of destructive conventional warfare, nuclear weapons immediately made all other weapons obsolete. Given the massive arsenals of the superpowers, any nuclear exchange would mean the annihilation of both sides and perhaps civilization as a whole. Using the examples of the Korean War, the Vietnam War and other Cold War conflicts, van Creveld argues that every conventional confrontation between states in the age of nuclear weapons would inherently escalate until the nuclear option was considered, rendering conventional, “Trinitarian” warfare ineffective. Major states could no longer use their military forces to fight other states without risking nuclear Armageddon. Van Creveld argues that nuclear proliferation is inevitable. All states of any consequence

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2 Martin van Creveld, “Through a Glass, Darkly”, http://www.d-n-i.net/creveld/through_a_glass_darkly.htm
3 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
will eventually possess nuclear weapons, until major interstate warfare becomes completely impossible, because wherever nuclear weapons appear, conventional warfare disappears.\(^6\) Van Creveld also highlights the remarkable reverse trend in military growth since the Second World War. Militaries have shrunk to a twentieth of the original size because they have become completely irrelevant.\(^7\)

Instead, van Creveld points to insurgency as the only practical use of force in a world dominated by nuclear weapons. As insurgents do not directly control territory, resources or populations, they cannot be threatened by nuclear retaliation.\(^8\) Furthermore, modern insurgents are capable of defeating even the most powerful conventional militaries. Since the end of the Second World War, even the superpowers have suffered embarrassing defeats at the hands of guerrillas and terrorist groups that were many times weaker in conventional military resources. Up until the twentieth century, insurgents were easily defeated. However, with the rise of mass political movements, mass media and cheap but effective weapons, insurgents were able to defeat every major conventional military they encountered, virtually without exception.\(^9\) The wars of decolonization, Chinese Civil War, the Vietnam War, the Afghanistan War, the two Intifadas and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan all saw the victory of the insurgents. Clearly, irregular warfare is the wave of the future.\(^10\)

Irregular warfare marks a fundamental shift in the nature of warfare, according to van Creveld. It is “non-Trinitarian” as it does not involve uniformed armies or official governments. Unlike network-centric warfare, it relies on social networks rather than technological ones.\(^11\) It involves fragmented coalitions of various insurgent groups that are difficult to destroy.\(^12\) Guerrillas blend into the population, using a variety of violent and non-violent tactics to strike at their enemy’s weaknesses. Van Creveld argues that attempts to use regular military forces against insurgents are always counter-productive, because the insurgents will always possess the moral high

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\(^{6}\) Martin van Creveld, “Through a Glass, Darkly”.  
\(^{7}\) Ibid.  
\(^{8}\) Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War.  
\(^{9}\) Ibid.  
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 55.  
\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 55.
ground due to their weaker resources, in the same way that an adult facing a child will always be morally disadvantaged. The September 11 attacks, the Madrid train bombings and the London 2006 bombings demonstrate that insurgents are capable of taking the war to their enemies. Since irregular warfare is on the ascendency and regular warfare is fast becoming extinct, the nature of warfare has changed decisively compared to the past three centuries.

The Sling and the Stone

Hammes begins his work *The Sling and the Stone* with a criticism of the technology-based Defense Transformation undertaken by the United States military. He argues that this approach results from a narrow view of history that does not appreciate the great social, economic and political changes that have accompanied technological development since the Second World War. He points to recent stalemates in the Middle East as evidence that network-centric warfare is not working. Instead, he proposes that a new generation of war has emerged that will rapidly supersede previous forms of warfare. The modern insurgencies that have tied down networked American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are the latest manifestations of 4GW, a form of warfare that has been “evolving around the world over the last seven decades”. According to Hammes, 4GW has defeated even the mightiest 3GW powers, making it essential that militaries understand and adapt to fighting 4GW.

Hammes uses the generational model to trace the emergence of 4GW. He argues that different developments in different periods create suitable “conditions” for the emergence of a new generation of war. The invention of cheap firearms, the emergence of the nation-state and the increasing wealth generated by improvements in agriculture and transportation allowed the first generation of warfare to appear, relying on mass armies, the size of armies ballooning almost tenfold between Agincourt and Napoleon. This reached its peak in the Napoleonic Wars where the patriotic conscripts of the French armies overwhelmed their better-trained but

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16 Ibid., p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 18.
considerably less numerous opponents. The second generation of warfare, based on massed indirect firepower, featured the mass production of artillery with which European nations fought the First World War.\textsuperscript{18} The third generation of warfare was then perfected with the German blitzkrieg of the Second World War that used combined arms tactics, newly perfected weapons such as the tank and aircraft, and flexible operational planning to outflank the static defence lines of the enemy. Hammes identifies the keys to German success as an unflattering devotion to the military and an intellectual willingness to continually innovate and anticipate the next generation of war, implying that current militaries should do the same.\textsuperscript{19}

Hammes next introduces insurgency as 4GW. According to him, Mao Zedong was the first military theorist to define insurgency as primarily a political struggle.\textsuperscript{20} He credits Mao with understanding how mass political organizations can defeat superior military strength and then placing it at the core of his three-phase People’s War, where guerrilla warfare backed by mass political mobilization was used to shift the “correlation of forces” in the communists’ favour.\textsuperscript{21} He then credits the Vietnamese communists with further refining Mao’s People’s War by including attacks on the national will of their French and American foes. According to Hammes, the communists adopted a protracted war of attrition accompanied by extensive use of mass media and appeals to the international community to undermine first French and then American public support for the war, resulting in both countries withdrawing their troops.\textsuperscript{22} The Sandinistas were the next major innovators in the evolution of insurgency, doing away with the final conventional offensive that accompanied People’s War. By creating a broad-based coalition of various dissident groups, while simultaneously preserving overall control in their own hands, the Sandinistas gained so much power that the government collapsed without the need for much fighting.\textsuperscript{23} Finally, the first Palestinian Intifada removed the need for violent action, relying totally on mass media and the sympathies of international non-state actors to turn public opinion overwhelmingly against the Israeli Defense Forces.\textsuperscript{24} Hammes also

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 19.  
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 27–32.  
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 47.  
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 53.  
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 70–75.  
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 84–85.  
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 99–100.
attributes the success of the movement to its being a “coalition of the willing, united by an idea and sustained by a network” and not guided by the formal Palestinian leadership.\textsuperscript{25} In contrast, Hammes considers the second Al Aqsa Intifada to have failed because it was directed by the Palestinian elite and delivered a hard-line, uncompromising message that turned public opinion decisively against the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{26} Because they announced their intention to exterminate the Jewish state, they left the Israelis no choice but to harden their own resolve and respond in kind. The failure of the Al Aqsa Intifada thus reinforces the unique decentralized and political nature of 4GW.

Since the end of the Second World War, Hammes argues that great changes in the political, social and technological arenas made the rise of 4GW inevitable. The increasing power of non-state actors and the fragmentation of the colonial empires into smaller states have increased the number of political players far beyond the handful of nation-states that fought one another in previous generations of warfare.\textsuperscript{27} Many non-state actors engage in warfare but lack territory, populations or material resources that can be threatened by conventional military defeat. Taking a leaf from van Creveld’s “non-Trinitarian warfare”, Hammes concludes that governments are now forced to contend with powerful non-state actors and international bodies that can influence their decision-making processes. Communication and transportation technology have combined to produce a “globalized” world where information travels rapidly. As a result, societies and economies are more inter-connected and thus more sensitive to manipulation. Hammes points to all these conditions as favouring the rise of 4GW, featuring modern insurgencies that are able to defeat militarily and economically superior states with their superior political will. Taking advantage of an increasingly networked society, they can attack the enemy’s will directly using a combination of guerrilla tactics, assassinations, terrorist attacks and, most importantly, non-violent means such as civil disobedience, propaganda and economic sabotage.\textsuperscript{28} Insurgents gather in flexible “coalitions of the willing” with no single leader or authority, which Hammes implies are difficult for traditional militaries to understand.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 101–102.  
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 122.  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 35–36.  
or defeat. They avoid direct military confrontation and, over decades rather than days or weeks as with 3GW, use innovative techniques to convey specific political messages, either to rally support for their cause or to pressurise enemy decision-makers into conceding.

Although van Creveld does not use the term “generation” directly, both he and Hammes agree that warfare has undergone a paradigm shift in recent decades, moving away from state-centred, conventional warfare based on physical destruction of the enemy towards non-state, unconventional warfare based on psychological and political manipulation of the enemy. Both imply that traditional military thought is unable to deal with this new form of warfare. Furthermore, both claim that insurgency is the wave of the future, able to match and defeat even superpowers.

Misreading Clausewitz

Hammes and van Creveld make many distinctions between 4GW and wars of the past. 4GW is supposedly distinguished by being “non-Trinitarian” and “political” compared to conventional warfare. These claims are handicapped by a superficial analysis of past military thought, in particular the writings of Clausewitz. Both van Creveld and Hammes have been quick to condemn Clausewitz and his work *On War* as relevant only to previous wars, not 4GW. Contrary to their assertions, this paper argues that these distinctions are false and that the supposedly distinctive traits of 4GW are, in fact, common to all wars. Conventional warfare was just as “political” as 4GW, 4GW was just as “Trinitarian” as conventional warfare, and Clausewitz is just as relevant to irregular warfare as he is to its regular counterpart.

Political Will is Always Part of War

Historically, irregular fighters have typically preferred a strategy of eroding the enemy’s will rather than destroying his means to fight. With the advent of globalization and the growth of communications technology, the insurgent enjoys greater opportunities than ever before in attacking his opponent’s political will. Hammes claims that this represents the emergence of a new generation of war, one in

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29 Ibid.
which the combatant “uses all available networks—political, economic, social and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit”. This is a useful reminder that military success does not translate into victory unless it serves some political end, and a valid criticism of many historical military endeavours. The problem, however, is that Hammes is merely restating the fundamentals of grand strategy.

Hammes’ assertion that the political nature of 4GW represents a decisive break from the past is inaccurate. On the contrary, war has always been about breaking the enemy’s will to continue the struggle, the only difference being whether the participants go about this efficiently or ineptly. According to Clausewitz, war is fundamentally a clash of opposing wills. Regardless of whether one destroys an opponent’s armed forces in the field or attempts some form of “psychological judo throw”, these attacks are but the means to the end of imposing one’s will on the enemy.

There has hardly been a war where the combatants do not try to influence one another’s will. This holds true in both conventional and unconventional conflicts. Many conventional military campaigns have been waged for psychological purposes. The Savannah campaign of 1864, for example, was a “scorched earth” attempt to undermine the collective will of the American South to continue the war by destroying property, sabotaging infrastructure, dispersing the slave workforce and devastating cotton plantations, a strategy of terror in all but name. It is also common to see both the First and Second World Wars as gruelling contests of attrition, mindlessly squandering men and weapons in huge offensives, bombing raids and artillery duels. Hammes claims that such wars do not consider the “political” and “psychological” aspects compared to 4GW. However, although physical destruction undoubtedly played a major part in these conflicts, closer examination will reveal that these wars, senseless though they might seem, were just as “political” and “psychological” as 4GW purports to be. The great offensive of Verdun in the First World War was launched by the Germans with the expressed purpose of inflicting

“unacceptable” casualties on the French, forcing them to withdraw from the war. The strategic importance of Verdun virtually guaranteed that the French army would stay to be mauled and suffer massive losses. Thus the ultimate aim of this great contest of attrition was to make the enemy’s political will, rather than simply wearing down his physical capacity to resist. 34 Indeed, a physical exhaustion of any major combatant’s power during the First World War was a virtual impossibility, given the ability of a modern nation to quickly mobilize all available manpower using conscription, equip them with mass-produced weapons, ship them to the front with railroads, and coordinate everything with the telegraph. In the event, every army involved in the Great War (with the possible exception of the Americans) collapsed psychologically long before it could be destroyed as a physical fighting force. 35 The great offensives did not only have a significant political effect, they were intended to from the beginning.

Both sides also tried many ways to break the deadlock of the trenches and attack the political will of the opposing side by other means, sometimes with considerable success. German Zeppelin raids on London in 1915 might have inflicted only 1,700 deaths in six months, less than a day’s worth of skirmishing on the Western Front, but they provoked widespread panic and, for a time, led to public calls for British withdrawal from the war. 36 Other attempts, such as the 1918 “Paris gun”, this time against France, provoked similar reactions. Likewise, unrestricted submarine warfare in both wars was aimed not just at war supplies and raw materials, but at cutting off essential foodstuffs to the general population of the British Isles. The most dominant weapon of twentieth-century warfare, the aircraft, was originally conceived as a terror weapon, a means to strike directly at the hearts of the enemy. Even before the perfection of heavier-than-air fighting machines, Zeppelin airships were used in purely psychological bombing raids over allied cities. Airpower theorists of the inter-war period, such as Giulio Douhet, promoted the deliberate bombing of population centres as a means to turn enemy civilians against their own governments. 37 The Second World War thus saw concentrated bombing campaigns aimed at destroying

34 Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths*, p. 11.
the moral, rather than merely the material, resources of Britain, Germany and Japan. Hammes’ attempt to classify these conflicts as primarily, or even purely, physical contests is therefore confounded by poor use of history.

When he mentions how irregular combatants of 4GW harness forms of power other than the military, Hammes also overlooks the fact that nation-states have historically done the same in earlier conflicts. Clausewitz considered Napoleon Bonaparte to have taken war to its “absolute” form by combining the political and military direction of the state in one person, mobilizing the entire French nation, waging war with deliberate ruthlessness and attempting to control information through the various organs of the state. The First and Second World Wars, classified by Hammes as conventional, pre-4GW conflicts, were the ultimate expressions of “Total War”. This was marked by the ability of a modern state to marshal the full resources of the nation, material and moral, to pursue its political purposes. It was also marked by attempts to strike at the resources of the opposing side, of which the indiscriminate bombing of civilians and the unrestricted submarine campaign were the most obvious manifestations. In the major wars of the twentieth century, political, social, military and economic potential alike were harnessed to the maximum extent possible to pursue the political aims of the combatants.

Hammes has misunderstood the relationship between the physical and psychological destruction of an enemy’s capacity to wage war. Writers from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have always affirmed that the will is the most important factor in war. The reason why physical rather than moral destruction seems to be more popular in war is because political will is notoriously difficult to gauge. The great offensives of the First World War failed mostly because each side tended to underestimate the willpower of the other, believing that their enemy was on the ropes and that one last push would be enough to win the war. In reality, both sides were able to maintain sufficient morale to continue the struggle until 1918, when reverses on the Western Front and the failure of their own “war winning offensive” finally brought down the German High Command. In the Second World War, the massive bombing attacks also failed to break civilian morale in a timely fashion. Despite horrendous loss of life and widespread destruction, both the Japanese and the German civilian populations

remained loyal to the end. With the enemy’s will being so unpredictable, it was only natural that generals tended to default to the aim of destroying an enemy’s physical means of resistance. However, this was merely the means to the end of breaking the enemy’s will. Currently, insurgents may be more adept than some governments at reading the enemy’s will or making their military actions serve their political ends, but this should not obscure the fact that these tenets have always been part of war throughout the ages. 4GW has not made some radical new discovery about the nature of war.

Contrary to what Hammes and van Creveld claim, it is not always clear that irregular fighters are superior to their regular opponents in estimating the will of the enemy. The Vietnam War is often seen as an example of American lack of resolve, but the United States actually continued fighting for over a decade. More recently, the global jihad movement led by Al-Qaeda has underestimated the resolve of the United States, believing that spectacular attacks would cause the superpower to cease involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. The massive American counter-attack that followed the September 11 attacks was completely contrary to the predictions of the group’s leadership.

The Trinity is Universal

Both Hammes and van Creveld claim that since 4GW involves non-state actors and irregular fighters, it is “non-Trinitarian” and thus fundamentally different from “Trinitarian” warfare described by Clausewitz. This claim results from a misreading of Clausewitz. “Trinitarian” warfare is not merely about nation states. The Trinity of hostility, uncertainty and purpose are alive and well even in irregular warfare. Although the three institutions that tend to embody these tendencies are the people, the military and the government, these institutions are not limited to the forms that were common in the time of Clausewitz. In any case, states remain major players in twenty-first century warfare.

When Clausewitz wrote On War, he created the wunderliche Trinity to describe the three tendencies that characterize war: hostility, which drives the desire

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40 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
for conflict, uncertainty, which makes war unpredictable and resistant to prescriptive solutions, and purpose, which attempts to direct the war effort to achieve some useful end.\textsuperscript{42} Contrary to the claims of Van Creveld, this Trinity is present in every type of conflict, regular or irregular, ancient or modern. Indeed, the Trinity can be seen today in supposedly “non-Trinitarian” forms of warfare. Hostility, for example, is a major part of the War on Terror, with various terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda stoking resentment and anger against the West to enlist support and recruit new members. Uncertainty is particularly pertinent as well, with doubts being raised about the course of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ability of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to continue fighting, and the likelihood of further attacks worldwide. Purposes in the war stem from both religious and secular concerns, as supporters and allies of al-Qaeda are motivated not just by visions of worldwide jihad, but also political self-determination and even criminal enterprise.\textsuperscript{43}

Clausewitz further explained that these three tendencies of war generally corresponded to three institutions: hostility to the people, uncertainty to the military and purpose to the government. However, he did not insist that these institutions were the only forms in which these tendencies manifested themselves. For example, the “military” could be anything ranging from the professional state army of a superpower to a ragtag irregular guerrilla force, while the “government” is simply a ruling body that can be running anything from a global empire to a clan or village. The “people” can represent the population of any society at any point in history. In other words, the Trinity actually refers to universal forces present in any type of war throughout human history, rather than the institutions that embodied them in Clausewitz’s time. Indeed, Clausewitz specifically mentioned the non-state Tartar tribes, city-states and feudal lords when discussing the Trinity and its associated institutions.\textsuperscript{44} As the Trinity is universal, there cannot be such a thing as “non-Trinitarian” warfare as Van Creveld claims, nor can 4GW theorists claim that war has entered a new generation by becoming non-Trinitarian.

Compounding this misunderstanding is an exaggeration of the Peace of Westphalia’s importance. First proposed by van Creveld, Hammes was quick to seize

\textsuperscript{42} Carl von Clausewitz, \textit{On War}.
upon the idea that the treaty had ushered in an era where states had a monopoly on the use of military force.\textsuperscript{45} Having thus established that states and their professional armies were the only ones allowed to wage war, van Creveld then pointed to the large number of wars waged by non-state actors since the Second World War as evidence that “Trinitarian” war was on the decline. The fact that warfare is increasingly fought by parties other than national governments is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether the Peace of Westphalia actually outlawed warfare by non-state actors. Firstly, the Treaty did not even attempt to establish a state system at all. The primary purpose of the treaty, other than to settle territorial disputes between the primary combatants of the Thirty Years’ War, was to break up the Holy Roman Empire into 300 principalities, most of which would not qualify as nation-states by any stretch of the imagination.\textsuperscript{46} In effect, the treaty was a “new constitution” for the Empire, not an attempt to establish a new state system. While the princes were allowed to declare war and make alliances with outside powers, they could not take any action “against the Emperor, and the Empire, nor against the Public Peace, and this Treaty, and without prejudice to the Oath by which everyone is bound to the Emperor and the Empire”, affirming their subordination to the Holy Roman Empire.\textsuperscript{47} Secondly, the Treaty did not actually give states any sort of monopoly to wage war. As van Creveld himself admits, “cities and coalitions of cities, religious leagues and independent noblemen, to say nothing of robbers”, continued to fight.\textsuperscript{48} A more plausible explanation for the domination of warfare by nation-states after the Thirty Years’ War is the sheer cost of field professional military forces, which automatically excluded all the smaller political entities from any serious fighting and forced even large states to consolidate power in order to continue funding military adventures.\textsuperscript{49} There is certainly nothing to suggest that the Peace of Westphalia formally “outlawed” non-state warfare for almost three centuries.

Van Creveld and Hammes also contend that terrorists are not bound by “traditional” loyalties of national identity, but by non-national or trans-national

\textsuperscript{46} Antulio J. Echevarria II, \textit{Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{47} Treaty of Westphalia, Article LXV, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp
\textsuperscript{48} Martin van Creveld, \textit{The Transformation of War}, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{49} Antulio J. Echevarria II, \textit{Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths}, p. 9.
loyalties such as an ideology or religion.\textsuperscript{50} This supposedly demonstrates that states are losing their military legitimacy as would-be fighters abandon national allegiances in favour of ideological ones, and that conventional warfare will be replaced by 4GW that is supposedly better suited to the consciousness of the new age. However, from a historical standpoint, ideological alignment in war has been the norm rather than the exception. Ideology has been a major part of all wars, conventional or otherwise, involving nation-states. Despite continuing to look out for their own interests, nations tend to favour alliances with those who favoured or those who opposed similar ideologies.\textsuperscript{51} The history of the twentieth century demonstrates that nations are quite capable of waging war along ideological lines. The Second World War saw socialist and democratic governments pitted against Nazism, the enemy of both, with large trans-national alliances on both sides.\textsuperscript{52} The Cold War continued this on an even larger scale, with the entire world split between the former allies, socialist versus capitalist. The Second World War had the largest conventional battles in history, while the Cold War featured unconventional engagements between the superpowers, all of which involved nation-states. In other words, assertions by 4GW writers that traditional methods of warfare are effective only with the nation-state framework and unable to deal with some new ideological dimensions are unfounded.

In his triumphant prediction of the increasing irrelevance of governments, van Creveld overlooks the fact that states are still important players today. Even in wars typically hailed as victories of non-state actors over governments, the insurgents typically enjoyed substantial outside support. The victory of the communists in Vietnam over the American superpower, for example, would not have been possible without overwhelming material support provided by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, both powerful states. Likewise, the victory of the Afghan mujahedeen over the Russians depended greatly on outside assistance, including advanced weapons smuggled in by the United States. The communists in Malaya, in contrast, failed because they were easily isolated from outside help. The current insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and indeed, all over the world, make use of surplus Cold War weapons manufactured by the superpowers and depend on the support, whether active or passive, of populations governed by states. Rogue states such as

\textsuperscript{50} Martin van Creveld, \textit{The Transformation of War}.
\textsuperscript{51} Antulio J. Echevarria II, \textit{Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{52} Lawrence Freedman, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation”, p. 83.
Iran and even superpowers such as America have traditionally provided money, weapons, expertise, diplomatic recognition and sanctuaries to the more successful terrorist groups worldwide, from the Cold War to the current War on Terror. Other states have actively worked to deny insurgents safe havens, cut off their finances, undermine their support within the local communities, and assassinate or arrest their principal leaders. Indeed, states remain key players in the current War on Terror precisely because their policies and competence can produce conditions that favour or disadvantage the growth of terrorist groups.53

The continued importance of states in twentieth and twenty-first century conflicts is reflected in the actions of insurgent groups themselves. Instead of simply tearing down a supposedly outmoded and ineffectual organization, insurgents today have sought to emulate and integrate themselves with it. The most contemporary and successful terrorist groups today, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, are noted for their ability to provide many of the services that state governments traditionally provide in an attempt to gain legitimacy for themselves. They have established day care centres, hospitals, schools, community centres, clubs and welfare programs.54 They have then formed powerful political parties with the support garnered from these activities. Rather then destroying the fabric of society, groups like Hamas and Hezbollah have clearly integrated themselves into it and drawn most of their support from it, building strong social, political and religious ties with the local community and using violence to manipulate the political machinery of states in their favour.

Hammes and Van Creveld are right to point out deficiencies in current military trends, particularly that Defense Transformation is too focused on material destruction while neglecting the greater strategic picture. Their comments serve to remind us that political will is an integral part of war. This, however, is nothing new, and commanders throughout history have always struggled with the need to make military efforts serve political purposes. Likewise, Clausewitz’s comments on the Trinity of war can be applied to all wars, including 4GW. States did not monopolize violence in the past, and they continue to be important players in contemporary war. By drawing false distinctions, 4GW does not enlighten or advance the study of war in any significant way, but rather hinders it.

Misreading Insurgency in History

Both Hammes and van Creveld use numerous historical examples in an attempt to demonstrate the emergence of 4GW that is both distinct and superior to earlier generations of warfare. Both Hammes and van Creveld are guilty of reductionism, plucking examples from the past for examples to support their claims that war has entered a new generation while dismissing what does not measure up.55 Even a simple survey of past conflicts will reveal that the generational model of war is inadequate to describe the complexity of war, and that insurgency is neither as inevitable nor as recent as both van Creveld and Hammes claim.

War is not Generational

Hammes presents modern warfare as generational, moving from first generation massed manpower warfare, to second generation massed firepower warfare, to third generation manoeuvre warfare. He then considers insurgency the natural next stage in the progression. However, warfare cannot be so easily classified in terms of generations.

Even a brief inspection of the history of warfare throws up some serious problems with the generational model that Hammes uses. Both manoeuvre and firepower have been desirable components of the successful army since the Thirty Years’ War and possibly earlier. The simple categorization of “first generation warfare” as a contest of mobilizing ever larger formations of manpower ignores important innovations in other areas that Hammes ascribes only to later generations. For example, the Swedish Army of Gustavus Adolphus in the seventeenth century contained elements of both firepower and manoeuvre.56 Gustavus himself is often hailed as the father of modern combined arms warfare, emphasizing aggressive cavalry tactics, lighter and more mobile field artillery, more manoeuvrable infantry formations, extended firing lines, and close cooperation between the various units of the army. Likewise, Napoleon and his predecessors of the First Republic owed their success not merely to their large conscripted armies, but to the use of independent

mobile army corps and massed artillery fire to create a breakthrough, sometimes
described as “the French secret weapon of the Napoleonic Wars”.

According to the generational model, however, the seventeenth century was “first generation warfare”: massed linear tactics relying on manpower, with combined arms and manoeuvre being a part of “third generation warfare”. Similarly, the First World War is characterized as “second generation warfare”, with a reliance on massed firepower. This is only partially true. While static defences and artillery barrages were common on the Western front, the Eastern front was never completely closed off by barbed wire, allowing the Germans to execute vast encircllements of their Russian foes, the essence of “third generation” manoeuvre warfare. The deadlock on the Western Front can be attributed more to the restrictions of the local geography than to the demands of 2GW. Indeed, the war on the Western Front opened with the largest manoeuvre operation yet attempted when the Germans, following the Schlieffen Plan, attempted to use their superior strategic mobility to create a breakthrough along the Atlantic coast while maintaining a defensive posture inland, enveloping and destroying the entire French field army in the west before shifting to fight the Russians in the east.

Hammes characterizes “third generation warfare”, based on manoeuvre, as beginning with the German army in the Second World War. “Blitzkrieg”, however, was never an official concept in German military doctrine of the time, but was rather a retroactive label applied after the amazing victories won by the Germans in the early part of the war. Indeed, the term may have originated on the cover of the September 1939 issue of the Times, which portrayed General von Brauchitch and the title “Blitzkrieger”. Instead, what Hammes takes as a radical new form of warfare was merely a continuation of concepts that had originated in the late nineteenth century, a war of movement (Bewegunskrieg) as opposed to a war of fixed positions (Stellungskrieg). This was developed not because Germany was more open to military innovations than Britain or France, but because her geostrategic position guaranteed a two-front war. Germany needed to rapidly defeat France in the west before concentrating on stopping the slow but relentless Russian forces in the east.

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60 Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths*, p. 15.
Guderian himself, who pioneered the use of the tank in his book, saw it mainly as a means of achieving the breakthrough that had eluded the German High Command in the First World War. What the tank did in the Second World War, the Germans came close to doing in 1918 with their “infiltration” tactics, which stressed rapid artillery barrages followed by storm troop attacks designed to create and then penetrate gaps in the enemy lines rather than assault them directly. In the first half of 1918 the Germans overran the Allied defences and nearly achieved a decisive breakthrough. The 1918 offensives failed mainly because the supporting infantry were unable to keep up with the storm troops. Although the German High Command only managed to rectify the mistakes by adopting the tank during the inter-war period, the concept of “blitzkrieg” is actually the culmination of German military thought dating back to at least the last nineteenth century. The German High Command was not, as Hammes claims, being receptive to a developing new “generation” of warfare, but was instead following the old military cliché of trying to refight the last war.  

By tying military development to changes in society, Hammes clearly implies that military success results from observing the characteristics of the current era and from there predicting the next generation of warfare. This is a simplistic view that dismisses the complexity of warfare by limiting each “age” to a specific set of characteristics and thus a specific form of warfare. Thus Hammes asks whether insurgencies are mere “aberrations” or indications of a new generation of warfare.  

Hammes attempts to explain the persistence of older generations of war by stating that some groups or governments may not possess the capability to move on to a newer generation of warfare and thus stagnate at that level; however, this still implies a linear development in warfare. Hammes is still saying that only a single generation of warfare can exist at a time, except when a more advanced generation is beating an older one to death. History cannot be explained in simple linear patterns of growth and decline, nor can the characteristics of any age be so easily defined. It is interesting that Hammes requires a group to be “ready” to receive a new generation of war when many insurgent groups cannot even wage 1GW but are somehow capable of advanced 4GW warfare at the same time. For example, in Somalia the tribal drums of a pre-

63 Thomas X. Hammes, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation”, p. 22.
modern society signalled the arrival of United States Army rangers in helicopters. The 2001 Afghanistan campaign involved sophisticated cruise missiles and special operations teams working closely with indigenous horse cavalry from the last century. Iraq has seen modern urban insurgency of the Algerian mould accompanied by suicide bombings attempting to re-establish a pre-modern form of political Islam.\textsuperscript{66} The generational approach fails to appreciate the complexity of warfare. It is ironic that Hammes criticizes the advocates of Defense Transformation and Network-Centric Warfare for being narrow-minded when he uses the concept of “ages” and “generations” of warfare in exactly the same manner.\textsuperscript{67}

Even if it were possible to apply the generational model to warfare, the modern insurgency that Hammes proposes is not necessarily the most logical next step based on the development of the first three generations. If warfare moved from massed manpower in 1GW to overwhelming firepower in 2GW and from there to 3GW combined-arms manoeuvre operations, network-centric warfare, with its focus on small, sophisticated and highly mobile forces networked together by information technology, moving rapidly to surround and destroy a larger and more unwieldy opponent, should be next in the progression.\textsuperscript{68} It makes use of the same information age technology that Hammes identifies as key to the success of 4GW, while seeking to penetrate ever deeper into the enemy’s rear.\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, Hammes seems to ignore the fact that the very first incarnation of 4GW theorists predicted that terrorists were going to be intelligent, technologically advanced, highly independent and able to first infiltrate and then collapse a society from within, sowing mass panic.\textsuperscript{70} In effect, 4GW fighters should more logically be improved “storm troopers” than ragged insurgents.

Perhaps the reason why Hammes’ conception of 4GW seems so abrupt compared to the earlier three generations he describes is because the comparison he presents is a false one. The characteristics of the first three generations, manpower, firepower and manoeuvre, describes tactics used in regular warfare, while 4GW
describes a strategy of irregular warfare or insurgency. This is an “apples and oranges” comparison that conveniently serves Hammes’ argument for the superiority of 4GW. The previous three generations of war are thus inaccurately presented as narrowly focused on military matters, while insurgency is elevated by transcending this limitation to encompass the political, social and economic spheres as well. However, tactics are naturally subservient to grand strategy and confined primarily to the military sphere. It is thus not surprising that “firepower” compares poorly when matched up against “insurgency” as a concept. A more equal comparison might be between conventional and unconventional warfare, in which case the disparity is not as great. As mentioned previously, conventional warfare waged by nation-states has proven quite capable of encompassing the other spheres as well. The term “total war” as applied to both World Wars was derived precisely from this success. Even the network-centric warfare that Hammes criticizes recognizes the need to integrate all elements of power to pursue strategic goals. Hammes champions this integration as the key characteristic of 4GW, when in fact it has been the key to victory in all wars. The challenge is not so much recognizing this tenet, but in how one goes about integrating the various elements, each of which operates in its own distinct way. Unfortunately, neither Hammes nor van Creveld specifies how exactly this should be done. Indeed, van Creveld himself criticizes Hammes for “chewing old cuds” and not developing a viable solution to this age-old conundrum.

**Irregular Warfare is not New**

Contrary to what Hammes claims, irregular warfare is as old as warfare itself. Rather than being a new development, insurgency has existed and developed in parallel to conventional warfare for millennia. While irregular or low-intensity warfare may be more prominent today, there is nothing new or revolutionary about it to warrant its mention as a new generation of war. Hammes artificially creates a distinction between modern insurgency and those of the past where one does not exist.

In his book Hammes claims that insurgency is roughly 70 years old and credits Mao Zedong with its development. However, even a cursory review of history reveals

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72 Ibid., p. 15.
73 Martin van Creveld, “It will Continue to Conquer and Spread”, p. 56.
that insurgency has always been a part of war and that its fundamentals were
developed well before Mao Zedong adapted them for his own purposes. Written
around two and a half millennia ago, Sun Tzu’s *Art of War* recommends many
principles that Mao later incorporated into his theory of guerrilla warfare, such as
attacking an enemy’s weakness while avoiding his strengths. The German tribes in the
first century A.D. waged a protracted guerrilla campaign against the legions, which
resulted in a Roman withdrawal. 74 The Americans used guerrilla warfare against the
British during the Revolutionary War with great success. The Spanish during the
Napoleonic wars coined the term “guerrilla” (small war) when they fought the French,
who called them insurgé (insurgents), and managed to kill or tie down hundreds of
thousands of French troops. Using guerrilla tactics, the Latin American countries
under Bolivar successfully evicted the Spanish themselves a few years later. 75 Van
Creveld considers Clausewitz an outdated theorist of conventional war, yet the great
Prussian commented on the effectiveness of irregular warfare during his time,
recognizing it as an integral part of warfare and giving a series of lectures on the
subject. 76 He even urged insurrection against Napoleon after Prussia’s defeat in 1806.
His contemporary, Jomini, another recognized authority on regular warfare, was also
appreciative of guerrilla warfare, recommending it as a useful method of harassing the
enemy’s forces, threatening his supply lines and sapping his morale. 77

During the colonial period, Charles Callwell made the important observation
that insurgency was a common recourse when a country’s regular armed forces were
defeated in the field. 78 The Confederate States of America briefly considered
insurgency after defeat in the Civil War. The Boers in South Africa resorted to
guerrilla tactics after the defeat of their main armies and the British responded with
concentration camps, barbed wire and mobile columns of mounted infantry. The
United States put down a serious insurrection in the Philippines after the Spanish-
American War. “Small wars” made up the bulk of conflicts fought in the latter half of
the nineteenth century. If irregular, intra-state warfare appears to have been more

75 Ibid., p. 90.
76 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*.
common than regular warfare between 1945 and 1991, the same could be said of the period between 1845 and 1891.\(^79\) French guerrilla warfare during the Franco-Prussian War tied down large numbers of German troops and prolonged the war for several months. In the First World War, T. E. Lawrence successfully mobilized resistance against the Ottoman Empire and consistently outfought Turkish troops in the Middle East. Guerrilla tactics were common in the Second World War; indeed, van Creveld considers the Yugoslav resistance under Tito particularly effective.\(^80\)

Responding to such criticism, Hammes distinguishes Mao, and by extension modern insurgents, with being the first to promote insurgency as a “war-winning” technique, whereas insurgents operating in previous eras only resorted to guerrilla warfare after their field armies were defeated or in support of these same field armies.\(^81\) Again this distinction is artificial. The main reason for Mao resorting to an indirect strategy was the Chinese Communists’ military weakness compared to Jiang Jieshi’s Nationalists, making a conventional military confrontation hopeless and a foregone conclusion. In essence, the Communists had already been “defeated” conventionally, forcing them to adopt guerrilla warfare. In a similar fashion, the overwhelming preponderance of American conventional military might today has already “defeated” all would-be challengers, forcing them to pursue other avenues of resistance.\(^82\) Mao Zedong also clearly intended guerrilla warfare to weaken the Nationalist army and buy time for the Communists to mass their regular forces, thus the famous three stages of People’s War specifies the need for a conventional third phase. Mao is, in fact, quite clear in his writings that guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare are complementary, with the conventional forces being favoured because only they are capable of making a decision.\(^83\) Following the Second World War, the Chinese Communists engaged their opponents in numerous large-scale engagements over territory with heavy weaponry such as tanks, aircraft and artillery, and won more through conventional military skill than guerrilla tactics.\(^84\) Similarly, the Vietnamese Communists won their victory over South Vietnam with a

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\(^79\) Michael Evans, “Elegant Irrelevance Revisited”, p. 72.
\(^80\) Martin van Creveld, “It Will Continue to Conquer and Spread”, p. 55.
conventional military campaign that culminated in tanks storming the presidential compound. Why Hammes would deny that these are clear cases of irregular warfare supporting the regular effort is mystifying.\textsuperscript{85} As Clausewitz and others have written, all wars depend on political will, and all that Mao and his Vietnamese successors accomplished was to prove this maxim true.

Hammes further claims that modern insurgents display new characteristics that distinguish them from their predecessors. However, closer examination reveals that these principles were already known well before they were supposedly developed by 4GW insurgents. For example, although Hammes claims that Mao was the first to identify the political component as the most important to guerrillas, T. E. Lawrence remarked at the beginning of the twentieth century that guerrilla warfare was two-thirds political and only one third military.\textsuperscript{86} Hammes claims that insurgents adopt short-term coalitions without a single leader or central authority to combat governments, such as against the Americans in Iraq, yet ad-hoc opposition in response to a powerful invader is perfectly ordinary occurrence both in regular and irregular warfare.\textsuperscript{87} In their colonial wars, both the British in India and the French in Algeria were confronted by loose coalitions of tribes, clans and other small groups.\textsuperscript{88} The Second World War saw mutually incompatible governments forming an alliance against Nazism, while the Japanese invasion likewise drove the Chinese Communist and Nationalist camps together. Hammes claims that modern insurgents target key enemy decision-makers, yet the Irish Republican Army did the same in the late nineteenth century. In fact, insurgents have always targeted key authority figures such as government officials and businessmen on the opposing side in order to inflict maximum political and economic damage.\textsuperscript{89} Hammes claims that modern insurgents produce disproportionate effects using mass media and other non-military methods, yet this technique was also pioneered in the 1880s as “propaganda of the deed”.\textsuperscript{90} The media has long been exploited as a means to influence governments. The Spanish-American War of 1898 was triggered in part by “yellow journalism”, while the Boers

\textsuperscript{85} Thomas X. Hammes, “Response”, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{86} T. E. Lawrence, \textit{Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph} (London: Cape, 1940).
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 59.
\textsuperscript{89} Rod Thornton, “Fourth Generation”, p. 90.
relied on the liberal press in the United Kingdom to forward their cause. Hammes considers the non-violent methods of the first Intifada revolutionary, yet non-violent methods were employed in India since 1900, of which Gandhi’s campaign was the most notable, including attempts to provoke government troops into killing peaceful protestors. While insurgents and their terrorist brethren are arguably more effective today than in the past, nothing that Hammes mentions about them is inherently “new” or unprecedented.

The examples Hammes has chosen to illustrate the “development” of modern insurgency also present problems. It is important to keep the effectiveness of these insurgent movements in perspective. Supplied by the Soviet Union and captured Japanese arsenals, the Chinese Communists faced a deeply corrupt Nationalist army of suspect loyalty and leadership with very poor morale and fighting effectiveness, hardly representative of even 1GW armies, let alone 3GW. Facing competent, well-led American units in the Korean War, this former revolutionary army suffered heavy losses. Although they successfully outlasted the mighty United States, the Vietnamese were lavishly supplied by their Soviet backers, protected from direct American retaliation by China and only succeeded in achieving their aims after more than a decade of constant fighting, a wrecked economy and an atrocious cost in lives. The Sandinistas succeeded against an ineffectual and deeply unpopular government that commanded almost no public support and was overwhelmed more by a popular uprising than a concerted insurgent campaign. American intervention in both Iraq and Afghanistan was marred by lack of commitment and poor strategic choices, including the decision not to allocate sufficient troops for peacekeeping operations. The success of the insurgents was due as much to the mistakes of their enemies as to any innovative or effective strategy on their part.

Van Creveld claims that the decline in inter-state warfare is due to its increasing irrelevance. This is accurate only up to a point. Contrary to the picture of shrinking militaries that he paints, the Cold War between the two superpowers built up enormous stockpiles of weapons, much of which now supplies insurgencies with their cheap, mass-produced but effective arsenals. These stockpiles became redundant

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94 Ibid., p. 49.
only after the collapse of the Soviet Union less than 20 years ago, due more to the temporary peace that ensued than anything modern insurgents have done or are capable of doing. Contrary to the picture of terrorists being capable of defeating regular forces at will, most insurgent activity has been confined to the third world, places where the instruments of state power are weak or non-existent and where the more capable forces of the developed world are at a disadvantage in terms of culture, politics language and geography. So far, insurgency has been far less effective in places where the state is strong, namely the developed world. Contrary to the idea of terrorists being able to launch attacks on first world countries, even the most powerful terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda have yet to prove that they are capable of repeating the September 11 attacks.95 The major example of terrorism in the first world, the Northern Ireland campaign, ended in a government victory, a fact that van Creveld himself admits.96

Van Creveld’s argument for the inherent superiority of insurgents is not convincing. It is not automatically a given that insurgents are the political and military equivalent of children. As the second Intifada and the Northern Ireland campaign demonstrate, insurgents can easily be labelled as criminals and mass murderers. Indeed, the label “terrorist” carries intensely negative connotations, requiring the use of euphemisms such as “freedom fighter” in order to describe irregular allies. Rather, the moral high ground is won by the side that is better able to manipulate public opinion, a contest where governments are not automatically at a disadvantage.

The theories of Hammes and van Creveld cannot withstand even a cursory examination of the history of warfare in general and insurgency in particular. War is not generational in nature, nor does it follow the pattern that Hammes so meticulously lay out. Insurgency is not new, and 4GW improperly distinguishes it as a new form of warfare when in fact many of its principles and weaknesses are already well-known. The theory of 4GW is thus both inaccurate and irrelevant.

95 Collin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century, p. 242.
96 Martin van Creveld, The Changing Face of War.
Conclusion

Hammes and van Creveld ignore important continuities in military thought and their theories suffer from bad history. They make false distinctions between insurgency and regular warfare with their claims that the former is more “political” and “non-Trinitarian” compared to the latter. They also make the claim that the nation-state is losing its monopoly over warfare. A review of theorists such as Clausewitz and of military history in general will reveal that none of these claims is true, and that existing military theory can easily accommodate modern insurgency. A further review of the history of warfare and insurgency’s place in it reveals that war does not evolve through generations, and that insurgency is much older and more complex than is claimed. By drawing distinctions where none exist and imposing a theory of warfare which does not fit the facts, 4GW is a flawed and unnecessary lens with which to examine recent trends in warfare. It is not as revolutionary as it claims to be, and should be abandoned. Insurgency is an old problem, not a radically new one. Its principles are already understood and accommodated within general military theory, and there exists a significant body of practical experience on dealing with it. Military thinkers would learn more about insurgency by studying Clausewitz and insurgency in history than they will by sticking to an empty theory. A proper understanding of insurgency is necessary if we are to deal with it properly, but 4GW cannot give us that understanding.
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