<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Reflections on defence security in East Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Ball, Desmond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/10220/9053">http://hdl.handle.net/10220/9053</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 237

REFLECTIONS ON DEFENCE SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

Desmond Ball

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore

27 April 2012
About RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies when it was established in July 1996, RSIS’ mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis,
- Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy,
- Foster a global network of like-minded professional schools.

GRADUATE EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Thus far, students from more than 50 countries have successfully completed one of these programmes. In 2010, a Double Masters Programme with Warwick University was also launched, with students required to spend the first year at Warwick and the second year at RSIS.

A small but select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students who are supervised by faculty members with matching interests.

RESEARCH

Research takes place within RSIS’ six components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (Centre for NTS Studies, 2008); the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN, 2008); and the recently established Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS, 2011). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region.

The school has four professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to conduct research at the school. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations and the Bakrie Professorship in Southeast Asia Policy.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.
Abstract

This paper recounts the East Asian experience with the construction of Defence-related architecture to date. It recalls some earlier history of the ARF, viz: the adoption of a Concept Paper, containing a large menu of possible confidence-building measures and other proposals for security cooperation, including numerous Defence-related measures, in 1995. It also describes in some detail the recent history of the ASEAN-led forums for Defence dialogue and cooperation which contributes to the identification and elucidation of at least some of the principal elements of a ‘Southeast Asian Defence Model’ which frames the agenda for prospective cooperation. The paper discusses recent developments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU), and argues that the purposes, structures, operational modalities and achievements of these organisations are not central to any consideration of East Asian security architecture. On the other hand, their recent experiences in important areas such as peace-keeping, missile defence and cyber security warrant serious reflection. The paper offers some proposals concerning half a dozen areas for substantive future consultation and cooperation by the constituent mechanisms of the Defence component of the East Asian security architecture. They involve a composition of the unremitting security challenges requiring regional resolution and the principal elements of a Southeast Asian Defence Model, as manifested in the record of achievements to date. Construction of the Defence part of the architecture sufficiently robust to effectively address the regional security challenges will require both reform of the Defence pieces into a more integrated, coherent and efficient structure and also disposal of some of the more dysfunctional aspects of the Southeast Asian Defence Model.

***********************

Desmond Ball is Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, Canberra. (He was Head of the centre from 1984 to 1991). Professor Ball is the author or editor of more than 50 books or monographs on technical intelligence subjects, nuclear strategy, Australian defence and security
REFLECTIONS ON DEFENCE SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

There is a growing perception that the Defence pieces of the security architecture in East Asia have recently achieved considerable momentum with respect to the institutionalisation of regional cooperation, and, indeed, that the Defence processes are now moving faster than Foreign Ministry-led processes associated with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

This paper recounts the East Asian experience with the construction of Defence-related architecture to date. It recalls some earlier history of the ARF, viz: the adoption of a Concept Paper, containing a large menu of possible confidence-building measures and other proposals for security cooperation, including numerous Defence-related measures, in 1995. It also describes in some detail the recent history of the ASEAN-led forums for Defence dialogue and cooperation, i.e., the ARF’s ‘Defence Track’ and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus processes. In addition, it discusses the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), an annual forum for meetings of Defence Ministers. This discussion should contribute to the identification and elucidation of at least some of the principal elements of a ‘Southeast Asian Defence Model’ which frames the agenda for prospective cooperation.

Before beginning this East Asian excursion, however, the paper discusses recent developments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU). I am not persuaded that the purposes, structures, operational modalities and achievements of these organisations are central to any consideration of East Asian security architecture. On the other hand, their recent experiences in important areas such as peace-keeping, missile defence and cyber security warrant serious reflection.

Finally, this paper offers some proposals concerning half a dozen areas for substantive future consultation and cooperation by the constituent mechanisms of the Defence component of the East Asian security architecture. They involve a composition of the unremitting security challenges requiring regional resolution and the principal elements of a Southeast Asian Defence Model, as manifested in the record of achievements to date. Construction of the Defence part of the architecture
sufficiently robust to effectively address the regional security challenges will require both reform of the Defence pieces into a more integrated, coherent and efficient structure and also disposal of some of the more dysfunctional aspects of the Southeast Asian Defence Model.

The NATO and EU models

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is a military alliance of countries from North America (the US and Canada) and Europe, formed pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949, at the outset of the Cold War, to provide collective defence. As enshrined in Article 5: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force’.1

During the Cold War, NATO was on the front-line. Any large-scale war between the US and the Soviet Union would have involved the European theatre. Any nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union would very likely have started with a theatre nuclear war in Europe. The US had a peak of approximately 7,300 tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe in 1971.2

NATO had 17 member countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the UK, the US and West Germany) in the 1980s. It now has 28 member countries, including Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, but notably neither Russia nor the Ukraine.

NATO is a military organisation, with a military command structure. Its headquarters is called the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, or SHAPE, and is now located in Brussels, Belgium. Its Military Committee, which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the member nations, is responsible for providing guidance to its

---

two force commanders, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). A Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is responsible for the development of policy and plans concerning nuclear matters. There are still about 200 US B61 gravity nuclear bombs scattered around air bases in western Europe.

It is important to note, as the NATO Web-site states, that:

NATO has no standing army. Instead, individual member countries make commitments as to the types and numbers of forces that will be made available to the Alliance to carry out agreed tasks or operations. These forces remain under national control until called for and are then placed under the responsibility of NATO military commanders.3

There are three major NATO activities that I want to mention here. First, NATO has developed robust capabilities, command structures and operational concepts for the performance of large-scale interventions. Initially, these were presumed to be for employment within Europe, where humanitarian, refugee and other issues were of direct and material interest to members of the alliance. NATO’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-95 began as its ‘first “peace-keeping” intervention’, although it gradually expanded to include large-scale air operations and the deployment of approximately 60,000 soldiers.4 The Kosova War in 1999 was promoted by NATO countries as ‘the first humanitarian war’.5

Its commitment to the Afghanistan conflict, maintained since 2001, was its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area.6 NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 was ‘a new kind of operation’. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that he saw the Libya operation ‘as a template for future NATO missions’. Critics argued that the Libyan intervention was ‘a long way from what NATO still insists is its core, founding mission: to protect its members’ territory and population’, and that NATO was ‘clearly taking the rebel side in a civil war [against Muammar Gaddafi]’.7

In the case of Iraq in 2003, members of NATO contributed forces to the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, but as national contributions. NATO later, from 2004 until December

2011, sent a NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) to help Iraq ‘create effective armed forces and, ultimately, provide for its own security’. 8

Second, NATO has embarked on an ambitious ballistic missile defence (BMD) program, identifying missile defence as a central element of its ‘core task of collective defence’. In March 2005, it agreed to develop an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD), to protect deployed forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and at the Lisbon Summit meeting in November 2010 it agreed to extend the ALTBMD system to offer protection to populations across the entire territory of the alliance. NATO provides the Command, Control and Communications capability, integrating the sensor systems, command and control systems and interceptor missiles of the member countries, while the US has provided additional interceptor missiles and a new early warning radar in Turkey specifically for the NATO program. 9 Twenty-four land-based SM-3 interceptor missiles are being deployed in Romania (at the Deveselu Air Base near Caracel), and are scheduled to be operational in 2015, and another 24 land-based SM-3 missiles are being deployed in Poland, to be operational in 2018. Spain and the US agreed on 5 October 2011 that four US Navy Aegis-equipped ships, with SM-2 and SM-3 missiles, would be based at Rota, Spain. The X-band AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey became operational in January 2012, in the eastern province of Malatya; it is evidently intended to provide warning of ballistic missile launches from Iran.10

There is a possibility that NATO might extend cooperation with respect to ballistic missile defence to India. It was reported in September 2011 that a senior NATO official had told a visiting group of Indians that: ‘You [India] have a missile threat that confronts you. We [NATO] have a missile threat that confronts us. Our need to defend against these missile threats might be the same’, a senior NATO official said. The cooperation would mainly involve technology exchange, as the

---

geospatial aspects of respective NATO and Indian ballistic missile trajectories are quite different.\textsuperscript{11}

And, third, Cyber Defence has become another important new area of cooperation for NATO. It has 70,000 computers in 58 locations in 31 countries. It is concerned about inter-operability of information systems in Coalition operations, as well as preventing and mitigating cyber attacks and providing ‘assured information-sharing’.\textsuperscript{12} Prompted by a series of major cyber attacks on public and private institutions in Estonia in April and May 2007, NATO implemented ‘a number of new measures aimed at improving protection against cyber attacks’, and began development of ‘a NATO cyber defence policy’. On 8 June 2011, NATO Defence Ministers approved a new ‘NATO Policy on Cyber Defence’ that sets out ‘a clear vision for efforts in cyber defence throughout the Alliance’. It envisages ‘a coordinated approach to cyber defence across the Alliance with a focus on preventing cyber attacks and building resilience’. NATO’s cyber activities, including the ‘key role’ of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), are described on its Web-site as follows:

At the working level, the NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB) has the responsibility for coordinating cyber defence throughout NATO Headquarters and its associated commands and agencies. The NATO CDMB comprises the leaders of the political, military, operational and technical staffs in NATO with responsibilities for cyber defence.

The NATO Consultation, Control and Command (NC3) Board constitutes the main body for consultation on technical and implementation aspects of cyber defence.... NATO’s Consultation, Control and Command Agency (NC3A) bears specific responsibilities for identifying the statement of operational requirements and acquisition and implementation of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities.

Lastly, the NATO Communication and Information Services Agency (NCSA), through its NCIRC Technical Centre, is responsible for provision of technical and operational cyber security services throughout NATO. The NCIRC [NATO Computer Incident Response Capability] has a key role in responding to any cyber aggression against the Alliance. It provides a means for handling


and reporting incidents and disseminating important incident-related information to system/security management and users. It also concentrates incident handling into one centralised and coordinated effort, thereby eliminating duplication of effort.\textsuperscript{13}

In December 2011, NATO organised a large-scale, three-day exercise in which representatives from every member country ‘worked together to prevent various simulated computer viruses and malicious programmes from infiltrating their networks’.\textsuperscript{14}

The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union which traces its origins to the European Economic Community (EEC) or ‘Common Market’. It has 27 member states (and four candidate countries). There are 17 countries still outside the Union, including avowed neutrals such as Switzerland and, of course, Russia. The EU’s military arm is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), accepted in June 1999 (as the European Security and Defence Policy), according to which the member countries pledged to ‘defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe’.\textsuperscript{15}

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established by the EU on 12 July 2004 to ‘(i) improve the EU’s defence capabilities especially in the field of crisis management; (ii) promote EU armaments cooperation; (iii) strengthen the EU defence industrial and technological base and create a competitive European defence equipment market; [and] (iv) promote research, with a view to strengthening Europe’s industrial and technological potential in the defence field’.\textsuperscript{16}

According to the EU’s Web-site: ‘The EU has no standing Army. Instead it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by EU countries for peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian missions. In order to respond quickly, the EU has established battlegroups of about 1,500 forces each. Two battlegroups are on standby

\textsuperscript{14} ibid.
at any given time’. Since 1999, EU peace-keeping forces have served in more than ten places, including Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosova, Georgia, Ukraine-Moldova, Sudan, Palestine and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.\textsuperscript{18}

However, a critic at the Atlantic Council has described the CSDP as ‘a fantasy’. He notes that ‘the EU still lacks a coordinated defence outside NATO’. He dismisses the peace-keeping efforts as having been ‘minor’.\textsuperscript{19}

In June 2011, the EU began establishing an EU-CERT [Computer Emergency Response Team] to ensure a coordinated response to cyber attacks against EU institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament.\textsuperscript{20}

The EU and NATO-EU cooperate closely with respect to defence matters. Some of the EU interventions have been dependent on NATO assets, beginning with its intervention in Macedonia in March 2003, where it formally took over from the initial NATO-led operation. But there are also major problems in the relationship. One involves membership: Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004, causing anguish in Turkey, a NATO ally but not yet a member of the EU. Second, the EU itself has not yet decided how far it wants to go down the defence track. It has still not decided whether it should have ‘a permanent planning and operational headquarters’. Third, Washington was unhappy with ‘the EU’s sudden move towards autonomy’ and the possibility of this detracting from NATO.\textsuperscript{21} These issues of membership, inability to take hard decisions, and US sensitivities obviously have some resonance in the Asia-Pacific region too.

The closest analogue to NATO in Southeast Asia was the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), established by the Manila Conference in September

1954 in an ambitious attempt at establishing a multilateral or collective security arrangement. It was created as part of the same energy that gave birth to NATO in 1949, but the logic of this strategy did not fit local conditions in Southeast Asia, where interests were (and remain) quite divergent and subversion rather than direct Communist frontal assault was the main threat, and the effort was ultimately doomed to failure.22

The ARF Concept Paper, Brunei Darussalam, August 1995

I do not want to dismiss all aspects of NATO and EU cooperative activities. They have a wealth of organisational and operational experience which it would be foolish to ignore. There are aspects of NATO’s ‘logics of intervention’, ballistic missile defence cooperation, and its cooperation with respect to Cyber Defence which warrant close scrutiny. However, I want to move on here to discuss the ARF’s first endeavour at codifying its operational modalities and proffering a comprehensive litany of cooperative measures that should be considered for possible implementation, viz: the ARF Concept Paper, produced by the ASEAN Senior Officials in May 1995 and adopted by ARF Ministers at their second ARF meeting in Brunei Darussalam in August.23

Although it is rarely referred to in recent years, it remains the fundamental basis of the ARF’s activities. For more than a decade, it was a principal yardstick for measuring and assessing the progress of the ARF – and hence of the multilateral security cooperation process in the Asia-Pacific region more generally. One of its basic principles was that, because ‘the region is remarkably diverse,... the ARF should recognise and accept the different approaches to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues’. Another was that: ‘The ARF should... progress at a pace comfortable to all participants. The ARF should not move ‘too fast for those who want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast’.24 The Concept Paper outlined ‘a gradual evolutionary approach to security cooperation’, which was envisaged to take place in three stages:

24 Ibid.
Stage 1: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures;

Stage 2: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms; and

Stage 3: Development of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms.

With respect to Stage 3, the *Concept Paper* stated that:

It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms for conflict resolution in the immediate future. The establishment of such mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue as they proceed to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability.\(^\text{25}\)

The *Concept Paper* covers some three dozen proposals for CSBMs, preventive diplomacy, maritime cooperation and other cooperative measures. These are divided into two lists: the first (Annex A) containing ‘measures which can be explored and implemented by ARF participants in the immediate future’; and, the second (Annex B) being ‘an indicative list of other proposals which can be explored over the medium and long-term by ARF participants and also considered in the immediate future by the Track Two process’.

**Table 1: The ARF Agenda, 1995**

**ANNEX A: IMMEDIATE 1995-96**

1. **Confidence-building measures**

   **Principles**
   1. The development of a set of basic principles to ensure a common understanding and approach to interstate relations in the region; and
   2. Adoption of comprehensive approaches to security.

   **Transparency**
   3. Dialogue on security perceptions, including voluntary statements of defence policy positions;
   4. Defence Publications such as Defence White Papers or equivalent documents as considered necessary by respective governments;
   5. Participation in UN Conventional Arms Register;
   6. Enhanced contacts, including high level visits and recreational activities;
   7. Exchanges between military academies, staff colleges and training;
   8. Observers at military exercises, on a voluntary basis; and
   9. Annual seminar for defence officials and military officers on selected international security issues.

---

\(^{25}\) Ibid.
II Preventive diplomacy

1. Develop a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes, taking into account the principles in the UN Charter and the TAC;
2. Promote the recognition and acceptance of the purposes and principles of the TAC and its provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes, as endorsed by the UNGA in Resolution 47/53 (B) on 9 December 1992; and
3. Seek the endorsement of other countries for the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in order to strengthen its political and moral effect (as endorsed by the Programme of Action for ZOPFAN).

III Non-proliferation and arms control

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).

IV Peacekeeping

1. Seminars/Workshops on peacekeeping issues; and
2. Exchange of information and experience relating to UN Peacekeeping Operations.

V Maritime security cooperation

Disaster prevention.

ANNEX B: MEDIUM AND LONG TERM

I Confidence-building measures

1. Further exploration of a Regional Arms Register;
2. Regional security studies centre/coordination of existing security studies activities;
3. Maritime information data bases;
4. Cooperative approaches to sea lines of communication, beginning with exchanges of information and training in such areas as search and rescue, piracy and drug control;
5. Mechanism to mobilise relief assistance in the event of natural disasters;
6. Establishment of zones of cooperation in areas such as the South China Sea;
7. Systems of prior notification of major military deployment, that have region-wide application; and
8. Encourage arms manufacturers and suppliers to disclose the destination of their arms exports.

II Preventive diplomacy

1. Explore and devise ways and means to prevent conflict;
2. Explore the idea of appointing Special Representatives, in consultation with ARF members, to undertake fact-finding missions, at the request of the parties involved to an issue, and to offer their good offices, as necessary; and
3. Explore the idea of establishing a Regional Risk Reduction Centre as suggested by the UN Secretary-General in his Agenda For Peace and as commended by UNGA Resolution 47/120 (see section IV, operative para 4). Such a centre could serve as a data base for the exchange of information.

III Non-proliferation and arms control

A regional or sub-regional arrangement agreeing not to acquire or deploy ballistic missiles.

IV Peacekeeping

Explore the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping centre.

V Maritime security cooperation

1. A multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents that apply to both local and external navies;
2. Sea Level/Climate Monitoring System;
3. Establishment of an ASEAN Relief and Assistance Force and a Maritime Safety (or Surveillance) Unit to look after the safety of the waters in the region;
4. Conventions on the Marine Environment
   • Dumping of Toxic Wastes
   • Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution
5. Maritime surveillance; and
6. Explore the idea of joint marine scientific research.

The terms ‘immediate future’ and ‘medium and long-term’ were not defined, but it was generally reckoned by the ARF Senior Officials in 1995 that Annex A should be achieved in 1-2 years, while some of the measures in Annex B could take 3-5 years and others perhaps a decade or so. In terms of the progression from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, dialogue and consultation about the latter were to begin immediately, with the expectation that some preventive diplomacy mechanisms would be devised and emplaced within about five years and some conflict resolution measures in about 10 years.

According to this schedule, the proposals contained in both Annexes A and B should have been implemented years ago. In fact, there was considerable progress
with most of the 16 measures contained in Annex A during the late 1990s. Most of them were fairly simple, such as the organisation of ‘seminars/workshops on peacekeeping issues’, ‘exchanges between military academies [and] staff colleges’, and ‘enhanced contacts, including high level visits and recreational activities’. Some required novel activity on the part of many of the members, such as the preparation and publication of Defence White Papers or ‘equivalent documents’, although some of the products have involved little real transparency’. An important achievement was the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, which entered into force in March 1997. Some of the proposals in Annex A made little headway, however, such as the development of ‘a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes’.

Many of the 19 measures listed in Annex B have also been adopted. This is especially the case with regard to maritime CSBM, where there has been considerable progress with the development of maritime information databases, such as the Australian-developed Strategic Maritime Information System (SMIS). A draft ‘multilateral agreement on the avoidance of naval incidents’ was produced by the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation (as CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 on ‘Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation’) in December 1997 and submitted to the ARF in early 1998, but it was never acted upon.

Other important proposals also stagnated, such as the notion of a Regional Arms Register. Some were quite ambitious, such as the ‘establishment of zones of cooperation in areas such as the South China Sea’. More generally, there was no progress with the institutionalisation of conflict resolution or arms control, and only modest progress with preventive diplomacy.

Assessment of the success rates with respect to the 35 measures contained in Annexes A and B is useful for informing consideration of the sorts of proposals which are likely to be acceptable to ARF countries and hence might be emplaced to support the evolving Southeast Asian Defence architecture. It seems that, in general, three conditions were necessary for acceptance. First, the measure must not be complex but must be easy to implement, such as enhancing Defence contacts through ‘high level visits and recreational activities’. Second, it must easy attract a broad consensus, or at least not be opposed by any single member country. And, third, it must not involve
any infringement on the principle of non-interference or any derogation of sovereignty.

The ARF’s ‘Defence Track’

The desirability of substantial participation of defence personnel (both civilian and uniformed) in the ARF process was recognised by the ARF at the outset, and since 1996-97 several concrete steps have been taken. These began at the SOM and ISG levels, but have more recently been extended to the Ministerial level.

In 1997, the ARF SOM introduced an ‘informal luncheon’ for defence officials attending the meeting to discuss defence-related matters. It was agreed in 1999-2000 that ‘participation in [the] Leaders Retreat at [the] ARF SOMs should continue to be [the] SOM leader plus one in order to accommodate participation by defense officials’. In July 2004, the ARF Foreign Ministers agreed at their 11th ARF meeting that an ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) should be convened back-to-back with the annual ARF SOM, and that it should include defence as well as Foreign Ministry officials. The first held ASPC was held in Beijing in November 2004, and the second in Vientiane in May 2005; the sixth was held in Phuket in May 2009.

At the ISG level, most of the delegations at the meetings of the ISG on Confidence-building in Honolulu in November 1998 and in Bangkok in March 1999 included defence officials. They ‘exchanged views and information on their respective defense policies, including defense conversion, and reviewed their political-military and defense dialogues, high-level defense contacts, joint training and personnel exchanges with fellow ARF participants’. Subsequent ISG meetings have included a Defense Officials’ Lunch for informal discussions ‘on issues of common interest’. These gatherings are used to explore and promote practical cooperative measures. In 2002, Singapore produced a ‘Concept Paper on Defence Dialogue within the ARF’, which proposed institution of ARF Defence Officials’

26 Co-Chairmen’s Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, Held in Honolulu, USA, 4-6 November 1998, and in Bangkok, Thailand, 3-5 March 1999, p. 20.
Dialogues (ARF-DOD), and which was considered and endorsed at the 9th ARF Ministerial meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan in July 2002. The ARF-DODs are held at least three a year, coincident with the annual ARF Ministerial meeting, ARF SOM meeting and an ISG meeting.

Four ARF-DOD meetings were held in 2010.\(^29\) The first was in Nha Trang in Vietnam’s central province of Khanh Hoa on 18 March. It focused on two main topics: (i) regional responses to mitigation of natural disasters, and (ii) strengthening the ARF’s ‘Defence Track’.\(^30\) The second was in Danang in central Vietnam on 18 May. It focused on ‘boosting military cooperation to cope with climate change’.\(^31\) The third was in Hanoi on 22 July, coincident with the 17\(^{th}\) ARF Ministerial meeting, and the fourth was in Bali, Indonesia, on 29 November.

There were three ARF-DOD meetings in 2011. The first was in Sydney on 6 April, immediately preceding the meeting of the ARF ISG on CBMs and Preventive Diplomacy. The second was in Surabaya, Indonesia, on 7 June, coincident with an ARF SOM meeting. It discussed ‘the implications to the region of the turmoils in North Africa and the Middle East, the various challenges in combating piracy in Somalia/Gulf of Aden, and in addressing terrorism’.\(^32\) The third was in Phnom Penh on 7 December. It discussed ways to strengthen cooperation with respect to (i) peace-keeping operations, and (ii) maritime security.\(^33\)

On 1-2 May 2008, immediately prior to the ARF SOM and ARF-DOD meetings in Singapore, Australia and Indonesia organised a Disaster Relief ‘Table Top’ Exercise (or ‘Map’ Exercise) in Jakarta to ‘improve the speed and effectiveness of multinational civil and military disaster response capabilities between the 27


participants of the [ARF]. In July 2008, the 15th ARF Ministerial meeting in Singapore endorsed a proposal by the Philippines and the US to conduct an ARF Disaster Relief Exercise, called a Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR), to ‘demonstrate ARF national capabilities in response to an affected country’s request for assistance and build regional assistance capacity for major, multinational relief operations’. The ARF’s first ‘field exercise’, it was held in May 2009 and used a simulated scenario where Manila and Central Luzon were devastated by a super-typhoon, and regional countries contributed assets and personnel to assist relief operations.

On 16 March 2011, Indonesia hosted a large-scale Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx). It was formally opened by Indonesia’s Vice President Boediono, at Manado in North Sulawesi, and involved about 3,000 observers and exercise players responding to a massive earthquake and a subsequent tsunami in eastern Indonesia. Boediono said that ‘the ARF DiREx Exercise would examine and prepare Standard Operating Procedures in disaster management for those instances when the international community is involved, [and] provide strategic inputs and recommendations to ARF member states with regard to Disaster Management’.

The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)

In 2005-06, the ASEAN Secretariat produced a ‘Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting’, which was the basis for the inaugural ADMM held in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006. The ASEAN Defence Ministers agreed at this meeting that ‘the ADMM should be an integral part of ASEAN, that it should add-value to and complement the overall ASEAN process, and that it should also be open, flexible and outward-looking in respect of actively

engaging ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners as well as ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF. The Ministers also agreed that:

... the specific objectives of the ADMM would be (a) to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security; (b) to give guidance to existing senior defence and military officials dialogue and cooperation in the field of defence and security within ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue partners; (c) to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness; and (d) to contribute to the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC).37

The Ministers also ‘expressed support for the ARF as the leading cooperative security process towards promoting peace and stability among countries in the Asia-Pacific region’, and agreed to establish an ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (or ADSOM) to support the activities of the ADMM.38 The second ADMM was held in Singapore in November 2007 and the third meeting in Pattaya in Thailand in February 2009. In addition, an ADMM Retreat was held in Bangkok in November 2009.39 The fourth ADMM was held in Hanoi in May 2010.40

The fifth ADMM meeting was held in Jakarta in May 2011. The Ministers ‘affirmed freedom of navigation in the East Sea in accordance with international laws, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’; they reiterated the commitment ASEAN member states to ‘fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the East Sea, looking towards the approval of the Code of Conduct to further promote peace and stability in the region’; and they ‘agreed to establish a joint committee to coordinate the use of ASEAN military assets for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief’. They also accepted three papers, viz: one setting out the ADMM’s three-year Work Plan for 2011-2013, the second concerning ‘the establishment of an ASEAN peace-keeping centres’ network’, and the third concerning the development of a mechanism for ‘ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration’.41

---

38 Ibid.

The first ADMM-Plus meeting was held in Hanoi in October 2010. It was attended by Defence Ministers from the ten ASEAN member countries and eight Dialogue Partners, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. The focus was on non-traditional security threats, such as natural disasters, pandemics, and the security implications of climate change and environmental deterioration. China’s Defence Minister, Liang Guanglie, stated that: ‘Non-traditional security threats are transnational and unpredictable, and require joint response. We support ADMM-Plus in focusing on non-traditional cooperation’. The second meeting is scheduled to be held in Brunei Darussalam in 2013.

It was initially agreed that the ADMM would continue to meet annually but that the ADMM-Plus meetings would be held only every three years. However, it has already become widely accepted that this interval is far too long for the organisation to have any direct effect on unfolding security issues. I have heard suggestions for biennial meetings, but I believe that the ADMM should move as soon as possible to instituting annual meetings with its Plus partners.

Further, consideration should be given to closer alignment of the ARF ‘Defence Track’ and ADMM-Plus processes, including coincidental meetings at the SOM level and even at the Ministerial level, with ARF Foreign Ministers and ADMM-Plus Defence Ministers meeting both separately and jointly at a common venue.

---

As noted above, the ARF already holds a biannual ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogues (ARF-DOD), coincident with the annual ARF Ministerial meeting and an ISG meeting. At the SOM level, an ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC), which includes Defence officials, is convened back-to-back with the annual ARF SOM.

Annual ADMM-Plus meetings would allow the ADMM, ADMM-Plus and ADSOM processes to be integrated with these ARF ‘Defence Track’ arrangements.

**ASEAN Military Dialogue**

In addition to the ARF ‘Defence Track’ and the ADMM process, ASEAN defence forces engage in a variety of high-level military-to-military dialogue, including with respect to perceptions of security challenges and prospective cooperative activities. ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces, and Chiefs of Armies, Navies and Air Forces meet at annual or regular meetings, such as ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) since 2001, the ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM) since 2000, the ASEAN Navy Interaction (ANI) since 2001, and the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference (AACC) since 2004. There is also a regular ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting (AMIIM).

The seventh ACDFIM in March 2010 resolved ‘that militaries in ASEAN need to work closer together in response to non-traditional security concerns as terrorism, natural disasters, infectious diseases, food and energy security, climate change, human trafficking, illegal arms trade and piracy’. Also at this ACDFIM:

ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces also agreed to consider the building of a mechanism for cooperative activities of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). They adopted a 2-year workplan, covering annual meetings and seminars/workshops that aim to share experience and expertise in areas of maritime security, peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism as well as exchange activities among ASEAN militaries. According to this workplan, the ASEAN Chiefs of Military Medical Meeting and a Table Top exercise will be held in 2011 for the first time. ACDFIM’s decisions are important in that they directly guide the activities of effective practical cooperation in the coming time.45

In July 2011, Indonesia and Singapore co-hosted the ACDFIM’s ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table Top Exercise (ASEAN HADR

---

TTX), held in both countries, to ‘promote practical and tangible cooperation among ASEAN militaries in HADR’. According to the Singapore Armed Forces Chief of Army, Major General Ravinder Singh:

This inaugural HADR TTX validated the standard operating procedures and guidelines for the Utilisation of Military Capabilities under the AADMER [ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response] framework. The exercise also allowed ASEAN Militaries to familiarise ourselves with one another’s modus operandi, and enhanced our inter-operability and preparedness for HADR operations.46

The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD)

The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), held each year in Singapore, was established by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2002, before the ADMM process began, to provide ‘a forum in which Defence Ministers could engage in dialogue aimed at building confidence between their military establishments, while at the same time fostering practical security cooperation’.47 The 2010 meeting was attended by high-level representatives of 28 countries The attendees now include the Defence Ministers of the 10 ASEAN countries, the US Secretary of Defense, and China’s Minister of National Defence, as well as the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) and permanent or under-secretaries at Defence Ministries. The IISS has emphasised that, ‘while the Shangri-La Dialogue is above all a Track One inter-governmental meeting, the participation of “non-official” delegates has from the beginning served to animate and enrich the summit’s proceedings’. The 2011 meeting had 345 delegates, counting both government and non-official participants.48

The SLD has had considerable policy impact. The third meeting in June 2004 was very useful for dialogue between the US and the littoral states with respect to the enforcement of security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The SLD in 2008 led to a study of ‘confidence-building measures in relation to the regional proliferation of submarines’. At the tenth meeting in June 2011, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dato’

---

46 ‘Address by Singapore Armed Forces Chief of Army, Major General Ravinder Singh at the 12th ASEAN Chiefs of Armies Multilateral Meeting at Sultan Hotel, Jakarta’, 26 October 2011, at acamm12indonesia.com/artikel/file_artikel/SINGAPORE.doc.
48 Ibid.
Sri Najib Tun Razak, proposed establishment of ‘a regional humanitarian body able to respond rapidly to regional disasters’. The 2011 SLD also provided the venue for a private bilateral meeting between the US Secretary of Defense and China’s Minister of National Defence concerning defence issues.49

The development of the ADMM-Plus, and its potential evolution into an annual event, poses a question about the future viability of the SLD. However, the meetings are quite different in character and serve different purposes. As the IISS has noted, the SLD ‘remains the wider Asia-Pacific region’s only annual meeting for defence ministers, not to mention its role in bringing together CHODs, permanent heads of Defence Ministries and intelligence chiefs’.50 The SLD is an established annual regional Defence Ministers’ meeting with a wide-ranging agenda and an uninhibited and partially public debate involving non-official experts from across the region. The SLD provides an important platform from which the national stakeholders in Asia-Pacific security may rehearse and clarify their defence policies, while simultaneously affording significant opportunities for more detailed, off-the-record discussion of key security concerns. The ADMM-Plus agenda, because of the perceived requirement among the grouping’s members for concrete policy advances, is focused primarily on what are effectively lowest common denominator areas of agreement, such as HADR and military medicine. It will be a while before the ADMM-Plus will be prepared to tackle the inter-state issues that form the main themes at the SLD, such as the regional impact of China’s rise, the region’s changing distribution of power, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation. The ADMM-Plus does not provide an opportunity for publicly airing, let alone debating, policy positions.

**Themes of an East Asian Model**

Security architecture is inevitably affected and, indeed, to some extent determined, by ‘strategic culture’. The concept of strategic culture holds that different countries and regions approach the key issues of war, peace and strategy from perspectives which are both quite distinctive and deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, history, military experience and political

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
beliefs. These factors profoundly influence how a country perceives, protects and promotes its security interests.\(^51\)

There may not, in fact, be any single strategic culture prevailing throughout the vast and disparate areas of either Asia or the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, there are some important cultural and traditional factors which are common to Asian societies but which obtain to different extents and in different fashion in different countries and which have different implications for cooperative approaches to security in the region. Some of these factors rest their status more on myth than practical respect. None are absolute. And none are immutable.

The principal (purported) elements of the Asia-Pacific strategic culture include longer time horizons and policy perspectives than those which characterise Western thinking and planning; commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; and styles of policy-making which feature informality of structures and modalities; form and process as much as substance and outcome, consensus rather than majority rule, and pragmatism rather than idealism. Indeed, form and process become the product. It is vitally important to ensure that they do not become the only product.

Some of the various purported elements of Asian strategic culture are fundamentally embedded in traditional political and social cultures, while others are more second-level derivations from the fundamental cultural conditions. For example, the practice of consensual rather than majority decision-making derives from the cultural predisposition to harmony. The relatively unqualified commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others, at the expense of the concept of humanitarian intervention, is partly due to the demands of nation-building, but it also derives from a value system which accords higher priority to community interests rather than individual rights.

There are several themes which emerge from the discussion of the ARF ‘Defence Track’ and the ADMM processes, as well as the review of the historical record with respect to the ARF’s Concept Paper, which are essential to consider in

\(^51\) Desmond Ball, ‘Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region’, *Security Studies*, (Vol.3, No.1), Autumn 1993, pp. 44-74; and Desmond Ball, ‘Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (With Some Implications for Regional Security Cooperation)’, (Working Paper No. 270, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, April 1993).
the development of any East Asian model. NATO’s principle of collective defence and the focus of both NATO and the EU on external interventions have little relevance in this region.

In this region, with its immense diversity and disparate security concerns, progress with the construction of new security architecture is invariably slow, gradual and iterative, and conditional on the formation of a consensus. The ‘Asian way’ is still invoked as an excuse for inaction. The principle of non-interference and the avoidance of matters which involve sovereignty issues greatly circumscribe the purview. Non-traditional security issues are easier to address than hard-core strategic and defence issues. The challenge for the ASEAN-led processes will be to move faster, to increase the rate of their evolution and to be more adventurous with respect to the ‘Asian way’, in order to meet emerging security issues of perhaps unprecedented scale, complexity and consequence, such as managing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), undertaking humanitarian intervention in accordance with ‘the responsibility to protect’, responding to large-scale natural disasters and environmental security issues, and ensuring cyber security.

**Utilising a Track 2 relationship**

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the principal Track 2 organisation supporting the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In important ways, Track 2 diplomacy is an integral part of the Southeast Asian model of confidence-building. It was instrumental in much of the burgeoning of CSBM activity that began in the region in the early 1990s.

The CSCAP Study Groups now produce papers specifically designed to address matters of direct interest to the ARF and operate in close alignment with ARF SOM and ISG/ISM processes. Back-to-back meetings of Study Groups with ISGs and ISMs have become fairly regular. For example, the Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum organised a one-off meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 30-31 October 2007, back-

---

52 Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan (eds), *Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader*, (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2010), chapters 1, 2 and 13.

to-back with a meeting of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBMs and PD); one of its recommendations was that ‘the ARF should consider developing a Vision 2020 Statement that would clarify the ARF’s objectives and provide specific benchmarks for its progress’. This suggestion was accepted by the ARF, and the resultant ‘ARF Vision 2020’ was adopted at the 16th ARF meeting in July 2009 in Phuket.54

Since 2009, arrangements have been in place for reciprocal attendances by CSCAP Co-chairs or their representatives at ISG meetings and by the Co-chairs of the ARF ISG at CSCAP Steering Committee meetings, and for regular attendance of the CSCAP Co-chairs at the ARF SOMs.

Track 2 organisations have been lethargic with respect to involvement in supporting or promoting the Defence cooperation activities. In my review of CSCAP in 2000, I argued that ‘there has been a virtually complete absence of informed dialogue concerning the identification of the most appropriate and productive sorts of cooperative activities to be accorded priority’ in the defence cooperation processes; he suggested that one possibility was ‘to conduct a half-day Map Exercise involving an accident by or hijacking of a vessel in some part of the region (such as the Malacca Straits) to demonstrate the cooperative aspects of the search and rescue practices involved’.55

In November 2009, at the CSCAP Steering Committee in Jakarta, Dr Suriya Chindawongse suggested that CSCAP might assist the ARF by studying ‘the future role of the “Defence Track” in the ARF’. CSCAP should be able to contribute in several ways. It could enhance the discussion at the ASPC and ARF-DOD meetings by preparing background papers on selected relevant subjects. It could provide assistance to the ADSOM in similar fashion to its assistance to the ARF SOM. I believe that the CSCAP Steering Committee should move forthwith to direct its Planning Committee to study and report on long-term arrangements and mechanisms for supporting the ADMM-Plus and the ADSOM.

A CSCAP group devoted to the ‘defence track’ could develop and refine proposals for both Map and live exercises designed to strengthen practical defence cooperation. It could work on the development and implementation of the principles and modalities of the ‘ADMM-Plus’ concept. It could also study the possibilities for closer alignment of the ARF and ADMM-Plus processes.

In 2007, the ADMM formed its own Track 2 organisation, called the Network of ASEAN Defence Institutions (NADI). As the Chairman of the ADMM-Plus noted last year: ‘NADI is a forum where scholars and researchers in ASEAN meet and exchange [views] on defence and security matters that are relevant to ADMM, with a view to seeking innovative recommendations to ADMM. In addition, NADI facilitates closer relationship among ASEAN defence research institutions’. 56 The NADI Secretariat is provided by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

The first NADI meeting was organised by the RSIS and held in Singapore on 22-23 August 2007. It ‘discussed and exchanged views on the agenda items of (a) regional security outlook, and (b) prospects for ASEAN security and defence cooperation and recommendations for cooperation’. 57 The second was organised by the Strategic Research Institute (SRI), National Defence Studies Institute of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters on 2-5 November 2008 in Bang Saen, Thailand. The meeting ‘recommended that in order to be more effective in monitoring and coordinating efforts among ASEAN member countries in non-traditional security and trans-national issues, ASEAN governments could consider the establishment of an ASEAN Crisis Monitoring and Coordination Centre’. The participants also ‘recognised that the ASEAN militaries could play a significant role in addressing and managing non-traditional security issues like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping operations (PKO) and maritime security’. 58

The third NADI meeting was held in Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam on 19-22 April 2010 after reviewing and assessing the situation, recommended for strengthening defence and military cooperation in a broader regional context. The

agenda covered a wide range of topics which included (a) an exchange of views on ‘Regional Security and Political Outlook and Emerging Regional Architecture’; (b) prospects for enhancing ASEAN militaries’ cooperation; (c) exchange of views on ADMM Plus; and (d) presentations on (i) maritime security, (ii) climatic change and its impact on national security; and (iv) the role of ASEAN in the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and prospects for the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).\(^59\)

The fourth meeting was held in Jakarta on 19-21 April 2011. It discussed ways to enhance defence cooperation in the region, and agreed to organise five Workshops in 2011 and 2012 to examine subjects of special interest: ‘Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)’, ‘Aviation Security’, ‘Maritime Security in East Asia’; ‘Future Direction/Trajectory of ASEAN’s Cooperation with its Dialogue Partners particularly in ADMM-Plus and the Expanded East Asian Summit’, and ‘Security and Development’.\(^60\)

There is scope for very useful cooperation between CSCAP and NIDA in their provision of support for the ARF and the ADMM. In some ASEAN countries, the same defence and security studies institutes are involved in both enterprises.

**Non-Traditional Security: Disaster Relief**

The ARF has demonstrated a commitment to promoting ‘regional assistance capacity for major, multinational disaster relief operations’ since 2008, when the ARF’s first ‘Table Top Exercise’ was held in Indonesia. The ARF’s first ‘field exercise’, in May 2009, used a simulated scenario where parts of the Philippines were devastated by a super-typhoon, and regional countries assisted with relief operations. And Indonesia hosted the Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) at Manado on 16 March 2011. These activities have involved the development of skills and the accumulation of experiences applicable in large-scale multinational HADR operations; they have also enhanced mutual trust among the participants.

Disaster relief should be institutionalised as an ARF function. The exercises should become regular events, both ‘Table Top’ and ‘in the field’, where command

---


and control, communications, mobilisation procedures, and inter-operability with respect to search and rescue, disaster management, evacuations and other emergency responses are practiced and refined, and ready to be employed as soon as possible whenever major disasters strike.

As the ADMM-Plus has decided to focus initially on non-traditional security threats, specifically including natural disasters, and the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces have ‘the building of a mechanism for cooperative activities of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)’ at the top of their agenda, it would seem useful for the ARF ‘Defence Track’, ADMM-Plus and ACDFIM processes to coordinate their activities in this area, and to ensure that lessons learnt in one forum are fully appreciated by the others.

**Maritime Security: Avoidance of Incidents at Sea**

Maritime cooperation must be central in any East Asian Defence Architecture. The security of East Asia is essentially maritime. Many of the countries in the region – from Japan down through Southeast Asia – are islands or island chains. Others, such as China and South Korea, have long coastlines. Southeast Asia lies at the junction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In terms of shipping movements, its seas and straits – the South China Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, the Java Sea, the Molucca Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, the Ombai-Wetar Straits and the Makassar Strait – are among the busiest in the world.

Security in this region is very much concerned with maritime issues and capabilities. The waterways through the region are strategically important for both merchant and naval vessels. Coastal and offshore resources provide a principal means of livelihood in many of the countries in the region. For many countries, military threats can come only over (or under) the sea.

Maritime issues are at the forefront of current regional security concerns. The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS III) introduced new uncertainties into the region, particularly in connection with Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and archipelagic state regimes. As noted below, of the three dozen or so conflict points in the region, more than a third involve disputes over islands, continental shelf claims, EEZ boundaries and other offshore issues. Many so-called non-traditional
security concerns, such as piracy, pollution from oil spills, safety of SLOCs, illegal fishing and exploitation of other offshore resources, and other important elements of economic security, are essentially maritime. These concerns are reflected in the significant maritime dimension of the current arms acquisition programs in the region – for example, the maritime surveillance and intelligence collection systems, multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack capabilities, modern surface combatants, submarines, anti-ship missiles, naval electronic warfare systems, and mine warfare capabilities. Unfortunately, some of these new capabilities tend to be more offensive, inflammatory and, in conflict situations, potentially prone to the possibilities of inadvertent escalation. They also have disturbing power projection potential, are the most likely to generate counter-acquisitions – that is, to fuel a regional arms race.

Maritime issues have of course also been at the forefront of the regional confidence-building and dialogue processes. About a third of the measures contained in Annexes A and B of the ARF’s 1995 Concept Paper concerned confidence-building and cooperation with respect to maritime matters. Unfortunately, only a few of these have been implemented.

One possibility is to regenerate interest in a Regional Agreement on ‘Avoidance of Incidents at Sea’, as proposed in Annex B of the Concept Paper and endorsed by the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation in CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 on ‘Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation’ in December 1997. The ARF’s Experts and Eminent Persons (EEPs) agreed at their fifth meeting held in Dili in Timor-Leste in January 2011 to prepare a discussion paper on ‘Cooperative Maritime Security Concepts’, including the concept of a regional Avoidance of Incidents at Sea Agreement.61

**Conflict Resolution**

Stage 3 of the ARF agenda adopted in 1995 concerns conflict resolution, but it is described in the ARF Concept Paper as ‘an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue’, and has received no attention in the ARF process to date. However,

---

thinking about conflict resolution should not be inhibited. This thinking should extend to consideration of possible institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution.

An essential precursory project would involve a study of the most likely characteristics of possible conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region — in terms of their scale, intensity, naval and air dimensions, level of technology, and sorts of casualties. There are some three dozen issues of potential conflict in East Asia involving competing sovereignty claims, challenges to government legitimacy and territorial disputes. The spectrum of the conflict issues is much more extensive and the character of possible conflict much more variegated than in any other region. About two-thirds of the issues involve inter-State disputes. Most of these are about maritime boundaries and offshore territorial claims, such as the competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. But many are about land borders, mostly involving disputes over colonial impositions but some having much longer roots. Analysis of these conflict issues, including the types of forces likely to be employed, should inform thinking about conflict resolution.

Barry Desker has suggested, with respect to CSCAP, that it could examine the development of approaches to the prevention of conflicts as well as elaborate a ‘road map’ for the resolution of conflicts. He also argued that CSCAP should give greater attention to intra-state conflicts, noting that, in Southeast Asia at least, ‘civil conflict is the primary focus of attention of states in the region as it can lead to political instability and chaos within states and across borders’.  

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and long-range delivery systems

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missile systems is now proceeding much more rapidly and extensively in Asia than in any other part of the world. It is both a much more complicated and a potentially more volatile process than the bipolar superpower strategic nuclear arms race of the Cold War. The proliferation process which is developing in Asia involves multidimensional dynamics. There are several bilateral competitors, some of which are engaged in

---

multiple pairings. The most obvious direct nuclear competition is between India and Pakistan. A nuclear arms race between India and China, which is a real possibility, would be especially disturbing. The expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal could also cause other countries in Northeast Asia to exercise their own nuclear options. Moreover, the dynamics now involve not only comparative nuclear capabilities, but interactive connections between nuclear postures and conventional capabilities.

Five of the world’s nine nuclear countries are in Asia — including Russia, which still maintains hundreds of nuclear weapons in the Far East, as well as China, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The US also maintains hundreds of nuclear weapons in the Pacific, as well as hundreds of others based in the US itself but targeted on China, North Korea and the Russian Far East.

China is the largest nuclear power in Asia, with a stockpile of about 180 nuclear weapons and an active development program. It is likely that China has now overtaken Britain and perhaps even France to become the world’s fourth or even third largest nuclear power.

North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006 and its second on 25 May 2009, and may have a stockpile of around 10 weapons.

There is also considerable proliferation of ballistic missile technology in the region, or at least in the Northeast and South Asia sub-regions. China has produced a full suite of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and short-range, tactical ballistic missiles. North Korea has hundreds of Scud B/C missiles and more than a hundred Nodong missiles, and has conducted tests of its Taepodong IRBM/ICBM.

There is a serious danger of cruise missile proliferation in this region. Cruise missiles are technically easier to produce and cheaper to acquire than ballistic missiles. Enabling technologies such as anti-ship cruise missiles (e.g., Exocets and Harpoons), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), GPS satellite navigation systems and

---

64 Ibid; and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment, p. 122.
small turbojet engines are now widely available. However, the development and deployment of cruise missiles are also more difficult to monitor.

These missile developments have prompted responses in Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan, as well as Australia, with respect to missile detection and tracking capabilities, and air defence and ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems, in which sea-based platforms play important roles.

The ASEAN-produced South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty which took effect in 1997 remains the only significant agreement concerning nuclear matters in East Asia. The SEANWFZ Treaty has a Protocol that is open to signature by the five recognised nuclear-weapon states, i.e., China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. The Protocol commits those states not to contribute to any violation of the Treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Zone. None of the five has signed the SEANWFZ Protocol, but in November 2011 they agreed with ASEAN states on steps that would enable them to do so.\textsuperscript{65}

The ASEAN-led Defence cooperation processes are committed, as the SEANWFZ Treaty expresses, ‘to contribute towards general and complete nuclear disarmament’. However, the worthiness of an objective should not be confused with its practical likelihood. It is more likely, at least in the foreseeable future, that while the numbers of US and Russian nuclear weapons may decline, those of India, Pakistan, China and North Korea will continue to increase.

At some point in the not-too-distant future, policy-makers must address the issues involved in management of a security environment in which nuclear weapons are of increasing salience, at least until a path to ‘Nuclear Zero’ can be found. In the interim, it is not unlikely that there will be crises in which the parties involved employ nuclear-related weapons systems for bargaining or deterrent purposes, or outbreaks of conflicts in which escalation to and even beyond the nuclear threshold are palpable risks.

Indeed, there are formidable problems involved in any transition through very low numbers to a zero situation, including those relating to verification and ‘break-

out’, the structures of the residual nuclear forces and their vulnerabilities to ‘first-strikes’, or ‘crisis stability’, and conventional force balances. The issues that are likely to arise from a low-number transition insofar as they pertain to Asia and the Asia-Pacific region will require very careful and considered management.

The ARF ‘Defence Track’ and/or the ADMM-Plus should institute some form of ISG dedicated to consideration of WMD matters. Indeed, the ARF’s ISG on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG CBM/PD) has already devoted several of its meetings to this subject, while the fourth ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (NP&D) was held in Sydney on 8-9 March 2012.

An East Asian Defence Security Architecture should contain some agency like NATO’s Nuclear Policy Group (NPG) for the development and regular review of a common policy concerning nuclear-related matters. Such an agency could also sponsor the design and promotion of nuclear-related arms control measures in the region.

**Defence enhancement and arms control**

An East Asian Defence Architecture cannot avoid consideration of the robust defence enhancement programs underway in the region and their implications for regional stability and security. Asia has now been involved in a sustained build-up of defence capabilities for two decades, hardly affected by economic tribulations. However, the character of the acquisition dynamics began to change around the end of the 1990s. Whereas the acquisitions in the first decade could be explained by and large in terms of modernisation, they have in some places in the past decade involved substantial competitive elements. This combination of increasing capabilities and action-reaction is the essence of arms-racing. It may still not be the dominant driver of the acquisitions throughout the region, but it is playing an increasingly significant role in some sub-regions, most especially with respect to naval acquisitions in Northeast Asia. Even in Southeast Asia, arms-racing behaviour has been manifest in a couple of areas (fighter aircraft and submarines) in Singaporean and Malaysian acquisitions.66

---

It is likely that, over the next 1-2 decades, the role of arms-racing will continue to increase. Action-reaction generates its own momentum. Further, there are no arms control regimes whatsoever in Asia that might constrain or constrict acquisitions. Moreover, prospective regional security dynamics, including prospective arms racing, will be much more complex than those which obtained in the old bipolar Cold War situation. There are none of the distinctive categories, milestones and firebreaks which were carefully constructed during the Cold War to constrain escalatory processes and promote crisis stability. Now, there are also interactions between conventional weapons acquisition programs on the one hand and developments with WMD and long-range delivery systems on the other hand. South Korea and Japan have responded to the development of ballistic missiles by China and North Korea by greatly enhancing their airborne intelligence collection and early warning capabilities and their land- and sea-based theatre missile defence (TMD) capabilities. US nuclear strategy has moved to permit virtually co-mutual employment of nuclear forces, precision conventional capabilities and information operations (IO), and to permit the use of nuclear weapons in otherwise non-nuclear situations. In this environment, with many parties and many levels and directions of interactions, the possibilities for calamity are high.

There is an urgent need for consideration of possible arms control agreements that might constrain arms racing and promote crisis stability in the region. One prospective area involves regional implementation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty, expected to be finalised in 2012, which is the most important initiative concerning arms acquisitions relevant to this region. An East Asian Arms Transfers Regime could develop codes of conduct for arms transfers. It could focus in particular on supply-side restraint, for which possible measures have been virtually ignored. Another area concerns the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, a major problem in parts of Southeast Asia, where much more could be done in terms of criminalisation of unauthorised sales, strengthening border controls, reducing and protecting vulnerable arms stockpiles, and improving the sharing of information between governments concerning arms traffickers and their activities.67

---

Cyber defence

Cyber defence provides the Information Assurance that is essential for the digital economy. It is necessary for the protection of critical national infrastructure, such as power supplies, banking and financial systems, air traffic control systems, and Internet services generally. Effective cyber security depends on national capacities, such as the quality of the legal framework and enforcement capabilities for combating cyber crime, but it also requires collective measures for increasing the ability of regional countries to effectively address sophisticated cyber security threats.

In early 2012, the CSCAP Study Group on Cyber Security completed a Memorandum on ‘ASEAN Regional Forum Cyber Security Strategy: Towards Ensuring a Safer Regional Cyber Environment’, intended for submission to the ARF SOM in May 2012 and thence the next ARF Ministerial Meeting. It reported that:

Potential cyber-related threats to Information Assurance can originate from natural disasters, accidental events, or hostile targeting. The latter may include, particularly, such common threats to all regional nations as organised crime and terrorism. Measures to maximise protection against cyber threats and also maximise the regional benefits of the digital economy, comprise two essential, separate, but inter-related activities. Firstly, each regional nation should implement a domestic cyber security strategy that is holistic and encompasses government, the private sector and civil society. Secondly, regional nations should establish common collective measures of cooperation that provide an additional umbrella of protection against cyber threats that is not achievable unilaterally.

With regard to a regional mechanism for coordinating responses to cyber threats, it recommended, *inter alia*, that:

the ARF explore whether APCERT should be further developed and expanded as the coordination centre for the distribution of information and advice about cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and protective and mitigation measures. In this role, APCERT will facilitate the broadening of information and technical exchange, provide specific incident reporting, advise on ‘best practice’, and conduct collaborative research and digital forensics.

It also recommended that:

a Regional Cyber Security Action Task Force (CSATF) [should] be established by the ARF to liaise with all key stakeholders to develop recommended standards, mechanisms, and policies to assist in the harmonization of laws.
Cooperation with respect to cyber security should be a high priority for East Asian Defence Security Architecture. In considering possible mechanisms, such as an enhanced APCERT and a CSATF, it would be useful to undertake a detailed examination of the EU-CERT and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) experiences.

**Conclusion: An Agenda for Progress**

The second meeting of the ADMM-Plus is scheduled to be held in Brunei Darussalam in 2013. It is now timely for Brunei Darussalam to initiate consideration of a wide variety of proposals not just for enhancing the work of the ADMM-Plus but also for strengthening the Defence Architecture in East Asia more generally. An agenda for progress could contain half a dozen subject areas, which fall into three sorts of categories. First, the ADMM and ADMM-Plus processes should consider measures concerning internal organisational and procedural matters. A compelling case can be made for making ADMM-Plus meetings an annual event. It would be good if this could be agreed at the Brunei meeting in 2013, understanding that this would require extensive consultation and dialogue beforehand. The ASEAN-led Defence dialogue processes should consider mechanisms for enhancing coordination of at least some of their activities. The ARF, the ARF-DOD, the ARF SOM, the ASPC, the ARF ISGs, the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus, the ADSOM, and the SLD, as well as their Track 2 affiliates, CSCAP and NADI, (and not to mention the ACDFIM, ACAMM, ANI, AACC or AMIIM), comprise a very crowded landscape. Instituting annual ADMM-Plus meetings should allow some rationalisation of these processes, including even the possibility of holding back-to-back meetings of ARF Foreign Ministers and ADMM-Plus Defence Ministers at a common venue.

Second, an agenda for progress for the ASEAN-led Defence processes should contain measures which continue to advance, and indeed accelerate, the cooperative activities about which substantial consensus has already been achieved and considerable progress already made. The investment already committed to the selection and promotion of such activities should be capitalised upon. Maritime developments must be at the forefront. Naval arms control measures should be pursued. An Avoidance of Incidents at Sea Agreement already has widespread support, but there are still some concerns remaining to be alleviated. Activities
Concerning Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) already have the active endorsement of the ARF’s ‘Defence Track’, the ADMM-Plus and the ACDFIM.

Cooperative activities involving the various ASEAN peace-keeping centres are ripe for promotion, with respect to joint training, the development and promulgation of joint doctrine, the resolution of inter-operability issues, and potentially even the development of a regional ready response capability. The recommendation of the NADI-2 meeting in Thailand in November 2008 that ‘ASEAN governments could consider the establishment of an ASEAN Crisis Monitoring and Coordination Centre’ deserves revitalisation.

It is now 17 years since the ARF declared that the establishment of mechanisms for Conflict Resolution was not an ‘immediate’ objective, but was ‘an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue as they proceed to develop the ARF as a vehicle for promoting regional peace and stability’. Surely the point has been reached, after 17 years of confidence-building and more than a decade’s work on Preventive Diplomacy by the ARF, for initial exploration of possible conflict resolution measures. Such exploration could include a study of the most likely characteristics of possible conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region, the elaboration of a ‘road map’ for the resolution of conflicts, and practical ways of addressing intra-state conflicts.

Third, if the ASEAN-led Defence processes are to maintain their ‘driver’s seat’ in the East Asian Defence Architecture, an agenda for progress must include a demonstrated capability to address the most dangerous military and non-traditional security developments across the region. These include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated long-range delivery systems, the robust arms race in Northeast Asia, and threats to cyber security. If the ASEAN-led Defence processes are unable to contribute substantially to the sort of regional defence architecture demanded by these mammoth and complex issues, they will become increasingly marginalised.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Vietnam-China Relations Since The End of The Cold War</td>
<td>Ang Cheng Guan</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects and Possibilities</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reordering Asia: “Cooperative Security” or Concert of Powers?</td>
<td>Amitav Acharya</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The South China Sea Dispute re-visited</td>
<td>Ang Cheng Guan</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>‘Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ as Justified, Executed and Mediated by NATO: Strategic Lessons for Singapore</td>
<td>Kumar Ramakrishna</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Taiwan’s Future: Mongolia or Tibet?</td>
<td>Chien-peng (C.P.) Chang</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Diplomacies: Reading Discontinuity in Late-Modern Diplomatic Practice</td>
<td>Tan See Seng</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Framing “South Asia”: Whose Imagined Region?</td>
<td>Sinderpal Singh</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Explaining Indonesia's Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Terence Lee Chek Liang</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues</td>
<td>Ananda Rajah</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Natural Resources Management and Environmental Security in Southeast Asia: Case Study of Clean Water Supplies in Singapore</td>
<td>Kog Yue Choong</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Crisis and Transformation: ASEAN in the New Era</td>
<td>Etel Solingen</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Asian Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations</td>
<td>Barry Desker</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19. Multilateralism, Neo-liberalism and Security in Asia: The Role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum
   Ian Taylor (2001)

20. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping as Issues for Asia-Pacific Security
   Derek McDougall (2001)

21. Comprehensive Security: The South Asian Case
   S.D. Muni (2002)

   You Ji (2002)

23. The Concept of Security Before and After September 11
   a. The Contested Concept of Security
      Steve Smith (2002)
   b. Security and Security Studies After September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections
      Amitav Acharya (2002)

24. Democratisation In South Korea And Taiwan: The Effect Of Social Division On Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations

25. Understanding Financial Globalisation
   Andrew Walter (2002)

26. 911, American Praetorian Unilateralism and the Impact on State-Society Relations in Southeast Asia
   Kumar Ramakrishna (2002)

27. Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony?
    Tan See Seng (2002)

28. What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of “America”
    Tan See Seng (2002)

29. International Responses to Terrorism: The Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control of Terrorism by Regional Arrangement with Particular Reference to ASEAN
    Ong Yen Nee (2002)

30. Reconceputalizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization
    Nan Li (2002)

    Helen E S Nesadurai (2002)

32. 11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges, and Warfighting
    Nan Li (2002)

33. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11
    Barry Desker (2002)

34. Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of September 11 For American Power
    Evelyn Goh (2002)

35. Not Yet All Aboard…But Already All At Sea Over Container Security Initiative
    Irvin Lim (2002)
36. Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulation in East Asia: Still Perverse?  
   Andrew Walter  
   (2002)

37. Indonesia and The Washington Consensus  
   Premjith Sadasivan  
   (2002)

38. The Political Economy of FDI Location: Why Don’t Political Checks and Balances and  
   Treaty Constraints Matter?  
   Andrew Walter  
   (2002)

39. The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN  
   Ralf Emmers  
   (2002)

40. Liquidity Support and The Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience  
   J Soedradjad Djawadono  
   (2002)

41. A UK Perspective on Defence Equipment Acquisition  
   David Kirkpatrick  
   (2003)

42. Regionalisation of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN  
   Partnership  
   Mely C. Anthony  
   (2003)

43. The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round  
   Razeen Sally  
   (2003)

44. Seeking Security In The Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia In The Emerging  
   Asian Order  
   Amitav Acharya  
   (2003)

45. Deconstructing Political Islam In Malaysia: UMNO’S Response To PAS’ Religio-Political  
   Dialectic  
   Joseph Liow  
   (2003)

46. The War On Terror And The Future of Indonesian Democracy  
   Tatik S. Hafidz  
   (2003)

47. Examining The Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian  
   Case  
   Eduardo Lachica  
   (2003)

48. Sovereignty and The Politics of Identity in International Relations  
   Adrian Kuah  
   (2003)

49. Deconstructing Jihad; Southeast Asia Contexts  
   Patricia Martinez  
   (2003)

50. The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion  
   Alastair Iain Johnston  
   (2003)

51. In Search of Suitable Positions’ in the Asia Pacific: Negotiating the US-China Relationship  
    and Regional Security  
    Evelyn Goh  
    (2003)

52. American Unilaterism, Foreign Economic Policy and the ‘Securitisation’ of Globalisation  
   Richard Higgott  
   (2003)
53. Fireball on the Water: Naval Force Protection-Projection, Coast Guarding, Customs Border Security & Multilateral Cooperation in Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror from the Sea
   Irvin Lim (2003)

54. Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy
   Chong Ja Ian (2003)

55. Pre-emption and Prevention: An Ethical and Legal Critique of the Bush Doctrine and Anticipatory Use of Force In Defence of the State

56. The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Implications for Regional Economic Integration
   Helen E S Nesadurai (2003)

57. The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operation
   Joshua Ho (2003)

   Irvin Lim (2004)

59. Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia
   Andrew Tan (2004)

60. Testing Alternative Responses to Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding and Beleaguering in the Real World
   Chong Ja Ian (2004)

61. Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004

62. Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Issues: A Study of Human and Drug Trafficking in East Asia

63. Outlook for Malaysia’s 11th General Election

64. Not Many Jobs Take a Whole Army: Special Operations Forces and The Revolution in Military Affairs.

65. Technological Globalisation and Regional Security in East Asia
   J.D. Kenneth Boutin (2004)

66. UAVs/UCAVS – Missions, Challenges, and Strategic Implications for Small and Medium Powers

67. Singapore’s Reaction to Rising China: Deep Engagement and Strategic Adjustment

68. The Shifting Of Maritime Power And The Implications For Maritime Security In East Asia
   Joshua Ho (2004)
Evelyn Goh
(2004)

70. Examining the Defence Industrialization-Economic Growth Relationship: The Case of Singapore
Adrian Kuah and Bernard Loo
(2004)

71. “Constructing” The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry
Kumar Ramakrishna
(2004)

72. Malaysia and The United States: Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement
Helen E S Nesadurai
(2004)

73. The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform
John Bradford
(2005)

74. Martime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment
Catherine Zara Raymond
(2005)

75. Southeast Asian Maritime Security In The Age Of Terror: Threats, Opportunity, And Charting The Course Forward
John Bradford
(2005)

76. Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives
Manjeet Singh Pardesi
(2005)

77. Towards Better Peace Processes: A Comparative Study of Attempts to Broker Peace with MNLF and GAM
S P Harish
(2005)

78. Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics
Amitav Acharya
(2005)

79. The State and Religious Institutions in Muslim Societies
Riaz Hassan
(2005)

80. On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies
Riaz Hassan
(2005)

81. The Security of Regional Sea Lanes
Joshua Ho
(2005)

82. Civil-Military Relationship and Reform in the Defence Industry
Arthur S Ding
(2005)

83. How Bargaining Alters Outcomes: Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Bargaining Strategies
Deborah Elms
(2005)

84. Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order
Evelyn Goh
(2005)

85. Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan
Ali Riaz
(2005)

86. Autobiography, Politics and Ideology in Sayyid Qutb’s Reading of the Qur’an
Umej Bhatia
(2005)
87. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo
   Ralf Emmers (2005)
88. China’s Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends & Dynamics
   Srikanth Kondapalli (2005)
89. Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses
   Catherine Zara Raymond (2005)
90. Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the Bush Doctrine
   Simon Dalby (2005)
91. Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of the Riau Archipelago
   Nankyung Choi (2005)
92. The Impact of RMA on Conventional Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis
   Manjeet Singh Pardesi (2005)
93. Africa and the Challenge of Globalisation
   Jeffrey Herbst (2005)
94. The East Asian Experience: The Poverty of 'Picking Winners
   Barry Desker and Deborah Elms (2005)
95. Bandung And The Political Economy Of North-South Relations: Sowing The Seeds For
   Revisioning International Society
   Helen E. S. Nesadurai (2005)
96. Re-conceptualising the Military-Industrial Complex: A General Systems Theory Approach
   Adrian Kuah (2005)
97. Food Security and the Threat From Within: Rice Policy Reforms in the Philippines
   Bruce Tolentino (2006)
98. Non-Traditional Security Issues: Securitisation of Transnational Crime in Asia
   James Laki (2006)
99. Securitizing/Desecuritizing the Filipinos’ ‘Outward Migration Issue’in the Philippines’
    Relations with Other Asian Governments
    José N. Franco, Jr. (2006)
100. Securitization Of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis To India
101. Environmental Management and Conflict in Southeast Asia – Land Reclamation and its
     Political Impact
     Kog Yue-Chooong (2006)
102. Securitizing border-crossing: The case of marginalized stateless minorities in the Thai-
     Burma Borderlands
     Mika Toyota (2006)
103. The Incidence of Corruption in India: Is the Neglect of Governance Endangering Human
     Security in South Asia?
     Shabnam Mallick and Rajarshi Sen (2006)
104. The LTTE’s Online Network and its Implications for Regional Security
     Shyam Tekwani (2006)
105. The Korean War June-October 1950: Inchon and Stalin In The “Trigger Vs Justification” Debate
Tan Kwoh Jack
(2006)

106. International Regime Building in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Cooperation against the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs
Ralf Emmers
(2006)

107. Changing Conflict Identities: The case of the Southern Thailand Discord
S P Harish
(2006)

108. Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities?
Christopher B Roberts
(2006)

109. TEMPORAL DOMINANCE
Military Transformation and the Time Dimension of Strategy
Edwin Seah
(2006)

110. Globalization and Military-Industrial Transformation in South Asia: An Historical Perspective
Emrys Chew
(2006)

111. UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime
Sam Bateman
(2006)

112. Freedom and Control Networks in Military Environments
Paul T Mitchell
(2006)

113. Rewriting Indonesian History The Future in Indonesia’s Past
Kwa Chong Guan
(2006)

114. Twelver Shi’ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects
Christoph Marcinkowski
(2006)

115. Islam, State and Modernity : Muslim Political Discourse in Late 19th and Early 20th century India
Iqbal Singh Sevea
(2006)

Ong Wei Chong
(2006)

117. “From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI”
Elena Pavlova
(2006)

118. The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry
Adam Dolnik
(2006)

119. The Many Faces of Political Islam
Mohammed Ayoob
(2006)

120. Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (I): Thailand and Indonesia
Christoph Marcinkowski
(2006)

121. Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (II): Malaysia and Singapore
Christoph Marcinkowski
(2006)
122. Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama  
Mohamed Nawab (2007)

123. Islam and Violence in Malaysia  
Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid (2007)

124. Between Greater Iran and Shi’ite Crescent: Some Thoughts on the Nature of Iran’s Ambitions in the Middle East  
Christoph Marcinkowski (2007)

125. Thinking Ahead: Shi’ite Islam in Iraq and its Seminaries (hawzah ‘ilmiyah)  
Christoph Marcinkowski (2007)

126. The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia  
Richard A. Bitzinger (2007)

127. Contested Capitalism: Financial Politics and Implications for China  
Richard Carney (2007)

128. Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army  
Samuel Chan (2007)

129. The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations  
Ralf Emmers (2007)

130. War, Peace or Neutrality: An Overview of Islamic Polity’s Basis of Inter-State Relations  
Muhammad Haniff Hassan (2007)

Kirsten E. Schulze (2007)

132. Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy  
Ralf Emmers (2007)

133. The Ulama in Pakistani Politics  
Mohamed Nawab (2007)

134. China’s Proactive Engagement in Asia: Economics, Politics and Interactions  
Li Mingjiang (2007)

135. The PLA’s Role in China’s Regional Security Strategy  
Qi Dapeng (2007)

136. War As They Knew It: Revolutionary War and Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia  
Ong Wei Chong (2007)

137. Indonesia’s Direct Local Elections: Background and Institutional Framework  
Nankyung Choi (2007)

138. Contextualizing Political Islam for Minority Muslims  
Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan (2007)

139. Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki, Surakarta  
Farish A. Noor (2007)

140. Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern / Post-modern Navies of the Asia Pacific  
Geoffrey Till (2007)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>Sulawesi: Aspirations of Local Muslims</td>
<td>Rohaiza Ahmad Asi</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Suharto Indonesia</td>
<td>Noorhaidi Hasan</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>New Security Dimensions in the Asia Pacific</td>
<td>Barry Desker</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>Japan’s Economic Diplomacy towards East Asia: Fragmented Realism and Naïve Liberalism</td>
<td>Hidetaka Yoshimatsu</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>The Asian Financial Crisis and ASEAN’s Concept of Security</td>
<td>Yongwook Ryu</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>Security in the South China Sea: China’s Balancing Act and New Regional Dynamics</td>
<td>Li Mingjiang</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>The Defence Industry in the Post-Transformational World: Implications for the United States and Singapore</td>
<td>Richard A Bitzinger</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>The Islamic Opposition in Malaysia: New Trajectories and Directions</td>
<td>Mohamed Fauz Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>Thinking the Unthinkable: The Modernization and Reform of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia</td>
<td>Farish A Noor</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Outlook for Malaysia’s 12th General Elections</td>
<td>Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Shahirah Mahmood, and Joseph Chinyong Liow</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>The use of SOLAS Ship Security Alert Systems</td>
<td>Thomas Timlen</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Thai-Chinese Relations: Security and Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>Chulacheeb Chinwanno</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>Sovereignty In ASEAN and The Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea</td>
<td>JN Mak</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>Sino-U.S. Competition in Strategic Arms</td>
<td>Arthur S. Ding</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism</td>
<td>Karim Douglas Crow</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>Interpreting Islam On Plural Society</td>
<td>Muhammad Haniff Hassan</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
160. Towards a Middle Way Islam in Southeast Asia: Contributions of the Gülen Movement  
*Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman*  
(2008)

161. Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military  
Relations in Indonesia  
*Evan A. Laksmana*  
(2008)

162. The Securitization of Human Trafficking in Indonesia  
*Rizal Sukma*  
(2008)

163. The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) of Malaysia: Communitarianism Across  
Borders?  
*Farish A. Noor*  
(2008)

164. A Merlion at the Edge of an Afrasian Sea: Singapore’s Strategic Involvement in the Indian  
Ocean  
*Emrys Chew*  
(2008)

165. Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect  
*Li Mingjiang*  
(2008)

166. Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Political Risk of Overseas Investments  
*Friedrich Wu*  
(2008)

167. The Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites  
*Jennifer Yang Hui*  
(2008)

168. Beibu Gulf: Emerging Sub-regional Integration between China and ASEAN  
*Gu Xiaosong and Li Mingjiang*  
(2009)

169. Islamic Law In Contemporary Malaysia: Prospects and Problems  
*Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid*  
(2009)

170. “Indonesia’s Salafist Sufis”  
*Julia Day Howell*  
(2009)

171. Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy  
and Its Impact in Indonesia  
*Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman*  
(2009)

172. Islamizing Formal Education: Integrated Islamic School and a New Trend in Formal  
Education Institution in Indonesia  
*Noorhaidi Hasan*  
(2009)

173. The Implementation of Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty: Bilateral and Regional  
Implications  
*Do Thi Thuy*  
(2009)

174. The Tablighi Jama’at Movement in the Southern Provinces of Thailand Today: Networks  
and Modalities  
*Farish A. Noor*  
(2009)

175. The Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at Across Western, Central and Eastern Java and the role  
of the Indian Muslim Diaspora  
*Farish A. Noor*  
(2009)

176. Significance of Abu Dujana and Zarkasih’s Verdict  
*Nurfarahisinda Binte Mohamed Ismail, V. Arianti and Jennifer Yang Hui*  
(2009)
177. The Perils of Consensus: How ASEAN’s Meta-Regime Undermines Economic and Environmental Cooperation
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Jonathan T. Chow (2009)

178. The Capacities of Coast Guards to deal with Maritime Challenges in Southeast Asia
Prabhakaran Paleri (2009)

179. China and Asian Regionalism: Pragmatism Hinders Leadership
Li Mingjiang (2009)

180. Livelihood Strategies Amongst Indigenous Peoples in the Central Cardamom Protected Forest, Cambodia
Long Sarou (2009)

181. Human Trafficking in Cambodia: Reintegration of the Cambodian illegal migrants from Vietnam and Thailand
Neth Naro (2009)

182. The Philippines as an Archipelagic and Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges, and Perspectives
Mary Ann Palma (2009)

183. The Changing Power Distribution in the South China Sea: Implications for Conflict Management and Avoidance
Ralf Emmers (2009)

184. Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da‘wa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia
Noorhaidi Hasan (2009)

185. U.S. Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia: From Manifest Destiny to Shared Destiny
Emrys Chew (2009)

186. Different Lenses on the Future: U.S. and Singaporean Approaches to Strategic Planning
Justin Zorn (2009)

187. Converging Peril: Climate Change and Conflict in the Southern Philippines
J. Jackson Ewing (2009)

188. Informal Caucuses within the WTO: Singapore in the “Invisibles Group”
Barry Desker (2009)

189. The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: A Failure in Practice
Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan (2009)

190. How Geography Makes Democracy Work
Richard W. Carney (2009)

191. The Arrival and Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at in West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia
Farish A. Noor (2010)

192. The Korean Peninsula in China’s Grand Strategy: China’s Role in dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Quandary
Chung Chong Wook (2010)

Donald K. Emmerson (2010)

194. Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind
Sulastri Osman (2010)
195. The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture
   Ralf Emmers (2010)

196. The Domestic Political Origins of Global Financial Standards: Agrarian Influence and the Creation of U.S. Securities Regulations
   Richard W. Carney (2010)

197. Indian Naval Effectiveness for National Growth
   Ashok Sawhney (2010)

198. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime in East Asian waters: Military and intelligence-gathering activities, Marine Scientific Research (MSR) and hydrographic surveys in an EEZ
   Yang Fang (2010)

199. Do Stated Goals Matter? Regional Institutions in East Asia and the Dynamic of Unstated Goals
   Deepak Nair (2010)

200. China’s Soft Power in South Asia
   Parama Sinha Palit (2010)

201. Reform of the International Financial Architecture: How can Asia have a greater impact in the G20?
   Pradumna B. Rana (2010)

   Kumar Ramakrishna (2010)

203. Future of U.S. Power: Is China Going to Eclipse the United States? Two Possible Scenarios to 2040
   Tuomo Kuosa (2010)

204. Swords to Ploughshares: China’s Defence-Conversion Policy
   Lee Dongmin (2010)

205. Asia Rising and the Maritime Decline of the West: A Review of the Issues
   Geoffrey Till (2010)

206. From Empire to the War on Terror: The 1915 Indian Sepoy Mutiny in Singapore as a case study of the impact of profiling of religious and ethnic minorities.
   Farish A. Noor (2010)

207. Enabling Security for the 21st Century: Intelligence & Strategic Foresight and Warning
   Helene Lavoix (2010)

208. The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian Regionalism
   Ralf Emmers and John Ravenhill (2010)

   Bhubhindar Singh and Philip Shetler-Jones (2010)

210. India’s Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities
   Colonel Harinder Singh (2010)

211. A Response to Fourth Generation Warfare
   Amos Khan (2010)
212. Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute: The Interplay of Nationalism and Natural Resources
   Ralf Emmers (2010)

213. Mapping the Religious and Secular Parties in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi, Indonesia
   Farish A. Noor (2010)

214. The Aceh-based Militant Network: A Trigger for a View into the Insightful Complex of Conceptual and Historical Links
   Giora Eliraz (2010)

215. Evolving Global Economic Architecture: Will We have a New Bretton Woods?
   Pradumna B. Rana (2010)

216. Transforming the Military: The Energy Imperative
   Kelvin Wong (2010)

217. ASEAN Institutionalisation: The Function of Political Values and State Capacity
   Christopher Roberts (2010)

218. China’s Military Build-up in the Early Twenty-first Century: From Arms Procurement to War-fighting Capability
   Yoram Evron (2010)

219. Darul Uloom Deoband: Stemming the Tide of Radical Islam in India
   Taberez Ahmed Neyazi (2010)

220. Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Grounds for Cautious Optimism?
   Carlyle A. Thayer (2010)

221. Emerging Powers and Cooperative Security in Asia
   Joshy M. Paul (2010)

222. What happened to the smiling face of Indonesian Islam?
   Muslim intellectualism and the conservative turn in post-Suharto Indonesia
   Martin Van Bruinessen (2011)

   Justin Zorn (2011)

224. Winds of Change in Sarawak Politics?
   Faisal S Hazis (2011)

225. Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations
   Li Mingjiang (2011)

226. Rising Power… To Do What?
   Evaluating China’s Power in Southeast Asia
   Evelyn Goh (2011)

227. Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform
   Leonard C. Sebastian and Iisgindarsah (2011)

228. Monetary Integration in ASEAN+3: A Perception Survey of Opinion Leaders
   Pradumna Bickram Rana, Wai-Mun Chia & Yothin Jinjarak (2011)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>229.</td>
<td>Dealing with the “North Korea Dilemma”: China’s Strategic Choices</td>
<td>You Ji</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.</td>
<td>Street, Shrine, Square and Soccer Pitch: Comparative Protest Spaces in Asia and the Middle East</td>
<td>Teresita Cruz-del Rosario and James M. Dorsey</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231.</td>
<td>The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the landscape of Indonesian Islamist Politics: Cadre-Training as Mode of Preventive Radicalisation?</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.</td>
<td>How Indonesia Sees ASEAN and the World: A Cursory Survey of the Social Studies and History textbooks of Indonesia, from Primary to Secondary Level.</td>
<td>Farish A. Noor</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237.</td>
<td>Reflections on Defence Security in East Asia</td>
<td>Desmond Ball</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>