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Title: The speed of convergence in congestion games under best-response dynamics
Authors: Fanelli, Angelo.
Flammini, Michele.
Moscardelli, Luca.
Issue Date: 2012
Source: Fanelli, A., Flammini, M., & Moscardelli, L. (2012). The speed of convergence in congestion games under best-response dynamics. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 8(3).
Series/Report no.: ACM transactions on algorithms
Abstract: We investigate the speed of convergence of best response dynamics to approximately optimal solutions in congestion games with linear delay functions. In Ackermann et al. [2008] it has been shown that the convergence time of such dynamics to Nash equilibrium may be exponential in the number of players n. Motivated by such a negative result, we focus on the study of the states (not necessarily being equilibria) reached after a limited number of players' selfish moves, and we show that Θ(n log log n) best responses are necessary and sufficient to achieve states that approximate the optimal solution by a constant factor, under the assumption that every O(n) steps each player performs a constant (and nonnull) number of best responses. We show that such result is tight also for the simplest case of singleton congestion games.
ISSN: 1549-6325
DOI: 10.1145/2229163.2229169
Rights: © 2012 ACM.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SPMS Journal Articles

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