Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/98923
Title: Clone structures in voters' preferences
Authors: Elkind, Edith
Faliszewski, Piotr
Slinko, Arkadii
Issue Date: 2012
Source: Elkind, E., Faliszewski, P., & Slinko, A. (2012). Clone structures in voters' preferences. Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '12, 496-513.
Abstract: In elections, a set of candidates ranked consecutively (though possibly in different order) by all voters is called a clone set, and its members are called clones. A clone structure is the family of all clone sets of a given election. In this paper we study properties of clone structures. In particular, we give an axiomatic characterization of clone structures, show that they are organized hierarchically, and analyze clone structures in single-peaked and single-crossing elections. We describe a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a minimal collection of clones that need to be collapsed for an election to become single-peaked, and we show that this problem is NP-hard for single-crossing elections.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/98923
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/12634
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229050
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SPMS Conference Papers

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