dc.contributor.authorZhang, Jie
dc.contributor.authorCohen, Robin
dc.contributor.authorLarson, Kate
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-15T06:00:10Z
dc.date.available2013-08-15T06:00:10Z
dc.date.copyright2012en_US
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationZhang, J., Cohen, R.,& Larson, K. (2012). COMBINING TRUST MODELING AND MECHANISM DESIGN FOR PROMOTING HONESTY IN E-MARKETPLACES. Computational Intelligence, 28(4), 549-578.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/13093
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in electronic marketplaces that is based on trust modeling. In our mechanism, buyers model other buyers and select the most trustworthy ones as their neighbors to form a social network which can be used to ask advice about sellers. In addition, however, sellers model the reputation of buyers based on the social network. Reputable buyers provide truthful ratings for sellers, and are likely to be neighbors of many other buyers. Sellers will provide more attractive products to reputable buyer to build their own reputation. We theoretically prove that a marketplace operating with our mechanism leads to greater profit both for honest buyers and honest sellers. We emphasize the value of our approach through a series of illustrative examples and in direct contrast to other frameworks for addressing agent trustworthiness. In all, we offer an effective approach for the design of e-marketplaces that is attractive to users, through its promotion of honesty.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesComputational intelligenceen_US
dc.subjectDRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering
dc.titleCombining trust modeling and mechanism design for promoting honesty In e-marketplacesen_US
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8640.2012.00428.x


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