dc.contributor.authorBae, Kee-Hong
dc.contributor.authorBaek, Jae-Seung
dc.contributor.authorKang, Jun-Koo
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Wei-Lin
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-05T03:43:05Z
dc.date.available2013-12-05T03:43:05Z
dc.date.copyright2012en_US
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationBae, K.-H., Baek, J.-S., Kang, J.-K., & Liu, W.-L. (2012). Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence. Journal of financial economics, 105(2), 412-435.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0304-405Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083
dc.description.abstractWe develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of financial economicsen_US
dc.subjectDRNTU::Business::Finance
dc.titleDo controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidenceen_US
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.contributor.schoolCollege of Business (Nanyang Business School)en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.02.007


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