Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100495
Title: Minority shareholders' control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak investor protection countries : a natural experiment from China
Authors: Chen, Zhihong
Ke, Bin
Yang, Zhifeng
Keywords: DRNTU::Business::Accounting::Financial statements and analysis
Issue Date: 2013
Source: Chen, Z., Ke, B., & Yang, Z. (2013). Minority shareholders' control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak investor protection countries : A natural experiment from China. The accounting review, 88(4), 1211-1238.
Series/Report no.: The accounting review
Abstract: Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100495
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18185
ISSN: 0001-4826
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50424
Rights: © 2013 American Accounting Association
metadata.item.grantfulltext: open
metadata.item.fulltext: With Fulltext
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