What determines the allocation of managerial ownership within firms? Evidence from investment management firms
Dimmock, Stephen G.
Gerken, William C.
Date of Issue2015
College of Business (Nanyang Business School)
We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upon the joint distribution of decision control and decision management rights. Using a unique dataset of institutional investment management firms, we show that ownership is higher for managers: with both executive and operational responsibilities; when benefits of cooperation are higher; and with large contributions to firm value. Consistent with career concerns, we find increases in a manager's ownership are associated with increases in unsystematic risk. Ownership dispersion within the firm is associated with the allocation of monitoring and operational roles and the potential benefits of cooperation.
Journal of corporate finance
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier B.V. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [Article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.11.004].