Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||What determines the allocation of managerial ownership within firms? Evidence from investment management firms||Authors:||Dimmock, Stephen G.
Gerken, William C.
|Issue Date:||2015||Source:||Dimmock, S. G., Gerken, W. C., & Marietta-Westberg, J. (2015). What determines the allocation of managerial ownership within firms? Evidence from investment management firms. Journal of corporate finance, 30, 44-64. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.11.004||Series/Report no.:||Journal of corporate finance||Abstract:||We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upon the joint distribution of decision control and decision management rights. Using a unique dataset of institutional investment management firms, we show that ownership is higher for managers: with both executive and operational responsibilities; when benefits of cooperation are higher; and with large contributions to firm value. Consistent with career concerns, we find increases in a manager's ownership are associated with increases in unsystematic risk. Ownership dispersion within the firm is associated with the allocation of monitoring and operational roles and the potential benefits of cooperation.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/79527
|ISSN:||0929-1199||DOI:||10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.11.004||Rights:||© 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier B.V. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [Article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.11.004].||Fulltext Permission:||open||Fulltext Availability:||With Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||NBS Journal Articles|
Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.