Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation
Date of Issue2014
College of Business (Nanyang Business School)
We provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when employees are more important for innovation, when free-riding among employees is weaker, when options are granted broadly to most employees, when the average expiration period of options is longer, and when employee stock ownership is lower. Further analysis reveals that employee stock options foster innovation mainly through the risk-taking incentive, rather than the performance-based incentive created by stock options.
Journal of financial economics
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier B.V. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [Article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.002].