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|Title:||Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation : evidence from job-hopping||Authors:||Gao, Huasheng
Managerial Labor Market
|Issue Date:||2015||Source:||Gao, H., Luo, J., & Tang, T. (2015). Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation : evidence from job-hopping. Journal of accounting and economics, 59(2-3), 203-220. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.001||Series/Report no.:||Journal of accounting and economics||Abstract:||We find that companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives’ pay, especially equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms. The pay raise is larger when incumbent executives have greater employment mobility in the labor market, when companies lose senior executives, and when job-hopping executives receive favorable job offers in their new firms. A company׳s subsequent pay raise to incumbent executives after losing an executive diminishes its deficiency in executive compensation relative to its industry peer firms, and is effective at retaining its incumbent executives. Overall, our evidence suggests that executive job-hopping activity has significant effects on firms’ compensation policies.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/79450
|ISSN:||0165-4101||DOI:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.001||Rights:||© 2015 Elsevier B.V. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier B.V. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [Article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.001].||Fulltext Permission:||open||Fulltext Availability:||With Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||NBS Journal Articles|
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