dc.contributor.authorGao, Huasheng
dc.contributor.authorLuo, Juan
dc.contributor.authorTang, Tilan
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-13T01:36:55Z
dc.date.available2015-04-13T01:36:55Z
dc.date.copyright2015en_US
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationGao, H., Luo, J., & Tang, T. (2015). Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation : evidence from job-hopping. Journal of accounting and economics, 59(2-3), 203-220. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.001en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4101en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/25371
dc.description.abstractWe find that companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives’ pay, especially equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms. The pay raise is larger when incumbent executives have greater employment mobility in the labor market, when companies lose senior executives, and when job-hopping executives receive favorable job offers in their new firms. A company׳s subsequent pay raise to incumbent executives after losing an executive diminishes its deficiency in executive compensation relative to its industry peer firms, and is effective at retaining its incumbent executives. Overall, our evidence suggests that executive job-hopping activity has significant effects on firms’ compensation policies.en_US
dc.format.extent18 p.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of accounting and economicsen_US
dc.rights© 2015 Elsevier B.V. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier B.V. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [Article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.001].en_US
dc.subjectDRNTU::Business::Accounting::Income
dc.subjectManagerial Labor Market
dc.subjectExecutive Compensation
dc.titleEffects of managerial labor market on executive compensation : evidence from job-hoppingen_US
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.contributor.schoolCollege of Business (Nanyang Business School)en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.001
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen_US


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