Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation||Authors:||Chattopadhyay, Anupam
|Issue Date:||2017||Source:||Chattopadhyay, A., Ukil, A., Jap, D., & Bhasin, S. (2018). Towards Threat of Implementation Attacks on Substation Security: Case Study on Fault Detection and Isolation. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, in press.||Series/Report no.:||IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics||Abstract:||Modern and future substations are aimed to be more interconnected, leveraging communication standards like IEC 61850-9-2, and associated abstract data models and communication services like GOOSE, MMS, SMV. Such interconnection would enable fast and secure data transfer, sharing of the analytics information for various purposes like wide area monitoring, faster outage recovery, blackout prevention, distributed state estimation, etc. This would require strong focus on communication security, both at system level as well as at embedded device level. Although communication level security is dealt in IEC 62351, implementation attack on embedded system is not considered. Since embedded system makes the core of smart grid, in this paper, we take a deeper look into impact of implementation attacks on substation security. An overview of potential exploits is first provided. This is followed by a case study, where implementation attacks like malicious fault injection attacks and hardware Trojan are used to compromise a substation level intelligent electronic device (IED). The studied scenario extend implementation attacks beyond its usual exploit of confidentiality to affect power grid integrity and availability.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88768
|ISSN:||1551-3203||DOI:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2017.2770096||Rights:||© 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TII.2017.2770096].||Fulltext Permission:||open||Fulltext Availability:||With Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SCSE Journal Articles|
TL Journal Articles
Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.