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|Title:||A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks||Authors:||Breier, Jakub
|Issue Date:||2017||Source:||Breier, J., Jap, D., & Bhasin, S. (2017). A Study on Analyzing Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes with Respect to Fault Attacks. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 7(4), 311–320.||Series/Report no.:||Journal of Cryptographic Engineering||Abstract:||Recently, several software encoding countermeasures were proposed, utilizing the side-channel hiding concept for software implementations. While these schemes aim to protect the underlying code against various leakage models, they can also be utilized against fault injection attacks to some extent. This property comes from the data redundancy that is being employed in order to equalize the leakage. In this work, we analyze three different software encoding schemes with respect to fault injection attacks. We use a custom-made code analyzer to check the vulnerabilities in the assembly code, and we experimentally support our results using laser fault injection technique. Our results show that implementations based on table lookup operations provide reasonable security margin and thwart fault propagation.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88769
|ISSN:||2190-8508||DOI:||10.1007/s13389-017-0166-5||Rights:||© 2017 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s13389-017-0166-5].||Fulltext Permission:||open||Fulltext Availability:||With Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||TL Journal Articles|
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