Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88742
Title: One Plus One is More than Two: A Practical Combination of Power and Fault Analysis Attacks on PRESENT and PRESENT-Like Block Ciphers
Authors: Patranabis, Sikhar
Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
Breier, Jakub
Bhasin, Shivam
Keywords: DPA
DFA
Issue Date: 2017
Source: Patranabis, S., Mukhopadhyay, D., Breier, J., & Bhasin, S. (2017). One Plus One is More than Two: A Practical Combination of Power and Fault Analysis Attacks on PRESENT and PRESENT-Like Block Ciphers. 2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC), 25-32.
Abstract: We present the first practically realizable sidechannel assisted fault attack on PRESENT, that can retrieve the last round key efficiently using single nibble faults. The attack demonstrates how side-channel leakage can allow the adversary to precisely determine the fault mask resulting from a nibble fault injection instance. We first demonstrate the viability of such an attack model via side-channel analysis experiments on top of a laser-based fault injection setup, targeting a PRESENT-80 implementation on an ATmega328P microcontroller. Subsequently, we present a differential fault analysis (DFA) exploiting the knowledge of the output fault mask in the target round to recover multiple last round key nibbles independently and in parallel. Both analytically and through experimental evidence, we show that the combined attack can recover the last round key of PRESENT with 4 random nibble fault injections in the best case, and around 7- 8 nibble fault injections in the average case. Our attack sheds light on a hitherto unexplored vulnerability of PRESENT and PRESENT-like block ciphers that use bit-permutations instead of maximum distance separable (MDS) layers for diffusion.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88742
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44738
DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.11
Rights: © 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2017.11].
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:TL Conference Papers

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