Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88733
Title: A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20
Authors: Kumar, S. V. Dilip
Patranabis, Sikhar
Breier, Jakub
Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
Bhasin, Shivam
Chattopadhyay, Anupam
Baksi, Anubhab
Keywords: ChaCha
ARX Cipher
Issue Date: 2017
Source: Kumar, S. V. D., Patranabis, S., Breier, J., Mukhopadhyay, D., Bhasin, S., Chattopadhyay, A., et al. (2017). A Practical Fault Attack on ARX-Like Ciphers with a Case Study on ChaCha20. 2017 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography, 33-40.
Abstract: This paper presents the first practical fault attack on the ChaCha family of addition-rotation-XOR (ARX)-based stream ciphers. ChaCha has recently been deployed for speeding up and strengthening HTTPS connections for Google Chrome on Android devices. In this paper, we propose differential fault analysis attacks on ChaCha without resorting to nonce misuse. We use the instruction skip and instruction replacement fault models, which are popularly mounted on microcontroller-based cryptographic implementations. We corroborate the attack propositions via practical fault injection experiments using a laser-based setup targeting an Atmel AVR 8-bit microcontroller-based implementation of ChaCha. Each of the proposed attacks can be repeated with 100% accuracy in our fault injection setup, and can recover the entire 256 bit secret key using 5-8 fault injections on an average.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88733
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/44739
DOI: 10.1109/FDTC.2017.14
Rights: © 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2017.14].
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SCSE Conference Papers

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