Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88132
Title: Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for generalized convex games with shared constraints
Authors: Sun, Chao
Hu, Guoqiang
Keywords: Generalized Convex Game
Nash Equilibrium
DRNTU::Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Issue Date: 2018
Source: Sun, C., & Hu, G. (2018). Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for generalized convex games with shared constraints. Journal of Physics: Conference Series, 1016, 012012-. doi:10.1088/1742-6596/1016/1/012012
Series/Report no.: Journal of Physics: Conference Series
Abstract: In this paper, we deal with the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for a generalized convex game. Each player is associated with a convex cost function and multiple shared constraints. Supposing that each player can exchange information with its neighbors via a connected undirected graph, the objective of this paper is to design a Nash equilibrium seeking law such that each agent minimizes its objective function in a distributed way. Consensus and singular perturbation theories are used to prove the stability of the system. A numerical example is given to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/88132
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/45628
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1016/1/012012
Rights: © 2018 The Author(s) (IOP Publishing). Content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 licence. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:EEE Conference Papers

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