dc.contributor.authorBaksi, Anubhab
dc.contributor.authorBhasin, Shivam
dc.contributor.authorBreier, Jakub
dc.contributor.authorKhairallah, Mustafa
dc.contributor.authorPeyrin, Thomas
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-14T09:02:32Z
dc.date.available2019-02-14T09:02:32Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationBaksi, A., Bhasin, S., Breier, J., Khairallah, M., & Peyrin, T. (2018). Protecting block ciphers against differential fault attacks without re-keying. 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). doi:10.1109/HST.2018.8383913en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/47670
dc.description.abstractIn this article, we propose a new method to protect block cipher implementations against Differential Fault Attacks (DFA). Our strategy, so-called “Tweak-in-Plaintext”, ensures that an uncontrolled value ('tweak-in') is inserted into some part of the block cipher plaintext, thus effectively rendering DFA much harder to perform. Our method is extremely simple yet presents many advantages when compared to previous solutions proposed at AFRICACRYPT 2010 or CARDIS 2015. Firstly, we do not need any Tweakable block cipher, nor any related-key security assumption (we do not perform any re-keying). Moreover, performance for lightweight applications is improved, and we do not need to send any extra data. Finally, our scheme can be directly used with standard block ciphers such as AES or PRESENT. Experimental results show that the throughput overheads, for incorporating our scheme into AES-128, range between ≈ 5% to ≈ 26.9% for software, and between ≈ 3.1% to ≈ 25% for hardware implementations; depending on the tweak-in size.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNRF (Natl Research Foundation, S’pore)en_US
dc.format.extent4 p.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.rights© 2018 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). All rights reserved. This paper was published in 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) and is made available with permission of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).en_US
dc.subjectCiphersen_US
dc.subjectEnctyptionen_US
dc.subjectDRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineeringen_US
dc.titleProtecting block ciphers against differential fault attacks without re-keyingen_US
dc.typeConference Paper
dc.contributor.conference2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)en_US
dc.contributor.researchTemasek Laboratoriesen_US
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Science and Engineeringen_US
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Physical and Mathematical Sciencesen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/HST.2018.8383913
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen_US
dc.identifier.rims206872


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