dc.contributor.authorKang, Jun-Koo
dc.contributor.authorLuo, Juan
dc.contributor.authorNa, Hyun Seung
dc.identifier.citationKang, J.-K., Luo, J., & Na, H. S. (2018). Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?. Journal of Financial Economics, 128(3), 576-602. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.03.005en_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine whether institutions’ monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal returns around forced CEO turnover announcements and 13D filings, and changes in firm value. These results are particularly evident when institutions have multiple blockholdings in the same industry, when they have activism experience, or when they have long-term blockholdings in their portfolio firms. Our results suggest that information advantages and governance experience obtained from multiple blockholdings are important channels through which institutions perform effective monitoring.en_US
dc.format.extent62 p.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of Financial Economicsen_US
dc.rights© 2018 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Financial Economics and is made available with permission of Elsevier B. V.en_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectInstitutional Investorsen_US
dc.titleAre institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?en_US
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.contributor.schoolCollege of Business (Nanyang Business School)en_US
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen_US

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record