dc.contributor.authorForcehimes, Andrew T.
dc.contributor.authorSemrau, Luke
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-29T03:10:32Z
dc.date.available2019-05-29T03:10:32Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationForcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2019). Actualism doesn’t have control issues: a reply to Cohen and Timmerman. Philosophia, 47(1), 271-277. doi:10.1007/s11406-018-9957-xen_US
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/48437
dc.description.abstractRecently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhilosophiaen_US
dc.rights© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.subjectActualismen_US
dc.subjectPossibilismen_US
dc.subjectDRNTU::Humanities::Philosophyen_US
dc.titleActualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmermanen_US
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Humanitiesen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9957-x


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