dc.contributor.authorForcehimes, Andrew T.
dc.contributor.authorSemrau, Luke
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-29T03:16:50Z
dc.date.available2019-05-29T03:16:50Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationForcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2018). Are there distinctively moral reasons?. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), 699-717. doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1en_US
dc.identifier.issn1386-2820en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/48438
dc.description.abstractA dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEthical Theory and Moral Practiceen_US
dc.rights© 2018 Springer Nature B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.subjectReasonsen_US
dc.subjectSocial practicesen_US
dc.subjectDRNTU::Humanities::Philosophyen_US
dc.titleAre there distinctively moral reasons?en_US
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Humanitiesen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1


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