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|Title:||Are there distinctively moral reasons?||Authors:||Forcehimes, Andrew T.
|Issue Date:||2018||Source:||Forcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2018). Are there distinctively moral reasons?. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), 699-717. doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1||Series/Report no.:||Ethical Theory and Moral Practice||Abstract:||A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90163
|ISSN:||1386-2820||DOI:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1||Rights:||© 2018 Springer Nature B.V. All rights reserved.||Fulltext Permission:||none||Fulltext Availability:||No Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SoH Journal Articles|
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