Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Non-compliance shouldn't be better
Authors: Forcehimes, Andrew T.
Semrau, Luke
Keywords: DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy
Issue Date: 2018
Source: Forcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2019). Non-compliance shouldn't be better. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(1), 46-56. doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1447586
Journal: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Series/Report no.: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Abstract: Agent-relative consequentialism is thought attractive because it can secure agent-centred constraints while retaining consequentialism's compelling idea—the idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available outcome. We argue, however, that the commitments of agent-relative consequentialism lead it to run afoul of a plausibility requirement on moral theories. A moral theory must not be such that, in any possible circumstance, were every agent to act impermissibly, each would have more reason (by the lights of the very same theory) to prefer the world thereby actualized over the world that would have been actualized if every agent had instead acted permissibly.
ISSN: 0004-8402
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2018.1447586
Rights: © 2018 Australasian Association of Philosophy. All rights reserved.
Fulltext Permission: none
Fulltext Availability: No Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SoH Journal Articles

Google ScholarTM




Items in DR-NTU are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.