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|Title:||Variable-width channel allocation for access points : a game-theoretic perspective||Authors:||Yuan, Wei
|Keywords:||DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering||Issue Date:||2013||Source:||Yuan, W., Wang, P., Liu, W., & Cheng, W. (2013). Variable-width channel allocation for access points : a game-theoretic perspective. IEEE transactions on mobile computing, 12(7), 1428-1442.||Series/Report no.:||IEEE transactions on mobile computing||Abstract:||Channel allocation is a crucial concern in variable-width wireless local area networks. This work aims to obtain the stable and fair nonoverlapped variable-width channel allocation for selfish access points (APs). In the scenario of single collision domain, the channel allocation problem reduces to a channel-width allocation problem, which can be formulated as a noncooperative game. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game corresponds to a desired channel-width allocation. A distributed algorithm is developed to achieve the NE channel-width allocation that globally maximizes the network utility. A punishment-based cooperation self-enforcement mechanism is further proposed to ensure that the APs obey the proposed scheme. In the scenario of multiple collision domains, the channel allocation problem is formulated as a constrained game. Penalty functions are introduced to relax the constraints and the game is converted into a generalized ordinal potential game. Based on the best response and randomized escape, a distributed iterative algorithm is designed to achieve a desired NE channel allocation. Finally, computer simulations are conducted to validate the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed schemes.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/102870
|ISSN:||1536-1233||DOI:||10.1109/TMC.2012.109||Rights:||© 2013 IEEE||Fulltext Permission:||none||Fulltext Availability:||No Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SCSE Journal Articles|
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