In defense of objective moral obligations

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that we have good reasons to posit objective moral obligations, but we lack good reasons to posit subjective moral obligations. Thus, the objectivist view about moral obligations is right, and the subjectivist and sense-splitting views are wrong. In section 1, I introduce the notions of objective and subjective moral obligations. In section 2, I explicate the motivations for positing objective ought, as well as the current attempts in literature to eliminate the objective ought by undermining those motivations. I argue that the current attempts in literature fail to undermine the motivations of the objective ought; thus, we have good reasons to accept that it exists. In section 3, I do the same for the subjective ought, but argue that we can successfully undermine the motivations of the subjective ought; thus, we lack good reasons to posit its existence. Therefore, I conclude that the objectivist view is right, and the subjectivist and sense-splitting views are wrong.