Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/138019
Title: | Search condition-hiding query evaluation on encrypted databases | Authors: | Kim, Myungsun Lee, Hyung Tae Ling, San Ren, Shu Qin Tan, Benjamin Hong Meng Wang, Huaxiong |
Keywords: | Science::Mathematics | Issue Date: | 2019 | Source: | Kim, M., Lee, H. T., Ling, S., Ren, S. Q., Tan, B. H. M., & Wang, H. (2019). Search condition-hiding query evaluation on encrypted databases. IEEE Access, 7, 161283-161295. doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2951695 | Journal: | IEEE Access | Abstract: | Private database query (PDQ) is a protocol between a client and a database server, designed for processing queries to encrypted databases. Specifically, PDQ enables a client to submit a search query and to learn a resulting set satisfying its search condition, without revealing sensitive information about a query statement. The whole query can be protected from the server, but for efficiency reasons known PDQ solutions generally consider to hide the constants only in a query statement. In this paper, we provide two fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)-based PDQ protocols that hide type of queries as well as the constants of a query statement. Particularly, our constructions focus on conjunctive, disjunctive, and threshold conjunctive queries. To this end, we first build a single compact logical expression to cover both conjunctive and disjunctive queries. On top of the logical expression, we design a PDQ protocol that enables to evaluate conjunctive and disjunctive queries without revealing any information on a given query. The second PDQ protocol comes from our observation that if a threshold conjunctive query has a particular threshold value, it results in either a conjunctive query or a disjunctive query. Because the PDQ protocol writes the three types of queries into a single polynomial expression, the resulting protocol can evaluate the three types of query statements without revealing any information on queries. To demonstrate their efficiency, we provide proof-of-concept implementation results of our proposed PDQ protocols. According to our rudimentary experiments, it takes 37.57 seconds to perform a query on 316 elements consisting of 16 attributes of 64 bits using Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan's leveled FHE with SIMD techniques for 149-bit security, yielding an amortized rate of just 0.119 seconds per element | URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/138019 | ISSN: | 2169-3536 | DOI: | 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2951695 | Schools: | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences | Rights: | This journal is 100% open access, which means that all content is freely available without charge to users or their institutions. All articles accepted after 12 June 2019 are published under a CC BY 4.0 license, and the author retains copyright. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, as long as proper attribution is given. | Fulltext Permission: | open | Fulltext Availability: | With Fulltext |
Appears in Collections: | NTC Journal Articles |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Search condition-hiding query evaluation on encrypted databases.pdf | 5.78 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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