Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/139532
Title: Nuking for land : do nuclear weapons aid in coercive bargaining in territorial disputes?
Authors: Low, Jun Hong
Keywords: Social sciences::Political science::International relations
Issue Date: 2020
Publisher: Nanyang Technological University
Abstract: Nuclear weapons are devastating instruments of war, that if used, have the potential to decimate entire cities and annihilate civilian population on an unfathomable scale. As such, it is no surprise that a credible nuclear threat can cause enormous terror and panic, possibly causing the target state to capitulate and accede to the challenger’s demands. This paper will examine whether nuclear weapons aid in coercive bargaining in general, and in territorial disputes. Statistical analysis using the MCT dataset will be employed, followed by a case study of the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-1996. We find that nuclear weapons do not aid in compellence generally, and in territorial conflicts.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/139532
Fulltext Permission: restricted
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:SSS Student Reports (FYP/IA/PA/PI)

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